2024-03-29T05:12:06Z
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/oai
oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00011298
2023-11-13T01:37:43Z
659:853:854:1219
Equilibrium Bidding Behavior in Scoring Auctions: the Case of Value-for-Money Evaluation
総合評価落札方式オークションの均衡入札 : 除算方式評価の場合
花薗, 誠
34224
Hanazono, Makoto
34225
2010-03-25
I study the equilibrium bidding behavior in procurement scoring auctions in which each bid is evaluated according to the value-for-money(quality-price ratio). In particular, I consider an auction with n bidders, each of whom receives a cost parameter for quality provision from a symmetric, independent uniform distribution, then decides whether to participate the auction by paying an entry fee, and bids a quality-price pair upon entering. The bidder with the highest value-for money experts the project with the promised quality, and receives the bidded price. I derive an equilibrium in which the probability of winning increase as the cost parameter becomes more efficient. However, this evaluation method implies a little odd bidding behavior: the equilibrium price and quality exhibit U-shape curves with respect to the cost parameter.
departmental bulletin paper
名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科
2010-03-25
経済科学
4
57
149
157
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/13171
0022-9725
jpn