公開講義「Stormy Seas: Japan’s Disputes over History and Territory」開催報告
中村登志哉

国際言語文化研究科メディアプロフェッショナルコースは2013年11月22日、同コース開設10周年を記念する研究プロジェクト「世界と対話するーー世界が日本を見る眼・日本が世界を見る眼」（研究代表・中村登志哉教授）の一環として、米国のボストン大学からトマス・バーガー准教授を招聘し、「Stormy Seas: Japan’s Disputes over History and Territory」と題する公開講義を開催した。バーガー准教授は、日本およびドイツの外交・安全保障政策や政治文化論に関する研究で知られる著名な研究者である。著書に『Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan』(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998)、『War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II』(Cambridge University Press, 2012)がある。

公開講義には本学教員や学生ら約60名が出席する中、バーガー氏は尖閣諸島や竹島などの領土や歴史認識など日本を取り巻く領土・歴史問題を、分かりやすく解説した。
公開講義の内容は、現在の東アジア情勢を理解する上で大変貴重な内容が含まれており、編集担当の小川明子先生のご協力を得て、その要旨を本誌上に掲載するものである。公開講義を開催するにあたっては、総長裁量研究費（教育奨励費）事業として採択し、開催費用を助成して頂いた本学の濱口道成総長、山本一良理事兼副総長、福田慎人国際言語文化研究科研究科長に一方ならぬお世話になった。質疑部分の記録作成には、院生の鈴木理恵さんと水野志保さんが協力して作業してくれた。何より、バーガー氏は学期中でもあり、公開講義の前日夜に名古屋入りして、講義翌日にポストンへの帰国の途に就くという、大変厳しいスケジュールで講義をしてくださった。講義の他にも、研究指導などにあたって頂いた。いつものことながら、公開講義開催にご協力頂いた学内外の関係各位に対し、開催責任者として、記して心からの感謝を申し上げたい。

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Stormy Seas: Japan’s Disputes over History and Territory

Thomas U. Berger

Thanks and praise – I will express my thanks to Professor Nakamura for inviting me. Since this is Asia, I also feel obligated to express my apologies, and in this case I feel I also apologize for giving him a hard time in preparing things. I am afraid that as I have gotten older I have become very much an absent minded professor – an obotsukenai kyouju as you say in Japanese, a phrase which exists in every language that I have studied). But then I will reaffirm that I am very happy to be here and to be given the opportunity for talking to you today.

As you know, in recent years Japan’s relations with its closest neighbors – China, South Korea and Russia – has been troubled by differences over historical and territorial issues. Many in Japan and the United States worry about what seems to be a pattern of deepening confrontation and fear about this trends implications for regional growth and stability.

Yet, it is worth remembering that over the past two decades, there have been times when things seemed rather different.

As recently as 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, President lee Myun Bak and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao were celebrating the formation of an East Asian community, and the three countries have been discussing ways of deepening regional integration for decades before that – at least since the time of Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi’s Pacific Basin Initiative. In 2009, when Hatoyama Yukio became Prime Minister, there were even people in the United States who feared that Japan was getting too close to its Asian neighbors and the US-Japanese alliance was in danger.

And despite the political difficulties, regional trade and investment has grown. As this figure shows intra-regional trade – that is trade among Asian countries – has gone from a bit over 45% of their total trade in 1990 to close to 60% of their trade today, and Asian companies – including major Japanese firms – rely on production chains that stretch across the region.

Since the 1980s, people have talked about the emergence of a new “Silk Road” in East Asia – a network of economic ties spanning the region and linking it to the outside world, bringing with it a renaissance in increased economic prosperity and cultural exchange.

Yet, at the same time, there has been a growing shadow cast over regional affairs, changing this optimistic view of Asia’s future to something much darker. Disputes over how history is
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commemorated – as over Yasukuni in Japan. And how it is portrayed in government approved textbooks and in Japanese popular culture have become a growing problem.

At the same time, there has been a growing dispute over territorial issues that often seem to be reinforced by the disputes over history. As in over the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands between Japan and China. Dokdo-Takeshima islands between Japan and Korea (incidentally, my Korean friends tell me that the Korean air Force jets in this picture were photo shopped in) and over the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories between Japan and Russia.

The intensity of these disputes has increased – most notably around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. And despite occasional efforts to restabilize relations and cool down emotions, the disputes have continued and in many respects become worse.

This leads to two central questions, which I will try to address here. First, why has there been an increase in disputes over history in East Asia? Nearly 70 years after the war ended and the Japanese empire collapsed, why do young people in China and Korea continue to express anger and rage over Japanese actions and what they perceive to be Japan’s failure to recognize its actions. And 2) How do these disputes feed into the potentially even more dangerous disputes over territory?

After all – the United States government still has not expressed any guilt for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Russia still tends to avoid expressing contrition for the crimes of the Stalinist past – an issue that weighs heavy on its relations with its neighbors, especially Poland, the Ukraine and the Baltic states.

On a global level, there are three sets of factors that seem to be supporting the increased controversy over history 1) the spread of democracy – which allows groups of people who feel victimized to speak out and demand recognition of their suffering, apologies and compensation 2) increased global interdependence – which gives victims groups a global platform to voice their views, and which allows them to put pressure on other governments through media campaigns, threats of boycotts and diplomatic lobbying and 3) the spread of human rights norms, which gives demands for apologies and compensation from victim groups greater legitimacy. The argument here is twofold 1) victims have a fundamental right to have their suffering addressed. Unless their suffering is acknowledged and compensated, neither they nor the societies from which they come from will never be able to recover from their trauma. And 2) unless past human rights abuses are recognized and condemned, it will be impossible to condemn and prevent human rights abuses in the future.
In different countries and in different regions around the world, these forces – democratization/globalization and the spread of human rights - have played out (manifested themselves).

In East Asia, when we trace the origins of the debate over history, there are 6 periods.

Period 1 – from 1945 to 1951 Japan was confronted with demands for historical justice at a time when it was very weak and was forced to address these issues. In the end, however, the United States and its allies chose not to pursue the issue vigorously. The United States and other powers were by and large disappointed with the failings of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, the purges and efforts to reeducate Japan in the same way that it was disappointed in its efforts in Germany and elsewhere. In general, these instruments – trials, etc. – are ineffective in changing how other countries think about the past and have failed to produce the desired results everywhere they have been tried – in Germany, in Austria, in France, in Chile, in South Africa, and in Japan. In addition, the US became more concerned about rebuilding Japan as a strong, anti-Communist ally. Many of those who were suspected of class A war crimes – such as Kishi Nobosuke – were seen as strong anti-Communist allies and were rehabilitated. A post-war settlement was reached with the Treaty of San Francisco obligated Japan merely to accept the verdict of the Tokyo war Crimes Tribunal. Compensation was limited to some material aid and sums, and the Japanese government announced that it would abandon its and the claims of its citizens to property in its former territories. The Western powers offered likewise to forgo further claims.

This left the very large issue of the claims of other countries, especially the countries that had not signed the San Francisco Treaty.

It was also in this period – not accidentally - that Japan’s territorial disputes were defined in their current form – the disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Dokdo/Takeshima and Southern Kurils/Northern Territories have their origins in failures to address boundary issues in this formative period.

From 1952 to 1982 Japan was able to successfully settle the issue of compensation and reparations with most of its neighbors. As it normalized relations with a range of Asia countries, beginning with Burma in the early 1950s, the Japanese government got them to renounce all claims to compensation in return for awards of foreign aid. In some cases, the process was violent. As in South Korea, where students rioted in protest of President Park Chung Hee’s signing the normalization treaty with Japan. In other cases the process was more orderly. As in China where the normalization process begun under Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and continued under Deng Xiaoping went more smoothly, and without protest.
In the 1960s and 70s, almost all of the other Asian countries with which Japan normalized relations were authoritarian dictatorships who could stifle the voices of protest by Victim’s groups. In addition, other Asian countries had little leverage with which to push Japan. There were no regional organizations, like NATO or the EU in Europe, through which pressure could be exerted. Intraregional trade was relatively weak. And Japan was well positioned to withstand pressure, since it was by far the biggest and richest economy in the region.

These conditions began to change in Asia only really in the 1980s. Increased pluralization in China and South Korea allowed victims groups to emerge. As a result, their governments came under increasing pressure to take a tougher stance on historical issues. At the same time, economic growth and increased intra-regional trade and investment gave other countries increased leverage vis-à-vis Japan.

The process began in 1982, when protests broke out first in South Korea and then China over proposed changes in Japanese textbooks triggered virulent protests. This was soon followed by the first protests over Yasukuni – when in 1985 Nakasone Yasuhiro triggered sometimes violent protests after he visited the shrine.

In the Fourth Period – which began with the end of the Cold War – Japan began to try to reach out to pursue reconciliation on historical with neighboring nations. This led to a series of apologies by Japanese leaders beginning with Kaifu followed later on by Murayama, as well as some efforts by Japan to offer additional compensation to the surviving victims of Imperial Japanese policies. The most important of these by far was the Asian Women’s Fund established in 1995 to help surviving Comfort Women. The meeting between Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo and President Kim Dae Jung in the summer of 1998 was one of the high points of this diplomatic campaign, and it helped spark a brief but important period where there was significant improvement in Japanese-Korean relations. Diplomatic relations improved, culminating the successful management of the 2002 World Cup in soccer, there was a boom in cultural exchanges, and public opinion data in both countries marked significant improvements. Sino-Japanese relations showed less signs of progress, but there was no marked deterioration.

There were two fundamental flaws to the campaign for reconciliation in this period:

1) First neither Korea nor China did much to help Japan reconcile. For example, when the Japanese government sought help from south Korea in setting up the Asian Women Fund, the Korean government refused to respond. As a result, the AWF was a unilateral action, and it foundered soon after it launched. Neither the Korean or Chinese government made
a sustained effort to help manage the reconciliation process through changes in education or commemorative policy.

2) Japan assumed that the problem was resolved. It too did not change its commemorative or educational policies in significant ways. When, for instance, Japan opened the Showa Hall museum in Tokyo, the first national level museum dealing with the period, the focus was exclusively on ordinary Japanese people as victims, instead of the role of Japan as a perpetrator as well.

As a result there was considerable space for the emergence of virulent forms of nationalism in East Asia in the 1990s and 21st century.

A number of factors played a role in this (list).

Both modern Korean and Chinese nationalism on the mass level were shaped decisively by anti-Japanese movements. The March 1st movement in Korea in 1919, followed by the May 4th movement in China that same year.

In Korea Authoritarianism came to be seen as the product of the colonial experience. President Park Chung Hee – father of the current President Park Gyeun He – was the embodiment of this trend. Before 1945 he had served as an officer in the Imperial Japanese army, one who hunted down Communist guerillas in Northern China. He then became the President who normalized relations with Japan in 1965. For many Koreans, democratization meant confronting this link, and with it what they saw as the long suppressed history of Japanese colonial domination.

In China the collapse of Maoism Marxism created a spiritual vacuum which the state increasingly tried to fill with a kind of raw nationalism. The “Patriotic Education” programs that began in the 1990s – partly in response to the disaster to the Tiananmen incident – focused on both the glories and the tragedies of China’s past in a new way.

In both Korea and China this led to a new historical narrative of victimization – with the Comfort women as a focal point in Korea and the “Century of Humiliation” as a defining event for China. This was sponsored by the Chinese government, but it got picked up on a societal level by various groups, including many “history activists” who were critical of the government. While it is impossible to directly challenge CCP rule, it is possible to criticize policies that are not sufficiently patriotic. As the slogan in pre-war Japan put it, it is never wrong to be patriotic “aikoku muzai”

This led by the early 2000s to a new era of apology fatigue and deadlock over history.
The process began with Koizumi in the early 2000s – Koizumi was not especially right wing, but he needed the support of the very conservative Abe faction. In addition, whenever Japan looks to become more active on security affairs, there is a tendency for conservatives to push for policies designed to enhance patriotism and national pride. Seen as necessary for the creation of “defense consciousness” (boei ishiki) which they feel cripples Japanese security. Led to anti-Japanese protests and riots, especially in China in 2005.

Weak leaders – like Roh Moo Hyun in Korea – were tempted to use nationalism to boost their ratings.

While in China a increasingly weak and illegitimate Chinese government found it costly to control national sentiments. These sentiments could lead to the expressions of anti-sentiments – as in the 2005 riots in China. But they could also turn against the Chinese government. The Chinese government could only clamp down on them because of the threat to ‘social order’.

Similar trends were observable in Japan – government authority was weakened by the collapse in economic performance. The public was increasingly dissatisfied with the elite – including foreign policy elites such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This trend was reflected on by the public reaction to leaked tapes of the arrest of North Korean activists in Shenyang, or the plight of the families of abductees. And nationalist politicians in Japan such as Governor Ishihara Shintaro in Tokyo were happy to seize on these issues.

This rise in nationalism came together with territorial issues in dangerous new ways in the 2000s. While the territorial disputes dated back decades, to at least the end of World War II, they were becoming more important for a number of reasons.

The first was the changing balance of power in East Asia. As China became rich, it spent more and more on defense. Japan fell behind in terms of economic and increasingly military power, and the United states was no longer as strong as it once had been in relative terms. He United States also became increasingly preoccupied with the War on terror and managing its own economic and political problems.

China’s new military power led to new ambitions, including defending its interests at sea. The first and second island chain. At the same time, Asia was becoming more prosperous. Which is a good thing, but this led to a rising demand for maritime resources – especially energy but fish as well.

Under the terms of UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas) countries
are entitled to the resources that lie in the Exclusive Economic Zone’s extended 200 nautical miles from their shore line. But the how to draw those boundaries is unclear and there is no mechanism for resolving disputes where those claims clash or overlap. As a result, maritime disputes became more contentious.

These geo-strategic (balance of power) and geo-economic (economic and legal) disputes became increasingly entangled with the history dispute in the 2000s. The geo-strategic interests did not – and do not - warrant risking real conflict. The military balance of power remains very favorable to the United States and its allies, and China knows it cannot risk a war. Hence it probes Japan’s resolve using its Coast Guard (the Maritime surveillance agency). And there are ways of sharing those resource more efficiently through peaceful means – like the 2008 agreement that was negotiated but failed between Japan and China, or the various fishing agreements that Japan and other East Asian countries have negotiated in the past.

The ability of leaders to make reasonable compromises has, however, been reduced by the nationalist sentiments. Park Gyeun He cannot afford to look soft on Japan, especially given her family background. Xi Jinping has committed himself personally to a strong line on maritime issues. To back down would lead to a loss of “face.” And Abe Shinzo, who owes his return to politics partly because of his reputation as a “strong leader” is also inclined to be tough.

As a result, the deadlock over history has turned into a deadlock over territory that – even though it is not likely to result in an actual war anytime soon – threatens to make the seas around Japan very stormy for some time to come.

質疑応答の一部（バーガー氏の発言はサイマルインターナショナルの宮西涼子通訳による）

【中村登志哉教授】

ありがとうございました。東アジア情勢を大変分かりやすくご説明いただきましたと考えております。厳しい見通しを示された、ベーシミスティックな予測をされておりますということでございますけれども、尖閣諸島や竹島などの領土問題と歴史問題など対中・対韓関係について、バーガーさんに、日本政府の現在の政策対応をどのように評価されているかをお聞きしたいと思います。

【バーガー・ボストン大学准教授】

非常に重要なご質問ありがとうございました。一点目の日本政府への対応への評価という点でありますけれども、50対50くらいの割合で私は評価しています。一方では、日本政府が非常に慎重な立場をとっているということはとても賢い選
択であると思います。尖閣諸島をめぐって、領有権の問題に対応するためには、
やはりアメリカの支援なしに対応することはできないということでありまして、
アメリカ政府は巻き込まれるということを非常に恐れております。もし日本が挑
発的な行為に出た場合には、アメリカからの支援、サポートというものが弱まるこ
とになりかねませんので、今の日本の姿勢というのは非常に賢明な姿勢だと思い
ます。責任あるパートナーという意味で、やはりアメリカからの支援を得るとい
うことが非常に重要です。100パーセントではないにしても、サポートを得ると
いうことが重要になってまいります。アメリカは日本に対して安心するように努
めていますが、その一方で、中国を牽制することも行っております。そしてまた、
アメリカはその一方で、中国への寛容な政策もとっておりますし、日本もまた中
国への寛容な政策というのをとっております。やはり、この問題に対応するには、
日中両国の連携プレーというのが必要になってまいります。（日米間に）楔が打た
れないよう、この点に関しましては、（両国で）注意深い政策をとっていくという
ことが賢明であると評価しております。結論的にはですから、この領有権をめぐ
る問題に関しては、日本政府の対応は賢明であると（考えております）。

もう一方で歴史の問題に関しては、（日本政府の対応は）問題があると考えます。
と言いますのも、アメリカ政府は（日本と）中国との緊張の高まり、韓国との緊
張の高まりに懸念を持っております。日本と韓国というのはアメリカにとって最
も重要な同盟国の二カ国です。その重要な同盟国同士がこの問題に関して合意に
達していない、紛争状態にあるということに関しては理解しがたいですし、それ
を受け入れることも難しい問題であると言えます。ですから、アメリカは日本に
に対して（問題の解決に向けて）さらに圧力をかけるだろうとみております。日本
政府は、それは頭では理解していると思いますけれども、安倍総理は本音ではた
ぶん別の方向を向いていると思います。アメリカ政府も、政府以外の人も、日本
政府に対して（歴史問題の解決に向けて）働きかけていますが、すべてが、日
本政府はそれに対して「あまりビンと来ていない」（この部分は日本語で発言）感
じがしています。

（質疑応答部分記録・鈴木理恵、写真撮影・松田知子）