A STUDY ON SANSKRIT SYNTAX (5):
ŚABDAKAUSTUBHA ON P.1.4.54-55
[Kartṛ and Hetu]

Sanskrit Text and Annotated Translation

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Introductory Remark

In this part of the ŚK, only two rules are dealt with: P.1.4.54 and 55. In the definition of “kartṛ: an agent” as final member of kāraka-category, Patañjali starts his comment on P.1.4.54 by explaining the meaning of ‘tantra’ etymologically. He says: kim yasya svam tantram sa svatantraḥ (How is this interpretation of the word svatantra, i.e., the one who has own loom?) [MBh ad P.1.4.54, I.338, 17]. By this understanding, we have to come across the difficulty that the designation kartṛ would be applied only to tantuvāya (a weaver). Rejecting this pūrvapakṣa, Patañjali states the intended meaning in this rule, namely “ayaṃ tantraśabdo ’sty eva vitāne vartate. ... asti prādhānye vartate. tadyathā. svatantra ’sau brāhmaṇa ity ucyate svapradhāna iti ganyate: Sometimes this word tantra stands for vitāna (extension, canopy).\(^1\) ... But it is sometimes used in the sense of prādhānya (being prominent). For example, svatantra ’sau brāhmaṇaḥ (This brahmin is independent). In this usage, we realize that he has his own independency” [ibid., 18-20]. In this way, the word svatantra, which is samjñin, is defined: one who has himself as independent.

As for the predominancy of kartṛ over other members of kāraka — apādāna, adhikarana, sampradāna, karana, and karman —, Patañjali, after replying to the Vārttika XV: na vā svatantra-

\(^1\) Kaiyāṭa explains this word as “vitanyate: it is expanded” [Pradīpa on do., II, 277r] and Nāgeśa further says “sa ca sanniveśaśiṣṭas tantusamīḥ: it means an assemblage of threads regularly weaved” [Uddyota, II, 278i].

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paratantrayoh paryāyena vacanāṃ vacanāśrayā ca saṃjñā (It [= the difficulty given in the Vt XIV, namely that apādāna cannot be an agent], does not [arise] because of independency and dependency. Both are the notions being realized in turn. And the designation [such as apādāna, etc.] is used according to an expression), states his opinion that when the pot is closely affiliated with the chief one [i.e., main agent], it is dependent but it is independent when it separates from [the chief one] (evam tarhi pradhānena samavāye sthālī paratantrā vyavāye svatantrā [MBh ad P.1.4.23, I.326, 7-8]). What is drawn from his statement is that the notion of independency/dependency is relative and that according to the wish of the speaker X (in this case “pot”) is independent and regarded as agent, and dependent in other expression. In this manner, the predominancy of kartr, to be accurate, that to be expressed as agent takes highest priority over others, is asserted.

Bhartrhari further summarizes the notion of svātantrya2 [VP III.7.101-102]:

prāg anyataḥ śaktilabhān nyagbhāvāpādanād api

\text{tadadhānapravṛttyāt pravrtyānāṁ nivartanaī} \parallel

adyāt prāvṛtīnīnām praviveke 'pi darśanāt \parallel

ārād apy upakārtvāt svātantryam kartur iṣyate \parallel

From above verses, we can extract following reasons why kartr is regarded as independent comparing to other kārakas:

1) bringing to bear its capacity preceding to other kārakas (prāg anyataḥ śaktilabhāt);
2) having a control of [other kārakas] (nyagbhāvāpādanāt);
3) [others] depend on it for their performances (tadadhānapravṛttyāt);
4) having [others] stop performing (pravrtyānāṁ nivartanaī);
5) no alternative for it (adyāt prāvṛtīnīnām pratīdhih);

1982 appearing without others (praviveke 'pi darśanāt);
1983 being helpful even from far place [= indirectly] (ārād apy upakārtvāt).

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2 Keeping this verses of the VP in his mind, Kaiyata comments on the MBh’s passage (kim punah pradhānan. kārtā. kathām punar jhāyate kartā pradhānan iti. yat sarvesu sādhaneṣu samnihitā kartā pravartāyatā bhavati [MBh ad P.1.4.23, I.326, 9-10]): kartā pravartāyati. tadadhānapravṛttyāt pravrtyāt kartō adarśanānām tasya ca prāg anyataḥ śaktilabhāt prāvṛtīnīnāmsaṃśātanāt karaṇāyābhāve 'py 'āste' "śe" ityādau kevalasya kartur darśanāt kartā prahītānām karaṇādīnāṁ adarśanāt prādhānyam kartur ity arthaḥ [Pradipa on do., II, 245r].
Among those reasons, 7) is a reason for admitting an accidental participant as the agent: the PM, quoting above verses, explains this phrase as “āṛād apy upakārito vā iti. yady apy asau taṇasthā phalasiddhāv upakāroti (even though this indifferent person becomes helpful in producing result, [he is regarded as agent])” [PM on P.1.4.54, I, 524].

Traditionally in the grammar, the agent is classified into three types, namely śuddhakartr, prayojakakartr, and karmakartr. Here is a passage from the Vaiyākaraṇabhusanāsāra of Kauṇḍa Bhatta [p. 243]:

ayaṁ ca trividhah — śuddhah, prayojako hetuḥ, karmmakarttā ca. “mayā hariḥ seyyate” “kāryate hariṇā” “gamayati kṛṣṇām gokulam.” madabhināśrayako harikarmakasevanānukūlo vyāpāraḥ. haryabhīnāśrayaka upādanānukūlo vyāpāraḥ. gokula-karmakagamanānukūlakṛṣṇāśrayakatādyāvāyāpārānukūlo vyāpāraḥ iti śābdabodhaḥ.

Tr.: There are three types of kartr, namely, a direct agent (śuddha-kartr), an instigator (prayojaka), i.e., a causal (hetu) [agent], and a reflexive agent (karmakartr). Examples for each types are “mayā hariḥ seyyate: Hari is worshipped by me” “kāryate hariṇā: X is led to make by Hari,” “gamayati kṛṣṇām gokulam: Y lets Kṛṣṇa go to Gokula.” Verbal cognitions of each sentences are as follows: [from first sentence] the activity having I as its substratum which is conducive to the act of serving in which Hari is direct object; the activity having Hari as its substratum which is conducive to the act of promoting to make [something]; the activity which is conducive to the activity having Kṛṣṇa as its substratum and being conducive to the act of going wherein Gokula is its goal.

The notion of kartr is denoted by several grammatical elements. P.2.3.18 prescribes that what is designated as kartr or karaṇa takes the third case ending (kartrkaraṇayos trītyā) and by this rule the agent “I” in the first example takes the Instrumental case. In the second case, its underlying sentence is “hariḥ kārayati” which is a causative construction and then passivization is applied to it. The prayojya-kartr, X, is denoted by the verbal ending -te which denotes the object of the

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3 Cf. The Mādhaviyadhānāvyrtti of Madhava quotes unknown verse which gives this classification [p. 10]: kartā ca trividho jñeyah kārakānāṁ pravarttakah 1 kevalo hetukarttā ca karmakarttā tathāpapaḥ II
instigation, so that Hari, *prayojaka-kartr*,\(^4\) takes the Instrumental case which denotes the agent. The third one is a case of the causative: Kṛṣṇa is a *prayojya-kartr* and Y is *prayojaka-kartr*. In its underlying sentence, “kṛṣṇo gacchati gokulam,” Kṛṣṇa is the agent but in the causative it becomes the object of the instigation. Since it is called *karman* according to P.1.4.52: *gatibuddhipratyavasānārthaśabdam-karmākarmakānāṁ aNikartā sa ṇau*, it takes the second case by P.2.3.2: *karmanī dvitiyā*. This case, although Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa picks up as the example of *karmakartr*, shows the example of *karma-kartr* in the sense that original agent in non-causative is termed *karman* in the causative. However, in the technical use, *karmakartr* means the agent which is turned from original *karman* and oft-used example is “*odanah pacyate svayam eva,*” which is called “reflexive construction.”

Among these types of *kartr*, second type is treated in § 33.0-1 of this study where P.1.4.55 is a subject and the third one, the agent of the reflexive construction, is treated in § 32.1-2.

It is to be noted in this part of the ŚK that in conceptualizing the *kartrtva*, not only Patañjali but Bhartṛhari stand on the point of view that how the agent functions in relation to the other *kārakas*, in other words, they focus on the relativity of *kārakas* although they admit the predominancy of agent over other *kārakas*. However, Bhaṭṭoji, having their arguments as fundamental premise, introduces another scheme to define the *kartrtva*: the definition intrinsically correlating with the meaning of verbal root.

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\(^4\) The *prayojaka-kartr* is classified into two: *mukhya* (principal) and *itara* (other than principal). The Nyāsa says [on KV on P.1.4.55, 1.585]: *prayojakatvam divīdham — mukhyam, itarac ca. devadattaḥ katām kārayaity atrā devadattasya mukhyam. bhikṣā vāsayaityā atrā bhikṣānam vāsaḥetuviśṭ prayojakatvam upacaritaṁ, na mukhyam. na hi bhikṣā yāyaṁ vasathety evam prayuñjate. iha ca kārakādhikāre tamaBgrahanena jhāpītām etat. tena yasyāpyī prayojaka-tvam upacaritaṁ, na mukhyam, tasyāpyī hetusanijñā bhavatī eva.* The example for the first type is “*devadattaḥ katām kārayati: Devadatta lets X to make a mat*” and the latter is “*bhikṣā vāsayaṭi: begging for alms makes him dwell.*” The agency of the latter case is realized in this way: the act of begging for alms becomes a reason to stay here so that the agency is supposedly applied to bhikṣā.
32. svatantrah kartā [P.1.4.54: SK. 559].

32.0 On the meaning of rule [139, 10-11]

Text: kriyāyāṁ svātantryena vivakṣito 'ṛthaḥ kartā syāt. dhātupātava-vyāpārārṣrayatvam svātantryam.

Translation: It is an agent (kartr) who is intended to be independent when an action [is taken place]. The independency (svātantrya) means the state of being a substratum of the activity which is denoted by the verbal root.

Notes: The designation kartr is defined as “svatantra” in the sense of “what is predominant/principle” (pradhānabhūta). According to the KV on P.1.4.54, this rule means that the one that/who is not subordinate is intended to express as something independent in the course of accomplishing an action, that is, being kāraka, called kartr (‘svatantrah’ iti pradhānabhūta ucyate. agunabhūto yaḥ kriyāsiddhau svātantryena vivakṣyate tat kārakam kartṛśaṃjñām bhavati) [I, 583-4].

The qualification to the word svatantra, i.e., “pradhānabhūta” or “agunabhūta,” shows that this definition is given on the basis of the judgement of the relative importance of kartr; other kārakas become operative only when the agent utilizes such and such auxiliary means and their participation into the action are dependent on the agent. Although each kārakas are independent in its role, for example, fire (agni) cannot stand proxy for the pot (sthāli) as far as the act of holding rice-grain is concerned, they are controlled and driven by the agent in the action as a whole. That is to say, other kārakas cannot be operative without the agent but not vice versa. In this respect, the agent is the chief participant in the action and has relative prominence.

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5 Cf. Nyāsa on do.: asty ayaṁ svatantraśabdo bahuvrihiḥ. svam tantram yasya sa svatantrah. asti ca samāsapratisrūpako rūḍhiśabdaḥ, pradhānārthaḥvyētiḥ, yathā — svatantro 'yam iha devadatta iti, pradhānabhūta iti, gamyate. tatra yadi pūrvo grhyate tadā tantuvāyaṣyaiva syāt; vistṛtā hi tantavas tantram, taĉ ca tantuvāyaṣyaivaśi. devadattaḥ pacatityādu na syāt. itarasya tu grahane sarvata bhavati. tasmād vyāptēr nyāyāḥ sa eva grhyata iti matvāḥ — svatantra iti pradhānabhūta iti. yady evam apradhānām apekṣyaya pradhānām ucyata iti yatṛādhikaranādihy apradhāhānī kārakāni santi, devadattaḥ kṛśhāir āgnīndanaṁ sthāyām pacatityādau tatraiva syāt. yatra tu teṣām avivakṣā — āste devadattah, śete devadatta ityādau, tatra na syād iti yo desāyat tam praty āha — agunabhūta (584) iti. evam manyate — pradhānenaṅgukhaḥ upalakyāte. gunabhāvo yatra nāstī sa kārtteī. kārakāntarāvivakṣāyām api agunabhāvo 'sty eveti sarvatene bhavati. nanu ca sāmygryadhiḥa hi kriyāsiddhiḥ, ekasyāpy abhāvo na sidhyatī, tat kasyātra pradhānāyam yat parīgrhāya svatantragranahām kriyate? ity āha — yaḥ kriyāsiddhiḥ ityādi. yady api kriyāsiddhau sarvatem nyāparrāḥ, tathāpi svātantryena yasya vivakṣyate sa eva svatantra ity ucyate, nānya iti. devadattah pacatitya atra devadattah kartṛśaṃjñākatvāt kārtrpratyayenocye ātma.
in the sense that others are under the supervision of it. This understanding is clearly presented in the above-quoted verses of Bhartrhari.

However, the definition given by Bhaṭṭoji in this passage differs from his predecessors. While the traditional definition is based on the relative point of view that kartr exercises control over other kārakas, newly introduced definition apparently changes its standpoint: it is re-defined in relation to the denotation of verbal root. Needless to say, every designations which come under the kāraka-category have certain relationship to the action, as is prescribed in P.1.4.23: kārake. Whatever related to the action, more precisely, to the accomplishment of the action is kāraka and particularly called apādāna, kartr, etc. The action is denoted by the verbal root and later grammarians analyze the meaning of verbal root into two aspects: vyāpāra (activity) and phala (result). It is their concern that how these aspects are linguistically represented in the sentences; by which grammatical elements they are expressed, and what semantic relation between the denotations and such grammatical form is. Hence, it is inevitable current of discussion for Bhaṭṭoji to re-define karṭṛtva by introducing new scheme which is based on the semantic investigation into the meaning of verbal root, namely dhātupāttavyāpārāśrayatva.

Although action itself denoted by the verbal root is realized as a complex of subsidiary activities⁶ and, as for the relation of kāraka to the action, Bhartrhari also states that particular kāraka is determined on the basis of to which action, i.e., main or subordinate action, it is tied (VP III.7.20-21: guṇakriyāṇāṁ kartāraḥ kartrā nyakkṛta-śaktayaḥ | nyaktāyām api sampūrnaḥ svair vyāpāraiḥ samanvitāḥ || karaṇatvādibhir jñātāḥ kriyābhedānupātībhīḥ | svātantryam uttaraṁ labdhvā pradhāne yānti kartrāṁ ||), it is Bhaṭṭoji who clearly distinguishes two aspects of the meaning of one verbal root and claims that specification of each kāraka, in this case kartr or karman, is determined by the relation of a participant to the aspects. Navya-vaiyākaraṇas — Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (it is probably enough to mention only three famous grammarians) — hold the same opinion that kartr is a substratum of vyāpāra and karman is that of phala. However, since Bhaṭṭoji and Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa are generally known as the "prthakṣaktivādin: one who has an opinion

⁶ VP III.8.4: guṇabhūtair avayavaiḥ samūhaḥ kramajanmannam | buddhyā prakalpitabhedaḥ kriyeti vyapadīśyate ||
that a verbal root is capable of denoting activity (vyāpāra) and result (phala) separately” as is stated in the VMM k.2 (phalavyāpārayor dhātur āśraye tu tiNiḥ smṛtāḥ | phale pradhanam vyāpāras tiNiarthas tu viśeṣaṇam ll) and in the VBh(S) on do., both in the active sentence (kartariprayoga) and in the passive sentence (karmaniprayoga) they construe the verbal cognition (śabdabodha) wherein the activity is main constituent. See the VBh on VMM k.2 [p. 19]: “tandulāṃ pacati caitraḥ” ity atra “ekatanḍulāśrayikā yā viklittiḥ, tadamukulaika-caitrābhinnāśrayikā vartamānā bhāvanā,” “tandulāḥ pacyate caīreṇā” ity atra ca “ekacaitrāśrayikā ekatanḍulābhinnāśrayikā yā viklittiḥ, tad anukūlā sāmpratikī bhāvanā” iti bodhaḥ.

On the other hand, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa is known as “viṣiṣṭaaktivādin: one who has an opinion that a verbal root is capable of denoting activity (vyāpāra) and result (phala) in the form that one is qualified by the other.” In the active sentence, what is main constituent in śabdabodha is “activity limited by a result” (phala-viṣiṣṭa-vyāpāra) and in the passive it is “result limited by an activity” (vyāpāra-viṣiṣṭa-phala). See the VSLM [I, 543]: tasmāt phalāvacchinne vyāpāre vyāpārāvacchinne phale ca dhātunāṃ saktiḥ. kartṛkarmārthakatattat-pratyayasamabhivyāhāraś ca tattadbodhe niyāmakam (Therefore, the verbal root is denotative of either an activity delimited by a result [in the active sentence] or a result delimited by an activity [in the passive]. The deciding factor is the use of the suffix expressive of either agent or object). Due to this divergency of opinions, he gives more qualified definition of kartṛ. See his Laghuśabdendusekhara on P.1.4.54 [I, 657-8]: kārakādhikārāt kriyājanane svatantra ity arthaḥ, tad āha — kriyāyāṃ iti. svātantryaḥ ca kartṛpratyayasamabhivyāhāre pradhānī-bhūtadhatvarthāśrayatvam (Since this rule is under the heading of kāraka, [kartṛ] is [the one] which is independent when an action is taken place. Thus said by [Bhaṭṭoji] such as “kriyāyāṃ.” The independency is the state of being a substratum of the meaning of verbal root which is represented as predominant in case that the verbal ending denoting the agent is used).7

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7 Cf. VSM [pp. 134-137]: kārakādhikārāt “kriyāyāṃ svatantraḥ kartṛsamjañakah” iti tasyārthaḥ. svātantryaḥ ca vyāpārāvacchedakasambandhena taddhatvarthyasvāyasyatat-nīrūpitapratikārānāśrayatve sati tannīrūpāvyāsyatārāmonyavishyatauddhatvarthāśrayatvam. “taddhatvarthaniṣṭha” ity atra dhātvarthas ca tātparavyāhārakānāpeṣadhatūtasyāya eva grāhyah.
32.1 Authority quoted {139, 12-13}
Text: āha ca — “dḥātunoktakriye nityaṁ kārake kartrṭesyaḥ” iti.
Translation: Thus said:
“In the action denoted by the verbal root the one which is always [principle] among the kāraka(s) is admitted as the agent.”
Notes: As is stated in the previous Notes, Bhaṭṭojoji gives new definition of the kartrtva on the basis of the meaning of verbal root. The attribution of the designation kartrtva is confirmed by the relation with respect to the activity which is denoted by the verbal root (dḥātunoktakriye).

In this quotation, Bhaṭṭojoji does not specify its source but this half verse is frequently attributed to Bhartṛhari inspite of the fact that it is not found in the present VP. Several texts, including this ŠK, which mention the name of Bhartṛhari or the VP as its source, are as follows:

ŠK on P.1.3.1 [II, 51, 25-28]: yadi tu — “dḥātunoktakriye nityaṁ kārake kartrṭesyaḥ” iti Bhartṛharipratipāditaritvā prādhānyena dḥātūpāttavyāpāratvarūpaṁ kartrṭvaṁ tavāpi sammatam, kas tarhīdānīṁ ākhyāṭārthah.
Tr.: However, if the state of being an agent is defined as principle [i.e., the one having] the activity denoted by the verbal root on the basis of the opinion of Bhartṛhari and you too admit this, then how is the meaning of the verb?;

V BhśS on the VMM k.24 [244]: kartrtrtṛyāyā āśrayo ’ṛtṛḥ. tathāhi “svatantrāḥ kartā” [P.1.4.54]. svātantraṁ ca dḥātvārthāvāpaśrayatvam. “dḥātunoktakriye nityaṁ kārake kartrṭesyaḥ” iti Vākyapadīyāt. ata eva yadā yadīyo vyāpāro dḥātunā ’bhidhiyate tadā sa karteti, sthāli pacati, agnī pacati, edhāṃsi pacanti, taṇḍulāḥ pacyate svayam evetyādi saṅgacchate.
Tr.: The meaning of third case denoting an agent is a substratum. Thus said [by Pāṇini], “svatantrāḥ kartā.” The state of being independent means the state of being a substratum of the activity which is the meaning of verbal root. This is proved by the statement from the Vākyapadīya, namely “dḥātunoktakriye nityaṁ kārake kartrṭesyaḥ.” Therefore, in case that one’s activity is denoted by the verbal root, that one is the agent. This notion is realized in the following examples, “sthāli pacati,” “agnī pacati,” “edhāṃsi pacanti,” and “taṇḍulāḥ pacyate svayam eva,” etc.;8

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8 The V Bhś also quotes this half verse and, furthermore, two verses (VP III.7.103-104) [pp. 106-107]. Cf. Bālamanorāmā on ŠK No. 559 [I, 633]: uktāṁ ca Harinā — “dḥātunoktakriye
This half verse is the part of śloka found in the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila, vākyādhiṭkaraṇa [MS 1.1.24], śloka 71cd. The context wherein this half verse is stated is how other kārakas can be regarded as kārtṛ in relation to the meaning of verbal root.

\[\text{Tr.: Then, how can such instrument, etc. be an agent in case of the act of cooking in terms of secondary supposition? It is because fuel, etc. cannot be regarded as instrument, etc. inasmuch as their own activities <66>. And we can express their activities in the form of “vikledyanti: they [rice-grain] become soft,” “jvalanti: they [fuel] are burning,” and “bibhrati: it [pot] holds [rice-grain]” <67ab>. However, those are not expected to express other actions in case of the act of cooking <67cd> just as the usage which expresses one action. Thus, they are treated as agent <68ab>. It cannot be so when the act of burning, etc. are not denoted by the verbal root ñpac- <68cd> because through mere coexistence they do not become the factor to show relationship [to the act of cooking] <69ab>. And their facilities are not be expressed by any other words <69cd>. [Therefore,}

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9 We cannot find this half verse in the VLM but in the Kalā commentary of Bālam Braṭṭa on VLM reads [p. 1249]: atas eva — dhātunoktakriye nityam kārake kārtṛtesaye | iti Hāry ukteḥ.

\(\sqrt{pac-}\) denotes the action of Devadatta [in “devadattah pacati”]\(^{11}\) and cannot convey the relation to fuel, etc. <70ab>. If it denotes all activities contained in the act of cooking <70cd>, only in this case fuel, etc. are regarded as agent such as Devadatta <71ab> because it is admitted that kartr is principle in the action denoted by the verbal root <71cd>. All [kārakas] are related to the action (bhāvanā) and there is no other definition of kartr <72ab>. Hence, we have usages such as “kāṣṭhāni pacanti,” etc. according to speaker’s intention <72cd>. Such usage would be impossible unless we accept above definition of kartr <73ab>.

32.2.1 Reflexive Construction {139, 14-16}


Translation: This [definition of kartr] is also [valid] in the case of the reflexive constructions. Since the result and the activity [which are denoted by the verbal root] reside in different loci in the case of √pac-, what is more general one [i.e., the activity of original/main agent] is abandoned. This holds good in the views that the verbal root has significative capacity [of two meanings, vyāpāra and phala] separately and that it has significative capacity wherein one is limited by the other.

Notes: Now, Bhāṭṭojī gets to the point whether above-mentioned definition of kartr goes for the reflexive constructions (karma-kartari).\(^{12}\) It has been already stated by Kātyāyana that the agency is to be admitted to the [original] object in the case of reflexive construction because the speaker intends to express its independency (Vt V on P.3.1.87 [II, 67, 11]: karmakartari kartrtvam svātantryasya vivakṣitatvāt). In the reflexive constructions prescribed by P.3.1.87: karmanā tulyakriyam karmavat, an original object in an active voice is regarded as an agent which conducts by oneself. As far as grammatical operation is concerned, since this rule introduces the passive affix yaK to the verbal root, the verbal form to be made becomes the same as it of passive form. However, the subject of this

\(^{11}\) In verse 57cd, the example given is “ukhāyūm odanaṃ kāṣṭhāna devadattah pacet.”

\(^{12}\) As for the reflexive construction itself (derivational process, relation to other constructions, traditional interpretation and so on), see the following articles: Joshi [1982]; Bhat [1982]; Filliozat [1983]; Deshpande [1985]; Iwasaki [1993]; Kudo [1994], [1996, 45-46], [1997(b), 48-54].
rule is kartr so that the introduced personal ending, although it is Ātmanepada ending, expresses the agent (odanah pacyate [svayam eva]).

We must consider about two points of next at least to form the reflexive construction. The first is the attribution of the agency to the [original] object. Grammatically, it is a principle that what is appointed as direct object receives the operations that are to be applied to the item designated as karman. The difference in accordance with the types of constructions is that the role of object is expressed by the case ending in the active voice or the personal ending (Ā) in the passive. Then, how about in the reflexive construction? The direct object, rice (odana), gets two grammatical labels: as karman in the active and as kartr in the reflexive. According to the definition given by Bhaṭṭoji, kartr is the substratum of vyāpāra and karman is the substratum of phala. To form the reflexive we need to change the relation of āśraya.

The second point is, closely related to the first above, that it is to be guaranteed in the meaning of verbal root to have the contents which promote the shift of the labels: the meaning “activity” whose substratum is the original object must be denoted by the verbal root. In this way, by changing our (i.e., speakers’) point of view with respect to the denotation of verbal root, rice is regarded as kartr because it is the substratum of the vyāpāra, otherwise it has no agency in so far as we accept the definition by Bhaṭṭoji. The vyāpāra, which is taken an active part by the original object, must be a constitutive part of the whole act of cooking, i.e., action (kriyā) and done a connotation in the meaning of verbal root surely. In this regard, although Kaiyata does not explain, as might be expected, in terms of two aspects of the meaning of verbal root,13 Nāgeśa clearly states “activity of karman” (Uddyota on MBh ad P.3.1.87 [III, 119r]):

\[svātantryaṇi ca pradhānadhātvāḥāśrayatvam. tac ca karma-
vyāpāramātrasya dhātvartatve sambhavitīty āha — pacyata iti.\]

Tr.: The independency is the state of being a substratum of the predominant meaning of verbal root. When the action belonging to the object alone is expressed by the verbal root, [karmakartari

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13 Pradipā on MBh ad P.3.1.87 [III, 119r]: svātantryasyeti. “pacyate odanah svayam eva”’ti viklittimātravāci pacih. tatra caudanasya kartrivam eva (in case of “pacyata odanah svayam eva,” \(\sqrt{\text{pacc-}}\) denotes the act of becoming soft alone and, here, rice becomes the agent [of that action]).
construction] becomes possible. To illustrate [its formation], it is said “pacyata [odanaḥ svayam eva]”; [ibid., 1201]: evaṃ ca saukaryātiṣayavivakṣayā vidyamānopi kartṛvyāpāro na vivaksyate, kim tu anekārthatvād dhātunāṃ karmanīṣṭhavyāpāramātraparata. tadā karmanāḥ kartṛte “karmanā tulyakriya” ity atrāvasthāntarīyakarmanā tulyakriya-tvam ity evārtho vivaksyata iti dik.

Tr.: In this way, according to the intention to express an extreme facility [of the object], the activity of the agent which is in fact present is not intended to express. Rather, since the verbal root denotes many meanings [namely, a group of subsidiary activities], only the activity residing in the object is intended. In this case that karman is admitted as kartṛ, P.3.1.87 means that [agent] whose action is similar to that of the object which is treated in different phase.

Therefore, the verbal cognition of “pacyate odanaḥ svayam eva” is, according to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa who is prthakśaktivādin as same as Bhaṭṭoji, “the activity conducive to the act of cooking whose agent is identical with rice expressed in singular number” (VBS on VMM k. 4 [p. 75]: “pacyate odanaḥ svayam eve”tyādau. atra hy ekodana-bhinnāśrayakah pākānukuḷo vyāpāra iti bodhāḥ) and “vyāpāra” in this case is “contact with fire” (agnisamyoga).14

In the view of viśiṣṭaśakti, the exact verbal cognition of above example is not found but, as is quoted above, Nāgeśa admits that the verbal root denotes only the activity of the original object in the reflexive construction.

As for the verbal cognitions of the active voice sentence and the passive sentence given by the prthakśaktivāda and the viśiṣṭa-śaktivāda, see the following extracted passages respectively:

“taṇḍulaṃ pacati caitraḥ” ity atra “ekataṇḍulāśrayikā yā vikliṭīḥ, tad anukūlaikacaitrābhinnāśrayikā vartamānā bhāvanā,” “taṇḍulaḥ pacyate caitreṇa” ity atra ca “ekacaitrāśrayikā ekataṇḍulābhinnāśrayikā yā vikliṭīḥ, tad anukūla śām-pratikā bhāvanā” iti bodhāḥ [VB on VMM k.2, p. 19].

Tr.: In “taṇḍulaṃ pacati caitraḥ: Caitra cooks rice-grain,” the verbal cognition is the activity conducive to the softening which

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14 See Darpaṇa on do.: saukaryātiṣayadyotanārthā ca tadivakṣā taṇḍulādīdāgatāgni-samyogādirāpavāparyāsayaiva phalajanakatayā dhātvarthatvātivakṣāyām ity arthaḥ. vastutas tu phalasyāpi janakavāpāragataparvāparvāryāropena vyāpāravena bhānād iti pūrvam uktaiva taṇḍulagataphalasyāiva vyāpārata ity arthaḥ.
resides in rice-grain [expressed] in singular number, whose substratum is identical with Caitra [expressed] in singular number, belonging to the present time. In “taṃḍulaḥ pacyate caitraḥ: rice-grain is cooked by Caitra,” it is the activity conducive to the softening whose substratum is identical with rice-grain [expressed] in singular number, whose substratum is Caitra [expressed] in singular number; tathā ca “grāmaṁ gacchati caitraḥ” ity atraikatvāvacchinnacaitrābhinnakartrko vartamānakāliko grāmābhinnakarmaniṣṭho yas saṃyogaḥ tad anukūlo vyāpāraḥ. “grāmo gamyate maitrene”ty atra tu maitrakartrkavartamānakālikavyāpārajanyo grāmābhinnakarmaniṣṭhaḥ saṃyoga iti ca bodhaḥ [PLM, p. 140].

Tr.: In “grāmaṁ gacchati caitraḥ: Caitra goes to a village,” the verbal cognition is the activity which has the agent identical with Caitra delimited by the oneness, conducive to the contact which resides in the object identical with the village, belonging to the present time. In “grāmo gamyate maitrena: The village is reached by Maitra,” the cognition is the contact which resides in the object identical with the village, which is produced by the activity which is belonged to the present time and has the agent [identical with] Maitra.

32.2.2 Reflexive-Causative Construction { 139, 16-17}

Text: nivṛttapreṣaṇam karma svakriyāvayave sthitam iti pakṣe tu pradhānabhūtadīvartha evēha kriyā, dhātuvan1 tu bhūtapūrvabhāvanārthatvāt.

*1. MS110Ob5: dhātubhūta°

Translation: However, in the opinion that [original] direct object [in a simple sentence] of which instigation by an agent has been removed [still] remains [agent] on its role of the action, [what is referred as] action here is the meaning of verbal root regarded as dominant. However, originally the verbal root can denote the activity which was there before [but is not there now] (bhūtapūrva).15

15 The notion of “bhūtapūrva” is referred to in MBh ad P.1.1.56 (sthānīvad ādesa ‘ṇaLvidhau) [I, 137, 7-26] where the replacement of the grammatical elements is discussed. The rule means that the substitute (ādesa) is treated as the original (sthānīn) except the case of the rule concerning to the sounds. Since sthānīn and ādesa are different entities, the grammatical operation(s) applied to the original cannot be valid to the substitute; by prescribing this rule which allows the extentional employment, it becomes possible to apply the rules, which are primarily operative to the original, to the substitute even though the original is replaced by the substitute. See in details, Joshi-Roodbergen [1990], pp. x-xi, and pp. 77-85 (Translation and Notes of above MBh’s passages).
Notes: In this passage, Bhaṭṭoji refers to one of two opinions concerning to the derivational stages of the reflexive causative construction, namely \textit{nivṛttapreṣaṇaṇapakṣa}, which is manifested by Bharṭṛhari [\textit{VP} III.7.56].\footnote{16} This is mainly taken up in the discussion on P.1.3.67 which prescribes that the \textit{Ātmanepada} ending, denoting the agent, is introduced to the causative base, when the direct object in non-causative is regarded as agent in the causative (\textit{Ner aNau yat karma ṇau cet sa kartānādhyāne}). On this rule itself, since there have been long tradition of discussion how many sentences it is to be divided into, I would like to decline to go into the interpretation of P.1.3.67 further. However, it is necessary to summarize the process of derivating the reflexive causative sentence in order to clarify the difference of two opinions, namely \textit{“nivṛttapreṣaṇaṇapakṣa”} and \textit{“adhyāropitapreṣaṇaṇapakṣa.”}\footnote{17}

\textbf{A. Nivṛttapreṣaṇaṇapakṣa.}

\textbf{A-1. Bharṭṛhari.}

The \textit{nivṛttapreṣaṇaṇapakṣa}, although Kātyāyana and Patañjali sow the seeds of discussion,\footnote{18} is declared in the \textit{VP}, namely, that [original] direct object [in the simple sentence] which has stopped being instigated by an agent [still] remains [agent] on its role of the action; when it desists from being object, it becomes agent in regard to its [activity] (\textit{nivṛttapreṣaṇaṇaṁ karma svakriyāvavyave sthitam}).

\footnote{16} This verse is quoted by Bhaṭṭoji twice in the \textit{ŚK}. One is treated in A-2 and B-2 (\textit{ŚK} on P.1.3.67) and the other is the passage on P.3.1.87 [II, 393, 1-13]: \textit{yaGātmanepadaCiN-CiNvadbhāvāḥ prayojanam. “bhidyate kāṣṭham svayam eva.” “abhedi kāṣṭham svayam eva.” “kārṣyate kaṭaḥ svayam eva.” ātmanepadasya trīṇy api imāṁ udāharanāṁ. yaKCiN-CiNvadbhāvaṁ tu krameneti vivekaḥ. nivṛttapreṣaṇaṁ karma svakriyāvavyave sthitam}}

\footnote{17 As for the reflexive causative construction, it has been discussed by several scholars, for example, Joshi [1982], Kiparsky [1982], Kiparsky-Staal [1969] and Deshpande [1985] (mainly in his \textit{Lecture One} containing the references to above three articles). More recently, Joshi-Roodbergen [1994, pp. 109-132] gives detailed analysis on the formation of reflexive causative construction referring to the commentaries on P.1.3.67. The present writer owes a lot to this.}

\footnote{18 See \textit{MBh} ad P.1.3.67 [I, 290-292] wherein Patañjali uses the example “ārohayanti hastināṁ hastipakāḥ” (p. 290, 3).}
nivartamāne karmatve sve kartrtvē 'vatiṣṭhate' ||.19 Bhartrhari gives five stages of derivational process in forming the reflexive causative sentence.20 These are sketched in the VP III.7.59-60:

nyagbhāvanāṁ nyagbhāvanāṁ rhau śuddhe pratiyate ||
nyagbhāvanāṁ nyagbhāvanāṁ Nyante 'pi pratipadyate ||
avasthāṁ pañcamīṁ āha Nyante tāṁ karmakartāri ||
nivṛtta-praṇāṇāḥ dhātoḥ prākṛte 'rthe Niǰ ucyate ||

Tr.: In the meaning of bare verbal root ruh-, what is understood is “nyagbhāvana: to cause to bent down” and “nyagbhāvana: to bent down.” [Both meanings] nyagbhāvana and nyagbhāvana are realized in case of the causative. It is on the fifth stage [of the derivational process] when it [Vruh] conjugates in the causative and the object [in the non-causative] is regarded as agent. The affix NiC is used in the original sense [of the verbal root] when it is [introduced] after the verbal root in which the instigation by [original] agent is removed.

His example is “ārohanti hastināṁ hastipakāḥ: elephant-drivers mount the elephant.” We cannot know how Bhartrhari had made derivational sentences but with the help of the commentary of Helārāja the sentences supposed by Bhartrhari are as follows21 (Mg. meaning):

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19 See the Prakīrtakaprapakāśa of Helārāja on VP III.7.56 [273]: dhāvtarthāmuṇkuḷyena čeṣṭānaṁ kartuḥ praṇaṇaṁ svavyāprāḥ kārakāntaravinyogalakṣaṇaṁ. tadanabhāhityāmaṁ kārtari pacyate odanaḥ svayam evetyādā nivartate. karmāryaśaya svavyāparyaya kārtari pratyayenabhāhityāmaṁ dhātuṁ naḥabhāhityāmaṁvati. pratiyamāṇaṁ tu tasya dvayarthāḥ pacic iti bhāvyavirodhaḥ asangataṁ ity ākhyātaṁ. “tāṁ dhāvantarāṁ” [VP III.7.57a] iti ca vakyāyamāṇaṁ viśayavibhāgena dhāvartathā kartavyāparyaya granthakrto bhīpetat. tasmin nivṛtte svacmiṁ kriyāvavyavai pradhānākriyāpēksaṁ gaṇabhūte svavyāpāre karma sthitam, kartreyāḥ bhūtānupvargatā tv asya karmayapadesah, yady api ca kartvyāpāre vivakṣite svakriyāyāṁ evāvasthānām tadāvāreṇa pradhānākriyānvitaṇāṁ, kāraṇam karmeti sāmānā- dhikaranīyāc ca, tathāpī sāmārthyaḥ atra pradhānyenāvasthānām bodhavayam. ata eva kartvyāpāreṇaḥ karmavasya nivṛttyāu āmiye sarvatra bhavati svakriyāvavyaye kartreyāḥ vatiṣṭhate iti kartvyāpāreṇaḥ pūrvaṁ karma bhūtāv saukar-yāṭīśayaprati-pādānaparataḥ tadāvāvaktaravartī kartā sampadyata iti bhavati karmakartā. āyaṁ bhāvah. na kevaloḥ kartvyāpāravāvaktvakṣamāre karma karmakartṛtā, api tu svavāpāre svātantravivaktvakṣāyām api satyām. tātām cāpi rātēti yaGaṇī i karma kāryāyāṁ “karmavat karmamān tulaśrī” [P.3.1.87] iti sāśtreṇa prāpyante. tad uktam Vārttikākṛtā “karmakartāri karmavat śvātantrasya vivaśīkapati” [Vy V on P.3.1.87] iti.

20 This problem is also discussed in the KV on P.3.1.67 and its commentaries, Nyāsa and PM, [I, 463-474]. It is the PM which makes detailed discussion on the nivṛttyapreṇapakṣa in contrast with the adhyātapreṇapakṣa referred as “aparaḥ prakārah” [ibid., 466]. See also the Pradīpa and Udyotaka on MBh ad P.3.1.67 [II, 178-182].

21 These examples are actually taken from Helārāja’s commentary on VP III.7.59-60 [276, 11-278, 4]. These are also explained by Joshi-Roodbergen [1994, p. 123] but the numbering is as A.1, A.2, B.1, B.2 and C in order. However, since third supposed sentence [B.2] is not found in the Helārāja’s commentary, I follow Joshi-Roodbergen.

69
a-1) ārohanti hastināṁ hastipakāḥ <simple, non-Caus., non-reflexive>
   Mg. (nyagbhāvayanti: to cause elephant to bent down)
a-2) āruhyate hastī svayam eva <reflexive>
   Mg. (nyagbhavati: to bent down)
a-3) ārohayanti hastināṁ hastipakāḥ <causative, original-agent-based>
   Mg. (nyagbhāvayanti: to cause elephant to bent down)
a-4) ārohayati hastī hastipakān <causative, original-object-based>
   Mg. (nyagbhavati: to bent down)
a-5) ārohayate hastī svayam eva <causative-reflexive>
   Mg. (nyagbhavati: to bent down)

In their sentence-denotations, a set of 1) and 3) are same and the other set of 2) and 4) are same.


On the other hand, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita construes four stages, using not only above example but also his own example, “paṣyanti bhavāṁ bhaktāḥ: the devotees see Bhava,” in his ŠK on P.1.3.67 [II, 81, 17-82, 10]:

\[
\text{tatra dhātūpāttavyāpārāśrayaḥ kartā dhātvartabhūtavyāpāravyadhikarānaphalaśāli karma. tathā ca “paṣyanti bhavāṁ bhaktāḥ” iti prayogah cākṣusajñānena visayikurvantity arthāḥ. yadā tu sauksyāyātisayavāvaskayā preranāṁśas tyajyate tadā “paṣyati bhavāḥ” iti prayogah. visayībhavatity arthāḥ. uktaṁ ca — nivṛttapreṣaṇaṁ karma svakriyāvayavaiḥ sthitam] nivṛttamāne karmatve sve kārtrte 'vatiṣṭhate || iti [VP.III.7.56]
\]

tataḥ paṣyantam prerayantity NiCi “dārasayanti bhavāṁ bhaktāḥ” iti prayogah. paṣyantity arthāḥ. uktaṁ ca — nivṛttapreṣanād dhātoḥ prākrte 'rthe NiJ ucyate || iti.


70
tatah punar Nyarthasya saukaryadyotananartham avivakśayam “darśayate bhavah” viśayibhavatīty arthaḥ. tad iha paśyatidarśayatyoḥ samānārthatayā kartṛsthabhāvakatvāc ca karmavadbhāvavirahe prakṛtasūrenātmāmanepadam. iha hi NiCprakṛti bhūteenā drśinā ya evārtho dvitiyakaksāyām upāttaḥ sa evaṃ caturthām iti sāmānakriyāvatvam asti aṃau yat karma prathamakaksāyaṁ tad eva kartṛ.

nyagbhāvanam nyagbhavanam ruhau śuddhe pratiyate || nyagbhāvanam nyagbhavanam Nyante ’pi pratipadyate || avasthāṃ paṃcamaṃ āhā Nyantatātikarmakartari || nivṛttapreśanād dhātoḥ prākṛte ’rthe NiJ ucyate || iti. [VP III.7.59-60]

iha viśiṣṭavacacakayoḥ śrūddhaNyantayor vācyāv amśau vācacakabhedāti vedaḥ gāṇayitvā pūrvoktraprathamātṛtīyakākśāyām avasthācatusṭayaḥ caturthakaksāyān tu paṃcami avastheti ślokārtha bhipretaḥ.

Tr.: In this case, “kartr” is a substratum of an activity denoted by a verbal root and “karman” is an abode of a result which resides in different locus of an activity and is denoted by a verbal root. That is to say, the usage “paśyati bhavam bhaktāḥ” means that [the devotees] make [Bhava] be an object through the optical sense (cāksuṣajñānena viśayīkuvrantaḥ). However, when in terms of the intention to express an extreme facility [of the object] the instigation of the agent is removed, “paśyati bhavah” is made in the sense that [Bhava] becomes the optical object [by himself] (viśayibhavati). As for this [formation], it is said by Bhartrhari. <translation omitted, see above>

Then, the causal affix NiC which express the meaning “to cause one who is seeing to do” (paśyatam prerayanti) is introduced to “paśyati” and the sentence “darśayanti bhavam bhaktāḥ” is derived in the sense that [the devotees] see [Bhava] (paśyanti). Again as for this, [Bhartrhari] said. <translation omitted, see above>

Then, in case that there is no intention to express the function of the causative conjugation, the sentence “darśayate bhavah” is made in the sense that [Bhava] becomes the optical object [by himself] (viśayibhavati). In above process, since the verbal forms
paṣyati and darśayati denote same meaning and √drś- itself is kartṛṣṭhabhāvaka verbal root, when it lacks the notion of "the agent having same function of the object", the Ātmmanepada ending is introduced by P.1.3.67. In the second stage, [desired] meaning is denoted by √drś-, being the base of the affix NiC, and that meaning is also [expressed] in the fourth stage so that two sentences are same in their denotations. The agent is the one which is the object in the first stage, i.e., in the non-causative sentence.

Correspondingly, the example "ārohayate hasti" is well explained. [At first stage, we have the sentence] "ārohanti hastināṃ hastipakāh" in the sense of "nyagbhāvayati: to cause to bent down." [At second stage, we have] "ārohati hasti" in the sense of "nyagbhavati: to bent down." Then, since the instigating activity of the agent is removed, by introducing the affix NiC [we have] "ārohayanti [hastināṃ hastipakāh]" in the sense of "ārohanti." At last stage, by removing the meaning of the affix NiC, [i.e., instigation, we have] "ārohayate [hasti]" in the sense of "nyagbhavati: to bent down." In this [explanation of the derivational process], first and third sentences are of same meaning and second and fourth are the same. This is the nivṛttapreṣaṇapākṣa. <the rest omitted>

The sentences of each stages are as follows:
First example same as that of Bhartṛhari.

b-1) ārohanti hastināṃ hastipakāh <simple, non-Caus., non-reflexive>
Mg. (nyagbhāvayanti: to cause elephant to bent down)

b-2) ārohati hasti <non-Caus., with reflexive nuance>
Mg. (nyagbhavati: to bent down)

b-3) ārohayanti hastināṃ hastipakāh <causative, original-agent-based>
Mg. (nyagbhāvayanti: to cause elephant to bent down)

b-4) ārohayate [hasti] <reflexive-causative>
Mg. (nyagbhavati: to bent down)

Second Example of Bhaṭṭoji himself.
c-1) paṣyanti bhavāṇi bhaktāḥ <simple, non-Caus., non-reflexive>
Mg. (paṣyanti: to see Bhava)

c-2) paṣyati bhavāḥ <non-Caus., with reflexive nuance>
Mg. (viṣayībhavati: to become an object by oneself)
Comparing to the process of Bhartrhari, a-4) stage is omitted, and a-2) is of the reflexive on one hand and b-2), also c-2), are not. The reason for the omission of a-4) seems that the sentence of this stage might be confused with the sentence formed by the other view (see below, d-2) and e-2)). The reason for the latter difference is simply that \(\text{dṛś-}\) is kartrsthabhāvaka-root so that it cannot form the karmakartari construction.\(^{23}\)

The procedure in case of Blattoji’s examples is as follows (in order to simplify the explanation, his own example is taken):

From 1) to 2). \(\text{dṛś-}\) denotes “cākṣuṣajñāna-anukūla-vyāpāra” and the verbal form paśyati is paraphrased as “cākṣuṣajñānena viśayikurvanti (or cākṣuṣajñānavisayam kurvanti).” From this meaning, the instigating activity of agent, i.e., vyāpāra (paraphrased as “kurvanti”), is removed; then, only phala-meaning is to be expressed. In this case, Bhava is not only the substratum of phala but of vyāpāra in the sense of “becoming an optical object.” Therefore, the sentence “paśyati bhavaḥ” is not simple active but has reflexive nuance;\(^{24}\)

From 2) to 3). Here, a prayojaka agent appears. The devotees (bhaktāh) becomes hetu and its activity is hetumat; then, the causal affix NiC is introduced by P.1.3.67 and the verbal form is “darśayanti” [3.pl.] but in this case the affix NiC is used in the sense of the original meaning of verbal root, “to see,” as is stated in VP III.7.60. Therefore, the sentence is equal to c-1) in their denotations;\(^{25}\)

\(^{23}\) MBh ad P.3.1.87 [II, 66, 16-17]: kartrsthabhāvakānām kartrsthakriyānām vā kartā kartā karmavan mā bhūd iti.

\(^{24}\) Bāḷāmanoromā on SK. 2738 [III, 574-5]: tadā cākṣuṣajñānavisayatvāpātter eva dyēr artho vivakṣitah, na tu tadanukūlavāprāh kṛṇḍhātugamyah presānāṃsaḥ. tadā “paśyati bhava” ity asya cākṣuṣajñānavisayayā sampadyate ity arthaḥ. saukāryātisayayavivakṣā yā anukūla-vyāpāramāsyā avivakṣā bodhyā. tathā ca cākṣuṣajñānavisayatvāpā(575)ter eva drṣyarthatvāt tadāśrayasya bhavasya kārtvam eva, tad āha viṣayō bhavatity artha iti. lañkanatya cākṣuṣaja-jñānaviṣayayo bhavatity artha ity arthaḥ.

\(^{25}\) Ibid. [III, 575]: tada iti kṛṇḍhātugamyah presānāṃsām vihāya cākṣuṣajñānavisayatvāpattivṛttter dyēr hetumaṃ NiJ ity arthaḥ. darśayanti bhavam bhaktā iti. cākṣuṣajñānavisayatvam...
From 3) to 4). Bhava is the *karman* in c-1) and treated as *prayojyakartr* in c-3). Since it is *karman* in non-causative and in its function it behaves as the agent. Thus, by applying P.1.3.67 the sentence "*darsayah hasti*" is composed. This means that Bhava makes himself become the optical object.

The point in this derivational process is that by removing the instigating activity of the original agent the activity of the original object (previously it is denoted by the verbal root as *phala*) is extracted. Since it is the substratum of the activity, it is possible to make the causative construction such as c-3) and to regard it as *kartr* such as c-4).

B. *Adhyāropitapreṣaṇapakṣa*.

B-1. Bhartrhari.

The other view, *adhyāropitapreṣaṇapakṣa*, is stated in *VP* III.7. 62-63 as is maintained by some grammarians:

\[
keśāmcid devadattāder vyāpāro yaḥ sakarmake ||
\]
\[
sa vinā devadattādeh kaṭādisu vivākyate ||
\]
\[
nivṛttapreṣaṇaṁ karma svasya kartuh prayojakam ||
\]
\[
preṣaṇāntarasambandhe Nyante lenābhidhiyate ||
\]

Tr.: According to some [grammarians’ view], the activity of Devadatta, etc. [which is] denoted by a transitive verb, is expected to express on the side of [the object] such as mat, etc. without [the agent] such as Devadatta, etc. The object, which has removed the instigation by the agent, becomes an instigator of its [original] agent and this is expressed by *I* - when [the verbal root] ends in the causal affix *NiC* in the relation of another instigation.

Seemingly, the example that Bhartrhari supposed is "*devadattaḥ kaṭaṁ karoti*" resulting in "*kārayate kaṭaḥ svayam eva*: the mat itself causes to make itself." Between two stages we have the causative construction which is not attested even in the *Prakṛnakapraśa* of Helārāja,²⁶ "*kārayati kaṭaḥ devadattena.*"
B-2. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣīta.
Bhaṭṭoji uses above two examples to show the derivational stages [ŚK on P.1.3.67, II, 82, 10-21]:

... yadvā — “paśyanti bhavaṁ bhaktāḥ.” “ārohanti hastināṁ hastipakāḥ” iti prāgyad eva prathamakakṣā. tataḥ sauκaryadyotanārthaṁ karmanā eva presāṇam adhyāropya NiC kriyate. “darsāyati bhavaḥ” “ārohayaḥ hasti” iti paśyata ārohataś ca prerayatity arthaḥ. tato NiCprakṛtibhyāṁ NiJbhyaṁ copāṭtayor dvayaṁ api presāṇayor yugapat tyāge “darsāyate” “ārohayate” ity udāharaṇam. viṣayībhavati nyagbhavatī ca pūrvavad evārthaḥ. so 'yam adhyāropitapresāṇapakṣa(m). ihādhyāropitapresāṇapakṣe “darsāyati bhavaḥ” “ārohayaḥ hasti” iti dvitiyakākṣāyāṁ atīvyāptīṁ vārayitum samānakriyatvaparam dvitiyam vākyam. tena presāṇadhikyāṁ nātiyāptīṁ. nivṛttrapresāṇapakṣe “darsāyanti bhavaṁ” “ārohayanti hastināṁ” ity evamṛupam triyakākṣāyāṁ atīvyāptīṁ vārayitum “aNau yat karma sa cen Nau karte” ty evamṛupam triyāṁ vākyam. iha tu aNau karmanor bhavahastinohi kartraṇam eva, na tu kartrtei nātiyāptīṁ.

Tr.: Or rather, [some grammarians have different view]. To start from the two examples “paśyanti bhavaṁ bhaktāḥ” and “ārohanti hastināṁ hastipakāḥ” are same as before. Then, in order to express the easiness of [the act of mounting, the sentences using] the causative verbal form are made in terms of superimposition of the instigating activity on the object, namely “darsāyati bhavaḥ” and “ārohayaḥ Hasti” in the sense respectively that [Bhava] causes those who are seeing to do so and that [elephant] causes those who are mounting to do so. Then, after removing two instigating activities expressed by the base of causal form on one hand and by the affix NiC itself on the other, we have the usages “darsāyate [bhavaḥ]” and “ārohayate [hasti].” Their meanings are respectively “[Bhava] becomes the optical object [by himself]” and “[elephant] bents down [by himself]” completely same as the cases of previous process. This is the adhyāropitapresāṇapakṣa. In this view, in order to prevent over-application [of P.1.3.67], the second portion of the rule [i.e., “aNau yā kriyā Nau cet”]28 is stated. By this reason, since the

---

27 See also SK No. 2738 [III, 577-578]: yadvā paśyantyārohanititi prathamakakṣā prāgyat. tataḥ karmanā eva hetuvaśrōhaṁ NiC. “darsāyati bhavaḥ.” “ārohayaḥ hasti.” paśyata ārohataś ca prerayatity arthaḥ. tato NiCbhyaṁ tatprakṛtibhyāṁ ca upāṭtayor dvayaṁ api (578) presāṇayos tyāge “darsāyate” “ārohayate” ity udāharaṇam arthaḥ prāgyat. asmin pakṣe dvitiyakākṣāyāṁ na taN. samānakriyāṁvābhāvāṁ NiJarthasyādhikyāṁ.

28 Traditionally, P.1.3.67 is divided into three portions: (1) ṇek; (2) aNau yat karma Nau cet; (3) sa kartā. See MBh ad P.1.3.67 [I, 291, 5-7]: evam vakṣyāṁ. Ner āśmanepadaṁ bhavati. tato ‘Nau yat karma Nau cet. aNyante yat karma Nau cen Nau yadi tad eva karma bhavati. tatah
instigating activity is added, [P.1.3.67] is not over-applied. In order to prevent over-application [of P.1.3.78] in the third stage of the nivṛttiapreśanapakṣa, the third portion of the rule ["aṇau yat karma sa ceto Nau kartā"] is prescribed [so that the Āmaneṇapaḍa ending is not added]. In this stage, the objects in the non-causative, the Bhava and the elephant, are treated as karman but not as kartṛ so that the over-application is avoided.

As heretofore, the sentences of respective stages are arranged as follows:

d-1) ārohanti hastinaṁ hastipakāh <simple, non-Caus., non-reflexive>
   Mg. (nyagbhāvayanti: to cause elephant to bent down)
d-2) ārohayati hasti [hastipākaṇ] <causative, original-object-based>
   Mg. (ārhataḥ prerayati: to cause those who are mounting to do so)
d-3) ārohayate [hasti] <reflexive-causative>
   Mg. (nyagbhavati: to bent down)

e-1) paśyanti bhavam bhaktāḥ <simple, non-Caus., non-reflexive>
   Mg. (paśyanti: to see Bhava)
e-2) darśayati bhavah [bhaktān] <causative, original-object-based>
   Mg. (paśyataḥ prerayati: to cause those who are seeing to do so)
e-3) darśayate bhavah <reflexive-causative>
   Mg. (viṣayīḥbhavati: to become an object by oneself))

The procedure is as follows:
From 1) to 2). The instigating activity, which is primarily of the original agents, bhaktas, is superimposed to the original karman, Bhava. The Bhava now has the activity (vyāpara) and it is called
hetu. Thus, the causal affix \( \text{NiC} \) is introduced by P.3.1.26 and we have the verbal form “\( \text{darśayati} \)” [3.sg.]. This instigating activity is directed to the original agent, in other words, the Bhava becomes \( \text{prayojaka agent} \).\(^29\) In this second stage, we have two instigating activities: one is superimposed on the Bhave and involved in the meaning of \( \sqrt{\text{drś-}} \) and the other is expressed by the affix \( \text{NiC}. \)\(^30\) It is to be noted that in the second stage P.1.3.67 is not applicable because the action denoted by \( \sqrt{\text{drś-}} \) is no longer the same for the instigating activity is added to it;

From 2) to 3). By the removal of two instigating activities, what still remains is the act of becoming the optical object. The Bhava is originally \( \text{karman} \) in the non-causative and becomes \( \text{kartr} \) in the causative so that P.1.3.67 is applied.\(^31\)

In this way, two derivational processes based on different views concerning to how to recognize the instigating activity produce the same reflexive causative sentences. In this respect, viz., to produce desired sentence, both processes provide correct derivation; it is the number of stages which decides its validity in the grammar. However, it should be noted that in the Pāṇini’s grammar if we want the last desired sentence, we can compose it directly or, at least, immediately from the first sentence: we do not need such intermediate stages with the exception of the use for the purpose of technical demonstration.

Bhaṭṭoji explicitly borrows the passage from the \( \text{PM} \) in this TEXT of the \( \text{SK} \). See \( \text{PM} \) on \( \text{KV} \) on P.3.1.87 [III, 470]:

tatra yada karmanah sakaryaātisayapratipādanāya kartr-vyāpāro na vivakṣyate, tadā nivṛttapreṣaṇam karma svakriyā-vavasthitam nirvartamāne karmatve sve kartrte vyavasthitam artha iti. \( \text{dhātur api tadvyāpāramātre vartate} \) (Tr.: Here, when the activity of the agent is not intended to express in order to convey an

\(^{29}\) Cf. Bālamanoramā on \( \text{SK} \), 2738 [III, 577-8]: \( \text{drśeḥ ruheś ca prathamakaksyāyāṃ karmibhūtasya bhavasya hastinaś ca prayojakakartrtrvarīpaḥhetuvāpāḥ dhetuman \( \text{NiJ} \) ity arthāh.\(^{(578)} \) \( \text{darśayati bhava iti bhaktān iti śesah, tad āha paśyate ārohaś ca prarayāty artha iti. cākṣusajñānavayatvam āpādayato bhaktān bhavah prerayati, nyagbhāvayato hastip(ak)ān hasti prerayāty arthāh.} \)

\(^{30}\) Ibid. [578]: \( \text{ubhayatra hetuman \( \text{NiC}. \) tatra prakritibhāyām drśiṛuhlḥbhāyām ekaikam preraṇam. \( \text{NiCā} \) tu tadvisayakam ekaikam preranāntaram pratyayate iti sthitih.} \)

\(^{31}\) Ibid.: \( \text{hetuman\( \text{NiC}. \) tatra prakṛtibhūtādṛśiṛuhlḥbhāyām ca upāttayoh preraṇayos tyāge sati cākṣusajñānavayato bhavati bhava iti, nyagbhavati hastīti cāṛthaḥ paryavasyatī tatra prakṛtasūrenātmanepade darśayate bhavah, ārohayate hastīti ca siddham ity arthāh.} \)
extreme facility of the object, the object which removes the
instigation by the agent remains agent on its role of the action;
when it desists from being object, it becomes agent in regard to
its [activity]. The verbal root also denotes its activity alone.)

32.2.3 Examples {139, 17-21}
Text: etena kāraṇāṁ kriyāṃvayaniyamo 'pi dvedhā vyākhyātah.
"devadattaḥ pacati," "sthāli pacati." ananyalabhyasya śabdār
rthatvād āśrayo lakārārthaḥ. "devadattena pacyate."*1 deva
dattarūpo ya āśrayas tad viśiṣṭo viklittyanukūlavyāpāra ity
arthah. vaiśiṣṭyaṁ cādheyatārūpaṁ samsargamaryādayā
bhāṣate.
*1. MS omits this example.

Translation: Therefore, it is explained in twofold ways that kāraṇas
are related to the action. E.x., "devadattaḥ pacati: Devadatta is
cooking" and "sthāli pacati: a pan is cooking." Basing on the
formula that if the meaning of the word is not understood
otherwise, [since the notion of agent is not yet expressed,] l-
denotes a substratum. "devadattena pacyate: it is cooked by
Devadatta." [This example means that] the activity conducive to
the softening [of rice], which is restricted by the substratum such
as Devadatta. In these cases, the interrelation (vaiśiṣṭya) [of the
meanings denoted by the words] appears as the supertratum-
ness by the relational seam (samsargamaryādā) [which is not
expressed in the sentence].

Notes: This passage treats with the intention of speaker. In the
definition of kartṛtvæ, Bhaṭṭojo, following to Patañjali and Vyākārās,
gives qualification "vivakṣita (intended)." As far as X is related to the
action denoted by the given verbal root in the form of constituting the
part of the action and it is intended to express as independent, it would
be regarded as agent.32 Therefore, although ‘pan’ is not the one which
can set in motion by itself, if the speaker wants to express so, it is
called kartṛ because it is independent in its activity, i.e., holding
something in it.33 As for the discussions of the ŠK about how other

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32 Cf. VP III.7.18: nispatnāmēre kartṛtvæm sarvatracāvīstī kārake 1 vyāpārabhedépekṣayām
karanatvādāsanabhavah II; 20-21: gunakriyānām kartārāh kartṛa nyākṛtaśaktayah I nyaktāyām api
sampūrṇaīh svair vyāpārāh samanvītah II karanatvādibhir jītāh kriyābhedānapūtibhih I
svātāntryam uttaram labdhipraddhāne yānti kartṛtaṁ II, 103: sarvair abhyuditāḥ śabdāir niyamo
na tu vastsūnī kartṛdharavivakṣayām śabdātt kartā pratiyate II

33 Cf. Bālamonarāmā on ŠK 559 [I, 633]: nanu sthāli pacatītyādau katham sthāyādīnām
cartṛtvam, svātāntryābhāvād ity atā āhā — vivakṣito 'ṛtha iti; Tatvabodhini [ibid.]: sthāyādīnām
kārakas can be regarded as kartr and how the sentences whose agent is originally karman, karaṇa, or adhikaraṇa are formed, see Kudo [1996], § 2.7 (pp. 44-48).

That the verbal ending denotes the substratum of either vyāpāra or phala by using the formula, “ananyalabhyaśabdārtha,” which is originally innovated by the Mīmāṃsakas, especially the Bhāṭṭa school, is mentioned in the ŚK elsewhere: for example, on P.3.1.67 (sārvadhātuke yaK) [II, 384]: pradhānabhūtadhātvarthāsrayah kartā, phalāśrayaś ca karma. phalavyāpārayoś ca dhātunaivopāttavāt. āśrayamatram lakārārthaḥ, ananyalabhyaśayaiva sabdārthatvāt.

As is seen in § 32.2.1, the verbal cognition of the passive sentence “devadattena pacyate” stated in this passage is apparently of the prthakṣaktivāda which construes the activity as main constituent.

33. tatrpravojaka hetu ca [P.1.4.55: SK. 2575]
33.0 On the meaning of rule [139, 22-23]
Text: tasya kartuḥ pravojaka hetusamjñāḥ syāc, cāt kartṛsamjñāḥ. samjñāsamāveśārthaḥ cakārah.
Translation: The term hetu is introduced to ‘pravojaka: instigator’ of that agent. Since the word ca is included [in this rule], it [= pravojaka] is also [called] kartr. By this word ca the co-application of the terms is intended.
Notes: This passage follows the KV on P.1.4.55 [I, 584-5]: ‘tat’ iti anantarāḥ kartā parāmṛṣyate. tasya pravojakāḥ = tatpravojakāḥ. nipātanāḥ samāsāḥ. svatanstrasya apravojako yo ’rthāḥ tatpravojakaḥ hetusamjñāṁ bhavati, cakārāt kartṛsamjñāṁ ca. samjñāsamāveśārthaḥ cakārah. As is stated in this KV, the compound tat-pravojaka is analyzed as a genitive-tatpurusa compound: tasya pravojakāḥ. However, this type of compounding, usually based on P.2.2.8, is prohibited by P.2.2.16 saying that [a pada ending in the sixth case2.2.8 is not2.2.10 compounded with a pada ending in the affixes trC or aka2.2.15] which denotes agent [to form tatpuruṣa2.1.22].34 Then, the KV regards this form as nipātana (ad hoc, already derived form).35

34 This explanation is based on that of the KV: karttari ca yau trJakau tābhhyāṁ saha saṣṭhī na samasyate. sōmarthvād akasya viśeṣaṁartham kartṛghraman, itaratra vyabhicārabhāvāt. As for the discussion about P.2.2.15-16, see Kudo[1998], pp. 107-111 (sections 8.1.3-4).
35 Cf. Nyāsa on KV on P.1.4.55 [I, 584-5]: nanu ca “kartari ca” [P.2.2.15] (585) ity anena saṣṭhasamāsapratisṛṣṭhenātra bhavitavyam ity āha — nipātanāt sumāsa iti; PM on do.: tasya pravojakas tatpravojaka iti. nanu “trJakābhīyāṁ kartari” [P.2.2.15] “kartari ca” [P.2.2.16] iti
Commentators on and after the KV construe the role of particle ca to indicate samāveśa (co-application) of two designations:36 one is hetu and the other is kartr prescribed in the previous rule. By introducing another samijña in this rule, tatprayojaka become called hetu and kartr as well. This treatment of the particle ca is, by designating X as hetu and kartr, to afford facilities for introducing affix NiC by P.3.1.26 and suffix l- by P.3.4.69.

The word prayojaka literally means “one who prompts,” namely ‘instigator.’ The act of instigating needs, at least, three factors in its establishment: X as instigator, Y as instigated, and Z as act of instigated. X is prayojaka-kartr because he is independent in his instigation; Y is prayojya but he is kartr as far as his act, Z, is concerned because X leaves Y to the discretion of that action. The problem that Y is not independent has been already discussed by Katyāyana and Patañjali. Unless Y is not independent X cannot be regarded as tat-prayojaka, the instigator of that (independent) agent. In this case, X cannot be qualified as hetu and the causative expression cannot be made. See the MBh ad P.1.4.55 [I, 339, 11-21]:

Praîse ’svatantraprayojakatvād dhetusamijñāprasiddhiḥ || Vt I || praîse ’svatantraprayojakatvād dhetusamijñāyā aprasiddhiḥ. svanantraprayojakino hetusamijño bhavatiṣy ucyate na cāsau svanantram prayojayati. svatantrapātāt siddham. siddham etat. katham. svatantrapātāt. svatantram asau prayojayati. Svanantrapātāt siddham iti cet svanantraparatantrapavām vipratisiddham || Vt II || yadi svatantra pranojyo ’tha prayojyo na svatantraḥ prayojyah svanantraḥ ceti vipratisiddham. Uktam vā || Vt III || kim uktam. ekam tāvad uktam “na vā svatantryād itarathā hy akurvaty api kārayatiti syād” [Vt II on P.1.4.54] iti. aparam

36 See the followings: Nyāsa on KV on P.1.4.55 [I, 586]: samijñāsamāveśārthā ca kāraṇa iti. asati tasmin ekasamijñādhikārād eva kartrsamijñā na syāt. atah samijñāsamāveśārthā ca kāraṇa kriyate. hetubhād etvādinā samijñādvayasya prayojanam darśayati. prayojakavāpyātre hi “hetumati ca” iti NJ vidhiyate. tasya hetuvam prayojaksya hetuvem atah upapadyate. hetutvāt prayojaka NiCo nimittam bhavati. kartrpratyayeno ca lakārenābbhidhānām kartrsamijñāyām satyān bhavatiti kartrvāt kartrprayayoena lakārenocaya iti; TatTVabodhīni on SK. 2575 = P.1.4.55 [III, 425]: ca kāraṇa ekasamijñādhikārabādhanārthās tad atah hetusamijñāṣa ceti. hetusamijñāḥ prayojanam “bhīmyor hetubhayo” [P.1.3.68] “bhīyo hetubhayo suK” [P.7.3.40] ityadāu prayojaksya hetuvem vyavahārah. kartrsamijñāyās tu “lāh karmanī ca bhāve ca —” [P.3.4.69] iti sūtreṇā pranojake vācye lakārādayah.

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uktam “na vā sāmānyakṛtavād dhetuto hy avishiṣṭam svatantrayaprayojakatvād aprayoṣjakā iti cēn muktasaṃśayena tulyam” [Vt XII-XIII on P.3.1.26, II, 35, 16 and 21] iti.

Joshi-Roodbergen [1995, pp. 160-163] divide this rule into two: P.1.4.55(a) “tatprayojakah” and P.1.4.55(b) “hetuṣ ca.” They gives two reasons for this division that the place of the particle ca, at the third position in this rule, is not natural and that “in the present context, ca serves as a boundary marker” (p. 160). See above reference in details.

33.1 Example and its explanation {139, 23-25}
Translation: For example, “kurvantatā prarayati; kārayati hariḥ: Hari prompts Y to do; makes Y do what Y is doing.” Since Hari is hetu, the causative affix NiC is introduced by P.3.1.26 in regard to his activity. In this case, since it is [also] the agent, the verbal ending l- represents the agent.
Notes: The prompting agent is called kartṛ as well as hetu. This co-application of the designations is confirmed by the word ca. In this example, Hari is called hetu and his activity is the act of prompting Y to do something; this activity (tadvyāpāra) is regarded as hetumat; then, P.3.1.26 becomes applicable. The causal affix NiC is introduced after the verbal root. On the other hand, since kartṛ, i.e., the prompting agent, is not yet expressed, l-suffix is introduced to denote the agent.
Here is a prakriyā of the word kārayati:38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particles</th>
<th>Rules</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kr + NiC</td>
<td>P.3.1.26 [hetu = Hari, hetumat = tadvyāpāra]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kr + i + IAṬ</td>
<td>P.3.2.123 [present tense selected]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kr + i + tiP</td>
<td>P.3.4.77, 78 [l- &gt; tiP-replacement]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kr + i + ŠaP + ti</td>
<td>P.3.1.68 [kartari]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kār-i-a-ti</td>
<td>P.7.2.115, 1.1.51 [r &gt; ār]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kār-e-a-ti</td>
<td>P.7.3.84 [i &gt; e]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kār-ay-a-ti</td>
<td>P.6.1.78 [e &gt; ay]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


38 This prakriyā is based on Joshi-Roodbergen [1975], p. 275, footnote 911.
It is to be noted that the word *hetumat* means not only the person who is instigated by someone but also the activity. In the *Vīś* on P.1.4.54, the independency of the prompted is discussed. This problem that the prompted agent serves no longer as agent because he starts to do something by order of someone is resolved by *Patañjali* saying that “after checking that the prompted is doing or not doing, he [i.e., prompter] concludes that he [i.e., the prompted] is independent when he is doing and he is not when he is not doing. [On the other hand, if the prompted does not do it inspite of the order by [the prompter], he is independent [from the prompter].” (*MBh* ad P.1.4.55 [I. 339, 7-9]: *preṣite ca kilāyam kriyām cākriyām ca dṛṣṭvādhyava- syati kurvan svatantra 'kruvan neti. yadi ca preṣito 'sau na karoti svatantra 'sau bhavatīti*). There is a difference between the independence of former case and of latter case: in the former case, it is the notion of independence in the action (this is the grammatical sense) and in the latter it is that in the personal relationship which is not to be treated in the science of grammar. What is *svatantra* is nothing but the agent according to the definition of previous rule. Thus, *Kātyāyana* and *Patañjali* thinks that the word *hetumat* discussed in the *Vīś* and *bhāṣya* on P.1.4.54 means the agent of the action.

However, *Patañjali* rises a question about the word *hetumat* in the *MBh* ad on P.3.1.26 [II. 31, 7-8]:

\[\textit{katham idaṁ viññāyate. hetumaty abhidheye NiC bhavatīti. āhosvīd dhetumati yo dhātur vartata iti.}\]

Taking up this awareness of the issue, the *KV* clearly states [on P.3.1.26, II, 388]:

\[\textit{hetuḥ svatantrasya (kartuḥ) prayojakah, tadiyo vyāpāraḥ preśanādilaksāṇo hetumān, tasminn abhidheye dhātora NiC pratyayo bhavati (Tr.: Hetu means “a prompter of an agent who is independent.” The activity belonging to him such as instigation (*presāṇa*), etc. is called *hetumat*. When it [the activity] is expressed, the causal affix *NiC* is introduced after the verbal root).}^{40}\]

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39 *Vīś* I [I. 338, 21]: *svatantrasya kartṛṣamjñāyāṁ hetumaty upasamkhyaśānam asvatantratvāḥ; *Vīś* II [ibid., 339, 1]: *na vā svatantryād itarathā hy akurvaty api kārayaśīti syāt; *Vīś* III [ibid., 5]: *nākurvatiśi cet svatantrah.*

40 The *Nyāsa* comments [ibid.]: *tadiya iti. tatsambandhi kriyāmako vyāpāraḥ. See also the *Pradīpa* on *MBh* ad P.3.1.26 [III, 57r]: *hetumati ca. kṛtrimaṇyaṁ pāribhāṣikasya prayojakasyeḥa*
In order to illustrate this interpretation, the KV gives examples: *kurvāṇam prayūṅkte, kārayati. hārayati* [on P.1.4.55, I, 586]. In this way, the word *hetumat* in P.3.1.26 is explained to mean the activity of *hetu* but not the person who has *hetu*. Therefore, in deriving the causative form, since the causal affix \(NiC\) is introduced to express the activity of the prompter, the notion of agent of the prompter is not yet expressed so that \(I-\) is introduced. This passage of the \(SK\) follows established interpretation of the rule.

End of the āhnika.

Text: *iti Śrī Śabdakaustubhe prathamasya adhyāyasya caturthe pāde tṛtiyam āhnikam.*

*(to be continued)*

**ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY**

(A-1) Sanskrit Sources [Pāṇinian]

KV: *Kāśikāvṛtti* of Vāmanana and Jayāditya.


(b) — with Jinendrabuddhi’s *Nyāsa (Kāśikāōīvaranaṇaṇaṇikā)* and Haradatta’s *Padamaṇjari*. Ed. by D.D. Shastri and K.P. Shukla, 6 Vols. Ratna Bharati Series Nos. 5-10. Varanasi: Ratna Publication, 1965-67 [Text referred by volume and page].

LS: *Laghusadendusekhara* of Nāgesa (Nāgoji) Bhāṭṭa.


MBh: Patanjali’s *Vṛyākarana-Mahābhāṣya*.


MDhV: *Mādhavīyadāhāvṛtti* of Mādhava or Sāyana.


MS: Manuscript of ŚK preserved in Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. No. 655 of 1891-95, folios 48. lines 11, letters 42, Devāṅgari, Sarņvat 1847.

Nyāsa of Jinendrabuddhi.

see KV(b) [Text referred by volume and page].

P: Pāṇini’s *śūtra*.
PM: Padamaṇjari of Haradatta Miśra.
(a) see KP(b) [Text referred by volume and page].
(b) Eds. by P. Śrī RamacandraDu and V. Sundara Sarma. 2 Vols. Sanskrit Academy Series No. 26, Hyderabad, 1981.

ŚK: Ṣabdakaustubha of Bhaṭṭoṛi Dikṣīta.
(b) see MBh(b).


VSBM: Vaiṣāyikaratjasmittamajjana of Bhaṇḍa Bhaṇḍa. see VMM and VBM.


(B) Secondary Sources.
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