国際公開講義「Media and Diplomacy in the Real-Time Era」
開催報告
中村登志哉


公開講義に出席した学生、メディア関係者ら約70人が出席した中、シープ教授は、衛星放送やソーシャルメディアの「ニューメディア」の登場が、コミュニケーションの世界だけでなく、コミュニケーションと密接な関係にある外交の姿も一変させ、新しいメディア環境に適応し、政府間対話や世界各地の市民とのコミュニケーション方法の見直しが各国政府とも迫られている現状を指摘した。その上で、ソーシャルメディアの登場でリアルタイムで情報が飛び交う時代に、領土問題や歴史認識をめぐり不信を深める東アジアで、日本や中国、韓国はどんな課題に直面しているかを分かりやすく解説した。

公開講義の内容は、日本のパブリック・ディプロマシーの在り方のほか、現在の東アジア情勢を理解する上で大変貴重な内容が含まれており、編集担当の井原伸浩先生のご協力を得て、その要旨を本誌上に掲載するものである。井原先生は同講義の進行も担当してくださった。

国際公開講義を開催するにあたっては、教育研究プロジェクトとして採択し、費用を助成していた福田真人国際言語文化研究科研究科長、同研究科の先生方に一方ならぬお世話になった。質疑部分の記録作成には、院生の何月さんと丹羽薫月さんが協力して作業してくれた。シープ教授は初めての来日であり、大変厳しいスケジュールの中で講義をしてくださった。講義の前日には特別セミナーを開き、東アジア諸国間のコミュニケーションの在り方などについて、院生と1時間半にわたり討論を繰り広げた。いつものことながら、公開講義開催にご協力頂いた学内外の関係各位に対し、開催責任者として、記して心からの感謝を申し上げたい。
In the modern world, media have always affected diplomacy. The telegraph, the telephone, then radio, then television, and then the still expanding universe of the Internet...all have affected both the pace and the substance of diplomacy.

A new world: Just ten years ago, Facebook was being born; YouTube was created in 2005; and Twitter not until 2006.

Within the past several years, diplomatic practice has become more visible and more dramatic, partly because of new media, and the need to understand it has become more urgent.

As I watched the United States government and others react with disbelief to what they were seeing during the “Arab spring” of 2011 and try to digest the information that was pouring in from so many sources, I asked myself, “How can a foreign policy that is both substantive and nimble be designed and implemented when Twitter is faster than the CIA?” Also, how can communication-based public diplomacy be conducted when there is so much pressure to respond at high speed and make yourself heard amidst the din of so many competing voices?

To give you an indication of where I will be going with this topic, let’s consider Twitter and how it can alter diplomatic processes in this real-time era.

Tweets are most effective when they are conversational and have a personal touch. Diplomats throughout the world use them. But is it the business of a nation’s embassy to be effective on social media or to be effective on official diplomacy? The answer is more complicated than it may seem, because diplomacy and media – no strangers to each other – are becoming entwined in new ways, and the public is paying close attention.

Here is a hypothetical case of how this works. Suppose I am a Japanese diplomat at Japan’s embassy in London, and one afternoon as I am walking across Trafalgar Square I see a large and well-organized demonstration critical of the Chinese government’s claims about the Senkaku Islands. I pull out my mobile phone and send a Tweet, with some photos, from my embassy Twitter account, about what I am seeing. This account has several thousand followers and a few hundred of them re-Tweet my message. And as the original Tweet moves along the network of reTweeting Twitter users, my Tweet “goes viral” in a minor way.

The Chinese government is not happy and complains to Japan’s Foreign Ministry. Within
the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, questions about this Twitter controversy are being asked: “Who authorized this? Who reviewed it? Who is this guy?”

Should I, the diplomat, be reprimanded for not going through official channels, or praised because I have involved a large audience in an important issue of Japanese foreign policy? Was I correct, as a diplomat, to take advantage of the timeliness Twitter allows and to practice “real-time diplomacy,” or should I have submitted my information for review before sending it to the public?

This is a small, hypothetical case, but it illustrates an important point: this mobile phone has many uses and is one of the most powerful diplomatic tools in the world. Policymakers must decide how it is to be used. In this instance, I as the diplomat did what the public expects: I provided real-time reporting, at least as quickly as any traditional news organization did. Even without Foreign Ministry clearance, I was able to present the event – the London demonstration – from the Japanese viewpoint. Assuming that I had been properly trained, I would have been careful with the content of my Tweet, but I still would have delivered it in real-time.

We are seeing long-lasting changes in the context and techniques of international relations. Among the lessons deserving attention are these:

- As the venues of mass communication become more diverse and pervasive, individual citizens become intellectually and politically empowered. They know more about what is going on around them and they use media tools to form communities of interest that enhance political activism. Tools are proliferating rapidly:
- There are 7 billion people in the world, and 6 billion cellphones. By 2020, all new phones will be “smartphones.” The $25 smartphone will soon be available, vastly expanding Internet access.
- Facebook has more than one billion users. If Facebook were a country, it would be the second-largest in the world, and closing fast on China.
- On Twitter, there are 500 million Tweets per day.
- On YouTube, 100 hours of video uploaded every minute and 6 billion hours are watched each month.

These are not just numbers; these statistics are evidence of fundamental societal change – how we live our lives.

Governments must learn to cope with political developments that proceed at an ever faster pace. Even adjusting to the “24-hour news cycle” has become less significant because it relied on a finite number of information providers whose content could be monitored by policymakers with relative ease. You could watch BBC and CNN and have a good idea about
what information global publics were receiving. Now information sources are so dispersed and numerous that governments trying to keep up with events lack systematic ways to collect and evaluate the information flow, and their policymaking becomes hesitant and reactive.

We are talking about speed, about a car with no brakes racing down a hill. Even if they themselves are not run over, policymakers cannot be mere spectators.

A fundamental incompatibility exists between speed and diplomacy. Effective diplomacy cannot be purely reactive; it requires back-and-forth among parties, an ability to listen and respond carefully. That is the traditional diplomacy with which policymakers in Japan, the United States, and elsewhere are familiar. Diplomatic practice along these lines has evolved over centuries.

But during much of the twentieth century, diplomatic practice was forced to change. Speed steadily encroached on diplomatic process as radio, and then television, and then the Internet were increasingly relied upon by the public and policymakers as principal sources of information. The diplomatic pouch became largely obsolete as foreign ministries turned first to open sources such as the BBC, CNN, and, more recently, Twitter and its siblings to find out what was going on in distant parts of the world.

Today, Japanese policymakers who deal with China, for instance, must monitor not only CCTV, Xinhua, and other Chinese broadcasters, but also Sina Weibo, QQ, and other Chinese social media. That is a massive, but essential, task.

Note that just 20 years ago the so-called “CNN effect” was at the cutting edge of media theory. The term referred to the presumed influence on policy that television coverage – particularly dramatic video content – had on policymakers.

The channel itself was used as an information source and a diplomatic messaging system. During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. Pentagon watched CNN to see what was happening on the battlefield; Saddam Hussein allowed CNN to remain in Baghdad so he had a way to send messages to Washington and the rest of the world; the public saw the war happening live and relatively unfiltered.

The more information, the better? That is a convenient theory, but suppose that information is more susceptible to manipulation and – because it is delivered in real-time – more likely to be inaccurate?

Even reports from the most highly regarded news organizations are not always correct, particularly when journalistic standards are compromised in the pursuit of getting a story first rather than first getting it right. Governments have their own information-gathering
mechanisms, in the form of diplomats and intelligence agencies, but when much of the world seems to be moving at the same breakneck speed that characterizes broadcast and online media reporting, waiting to hear from slower – even if perhaps more reliable – sources might not be politically feasible. Media not only deliver messages, they do much to determine the content of those messages.

One reason that Twitter and other social media are so important in the diplomatic process is that the public has embraced such tools and, more important, also embraced a new, fundamentally activist role for the individual citizen in terms of dealing with information. Related to this, a word we often hear is “empowerment.” Considering “empowerment” takes us to the heart of the real-time world.

“Empowerment” in this context means individuals taking control of how they get information – whether you must rely on gatekeepers (some benign, some not), or gather information for yourself, deciding when you will do so, and what you will do with it.

Less than a half-century ago, we received news when news organizations wanted to give it to us. They delivered the newspaper to our homes at five in the morning. They gave us a television newscast at six in the evening. Radio offered a sprinkling of all-news stations, but basically, when we got news was not our decision.

Then, Ted Turner had the notion that people might like getting news when they wanted it. And in 1980, CNN was born, and television news was forever changed. What CNN and other such news channels have in common is opening the door to accessing the news: We the public can get news when we want it. This is empowerment.

But while these changes were taking place, people in much of the world remained dependent in another way, relying on Western media giants such as CNN or the BBC to provide news that had not passed through various forms of censorship imposed by their own governments. Then in 1996, the Arab world began to watch Al Jazeera. A quick example of why this was so important: During the Gulf War of 1991, Arabs’ best sources for information were non-Arab – the BBC, CNN, and such. But by the time of the 2000 intifada, there was an Arab broadcaster delivering the news.

Understand the importance of this to Arabs. They could say, “Now we are seeing events in our world that affect us through our own eyes. Western media hegemony was weakened, and the “ownership” of news moved closer to the consumers of the news product. This is another manifestation of empowerment, and it is another aspect of real-time diplomacy. Publics are more trusting of news that they feel is truly their own.
Let’s jump forward in time again, to yet another new stage of technology. By 2011, increasing numbers of people throughout the world had discovered that they were no longer the “audience,” passively receiving whatever was provided them by news organizations, global or local. Using new tools such as YouTube and Twitter and Facebook, they were now “citizen journalists,” disseminators of news – “news” as they defined and discovered it. The traditional gatekeepers were becoming irrelevant. This, too, is empowerment.

It is in this context, this time of media-based empowerment, that we should consider the transformation of diplomacy. Keep in mind that one thing these new media have in common is speed of delivery. This speed in itself can dictate the pace of diplomacy, and if you subscribe to the theory that fast diplomacy is usually bad diplomacy, you can see the perils that loom.

But remember that speed is accompanied by a vastly expanded supply of information, plus the expectation by citizens that they are no longer outsiders. Empowered by fast information flow, they expect to participate.

One of my favorite books about international relations is Harold Nicolson’s Diplomacy, published first in 1939. Nicolson wrote, “In the days of the old diplomacy it would have been regarded as an act of unthinkable vulgarity to appeal to the common people upon any issue of international policy.”

Today, it would be an act of unthinkable political stupidity to disregard “the common people” (now more felicitously referred to as “the public”) in the conduct of foreign affairs. With their unprecedented access to information, many people around the world have a better sense of how they fit into the global community, and they are less inclined to entrust diplomacy solely to diplomats. They want to be part of the process.

With members of the public having rising expectations about participating in this “democratic diplomacy,” diplomats must play more of a conventional political role than they may have done in the past, with constituencies far larger than the traditional foreign policy establishment.

Shrewd domestic politicians such as American secretaries of state James A. Baker and Hillary Rodham Clinton possess skills that have become essential supplements to the traditional art of diplomacy. They recognize that their domestic public is affected by high-speed news delivery, as are the publics in many of the countries with which they deal, and so their diplomacy must reflect sensitivity to shifting political currents, at home and abroad. Thanks to new communication tools – from satellite television to Twitter – the world intrudes into more lives than ever before.

A reordering of relationships is underway among those who make policy, those who carry
Henry Kissinger observed that “new technologies make it much easier to acquire factual knowledge, though they make it harder in a way to process it because one is flooded with information, but what one needs for diplomacy is to develop a concept of what one is trying to achieve. The Internet drives you to the immediate resolution of symptoms but may make it harder to get to the essence of the problems. It’s easier to know what people are saying, but the question is whether diplomats have time to connect that with its deeper historical context.”

Balancing recognition of historical context with the pressures generated by new information and communication technologies will require a new approach to the construction of diplomacy and to being a diplomat.

Historian Robert Darnton has noted: “Radio did not destroy the newspaper; television did not kill radio; and the Internet did not make TV extinct. In each case the information environment became richer and more complex. That is what we are experiencing in this crucial phase of transition to a dominantly digital ecology.”

It is important that policymakers understand that media history is a continuum, not totally separate eras. Recognizing this will help enable diplomats and other officials to most effectively use the appropriate media tools for their particular tasks.

Diplomats who claim to be up to date merely because they have their own Twitter accounts or Facebook pages miss the point. Many of them are enamored of gadgetry without recognizing what media tools can really do on a macro as well as micro level. The foreign policy establishment in many countries is exceedingly slow to recognize change, in this case the impact of networks that communication-based connectivity enables.

Some of the major powers still embrace strategies that worked well during the Cold War. Perhaps, in retrospect, those appear to have been desirably simpler days, with principal adversaries clearly identified and the rest of the world’s nations serving as supporting players that could be courted or ignored, depending on the superpowers’ whims. The information space could be defined and controlled; propaganda could be delivered to audiences that had few alternative sources of news about the world. That is no longer the case. The information environment today is far more competitive.

Further, the cushion of time that diplomats once enjoyed has steadily diminished. The shrinking accelerated during the past half-century, driven at first by the growing influence of television. Internet-based media have changed the nature of information flow in ways that have further necessitated rapid-reaction diplomacy.
In diplomacy as in other aspects of public policy, responding quickly and responding wisely might be very different. Traditional diplomats from the George Kennan, George Marshall, or Dean Acheson era would presumably argue that diplomacy and speed are not only incompatible, but they are fundamentally antithetical. But today’s world requires rapid response; the public expects it. Political changes are fueled by high-speed communication that causes them to zoom past careful diplomats. Good diplomatic practice should not be tossed aside, but it must adapt to the pace of events more comprehensively than it has to date.

For contrast, not nostalgia, I offer you an example of how things used to work.

It is Berlin, about 1:00 AM on Sunday, August 13, 1961. CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr was where all good journalists should be at one o’clock on a Sunday morning – in a bar. He received a call from a source telling him that East German forces were closing the border between East and West Berlin with barbed wire and barricades. Soon thereafter, this became the Berlin Wall.

Schorr and his CBS News crew filmed what was taking place and took their film to Berlin’s Tempelhof Airport, where it was put on a propeller plane going to London. From there, after sitting for some hours, it was flown to New York. Then it was taken to a film-processing lab. Even with the benefit of the time change, it was by now Sunday afternoon in the United States. The film still needed to be processed, reviewed, and edited. It finally aired on the network’s Tuesday night newscast.

Meanwhile, print coverage about events in Berlin was only somewhat faster. The first story appeared as a last-minute addition to the Sunday, August 13 edition of the New York Times – an article from Reuters with the lead paragraph saying simply, “East Germany closed the border early today between East and West Berlin.”

This relatively soft coverage was the news media backdrop against which President John F. Kennedy was to shape his response. Vacationing in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, he had been informed about events in Berlin on Sunday morning, more than twelve hours after the barricades began being set up in Berlin. Officials at the State and Defense Departments had delayed contacting the president partly because they were unsure what the East Germans were doing. U.S. policy options had been based on the assumption that any such blockading would be to seal off access to West Berlin, but Allied routes into the city were unimpeeded.

Late that morning, Secretary of State Dean Rusk called Kennedy. Following their conversation, the President determined that there was no immediate threat to American interests or personnel, and so he decided to take no immediate action. He told Rusk, “I’m going sailing,” and Rusk said, “I’m going to a baseball game.”
The apparently relaxed response of the president was in part a signal to the Kremlin that the United States was not going to react rashly and escalate the “crisis.” The president’s low-key reaction also bought time for more information to be gathered.

Press interest in the events in Berlin remained low on the news agenda. At the Monday morning White House press briefing, press secretary Pierre Salinger was not queried about Berlin until after thirty-four questions about other topics had been asked.

By the time the CBS footage of the first barricades aired on Tuesday the 15th, U.S. policymakers had a better sense of what Soviet and East German intentions were, and they were not inclined to treat the Berlin wall-building as a major Soviet policy shift requiring a provocative military response. As Kennedy aide Theodore Sorensen observed, “Not one responsible official – in this country, in West Berlin, West Germany or Western Europe – suggested that Allied forces should march into East German territory and tear the Wall down….Nor did any ally or adviser want an excited Western response that might trigger an uprising among the desperate East Berliners.”

Consider how the scenario – and the response – might have been different had today’s communication apparatus been available in August 1961. Daniel Schorr’s CBS team would not have been worried about getting their film to the airport; they would have been on the air live throughout the early morning hours in Berlin (which were in the midst of primetime in the United States) and they would have had plenty of company, as the full array of national and global satellite news organizations would have been there with them on the scene. And so, the entire world would be watching. YouTube would feature hundreds of videos taken by spectators, Twitter would flash terse reports from onlookers in West and East Berlin, and cell phone video would attract followers to Facebook’s own walls. All this “breaking news” would be delivered in a steady stream, punctuated by dramatic speculation from television anchors and with minimal context related to larger geopolitical issues.

How would President Kennedy have responded in those circumstances? Would he have gone sailing or would he have rushed back to Washington as his advisors developed a media strategy for the crisis? Rolling some U.S. tanks up to the Berlin boundary line might make for good video and might be reassuring to Americans made nervous by alarmist news reports. The president might decide he needed to go on television himself and challenge the Communists’ tactics. Would this be good diplomacy or merely good television? What would the Soviets and their East German allies have then done?

In dealing with the 1961 Berlin crisis, Kennedy was one of the last presidents to enjoy a pace that should not be called leisurely, but certainly was not frantic. He was not pressed by a constant, high-speed flow of news being delivered to the public.
His successors found themselves facing increasingly influential television coverage and then the array of newer media. This growth in the supply of information and the speed of its flow changed the political environment in which policy decisions were made.

As media-driven changes in foreign policy take place, diplomats should develop better contacts with the general population than they do today. Former U.S. Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman has described an “expeditionary diplomat” who breaks free from the isolation of working behind embassy walls and contacting just a narrow array of host-country officials. This new approach has its risks, personal security among them, but it also has significant potential benefits. And it meets the expectations of publics growing accustomed to receiving more information from various sources.

Such expeditionary diplomacy would be part of a greater emphasis on public diplomacy. Working with publics, not just governments, is particularly important now that communication technologies have empowered individuals in terms of their ability to access information and connect with one another. More than ever before, they can learn about the larger world. That is why my earlier example of the Japanese diplomat in London is so significant.

For too long, public diplomacy has been looked on by some as being a “nice” but nonessential exercise that supplements traditional, manipulative propaganda efforts. If that was ever true, it certainly is not the case now. In a real-time, networked society, power can emanate from the public, and therefore developing and maintaining ties with publics around the world is an essential element of foreign policy.

Doing so will require more resources than most countries make available today, and, more important, it means making public diplomacy much more central in the creation and implementation of foreign policy. This will require remapping the terrain of international relations, with traditional state-to-state linkages being enlarged to incorporate far more state-to-people programs than now exist and to make them much more integral in a nation’s diplomacy.

One of the factors behind these needed changes is a sophisticated appreciation of the ways that social media have displaced other forms of information dissemination. Traditionally, there were distinct providers and consumers of content. The consumers were passive recipients, selecting items from a very limited menu of offerings. The public had little ability to be providers themselves except in limited ways, such as through writing letters or talking face-to-face or on the telephone.

Within the past few years, all this has changed. Almost anyone can both gather and disseminate information. The most widespread tool for this is the mobile telephone. Record a few minutes of video on your phone, post it on YouTube, and millions can watch whatever
you have decided is newsworthy. For many, such “news” consists of the cute antics of a child, but others, such as those who recorded images of a protest somewhere in China or an attack on Muslims in Myanmar become independent, one-person news suppliers – “journalists” in a broad sense of the word.

Beyond dissemination of information, these social media tools can force changes in the way foreign ministries and individual diplomats deal with the world. Consider this case, involving a young woman in Iran in 2009.

On June 20, 2009, Neda Agha-Soltan left her parents’ Tehran home to join the protests against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in the presidential election. Neda was by no means a hard-core radical, but she had voted eight days earlier and was furious about the reported results. With a friend, she ventured into the chaos of the politically charged streets.

Then, a single gunshot. It was apparently fired by a sniper on a rooftop. Neda slumped to the ground, bleeding profusely. The bullet had apparently struck her heart; as she lay on the ground blood flowed from her chest, then from her mouth and nose.

Someone nearby used a mobile phone to capture video of Neda as she went to the ground and as she died, less than a minute later. The images are gruesome and gripping; a close-up shows the blood running in streams across her face.

The Iranian government had blocked access to YouTube, but within moments the person who filmed the murder had e-mailed the video to several friends, one of whom was in the Netherlands and beyond the Iranian barriers. Minutes later, it appeared on YouTube, shortly thereafter on CNN and elsewhere, and soon the whole world knew Neda.

Like many other Internet tools, YouTube disseminates information globally and at lightning speed. With millions throughout the world already paying attention to events in Iran, the “viral” spread of the Neda video was no surprise. It appears in numerous versions on YouTube, some of which have been viewed more than a million times.

The video transformed the world’s perception of the Iran uprising. Before, for most of the world, the protests had been a remote event, with anonymous demonstrators protesting something most people outside Iran did not care about. It was just more politics. But now, there was a name and a face; a beautiful young woman dying in full view of millions. Even people who knew nothing about the Ahmadinejad regime (or even about Iran) became angry about the murder of Neda.

That sounds simplistic, and it is. But high-speed, global media can transcend conventional political reasoning. Watch Neda’s death – the video is still available on YouTube – and see how you react. This was a person, not an issue. She was Neda, and YouTube brought her close to millions. Although some argue that video can touch the heart while bypassing the brain, as a
matter of practical politics dramatic images have innate power that cannot be disregarded.

In earlier years, Neda’s death would have passed unremarked except by her family and friends. But because of one person with a mobile phone, Neda and her fate became known to the world. That one person became, for the moment, a journalist, and the gatekeepers were powerless to stop him from reaching the real-time world. This is part of the new reality of real-time diplomacy.

The rise of social media has contributed to the displacement of traditional hierarchies by networks. Diplomacy and other political mechanisms will need to be realigned to deal with the rise of networks. The stratified structures of leadership common in most states will not disappear overnight, but the dispersed elements of networks will become more significant as the newest communication technologies become more widespread, fostering increased connectivity among these elements.

The ability to reconfigure is the key to decentralized networks’ effectiveness. This can be seen in terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. In many cases, a traditional hierarchic structure lacks the agility to avoid fast and ferocious suppression by established forces of power, and does not possess networks’ communication orientation. The adaptability of networks also adds levels of complexity to diplomacy because networks’ protean nature can disrupt the consistency on which diplomats prefer to rely. (Governments have trouble comprehending a “leaderless” enterprise.)

Given networks’ flexibility and their interconnected but dispersed nodes, social media are essential tools in providing cohesion within the network. They are well suited for providing the non-linear communication that network participants require.

In this part of the world, the challenges of the real-time era are particularly complex. We have technologically advanced countries – Japan, Korea, Singapore, and China among them – but none of these has yet proved truly dominant. China has certainly spent the most money – for instance, the equivalent of US$6 billion on its international broadcasting – but has little to show in the way of definitive results. As for social media, China has created its own alternatives to Facebook and Twitter, and it aggressively censors online content. But it appears that almost every Chinese teenager has figured out how to jump over the firewalls and join non-Chinese social media networks. Isolation is increasingly difficult in this new era.

To enhance its influence within this region and beyond, countries such as Japan should take several steps.

First, adjust diplomatic processes to reflect the demands of the real-time world. Be
prepared for the YouTube videos or other social media content that race through public consciousness instantly. Foreign ministries must prepare themselves both to respond to and initiate this kind of communication. Policies should be created that assign responsibilities in advance for this process.

Second, friendly countries should work together to address real-time crises that endanger regional stability. For example, North Korea, through weapons tests or other military activity, is always capable of provoking public alarm. To avoid allowing public concern to reach the point at which it affects wise policymaking, governments throughout the region should coordinate their real-time response and social media content. Remember that information will be reaching the public through numerous channels at high speed, and that it is important to not allow that information flow to get too far ahead of governments’ own information dissemination.

Third, policymakers should ensure that they listen to the voices of social and other real-time media. This is “open-source intelligence” and is available to anyone who cares to listen. Much can be learned, for example, from Chinese social media content that runs counter to the Chinese government’s official pronouncements. In China and elsewhere, criticism of governments that a few years ago might have been fully suppressed now can emerge on social media (although sometimes only briefly), and policymakers elsewhere should be listening and preparing their responses. Those responses should use the same social media venues to reach targeted publics.

Fourth, policymakers must educate themselves in the technological capabilities of the real-time world. This does not mean that every policymaker must be a high-tech wizard, but rather that she or he recognizes the enormous changes that these media have made in terms of empowerment of the public. Individual citizens now see themselves as partners in providing information and acting on it. They expect more from governments – more openness and more responsiveness. They expect real-time reaction to real-time information, wherever that information may be coming from. If governments fail to understand these changes, they will find themselves increasingly alienated from their own and global publics.

In this lecture, I have offered lessons from the past and tried to anticipate the future. Reflecting on the past is always useful, but the pressures of modernity are the principal factors reshaping diplomacy today. For example, consider the uproar about the allegedly slow response of the outside world to the fast-accelerating events in many Arab states during 2011. In evaluating such criticism, a question arises: How can any policymaker keep up with the vast amount of information coming from a vast number of sources?

The public’s expectations are geared to the speed of the information flow, but that does not
necessarily mean that those who govern should try to match their policy implementation to the
date of this flow. As I noted earlier, fast policymaking is often unwise policymaking, but that
is an inadequate answer to those who are accustomed to getting their news with the click of a
computer mouse and expect to see crises resolved by the next time they click. I do not endorse
trying to match the pace of diplomacy to the speed of social and other media, but I do suggest
that policymakers must do a better job of addressing the political realities and technological
capabilities of a social-media-oriented society that relies heavily on networks of various kinds
to acquire the information used in decision making and political action.

Although no precise how-to-do-it formula emerges from considering these matters, these
thoughts may, I hope, help establish the context in which policymakers and the public will be
considering and responding to political events for years to come.

All this underscores the importance of public diplomacy-reaching out to foreign publics
directly, rather than solely through their governments. Today this is more technologically
feasible and more politically essential than ever before. Publics expect to be spoken to and
they expect to be heard. This makes listening, one of the most underrated of diplomatic skills,
exceptionally important.

If diplomats fail to listen, they will miss important voices, many of them belonging to non-
state actors. In Egypt in 2011, the Facebook page of “We Are All Khaled Said” provided real-
time insights into the movement that was reshaping Egypt many months before the world was
jolted by events on Tahrir Square. Intelligence services have come to recognize the value of
monitoring the online products of Al Qaeda and its siblings. On a more benign level, listening
to global publics can provide invaluable insights about social and political attitudes, which can
allow diplomats to more precisely evaluate the environments in which they work. The content
on Sina Weibo, for instance, provides useful information about trends in China, and similar
examples abound.

No longer are these “just the media.” The distance between media content and public
opinion has been narrowed greatly by the participatory nature of social media. Policymakers
can use this to their advantage, or they can be seriously undermined by it. The choice is largely
their own.

Pulling together all these many factors, should we be optimistic or pessimistic about the
future of diplomacy? The equalizing effect of new communication technologies can bring
greater closeness to the individual citizen’s relationship to her or his state, and therefore
enhances the work of diplomats who champion democracy, human rights, and related ideals. On
the other hand, publics can now band together through media-enhanced networks and distance themselves from governments and even oppose those governments.

As for speed – a key element of “real-time diplomacy” – there is no going back to the day when President John F. Kennedy could go sailing and feel confident that with the wind behind him he could outpace the news cycle.

Instead we must recognize that a Tweet from an embassy can precipitate a political crisis and that a YouTube video can ignite violent mobs. Real-time diplomacy must be developed with full recognition of such new realities.

I remain optimistic about this new diplomatic environment because I have faith in the positive effects of broader dissemination of information to broader publics. Diplomats will gradually adjust to the newest media forms just as they did to the advent of television, and before that to radio and other “modern” media.

This will not be easy; there will be plenty of mistakes and corrections along the way. But what is undeniable is that politics and power are being reconfigured as we explore the world of real-time diplomacy.

【質疑応答の一部】
【中村登志哉教授】ありがとうございました。大変包括的なお話をいただきまして勉強になりました。日本について質問がございます。シープ先生が講義の中でも触れのように、世界の中で日本は世界の多くの国々と友好な関係を保っています。外務省の毎年の世論調査におきましても、多くの国で対日感情は決して悪くはなく、むしろ良いことがあるかもしれません。ところが、先生のお話の中にもありましたように、二つのアジアの国において日本は大きな問題を抱えています。言うまでもなく、中国と韓国です。領土問題や歴史認識を巡り、困難な関係に陥っております。日本政府は外務省に2004年にパブリック・ディプロマシーを担当する部署を設置して取り組んできています。そこで伺いたいのは、中国や韓国との関係において不信の構造を脱し、よりよい関係を築くためには、どのようなコミュニケーションを図るべきか、もしシープ先生が日本政府にアドバイスをするとすれば、どんなアドバイスをされますか。
【シープ教授】そのようなアドバイスをすることには、いつも躊躇するのですが、最初に申し上げたいのは、中国あるいは韓国に対処する際に、やはり聞く耳を持つということだと思います。なるべく包括的に耳を傾ける。世論は中国や韓国でどうなって
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いるか。例えば（中国の）微博（Weibo）で何が書かれているか。あるいは、韓国のソーシャルメディアでは、日本のことをどう言っているかを知ることです。好意的な意見を持ってもらうことよりも、むしろ国民が何を言っているかに、しっかり耳を傾けるべきだと思います。時に政府の公式見解と国民の意見が大きく異なることはありますので、耳を傾けるということは本当に重要です。

外交を展開する、あるいはメッセージを送る前に考えなければいけないのは、相手が何を言っているのか、そして、その話しかけたいオーディエンスは一体何を考えていているのかということを知るべきだと思っております。

今の安倍政権がどんな外交を展開しているのか詳しくは把握していませんが、いわゆる歴史認識問題があるという。この（東アジア）地域、あるいは他地域もそうですが、いままだに相手に対して猜疑心を持っている。日本に対して、過去の経緯から懐疑的な国はたくさんあります。ドイツに対しても同様です。これには対処しなければいけない。きちんと問題を認識し、相手の言っていることにまず耳を傾けることが重要です。もし思い込みがあれば、その場合にはそれを直す、是正してやるということ。ときに、逃げてはいけない問題だと思います。放っておけば日本の信頼に傷がつきます。ですから、対処することが実に重要なのです。逃げないと言うことです。

二つの答えをまとめると、相手国の市民が何を言っているのかに耳を傾ける、そして、逃げずに対処するということです。国際放送や教育交流プログラム、ソーシャルメディアなど、いろんな形でパブリック・ディプロマシーは展開できると思います。

【司会・井原伸浩准教授】会場からの質問をお受けします。
【中部日本放送・後藤克幸解説委員】今日は大変日が選ぶ講演をありがとうございました。地元の放送局のジャーナリストしております後藤と申します。国民の声を耳を傾けるという話は大変大事だと思いました。最近、ノーベル平和賞のマララさんのスピーチなどを聞いて感動したのですが、彼女を鰐おうとしたのはこのアジアでも勢力を持つたみバールというグループ、中東に行くと「イスラム国」とか、非常に暴力的なテログループがパワーバウンスしているのに対して、多くの人たちには不安を持っていると思います。民主主義社会と過激なイスラムのグループとの衝突、それが今後増加しないかすごく不安を感じます。（そういった）暴力的なグループも非常に最近ソーシャルメディアを巧みに活用して、広報活動をしているようですね。民主主義社会がそれに対抗して、基本的人権を大事に、教育を大切にして、人の命を大切にする社会をつづけさせるために、どのようなことがわれわれにできるか。どんな手段があるとお考えですか。
【シーブ教授】非常に重要なご質問をどうもありがとうございます。これから過激派ですけれども、ソーシャルメディアをよく使っています。例えば、あのイスラム国もそうで、ソーシャルメディアは頻繁に使い、ビデオを製作しています。ソーシャルメディア
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イアについては、ソーシャルメディアで対応することできます。「イスラム国」を例に考えます。テロリズムをピラミッドとして考えれば、そのトップには本当に悪者がいて、実際に戦闘を繰り広げている戦闘員がいます。これに対しては、ソーシャルメディアやパブリック・ディプロマシーではなく、軍事力で対応せざるを得ません。ところが、ピラミッド構造の下に行きますと、数が増えてきて、若い人もいます。これらの人々に対して、何らかの形でリーチすることができればいいわけです。そこで、ソーシャルメディアによるパブリック・ディプロマシーが重要になります。なぜ重要なのか。いわゆる「アラブの春」でソーシャルメディアが大きな役割を果たしたように、ピラミッドの底辺部分を支える層にはソーシャルメディアが有効なのです。

一方で、優しい言葉を使って外交を展開するとともに、軍事力を使うというバランスが必要なのです。これは非常に難しい問題です。ソーシャルメディアの役割は非常に高まってきますけれども、ソーシャルメディアだけに期待するのは間違っていません。

【M1・松島悠司君】メディアプロフェッショナルコースの松島と申します。ソーシャルメディアよりも新しい、次なる未だまだ登場していないメディアというのはどのようなものになるかと考えていて、ソーシャルメディアはこれまでのメディアになかった双方向性をもたらしましたが、次の大変は現状では、どのようなものを補うような形で登場するのでしょうか。

【シーブ教授】それが分かっていたら、私はお金持ちになったと思います。技術というものは今後もどんどん発展するので、いろんなものが考えられることと思います。ただ、一つ分かっていることがあります。それは従来型のメディアがやはり変わってしまうなければならないということであります。そうしないと生き残っていくことはできないのです。メディアはどんどん新しくなってきています。例えば、ニューヨークタイムズのような新聞を考えてみて下さい。ニューヨークタイムズはこれからも残っていくと思います。しかし、インクで印刷した紙のものではなく、デジタル製品になっているのかもしれません。そして、より洗練されたホームプリンターが出てくると思いますので、紙でもらうよりも自分で印刷するということもあると思います。ビジネスモデルもどんどん変わっていくでしょう。

私が教っているコミュニケーション・ジャーナリズム学部では、学生の親がいつも心配していることがあります。それは、ジャーナリズムには将来がないのではないか、だから、自分の娘あるいは息子が仕事に就けないのでないかと恐れているのです。

例えば、私は毎朝、6つのニュースレターを受信しています。ほとんどが外交や防衛に関するもので、Eメールで送ってきます。無料のものもあれば、購読しているものもあります。だれかがそれを書いていて、しかも、非常に質が高いものがあります。ニューヨークタイムズとかワシントンポストではない、執筆者が書いているわけ
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です。そういったものを書いて、ちゃんと売れているのです。これからの、より専門化したジャーナリストが出てくると思います。ニュースや、報道に関わる職種が失われるということではなくて、ニュースの発信の方法、受信の方法が変わってくる。それは、メディアを勉強している皆さんにも関わってくるでしょう。親御さんたちが心配しているかもしれませんが、大丈夫だと思います。

私の大学ではかつて、プリント・ジャーナリズムを学ぶ学科と放送とが分かれていました。その後で、プリント・ジャーナリズムと放送、それからオンライン・ジャーナリズムに分けられました。しかし、今もうそういう区別はありません。全員がすべてを勉強するのです。ですから、書けなくてはいけない、ビデオも撮れなくてはいけない、オンラインに出ることもできなければいけない。新築されたニュースルームで、すべての媒体について教えているのです。これをクロストレーニングと呼んでいますが、垣根をなくして教える。これからのジャーナリストはこうしたことが求められているわけです。皆さんにも、あらゆるタイプのメディアが扱えるようになっていってほしいと思います。

（質疑応答記録・何丹さん、丹羽葉月さん、写真撮影・許雅淇さん）