2024-03-29T10:49:53Z
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/oai
oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00010108
2023-01-16T03:55:58Z
1076:1077:1078
Tax Competition, Spillovers, and Subsidies
Ogawa, Hikaru
open access
tax competition
spillover externality
matching grant
In the literature of local public finance, one of the well-known property of optimal matching grant program is that the matching grant rate should increase as the degree of benefit spillovers of public goods increases. This paper presents the re-examination of properties of optimal matching grant program, using the model of Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002). The result formally captures a quite counterintuitive property of matching grant that optimal matching grant rate might decrease with the degree of spillover externality.
名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター
2004-09
eng
departmental bulletin paper
VoR
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11926
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/10108
Economic Research Center Discussion Paper
E04-4
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10108/files/paperE04-4.pdf
application/pdf
643.6 kB
2018-02-20
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10108/files/commentE04-4.pdf
application/pdf
12.3 kB
2018-02-20
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10108/files/abstractE04-4.pdf
application/pdf
11.6 kB
2018-02-20