2024-03-29T15:27:01Z
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/oai
oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00015688
2023-01-16T05:00:44Z
326:521:832:1474
Recognition, Concept Formation and Knowledge: Preliminary Consideration for the Theory of Recollection in Plato's Phaedo
KANAYAMA, Yasuhisa (Yahei)
open access
In order to clarify the exact relationship between Recollection in the Meno and that in the Phaedo, and the role of Recollection in Plato's epistemology as a whole, it is necessary to examine in detail what kind of cognition is meant, in the Phaedo, by the recollection of the Equal itself and the sense of deficiency we have, concerning equal things striving to be like the Equal itself. As a preliminary consideration for this task, I here focus on the general question of what stage Platonic recollection covers in our cognitive development, the stage of concept formation (the traditional interpretation) or that of higher learning (the interpretation of e.g. D. Scott). Against the latter interpretation, I argue that it is not necessary to limit recollection to Platonists. Even though knowledge (έπίστασθαι) of the Equal itself may be attributed only to Platonists, which is represented by "we" in the Recollection argument, its notion (έννοείν) need not be limited to them alone. Neither am I in agreement with the traditional interpretation, when it limits the core of recollection to the initial stage of concept formation, to the neglect of concept reformulation. I take it that recollection corresponds to each and every stage of the process of improving concepts or notions through constant revision and reformulation, which finally arrives at the knowledge of Forms.
School of Letters, Nagoya University
2013-03
eng
departmental bulletin paper
VoR
https://doi.org/10.18999/jousl.9.1
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/17708
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/15688
10.18999/jousl.9.1
1349-6190
Journal of the School of Letters
9
1
20
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/15688/files/jousl_9_1.pdf
application/pdf
170.9 kB
2018-02-20