The Modern Concept of Man and Hume on Personal Identity

Hitoshi TAMURA

The purpose of this paper is to make clear what is Hume’s true contribution to our understanding of the problem of personal identity. I introduce two anthropological theories about the history of the concept of a person in the western civilization, one of which is presented by Marcel Mauss and the other by Louis Dumont. Both give us essentially the same picture. In the western history, detachment from (in Mauss), or renouncement of (in Dumont), society has given a human being the inner sense of self as distinguished from social status. In the Book One of *Treatise*, Hume tries to explain the mental process of making up the identity of a person by means of perceptions and the principles of their relation. He, however, ends up with getting into a labyrinth and cannot find his way out of it. In the Book Two of *Treatise*, He tries to describe the emergence of self in terms of social relationship. He does not see it as necessary to renounce society. But we can make a plausible description of the emergence of a person with the inner sense of self in a natural extension of the Humean explanation. Hume has come near to the correct understanding of the sociological mechanism of the emergence of the modern individual. He tells us, though implicitly, that we can have self as something concrete only when we live in the social relationships with others that could mean the Maussean detachment or the Dumontian renouncement.

1. Introduction

In this paper I will try to make clear what is Hume’s true contribution to our understanding of the problem of personal identity. Obviously he does not show us a clear-cut solution of it. He tells us in the Appendix of Treatise that he has got into a labyrinth and cannot find his way out of it when he makes a strict review of the problem. He says: “I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head” (T Appendix 20; SBN 636). Hume believes that personal identity is a fiction, but he knows that he cannot give an acceptable explication of the mental process of making it up. He sees some problem there but does not tackle nor solve it.

Commentators have not yet come to agree concerning exactly what seems to Hume to be the fundamental difficulty about personal identity. I will not try to settle this exegetic

---

1 I read this paper at the 24th Hume Conference, Monterey, California, 1997. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Jane L. McIntyre and John Biro for helpful comments at the Conference. This paper is published for the first time, though it was included in the compilation of the handouts for the Conference and in the Study Report of the Grant-in-aid For Scientific Research of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Grant Number 07801002, March 1998.

2 The citation of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* is given in the standard style, that is, the book, part, section, paragraph number of Hume 2000 (T) and the page number of Hume 1978 (SBN).
issue, because I do not have much interest in understanding what Hume might consider as a predicament. Rather, I am interested in what we can find in his treatment of the problem. It seems to me that the value of Hume’s arguments is just to show us the intricacy of the problem. His treatment indicates that no one can solve it merely by philosophical reflection on the mind.

My interpretation of Hume is meant to be an explication of the difficulty that looms in the modern apparatus of philosophical thinking. I take this to be consciousness and its immediate objects. I will look at the problem of personal identity not only from a philosopher’s but also from an anthropologist’s point of view. The latter will make it easy for us to see the true problem that Hume has fallen into. For anthropologists can look through the problems of modernity in a broad context based on cultural comparison.

2. A human being and the concept of person

First of all, we have to distinguish two concepts of person; a person as a natural being and a person as a moral being. I mean by the former a species of animal, i.e., homo sapiens. About the latter, Locke gives a classical definition. He says that the term “person” is “a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit” (ECHU 2-27-26). Thus, a person is a human being seen from a moral point of view. He gives a definition of a person as follows: it is “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it” (ECHU 2-27-9). In contradistinction to this, he says that the idea of a man “is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form” (ECHU 2-27-8). In Lockean terminology, “a man” is a sample of Homo sapiens, and “a person” is a thinking intelligent being. From now on I will use these conceptions as Locke does.

This distinction is important to any theory of personal identity, because what is to be established in such a theory is not the identity of a human being but that of a person. Can we distinguish, however, a person from a human being in terms of Locke’s definition? Apparently, it is easy. A person is a thinking being with self-consciousness but a human being is merely an animal of a certain kind. But this is wrong, of course. Locke says: “tis not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone, that makes the idea of a man in most people’s sense; but of a body so and so shaped joined to it ... the same successive body not shifted all at once, must as well as the same immaterial spirit go to the making of the same man” (ECHU 2-27-8). A human being is a body so and so shaped conjoined to a thinking being. A human being also has the capacity of thinking. What can think must have consciousness. Then, not only a person but also a human being has consciousness. Having consciousness, therefore, cannot be the distinguishing trait of a person.

The fact that both a person and a human being can think and have consciousness

---

3 The citation of Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is given in the standard style, that is, the book-chapter-section number of Locke 1975 (ECHU).
The Modern Concept of Man and Hume on Personal Identity

makes it difficult to decide what a person is and what the criteria of its identity are. A person is something more than a human being. But it is not clear what the additional conditions for a human being to be a person are. An anthropological point of view will show us the socio-historical background of this conceptual puzzle about “a person” and “a human being”. I will take up two anthropologists: Marcel Mauss and Louis Dumont. Both have their own theory about the history of the concept of a person, self or individual.

3. Marcel Mauss and the concept of a person

Marcel Mauss warns us that we must not think the idea of a person, or the idea of a self, to be something “natural, clearly determined in the depths of [one’s] consciousness” (Mauss 1985, 1). To regard it as natural is a “simplistic view.” He says: “It is still imprecise, delicate and fragile, one requiring further elaboration.” But he adds something contradictory to this remark: that is, “it is plain ... that there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of his body, but also at the same time of his individuality, both spiritual and physical” (Mauss 1985, 3).

These remarks seem to be incompatible. If any human being must be aware of her spiritual and physical individuality, then the idea of a self cannot escape her. She must be aware of the bodily self, as she knows that she has a body and that she cannot be happy if it is injured. She must also be aware of her spiritual self, as she knows what she wants to be in the future and what she has done in the past. If this is true, then the idea of a self is something quite natural.

We may say, moreover, that any animal is aware of its self in this sense. Even a single-celled organism can avoid toxic substances, hence it can be said, in a sense, that it holds its own body as what should be protected against a possible harm. Higher animals can perform more complicated tasks of self-protection. In doing these, they must be aware of their physical existence, i.e. of their bodily selves. Their spiritual individuality may be controversial. But it is evident, I believe, that some higher mammals have the capacity of learning from past experience. It seems to me, moreover, that some of them can anticipate the future. If so, they are aware of their past and future. In this sense, they are aware of their intentional individuality, even if this awareness covers a very limited compass. As a biological matter of fact, many creatures, including Homo sapiens, have natural awareness of self. Self-awareness in this sense must belong to the natural history of animals.

The implication of this biological fact, however, is that the natural awareness of self is not what Mauss describes as delicate and fragile. This must be quite sturdy and resilient, because this is the biologically necessary condition of survival. It is not the natural history of self that Mauss wants to talk about. What is “requiring further elaboration” is the self in society, not in nature.

Mauss tells us a social history of the idea of a person or a self, one that covers the vast range from primitive societies to modernity. He tells us that at the beginning a person is just a social rôle (la personnage). In the society of the Pueblos “the clan is conceived of as being made up of a certain number of persons, in reality of ‘characters’ (personnages)” (Mauss
Two points are important: “the existence of a limited number of forenames in each clan; and the definition of the exact rôle played by each one in the ‘cast-list’ of the clan, and expressed by that name” (Mauss 1985, 4). The driving force of clans and of the societies is superimposed upon the lives of male members of the clan. It sustains “sole heirs of those that bear their forenames” (Mauss 1985, 6). Thus, the social rôle designated by a particular name is the essence of the beginning stage of the idea of person. This ‘person’ is absorbed in his clan but can be distinguished from it as an entity that subsists “in one of his descendants endowed with the same status, forenames, titles, rights and functions” (Mauss 1985, 6).

At the end of Mauss’s history, in modernity, a person is considered as “the indivisible self” (Mauss 1985, 22) and “the condition of consciousness and of science, of Pure Reason” (ibid.). This end product is the pure consciousness of an individual who is thought to be able to subsist by herself. In the intermediate stages, there are various conceptions of person which can be characterized by diverse mixtures of social factors and individual factors. For example, in the Roman era “all freemen of Rome were Roman citizens, all had a civil personae” (Mauss 1985, 16). “The ‘person’ . . . is more than . . . a right to assume a rôle… It is a basic fact of law” (Mauss 1985, 14). A human being can be looked upon as a person from a legal point of view.

The most important thing in between the first stage and the last is the Christian concept of a person. Mauss puts it: “Our own notion of the human person is still basically the Christian one” (Mauss 1985, 19). In the Christian conception “the person is a rational substance, indivisible and individual” (Mauss 1985, 20). Mauss suggests that the individuality or unity of a person has something to do with unity of the Trinity and unity of the two natures of Christ. I do not know exactly what Mauss means here. I can only guess that the conviction of monotheism may bring about the concept of a human being that lives a religious life led to only one god with having only one will. The Christian self may be defined as the single will to love God, or to live for the sake of God, who is the single cause of the universe. The indivisibility of a person can be thought to be a logical consequence of the oneness of will in a human being.

Mauss’s history of the idea of a person or a self can be summed up as follows: it is a transition from the idea of a person as a social rôle to the idea of a person as an individual consciousness or an inner self. At the beginning, the individual who plays the rôle is of little importance. At the end, what he is in society is of little importance. A social rôle can be real only when somebody plays it. But just somebody playing it is enough. Thus, a person in a society comes into being as somebody with a definite social rôle. In the Christian era everybody can be regarded as a will to live in the love of God. A human being is an indivisible self in relation to God. Then a human person can be defined only by the relation to God. There is no need to mention social circumstances.

The concept of an inner self thus characterized can be seen in today’s philosophical talk. You may talk about personal identity without mentioning social circumstances. The self that is the condition of consciousness and of science, of morality, of reason, etc. shows up in talk without any relation to something that surrounds it. Is it possible to talk about it in this way? Hume’s predicament in the Book 1 must have something to do with this question, I guess. But I would like to see another history of the concept of individual, one told by Louis
4. Louis Dumont and the emergence of the individual

In his description of the conceptual history of the individual, Dumont makes use of two sets of contrastive concepts: the holistic type of society and the individualistic type of society and the outworldly individual and the inworldly individual. The holistic type of society values, “in the first place, order: the conformity of every element to its rôle in the society—in a word, the society as a whole” (Dumont 1977, 4). By contrast, the individualistic type of society values, “in the first place, the individual human being, ... an embodiment of humanity at large” (ibid.). In the former, the requirements of society have priority over those of individuals. In the latter, the requirements of an individual have priority over those of the social order. Dumont is unique in admitting that the holistic type of society is prevalent in the history of the world. As he puts it: “among the great civilizations the world has known, the holistic type of society has been overwhelmingly predominant; indeed, it looks as if it had been the rule, the only exception being our modern civilization and its individualistic type of society” (ibid.). It is its peculiar evaluation of an individual that makes modernity the exception.

The concept of an individual, however, requires careful treatment. Dumont warns us that it could involve two things at the same time. “When we speak of man as an individual, we designate two concepts at once: an object out there, and a value” (Dumont 1986, 25). The former is “the individual sample of mankind, as found in all societies” (ibid.). The latter is “the independent, autonomous, and thus essentially nonsocial moral being, who carries our paramount values and is found primarily in our modern ideology of man and society” (ibid.). This corresponds to Locke’s distinction between a man (a human being) and a person, and to Mauss’s between a human being with the natural awareness of self and a person as the indivisible inner self.

The concept of the individual as a value is the central figure in Dumont’s historical account. He points out that an individual in this sense can be found in a holistic type of society such as India, though primarily it is seen in the modern, individualistic type of society. In India, the individual as a value exists as a renouncer of worldly life. “The man who is after ultimate truth foregoes social life and its constraints to devote himself to his own progress and destiny” (Dumont 1986, 25). Most important, “the renouncer is self-sufficient, concerned only with himself” (Dumont 1986, 26). This person lives outside the social world. He is a hermit and can be defined solely by his relation to the ultimate truth. In other words, he does not need society except for his physical subsistence. This is the outworldly individual.

In contradistinction to this, we can understand the concept of an inworldly individual: an individual who lives in a society but is self-sufficient, concerned only with herself. In Dumont’s words, she is an “independent, autonomous, and essentially nonsocial moral being” (Dumont 1986, 25). This is the individual in the modern society. The problem, therefore, that Dumont tackles is the historical account of the reasons why only in modern society can a human being survive as the individual as a value.
Dumont considers that the ancient western world is basically a holistic type of society, in which the individual as a value can appear only in the form of the outworldly individual. The first individuals in the western world are the early Christians. In the teaching of Christ, a human being is an individual-in-relation-to-God. This means that “man is in essence an outworldly individual” (Dumont 1986, 27). Then, Dumont’s problem can be restated as follows: why only in the history of western world could the outworldly individual come into worldly life without giving up its autonomous, nonsocial character?

He accounts the long history of the western political struggle between the sacred power of the church and the secular power of emperors and kings. He describes it as a process in which the worldly powers get gradually “contaminated by the outworldly element” (Dumont 1986, 32) and at last life in the world is “thought of as entirely conformable to the supreme value” (ibid.). According to Dumont, Calvin completes the process. “The antagonistic worldly element that individualism had hitherto to accommodate disappears entirely in Calvin’s theocracy… The individual is now in the world, and the individualist value rules without restriction or limitation. The inworldly individual is before us” (Dumont 1986, 53).

What is relevant to the problem of personal identity is the way the inworldly individual identifies herself. In Dumont’s view, it is will that gives her the means of identification. In Calvinist doctrine, God is essentially will, and His will is the archetype of human will. “Calvin’s God is ... the affirmation by proxy of man himself as will” (Dumont 1986, 54). In this doctrine, “the will applied to the world, the end sought after, the motive and inner spring of the will are extraneous; they are ... essentially outworldly” (Dumont 1986, 56). The identification of our will with the will of God means that “outworldliness is now concentrated in the individual’s will” (ibid.). The inworldly individual is self-sufficient and essentially nonsocial in that her identity can be established solely by her will, which is determined in relation to God, and social circumstances are completely irrelevant.

Now we have two views about the emergence of the modern concept of person or self. Both views give us essentially the same picture. Mauss tells us that the historical process can be regarded as the detachment of the individual from her social rôle. At the end of the process she is considered as the inner self, and her social rôle is thought to be completely irrelevant to who she is. Dumont tells us that the process of the emergence of the modern individual can be regarded as the process through which an outworldly individual comes in this world without giving up her nonsocial character.

I think we have an answer of the question already stated at the end of the section 2: what are the additional conditions for a human being to be a person? One of the conditions is, according to Mauss and Dumont, a particular type of relationship between a human being and the society in which she lives. It is the negative relationship between person and society. In Maussian terms, a human being who detaches herself from society and established her self in terms of consciousness alone may be regarded as a person in its modern sense. In Dumontian terms, a human being who renounces worldly values and establishes herself as an autonomous will may be regarded as the modern individual. In other words, a person is distinguished from a natural human being insofar as she rejects the social arrangement of her status, and her identity is established solely by her consciousness and intentionality.
5. Hume on personal identity

5-(1) The heap-of-perceptions theory and the multiple self

In the Appendix for his Treatise, Hume tells that he has come to understand that the identity of a person cannot be established merely by means of reflection about the immediate objects of consciousness or, in his terminology, perceptions. It seems to me that his arguments in the Book 1 constitute a proof of the impossibility of the derivation of personal identity from the natural awareness of self in a human being.

It is said that the Humean predicament about the explanation of personal identity is the circularity of the arguments. He says that “the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other” (T Appendix 20; SBN 635). Whose perceptions does a person reflect on? If it is his, then this is just a plain instance of begging the question. But Hume’s arguments can be regarded as a more sophisticated one.

Hume holds a mind to be “a heap or collection of different perceptions” (T 1.4.2.39; SBN207). The totality of the heap of perceptions can be said to be the mental space of a human being. There are certain natural relations that unite the perceptions. The uniting principle is to be regarded as a gentle force. Hume says: “there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which constitutes a thinking being” (T 1.4.2.39; SBN 207). Thus, an object that lacks a relation to this mass of perceptions is the thing that is not thought of. In other words, the existence of a relation stands for the mental capacity that can be taken for consciousness. The term ‘thought’ can be understood in a very broad sense. An object that is thought of may be perceived, or remembered, intended, and so forth. In remembering, the remembered object is again a perception. Then, there is a relation among the heap of perceptions that is being a memory of. A perception x can be a memory of another perception y. Here we have a basic apparatus to interpret Hume’s account of personal identity.

Hume tries to explain the mental process of making up the identity of a person by means of perceptions and the principles of their relation. It is the resemblance of perceptions that gives rise to the idea of identity. Memory produces the resemblance. Given that resemblance is a natural relation among perceptions, there appears quite naturally a cluster of perceptions in the mental space. This cluster is made up by the relation of “being the memory of”.

Suppose that a boy was flogged when he was robbing an orchard. After a year he remembers it. He has a memory of his experience, which is in essence an idea of the impression of the bitter experience. He may have several occasions that can remind him of the experience. The memory images (the ideas) resemble the original impression, so that the imagination goes from one to the other easily and produces a fictitious conception that these perceptions as a whole have identity through time. The impression and the ideas seem to be making up one cluster of perceptions. Hume puts it: “must not the frequent placing of these
resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object?” (T 1.4.6.18; SBN 261) So far, so good.

Suppose again the boy at another time has another experience of being praised and that he has occasions to remember it. He has then another cluster of perceptions, which is made up of the original impression and the ideas of it. This second cluster made of the experience of being praised is different from the first one of being flogged. For the original impression is different. Both clusters can bring about a fictitious entity which appears to have identity through time. The second entity brought about by the second cluster, however, is not the same as the first one. It is because the imagination must run along the different perceptions in each case.

It is possible that a cluster contains a great many perceptions. Suppose that someone gets into a dangerous situation at a moment $t_1$. He reflects upon his past experience. He has a cluster of perceptions which contains many scenes of his life. He gets over the situation, deciding what to do with recourse to his memory. The cluster of perceptions, or the view of his past experience, will produce a fictitious entity that appears to have identity through time. In this case, the entity is something similar to self. The entity is in reality a cluster of perceptions which is combined by the principle of their natural association. Perhaps the perceptions are connected not only by resemblance but also by causation and contiguity. Suppose again, at another time $t_2$, he falls into danger again. He manages to get out of it with another reflection upon his life, that is, another cluster of perceptions. Then, there are two clusters of perceptions each of which is a different view of his past experience. They may have some perceptions in common, since each of them is made up of the various scenes of his life. Each will produce a fictitious entity that gives rise to the idea of identity through time. But it is not necessarily the case that these two clusters constitute one and the same entity. This is simply because they must contain different members, otherwise they would be extensionally one and the same cluster of perceptions. Now this person has apparently two selves. And I think this is the case.

Experience tells us what to do in such and such a situation. Suppose that at $t_1$ a person’s past experience teaches him that he might as well tell a lie to get over the situation. But at $t_2$, another view of his past experience may suggest that he has to tell the truth to cope with a new situation. In each occasion, his view of past experience gives an appropriate command to his action. According to it, he can deal with the tough situation in each case. But the moral commands that the clusters put forward are incompatible with each other. He can prudently protect himself on each occasion, but from time to time he switches his moral point of view.

I think we can conclude two things. First, it can be said that he has an image of self at each time. For he has a view of his past life and he can derive some moral command out of the cluster of perceptions that make up his past. Moreover, according to Hume’s explication, the cluster can give rise to one continuing object. I think we may call this object his self. Secondly, the self at $t_1$ is not identical with the self at $t_2$. They must be extensionally different, as we have seen above. They are different in their content, since the self at $t_1$ is such an entity that commands him to tell a lie but the self at $t_2$ does just the opposite. If you feel
that these two things must put forward the same moral command as far as they are called self, then you beg the question and commit yourself to a circular argument. It is not certain that on Hume’s account the diverse images of the self should converge into one. We must not presuppose that one should have one and the same self all through the life. We have to admit that one can have several selves.

The person in the example has a good awareness of self so far as he can succeed in self-protection. He knows how to do things upon his prudential policy at any occasion. He may be a very shrewd person. It does not seem to me, however, that he is a person with identity through time. Of course, he is a human being with identity through time. But his self is switched from one to another, according to the situation in which he finds himself. In Lockean terms, he is “the same thinking thing in different times and places” as a human being but he is not that as a person, that is, as self. In order to be a person with identity through time, he has to make his diverse selves converge into one and the same entity. Hume’s account does not assure us that such a convergence necessarily takes place. It may be true that the imagination runs along a train of perceptions and that there emerges naturally a fictitious conception that the perceptions as a whole should make up one continuing object. But from time to time the resulting objects may be different from each other, so that any one of them is not the entity that sustains the person’s identity. In short, Hume shows us how the self-awareness of a human being is made up but not that of a person.

5-(2) Self and society in Hume

Hume takes it for granted that a human being must carry her personal identity with her. He is perplexed, as his argument in Book 1 has not yielded a successful explanation of this. As we have seen, however, it can be regarded as success in showing that personal identity cannot be derived from perceptions and the natural relations among them.

We have seen that Marcel Mauss and Louis Dumont suggest that the concept of a person, self or individual becomes a matter of great importance for a human being only in some particular socio-historical context. Christianity aside, detachment from (in Mauss), or renunciation of (in Dumont), society will give a human being the inner sense of self as distinguished from social status. Only when going against the society, they imply, can you feel yourself to be an independent, autonomous moral being. They may seem to be saying that social relationships are irrelevant to personal identity. In reality, detachment and renunciation are social relationships in negative form. One needs society in order to be nonsocial. Therefore, the concept of a person, self or individual is essentially social one.

In Book 2 of Treatise, Hume tries to describe the emergence of self in terms of social relationships. He does not see it as necessary to renounce society. But he realizes that some social condition is indispensable in order to obtain the self that is not so unsteady as the self gained merely by reflection upon perceptions. Self is introduced as the object of pride and humility. I will look at this account briefly.

It is “the double relation betwixt ideas and impressions” (T 2.1.5.8; SBN289) that generates pride or humility. Jane L. McIntyre describes the mechanism well. “The pleasure caused by something related to me is associated with the pleasurable feeling of pride; the
cause itself is related to the idea of the self. These two associations reinforce each other, generating the feeling of pride, and turning my attention towards myself” (McIntyre 1989, 551).

The feeling of pride is in essence a “justified self-satisfaction”. It is said that in English the word “pride” often suggests private self-regard, rather than a public expression of it (Hayakawa 1968, 54). I am afraid that it might be mistaken for a nonsocial feeling confined and enjoyed within one’s mind. But Hume clearly realizes this would be wrong. When a man is proud of a beautiful house, one of the necessary conditions of having the feeling of pride is the fact that this house belongs to him and not to anyone else. “Beauty, consider’d merely as such, unless plac’d upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity” (T 2.1.2.6; SBN 279). What is essential in producing pride in me is the fact that something good belongs to me and not to anyone else. The feeling of pride and humility tacitly refers to the distinction and comparison between me and someone else. As Hume puts it: “According as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we feel either of those opposite affections, and are elated by pride, or dejected with humility” (T 2.1.2.2; SBN 277; ital. added). The word “advantage” means “the state of being in a stronger or better position than others” (Sinclair 1987). Comparison with others is an indispensable element of being advantageous and, consequently, of being proud of something. The self is introduced into our conception by this comparison as well as by introspection.

The self thus introduced is not merely a transient train of perceptions. It has concrete content fixed by the double relation. The content is just the feeling of pride or humility. This will not change as far as the double relation between ideas and impressions does not change. Someone proud of his beautiful house must have a different set of perceptions every time when he reflects upon his self by introspection. Consequently the clusters of perceptions are different from each other. But every cluster of perceptions, which is extensionally distinct, must result in the same content. He, the self, is filled with the feeling of pride with regard to his beautiful house. This feeling recurs as long as the double relation is stable, though the cluster of perceptions, which constitutes the self gained introspectively, is always transient.

The self introduced as the object of pride and humility may seem to be far from a person as an independent moral being. But I do not think this is true. Suppose one comes to realize that having a beautiful house is rather meaningless. One is determined not to be proud of one’s house nor any of his possessions. Possession is unimportant, one thinks. The person, who was filled with vanity and pride, now comes to have his own way of thinking. He has established his system of values. Thus he goes somehow against this worldly-minded society and would not like to make use of the received ways of thinking. Then he must be able to grasp what he has in mind in terms of his own way, so that he is able to see who he is without recourse to thinking about anyone other than himself. Thus he can consider himself as the same thinking thing in different times and places in the manner peculiar to a modern individual. He becomes self-sufficient. He is a Lockean person, or he reaches the stage of the Dumontian inworldly individual.
6. Conclusion

We now have a description of the emergence of a person with identity through time. Our description thus far is easily gained as a natural extension of the Humean explanation of pride and humility. It is plausible, therefore, that Hume has come near to the correct understanding of the sociological mechanism of the emergence of the modern individual. Hume tells us, though implicitly, that the identity of a person cannot be derived merely from an introspection of the mind and that we can have self as something concrete only when we live in social relationships with others.

References