2024-03-28T08:57:30Z
https://nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp/oai
oai:nagoya.repo.nii.ac.jp:00017421
2023-01-16T03:59:15Z
1076:1077:1078
Strategic Delegation in Asymmetric Tax Competition
Ogawa, Hikaru
51250
Susa, Taiki
51251
Tax competition
Strategic delegation
Terms of trade
2014-02
This study examines asymmetric tax competition under representative democracy systems. The findings show that the degree of asymmetry between countries affects the result of elections in each country, where the citizens select a policymaker to set a tax rate for the country. In particular, under certain conditions, a decisive voter in the election can select a citizen whose share of the country’s capital is higher than the decisive voter’s own share.
departmental bulletin paper
名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター
2014-02
Economic Research Center Discussion Paper
E14-3
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/19504
eng
E-Series;E14-3