アルチャート著『エンブレム』における
ルネッサンス法学の〈歴史手法〉と〈記憶術〉

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研究発表

(1)学会誌等

「ルネッサンス法学と記憶技芸」名古屋大学言語文化部紀要（1999年第１号）（発表予定）

"Alciato's Term Emblem in Renaissance Legal Context" *Emblematica* XIV (2000)　（発表予定）

研究成果：

本研究報告書は、四部で構成されている。それぞれの部は、本研究の三つの目的と次のように対応している。

第一の目的は、アルチャートが流布させた法学の<歴史手法>が、『エンブレム』（合計222篇）のなかの神話・博物・風俗の解釈のなかに具体的にどのように生きているかを、中世の神話・博物・風俗解釈との比較によって明らかにすることであった。(1)この目的を果たすための基礎準備として、アルチャートの『エンブレム』が大きく依存すると推定されるプルータルコス『倫理論集』をデーターベース化することにした。また、(2)アルチャートはそれまでのローマ法を改竄して集大成した『市民法大全』(528-34年)の条文を、条文が実際に起草されたそれぞれの時代の生態を明らかにすることによって、条文の原状回復を試みた。それと同様に、神話・博物・風俗に触れた原典に戻り、原典が書かれた時代の生態にもとづいて神話・博物・風俗の意味を汲み取るという姿勢が貫かれていることを示すことであった。

この第一の目的の(1)と(2)の成果のうち、(1)の成果が、本報告書の Part3 である。『倫理論集』はロエブ版(Plutach's *Moralia* ed. and trans. Frank Cole Babbitt(London: Heinemann, 1927))を使用してデーターベース化した。原著はロエブ版で16冊（約7200ページ）という巨大なものであったため、データベースは全体で2556ページ（約4.8メガバイト）にもおよぶ膨大な量に最終的になった。OCRを用いてデータを読み込み、そのあとに出てきた生データの整理などをおこない、なんとかコンピューター上で検索できるテキストに仕上げた（要した総時間約400時間)。データベース全体はウェッブ上に公開した。リンク先は以下の通りである。<http://lang.nagoya-u.ac.jp/~suzuki/plutarch>。今回の成果報告では、完全原稿(fair text)として提出できる全体の約20分の一の部分（『倫理論集』71作品中の最初の3作品262キロバイト）を印刷した。

第一の目的の(2)の成果が、本報告書の Part4 および Part2 である。Part4 では、アルチャート『エンブレム』（合計 222 篇)の材源が、どのようなものであったかの調査結果である。これによって各エンブレムが具体的に古典の作品とどのように関連しているか、とくにプルータルコスおよびアルチャートの法学作品の関係を示した。今回は文書の形で提示できなかったが、『エンブレム』は、各材源が書かれた時代にもっていた意味を忠実に際限しているのではなく、自分の時代にあわせた恣意的解釈に基づいていることが明らかになってきた。(具体的な例として、エンブレム46番などがある。)

本研究の第二目的は、図絵とその解説詩をワンセットとして結びつけるエンブレムの形式が、短期間に膨

大な数の法律条文や法規解釈を効率よく暗記するための実践手段であったことを明らかにすることであった。この目的を果たすために、(1)記憶がどのように考えられ、また記憶術が西洋でどのように受容されてきたか、その歴史的推移について調査した。また、それと平行して、(2)当時の法学部生や裁判官が使用していた法学提要書を探し、そのなかで図絵や図表がどのように用いられているかを詳しく調査した。

この第二の目的のうち、(1)の調査結果とそのまとめが、本報告書の Part1 の論文「記憶と記憶技芸」である。ここで、西洋、とくにローマ時代において記憶は現代のように記憶術としてではなく記憶技芸として、修辞学の一部門であったことを明らかにした。また、記憶は、これもまた現代のように頭のなかに記銘・保持することではなく、肉眼に対応する心眼があることを実証的に示した。しかも、記憶技芸は、その悦楽と無限ループ構造ゆえに、人間の認識にパラドキシカルにかかわるものであることも、現代哲学や象徴哲学を援用しながら解き明かした。

また第二目的の(2)にかんする調査結果にもとづいた論文が、本報告書の Part2 の "Alciato's *Emblemata* in Legal Context" である。現在ではエンブレム作家としてしか知られていないアルチャートは、当時はローマ法の最高権威者の一人であったことを、彼の現存する墓像を探し出して明らかにした。また、図絵と文字をドッキングさせた『エンブレム』の形式が、今回の調査によって発見された法学提要書にすでにみられること、しかもアルチャートの著作そのものにもみられることを示した。これは、従来の研究ではまったく知られていなかった新事実である。

第三の目的は、＜歴史手法＞と＜記憶術＞から得られた知見を梃子にして、アルチャートには現実に密着した歴史的興味が先行しており、神話・博物にアルチャートが付した教訓は、万人がいつの時代においても共有しうる普遍的倫理として提起されてはいなかったことを、明らかにすることであった。この成果が、本報告書の Part2 の "Alciato's *Emblemata* in Legal Context"（最終章）の部分である。第一目的の(2)の調査結果から、モットーは、かならずしもエンブレムの材源がもっている本来の意味と一致しておらず、歴史的興味というよりも同時代的興味が先行していることが明らかになってきた。そこで浮かび上がってきたのが、そのような興味を許す知的文化的枠組みであった。その枠組みとは、あらゆる知識を網羅的にもつことをめざすサークル＜エンキュリア＞ある。これは、法律学がそもそももっており、法律家に要請されていた制度である。『エンブレム』のモットーがもっているベクトルを支配しているのは、無限に広がる知識を一冊の本のなかに封じこめようとする法律家（あるいは人文主義者）の知的伝統と風土であることを示した。

以上の成果の今後の展開については、Part1 の論文「記憶と記憶技芸」の一部は、名古屋大学言語文化部紀要（1999 年第 1 号）に掲載する。また、本研究成果の一部は、本学の日本言語文化部大学院講義「比較芸術論」(99 年度）のなかで使われる。Part2 の論文の簡約改良版は、国際学術雑誌 *Emblematica* に 1999 年 3 月までに投稿する。第 5 回国際エンブレム学会（1999 年 8 月　ルドウィグ・マクシミリアーノ大学　ミュンヘン[ドイツ]）で研究発表するようすでに招致されているが、世界の学者との交流のなかで今回の成果、とくに＜エンキュリア＞とエンブレムとの関係について知見を深めたい。また、ドイツのヘルツォーグ古文書館で、一次資料を渉猟し、本成果をさらに実証度の高いものへと進化させたい。

Part 1

記憶と記憶技芸

1. 記憶の眼

1.1. 肉眼と心眼

「父上を、僕は父上を見ているんだと思う」と、父親を亡くしたハムレットは友人ホレーショーに語る。ハムレットに会う前に、まさにその父親の亡霊をみたホレーショーは、「で、どこで」とたずねると、ハムレットは「僕の心の眼の中でさ」"in my mind's eyes"(1幕2場185行)と返事をする。これは、憂鬱の病にとりつかれたハムレットが、詩的に語ったことと考えてしまいがちだ。なぜなら、ハムレットから約400年たった現代の私たちなら、「死者の姿が心のなかに残って見える」という表現を、使うからだ。

そもそも憂鬱の病というのは、もちろん腺ペストのような疫病ではない。なんとなく気分が暗くなり、人々から距離をおいてひきこもる叙情的気分のことだ。このジゾイゾ的な態度は、当時はとくに若者の間で流行していた、〔気障%きざ%〕な気分であった。[1] だからこの病にとりつかれたハムレットが、友達とのやりとりのなかで、詩的に自分を演じてみせるのは、当然といえば当然なのだ。しかしハムレットの気分が流行にのった気まぐれだったからといって、「心の眼」で亡き父親の姿をみるという表現が、たんなる芸術的修飾だと考えてはならない。

死んだ人はもう二度と自分の目の前に姿をあらわすことはない。死んだ人をこの肉眼でみることはできない。しかし、目をつぶり、その人の姿を思い浮かべることはできる。あるいは、肉眼をどこか一点に集中させて、事実上見ることをやめて、精神をその人に向けると、心のなかにその人の姿が浮かんでくる。心のなかに浮かび上がって定着するその状態は、精神の働きなしには不可能だ。この精神の働きを、ハムレットは肉眼とは別に精神に眼と評している。しかし、それはたんなる比喩ではない。なぜなら、その状態は、いわば心眼ともいうべきものが、肉眼ではとらえることのできないものをみているのだといっているのは、憂鬱病にとりつかれたハムレットだけではないからだ。

肉眼とは別に、もうひとつ心眼があるという考え方は、「目から鱗が落ちる」といった私たちが使う比喩表現にもみてとることができる。心眼をくもらせていたなにかがとれて、真実がみえてくるという意味で使うが、鱗が落ちるこの目はあくまでも比喩で、実際にそのような目があると私たちは考えない。そもそもこの表現は、日本語にもともとあった言い回しではなく、聖書（『使徒行伝』9章18節）からの引用である。新興宗教・キリスト教徒を迫害していたユダヤ人サウロは突然、目が見えなくなり、馬から転落する。転落し放心状態にあったとき、聖霊の働きによってキリスト教の正しさをサウロは知らさせる。サウロは回心し、そのとき「目から鱗」が落ちたのだ。そのあとから、迫害者サウロのアイデンティティーは180度転換し、キリスト教擁護者となり、名前もパウロと変る。

サウロの場合には、肉眼が急に働かなくなることは、精神が真にたいして閉ざされている盲目をあらわしている。回心して真実が見えるようになることは、心の眼が開眼することと考えられていたのだ。心の眼が開くことは、肉眼が正しく機能することの必要条件なのだ。このように、まず肉眼のほかに心眼があると考えられ、肉眼と心眼とはそれぞれ独立してばらばらに機能するのではなく互いに影響を及ぼしあう相関関係にあるのだ。この二重の見方は、なにも聖書に固有の身体観ではない。プラトンにも、まったく同じような身体観がある。

プラトンが得意とする〔哲学的問答法%ディアレクティケー%〕の目的は、「文字どおり異邦の泥土のなかに埋もれている[人間の]魂の眼φυχῆς ὄμμαを……[天]上へと導いていく」（『国家』7巻533D）ことにある。プラトン哲学では、人間の魂はそもそもイデア界に住んでいた。しかし、魂が堕落することによって、人間はこの地上に落下し、肉体をまとうようになる。本来の住んでいた土地ではないこの地上という異邦の地にあって、肉体をまとった魂は、肉眼という肉体の眼によって、外界を把握している。しかし、私たちはたんに外界の事物を感覚によって把握するだけではない。そうやって感覚される事物のなかに、私たちは美しさ、正しさ、善さなどのものをみてしまう。それは、個々の事物のなかに美のイデア、正のイデア、善のイデアが分有されているからで、その分有されているイデアを見ているのは、

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[1] Bridget Gellert Lyons, *Voices of melancholy : studies in literary treatments of melancholy in Renaissance England* (London : Routledge & K.Paul, 1971), 35.

肉眼では心眼なのである。心眼によってえられるイデアの知は、かつてははっきりと「見られてもの」（ギリシア語イデアの本来の意味）を想起させてくれる。心眼は、私たちが日常の生の流れに埋没してしまい、イデアを忘却していたことを気づかせてくれる。

記憶にかんして詳述しているキケロは、弁論家が用いる文体の装飾のなかで比喩について述べている。比喩は、たとえば「豊かなカリブディス」という表現よりも「渦巻き」のほうがよいという。その理由は、

心の眼は聞いたものごとよりも見たものごとの方に容易にひかれるからだ。[2]

こうした一連の古典の例からもわかるように、ハムレットがわざわざ「心の眼」といったことは、たんなる比喩ではないのだ。心眼は、比喩ではなく、ひとつの規定された存在して考えられていた。このことをはっきりと示すのが、『ハムレット』とほぼ同時代のロバート・フラッドの図だ。フィチーノの著作をつうじて、ルネッサンスの知的神秘主義の洗礼をうけたフラッドは、『両宇宙誌』(1617 - 21年)のなかで、記憶技芸について一章を割いている。その章の見出しに、心眼が図像化されている（図1）。横顔の男の頭は、三つの円によって分割され、その前頭葉にあたる円のなかに部分に、男の肉眼と同じ形の眼が描かれている。心眼は、肉眼でみることができずここに存在していないものを見させてくれる特別な力をもっている。その力は、空間の領域だけに限定されてはいない。死んだ人は今ここにいないだけでなく、過去の人であり、思い出すことによって現前化している。心眼は、空間をこえるだけではなく、時間をまたがって過去となった人や出来事を今ここに再現することを可能にしてくれるのだ。心眼の機能は、記銘されたことを保持し、自由にそれを想起することなのだ。

しかも、その時間は、自分の意識化におさまるような飼い慣らされた時間だけではない。日常の生の流れ（これを「生活世界」とよぶことにしよう）のなかで、自分がかつて経験したこと、いま経験していること、これから経験するであろうこと、こういった生活世界にべっとりとつきそうようにしてある限定された時間の範囲だけで、心眼が働くのではないのだ。プラトンにみられるように、生活世界にいわば垂直にたえず切断面をきりこんでいる永遠の時間とでもいうべき、過去・現在・未来を超越している不動の時間にも、心眼は働いているのだ。ここでも心眼は、その機能として、イデア界で記銘されたことを、異邦のこの地上にあっても保持し、心眼で世界のなかに分有されているものごとを見ることによって想起するのだ。

記銘→保持→想起という心眼の機能が、じつは記憶と同義であることはもはやいうまでもない。

1.2. 記憶技芸

ギリシア人が生み出した様々な技芸・芸術artsは、ローマ人に受け継がれて、ヨーロッパの知的伝統の源流となっている。そのような技芸のなかで、20世紀の我々が忘れてしまったもののひとつが、記憶技芸（ラテン語でアルス・メモリアars memoria）である。記憶技芸のもっとも基本的な操作は、あらかじめ頭のなかに覚えこんだ数多くの＜場＞や幾種類もの＜像＞に、これから記憶したいものごとのひとつひとつをつないだり引っかけたりして、はっきりと記憶することである。

記憶技芸が教えるこの技術は、「記憶術」mnemotechinicsとして、理性重視の現代では少しいかがわしく、そして皮相的でうそ臭いテクニックのように思われている。しかし、紙が高価な用品で軽々しく使えない時代にあっては、聞いたことをメモ書きという形で残す場合にも、その聞いたことが文書として残すにたるだけの十分な価値がそもそもあるかという反芻をへなくてはならなかった。古代ギリシア・ローマ文化からすくなく見積もっても1000年経過したルネッサンス期においてすらも、紙はまだまだ高価な用品であることにかわりはなかった。羊皮紙に書きつづったレオナルド・ダ・ヴィンチの『覚え書き』は、一度書かれたことが何度も消されて上書きされている跡が残っている。記録紙の高価さが、消す必要もなく上書きも不要な記憶術を大変に重宝な技術にしていたことは、容易に推測できる。

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[2] Cicero, *De Oratore*, *Partitiones oratoriae*, ed. and trans. Harry Caplan (London: Heinemann, 1942-48), III. xli,163.



図1　ロバート・フラッド『両宇宙誌』

また、グーテンベルグの印刷術が普及する以前の写本文化においては、現物の複製が大量に出回るということは、ほぼ100%ありえないことであった。修道院で書字生が生産する複製の数は、需要を満たすだけの数にはとうてい及ばなかっただろう。複製が大量に出回らない文化においては、現物に簡単にアクセスすることができないから、読んだ現物を正確に覚えていることは、きわめて重要であった。その意味でも、記憶術はとてつもなく役立つ技術だったのだ。

とはいえ、もしもヨーロッパで培われたギリシア源流の記憶技芸が、実務・実利のうえから有益な技術にすぎないなら、科学発明の文明史という本流のなかのひとつの支流にすぎない。ところが、記憶技芸が用いる＜場＞（ラテン語でロクスlocus[「場所」という意味]）は、頭の中に思い浮かべる壮大な建築物のなかの一つ一つの部屋やその部屋の中の装飾物などだった。そのために、記憶技芸は、その時代の芸術と密接な関係をもち、ちょうど古典古代、ゴシック、ロマネスク、ルネッサンスといったようなその時代に特徴的な様式をもってしまう。ゴシックのすらりと垂直に天に向かって伸びている建物を＜場＞とする場合と、渦巻く螺旋の複雑な装飾をもったバロックの建物を＜場＞とするときとでは、人間精神の働きも違ってくる。これは、＜場＞に限ったことではなく、えてして人間の姿で造形化されることの

多かった＜像＞（ラテン語でイマーゴーimagago[「模造」という意味]）についても、当然いえる。つまり、記憶技芸は、科学文明史の傍流ではなく、文化史のなかの、太くなかもしれないがひとつ立派なの本流なのだ。

記憶技芸は、文化史の本流ということに加えて、文化史を背後から支配している精神史にもかかわっている。記憶は、複数の＜場＞や＜像＞を頭の中で再現化することなしには成り立たたない。また、それらの再現は、一定の規則にしたがって頭の中に再生されないなら、新たに記憶したものごとそのものが崩れてしまう。頭の外部にある記憶したい対象やものごとが、頭の内部で一定の規則にしたがって表象され、意識の操作によって数多くの＜場＞や＜像＞にくくりつけられる。次に、＜場＞や＜像＞を思い浮かべて、くくりつけられた対象・ものごとを頭の内部で再生し、利用する（図2）。記憶を正当に位置づけるには、こうした記憶の過程が人間精神の外部とどのような関係にしあって稼動しているのか、という精神作用のグランド・デザインを射程に入れずしてはできない。したがって、哲学の近代的区分にしたがうなら、存在論ではなく認識論にかかわる精神のあり方が記憶技芸の土台にあるのだ。

1.3. 記憶技芸と記憶術の違い

記憶技芸が認識論にまでであったということは、この技芸が、たんに記憶を頭の中に定着させるハウ・ツゥーとしての、いわば狭窄視野の技術ではなかったということである。このことはどんなに強調しても強調しすぎることはない。たしかに、記憶技芸は、結果として実践で役に立つ学問であった。しかし、実際には役に立つかどうかを背後から支配しているのは、人間が自分を取り巻く存在世界をどのように認識しているかという形而上的な精神構造である。その構造までをも射程に入れなくては、記憶技芸は正統な記憶技芸とはなりえないという基準を、内部に抱えこんでいる。

ふつうに今の私たちが思い浮かべてしまう記憶術では、記憶は、あくまでもものごとを効率よくしかも出来るだけたくさんの事柄を覚えるというその実用実践という目的に限定されてしまう。そのためにどういう手段をとれば、最大効率で大量のものごとを記憶できるかが、一番の関心事となる。そこで、それこそ枚挙にいとまがないほど数多くの記憶術が出てくる。覚えるべき事柄を星座の属性とからめる類比法、状況を誇張して強い印象を脳に与えて覚える誇張法、場面を描画に焼き直して記憶する図画法、そして語呂合わせに代表されるような数字とイメージを対応させる線形法などは、その代表的な例である。[3] これらのいわば「秘伝」や「スーパーテクニック」は、大量に効率よく覚えるべきものごとを頭のなかに入れることを助けるばかりではない。それら覚えたことがらを長期間にわたって保持し、必要におうじて覚えたことをスムーズに再現させてくれる。

しかし、どんな目的のために覚えるのかという点になると、必須事項を暗記して試験に合格しより高い地位に登るだとか、結婚記念日を忘れずに家庭の平和を守るといったような、身近な生活にかかわることばかりが、あげられがちになる。もちろん、これらのことは、社会の通念としてはいずれもプラスのことだから、さまざまな記憶術や、記憶術を教える一般書は、人々の間に流布していく。しかし、高い地位になんのために登るのか、家庭の平和とはそもそもなんなのかといった、社会通念を疑う精神的構えをそこにみつけだすことは、たいていの場合、不可能である。生活に役立つという世俗功利主義にどっぷりつかるのではなく、世界や人間の本来のあるべき姿に合致するような記憶すべき内容の選別を、そこにみいだすことはまず不可能である。世界の成り立ちはかくかくしかじかのようになっているから、その世界の成り立ちにふさわしいような人間のあり方があり、したがってこういうことがらを覚えなくてはならない。そのためには、このような記憶方法があるという順序になっていない。覚えるべきことがらは、たいていは生活とって必要な目先のことがらであり、実生活

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[3] 栗田昌裕『栗田博士の「超」記憶法』（廣済堂, 1996年）32－221ページ。この本では、20種類の記憶方法が解説されている。また、誕生日や相手の名前など、それぞれの事項別に記憶方法を提言したダグラス・ハーマンは、約94の記憶術を教えている。参照ダグラス・ハーマン『超記憶術』（土田光義訳 白楊社, 1994年）。なお、近代の著作で、大容量記憶術の典型となっているのは、私見では、イギリス人リチャード・グレイのもの。Richard Grey, *Memoria technica: or, A new method of artificial memory, applied to and exemplified in chronology, history, geography, astronomy. Also Jewish, Grecian and Roman coins, weights and measures, &c. With tables proper to the respective sciences; and memorial lines adapted to each table* (London: no publisher, 1730).



図 2　記憶技芸の基本構図

上の快適さをえるための手段である。つまり、全体を貫く基本的な世界像・人間観がそこには欠けているのだ。

ときに、こうした記憶術指南書が、きわめて学術的な構えをとることがある。そこでは、人間の心理的・生理的な機構が、さまざまな実験とその統計資料にもとづいて解剖される。解剖といっても、記憶は消化器官のように化学反応を臓器のなかで起こすわけではない。だから、脳細胞がいくつあるか、脳細胞の多さは記憶のよさに比例するか、記憶をつかさどっている部分は脳のどのあたりかということにはあまり関心がない。むしろ、私たちの実際の行動から、脳の働きを細かく類推し、脳の働きを外側から法則化することである。解剖された脳が、どのような場合にその記憶機能をうまく稼動させ、どうすれば脳は記憶を長期間にわたって保持することができるかが、そこで導き出される。実証主義にもとづいたこの記憶術は、いっけんすると脳の仕組みをいわば科学的にとりあつかっているから、人間の精神構造をあつかっているかのように、私たちはとりちがえてしまう。[4] しかし実際には、そこであつかわれているのは外界を認識する脳の仕組みや仕方であっても、けっして精神の仕組みではない。なぜなら、この科学においては、人間は動物の一部と暗黙のうちに考えられているからだ。動物のなかで最高位にある人間は、他の動物よりもどのように勝って記憶力をもっているのかを探るという姿勢があるからだ。動物の究極の延長線上にある人間は、動物よりも優れた脳をもっているとしてしか考えられていないのだ。そこには動物には越えられない人間を人間たらしめている固有の精神が欠けているのだ。かわりにそこにあるのは、脳力である。だからこそ、状況におうじて記憶力に変動がある人間の脳をすこしでも改良すべく、正しい記憶の仕方が解説されるのである。動物と人間との間に連綿性をみてしまう科学的連続説は、人間精神を脳力へと矮小化している。これによって、精神のいとなみ、人間固有の認識のあり方が見落とされてしまうのだ。

記憶技芸は、記憶の権利や身分を人間の認識過程というさらに広い視界の中で捉えようとする学問としての可能性を最初からもっていた。もちろん、実践での有効性と抽象的な精神構造という、形而下と形而上という二つの軸のうち、どちらに比重をかけるかは、西洋の記憶技芸の長い歴史のなかでは、地域や時代によって微妙に揺れ動いている。しかしすくなくとも古典と称され、記憶技芸として人々の共通理解となった記憶技芸書は、人間精神がどのような構造になっているかを忘れることはなかった。そうであったからこそ、ところが、また実際に一つの学問として取り扱われたのだ。

「記憶の女神ムネーモシュネーは、学芸女神ムーサたちの母親」というギリシアの格言がある。もしもこの格言が、学芸をするには多くの基本事項を覚えなくてはならず記憶が不可欠だという、あまりにも当然で実際上の意味しかもたないなら、記憶は学芸のつまらない必要条件になってしまう。学芸の必要条件なら、記憶のほかにも、構想力・理性など思いつくままに次々とあげていくことができる。「学芸の母」という意味は、人間が認識するという土台において、記憶は、真理とどうかかわり誤謬をどう退けるかといった形式で「何を記憶すべきか」という問いに答えることが要請されることを、教えているのだ。ムーサたちが代表するような学芸では、真理にしても記憶すべきことにしても、それらは公理・公準や基本項目として、了解済みの前提になっている。これにたいして、ムーサたちの学芸が既成の前提としていることに問いを投げかけ根底まで遡ることのが、記憶技芸なのだ。言い換えるなら、この格言の実質上の意味は、記憶技芸は、認識理解変遷の精神史という地平における母体だということだ。

2. 認識理解変遷の精神史としての記憶技芸

2.1. シモーニデースの＜場＞と＜像＞

記憶そのものを語るとき、いつも必ずふれずにはすまされない古典の箇所がある。それは、キケロにある次の話だ。ギリシアのテッサリアに住む貴族スコパスが宴会を催した。ギリシアの宴会では詩人を招いて、歌を吟じさせることが典型的な余興となっていた。この宴会に招聘された詩人は、ケオス島のシモーニデースであった。詩人は慣例にしたがって宴会の主

[4]実証主義アプローチの典型は、Gillian Cohen, Michael W. Eysenck and Martin E. LeVoi, *Memory: A Cogntive Approach* (Philadelphia: Open Univ. Press, 1986).

人を祝する歌をうたったが、その祝歌のなかに双子の神カストルとポルクッスもおりこんで、この双神をほめたたえた。さて、歌が終わると、主人スコパスは約束額の半分しか謝金は出せぬという。歌の半分が双神に捧げられていたから、残り半分の額は神からもらえというのだった。宴会は続いたが、席を連ねていた詩人シモーニデースのところに、詩人に用があるという若者が二人、家の外で待っているという知らせが届いた。そこで詩人が席を立ち、外に出てみると誰もいない。ところが、こうして詩人が席をはずしているうちに、宴会の〔間%ま%〕の屋根が落ち、スコパスをはじめ招待客たちは皆死んでしまう。死体は瓦礫でめちゃめちゃになり、いったいどの体がだれなのか判別がつけられないほどであった。ところが、シモーニデースはだれがどの席にいたのかはっきり覚えていたので、死体のある場所からそれが誰かをきちんといいあてることができた。二人の若者の正体が双神であったことは、いうまでもない。双神カストルとポルクッスは、詩人を死から救って、手に入れることのできなかった残り半分の報酬に十分に報いた。そればかりか、記憶によって死体を正しく判定するという機会を詩人にあたえることによって、シモーニデースに記憶術原理の創案者という地位までもさずけたのだ。

> **さて、シモーニデースはそこでこう推定したのだった、この能力[記憶力]を磨こうと思うなら＜場＞を選び、覚えたいと思っているものごとの心的な＜像＞をつくりだし、その＜像＞を＜場＞におくことだ。そうれすれば、＜場＞の順番がものごとの順番を保ち、ものごとの＜像＞はものごとそのものをしるしとしてあらわすことになるから、＜場＞は蜜蝋板に、＜像＞は蜜蝋板に書きしるす文字としてそれぞれ使えるようになる。[5]**

記憶するには、ただひたすら覚えるのではなく、技術があることを教えている。宴会の間という＜場＞を思い浮かべて、自分の精神のなかに現実の空間のコピーをつくりだす。そして、宴会の出席者ひとりひとりの＜像＞を想起して、精神のなかにつくりだされたそのコピー空間のなかにひとつひとつの＜像＞をおいてみるのだ。コピー空間は、文字を書きつける蜜蝋板のように覚えておきたい内容を記録するための土台なのだ。想起された＜像＞は表音文字というよりも象形文字のように、その土台に書きつけられる。＜場＞とそこに結びつける＜像＞という媒介をもつことによって、人間はその記憶力を磨くことができるのだ。

しかし、このシモーニデースの逸話は、ただたんに記憶力増進の手管を教えているのではない。この逸話は、法廷弁論家キケロが修辞学の一部門として記憶を解説するなかで引用しているのだ。古典古代の修辞学は、現代と同じように、言葉をうまく使って、美しく巧みに表現することが目的であった。しかし、表現する場は書物のなかではなく、議会での演説、裁判での弾劾弁論論争という実践的な場であった。美しく巧みに使う当の第一目的は、相手を説得するためだったのだ。したがって、当時の修辞学は、発声や身ぶりをどうするかという、現代なら演劇に分類されるような表現様式までをもふくんでいた。言語表現だけに限定された間口の狭い学芸ではなかった。とくに、ローマ時代になると、修辞学は詩学との接近を深めて、表現が聴衆にあたえる心理的効果などをまでもその学問対象とするようになっていった。[6]

演劇学・心理学までをも射程にいれた実践的修辞学の一分野として、記憶が考えられている。実践でなぜ記憶が必要であったかは、容易に想像がつく。用意された原稿を棒読みする現代の裁判官や日本の国会答弁のスタイルのように、紙にたよる発言をすれば、相手を説得する力が激減してしまう。ところが、アメリカの大統領や中国の主席のように、原稿がまるで手元にないかのように、かなり記憶にたよりながら、そして自らも興にのりながら熱弁をふるえば、人々からは賛同の拍手喝采をうけ熱狂をもってうけいれられる。原稿の棒読みよりも記憶にたよった雄弁のほうが、はるかに説得力をもち、実地で有効なのだ。

しかしいくら記憶にたよるといっても、人間の暗誦能力には限界がある。あらかじめ十分に練った発言内容を、一字一句ただ丸暗記することは苦痛以外のなにものでもない。そこで、頭のなかに適当な＜場＞を思い浮かべ、いくつかの＜像＞に分割された発言内容をその＜場＞にひっかけてとめる。発言するときには、その＜場＞をひとつひとつ順番に思い浮かべて、各＜場＞につなぎとめておいた＜像＞を想起し、発言内容を思い出しながら、弁舌をふるう

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[5] Cicero, *De Oratore*, II. lxxxvi, 351-54.
[6] Thomas M. Conley, *Rhetoric in the European Tradition* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), 32-45.

のだ。この方法をとるなら、かなり長い弁論もそれほど大きな脱線がないままに間違わずに覚えられるだろう。

2.2. キケロ

弁論類だけでも三桁の著作を残している雄弁家キケロは、『弁論家について』（前46年）のなかで記憶についてかなり本格的な言及を残している。自分は、「技芸として教えられる＜場＞と＜像＞によるあの例の[記憶]方法」にたよることを、必ずしも嫌ってはいないと明言している。[7] そして次のように詳述している。

> **であるからしまして、……膨大な数の＜場＞を利用しなくてはなりませんが、＜場＞には照明、くっきりとした配列、適当な距離が必要です。一方、＜像＞の方は、生き生き、明確、奇抜であって、すみやかに心に出会いまた貫くようなものが必要です。[8]**

＜場＞は明るすぎても暗すぎてもいけないから、平野（カンプス）や神殿はふさわしくない。また＜場＞と＜場＞は適当に離れていて整列している必要があるから、ブドウの房の一粒一粒や壷の装飾模様なども対象外になる。これにたいして＜像＞は、見事な彫刻像を思わせるようなすばらしいものでなくてはならない。

＜場＞と＜像＞がどのようなものでなくてはならないかという概略のつぎには、記憶をものごとに対応する記憶と言葉に対応する記憶とに二分類する。

> **言葉に対応する記憶は、私たちにとっては必要不可欠なものでありまして、数多くの＜像＞によって識別されております。文のなかの肢体を結びあわせる関節のような働きをする言葉[接続詞、前置詞]はたくさんあり、そんな言葉は類似という概念をもちいてできあがったはずはありません。ところが、ものごとに対応する記憶は、弁論家にとってとくに必要となる財産です。ものごとを象徴する個々の人物［の像］を巧みに配列することによって、この財産を私たちは心に刻印することができるのです。その結果、＜像＞という手段によって観念を把握し、＜場＞という手段によって観念の順番を把握することができるのです。[9]**

ひとつの文のなかのひとつひとつの言葉に対応するたぐいの＜像＞が、言葉に対応する記憶である。これにたいして、個々の観念に対応する記憶がものごとに対応する記憶である。

『弁論家について』よりも30年も前に書かれた『創案について』（前85年頃）では、記憶を修辞ではなく倫理の枠のなかで考察している。

> **慎重とは、なにが善で、なにが悪か、またなにが善でも悪でもないかを知ることである。慎重は、記憶、知性、予見からなっている。記憶とは、すでに起った事柄を、精神が思い起こす際に用いられる能力である。知性とは、現在の事態を精神が確認する際に用いられる能力である。予見とは、ある出来事が起らないうちに、それがやがて起ることを認める際に用いられる能力である。[10]**

中世からルネッサンスにかけても受け入れられていた定義だが、美徳は、慎重・正義・堅忍・節制の四つの部分（四枢要徳）からなっている。それぞれの美徳は、それを支えている機能がある。慎重が慎重であるためには、記憶の機能が働かなくてはならないと、キケロは考えたのだった。

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[7] Cicero, *De Oratore*, I. xxxiv, 157.

[8] Cicero, *De Oratore*, II. lxxxvii, 358. なおロエブ訳では、「活発で、鮮明な輪郭をもち、異常な」となっているが、最後の「異常な」insignitisはむしろ「並はずれて偉大な」と解釈すべきである。

[9] Cicero, *De Oratore*, II. lxxxviii, 359. なお拙訳の「個々の人々」singulis personisはロエブ訳では、「いくつかの仮面」となっている。古典古代では、抽象概念が人物像であらわされたことを考えれば、personaは仮面ではなく人物ないしは人物像のほうが、適訳だと考えられる。

[10] Cicero, *De inventione, topica, De optime genere oratorium*, ed. and trans. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. Hubble (London: Heinemann, 1949), II, liii, 160.

2.3.『ヘレンニウスへの修辞学』

ではサイモーニデースの逸話を引用するキケロのローマでは、記憶がどのように考えられていたのだろうか。これを教えてくれるもっとも有効な一次文献は、キケロの著作と中世・ルネッサンスでは誤認されていた修辞学書『ヘレンニウスへの修辞学』（前86-82年）である。

この本の著者はいまだに不詳だが、キケロ作と長らく誤認されていた。最高の弁論家キケロの著述だという誤認があったために、十数世紀にわたってたいへんに権威をもった。もっともキケロ作との誤認には、それなりの根拠があった。この作品で述べられている修辞学の考え方は、ほぼキケロの真作である修辞学書『弁論家について』と共通しているのだ。ローマ時代を通じて散文の全盛期をむかえたこの共和制末期に、キケロの代表されるような修辞学がどのようなものとして考えられていたかを、教えてくれるのだ。

この著作の文体が、冗長だが迫力のこもったキケロの文体よりも、アリストテレスのごつごとした単調な文体にはるかに似ていることが暗示するように、この本は読んでいてけっして楽しくはない。お決まりどおり、修辞学の五部門が一本調子で順番に解説される。(1)発想inventio：自分の主張を妥当なものとするために、主張にふさわしい論証の材料や方向をさがしだす技術。(2)配置dispositio：発想によって発見された内容を、適当な順序で配列する技術。(3)修辞elocution：発想によってみつけられたことがらに、適切な言語表現をあたえる技術。(4)記憶memoria：ことがらと言語表現を心のなかでしっかりと記憶しておく技術。(5)発表pronuntiatio：ことがらと言語表現の重みにかなうように、発声や表情・身ぶりを調整する技術。[11]

(4)の記憶にかんする記述で、＜場＞と＜像＞の説明はキケロの考え方をさらに敷衍させたより詳しい説明になっている。「記憶技術は＜場＞と＜像＞とから成り立っており」、＜場＞は、家屋、柱廊、凱旋門などで、＜像＞は自分の気にいっている姿形、しるし、似像などである。[12]　＜場＞をなににするかはきわめて重要である。違ったセリーにある記憶すべき内容も、同じ＜場＞にあてはめていくからである。また、記憶した内容が＜場＞から時間とともにしだいに消えていっても、＜場＞だけは土台として忘れてはならないからである。

新たな記憶すべき内容を次々と蓄積するばかりか、蓄積の土台でもある＜場＞を設定するさいに注意しなくてはならないのは、＜場＞そのものが一連のセリ



図 3 十字型教会

[11] キケロの定義も参考になる。Cicero, *De inventione* , I, vii, 9.

[12] [Cicero,] *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, ed. ad trans. Harry Caplan (London: Heinemann, 1954), 93.

ーとなっていて、そのセリーの各要素の順番をしっかりと覚えられることである。たとえば、私たちにとって比較的わかりやすい、記憶にふさわしい＜場＞の例をあげれば、キリスト教の十字型教会である（図3）。入り口（ポーチ）から教会にはいると、教会の〔身廊%しんろう%〕（ネイブ）が正面に延びている。身廊の右には〔側廊%そくろう%〕（アイル）が走り、左にも同じように側廊が走っている。身廊を進むと、交叉部（クロッシング）の真下に出て、右と左にそれぞれ袖廊（トランスセプト）が延びている。交叉部をさらに奥へと進むと、正面に祭壇があり、祭壇奥には後陣（アプス）が楕円形状に広がっている。後陣のさらに後ろには、周歩廊（アンビュラトリー）がある。建物全体を想起し、次にその建物のなかをめぐっていく順番を決めておく。決めた順にしたがって、一つ一つの場所に覚えるべき＜像＞をおいておく。各＜場＞と＜像＞の接着が完了すれば、＜場＞を訪れるのが正順であろうと逆順であろうと、どちらからでも思い出せるようになる。[13]

ただし、＜場＞の数が少ないときには問題はないが、＜場＞数が多くなると、＜場＞にアクセントをつける必要がある。アクセントのないのっぺらぼうな多数の＜場＞は、頭のなかで混乱をもよおしてしまう。混乱を防ぐために、五番目の＜場＞ごとになにか変った目印をつけておく。たとえば、さきほどの教会の例だと、入り口→身廊→右側廊→左側廊→交叉部→右袖廊→左袖廊→祭壇→後陣→周歩廊という順になるから、五番目の交叉部には黄金の五本指、十番目の交叉部にはデキムスという人名（ラテン語で10はデキムス）をつけておく。これらは、日本語ならさしずめ五本松という地名や十字屋という屋号にあたるだろう。ともかく、番数と関係のあるしるしを、大きな区切りとなる＜場＞につけておくのだ。

またもうひとつ、＜場＞数が多い場合に＜場＞の選定で注意しなくてはならないことがある。ひとつひとつの＜場＞の違いがあらかじめ鮮明でないと、混乱を起こしてしまう。柱廊のように、同じデザインがなんども繰り返される＜場＞は、たとえ多くの＜場＞を提供するとしてもふわしくない。また石棺を装飾する彫刻の一場面一場面のように、＜場＞のもともとの大きさがあまりにも小さいと、＜像＞をそこにつけたときに＜場＞全体があまりに混雑してしまい、これもまた混乱を引き起こすから、勧められない。

つぎに＜像＞についてだが、著者はものごとに対応する＜像＞と、言葉に対応する＜像＞との二種類に分けている。ここでいうものごとは、いわゆる〔物%ブツ%〕だけではなく、主張や見解までをもふくみ、これにたいして、言葉は、一字一句違わずに覚えなくてはならない単語や語句をさしている。修辞学がこの時代には口頭弁論術であり、いわば音声中心主義に重心がかかっていたことからすれば、この分類は現在の私たちが発話を考えるときの分類とほぼ一致している。発話は、物質存在としてみると、音声、文字、しぐさであり、思考との関連からみると、思考表現の道具、意思伝達の手段という二種類に分類されるからである。[14] しかし、修辞学の五部門のうち、それぞれの部門がものごとにかかわるのか、それとも言葉と関係するのかは、かなり境界がはっきりしていた。発想は、主題・主張を熟考することだからものごと、配置は発想によって見いだされた内容の配列だからものごと。ところが三番目の修辞は、主題・主張・内容にふさわしい言葉を提供することで言葉にかかわる。修辞につづく記憶で、ものごとと言葉の両方をしっかりと保持することが問題になるので、記憶においてはじめてものごとと言葉の両者にかかわることになる（図4）。したがって、主題を思い出し、どのような順で議論を進めるかを覚えるときには、＜ものごとの記憶＞memoria rerumが必要になり、どんな言葉で語っていくのか、その一字一句を記憶するときには＜言葉の記憶＞memoria verborumを使うのだ。

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[13] 「＜場＞が順序立てて配列されていると、その結果として、＜像＞を思い出すときには、＜像＞が付けられていた＜場＞を、気にいったどの＜場＞からでもどちらの方向にでも、口に出していうことができるのだ」（同上）120ページ。

[14] Julia Kristeva, *Le Language, cet inconnu: Une initiation à la linguistique* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1981), 5.

部門	発想	配置	修辞	記憶
取り扱う対象	ものごとres		言葉verba	ものごとと言葉
使用する記憶	＜ものごとの記憶＞ memoria rerum		＜言葉の記憶＞ memoria verborum	＜ものごとの記憶＞と ＜言葉の記憶＞

図４　修辞学部門と対象と記憶

では、どんな＜像＞をつかったらよいのだろうか。答は＜場＞の場合とほとんど変らない。大きく違うところは、＜場＞は人ごみの少ない静かな場所が勧められ穏やかなイメージをもっているが、＜像＞は感情を高ぶらせる刺激的なものごとがよいとされている。たとえば、空にか輝く太陽は平凡だが、日食は異常なので＜像＞にふさわしい。著者は＜ものごとの記憶＞の例として、毒殺事件で原告の主張を記憶する方法あげている。

> **被害者を個人的に知っているなら、その人がベットで横たわっている姿を想像しよう。もし知らないなら、誰かかわりの人が寝ていると想像するが、その人は最下層の身分であってはならない。卑しい身分だと[町中にごろごろしているから]誰だかすぐに思い出せないからだ。さて、[君が弁護しなくてはならない]訴えられている加害者がそのベットのわきにいるものとし、右手には盃を、左手には書字板をもっている。加害者の薬指には牡羊の睾丸がついている。こうすることで、私たちは毒殺された人、証人、遺産を記憶にとどめておけるのだ。**[15]

加害者がもっている盃は毒、書字板は遺書・遺産、〔睾丸％テステース％〕は複数の〔％証人％テステース〕をそれぞれあらわしている。こうして、加害者は遺産目当てに被害者を毒殺し、この事件には多数の証人がいるという原告の主張が記憶できる。具体的にどういう言葉で議論するかではなく、どういう内容について議論しなくてはならないかが、ベットの＜像＞からたぐりだせるのだ。これに続けて被告の弁護をするとなると、たとえば、被告は毒をもって殺したとされる日には元老院で開かれていた裁判に出席し、弾劾弁論をしていたという具体的な内容をいわなくてはならない。そこで白い服をまとった老人が人差し指を立てている姿を＜像＞にして、その＜像＞を階段席という＜場＞につなぎとめる。ちなみに、ローマでは裁判は、階段席にすわる元老院議員が自ら投じる評決によって決着がつき、議員はトーガとよばれる白い服を身につけていた。

言葉に対応する＜像＞は、ものごとに対応する＜像＞と同様に、＜場＞を記憶することからはじまるが、言葉の一字一句を違わずに覚えることが目的だから、ものごとの＜像＞よりもはるかに多くの＜場＞を設定しなくてはならない。牡羊の睾丸だけでは、「複数の証人がいた」「証人は多数いた」「証人はたくさんいる」……といったように、幾通りにも言葉が対応してしまう。そこで、たとえば「複数の証人がいた」といいたいなら、顔の両頬をふくらませた人物を思い浮かべ、その人が睾丸を指につけ、その指を下を向けているといったようにする。[16]　二つの頬をふくらませているから「複数の」となり、睾丸は「証人」、下に向けた指は過去であったことあらわすから「いた」となる。こんな奇妙なしぐさをしている人物が＜場＞となるのだ。その人物から「複数の証人がいた」を思い出すのだが、＜場＞と＜像＞を思い浮かべるだけでは不十分で、すくなくとも三、四回は繰り返して読まなくてはいけないと、著者は注意している。繰り返すことで、「〔技芸％アルス％〕は〔自然％ナートゥーラ％〕を補完する。というのも、技芸も自然もただそれだけでは十分に強力ではないのだ」。[17]　著者はこの本の末尾を、記憶の〔技％アルス％〕は、なんども繰り返すという記憶の基本的行為（自然）なしにはなんら益するところがないといってくくっている。

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[15] *Ad Herennium*, III, xx, 33.

[16] *Ad Herennium*, III, xxi, 34.　著者はラテン語の詩行の例をあげているが、煩雑なので、筆者の考えた例をあげた。

[17] *Ad Herennium*, III, xxi, 34.

2.4. クインティリアーヌスの記憶の＜建物＞

シモーニデースの場合には、＜場＞が宴会場のひとつひとつの席であり、＜像＞はそこに座っていた一人一人の客であった。宴会場と宴席は、死体が誰かを実際に確定するためには必要だから、この場合には＜場＞と＜像＞をなににするかはほぼ決まっている。しかし、演説・弁論の場合には逆にほぼどんな＜場＞を想定してもかまわない。＜像＞として想起される演説・弁論の各部分も、こういう＜像＞でなくてはならないという必然性はそれほど強くない。＜場＞と＜像＞をなににするかは、発言者の恣意にまかされている。言い換えれば、発言者がかなり自由に＜場＞と＜像＞を決められたのだ。

しかし、発言者の自由といっても、人間の精神は勝手気ままで無作為な方向に発散しているわけではない。20世紀の力動心理学の成果、とりわけユングの〔原型%アーキタイプ%〕が示唆するように、人間が心のなかに思い描くイメージは、おおまかではあっても一定のパターンをもっている。したがって、人間の意識にうったえる＜場＞と＜像＞も、なんでもよいというわけではなく、人間の心性に沿うようなパターンが好まれることになる。

＜場＞のなかでももっとも好まれ、圧倒的によく用いられたのは、建物であった。＜場＞として建物を勧めたのが、ヨーロッパで修辞学の最高の大家として尊敬をあつめたクインティリアーヌスである。12巻からなる大著『**弁論術教程**』(96年頃)のなかで、「できるかぎり大きくて変化にとんでいる＜場＞を覚えるべきである」と述べている。[18] この修辞家が、変化にとんでいるという言葉でいわんとしていることは、前庭、居間、寝室、談話室などの多種類の部屋と、彫像などのさまざまな室内装飾品である。＜建物＞のつぎは、演説・弁論を複数の＜像＞にすることだ。クインティリアーヌスが勧める像は、錨と武器であった。それらの＜像＞を一部屋一部屋におき、また装飾品につなげていく。この接着作業が終わったら、こんどはもう一度、その建物を思い出し、順番に部屋や装飾品を訪ねていく。＜場＞と＜像＞を利用するシモーニデース・クインティリアーヌス法は、ローマ時代に元老院で弁舌をふるう演説家たちが、精神のなかが仮想建物を想起し、順に建物をめぐりながら話を進めていったことを教えてくれる。演説は舌から流れ出るように進んでいくが、それは意識のなかの建物回覧と平行して進んでいったのだ。

この修辞家の記憶法にかんする明瞭な手ほどきは、建物だけにおわらない。＜場＞については次のように銘記している。

> **ですから私たちには＜場＞が必要ですが、現実のものでも想像上のものでもどちらでもよく、また＜像＞ないし＜模造＞は創り出さなくてはなりません。**[19]

＜場＞と＜像＞とわけているが、その根幹を支配しているのは、イメージなのだ。このことは、『**ヘレンニウスへの修辞学**』でも、実は述べられている。「思考は、どんな領域でも抱くことができるし、思考それ自身のなかに自分の意のままに＜場＞を設定することができるのだ」[20] このことから、イェーツは、記憶術では＜場＞は現実に知っている場所でなくとも、「虚構の場所」と呼ばれる想像上の＜場＞でもこの時代からよかったのだと、主張している。[21] その指摘は100パーセント正しいが、「虚構の場所」までも＜場＞の許容範囲として認められていたことの意義をいいつくしているかという、大事なポイントを落としている。

20世紀には、意識の背後に無意識の作用を見る深層心理学、合理的理性にさえも感情や意志が存在することを教える現象学、近代文明の深層には前近代に通じる共時的な構造が存在することを暴く構造主義が台頭した。これらの科学はいずれも近代科学的認識を懐疑し、認識の視点を人間の意識や行為から離陸させ、社会や文化というマス・レヴェルでも数値や量で捉えられる表層から深層を扱うようにとその視点を移動させた。これらの科学は、人間に関する出来事をデカルト以来の機械論的合理主義で理解することに異議申し立てを唱え、こうした動きのなかから復活したのがイメージの復権であった。たとえば、ミルチャ・エリアーデは、イメージとシンボルは人間存在から切り離せず、現代人の中に神話と原始心性が生きていることを再発見した。この神話学者によって、認識のなかにイメージを復権することが世界を全体性のうちに見る新しい人間学が可能になった。デュランは、イメージとシン

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[18] M, Fabius Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, trans. H. E. Butler (London: Heinemann, 1922), XI, ii, 18.
[19] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, XI, ii, 20.
[20] *Ad Herennium*, 141.
[21] Francis A Yates, *The Art of Memory* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966) 8.

ボルを再生することが生命的・心理的・社会的均衡、ひいては人間的・宇宙的均衡を回復するために不可欠であると主張している。イメージは誤謬をもたらすものとしてデカルト以後の科学によって否定し抑圧されてきたが、それこそ精神の鈍化・疎外、超越的なものに対する人間の力の衰えにすぎないのだ。また、哲学者バシュラールは、他の二人よりももう少し積極的にイメージを評価している。功利主義的に人間を認識することは、人間をたんなる条件反射の集合体としてみてしまい、夢見る人間・夢想する人間は排斥されてしまう。しかしイメージこそは人間を動かしている原初的で根源的な力であって、心的な現実であるから、イメージにその原初的な心的機能を返してやらなくてはならない。

では、イメージとはなんなのだろうか。イメージとは一般的には、人間が心の中に思い浮かべる像だと考えらえている。しかしサルトルにならってもう少し正確に定義すると、それは人間の意識がものごとにどのようにかかわりあうかという関係であり、ものごとが人間の意識にどのように現われるかという現われ方であるといえる。イメージが意識ではないことはいうまでもない。意識は目の前になにかものごとがあるかどうかということとは無関係に、即自的に存在する。イメージは即自的な意識が意識の外部にあるものごとを志向する関係であって、ものごとが意識に現われる現われ方である。

イメージはまた知覚とも異なっている。知覚は、ものごとを視覚・聴覚・味覚・触覚などの感覚器官を通じてものごとを意識する器官であって、即自的にはほとんど意味をなさず対他的であることによって初めて存在価値を持つといってよい。知覚が働くためにはものごとは存在しなくてはならない。ところがイメージにおいては、ものごとは目の前に存在しなくとも差し障りがなく、ものごとは意識の中で思い浮かべられさえすればよい。サルトルは、知覚が対象を存在するものとして措定するのに対して、イメージは対象を空無として措定するといっている。ものが存在しなくともイメージは存在しうるのである。

イメージと知覚との違いを特徴づけているもう一つの点は、知覚はものごとを部分的にしか捉えることができないのに、イメージはものごとを全体的にまるごとつかむことができるということである。サルトルがあげているサイコロの例でいえばテーブルの上に置かれたサイコロを知覚によってつかまえようとすると、目で見えるのはサイコロの六つの面のうちの三つだけで、他の三つの面がどうなっているのか、何色をしているのかを言い当てることができない。だからサイコロが全体としてどうなっているのかを正確に意識の上にのせるには、サイコロに手で触れてどれを前後左右に動かさなくてはならない。知覚は実際に対象を目の前において五感を働かせながら対象を観察していくのである。それに対して、イメージの方は、意識の中ですでに知られていることを思い浮かべることによって、知覚ではとらえらえないサイコロの三つの面がどんなものであるかを、一瞬のうちに全体的にとらえることができる。もちろん意識にイメージがあらかじめ蓄積されていない場合には、全体像を提示することはできない。それは繰り返しにはなるが、ものごとが感覚によって知覚されたり、思考によって概念化されてつかまえられてその全体がイメージとして意識の中に蓄積され、そうやって溜め込まれたイメージが頭の中に甦って、イメージがイメージとしての役割を果たすからである。

理性的な判断や合理的認識からすれば、イメージというのは対象の存在を欠如させている関係にすぎないという点では足のない幽霊のような存在であるし、対象の全存在を一望のうちに見ることができるという点では全能を備えた神のような存在である。人間というのは、イメージの亡霊を引きずっているのだといえる。

しかし、これを逆にいえば、存在は宇宙全体と有機的な結びつきをもっているが、ある存在がイメージ化されると、宇宙全体からその一部切り取ることだ。イメージは、本来の結びつきを人間から奪うものなのだ。存在は一部を失うことによってイメージとなる。この無数の散逸するイメージが、記憶（精神・意識）によって保持される。そのような意味での記憶は、身体的記憶と精神的思い出に分けられる。記憶機械としての大脳と、思い出としての記憶とは直接関係がない。まさにベルグソンのいうように、「意識というものは記憶であり、つまり現在における過去の保存と蓄積なのであります」。[22]

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[22] 『世界の名著53　ベルグソン』（澤瀉久敬編　中央公論社　1979年）28ページ。

3. 記憶のパラドクス

3.1. 三つの記憶

これらの古典作家たちが同時に見落としていたのは、記憶の特異性である。記憶は修辞学の一部門としてとりあつかわれるには、あまりにも重過ぎる精神機能なのだ。言い換えるのなら、記憶が哲学的な吟味をへていないために、あまりにも軽々しくあつかわれているのだ。彼らにとって記憶を考察するとは、あらかじめて定義可能なものである修辞学という種のなかで、発想・配置・修辞・記憶・発表という類がどのような住み分けをしているのか、その領域を確定するだけである。また、次に記憶を種に格上げして、そのなかにものごとの記憶と言葉の記憶という別々の類が住んでいることを説明するにとどまっている。これは、あらかじめ確立された記憶という観念を、既成の枠組みにしたがって分類し細かく説明しているだけで、ジグゾーパズルの各ピースをはめこむこととあまりかわらない。

そもそも記憶は、時間の流れのなかで忘却してしまう人間の脳の働きに歯止めをかける反エントロピーの作用をする。生活空間を、円環的であれ直線的であれ、ともかく時間の流れのなかにおかざるをえない人間は、時間の流れとともにいやおうなしに経験を重ねていく。ここでいう経験とは、会得する知識や技術という狭い意味の経験ではなく、五官によって見たり聞いた感じたりすることや、自分の身体によって試みたりすることまでをもふくんだ広い意味の経験である。しかしこの意味での経験なら、おおよそ感覚器官をもっている生物ならほとんどすべて例外なくおこなっている営みである。ただし、意識をもたない下等生物は、感覚器官が受ける刺激にたいして、あらかじめ決まった反応をして生きている。経験は、意識をへない反射運動に終わってしまう。おそらくＤＮＡに埋めこまれている遺伝情報のなかでももっとも原始的な知である反射は、刺激をうけた瞬間に想起され、反応が開始する瞬間に忘れ去れられていく。記憶は本来永続性が要請されているが、瞬時に想起と忘却が起るという意味では、この記憶は、瞬間的記憶といってもよい。

ところが、家畜や人間などの高等な生物は、経験にたいして反射だけでは終わらない。自らの意識を行使して、無数な経験のなかからそのうちのある特定の経験だけを有徴として認識する。無数の経験のなかからどの経験をひとつの反復されたパターンとして認識するかは、本能だけにべったりと依存しているのではない。認識は、意識そしてさらには意志によって左右されるのだ。そしてなにを認識するかというその一歩手前にあるのは、そのなにかが反復されていることに気づくことである。その気づきがあるためには、当然、記憶がなくてはならない。ということは、認識の土台となっている意識には記憶が不可欠だということになる。だからこそ、ベルグソンは次のようにいっている。「意識とはまず記憶を意味します。…意識とは、現在における過去の保存と蓄積なのであります。…精神は現在あるものにかかわっていますが、しかし、それはなによりもまずあろうとするもののためにである。注意とは期待であり、生へのなんらかの注意をともなわない意識はない。」（ベルクソン『意識と生命』）[23]

しかし、意識を記憶に収斂させるベルクソンのように、記憶を広義に考えてしまうと、古典の三人が自覚していた人間に特徴的な記憶が隠れてしまう。記憶とのからみにおいて、人間を他の生物から区別する特徴が、消されてしまう。高等生物の場合には、時間の流れのなかで生じる独立した諸経験が、時間が経過していくなかですべて流産していかない。諸経験のなかの一部分が同一の経験として意識にのぼるのは、記憶のおかげである。**高等動物では、パブロフの有名な唾液条件反射の実験が教えるように、条件反射によって、ある刺激に付随するものが刺激そのものにとってかわ**られる。ベルが鳴るという刺激と餌を食べるという刺激は、記憶の働きによって、ベルが鳴る刺激だけで、餌をあたえれらなくなってからも唾液を流すという行動を引き起こす。刺激に付随するものが刺激そのものにとってかわられるということは、高等生物は記憶の恩恵によって、信号（シグナル）を選別し、選別された信号に自分の行動を結びあわせている。

記号というものは、今ここにないもの「について考えていること」、「について言及していること」、すなわち＜不在のもの＞にたいして独特の態度を推し進めるという役割をもっていると考えられている。この意味では、パブロフ実験で鳴るベル（シグナル）は、犬にとっては記号である。しかし、信号（シグナル）が実体からまったく離れる記号もある。シンボルである。記号を最上位概念とすると、その概念のなかに信号とシンボルの二種類あるこ

[23] 『世界の名著53　ベルグソン』141ページ。

とになる。ところが、人間の場合には、「音声行為vocal activityから言葉行為verbal activityへという歴史の趨勢」があった。[24] 人間は、固有の言葉をもっている。人間の場合には、諸経験の一部が受動的に総合化されるのではない。言葉は、信号機能signal-functionからシンボル機能symbolic functionへと人間の経験受容を変えていく。記憶は、内的で質的印象から出発して、個別の諸事例を、記憶の時空間のなかで保存する。しかし、人間の場合には他の高等生物とは異なって、その印象も記憶の時空間も、信号としての印象や経験実態に近接した時空間ではない。シンボル化された、記号の豊穣な領域になっているのだ（図5）。

刺激	信号（シグナル）	シンボル
下等動物	高等動物	人間固有
瞬間的記憶	限定された記憶	豊穣な記憶
感覚化	感覚化	視覚化

図 5　記憶と諸機能関係

（破線の枠組みは、包摂関係を示す）

たとえば、犬は飼い主の名前を聞くと、急に反応する。二人が犬のそばでは会話をしているときに、犬がよく知りまた記憶している人物の名前が会話のなかにでてくると、犬はその人物がその場にいるのかと思い、あたかもその人がいるかのような反応をする。それは、その人の名前が犬にとってひとつの信号になっていて、その人の登場が頭をなでてくれるだとか散歩だとかいった刺激に結びつくので、反応するのだ。ところが会話をしている当の二人にとっては、その人の名前は言葉・シンボルである。その言葉を発せれられることによって、あるものごとやある状況を二人は心のなかに抱くことになる。その抱かれるものは、対象そのものではなく、対象の概念である。シンボルが直接意味しているのは、ものごとの概念であって、ものごとそのものではない。あるものごとやある状況を概念として心に抱いたからといって、あるものごとやある状況がいまそこに実際にある場合に反応するようには、反応しない。ところが、犬にとっては、言葉はシンボルではなくシグナルであるから、あたかもそこに実際にあるかのように反応してしまうのだ。

シンボル化は、人間のもっている感覚器官のなかでも視覚にもっとも多く依存する。これは、記憶によって意識のなかにできあがる内的な質的印象の多くが、映像化によって想起されることから容易に察しがつく。そして、映像化されるものは必ず広がりをもつから、＜場＞と＜像＞という記憶の要がいずれも空間的広がりあることは、偶然ではないのだ。

3.2. 視覚優位の記憶と視覚の悦楽

シモーニデース→キケロ→クインティリアーヌスという系譜における＜場＞と＜像＞を活用した記憶方法を、大量に効率よく覚えこむための記憶術にすぎないのだとしてさっさと片づけてしまうのは、早計に失する。これら古典の先達は、人間の魂に信じがたいほどの強烈な印象を保持するための技術の手ほどき、ただそれだけをしているのではないからだ。＜場＞と＜像＞を使った記憶様式が優れていると三人が考えている前提には、見ることは、人間にそなわっている他の感覚よりも強い印象を残すということがある。

＜場＞と＜像＞という映像化は、記憶による想起が映像化をともなうからという一般的な理由だけから裏打ちされているのではない。もしもただたんにそれだけの理由で、＜場＞と＜像＞が提唱されたのなら、この方法は、道具をひとつ増やして生活を便利にする技術にすぎない。人間が〔性％さが％〕として背負いこんでいるこの一般的な意識メカニズムのほか

[24] Sussane K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1942), 31.

に、哲学的な信念が映像化の根拠にあったのだ。古典哲学では、視覚は人間の五官なかでももっとも強大な力をもっていると考えられていたのだ。

キケロは、さきほど引用した箇所につづいて、次のような信念を表白している。

> **シモーニデースは聡明にも気づいていたのだが、……私たちの感覚のなかでももっとも鋭いのは視覚であり、その結果、耳がうけとったものや反省したことがらが、もしも眼の瞑想を介して私たちの心に送られるなら、それらのものごとはこのうえなく容易に精神のなかに保持されるのである。[25]**

これはキケロに独特の思想ではない。**アリストテレスも、ほぼ同じことをいっている。**

> **すべての人間は、生まれつき、知ることを欲する。その証拠としては感覚への愛好があげられる。……もっとも愛好されるのは、眼による感覚である。……その理由は、見ることが、ほかのいずれの感覚よりももっともよく我々にものごとを認知させ、ものごとの多くの違いをあきらかにしてくれるからである。[26]**

中世哲学にもっとも大きな影響をあたえることになる『形而上学』の冒頭で、アリストテレスが述べているのは、すべての人間は知ることを欲し、知覚が一番好きだということだ。人間は、空間による対置と時間による連続、そして構想力による表象化をおこなって、存在世界を認識する。認識とは、人間の基礎的な行為や反応にみられる人間性の基本傾向に起源をもっている。人間の五官もそうした基本傾向によって決定されている。ただし、人間は即時的事実というものを生のままそのままごとつかめない。なぜなら、かならず時空間の軸において対象を表象化してしまうからである。時空間のなかの表象化――それはまさしく視覚化ということである。

人間の本源的性向を視覚化と同一視したのは、アリステトテレスやキケロの後輩にあたる、新プラトン主義者のプロティノスであった。いや正確にいえば、人間にかぎらず、生物と非生物をとわず、この世界内のすべてのものは、観照を希求していると、プロティノスは考えている。自然から魂へ、魂から知性へと存在の位階が上位になるにつれて、観照と観照をおこうものとの関係も緊密化し、一体化の傾向を強める。「この世のものは大地であれ植物であれ、すべてが観照を行っているのであって、人々の実戦活動も、…それぞれが観照をめざして行われている。」（プロティノス『自然、観照、一者について』Ⅲ．8）。[27]

見ることの悦楽とでも呼べるような人間の性向が、さきほどのシンボルの映像化と共鳴して、精神のなかに肉眼と類比関係にあるもうひとつの眼が考えられるようになる。『ヘレンニウスへの修辞学』では、心眼はあたかも肉眼と同じように、眼からの距離と対象の間隔を把握するかのように、その機能が述べられている。

> **外的眼[肉眼]のように、思考の内的眼[心眼]は、対象があまりにも近すぎたり、逆に遠すぎたりすると、視力が落ちてしまう。[28]**

肉眼と類比される記憶の心眼は、距離、そして光をも把握するのだ。

心眼のなかに映っているものは、文字情報として思い浮かべられるのではなく、絵画や写真のように頭のなかで再現されなくてはならない。ここにおいて、肉眼ではない別な種類の視覚を想定しなくてはならない。その視覚は、肉眼とはまったく無関係ではないにしても、肉眼とは別な眼球であるはずだ。その眼球こそが、ハムレットがいっていたように、心眼なのである。

3.3. 悦楽の視覚への抑止と記憶

『ヘレンニウスへの修辞学』　では、しかし、頻繁にでてくる言葉にたいしては、＜像＞はあらかじめこうだと規定された対応物を決めておいたほうが、便利だ。実際にギリシアで

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[25] Cicero, *De ortore*, II, lxxxvii, 357.
[26] アリストテレス『形而上学』（出隆訳　岩波文庫　1961年）980a。
[27] 田中美知太郎編『プロティノス全集』（中央公論社　1988年）Ⅱ．420ページ。
[28] *Ad Herennium*, 134.

は大半の人々が＜像＞のリストをもっていた。「ギリシア人の多くは、…数多くの言葉にたいしてそれらに呼応する像をリストにするという方針にしている。リストがあるおかげで、像を空で覚えたい人たちは、像をどういうものにするかと無駄な労力をはらわずに、像を手中のものとすることができるのだ」。[29] この像が具体的にどんなものであったのか、著者はいっさい述べていない。イェーツは、速記文字ではないかと推測しているが、これには確証がない。いったいどんなものであったのかという歴史上の事実の詮索の大切だが、著者が像リストにあえてふれようとしない理由そのものは、はるかに興味深い。言葉に呼応している像を数千作り出したところで、実際に使う言葉全体をカバーできないから、そんな像は覚えても、あまり役にはたたないという理由なのだ。

しかし、著者が無駄だと考えている手法は、まさに漢字のロジックなのだ。ギリシア文字にしてもローマ文字にしても、音声を正確に転写しようという性向をもっている文字だ。これにたいして、漢字は、自らの母体にはらみもつ生成してやまない形をバネにして、ブラックホールのように強烈な力によってあらゆるものを呑みこんでいく音声の場にとりこまれない。漢字は、音声の転写手段になりさがる、アルファベット表音文字の運命に、素直に従わない。漢字自身が孕むその形によって概念という心的なものの方に吸いこまれていくその瞬間に、漢字は視覚的な連想力を稼動させる。たとえば、梅という漢字は、ローマ字表記のumeとは異なって、〔旁%つくり%〕の「毎」によって音声情報を伝え、「木」という〔片%へん%〕で、それが木の一種であることを指示している。さらに、眼にみえないものごとの母体となっているものを、形として自らの内部に背負っていることに反映している。漢字「梅」の場合でいえば、梅が実をたくさんつけることと、母親が子をたくさん産むこととが類比されて、記号表現としての梅は記号内容としての多産を象徴する。漢字は、アルファベット文字にはないこの視覚的連想力が働いて、概念に概念が重なりあって、そこには様々な可能性が開けてくる。

ということは、漢字は、高貴なギリシア人や実践的なローマ人が創案し流布することのできなかった優れた記憶技芸の＜像＞なのだ。

3.4. ＜場＞と＜像＞の無限ループ

宴会場の死体を同定するシモーニデースの場合には、＜場＞は宴会場、＜像＞は招待客ときまっていると考えられてきた。シモーニデースの逸話を引用する弁舌家キケロにとっては、＜場＞と＜像＞は発言者の自由裁量によってほぼ自由に決められた。クインティリアーヌスは、＜場＞を建物、＜像＞を錨・武器にするよう勧めた。この三人の動きは、＜場＞と＜像＞が事実密着型から、抽象化へ、そして象徴化といったように変化している。

言葉に対応する＜像＞の実際例として、著者は詩行をつかっている。ひとつの詩作品や戯作をそのまま覚えようとして、この＜場＞と＜像＞による置換法をつかうなら、頭のなかに個々の点として連続した＜場＞と＜像＞が長々と連なることになる。[30]

しかしここで見落としてはならないのは、＜場＞と＜像＞を記憶しなくてはならないという、記憶したい内容のための土台を記憶するという構造である。記憶はどこまでも記憶へと遡及していく。記憶技芸では、そもそも＜場＞と＜像＞が成立するためには、個々の＜場＞を統合している全体の場、クインテイリアーヌスの場合でいえば、個々の部屋をひとつの場としてまとめあげている邸宅という＜場＞が必要である。

> **数多くの部屋にわけられている広々とした邸宅である。邸宅のなかの目立つものひとつひとつを、こつこつと心に刻みつけ、思考が邸宅のどこにでもなんの障害もなく走り回ることができるようにするのだ。そのためにまず最初にやるべきことは、やすやすと邸宅内を走り回れることを確保することである。邸宅をこのうえなくしっかりと記憶しておけば、これから記憶することの助けになるからだ。[31]**

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[29] *Ad Herennium*, III, xxiii, 38.

[30] ちなみに東洋では、＜場＞と＜像＞の置換法ではなく、お経などにみられるようにリズムによる暗誦法が多用されたし、また現在でもある分野では好んでもちいられている。参照　綿本昇『「空」の奇跡でやる気の出る本：集中力、記憶力、創造力がみるみるアップする密教瞑想』（プレジデント社　1984年）。

[31] Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria*, XI, ii, 18.

邸宅を自由に動き回れるために、邸宅内の部屋をひとつひとつくまなく覚えこむ。覚えこむのは、これらか覚えようとすることがらをスムーズに覚えるためだ。では、部屋を覚えるにはどうしたらよいのか。それは、説明されていないのだ。ちょうど辞典の基本語のように、石の説明に「岩より小さく砂より大きな岩石」とあると理解できたつもりになる。しかし、岩は「地上に現れている大きな鉱物」と説明されいて、さらに鉱物をひくと、「固体の岩や石の類」となっている。石→岩石→鉱物→固体の岩や石といったように、ループ状に元に戻ってきてしまう。この自己言及性は、これから記憶しようとするものを記憶するために、邸宅を記憶し、邸宅を記憶するためにどうすればよいのかを答えてくれないのだ。記憶したい内容を効率よく大量に覚えるためには、さらに別なことを覚えるという入れ箱式の仕掛けがあるのだ。

一見すると＜ものごとの記憶＞と＜言葉の記憶＞は、修辞の第四部門である記憶がとりあつかうことになっているものごとと言葉に呼応して、整合性があるように思える。ところが、記憶の柱は＜場＞と＜像＞であった。＜ものごとの記憶＞と＜言葉の記憶＞にも＜場＞と＜像＞がなくてはならない。毒殺事件の＜ものごとの記憶＞の例でいうなら、著者ははっきりとは述べていないがベットが＜場＞ということになるだろうから、ベット→階段席が＜場＞であり、書字板、薬指、白い服、人差し指といった＜像＞が、それぞれの＜場＞につなげられる。しかし、これらの＜場＞と＜像＞はいわば最初の下位にある第一区分である。これを＜場＞^{1}と＜像＞^{1}とするなら、これらを包みこむようにして上からおおいかぶさる＜場＞と＜像＞がある（図6）。その次位の＜像＞は、＜場＞^{1}と＜像＞^{1}が指し示している内容をどのような言葉によって表現するかという、具体的なひとつひとつの言葉である。この言葉が、新たな＜像＞によって置き換えられ、置き換えられたその＜像＞はそれまでなかった＜場＞に結びつけられる。この＜場＞と＜像＞は、＜場＞^{1}と＜像＞^{1}の次にやってくるものなので、＜場＞^{2}と＜像＞^{2}とする。言葉の修辞は、言葉によって内容をくるむが、くるまれた内容のひとつひとつは、修辞学の第二部門である配置によって並べられる。ベットと階段席のどちらをさきに述べるのか、その順番が決められる。

配置という高次の枠組みが、くるまれた内容をさらに上からおおうのだ。いったん配置が決まれば、くるまれた内容のひとつひとつをまた新たな＜場＞と＜像＞によって置き換えなくてはならない。配置は、言葉の修辞よりも上位にあるから＜場＞^{3}と＜像＞^{3}となる。しかし、配置は、毒殺事件であれば、被告は無実であるという大目的をもっとも効果的に主張するためのものだから、その大目的に支配されていることになる。そしてこの大目的そのものも、覚えている必要があるから、＜場＞^{4}と＜像＞^{4}に転換されなくてはならない。この＜場＞^{4}と＜像＞^{4}こそ、これまでのすべての＜場＞と＜像＞を創り出す**根拠のもっとも一番背後にある根拠である。**



図 6　修辞学部門と記憶の働き

ここまでくると、前の図（図4）のように、発想→配置→修辞→記憶というお定まりの部門の順序につれて、各部門に必要な記憶とは別な、記憶の働きがあることがわかる。記憶はすべての部門にかかわっているが、そのかかわり方は、ものごとか言葉かという結びつきだけではないのだ。記憶は、その＜場＞と＜像＞という二本柱によって、入れ箱式に下位部門のことがらが上位の部門のことがらによってつぎつぎと支配されていくのだ。池の水面に落とした石のように内側から外へ、個々の具体的なことがらからさらにおおきなことがらへと波紋を広げいくのだ。その広がり方は、お定まりの部門順序が記憶の範囲が広がっていくのとは逆の方向に進んでいるのだ。また、含み含まれる関係も、修辞学の定石では発想・配置（＜ものごとの記憶＞）と修辞（＜言葉の記憶＞）という異なった二項は記憶という土台において成り立っているので、記憶が発想・配置と修辞をまとめあげている根源的力になっている。ところが、記憶の機能からすれば、下位が上位に包摂されていく過程にあって、記憶は発想・配置・修辞の僕なのだ。記憶は、支配者にして僕であり、逆行する双方向性をはらみもっているのだ。それは、たとえば、言語が言語についての言語であるといった二重性と同じように自己言及的であるということだ。自己言及性ゆえにかかえこんでしまう錯綜性・過剰性のため、記憶は、おさまりのよいユークリッド平面幾何の体系を破りでて、いつのまにか内側の面が外側にめくれでて、外側が内側に転換するクラインの壷のようにたちあらわれているのだ（図7）。



図7　クラインの壷

記憶がおこなっているのは、このように弁論にトポジカルな変形をあたえることなのだ。ところが私たちは、そんな爆発的な曲芸をおこなっている記憶の妙技をくさすかのうに、毒を抜かれた＜場＞と＜像＞の設定に記憶を収斂させてしまう。記憶というクラインの壷をぺしゃんこに押しつぶして、単純な平面にしてしまうのだ。この押しつぶされた記憶は、弁論という本来ならば発散して多面多様体となってしまうために、小さな理性では理解不可能なものを理解可能なように平面化し規格化する。そこにつくりだされたのは、平面的でおさまりのよい弁論だ。弁論は記憶をとおして、わかりやすく手にとっていともたやすくもてあそぶ対象に堕してしまう。それと同時に、弁論だけではなく記憶そのものも、＜場＞と＜像＞といった社会に流通する記号に変換されて、弁論と同様にも社会・文化の場に強く結びつけられていくようになるのだ。そのために記憶は自らが弁論と同様に錯綜する過剰性をもっている多面多様体であるという事実が、ますます隠蔽されてしまうのだ。

4. 分水嶺としての記憶

4.1. アリストテレスの記憶

記憶を生物の優劣基準にもちこんだのは、アリストテレスであった。

> **動物は、(1) 自然的に感覚を有するものとして生まれてついている。(2) この感覚から記憶力が、ある種の動物には生じないが、あるほかの種の動物には生じてくる。そしてこのゆえに、これらの動物の方が、あの記憶する能のない動物よりもいっそう多く利口でありいっそう多く教わり学ぶに適している。……記憶力のほかにさらにこの聴の感覚をもあわせ有する動物は、教わり学ぶこともできる。**[32]

このようにアリストテレスは、生物にはみななんらかの感覚が自然に備わっているという共通項でくくったうえで、生物には、記憶する能力がある生物と記憶力のない生物との二種類あることを指摘する。生物の違いを見分ける最初の指標として、記憶能力を考えているのだ。そして、記憶力のある生物は記憶力のない生物よりも優秀だとみなしている。記憶力という生物分類の第一次指標のつぎに、アリストテレスは、生物が経験をそなえているかどうかを

[32] アリストテレス『形而上学　上』（出隆訳　岩波文庫　1961年）980a 。21ページ。

第二次指標にしている。「ほかの諸動物は、〔表象%ファンタシア%〕や記憶で生きている」が、人間には経験がそなわっている。どういうことかというと、動物は同じ状況がなんどもなんども繰り返されても、そこから経験則をみいだすことがない。トンビは、夕方に**気流にのってゆったりと帆翔する日とそうでない日がある。私たちは経験から、トンビが帆翔する日の翌日は晴れ**になることが多いことを、経験によってしっている。しかし、十中八九、トンビはいま自分が上昇気流にのっていることは意識しても、夕方の上昇気流と明日の晴れとを経験法則化することはない。ところが人間の場合には、この経験法則化ができる。ただし、もしそうよんでいいのなら、ここで問題になっている人間の経験化能力というも、じつは記憶があってはじめて生まれ発揮される能力である。なぜなら、「同じ事柄についての多くの記憶がやがてひとつの経験としての力をもたらすからである」（『形而上学』981a）。

では、ひるがえってなぜ記憶が可能なのだろうか。アリストテレスは、その精密な議論の進め方にもかかわらず、記憶が成立するメカニズムについて語っていない。また、感覚が記憶を生じさせると考えていても、いったいどんな感覚かということについても語ってくれない。[33]

4.2. 分有された記憶

記憶というと、私たちは単純になにかを覚えておくことと考えがちである。昨日は子供が学校でいじめられて帰ってきたとか、明日は結婚記念日だから今日のうちにプレゼントを買っておこうだとかいったことを、覚えている。単純にみえる記憶という行為は、人間としてスムーズな生活を送るためには便利な精神の働きである。便利どころか、不可欠であるといってもよい。かりに子供がいじめられたことを覚えていないと、次に子供がいじめられて帰ってきたとき、またふたたびいじめられたということがわからなくなってしまう。なんど繰り返しいじめられても、その日のその場かぎりのことになってしまう。これでは、現象の表層に潜んでいる常態を認識できなくなる。また、明日がなんの日か覚えていないと、いまのうちに予測をたてて未来にそなえて対処することができなくなり、場合によっては一命を落としかねない。未来になにが起るかを覚えていることによって、現象の向こう側に待ち構えている事態に準備することができる。

いや周囲の世界と私たちがかかわっていくうえで記憶が必要であるばかりではない。そもそも自分が自分であること、これがわかっているために記憶が不可欠である。カントの『純粋理性批判』のなかでもおそらくもっとも有名な箇所のひとつは、「統覚の分析的統一はなんらかの総合的統一を前提にする」という、人間の自己規定の在り方を論じた箇所だろう。まず、我々が周囲のものごとを知覚している前の状態では、世界は無限の多様態として私たちに与えられている。つぎつぎのものごとを私が見ていくと、ものごとは私の表象（私が表象するものごと$_1$、私が表象するものごと$_2$）として立ち現れくる。そのいずれの表象も、私が見たものとしての＜私の表象＞である。ここには同一の＜私＞が登場している。裏返して言えば、私はいつも自分が同一であることを覚え・記憶している。このレベルの＜私＞の同一性は、私があるものごとを表象しているときの私$_1$と、次の瞬間に別なものごとを表象しているときの私$_2$との間に成立している私$_1$＝私$_2$という同一性だ。この同一性は、厳密に言うなら、私が表象しているものごと$_1$、私が表象しているものごと$_2$という諸表象を媒介として成り立っている。表象という媒介なしには、崩れていってしまう、そういう＜私＞の同一性だ。私は、*私の*表象$_1$＝*私の*表象$_2$という同一性を意識することによってのみ私の同一性を意識できる。このように、私の同一性は、算術的論理学の同一律から単純ストレートにはけっして導かれない。「私が、私に与えられた混沌状態を独特の仕方で 統一することが前提なのだ」。[34] この独特の統一には、記憶が不可欠なのだ。

記憶は、社会生活をスムーズに送るという表層のレベルでも、そもそも私が私であることを保証するメカニズムを成り立たせているという深層においても、なくてはならないものなのだ。ところで、哲学では長い間、人間の意識の外部に、客観的な事物があって、その対象物について人間はなんらかの観念を抱くが、客観的事物と人間の主観的観念はそれぞれ独立

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[33] ただし、人間の場合、視覚を五官のなかでもいちばん好むものだと指摘している（『形而上学』980a）。とすると、記憶を意識的にしようとするならば、視覚に訴えることが有効だという議論になる。また逆に、視覚的なものは記憶に残りやすいということになる。ここから、視覚と記憶との親密な関係が生まれてくる。

[34] 中島義道『哲学の教科書』(講談社, 1995年)301-304ページ。

して別個に存在している、と考えられたきた。客観的事物と主観的観念は互いに独立しているとはいえ、人間が事物にたいして抱く観念は、事物を模倣・模写しきちんとした対応関係にある。この対応関係のおかげで、客観世界というものは、事物によってかくかくじかじかのあり方で構成されているのだという世界図が立ちあがる。ではなぜ観念と事物の対応が可能かといえば、事物が人間の感覚に刺激を与えるからである。また、この刺激を人間の精神が感覚によって感じ取って、観念をつぎつぎと作り上げるからである。記憶は、〔生%なま%〕の経験や刺激をそのまま受け入れているのではけっしてないのだ。表象・観念化という過程をへた経験や刺激を、記憶としてとどめるのだ。

人間にふりかかり、また人間が経験する出来事は生成変化してやまない。それらの出来事や刺激は、広い意味での感覚によって感じとられるが、感じとられてその場その場で即自的に崩れていってしまっては記憶はなりたたない。この事態を哲学的文脈でいえば、出来事は、人間の内部になんらかの形式と内容をもって保持されていなくてはならない、ということになる。また、形式と内容をもって保持されることは、心理学の文脈に即していえば、人間にたいするどのような刺激も、その人間の身体組織や組織機能にたしかに規定された痕跡として残っているはずだということになる。このように外部からの刺激のあるものが生理的な痕跡として人間の大脳のなかに永続して残るものを、ゼモンにならって「エングラム」engram とよぼう。[35] もちろんエングラムは、たんなる断片として独立して互いに無関係にばらばらにあるのではない。エングラムは連鎖をなした複合体となってはずである。複合体でなく、ひとつの痕跡が別の痕跡とまったく無関係にあるとすると、痴呆症患者のように、前の瞬間にとった行動と次の瞬間にとる行動とがちぐはぐになってしまう。人間は、外からまたは内側からなんらかの刺激を受けるたびに、このエングラム複合体に問い合わせ、次に瞬間にどういう反応をその刺激にたいしてかえすかを決定する。

近年のDNAやRNA研究は、ナノ単位の極少の遺伝子が膨大な量の情報をもっていて、遺伝子相互が影響を及ぼしあうことによって、情報のうちのほんの一部分だけがよびさまされることをあきらかにした。[36] 生物はその遠い起源からこれまでに経験したことを、体内に遺伝子情報として保持していることを、明らかにしてくれた。この保存機能があるからこそ、同一の環境でなくとも、環境そのものが大きく変化する場合にも、生物は死滅せずに環境に適応することが可能になっている。とすると、情報の蓄積と情報の取り出しをするという広義での記憶は、どのような生物にあっても一般的に備えられている機能ということができるのだ。

この広義の記憶は、動物にも人間にもあてはまる。しかし、この説明では人間に固有の記憶とはどういうもので、どのような役割を果たしているかは教えてくれない。刺激の痕跡を保持するだけでは、人間的意味での記憶とはならない。刺激の痕跡が、ちょうど貯水槽の水のように均一にそれでいながら雑然と蓄積されているように、無秩序で無関係なものとしてあるだけでは、人間的意味での記憶とはならない。エングラムが人間固有の記憶として生きたものになるためには、再認と同一化という二つの精神的働きがなくてはならない。そもそも精神の純粋な営みは、過去を保存し、未来に向かって刻々と現在を組み込んでいく＜純粋記憶＞にある。記憶は、知覚とどう関わっているのだろうか。純粋知覚（記憶をまったく含まない知覚）は、いま自分が関心がある対象だけにしか向かわず、あるがままの世界からその対象を必要となるような部分だけを切り離してくる。「知覚は、宇宙における身体の位置を知らせるもの」である。[37] あるいは、複数の互いに排除しあう感覚経験をひとつの空間全体へと＜縮約＞し、また逆に、空間全体を個々の要素に分解してみる＜分析＞とを、人間は行っているのだ。[38]

これが習慣化すると、再認という意識がほとんど働かずに、ある物やことにたいしては意識はこういう行動を身体にとらせるという＜習慣―記憶＞が生まれる。それ自体が特殊なイメ

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[35] Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* , (Yale U.P. 1962), 50. 外林大作他編『誠信　心理学辞典』（誠信書房, 1981年）41ページ。

[36] ジェームス・ワトソン『二重らせん』（江上不二夫・中村桂子訳　講談社文庫　1986年）177-187ページ。中村桂子『あなたのなかのDNA』（ハヤカワ文庫　1994年）104-123ページ。立花隆・利根川進『精神と物質』（文春文庫　1993年）287-333ページ。

[37] F. C. T. Moore, *Bergson: Thinking Backwards* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), 27.

[38] Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosohy of Symbolic Form*, trans. by Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1955), vol. I, 100.

ージである身体において、＜習慣―記憶＞によってそのつど身体の行動ために有用な記憶が選び出される。利害に沿うイメージが弁別されて、身体の可能な行動への構えができあがると、知覚が成立する。抽象化された具体的な刺激や経験は、再認と同一化によって人間の精神のなかで再度繰り返される。

Part 2

Alciato's *Emblemata* in Renaissance legal and *ars memoria* traditions

1. Alciato as humanist jurist

Alcito's monument, which was made by his nephew Francesco Alciato, a jurist active in the midde of the sixteenth century, still magnifiently stands in a courtyard at the University of Pavia. Two of the four reliefs fllanked upon the tomb come from his *Emblemta*. Taking into account the large number of editons of the book, some of his emblems might do well to be attached to his tomb. Alcatio's *Emblemata* has always been recogonized as influential by students of the Renaissance visual arts. He has recently been more highly regarded as a founder and the most influential writer of a new genre *Emblemata*. The fact that one third of the sources of this literary work is deprived from his own tranalation of *Greek Anthology* has lead us to consider him as a distingushed humanists. His freindly associatation of Erasmus and Boniface Amerbach endorse our repect to him as a humanist. Sometines his commentaries on Tacitus and his association with Bartolommeo Simonetta and Pomponio Gaurico misleads us to suppose that Alcaito was a man of literatute rather than a jurisconsul. A mere glance at the inscription of his tomb, however, is suffice to realize that he was praised first and foremost as a jurisconsul (Fig. 1):

ANDREAE ALCIATO
MEDIOL[ANENSIS] IURISCON[SUL]
CAESQUE SENTATORI
Qvi omnivm doctorinarvm
orbem absolvit.
Primvs legvm stvdia
decori

Andrea Alciato
Jurisconsult of Milan
He completed the whole circle of learning,
and was the first to restore the study of the laws to its ancient dignity.

Identifying in this inscription Alciato with a jurisconsul, not with a man of literature like Dante or Petrarch, was not eccentric. One of the funeral orations on Alciato clearly defines him as a jurisconsul.[1] The speaker, much admiring Alciato's talents to creating belle letters, attributed his literary ability to fruits of his early career. Alciato's main arena, where he devoted his energy, was not cannon laws but civil laws, as we could esaily imagine. His importance in the history of jurisprudence, which was evident to his contemporaries and the schoalrs in the sixteenth century, has only recetnly begun to be fully appreciated.

The combination of literary knowledge and professional acumen of laws enabled him to explore a new field of literature. His capacity as an emblem writer is embodied in those two of the four images, which are listed within his Emblemta. On the other hand, a huge figure on the upper

[1] Alexander Grimaldi's *Funeral Oration*, p.4-6 in Henry Green, *Andrea Alciati and His Books of Emblems* (1872; rpt. New York: B. Franklin, n. d.), 256-257.

right-hand corner at the very foot of the effugy of Alciato shows that he is a jurisconsul. The University of Pavia has been one of the most distinguished instututions for studying Roman laws. There he first formally learned jurisprudence, taught around four years in his eminent years , and died as a professor of Roman Law. There are some evidences that Alcaito has always considered himself primarily as a jurisconsul. He regarded that the security of his life depends upon his reputation as a lawyer. His inaugural oration at the Univeristy of Pavia prasied the knowledge of jurisdiction as a support of his life despite his past vicissitudes.[2]

What strikes us most in the monument is that he seemed to be considered as more a distingushed Roman lawyer than a founder of emblem literature. This may sound strange to us, partly because his emblem book has run up till 156 editons, more popular in its numbers than Rablaise's Gargantue, who tried to study laws at the University of Orelan. But, in his own time Alciato was more famous for his contribution of jurisprudence than for an achievement as an emblem writer.[3] Some jurisconsuls called him a representative of newly-risen humanist legal interpretaion of texts.[4] A mere glance at the huge amount of Alcaito's whole achievements induces us that he is a legal humasnit first, and that he has written his Emblemata as a work of his left-hand.[5]

Actually, Ulrich Zasius, one of the remarkable contemporaries of Alciato, was struck by the brilliance , erudition, and penetration of Alcaito's Paradoxa, writing to Bonifacius Amerbach, another famous jurist that a mighty reformer of the study of Roman law had arisen. Zasius expressed his readiness to fight under Alcaito's flag.[6] Alciato was at the center of revolution of jurisprudence that inaugurated the eclectic view of the combination of the knowdege of grammer and rhetoric with that of classical literature and legal texts as fundamentally indispensable.

2. Emblematic method within Legal Tradition

Most of the emblme scholars cite Alciato's private letter to Calvo as an evidence that Alciato first regarded emblems as a kind of ornament or symbols:

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[2] Alciati, Andrea. *D. Andreae Alciati mediolanensis ivrecos: Opera omnia in qvatvor tomos legitime digesta, natiuo suo decori restituta, indice locupletiss adaucta* (Basel: Thomam Guarinum, 1582), IV.1035; James Hutton, *The Greek Anthology in Italy to The Year 1800* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1935), 207.

[3] This is true to some other legal humanists who are known to us now as an emblem writer like Nicolas Reusner and Julius Wilhelm Zincgreff.

[4] François Hotman, *Anti-tribonianus* in Opera (Geneva: 1599), I. 259101;_Myron Gilmore, *Humanists and Jurists: Six Studies in the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963), 155-157.

[5] The following list of Alciato's complete works shows that his *Emblemata* occupies only 1.5 % of his total works: total page 5178; Andrea Alciati, *Opera omnia in quo Moines queer in hunch Esc diem voter tomos legitime digesta, anti suo decori restituta, indice locupletiss* (Basel: 1582). Vol. 1 *Resonsorum Juris* (1524 pages[one column is counted as one page]+preface 28 pages+index 64); Vol. 2 Pandectarum,sue Digestorvm Iuris iuilis septimae partis titulos aliquot commentaria continens(De verborum obligationibus(col. 2-1023); De appelationibus (col. 1023-4); De verborum & rerum significatione (col.1025-1348)+preface+index 1); Vol. 3 Codex Iustinianei et decretalium Grecori IX. titulos aliquot commentari complectens(Codex (col 2-612); Decretalium (col 614--972)); Vol. 4 Tractatus et orationes continetur, ut ex sequenti pagia videre licet(Dispunctionum libri (col.1-161+ Praetermissorum libri II.(col.247-279)+Paragon libri XII(col.279-582)+De magistratibus(col.583-619)+De singulari certain libber(col.619-665)+consilium in materia duelli (col.665-677)+De praesumptionibus tractatus(col.677-894)+De ponderibus & mensuris libellus(col.895-903)+Galeni de ponderibus & mensuris liber(col.903-908)+De verborum significatione (cl.909-1020)).

[6] Urlichi Zasii, *Epistolae*, ed. J. A. S. von Riegger (1774), ii. 12ff. cited in Sir. John Macdonell, *Great jurists of the world* in *The Continental legal history series* vol. 2 (Boston; Little Brown and company, 1914),. 71.

> During this Saturnalia, at the behest of the illustrious Ambrogio Visconti, I composed a little book of epigrams, which I entitled Emblems: in separate epigrams I describe something which, from history or from nature, has some elegant significance, after which painters, goldsmiths, and founders could fashion the kind of thing we call badges and which were fasten on hats, or use as trade-marks, like the anchor of Aldus, the dove of Froben and the elephant of Clavo, long pregnant, but producing nothing.[7]

This letter to his friend humanist in 1522 shows that the personal devices of the wearer or the family insignia were already popular in his age. He affirmed in the same letter that with the request of an aristocrat in Milan he published a book named *Emblemata* in 1531 as a useful handbook to devise symbolical signs on shields, designs on cap-brooches, and figures as printer's mark.

Much attention has been hitherto paid by emblem scholars to the historical development of Alcaito's *Emblemata* per se due to the inconsistency of date on its first publication and to his frequent revisions and additions of emblems to the book, not to mention the annotations to the book by later writers. The efforts of the scholars have also made to locate literary sources of the emblems in *Greek Anthology*, *Aesop*, and Horapollo's *Hieropglyphics*. Instead of approaching *Emblemata* as a literature in the process of formation, Alciato's reference to the decorative arts in the letter of 1522 supports the synchronic way to relate *Emblemata* with his contemporary arts.

Alciato's contemporay critics like Aretino and Goldsmith Celini, both of whom worked in different fields, rediculed the fashion prevalent among the aristcrats. As it might be a reflection of the advent of mannerism, some of those ornaments entails allegorical meanings difficult to deciper at first sight, which is one of the characteristics of Alcaito's emblems. Like his emblems, they also hold an inscription to help reveal their meaning represented by their figure. Moreover, some of the figures they represent are almost the same with those in *Emblemata* .

It is true that the primary purpose of composing his *Emblemata* is to help creating and understanding various criptic images of Greco-Roman culture, which became unknown to his contemporaries. This does not mean the images in the book have nothing to do wih his own expertise on jurisprudence. Some legal works published prior to *Emblemata* has explanatary or sometimes esoteric illustrations. *Institutua novissime regonita aptissimique figuris* (Venice: 1512)(fig. 2) has an illustration at the head of the each title of Justinian *Institutes*. Guillaume Le Rouille's *De Justitia et injustitia* (Lyon: 1520)(fig. 3) has four large single-leaf woodcut illustrations to explain the content of its chapter. Words embedded within the figure show what each book mentions.[8] The illuminated legal books printed prior to *Emblemata* have likewise a large number of painted pictures. Gratian's *Decretum*, whose first illuminated edition was published in

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[7] Gian Luigi Barni, *Le Lettere di Andrea Alciato* Guireconsulto (Firenze: Felice Le Monnier, 1953), Nr. 24 (p.35).

[8] A series of ceramic figures for decorating the wall of a house as an illustration of a title in *The Digest* in the early seventeenth-century is still existent. Chances are that those figures are from the illustrations of *The Digest* in the earlier periods. J. E. Spruit, *Le droit romain, sujet d'une décoraion murale du 17e siècle* (Amsterdam: Stiching toto Bevordering der Notariële Wetenschap,1989). It is not a coincidence that the ornaments of the mantelpiece in England discovered by Peter M. Daly are related to jurisprudence. Peter M. Daly and Bari Hooper, "John Harvey's Carved Mantle-Piece (ca. 1570)" in Peter M. Daly, ed.,



Fig. 1 Alciato's Tombstone

Fig. 2 *Institutua novissime regonita aptissimique figuris* (Venice: 1512)

Fig. 3 Guillaume Le Rouille, *De Justitia et injustitia* (Lyon: 1520)



Digestum vetus.

¶ Digestorum seu Pandectarũ Imperato
ris Justiniani primus tomus, qõ digestum vetus appellant, mẽdis fe
re innumeris, que hactenus in eo latebant, relectis, ad vetustorũ exem
plarium tam impressorum q̃ manu scriptorum fidem exacte recogni
tus, integritatiq̃ pristine restitutus erit in publicum, cum grecis voci
bus cõcertui aeonnullis additionibus nuper inserris: ad cuius mar
ginem adiecte sunt quedã recte lectionis cõiecture ex Angeli Politia
ni, Baptiste Egnatij, Bartolini Phij, Raphaelis Volaterrani, Phi
lippi Beroaldi, Carelliani Lotte, Antonij Nebrissensis, Aldarici Za
sij, q̃ pre ceteris Guillelmi Budei, atq̃ Andree Alciati adnorationib̃
diligenter excerpte: que iuris studiosos non mediocri leuabũt labore:
quoniam lumen obscuris, q̃ fedissime mutilatis membra formãq̃ re
struunt. Emat igitur hanc primam digestorum partem studiosa iuuen
tus cui aut nihil aut parum addi vel adimi potest.

¶ Ad lectorem distichon.
Qui bona cesaret tentas dignoscere iuris
Dogmata, purgatum dispice lector opus.

1527

Fig. 4 *Digestum vetus. Digestorum seu Pandectatrum Imperato* (Lyon: 1527)



Fig. 5 *Authentica Nouellarum volumen* (Lyden: 1550)



Fig. 6 Cicero, *De Officiis*. (Augusburg: 1531)

1438, was popular throughtout the later centuries due to its prieminent importance as a basic text of cannon law. *Novella* of Justinian, one of the four major legal texts in the filed of civic law, was also printed with an illuminated picture at the head of the each of the book.[9] One such example is *Digestum vetus. Digestorum seu Pandectatrum Imperato* (Lyon: 1527)(fig. 4)

Though these pictures, explaining a long, sometimes tedious legal titles, seem to be unappropriate for ornamnetal use, these engravings, when seperated from its legal texts, would look like esoteric represention per se to demand intellectual energy to deciper the meaning of the pictures. Indeed, one large volume edition of Justinian legal texts other than *The Digest* and *The Institute* in 1550, where Alcaito's various notes and glosses are adopted, has seventeen pictures including an large illustration of the emperor Justianus aproaching to Tribonianus(fig. 5). This combined edtion of *Novella*, *Codex*, *Feudorum*, *Constitutiones*, and *Arbor Feudorum* (*Tree of Feudals*). [10] This book was dated in 1550, but could have been previously preparded by printers. In these documents nineteen illustrations are inserted at the head of the each book to relate what the first title of the individual book contains, sometimes explicitly, other times rather enigmatically. As this volume begins with Alciato's commentary on *Novella* and the first large illustration is accompanied by the minute explanation, which might be also attributed to Alciato, Alciato did not mention anything about his intention to attach those illustrations to the head of each collation and book.

3. Merger of Legal Method into Ars Memoria

Before we jump into the maze of emblematic illustrations, we should first take note of some basic but indispensable techinical legal terms concering with the illustrations. Colophon is the inscription or device, sometimes pictorial or emblematic, formerly placed at the end of a book or manuscript, and containing the title, the scribe's or pinter's name, date and place of printing. Another name for colophon is the inscription. The *Digest* records "the provenance of each excerpt, giving the name of the author, the title of the work, and the number of the book. This is called *inscriptio*, e.g. 'Ulpian, first book *ad Sabinum*'".[11] While colophon and inscription help the readers to memorize its referents as a peg, proprietas is a way to grasp the spirit of legal words and the intension of legislators. Proprietas is indispensable for understanding each legal text correctly: "not the name but the force of meaning, not the word but the conception"[12] Proprietas works instead of sticking to the literal descriptive meanings of legal words and provisions. Proprietas is to help the readers to understand the meanings of each law exactly to the point of the suble shade of difference.

Andrea Alciato and the Emblem Tradition: Essay in Honor of Virginia Woods Callahan (New York: AMS, 1989), 177-204.

[9] The standard edition of the *Corpus Juris*, generally referred to as the medieval vulgate edition and still used among jurists at bar in the sixteenth century, included medieval texts: a book of Lombard feudal customs, the *Libri Feudorum*, and some laws of German emperors.

[10] *Authentica Nouellarum volumen* (Lugduni: Ad Salamandrae, apud Sennetonios fratres, 1550).

[11] Barry Nicholas, *An Introduction to Roman Law* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,1962), 40.

In reality, the pictures used in this book do not necessarily gurantee Alciato's intention in the sense that they simply describe the upper-most surface of the legal terms.

This way of Alciato's interpretation tellingly suggests us why Alciato has crowned each emblem with a motto. A mere glance at some of the Renaissance editions and translations of *Greek Anthology* and Aesop's *Fables* tells us that both of them have had no captions to canalize our complex impressions on the texts to one destined direction. The mottos are indispensable for the first step of interpretaion. Though it is difficutl to trace and identify the mottos of the emblems with legal sententia, a typical mode of judgement to encounter actual moral problems is apprarent in the way legal sententia is used. The intriguing complexity and the conservation in the memory are characteric of emblems,

Everhard Bronchorst, a professor at the Univerisyt of Leyden, averts that the value of the title is two-fold. First, it helps the student to establishe and retain in his memory what is most important in the law. *Regulae* are the legal equivalent of the rhetoricain's *loci communes*. His remark reminds us of the comparison of the emblem to the common topics in Quintilian's *Institutes*. "They cover in a brief compendium all the matters which are discussedd at length in the vast ocean of the law and provide a general index to universal law." Secondly, knowledge of the title's contents gives the practising lawyer the utmost skill in diputaion and readiness in deciding cases. For he will always have a ready axiom to resolve any ambiguity by deductive reasoning.[13]

Our next questions to solve is in what circumstances Alciato found the way to merge legal tradition of colophon, proprietas and regulae into the memory system. It is certain that Alciato has already known the kind of the text that attaches an illustration at the head of each title. When he published Alciato's *Emblemata*, Steiner had had an experience to print out books on jurisconsls. A year before the publication of *Emblemata*, he publihsed a law book on civil laws and in 1535 a book on criminal laws. Steigner published a German translation of Cicero's *De Officiis* in the same year of 1531 with the publication of *Emblemata*.[14] Cicero has been considered as one of the most prominent rethoricians among the humanists and one of the distingushed jurisconsults among the Renaissance jurists. Alcaito paid a homage to Cicero to be the most prominet jurisconsul.[15] This translation of Cicero's work includes illustrations different from the ones attached to the legal books (fig. 6). Each illustration has an epithet at its head. This is quite similar to the form of Alciato's *emblemata*. The illustration seems to be lacking in moto, but the sentence of the chapter plays the role of the moto.

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[12] *De verborum significatione*, 14ff.

[13] Peter Stein, *The Character and Influence of the Roman Law* (London: The Hambeldon, 1988), 71.

[14] Cicero, *De Officiis. Ein Büch, so Marcus Tullius Cicero der Römer, zu seynem Sune Marco, von den tugentsamen ämptem* (Augusburg: 1531). This is the reprinted edition dated 16 February of the same year. It was translated by Johann Neuber, and its woodcut illustrations., including a portrait of Johann von Schwartzenberg after Dürer, are attributed to Hans Weiditz.

[15] "adeo enim a quibusdam depruatus suerat, ut suspicari potuissem, consulto atque dedita opera id factum nis cognouissem, in caeteris quoque aliorum operibus eandem eos diligentiam adhibere solitos, quapropter non est quod de eis ulterius conquerr, maius mihi negotium est cum detractoribus; e quibus aliqui stylum tanquam no plane Ciceronianum damnant. quius respondeo, inque eos mecum agere, qui cum ipsi in sinu & sub puluino Cieronem semper habenat, qiusque elegantiam, copiam, suuitatem, non ideo praestant, h{e? ç} a me requirunt" in *De singulari certamine liber* of Alciato's *Opera omnia*, ii. 256.

One of the quickest way to become from the have-nots to the have is to major in jurisprudence so as to be a member of courts, boht in the sense of aristorcatic society and law enformcement. Consequently, the legal books are well sold in that period and Renaissance publishers are willing to print books related to jurisprudence.[16] Augusburg was particularly known as a center of illustrations. It had long been the centre of the "Kartenmaler" who cut and printed the woodcuts of saints and those for playing-cards, and by 1418 had formed a separate guild. There were the playing-card makers , who are dated back to 1377 at the latest, and the producers of the woodcut figures of saints as pilgrims' tokens and souvenirs. It appears that there was a considerable opposition to the new idea of book-illustraion, but the abbot Melchior von Stamheim decided that books might be printed with woodcuts so long as members of the guild were emplyoed in making the blocks.[17]

4. Alciato's Historical method of *Emblemata*

Alciato's first published work was *the Annotationes in Tres Posteriores Libros Codicis Justiniani* (*Notes on the Last Three Books of the Codex of Justinian*) in 1515, when he was merely twenty-four years old.[18] In the praface he made a special thanks to his friend, who provided him with *Notitia Dignitatum*. He confessed that without this book, a document of late Roman imperial administration, he could not have hunted the corrupted texts of the last three books of *the Codex* to emanate. The *Digest* has three different prefaces: one for Tribonian, another for readers, and the other for jurisconsults. In the first preface to the *Digest*, Justinian ordered the chief editor to omit, modify, or even reverse what he called the "old learning" or "old ways".[19]

The emperor Justinian asked the legal scholars in the fifth century to compile all the Roman legal texts into one definitive compendium. At the same time, he ordered some alterations of the original text either by abridgement and omission or by insertion of new materials should be made to catch up with the situation in his time. The modern emblem scholars suggest that the term emblem must have been used among the jurisconsults as referring to those parts in Justinian's *Corpus juris civili* which Tribonianus, the chief editor of the laws, is said to have inserted and sometimes procrastinated the original legal texts.

A long jurisprudence scholarship in the medieval periods justify the application and actual usage of the interpolated legal texts of *the Digest of Justinian* and his other influential legal documents as

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[16] Some of those examples are as follows: *Lehrenrecht der teütscht auch inn ein neibe* (1530), *Des aller Durchteuch* (1532), *Juris deutsch oder Ordnun* (1530), *Teütscht oder ordnunge* (1535).

[17] Hugh William Davies, *Devices of the Early Printers 1470-1560* (London: Grafton, 1935), 116-17

[18] *Notitia vtraqve cvm orientis tvm Occidentis vltra* (Basel: 1515).

[19] It is strange that the first preface was not cited in most of the editions of the *Corpus Juris Civilis* published in the sixteenth-century. Instead of the omission of the preface, the edition of the *Digest* published in 1528 has a series of figures of the jurisconsults and the short derogatory bibliography of Emperor Justinian and Tribonianus; *Digestorum seu pandectaru[m] imperatoris Justiniani primus [-secundus] tomus, ad cuius marginem adiecte sunt queda[m] recte lectionis co[n]iecture ex Angeli Politiani, Baptiste Egnatii, Bartolini Pii, Raphaelis Volaterrani, Philippi Beroaldi, Catelliani Cotte, Antonii Nebrissensis, Uldarici Zasii, & pro ceteris Guillelmi Budei, atq[ue] Andree Alciati adnotationib[us] diligenter excerpte* (Lyons: Jacob Giunta, 1527-1528. Printed by Jacques Mareschal & Joannes Moelim).

the authentic unified system. Their lack of sense of history together with their total disregard for other classical texts of humanities than Justinian legal texts, and their devotional attitude towards the *Corpus* as a complete authoritative system applicable to any ages and any places like the Scriptures almost blindly accepted the traditional vulgate edition of the *Corpus Juris* as a set of definitive texts which should not be tampered with their exegetical deductive criticism. Accurisius, whose *Magna glossa* has been the most eminent device that other medieval scholars have relied on, noticing some corruptions and inexplicable words within the texts, made a few comments about them, but these notes are trivial compared with the total amount of the glosses he and his followers added to the texts.[20] What the medieval legalists thought worth serious consideration is to reconcile the inconsistencies among the texts in the *Corpus* contradictions. Commentators, a school of scholars of the Roman Law in the later Middle Ages from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as distinct from previous legal school of the glossators, put an emphasis upon the application of the *Corpus Juris* to the legal cases not in their literal sense but as essential principles extracted from legal substance. For the commentators, the *Corpus Juris* was an achievement of the past, which can only be of use as a common law in its essence. They tend to pay much attention to root the importance of Justinian laws in practical affairs and not just in literal consistency among Justinian texts.

No one can specify who invented the printing press in the middle of the fourteenth-century, but this new invention has changed the attitude toward texts. In the age of manuscripts, the various versions of the texts are co-existent based upon the writings of different scribers. No definite versions are guaranteed. In the age of printing press, satisfactory authorized texts are always present. The author's intention shifts from one turning back to the past literary and philosophical resources to one organic text per se. There is no longer flowering of different kinds of sources. The book can be read as it is.

In general, the writers of the Renaissance were highly concerned about words and their precise use.

This is particularly true to legal humanists. For it was during the early sixteenth century that they restore the original meaning of words by relating them to all that was known about the ancient world by means of assembling the lost classical manuscripts or their printed editions as many as possible. In the sixteenth-century Italian jurisconsults tended to support and maintain this late medieval tradition. But the humanists like Petrarch and LorenzoValla in the previous centuries took it into account that Justinian texts are compilation of the legal texts mutilated by Tribonian and his fellow editors to adjust the pristine texts to the legal customs of the age of Justinian for practical purposes.

Hunting Tribonian interpolations to restore the legal texts as they once were should be more a serious assignment for scholars than adding glosses to the interpolated legal texts to fabricate reasonable sense out of them. The trouble with these humanists is that they have no experience as a lawyer, however heavily armed with a vast erudition of classical literature and whatever important

[20] For example, *The Digest* 33.5.19; 30.1.

political role they are engaged in as a man of action to advocate a code of classical civic duty. They have had to be completely dependent upon philology to detect the interpolations and upon classical knowledge gained by means of literary works to explicate the meaning of the texts.

Since Alciato's time the legal humanists' eagerness and attentiveness of culling interpolated texts from various so called "fare" manuscripts has become a yardstick to measure on which side of the two, Medieval scholastic method or Renaissance humanist critical method, one takes. As Luigi Finetti pointed out, Alciato came across the problem of interpolation when he tried to resurrect the correct meaning of the legal texts and, in fact, pointed out some examples of interpolated texts. Alciato, like other scholars, Poliziano, Bolognino, Budé, dedicated himself to correct errors of scribes and misunderstanding of medieval jurists.

Consequently, most of the *Digest* published in the sixteenth-century do not cite the first preface to Tribonian, and, even in case of the citation, only the main body of the text without any gloss is printed, contrary to the other part of the legal texts with an incredible large amount of notes and commentaries. Godredus' *Corpus juris civilize Iustiniaiane*, a compendium of the previous two centuries, which has probably the most annotated preface in the early seventeenth-centuries, has merely thirteen notes.

Alciato's effort was to bring the old legal texts to the date. Alciato's *De verborum significatione* (*On the Meaning of Words*), for example, a whole chapter on daily words and legal terms used in the *Corpus Juris* was devoted to explain their precise meaning and deprive them of ambiguity. His notes in the second last title—confusingly *De verborum significatione*—of the *Digest* deal with 266 legal maxims from the viewpoint of philology. Lechimare, one of the most major jurists in the seventeenth-century France, praised Alciato as the one who dispersed adumbrated knowledge miserably tampered with the crooked intellect of the medieval jurists.[21]

Discussing the origin of the law, Alciato affirmed what Pantagruel said: "the law grew up out of the filed of moral and natural philosophy. Then how could these idiots [= glossators and commentators] construe it when by God they studies less philosophy than the average mule? The humanities, a knowledge of antiquity, history? In these subjects your dotards were about as well equipped as a toad is with feathers."[22] Alciato cut a conspicuous figure as a new rising generation of jurisconsults by publishing *Praetermissa* (*The Omitted Matters*), a treatise of linguistic questions in the law, and *De Verborum significatione*. In particular, he declared his intention of eliminating superfluities, inequities, contradictions (the famous antinominae), and anachronisms. [23] In addition to what the later jurisconsults called "interpolation", he was thoroughgoing in establishing his whole texts as an definitive authority in the filed of law. He prohibited any later scholars from expanding the texts by any kinds of commentaries to permit only "paratitles" and summaries. The interpretation of the Justinian laws is indispensable because laws vary from country to country, from

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[21] M. P. Gilmore, *Humanists and Jurists: Six Studies in the Renaissance*, 24-54.
[22] *The five Books of Gargantuan and Pantagruel*, trans. Jacques le Clercq (New York: Harper and Row, 1936), 203-4.
[23] Donald R. Kelley, *History, Law and the Human Sciences: Medieval and Renaissance Perspectives* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), II. 29.

one period to another. This historical sense combined with consciousness of geographical difference justifies the accumulation of new interpretations of the text itself to decipher the fundamental ideal of justice, law, equity, custom.

Alciato's first book attracts our attention, not because this first book has the praface of his consciouness of the corruption of the legal texts of Justinian, but because the original book has a comparatively large number of illustraions, which suggests a source of emblems. In his letter to his friend, Boniface Amerbach in 1528, he referred to Beatus Rhenanu's plan to publish an annotation to Pliny's *Natural History*.

> I would like him to see to it that for individual chapters there would be added graphically animals, geography, fish, plants, which I think would be not at all difficult. I myself could be of some help in this matter, since, as you know, I am an aficionado and collector of the works of *Dioscordies*.[24]

Alciato was famous in pointing out the emendated points in the texts of the *Corpus juris civilis*, but he has probably never used the word emblem in the sense of interpolation. A mere glance at Alcaito's contemporary legal works clearly indicate that this term is not used among the jurisconsuls as referring to those parts in Justinian's *Digest* which Tribonianus, the editor of the laws, is said to have inserted and sometimes procrastanated the original laws.

5. The diffused order of *Emblemata* and the legal idea of "Encyclia "

The word emblem possesses a specail connotaion for Alciato:It is in the same letter to Amerach in reference to Pliny's *Natural Hstory*:

> I think that everywhere there could be found makers of inlay and wood-workers who could very easily make type-foundings of this kind.[25]

There were a wood-worker or mosaic workers who can provide the illustrations of natural things. Emblem was a technical term of the mosaic.

There has been a long discussion about what Alciato had in mind when he chose the word *Emblemata* for his small book *Emblemata liber*, a collection of Latin epigrams with illustrations.[26] The locus classicus of Alciato's reference to the composition of this book is his letter to his friend Franceso Clavo in 1521, which was cited in the first chapter of this paper. It shows that this literary work is one of his left-handed works partly to kill time during Christmas vacation. It should not be ignored that the locus did not monopolize the whole message to his friend, but rather simply occupy

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[24] Barni, *Lettere*, Nr. 42 (p.73 ll.57); Virginia Callahan, "A Comment on the 1531 Edition of Alciato's Emblems", *Emblemata* VI (1993), 201-204.
[25] Barni, *Lettere*, Nr. 42,
[26] Hessel Miedema, "The Term *Emblema* in Alcaiti", JWCI 31 (1968) 234-50; B. F. Scholz, "The 1531 Augusburg Edition of Alcaito's *Emblemata*: A Survey of Research", *Emblematica* 5 (1991) 213-54.

a part of his achievements as a legal scholar.[27] He also mentioned that he has finished writing the treatise *De verborum significatione* and *In primum Codicis Justiniani librum.* The diffused order of legal texts within the individual titles in the *Digest* has been troubling the legal historians of Roman laws since the Renaissance. No definite explanation for the way each text are arranged within a title has ever been provided.[28]

Renaissance jurists have tried to reduce or even nullify the contradictions among the text. Though each tile in *Digesta* is devoted to one topic, the order of fragments appears to be arbitrary within each title, and there is no cross reference.[29] The laws were not cited even in chronological order. This reminds us of the haphazard way of laying down emblems. We are so accustomed to the "blessed rage of order" that we tend to cast doubt that some systems are hidden in the way emblems are put. In reality, in less than twelve years after the publication of *Emblemata*, the editors made various attempts to arrange the emblems in a definite format in its order and its layout. Gulielum Rovill's arrangement won this game to transmit us *Emblemata* in its present available framework.[30] The fact that Alciato is literally one of the most distinguished jurists in his period leads us to presuppose that he is more keen to organization than other scholars of humanities. But his legal background tells us nothing about such an inclination toward order. One of his greatest major works *Parerugon* is a misecellanious collections of his opinions about topics ranging from problems of laws surprisingly to such daily events as colours. It is this work that made him well known in later generations.

Poliziano, whom Alciato praised most in his early work approached to humanistic learning as what he calls "encyclia."[31]. Poliziano insisted that the learners should have an comprehensive knowledge of all domains of studies including those "of jurists, physicians, dialectician, and whoever else make up that circle of leering which we call 'encyclia'". This attitude perfectly coerces into the idea of jurisprudence as true philosophy (*vera philosophia*). As Justinian clearly defines at the beginning of the *Digest*, the law is concerned with things divine and human. Though this idea was deteriorated during the Middle ages due to the fact that the people in those ages put an emphasis on things divine to set theology up as a mistress of all leanings.[32] The reverse revisionist course taken by the humanists offers a good opportunity for them to propose what learning they should pay homage to.

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[27] According to the arts of letter writing (*artes dictaminis*), one of the three kinds of Ciceronian rhetoric arts, a letter should be made up of five parts: salutation (*salutatio*), capturing of readers (*benevolentiae captatio*), laying out facts (*narratio*), request (*petitio*), closing (*conclusio*). Alciato's reference to *Emblemata* occupies the first part of *narratio*. About the division of the letters, see Thomas M. Conley, *Rhetoric in the European Tradition* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), 94.

[28] One of the most convincing theories is Bluhme's: *Die Ordnung der Fragmente in den Pandektentiteln* (1820), later reprinted in *Labeo* 6 (1960), 50, 236, 368. Peter Stein, *The Character and Influence of the Roman Law*, 69.

[29] Barry Nicholas, *An Introduction to Roman Law* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,1962), .43.

[30] *Alciati emblemata denuo ab ipso Autore recognita* (Lugduni: Gulielum Rovill, 1566).

[31] Donald R. Kelley, *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970), 48

[32] It is true that Accursius denied the necessity of theological erudition for the lawyers on the account of the fact that civil laws would give us all kinds of knowledge, but his predecessors tended to exalt theology over jurisprudence. cf. Accursius, *Gloss on Digesta* I, 1.1.

The harmonious alliance of encyclopedic knowledge with ethics reflected in Alciato's *Emblemata.* Two hundred twelve emblems are crammed with extensive knowledge ranging from esoteric sciences to classical literature, but each one of them cannot be separated from the ethics current in his period.

6. Conclusion

Given the proper attention to the legal context in the sixteenth century, when Alciato has lived and influenced his predecessors, the idea of emblem that a symbolic picture carrys a little-far-fetched notion decipherd by a concice sentence has also existed in legal tradition. (1)Some of the sixteenth-century commentaries based upon the style of glossariarts concerning Justinian's works, the counterpart of the Bible in thelogoy in its importance of the text itself, have a picture forwarded to each book or chapter in a legal work.. (2)Other legal works on justice in general and some particular laws have also pictures to explain the title of each chapter. Alcaito himself has adopted this emblematic picture in his own work.(it is quite unfortunate that Alciato did not mention anything about this work). (3)Thirdly, publisher Steiner printed a German translation of Cicero's *De Officiiis* in the same year of 1531 when he published Alcaito's *Emblemata.* Cicero was respected as an epitome of the eminent jurisconsult among the sixteenth-century legal historians. A large number of his works are edited and published in the century, but this translation is particulary unique in the sense that the picture is attached to each chapter and each picture carries an epigram at its head.

Consciousness of history and urge to recovery genuine legal texts among Renaissance jurisprudence displaced the traditional interpretations the most authoritative texts of Justinian. Alciato shared the same consciousness and the burning urge with other jurists, or rather he was the most prominent standard-bearer of this new movement. Consequently, his brand-new interpretations of ancient culture in *Emblemata* are the fruit of his assiduous effort to restore the original meaning of words by relating them to all that was known about the ancient world by means of assembling the lost classical manuscripts or their printed editions as many as possible.

Part 3

Plutarch, *The Moralia*

I. De liberis educandis
Quomodo adoleseens poetas audire debeat
De recta ratione audiendi
Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur
Quomodo quis suos in vfrtutc sentiat profectus

II. De eapienda ex inimicis uhutate
De arnicorum multitudine
De tuenda sanitate praecepta
Coniugalia praecepta
Septern sapientium conviviurn
De superstitione

III. Regum et imperatorum apophthegrnata
Apopbthegmata Laconica
Instituta Laconica
Lacaenarum apophthegmata
Mulierum virtutes

IV. Quaestiones Romanae
Quaestiones Graecae
Parallela Graeca et Romana
De fortuna Rornanorurn
De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute
Bellone an pace clariores fuerint Athenienses

V. De Iside et Osiride
De Eapud Deiphos
De Pythiae oraculis
De defeetti oraculorurn

VI. An virtus doceri possit
De virtute morali
De cohibenda ira
De tranquillitate anirni
De fraterno amore
De amore prolis
An vitiositas ad infelicitate sufficiat
Anirnine an corporis affectiones sint pejores
De garrulitate
De curiositate

VII. De cupiditate divitiarurn
De vitioso pudore

VII De invidia et odio
De se ipsurn cit a, invidiarn laudando
De genio Socra,tis
De exiho

VIII. Quaestionum convivalium libri vi

IX. Quaestionum convivaliurn libri lii
Arnatorius

X. Arnatoriae narrationes
Maxirne cum principibus philosopho esse disserendurn
Ad principem ineruditurn
An seni respublica gerenda sit
Praecepta gerendae reipublicae

De unius in republica dorninatione populari
Comparationis Aristophanis et Menandri cornpendiurn
XI De placitis philosophorum, libri ii
Quaestiones naturales
XII. De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet
De primo frigido
Aquane an ignis sit utilior
Terrestriane an aquatilia animalia sint callidi
Bruta animalia ratione uti, sive Gryflus
De esu carnium orationes
XIII. Platonicae quaestiones
De animae procreatione in Timaeo
Compendium libri de animae procreatione in Timaeo
De Stoicorum repugnantiis
Compendium argumenti Stoicos absurdiora poeis dicere
De communibus notitus adversus Stoicos
XIV. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum
Adversus Colotem
An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum
De musica
XV. Fragments

THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

(DE LIBERIS EDUCANDIS)

1. LET us consider what may be said of the education of free-born children, and what advantages they should enjoy to give them a sound character when they grow up.

2. It is perhaps better to begin with their parentage first; and I should advise those desirous of becoming fathers of table offspring to abstain from random cohabitation with women; I mean with such women as courtesans and concubines. For those who are not well-born, whether on the father's or the mother's side, have an indelible disgrace in their low birth, which accompanies them throughout their lives, and offers to anyone desiring to use it a ready subject of reproach and insult. Wise was the poet
who declares:

The home's foundation being wrongly laid, The offspring needs must be unfortunate.

A goodly treasure, then, is honourable birth, and such a man may speak his mind freely, a thing which should be held of the highest account by those who wish to have issue lawfully begotten. In the nature of things, the spirits of those whose blood is base or counterfeit are constantly being brought down and humbled, and quite rightly does the poet declare: A man, though bold, is made a slave whenever He learns his mother's or his sire's disgrace.' Children of distinguished parents are, of course, correspondingly full of exultation and pride. At all events, they say that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, often declared to many persons, that what-ever he desired was always agreed to by the Athenian people; for whatever he wished his mother also wished; whatever his mother wished Themistocles also wished; and whatever Themistocles wished all the Athenians wished. It is very proper also to bestow a word of praise on the Spartans for the noble spirit they showed in fining their king, Archidamus, because he had permitted himself to take to wife a woman short of stature, the reason they gave being that he proposed to supply them not with kings but with kinglets.

3. In this connection we should speak of a matter which has not been overlooked by our predecessors. What is this? It is that husbands who approach their wives for the sake of issue should do so only when they have either not taken any wine at all, or at any rate, a very moderate portion. For children whose fathers have

chanced to beget them in drunkenness are wont to be fond of wine, and to be given to excessive drinking. Wherefore Diogenes, observing an emotional and crack-brained youth, said, "Young man, your father must have been drunk when he begot you!" So much for my views on the subject of birth. We must now speak of education.

4. As a general statement, the same assertion may be made in regard to moral excellence that we are in the habit of making in regard to the arts and sciences, namely, that there must be a concurrence of three things in order to produce perfectly right action, and these are: nature, reason, and habit. By reason I mean the act of learning, and by habit constant practice. The first beginnings come from nature, advancement from learning, the practical use from continued repetition, and the culmination from all combined; but so far as any one of these is wanting, the moral excellence must, to this extent, be crippled. For nature without learning is a blind thing, and learning without nature is an imperfect thing, and practice without both is an ineffective thing. Just as in farming, first of all the soil must be good, secondly, the husbandman skilful, and thirdly, the seed sound, so, after the same manner, nature is like to the soil, the teacher to the farmer, and the verbal counsels and precepts like to the seed. I should strenuously insist that all three qualities met together and formed a perfect union in the souls of those men who are celebrated among all mankind, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and all who have attained an ever-living fame.

Now it is a fortunate thing and a token of divine love if ever a heavenly power has bestowed all these qualities on any one man; but if anybody imagines that those not endowed with natural gifts, who yet have the chance to learn and to apply themselves in the right way to the attaining of virtue, cannot repair the want of their nature and advance so far as in them lies, let him know that he is in great, or rather total, error. For indifference ruins a good natural end went, but instruction amends a poor one; easy things escape the careless, but difficult things are conquered by careful application. One may understand how effective and how productive a thing is application and bard work, if he only direct his attention to many effects that are daily observed. For drops of water make hollows in rocks, steel and bronze are worn away by the touch of hands, and rims of chariot-wheels once bent by dint of labour, cannot, no matter what be done, recover their original lines. The bent staves which actors use it is impossible to straighten; indeed the unnatural shape has, through labour, come to predominate over the natural. And are these the only things which clearly show the potency of diligence? No, but myriads upon myriads. A piece of land is good by nature, but without care it grows waste, and the better it is by nature, so much the more is it spoiled by neglect if it be not worked. Another piece is forbidding and rougher than land should be, but, if it be tilled, straightway it produces noble crops. What trees if they are neglected do not grow crooked and prove unfruitful? Yet if they receive right culture, they become fruitful, and bring their fruit to maturity. What bodily strength is not impaired and finally ruined by neglect and luxury and ill condition? On the other hand, what weak physique does not show a very great improvement in strength if men exercise and train themselves? What horses if they are well broken when young do not become obedient to their riders, whereas if they are left unbroken they turn out stubborn and restive? Why wonder at other instances, seeing as we do that many of the wildest animals are made tame and used to their labours? Well did the Thessalian say, when asked who were the most pacific of the Thessalians, "Those who are just returning from war. But why discuss the matter at length? For character is habit long continued, and if one were to call the virtues of character the virtues of habit, he would not seem to go far astray. I will cite but one more example on this point and then I shall desist from discussing it further. Lycurgus, a the lawgiver of the Spartans, took two puppies of the same litter, and reared them in quite different ways, so that from the one he produced a mischievous and greedy cur, and from the other a dog able to follow a scent and to hunt. And then at a time when the Spartans were gathered together, he said, " Men of Sparta, of a truth habit and training and teaching and guidance in living are a great influence toward engendering excellence, and I will make this evident to you at once." There-upon producing the two dogs, he let them loose, putting down directly in front of them a dish of food and a hare. The one dog rushed after the hare, and the other made for the dish. While the Spartans were as yet unable to make out what import he gave to this, and with what intent he was exhibiting the dogs, he said, "These dogs are both of the same litter, but they have received a different bringing-up, with the result that the one has turned out a glutton and the other a hunter." In regard to habits and manner of life let this suffice.

5. Next in order comes the subject of feeding. Mothers ought, I should say, themselves to feed their infants and nurse them themselves. For they will feed them with a livelier affection and greater era, as loving them inwardly, and, according to the proverb, to their fingertips. But the good-will of foster-mothers and nursemaids is insincere and forced, since they love for pay. Nature too makes clear the fact that mothers should themselves nurse and feed what they have brought into the world, since it is for this purpose that she has provided for every animal which gives birth to young a source of food in its milk. Wise also is her forethought; for

she has fashioned women's breasts double, so that, if there be twins, they may have a double source of nutrition. Yet apart from all this, mothers would come to be more kindly disposed towards their children, and more inclined to show them affection. Not unnaturally either, I swear; for this fellowship in feeding is a bond that knits kindliness together. Yes, even the brute beasts, when dragged away from their companions in feeding, evidently miss thumb So, as I have said, mothers must endeavour, if possible, to nurse their children themselves; but if they are unable to do this, either because of bodily weakness (for such a thing can happen) or because they are in haste to bear more children, yet foster-mothers and nurse-maids are not to be selected at random, but as good ones as possible must be chosen; and, first of all, in character they must be Greek. For just as it is necessary, immediately after birth, to begin to mould the limbs of the children's bodies in order that these may grow straight and without deformity, so, in the same fashion, it is fitting from the beginning to regulate the characters of children. For youth is impressionable and plastic, and while such minds are still tender lessons are infused deeply into them; but anything which has become hard is with difficulty softened. For just as seals leave their impression in soft wax, so are lessons impressed upon the minds of children while they are young. And, as it seems to me, Plato, that remarkable man, quite properly advises nurses, even in telling stories to children, not to choose at random, lest haply their minds be filled at the outset with foolishness and corruption. Phocylides, too, the poet, appears to give admirable advice in saying:

Should teach while still a child The tale of noble deeds.

6. Now there is another point which should not be omitted, that in choosing the younger slaves, who are to be the servants and companions of young masters, those should be sought out who are, first and foremost, sound in character, who are Greeks as well, and distinct of speech, so that the children may not be contaminated by barbarians and persons of low character, and so take on some of their commonness. The proverb-makers say, and quite to the point," If you dwell with a lame man, you will learn to limp."

7. When now they attain to an age to be put under the charge of attendants, then especially great care must be taken in the appointment of these, so as not to entrust one's children inadvertently to slaves taken in war or to barbarians or to those who are unstable. Nowadays, the common practice of many persons is more than ridiculous; for some of their trustworthy slaves they appoint to manage their farms, others they make masters of their ships, others their factors, others they make house-stewards, and some even money-lenders; but any slave whom they find to be a wine-bibber and a glutton, and useless for any kind of business, to him they bring their sons and put them in his charge. But the good attendant ought to be a man of such nature as was Phoenix, the attendant of Achilles.

I come now to a point which is more important and weighty than anything I have said so far. Teachers must be sought for the children who are free from scandal in their lives, who are unimpeachable in their manners, and in experience the very best that may be found. For to receive a proper education is the source and root of all goodness. As husbandmen place stakes beside the young plants, so do competent teachers with all care set their precepts and exhortations beside the young, in order that their characters may grow to be upright. Nowadays there are some fathers who deserve utter contempt, who, before examining those who are going to teach, either because of ignorance, or some-times because of inexperience, hand over their children to untried and untrustworthy men. And this is not so ridiculous if their action is due to inexperience, but there is another case which is absurd to the last degree. What is this? Why, sometimes even with knowledge and with information from others, who tell them of the inexperience and even of the depravity of certain teachers, they nevertheless entrust their children to them; some yield to the flatteries of those who would please them, aud there are those who do it as a favour to insistent friends. Their action resembles that of a person, who, if he were afflicted with bodily disease, should reject that man who by his knowledge might be able to save his life, and, as a favour to a friend, should prefer one who by his inexperience might cause his death; or again that of a person who should dismiss a most excellent shipmaster, and accept the very worst because of a friend's insistence. Heaven help us! Does a man who bears the name of father think more of gratifying those who ask favours than he thinks of the education of his children? And did not Socrates a of old often say very fittingly, that if it were in any way possible one should go up to the loftiest part of the city and cry aloud," Men, whither is your course taking you, who give all possible attention to the acquiring of money but give small thought to your sons to whom you are to leave it? 3' To this I should like to add that such fathers act nearly as one would act who should give thought to his shoe but pay no regard to his foot. Many fathers, however, go so far in their devotion to money as well as in animosity toward their children, that in order to avoid paying a larger fee, they select as teachers for their children men who are not worth any wage at all-looking for ignorance, which is cheap enough. Wherefore Aristippus not inelegantly, in fact very cleverly, rebuked a father who was devoid both of mind and sense. For when a man

asked him what fee he should require for teaching his child, Aristippus replied, "A thousand drachmas"; but when the other exclaimed, "Great Heavens! what an excessive demand I can buy a slave for a thousand," Aristippus retorted, " Then you will have two slaves, your son and the one you buy." And, in general, is it not absurd for. people to accustom children to take their food with their right hand, and, if one puts out his left, to rebuke him, and yet to take no forethought that they shall hear right and proper words of instruction?

8. Now I will tell what happens to these admirable fathers when they have badly brought up and badly educated their sons. When their sons are enrolled in the ranks of men, and disdain the sane and orderly life, and throw themselves headlong into disorderly and slavish pleasures, then, when it is of no use, ~e fathers regret that they have been false to their duty in the education of their sons, being now distressed at their wrongdoing. For some of them take up with flatterers and parasites, abominable men of obscure origin, corrupters and spoilers of youth, and others buy the freedom of courtesans and prostitutes, proud and sumptuous in expense; still others give themselves up to the pleasures of the table, while others come to wreck in dice and revels, and some finally take to the wilder forms of evil-doing, such as adultery and bacchanalian routs, ready to pay with life itself for a single pleasure. But if these men had become conversant with the higher education, they perhaps would not have allowed themselves to be dominated by such practices, and they would at least have become acquainted with the precepts of Diogenes, who with coarseness of speech, but with substantial truth, advises and says, Go into any brothel to learn that there is no difference between what costs money and what costs nothing." Pearle call it, rather than advice) that, to sum up, the beginning, the middle, and end in all these matters is good education and proper training ; and it is this, I say, which leads on and helps towards moral excellence and towards happiness. And, in comparison with this, all other advantages are human, and trivial, and not worth our serious concern. Good birth is a fine thing, but it is an advantage which must be credited to one's ancestors. Wealth is held in esteem, but it is a chattel of fortune, since oftentimes she takes it away from those who possess it, and brings and presents it to those who do not expect it. Besides, great wealth is the very mark for those who aim their shafts at the purse-rascally slaves and blackmailers; and above all, even the vilest may possess it. Repute, moreover, is imposing, but unstable. Beauty is highly prized, but short-lived. Health is a valued possession, but inconstant. Strength is much admired, but it falls an easy prey to disease and old age. And, in general, if anybody prides himself wholly upon the strength of his body, let him know that he is sadly mistaken in judgement. For how small is man 5 strength compared with the power of other living creatures! I mean, for instance, elephants and bulls and lions. But learning, of all things in this world, is alone immortal and divine. Two elements in man's nature are supreme over all-mind and reason. The mind exercises control over reason, and reason is the servant of the mind, unassailable by fortune, impregnable to calumny, uncorrupted by disease, unimpaired by old age. For the mind alone grows young with increase of years, and time, which takes away all things else, but adds wisdom to old age. War, again, like a torrent, sweeps everything away and carries everything along in its current, but learning alone it cannot take away. It seems to me that Stilpo, the philosopher of Megara, made an answer worth recording, at the time when Demetrius, having reduced the people of that city to slavery and razed its buildings, asked him whether perchance he had lost anything; but Stilpo replied:

No, indeed, for war cannot make spoil of virtue." In full accord and harmony with this appears the reply of Socrates. For he, when someone (I think it was Gorgias) asked him what notion he had regarding the great king, and whether he thought him happy, said, "I do not know how he stands in the matter of righteousness and learning,"-his thought being that happiness depends upon these and not upon accidental advantages.

9. Just as I advise people to make nothing of more immediate importance than the education of their children, so again I say they ought to cling to the uncorrupted and sound education, and to withdraw their sons as far away as possible from the nonsense of ostentatious public discourse. For to please the multitude is to displease the wise. And Euripides bears witness to my words when he says :

I have no gift to reason with a crowd;
I'm wiser with my friends and fewer folk.
And this is just; since those the wise hold cheap
Are better tuned to speak before a crowd.

I observe that those who practise speaking in a way to catch the favour of the vulgar herd also turn to this matter, and I could not deny that I have also rehearsed my speech to the best of my ability; for I should be a miserable wretch, if, in view of his past and present treatment of me, I had paid no attention to what I was going to say to

you about it." But I, for my part, would not assert that readiness of speech is to be utterly rejected, or again that it should not be used in its proper place, but that it is to be used like a drug, with caution. Indeed until one arrives at man's estate I do not think it right that he should speak at all offhand, but when he shall have firmly established his powers, then, if the occasion invite, it is fitting for him to exercise some freedom in his speech. For just as those who have been in fetters for a long time, even if later they be set free, yet, because of the long-continued habituation to their bonds, are not able to walk freely, and are not sure on their feet, s6 is it with those who for a long time have kept their speech under close restraint: if ever it becomes necessary to speak offhand, they nevertheless keep to the same type of expression as before. But to allow those who are still young to speak extempore stands responsible for the worst sort of rambling talk. They tell the story of a wretched painter, who, exhibiting to Apelles a painting, said, "This I have only this moment painted." Whereupon Apelles replied, "Even should you not say so, yet I know that it was painted hastily, and I only wonder that you have not painted more of like sort."

I advise then (for I return now to my original theme) that, as one should always be careful to avoid the theatrical and melodramatic style, so, on the other hand, one should exercise the same caution to avoid triviality and vulgarity in style; for a turgid diction is unfitted for a man in public life, a barren style is too unimpressive; but as the ought to be not merely healthy but also dry, so also speech should be not merely free m fault but vigorous too. For the cautious is rely commended, but the audacious is admired well. It so happens that I entertain the same opinion also in regard to mental disposition. For should not be bold, on the one hand, or, on the other, pusillanimous and cowering, since the one resolves itself into impudence, and the other into servility. Always to pursue the middle course in everything is artistic and in good taste.

While I am still dwelling upon my own opinion in regard to education, I desire to say that in the first place a discourse composed of a series of short sentences I regard as no small proof of lack of culture; in the second place I think that in practice such discourse soon pails, and in every ease it causes impatience; for monotony is in everything tiresome and repellent, but variety is agreeable, as it is in everything else, as, for example, in entertainments that appeal to the eye or the ear.

10. Now the free-born child should not be allowed to go without some knowledge, both through hearing and observation, of every branch also of what is called general education; yet these he should learn only incidentally, just to get a taste of them, as it were (for perfection in everything is impossible), but philosophy he should honour above all else. I can perhaps make my opinion clear by means of a figure: for example, it is a fine thing to voyage about and view many cities, but profitable to dwell only in the best one. And it was a clever saying of Bion, the philosopher, that, just as the suitors, not being able to approach Penelope, consorted with her maid-servants, so also do those who are not able to attain to philosophy wear themselves to a shadow over the other kinds of education which have no value. Wherefore it is necessary to make philosophy as it were the head and front of all education. For as regards the care of the body men have discovered two sciences, the medical and the gymnastic, of which the one implants health, the other sturdiness, in the body; but for the illnesses and affections of the mind philosophy alone is the remedy. For through philosophy and in company with philosophy it is possible to attain knowledge of what is honour-able and what is shameful, what is just and what is unjust, what, in brief, is to be chosen and what to- be avoided, how a man must bear himself in his relations with the gods, with his parents, with his elders, with the laws, with strangers, with those in authority, with friends, with women, with children, with servants; that one ought to reverence the gods, to honour one's parents, to respect one's elders, to be obedient to the laws, to yield to those in authority, to love one's friends, to be chaste with women, to be affectionate with children, and not to be overbearing with slaves; and, most important of all, not to be overjoyful at success or overmuch distressed at misfortune, nor to be dissolute in pleasures, nor impulsive and brutish in temper. These things I regard as pre-eminent among all the advantages which accrue from philosophy. For to have a generous heart in prosperity shows a man, to excite no envy withal shows a disciplined nature; to rule pleasure by reason marks. the wise man, and not every man can master his passion. But I regard as perfect, so far as men can be, those who are able to combine and mingle political capacity with philosophy; and I am inclined to think that these are secure in the possession of two things which are of the greatest good: a life useful to the world in their public position, and the calm and untroubled life in their pursuit of philosophy. For there are three forms of life, of which the first is the practical life, the second the contemplative life, and the third the life of enjoyment. The last, which is dissolute and enslaved to pleasure, is bestial and mean, but the contemplative life, which falls short in practice, is not useful, while the practical life which has no portion in philosophy, is without culture or taste. One must try, then, as well as one can, both to take part in public life, and to lay hold of philosophy so far as the opportunity is granted. Such was the life of Pericles as a pubic man,

such was Archytas of Tarentum, such was Dion of Syracuse, such was Epaminondas of Thebes, of whom the next to the last was the associate of Plato.

In regard to education I do not know why it is necessary to take the time to say more; but in addition to the foregoing, it is useful, or rather it is necessary, not to be indifferent about acquiring the works of earlier writers, but to make a collection of these, like a set of tools in farming. For the corresponding tool of education is the use of books, and by their means it has come to pass that we are able to study knowledge at its source.

11. It is not proper, either, to overlook the exercise of the body, but we should send the children to the trainer's and cultivate adequately this side of education with all diligence, not merely for the sake of gracefulness of body but also with an eye to strength; for sturdiness of body in childhood is the foundation of a hale old age. Just as in fair weather, then, one ought to prepare for storm, so also in youth one should store up discipline and self-restraint as a provision for old age. But the amount of bodily ,exercise should be so limited as not to be a drain on the children and make them too tired to study; for, according to Plato, a sleep and weariness are the enemies of learning. But why do I introduce this subject here? Just because I am anxious to say that which is of greater importance than all the rest: it is for the contests of war that boys must be practised, by exercising them-selves in throwing the javelin, shooting with the bow, and in hunting. "For the goods of the vanquished" in battle "are prizes offered to the victors." b War has no place for a bodily condition produced by an indoor life, and a slenderly built soldier accustomed to military exercises forces his way through the masses of fleshy athletes.

But someone may say, "What is this? You, who have promised to give directions in regard to the education of free-born children, are now evidently disregarding the education of the poor children of the common people, and you acknowledge that you are offering your suggestions for the rich only." To these it is not difficult to make reply. My dearest wish would be that my scheme of education should be generally useful; but if some, being needy in their private circumstances, shall be unable to avail themselves of my directions, let them lay the blame therefor upon fortune and not upon him who gives this counsel. Even the poor must endeavour, as well as they can, to provide the best education for their children, but, if that be impossible, then they must avail themselves of that which is within their means. I have burdened the discussion with this minor matter so as to connect therewith in due order the other topics which tend toward the right education of the young.

12. This also I assert, that children ought to be led to honourable practices by means of encouragement and reasoning, and most certainly not by blows or ill - treatment, for it surely is agreed that these are fitting rather for slaves than for the free-born; for so they grow numb and shudder at their tasks, partly from the pain of the blows, partly from the degradation. Praise and reproof are more helpful for the free-born than any sort of ill-usage, since the praise incites them toward what is honourable, and reproof keeps them from what is disgraceful. But rebukes and praise should be used alternately and ~ a variety of ways; it is well to choose some time when the children are full of confidence to put them to shame by rebuke, and then in turn to cheer them up by praises, and to imitate the nurses, who, when they have made their babies cry, in turn offer them the breast for comfort. Moreover in praising them it is essential not to excite and puff them up, for they are made conceited and spoiled by excess of praise. In my time I have seen fathers in whom excessive affection had become the cause of no affection. What is it that I mean to say, in order that by the example I give I may make my argument more luminous? It is this: in their eagerness that their children may the sooner rank first in everything, they lay upon them unreasonable tasks, which the children find themselves unable to perform, and so come to grief; besides, being depressed by their unfortunate experiences, they do not respond to the instruction which they receive. For, just as plants are nourished by moderate applications of water, but are drowned by many in succession, in the same fashion the mind is made to grow by properly adapted Lasks, but is submerged by those which are excessive. Children must be given some breathing-space from continued tasks, for we must bear in mind that our whole life is divided between relaxation and application. For this reason there have been created not only waking hours but also sleep, not only war but also peace, not only storm but also fair weather, not only periods of vigorous activity but also holidays. In short, rest gives relish to labour. We may observe that this holds true not merely in the case of living creatures, but also in the case of inanimate things, for we unstring bows and lyres that we may be able to tighten them again. The body, generally speaking, is maintained by hunger and its satisfaction, and the mind by relaxation and labour.

13. It is right to rebuke some fathers who, after entrusting their sons to attendants and masters, do not themselves take cognizance at all of their instruction by means of their own eyes or their own ears. Herein they most fail in their duty; for they ought themselves every few days to test their children, and not rest their hopes upon the disposition of a hired person; for even those persons will devote more attention to the children if they know they must from time to time render an account. And in this connection there is point as well as wit in the

remark of the groom who said that nothing make the horse so fat as the king's eye.
Above all, the memory of children should be trained and exercised; for this is, as it were, a storehouse of learning; and it is for this reason that the mythologists have made Memory the mother of the Muses, thereby intimating by an allegory that there is nothing in the world like memory for creating and fostering. This, then, is to be trained in either case, whether one's children be naturally gifted with a good memory, or, on the contrary, forgetful. For we shall thus strengthen nature's generous endowment, and thus fill out her deficiency; and while the first class of children will excel others, the second class will excel their former selves. The saying of Hesiod b is admirably put:

If even small upon the small you place
And do this oft, the whole will soon be feat.

Nor should parents forget that those branches of instruction which involve memory make no small contribution, not merely to education, but also to the practical activities of life; for the memory of past activities serves as a pattern of good counsel for the future.
14. Moreover, one's sons are to be kept from foul language; for, according to Democritus,a "A word is a deed's shadow." Then, too, proper measures must be taken to ensure that they shall be tactful and courteous in their address; for nothing is so deservedly disliked as tactless characters. Besides, children may avoid getting themselves disliked by their associates if they do not prove totally unyielding in discussions. For it is a fine thing to understand, not only how to gain the victory, but also how to submit to defeat, in cases where victory is injurious; for there is really such a thing as a "Cadmean victory." b As a witness of this I may quote Euripides the wise, who says:
When of two speakers one is owing wroth, Wiser is he that yields in argument.
We must now lay down some rules of conduct which the young should follow no less but even more than those previously given. These are:
To practise the simple life, to hold the tongue in check, to conquer anger, to control the hands.
We must consider the importance of each of these; and they will be more intelligible if based on examples.
So, to begin with the last, some men by putting their hands to wrongful gains have upset the good repute of their earlier lives. Witness the case of Gylippus, the Spartan, who was forced into exile because he had secretly unsowed the bags of money. Again, an unruffled temper is certainly the mark of a wise man. Thus Socrates once, when a bold and impudent youth had kicked him, observed that the bystanders were so indignant and so violently moved as to wish to follow up the offender; but he only said: "If an ass had kicked me, should you have thought it proper to kick him in return?" That youth, however, did not by any means get off scot-free, but as everybody jeered at him, and nicknamed him "Kicker, he ended by hanging himself.
And when Aristophanes brought out the Clouds, and heaped all manner of abuse upon Socrates in every possible way, one of those who had been present said to Socrates, "Are you not indignant, Socrates, that he used you as he did in the play?" "No indeed," he replied; "when they break a jest upon me in the theatre I feel as if I were at a big party of good friends." What Archytas of Tarentum and Plato did will be seen to be closely akin to this. For Archytas, on his return from the war (where he had been general) found his land gone to waste. He summoned his overseer and said, "You should be sorry for this, if I were not in too great a temper." And Plato, provoked at a gluttonous and impudent Slave, called his sister's son, Speusippus, and said as he withdrew, "Beat this fellow, for I am too 'much provoked." But it may be urged that such actions are difficult and hard to imitate. I know that myself. But the effort must be made, by employing the actions of such men as standards as far as possible, to abate a great part of our unbridled and furious temper; for in other respects also we are not comparable with them either in experience or in magnanimity. Yet we, no less than they, feeling ourselves to be the high priests of God's mysteries and torch-bearers of wisdom, do attempt, so far as lies in our power, to imitate and to get a little taste of such conduct for ourselves. The control of the tongue, then, still remains to be discussed of the topics I suggested. If anybody has the notion that this is a slight and insignificant matter, he is very far from the truth. For timely silence is a wise thing, and better than any speech. And this is the reason, as it appears to me, why the men of olden time established the rites of initiation into the mysteries, that we, by becoming accustomed to keep silence there, may transfer that fear which we learned from the divine secrets to the safe keeping of the secrets of men. For, again, nobody was ever sorry because he kept silent, but hundreds because they talked. Again, the word unspoken can easily be uttered later; but the spoken word cannot possibly be recalled. I have heard of countless men who have fallen into the greatest misfortunes through intemperate speech. Of these I

shall mention one or two as typical and omit the rest. When Ptolemy Philadeiphus married his sister Arsinoe, Sotades said,
It is wrong for you to try to spur that mare,

and thereafter he rotted in prison for many years; and so suffered condign punishment for his untimely talking, and to make other men laugh he sorrowed a long time himself. A story to match and couple with this, and much more dreadful, is what the sophist Theocritus said and suffered. Alexander had bidden the Greeks to make ready crimson robes so that on his return he might offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving for his victory in the war against the barbarians, and all the states had to pay a poll-tax in money, when Theocritus remarked, "Before this I used to be in doubt, but now I know for a certainty that this is Homer's 'Crimson Death.' "a And thereby he made an enemy of Alexander. And Antigonus, king of the Macedonians, who was blind of one eye, he drove to immoderate anger by reproaching him with his disfigurement. For Antigonus sent his chief cook, Eutropion, who had been an officer in his army, to Theocritus, and insisted that Theocritus should come to him and engage him in discussion. When Eutropion delivered his message to Theocritus, coming several times for the purpose, the latter said, "I know very well ?hat you want to serve me up raw to your Cyclops," twitting the one for being disfigured and the other for being now a cook. "Then you shall not keep your head on," said Eutropion, "but you shall pay the penalty for this reckless talk and madness of yours. He thereupon reported the remark to the king, who sent and had Theocritus put to death.
But besides all this, we should, as a most sacred duty, accustom children to speak the truth. For lying is fit for slaves only, and deserves to be hated of all men, and even in decent slaves it is not to be condoned.
15. So far I have felt no doubt or even hesitation in saying what I have said about the decorous conduct and modest behaviour of the young; but in regard to the topic now to be introduced I am of two opinions and two minds, and I incline now this way, now that, as though on a balance, being unable to settle down on either side; and a feeling of great reluctance possesses me, whether to introduce or to avoid the subject. Still I must venture to speak of It. What is it then? It is the question whether boys' admirers are to be permitted to associate with them and pass their time with them, or whether, on the contrary, they should be kept away and driven off from association with the youth. For when I have regard to those uncompromising fathers, harsh and surly in their manner, who think the society of admirers an intolerable outrage to their sons, I feel cautious about standing as its sponsor and advocate. But again, when I think of Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aeschines, Cebes, and that whole band of men who sanctioned affection between men, and thus guided the youth onward to learning, leadership, and virtuous conduct, I am of a different mind again, and am inclined to emulate their example. Euripides G gives testimony in their favour when he says:
Among mankind another love exists,
That of an upright, chaste, and noble soul.
Nor may we omit the remark of Plato wherein jest and seriousness are combined For he says that those who have acquitted themselves nobly ought to have the right to kiss any fair one they please. Now we ought indeed to drive away those whose desire is for mere outward beauty, but to admit without reserve those who are lovers of the soul. And while the sort of love prevailing at Thebes and n Elis is to be avoided, as well as the so-called kidnapping in Crete, that which is found at Athens and in Lacedaemon is to be emulated.
16. In this matter each man may be allowed such opinion as accords with his own convictions. But now that I have spoken of the orderly and decorous behaviour of children, I shall next pass to the period of adolescence, and say a very few words about it. I have often expressed my utter disapprobation of men who have been responsible for the introduction of depraved habits. For, while it is true that they have put attendants and teachers in charge of their children, they nevertheless have allowed the impetuosity of youth to range unrestrained, when they ought, on the contrary, to have exercised greater caution and watchfulness over them when they were young men than when they were children. For who is not aware that the faults of children are trivial and altogether corrigible
heedlessness, perhaps, towards their attendants, or deceiving and refusing to mind their teachers? But the iniquities of early manhood are often monstrous and wicked-unlimited gluttony, theft of parents' money, gambling, revels, drinking-bouts, love affairs with young girls, and corruption of married women. The impulses of young men should therefore be kept fettered and restrained by careful supervision. For life's prime is prodigal in its pleasures, restive, and in need of a curb, so that parents who do not take hold of the reins with firm hand at this period of life, are manifestly, by their folly, giving to their sons licence for wrongdoing. Wise fathers ought, therefore, especially during this time, to be vigilant and alert, and to bring the young men to reason by

instruction, by threats, by entreaties, by pointing out examples of men who through love of pleasure have become involved in misfortunes, and of those who, through their stead-fastness, have gained for themselves approval and good repute. For these two things-hope of reward and fear of punishment-are, as it were, the elements of virtue. For the one renders men more eager for honourable pursuits while the other makes them averse to base actions.

17. It should be the general rule to keep the young away from any association with base men; for they carry away something of their badness. This duty Pythagoras also has enjoined in the form of allegories which I shall now quote and explain. For they contribute no small influence towards the acquisition of virtue. For example:

"Do not taste of black-tails;" that is, "Do not spend your time with men of black character, because of their malevolence."

"Do not step over the beam of a balance"; that is, one should give greatest heed to justice and not transgress it.

"Do not sit on a peck measure; as much as to say that we should avoid idleness and have forethought for providing our daily bread.

"Do not give your hand to everybody"; instead of, "Do not make friends,. too readily."

Do not wear a tight ring" ; means that one should live his life unhampered, and not subject it to any bond.

"Do not poke a fire with steel " instead of The name of a fish.

Do not provoke an angry man." Indeed, it is~ wrong to do so, and we should yield to men who are in a temper.

"Do not eat your heart"; as much as to say, "Do not injure your soul by wasting it with worries.

"Abstain from beans"; means that a man should keep out of politics, for beans were used in earlier times for voting upon the removal of magistrates from office.

"Do not put food into a slop-pail"; signifies that it is not fitting to put clever speech into a base mind. For speech is the food of thought, and baseness in men makes it unclean.

"Do not turn back on reaching the boundaries"; that is, when people are about to die and see the boundary of their life close at hand, they should bear all this with serenity and not be faint-hearted.

I return to the subject suggested at the beginning of the chapter. As I said there, the young should be kept away from every sort of base men, and most of all from flatterers. Let me repeat here what I say over and over again to many fathers: There is no class of persons more pernicious than fiatterers, nor any that more surely and quickly gives youth a nasty tumble. They utterly ruin both fathers and sons, bringing to sorrow the old age of those and the youth of these, and dangling pleasure as an irresistible lure to get their advice taken To Sons who are to inherit wealth fathers commend sobriety, flatterers drinking to excess; fathers corn-mend self- restraint, flatterers profligacy; fathers frugality, flatterers extravagance; fathers industry, flatterers indolence, saying, "All life is but a moment. We must live, not merely exist. Why should we give a thought to your father's threats? He's an old twaddler with one foot already in the grave, and before long we'll take his coffin on our shoulders and carry him out." Another of them posts a drab in the young man's path, or prostitutes a married woman for him, and spoils and wastes the father's provision for old age. Detestable is their whole tribe, pretenders of friendship, with-out a vestige of honest speech, flatterers of the rich but despisers of the poor, addressing themselves with instinctive art to the young, grinning broadly when their patrons laugh, spurious claimants to any spirit, and bastard members of human life, subsisting at the beck and nod of the wealthy; free-born by freak of fortune, but slaves by choice. Whenever they are not treated with insult, they feel themselves insulted because then they do not fulfil the purpose for which they are kept. So if any father is concerned for the good upbringing of his children, he must drive away these detestable creatures, and quite as much must he drive away schoolmates who show depravity, for these also are capable of corrupting the most likely natures.

18. Now all these rules concern honour and good profit, but what follows concerns human nature. Take the fathers again: I do not think they should be utterly harsh and austere in their nature, but they should in many cases concede some shortcomings to the younger person, and remind them-selves that they once were young. As physicians, by mixing bitter drugs with sweet syrups, have found that the agreeable taste gains access for what is beneficial, so fathers should combine the abruptness of their rebukes with mildness, and at one time grant some licence to the desires of their children, and slacken the reins a little, and then at another time draw them tight again. Most desirable is it that they should bear misdeeds with serenity, but if that be impossible, yet, if they be on occasion angered, they should quickly cool down. For it is better that a father should be quick-tempered than sullen, since a hostile and irreconcilable spirit is no small proof of animosity towards one's children. It is a good thing also to pretend not to know of Some shortcomings, and to turn the old man's dull eye

and dull ear to what they do, and seeing, not to see, and, hearing, not to hear, sometimes, what goes on. Our friends' shortcomings we bear with: why should it be surprising that we bear with our children's? Though our slaves often suffer from a headache in the morning, we do not force them to confess a debauch. "You were niggardly once; well, now be liberal. You were indignant once; well, pardon now. He tricked you once with the help of a slave; restrain your anger. He once took away a yoke of cattle from the field, he once came home with breath reeking from yesterday's debauch; ignore it. Or smelling of perfume ; a do not say a word." In this fashion is restive youth gradually broken to harness.

19. An effort should be made to yoke in marriage those who cannot resist their desires, and who are deaf to admonitions. For marriage is the most secure bond for youth. One should, however, betroth to his sons women who are not greatly above them either in birth or wealth. The maxim Keep to your own place "a is wise, since those who take to wife women far above themselves unwittingly become not the husbands of their wives, but the slaves of their wives' dowries.

20. I will add but little more and then conclude the suggestions. Fathers ought above all, by not behaving and by doing as they ought to do, to make themselves a manifest example to their children, so that the latter, by looking at their fathers' lives as at a mirror, may be deterred from disgraceful deeds and words. For those who are themselves involved in the same errors as those for which they rebuke their erring sons, unwittingly accuse themselves in their sons' name. If the life they lead is wholly bad, they are not free to admonish even their slaves, let alone their sons. Besides, they are likely to become counsellors and instructors to their sons in their wrongdoing. For, wherever old men are lacking in decency, young men too are sure to be most shameless.

We must endeavour, therefore, to employ every proper device for the discipline of our children, emulcting the example of Eurydice, who, although she was an Illyrian and an utter barbarian, yet late in life took up education in the interest of her children's studies. The inscription which she dedicated to the Muses sufficiently attests her love for her children:

Eurydice of Hierapolis
Made to the Muses this her offering
When she had gained her soul's desire to learn.
Mother of young and lusty sons was she,
And by her diligence attained to learn
Letters, wherein lies buried all our lore.

Now to put into effect all the suggestions which I have given is the province of prayer, perhaps, or exhortation. And even to follow zealously the majority of them demands good fortune and much careful attention, but to accomplish this lies within the capability of man.

HOW THE YOUNG MAN SHOULD STUDY POETRY

(Quomodo adoleseens poetas audire debeat)

1. IF, my dear Marcus Sedatus, it is true, as the poet Philoxenus used to say, that of meats those that are not meat, and of fish those that are not fish, have the best flavour, let us leave the expounding of this matter to those persons of whom Cato said that their palates are more sensitive than their minds. And so of philosophical discourses it is clear to us that those seemingly not at all philosophical, or even serious, are found more enjoyable by the very young, who present themselves at such lectures as willing and submissive hearers. For in perusing not only Aesop's Fable:, and Tale: from the Poets, but even the Abaris of Heracleides, the Lycon of Ariston, and philosophic doctrines about the soul when these are combined with tales from mythology, they get inspiration as well as pleasure. Wherefore we ought not only to keep the young decorous in the pleasures of eating and drinking, but, even more, in connection with what they hear and read, by using in moderation, as a relish, that which gives pleasure, we should accustom them to seek what is useful and salutary therein. For close-shut gates do not preserve a city from capture if it admit the enemy through one; nor does continence in the other pleasures of sense save a young man, if he unwittingly abandon himself to that which comes through hearing. On the contrary, inasmuch as this form of pleasure engages more closely the man that is naturally given to thought and reason, so much the more, if neglected, does it injure and corrupt him that receives it. Since then, it is neither

possible perhaps, nor profitable to debar from poetry a boy as old as my Soclarus and your Cleander now are, let us keep a very close watch over them, in the firm belief that they require oversight in their reading even more than in the streets. Accordingly, I have made up my mind to commit to writing and to send to you some thoughts on poetry which it occurred to me recently to express. I beg that you will take them and peruse them, and if they seem to you to be no worse than the things called amethysts a which some persons on convivial occasions hang upon their persons or take beforehand, then impart them to Cleander, and thus forestall his natural disposition, which, because it is slow in -nothing, but impetuous and lively in everything, is more suspect to such influences. because it is very pleasant to eat but it makes Bleep full of bad dreams and subject to strange and disturbing fancies, as they say. Similarly also in the art of poetry there is much that is pleasant and nourishing for the mind of a youth, but quite as much that is disturbing and misleading, unless in the hearing of it he have proper oversight. For it may be said, as it seems, not only of the land of the Egyptians but also of poetry, that it yields Drugs, and some are good when mixed and others baneful to those which cultivate it.

Hidden therein are love and desire and winning converse, Suasion that steals away the mind of the very wisest. For the element of deception in it does not gain any hold on utterly witless and foolish persons. This is the ground of Simonides' answer to the man who said to him, "Why are the Thessalians the only people whom you do not deceive?" His answer was," Oh, they are too ignorant to be deceived by me"; and Gorgias called tragedy a deception wherein he who deceives is more honest than he who does not deceive, and he who is deceived is wiser than he who is not deceived. Shall we then stop the ears of the young, as those of the Ithacans were stopped, with a hard and unyielding wax, and force them to put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and avoid poetry and steer their course clear of it; or rather shall we set them against some upright standard of reason and there bind them fast, guiding and guarding their judgement, that it may not be carried away from the course by pleasure towards that which will do them hurt?

No, not even Lycurgus, the mighty son of Dryas had sound sense, because, when many became drunk and violent, he went about uprooting the grapevines instead of bringing the springs of water nearer, and thus chastening the "frenzied god," as Plato. says," through correction by another, a sober, god." G For the tempering of wine with water removes its harmfulness without depriving it at the same time of its usefulness. So let us not root up or destroy the Muses' vine of poetry, but where the mythical and dramatic part grows all riotous and luxuriant, through pleasure unalloyed, which gives it boldness and obstinacy in seeking acclaim, let us take it in hand and prune it and pinch it back. But where with its grace it approaches a true kind of culture, and the sweet allurement of its language is not fruitless or vacuous, there let us introduce philosophy and blend it with poetry. For as the mandragora, when it grows beside the vine and imparts its influence to the wine, makes this weigh less heavily on those who drink it, so poetry, by taking up its themes in philosophy and blending them with fable, renders. the task of learning light and agreeable for the young. Wherefore poetry should not be avoided by those who are intending to pure philosophy but they should use poetry as an introductory exercise in. philosophy, by training themselves habitually to seek the profitable in what gives pleasure, and to and satisfaction therein; and if there be nothing profitable, to combat such poetry and be dissatisfied with it.. For this is the beginning of education,

If one begin each task in proper way
So is it likely will the ending be,

as Sophocles says.

2. First of all, then, the young man should be introduced into poetry with nothing in his mind so well imprinted, or so ready at hand, as the saying, "Many the lies the poets tell," G some intentionally and some unintentionally; intentionally, because for the purpose of giving pleasure and gratification to the ear (and this is what most people look for in poetry) they feel that the truth is too stern in comparison with fiction. For the truth, because it is what actually happens, does not deviate from its course, even though the end be unpleasant; whereas fiction, being a verbal fabrication, very readily follows a roundabout route, and turns aside from the painful to what is more pleasant. For not metre nor figure of speech nor loftiness of diction nor aptness of metaphorical unity of composition has so much allurement and charm, as a clever interweaving of fabulous narrative. But, just as in pictures, colour Is more stimulating than line-drawing because it is life-like, and creates an illusion, so in poetry falsehood combined with plausibility is more striking, and gives more satisfaction, than the work which is elaborate in metre and diction, but devoid of myth and fiction. This explains why Socrates, being induced by some dreams to take up poetry, since he was not himself a plausible or naturally clever work-

man in falsehood, inasmuch as he had been the champion of truth all his life, put into verse the fables of Aesop, assuming that there can be no poetic composition which has no addition of falsehood. It is true that we know of sacrifices without dancing or flute, but we do not know of any poetic composition without fable or without falsehood. The verses of Empedocles and of Parmenides, the Antidoles against Poisons of Nicander, and the maxims of Theognis, are merely compositions which have borrowed from poetic art its metre and lofty style as a vehicle in order to avoid plodding along in prose. Whenever, therefore, in the poems of a man of note and repute some strange and disconcerting statement either about gods or lesser deities or about virtue is made by the author, he who accepts the statement as true is carried off his feet, and has his opinions perverted; whereas he who always remembers and keeps clearly in mind the sorcery of the poetic art in dealing with falsehood, who is able on every such occasion to say to it,

"Device more subtly cunning than the lynx,

why knit your brows when jesting, why pretend to instruct when practising deception?" will not suffer any dire effects or even acquire any base beliefs, but he will check himself when he feels afraid of Poseidon b and is in terror lest the god rend the earth asunder and lay bare the nether world; he will check himself when he is feeling wroth at Apollo in behalf of the foremost of the Achacans,

Whose praises he himself did sing, himself
Was present at the feast, these words he spoke
Himself, and yet himself brought death to him ;

he will cease to shed tears over the dead Achilles and over Agamemnon in the nether world, as they stretch out their impotent and feeble arms in their desire to be alive; and if, perchance, he is beginning to be disturbed by their suffering and overcome by the enchantment, he will not hesitate to say to himself,

Hasten eager to the light, and all you saw here
Lay to heart that you may tell your wife hereafter.

Certainly Homer has put this gracefully in reference to the visit to the shades, indicating that it is fit stuff for a woman's eyes because of the clement of fable in it.
Such things as this are what the poets fabricate intentionally, but more numerous are the things which they do not fabricate, but think and believe in their own hearts, and then impart to us in their false coming. Take for example what Homer has said relating to Zeus:

In the scales he placed two fates of Death so grievous, One of Achilles and the other of horse-taming Hector;
Grasping the middle he poised it, and Hector's fated day descended.
Down to Hades he went, and Phoebus Apollo forsook him.

Now Aesehyhis has fitted a whole tragedy to this story, giving it the title of The Weighing of Souls, and has placed beside the scales of Zeus on the one side Thetis, and on the other Dawn, entreating for their sons who are fighting. But it is patent to everybody that this is a mythical fabrication which has been created to please or astound the hearer. But in the lines

Zeus, appointed to decide the outcome of men's fighting

and

A fault doth God create in men
Whene'er he wills to crush a house in woe,

we have at last statements in accord with their opinion and belief, as they thus publish to us and try to make us share their delusion and ignorance regarding the gods. Then again the monstrous tales of visits to the shades, and the descriptions, which in awful language create spectres and pictures of blazing rivers arid hideous places

and grim punishments, do not blind very many people to the fact that fable and falsehood in plenty have been mingled with them like poison in nourishing food. And not Homer nor Pindar nor Sophocles really believed that these things are so when they wrote

From there the slow-moving rivers of dusky night
Belch forth a darkness immeasurable,

and

On past Ocean's streams they went and the headland of Leueas,

and

The narrow throat of Hades and the refulgent depths.

However, take the case of those who, bewailing and fearing death as something piteous, or want of burial as something terrible, have given utterance to sentiments like these:

Go not hence and leave me behind unwept, unburied,

and

Forth from his body went his soul on wing to Hades,
Mourning its fate and leaving its vigour and manhood,

and

Destroy me not untimely; for 'tis sweet
To see the light. Compel me not to gaze
Upon the regions underneath the earth.

These are the voices of persons affected by emotion and prepossessed by opinions and delusions. For this reason such sentiments take a more powerful hold on us and disturb us the more, inasmuch as we become infected by their emotions and by the weakness from whence they proceed. Against these influences, then, once more let us equip the young from the very outset to keep ever sounding in their maxim, that the art of poetry is not greatly sears, being concerned with the truth, and that the truth about these matters, even for those who have made it their sole business to search out and understand the verities, is exceedingly hard to track down and hard to get hold of, as they themselves admit; and let these words of Empedocles be constancy in mind:

Thus no eye of man hath seen nor ear hath heard this,
Nor can it be comprehended by the mind

and the words of Xenophanes:

Never yet was born a man nor ever shall be
Knowing the truth about the gods arid what I say of all things,

and by all means the words of Socrates, in Plato, when he solemnly disavows all acquaintance with these subjects. For young people then will give less heed to the poets, as having some knowledge of thee matters, when they see that such questions stagger the philosophers.

3. We shall steady the young man still more if, at his first entrance into poetry, we give a general description of the poetic art as an imitative art and faculty analogous to painting. And let him not mercy be acquainted with the oft-repeated saying that "poetry is articulate painting, and painting is inarticulate poetry," but let us tease him in addition that when we see a hoard or an ape or the face of Thersites in a picture, we are

pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful thing, but as a likeness. For by its essential nature the u~ y cannot become beautiful ; but the imitation, be it concerned with what is base or with what is good, if only it attain to the likeness, is commended. If, on the other hand, it produces a beautiful picture of an ugly body, it fails to give what propriety and probability require. Some painters even depict unnatural acts, as Timomachus painted a picture of Medea slaying her children, and Theon of Orestes slaying his mother, and Parrhasius of the feigned madness of Odysseus, and Chaerephanes of the lewd commerce of women with men. In these matters it is especially necessary that the young man should be trained by being taught that what we commend is not the action which is the subject of the imitation, but the art, in case the subject in hand has been properly imitated. Since, then, poetry also often gives an initiative recital of base deeds, or of wicked experiences and characters, the young man must not accept as true what is admired and successful therein, nor approve it as beautiful, but should simply commend it as fitting and proper to the character in hand. For just as when we hear the squealing of a pig, the creaking of a windlass, the whistling of the winds, and the booming of the sea, we are uneasy and annoyed; but if anybody gives a plausible imitation of these, as Parmeno imitated a pig, and Theodorus a windlass, we were pleased; and just as we avoid a diseased and ulcerous person as an unpleasant sight, but take delight in seeing Aristophon's Philoetetes and Silanion's Jocasta, who are represented on the stage as pining away or dying; so too the young man, as he reads what Thersites the buffoon, or Sisyphus the seducer of women, or Batraclius the bawd, is represented as saying or doing, must be taught to commend the faculty and art which imitates these things, but to repudiate and condemn the disposition and the actions which it imitates. For it is not the same thing at all to imitate something beautiful and something beautifully, since" beautifully " means" fittingly and properly" and ugly things are "fitting and proper" for the ugly. Witness the boots made for the crippled feet of Damonidas, who prayed once, when he had lost them, that the man who had them might have feet which they would fit; they were sorry boots, it is true, but they fitted their owner. Consider the following lines:

If one must needs do wrong, far best it were To do it for a kingdom's sake,

and

Achieve the lust man's good repute, but deeds
That fit the knave; therein shall he your gain, and
Of talent dowry ! Shall I not accept ? (and till I live if I would overlook
talent ? Shall I ever keep again
If I should give it up ? In hell shall I
suffer for impiety to gold?

These, it is true, are wicked and fallacious sentiments. From lines spoken by Ixion in an unknown play; but fitting respectively for Eteocles, Ixion, and an old usurer. If then we remind our sons that authors write them, not because they commend or approve them, but with the idea of investing mean and unnatural characters and persons with unnatural and mean sentiments, they could not be harmed by the opinions of poets; nay, on the contrary, the suspicion felt against the person in question discredits both his actions and words, as being mean because spoken or done by a mean man. Of such sort is the account of Paris in his wife's arms after his cowardly escape from battle. For since the poet represents no other save this licentious and adulterous man as dallying with a woman in the daytime, it is clear that he classes such sensuality as a shame and reproach.

4. In these passages, close attention must be given to see whether the poet himself gives any hints against the sentiments expressed to indicate that they are distasteful to himself; just as Menander m the prologue of his Thal has written:

Oh, sing to me, my muse, of such a girl,
One bold and fair, and of persuasive tongue,
Unjust, exclusive, and demanding much,
In love with none, but always feigning love.

But Homer has best employed this method; for he in advance discredits the mean and calls our attention to the good in what is said. His favourable introductions are after this manner:

Then at once he spoke; his words were gentle and winning

and
He would stand by his side, and speak soft words to restrain him.

But in discrediting in advance, he all but protests land proclaims that we are not to follow or heed
the sentiments expressed, as being unjustifiable and mean. For example, when he is on the point of narrating Agamemnon's harsh treatment of the priest, he says in advance,

Yet Agamemnon, Atreus' son, at heart did not like it Harshly he sent him away;

that is to say, savagely and willfully and contrary to what he should have done; and in Achilles' mouth he puts the bold words,

Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer's coil rage,

but he intimates his own judgement in saying,

Then once more with vehement words did the son of Peleus
Speak to the son of Atreus, nor ceased as yet from his angered

hence it is likely that nothing spoken with anger and severity can be good. In like manner also, he comments upon actions:

Thus he spoke, and Hector divine he treated unseemly, Stretching him prone in the dust by the bier of the son of Menoetius.

He also employs his closing lines to good purpose, as though adding a sort of verdict of "is own to what is done or said. Of the adultery of Ares, he represents the gods as saying,

Evil deeds do not succeed: the swift by the slow is taken,

and on the occasion of Hector's great arrogance and boasting he says,

Thus he spoke in boast; queen Hera's wrath was kindled

and regarding Pandarus's archery,

Thus Athena spoke, and the mind of the fool she persuaded.

Now these declarations and opinions contained in the words of the text may be discovered by anybody who will pay attention, but from the actions them-selves the poets supply other lessons; as, for example, Euripides is reported to have said to those who railed at his Ixion as an impious and detestable character, " But I did not remove him from the stage until I had him fastened to the wheel." In Homer this form of instruction is given silently, but it leaves room for a reconsideration, which is helpful in the case of those stories which have been most discredited. By forcibly distorting these stories through what used to be termed" deeper meanings," but are nowadays called" allegorical interpretations," some persons say that the Sun is represented as giving information about Aphrodite in the arms of Ares, because the conjunction of the planet Mars with Venus portends births conceived in adultery, and when the sun returns in his course and discovers these, they cannot be kept secret. And Hera's beautifying of herself for Zeus's eyes,0 and the charms connected with the girdle, such persons will have it, are a sort of purification of the air as it draws near the fiery element; as though the poet himself did not afford the right solutions. For, in the account of Aphrodite, he teaches those who will pay attention that vulgar music, coarse songs, and stories treating of vile themes, create licentious characters, unmanly lives, and men

that love luxury, soft living, intimacy with women, and

Changes of clothes, warm baths, and the genial bed of enjoyment.

This too is the reason why he has represented Odysseus as bidding the harper

Come now, change the theme and sing how the horse was builded,

thus admirably indicating the duty of musicians and poets to take the subjects of their compositions from the lives of those who are discreet and sensible. And in his account of Hera, he has shown excellently well how the favour that women win by philters and enchantments and the attendant deceit in their relations with their husbands, not only is transitory and soon sated and unsure, but changes also to anger and enmity, so soon as the pleasurable excitement has faded away. Such, in fact, are Zeus's angry threats as he speaks to Hera in this wise:

So you may see if aught you gain from the love and caresses
Won by your coming afar from the gods to deceive me.

For the description and portrayal of mean actions, if it also represent as it should the disgrace and injury resulting to the doers thereof, benefits instead of injuring the hearer. Philosophers, at any rate, for admonition and instruction, use examples taken from known facts; but the poets accomplish the same result by inventing actions of their own imagination, and by recounting mythical tales. Thus it was Melanthius who said, whether in jest or in earnest, that the Athenian State was perpetually preserved by the quarrelling and disorder among its public speakers; for they were not all inclined to crowd to the same side of the boat, and so, in the disagreement of the politicians, there was ever some counterpoise to the harmful. And so the mutual contrarieties of the poets, restoring our belief to its proper balance, forbid any strong turning of the scale toward the harmful. When therefore a comparison of passages makes their contradictions evident we must advocate the better side, as in the following examples

Oft do the gods, my child, cause men to fail,

as compared with

You've named the simplest way; just blame the gods ;

and again

You may rejoice in wealth, but these may not,

as compared with

'Tis loutish to be rich, and know naught else;'

and

What need to sacrifice when you must die ?

as compared with

'Tis better thus; God's worship is not toil.

For such passages as these admit of solutions which are obvious, if, as has been said, we direct the young, by the use of criticism, toward the better side. But whenever anything said by such authors sounds preposterous and no solution is found close at hand, nullify its effect by something said by them elsewhere to the opposite effect, and

we should not be offended or angry at the poet, but with the words, which are spoken in character and with humorous intent. As an obvious illustration, if you wish, over against Homer's accounts of the gods being cast forth by one another, their being wounded by men, their disagreements, and their displays of ill-temper, you may set the line:

Surely you know how to think of a saying better than this one,

and indeed elsewhere you do think of better things and say more seemly things, such as these

Gods at their ease ever living,
and
There the blessed gods pass all their days in enjoyment,

and

Thus the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals
Ever to live in distress, better themselves are free from all trouble.

These, then, are sound opinions about gods, aud true, but those other accounts have been fabricated to excite men's astonishment. Again when Euripides says,

By many forms of artifice the gods
Defeat our plans, for they are stronger far,

it is not bad to subjoin,

If gods do aught that's base, they are no gods,'

which is a better saying of his. And when Pindar very bitterly and exasperatingly has said,

Do what you will, so you vanquish your foe,

Yet," we may reply, " you yourself say that

Most bitter the end
Must surely await
Sweet joys that are gained
By a means unfair.'

And when Sophocles has said,

Sweet is the pelf though gained by falsity. ,

"Indeed" we may say, "but we have heard from you that
False words unfruitful prove when harvested."

And over against those statements about wealth:

Clever is wealth at finding ways to reach
Both hallowed and unhallowed ground, and where
A poor man, though he even gain access,
I could not withal attain his heart's desire.
An ugly body, hapless with its tongue,
Wealth makes both wise and comely to behold,

he will set many of Sophocles' words, among which are the following:

E'en without wealth a man may be esteemed,'

and

To beg doth not degrade a noble mind,'

and

In the blessings of plenty
What enjoyment is there,
If blest wealth owe its increase
To base-brooding care?

And Menander certainly exalted the love of pleasure, a Pindar, Isthrnian with a suggestion of boastfulness too, in these glowing lines that refer to love:

All things that live and see the self-same sun
That we behold, to pleasure are enslaved.

But at another time he turns us about and draws us towards the good, and uproots the boldness of licentiousness, by saying:

A shameful life, though pleasant, is disgrace.

The latter sentiment is quite opposed to the former, and it is better and more useful. Such comparison and consideration of opposing sentiments will result in one of two ways: it will either guide the youth over toward the better side, or else cause his belief to revolt from the worse.
In case the authors themselves do not offer solutions of their unjustifiable sayings, it is not a bad idea to put on the other side declarations of other writers of repute, and, as in a balance, make the scales incline toward the better side. For example, if Alexis stirs some people when he says,

The man of sense must gather pleasure's Iruits,
And three there are which have the potency
Truly to be of import for this life-To eat and drink and have one's way in love,
All else must be declared accessory,

we must recall to their minds that Socrates used to say just the opposite-that "base men live to eat
and drink, and good men eat and drink to live.' And he who wrote

Not useless against the knave is knavery,

thus bidding us, in a way, to make ourselves like knaves, may be confronted with the saying of Diogenes; for, being asked how one might defend himself against his adversary, he said, "By proving honourable and upright himself." We should use Diogenes against Sophocles, too; for Sophocles has filled hosts of men with despondency by writing these lines about the mysteries:

Thrice blest are they
Who having seen these mystic rites shall pass
To Hades' house; for them alone is life
Beyond; for others all is evil there.

But Diogenes, hearing some such sentiment as this, said, "What! Do you mean to say that Pataecion, the robber, will have a better portion after death than Epaminondas, just because he is initiate? And when Timotheus, in a song in the theatre, spoke of Artemis as

Ecstatic Bacehic frantic fanache,

Cinesias at once shouted back, "May you have a daughter like that! " Neat too is Bion's retort to Theognis, who said:

Any man that is subject to poverty never is able
Either to speak or to act; nay, but his tongue is tied.

How is it, then," said Bion, "that you, who are poor, can talk much nonsense, and weary us with this rubbish?
5. We must not neglect, either, the means for rectifying a statement which are afforded by the words that lie near, or by the context; but just as physicians, in spite of the fact that the blister-fly is deadly, think that its feet and wings are helpful to counteract its potent effect, so in poetry if a noun or adjective or a verb by its position next to another word blunts the point which the passage, in its worse interpretation, would have, we should seize upon it and add explanation, as some do in the ease of the following:

Thus, at the last, can honour be paid by miserable mortals Cutting the hair from their heads while the tears stream
down their faces,

and

Thus, then, the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals Ever to live in distress.

For he did not say that absolutely and to all mankind a grievous life has been allotted by the gods, but to the silly and foolish, whom, since they are wretched and pitiable on account of wickedness, he is wont to call by the name of" unhappy" and" miserable."
6. Another method, again, which transfers from the worse to the better sense suspicious passages in poetry, is that which works through the normal usage of words, in which it were better to have the young man trained than in what are called" glosses." It is indeed learned, and not unpleasing, to know that "rhigedanos " means "dying miserably" (for the Macedonians call death " danos "), that the Acolians call a victory won by patience and perseverance an "outlasting," that the Dryopians call the divinities "prpros." But it is necessary and useful, if we are to be helped and not harmed by poetry, to know how the poets employ the names of the gods, and again the names of bad and of good things, and what they mean when they speak of Fortune or of Fate, and whether these belong to the class of words which in their writings are used in one sense only or in several senses, as the case is with many other words. For, to illustrate, they apply the term
house" sometimes to a dwelling house, as

into the lofty house,

and sometimes to property, as

My house is being devoured ;

and the term "living" they apply sometimes to life, as

But dark-haired Poseidon
Thwarted his spear, nor would let him end his foeman's living,

and sometimes to possessions, as

And others are eating my living;

and the expression "be distraught is used some-times instead of " be chagrined " and " be at one's wits' end There was a tradition, preserved In the schola, that rises, often found in Homer, was the equivalent of gods."

Thus he spoke, and she departed distraught and sore troubled

and at other times, instead of" to be arrogant" and "be delighted," as

Are you now distraught since you vanquished Irus, the vagrant?
and by " huddle " they mean either " be in motion," as Eunpides says

A monster huddling from the Atlantic's surge,

or " sit down" and " be seated," as Sophocles d says

What means your huddling in these places here
With suppliant garlands on the boughs ye bear?

It is a graceful accomplishment also to adapt the usage of the words to fit the matter in hand, as the grammarians teach us to do, taking a word for one signification at one time, and at another time for another, as for example,

Better commend a small ship, but put your goods on a big one.

For by " commend " is meant " recommend," and the very expression of "recommend " to another is used nowadays instead of deprecating for one's self, as in everyday speech we say," It's very kind," and "Very welcome," when we do not want a thing and do not accept it. In this way also some persons will have it that it must be" commendable Persephone" because she is deprecated.
Let us then observe closely this distinction and discrimination of words in greater and more serious matters, and let us begin with the gods, in teaching the young that when the poets employ the names of the gods, sometimes they apprehend in their conception the gods themselves, and at other times they give the same appellation to certain faculties of which the gods are the givers and authors. To take an obvious example, it is clear that Archilochus, when he says in his prayer,

Hear my prayer, O Lord Hephaestus, and propitious
Lend thy aid, and bestow what thy mercy bestows,

is citing on the god himself; but when, lamenting his sister's husband who was lost at sea and receives no formal burial, he says that lie could have borne the calamity with greater moderation,

If upon his bead and his body so fair,
All in garments clean, Hephaestys had done his office,

it is fire that he called by this name and not the god. And again when Euripides ~ said in an oath,

By Zeus amidst the stars and Ares murderous,

he named the gods themselves; but when Sophocles d says,

Blind and unseeing Ares, worthy dames,
With snout like that of swine upturns all ills,

the name is to be understood as meaning war; just as again it suggests weapons of bronze in the passage where

Homer e says,

Dark red blood of these men by the fair-flowing river Scamander
Keen-edged Ares has shed.

Since, then, many words are used in this way, it is Phoenissae,
necessary to know and to remember that under the name Zeus also (or Zen) the poets address some-times the god, sometimes Fortune, and oftentimes Fate. For when they say,

Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida, most glorious and mighty,
Grant to Ajax victory,

and

O Zeus! who boasts to be more wise than thou .

they mean the god himself; but when they apply the name of Zeus to the causes of all that happens, and say,

Many valiant souls it sent to the realm of Hades,
Goodly men, and their bodies gave to the dogs as ravine
And to birds a feast-the design of Zeus in fulfillment,

they mean Fate. For the poet does not imagine that it is the god who contrives evils for mankind, but by the name he rightly implies the compelling force of circumstances, that States and armies and leaders, if they show self-control, are destined to succeed and to prevail over their enemies, but if they fall into passions and errors, if they disagree and quarrel among themselves, as these heroes did, there are they destined to act discreditably and to become disorganized and to come to a bad end, as Sophocles says:

For fated is it that front evil plan,
An evil recompense shall mortals reap

and certainly Hesiod' in representing Protetlleus as exhorting Epimetheus

Never to welcome
Any gifts from Zeus of Olympus, but always return them,

employs the name of Zeus as a synonym for the power of Fortune. For he has given the name of " gifts of Zeus " to the blessings of Fortune, such as wealth, office, and, in a word, outward possession of which is unprofitable to those who cannot make good use of them. Wherefore he thinks that Epinietheus, who is a worthless man and a fool, ought to be on his guard against any piece of good fortune, and be fearful of it, as he is likely to be injured and corrupted by it. And again when the poet says,

Never dare to reproach any man for accursed and woeful
Poverty, gift of the blessed gods whose life is for ever,

he now speaks of what happens by chance as god-given, with the suggestion that it is not meet to impugn those who are poor through misfortune, but to reproach the penury that is accompanied by laziness, soft living, and extravagance, since then it is disgraceful and reprehensible. For at a time when men did not as yet use the name " Fortune," butknew the force of causation as it traverses its irregular and indeterminate course, so strong, so impossible for human reason to guard against, they tried to express this by the names of the gods, exactly as we are wont to call deeds and characters, and in fact even words and men, "divine" and "godlike." In this manner, then, a corrective is to be found for host of the seemingly unjustifiable statements regarding
Zeus, among which are the following:

Fixed on Zeus' floor two massive urns stand ever,
Filled with happy lives the one, the other with sorrows,

and

Cronos' soil, enthroned high, that made naught of our pledge,
little for both our hosts with evil,

and

Then rolled forth the beginning of troll
Both on Trojans and Greeks through designs of Zeus the almighty.

These are to be interpreted as referring to Fortune or Fate, in which guise arc deiced those phases of causation which baffle our logic, and are, in a word, beyond us. But wherever there is appropriateness, reason, and probability in the use of the name, let us believe that there the god himself is meant, as in the following:

But he ranged to and fro against the lines of the rest of the fighters;
Oh with Ajax, Telamon's son, he avoided a conflict,
seeing that Zeus was wroth if he fight with a neat far
better.

and

For Zeus takes thought for honor's greatest weal
The little things lie leaves to other gods.

Particular attention must be paid to the other words, when their signification is shifted about and changed by the poets according to various circumstances. An example is the word " virtue." For inasmuch as virtue not only renders men sense, honest, and upright in actions and words, but also often enough secures for them repute and irreverence, the poets, following this notion, make good repute and influence to be virtue, giving them this name in exactly the same way that the products of the olive and the chestnut are called " olives " and " chestmits," the same names as the trees that bear them. So then when poets say,

Sweat the gods have set before the attainment of virtue,

and

Then the Greeks by their virtue broke the line of their foemen,

and

If to die be our fate, Thus to die is our right Merging our lives into virtue,

let our young man at once feel that these sayings relate to the best and godliest estate to which we can attain, which we think of as correctness of reasoning, the height of good sense, and a disposition of soul in full agreement therewith. But when at another time, in his reading, he finds this line,

Zeus makes virtue in men both to increase and diminish, or this,
Virtue and glory are attendant on riches,

let him not " sit" astounded and " amazed " at the rich, as though they were able to purchase virtue without ado for money, nor let him believe either that the increase or diminution of his own wisdom rests with Fortune, but let him consider that the poet has employed " virtue " instead of repute, or influence, or good fortune, or the like.

For assuredly by " evil " the poets sometimes signify badness in its strict sense, and wickedness of soul, as when Hesiod says,

Evil may always be bind by all lands,

and sometimes some other affliction or misfortune, as

when Homer b says,
Since full soon do mortals who live in evil grow aged.

And so too anybody would be deceived, should he imagine that the poets give to " happiness " the sense which the philosophers give to it, namely, that of complete possession or attainment of good, or the perfection of a life gliding smoothly along in accord with nature, and that the poets do not oftentimes by a perversion of the word call the rich man happy aud blessed, and call influence or repute happiness. Now Homer ~ has used the words correctly

By all, but I am called by no man blessed.
Einipidcs works much disturbance and confusion when he says,

May I ne'er have a painful happy life, and

Why do you honour show to tyranny, Happy iniquity ? a

unless, as has been said, one follows the figurative and perverted use of the words. This, then, is enough on this subject.

7. There is a fact, however, which we must recall to the minds of the young not once merely, but over and over again, by pointing out to them that while poetry, inasmuch as it has an imitative basis, employs embellishment and glitter in denying with the actions and characters that form its groundwork, yet it does not forsake the semblance of truth, since imitation depends upon plausibility for its allurement. This is the reason why the imitation that does not show an utter disregard of the truth bungs out, a long with the actions, indications of both vice and virtue commingled; as is the case with that of Homer, which emphatically says good-bye to the Stoics, who will have it that nothing base can attach to virtue, and nothing good to vice, but that the ignorant man is quite wrong in all things, while, on the other hand, the man of culture is right in everything. These are the doctrines that we hear in the schools ; but in the actions and in the life of most men, according to Euripides ,b

The good and bad cannot be kept apart But there is some commingling.

But when poetic art is divorced from the truth, then chiefly it employs variety and diversity. For it is the sudden changes that give to its stories the elements of the emotional, the surprising, and the unexpected, and these are attended by very great astonishment and enjoyment; but sameness is emotional and prosaic. Therefore poets do not. represent the same people as always victorious or prosperous or successful in everything; no, not even the gods, when they project themselves into humanity. Lctivihes are represented in thc poets usage as free from emotion or fault, that the perturbing and exciting element in the poetry shall nowhere become idle and dull, for want of danger and struggle.

8. Now since this is so, let the young man, when we set him to reading poems, not be prepossessed with any such opinions about those good and great names, as, for instance, that the men were wise aud honest, consummate kings, and standards of all virtue and uprightness. For he will be greatly injured if he approves everything and is in a state of wonderment over it, but resents nothing, refusing even to listen or accept the opinion of him who, on the contrary, censures persons that do and say such things as these

This I would, 0 Zeus, Athena, and Apollo,
That not one escape death of all the Trojans living
And of the Greeks' hut that you and I elude destruction,

So that we alone may raze and destroy sacred bulwarks,"

and

saddest of all the sad sounds that I discard was the cry of Cassandra,
Priam's daughter, whom Clytemnesra craftily planning
Slew o'er my body,

and

That I sedueced the girl and ensure her hate for my father. So I obeyed her and did it,

and

Father Zeus, none other of the gods is more baleful.

Let the young man, then, not get into the habit of contending anything like this, nor let him be plausible and adroit in making excuses or in contriving some specious quibbles to explain base actions, but rather let him cherish the belief that poetry is an imitation of character and lives, and of men who are not perfect or spotless or unassailable in all respects, but pervaded by emotios, false opinions, and sundry forms of ignorance, who yet through inborn goodness frequently change their ways for the better. For if the young man is so trained, and his understanding so framed, that he feeds elation and a sympathetic enthusiasm over noble words and deeds, and an aversion and repugnance for the mean, such training will render his perusal of poetry harmless. But the man who admires everything, and accommodates himself to everything, whose judgement, because of his pre-conceived opinion, is enthr2Aled by the heroic names, will, like those who copy Plato's stoop or Aristotle's lisp, unwittingly become inclined to conform to much that is base. One ought not timorously, or as though under the spell of religious dread in a holy place, to shiver with awe at everything, and fall prostrate, but should rather acquire the habit of examining with confidence " wrong " and " improper " no less than " right " and " proper." For example, Achilles has summons an assembly of the soldiers, who are suffering from an illness, since he is most impatient of all over the slow progress of the war because of his conspicuous position and reputation on the field ; moreover, because he has some knowledge of medicine, and perceives now after the ninth day, on vehicles these maledictions reach their crisis, that the disease is out of the ordinary and not the result of familiar causes, lie does not harangue the multitude when he rises to speak, but makes himself an adviser to the king:

Son of Atreus, now, as I think, are we destined to wander
Back to seek our homes again.'

Rightly, moderately, and properly is this put. But after the seer has said that he fears the wrath of the most powerful of the Greeks, Achilles no longer speaks rightly and moderately, when he swears that nobody shall lay hands on the seer while he himself is alive,

No, not though you name Agamemnon,

thus making plain his slight regard and his contempt for the leader. A moment later his irritation becomes more acute, and his impulse is to draw his sword with intent to do murder; not rightly, either for honour or for expediency. Again, later, repenting,

Back he thrust his massive blade once more to its scabbard,
Nor ignored Athena's words,'

this time rightly and honourablly, because, although he could not altogether eradicate his anger, yet before doing anything irreparable he put it aside and checked it by making it obedient to his reason. Then again, although Agamemnon is ridiculous in l)is actions and words at the Assembly, yet in the incidents touching Chryseus he is more dignified and kingly. For whereas Achilles, as Briseis was being led away,

Burst into tears and withdrawing apart sat aloof from his comrades,

Agamemnon, as lie in person put aboard the ship, and gave up and sent away, the woman of whom, a moment before, he has said that he cared more for her than for his wedded wife, committed no amorous or disgraceful act. Then again, Phoenix, cursed by his father on account of the concubine, says

True in my heart I had purposed to slay him with keen-pointed dagger,
Save that one of the deathless gods put an end to my anger,
Bringing to mind the people's talk and men's many reproaches,
Lest I be known among the Greeks as my father's slayer.

Now Aristarchus removed these lines from the text through fear, but they are right in view of the occasion, since Phoenix is trying to teach Achilles what sort of a thing anger is, and how many wild deeds men are ready to do from temper, if they do not use reason or hearken to those who try to soothe them. So also the poet introduces Meleager angry at his fellow-citizens, and later mollified, and he rightly finds fault with his emotions, but, on the other hand, his refusal to yield, his resistance, his mastery over them, and his change of heart the poet commends as good and expedient.
Now in these cases the difference is manifest ; but in cases where Homer's judgement is not made clear, a distinction is to be drawn by directing the young man's attention in some such manner as the following; If, on the one hand, Nausicaa, after merely looking at a strange man, Odysseus, and experiencing Calypso's emotions toward him, being, as she was, a wanton child and at the age for marriage, uttered such foolish words as these to her maid-servants,

How I wish that a man like this might be called my husband,
Living here with us, and be contented to tarry,

then are her boldness and lack of restraint to be learned. But if, on the other hand, she sees into the character of the man from his words, and marvels at his conversation, so full of good sense, and they prays that she may be the consort of such a person rather than of some sailor man or dancing man of her own townsmen, then it is quite right to admire her. And again, when Penelope enters into conversation with the suitors. not holding herself aloof, and they favour her with gifts of garments and other apparel, Odysseus is pleased

Since she had coaxed all these gifts from them, and had cozened their senses.

If, on the one hand, he rejoices at the receipt of the presents and the profit, then in his prostitution of our wile lie outdoes Poliager, who is satirized in the comedy as

Poliager blest
Who keeps a Cyprian goat to yield him wealth.

But if, on the other hand, he thinks that he shall have them more in his power, while they are confident because of their hopes and blind to the future, then his pleasure and confidence has a reasonable justification. Similarly, in the enumeration of his possessions which the Phacacians had put ashore with him before they sailed away, if on the one hand, upon finding himself in such solitude and in such uncertainty and ambiguity regarding his surroundings, he really fears about his possessions,

Lest the men on the ship had sailed away with something,

then it is quite right to pity or indeed even to loathe his avarice. But if, on the other hand, he, as some say, being of two minds whether lie were in Ithaca, thinks that the safety of his possessions is a demonstration of the rectitude of the Phacacians (for other-wise they would not have carried him for nothing, put him ashore in a strange land, and left him there, at the same time keeping their hands off his possessions), then he makes use of no mean proof, and it is quite right to praise his forethought. But some critics find fault also with the very act of

putting him ashore, if this really was done while he was asleep, and assert that the Etruscans still preserve a tradition that Odysseus was naturally sleepy, and that for this reason most people found him difficult to converse with. Yet if his sleep was not real, but if, being ashamed to send away the Phaeacians without gifts and entertainment, and at the same time unable to elude his enemies if the Phacacians were in company with him, he provided himself with a cloak for his embarrassment in feigning himself asleep, then they find this acceptable. By indicating these things to the young, we shall not allow them to acquire any leaning toward such characters as are mean, but rather an emulation of the better, and a preference for them, if we unhesitatingly award censure to the one ass and commendation to the other. It is particularly necessary to do this with tragedies in which plausible and artful words are framed to accompany disreputable and knavish actions. For the statement of Sophocles is not altogether true when he says

From unfair deed fair word cannot proceed.

For, as a fact, he is wont to provide for mean characters and unnatural actions alluring words and humane reasons. And you observe also that his companion-at-arms in the dramatic art has represented Phaedra" as preferring the charge against Theseus that it was because of his derelictions that she fell in love with Hippolytus. Of such sort, too, are the frank lines, aimed against Hecuba, which in the Trojan Women he gives to Helen, who there expresses her feeling that Hecuba ought rather to be the one to suffer punishment because she brought into the world the man who was the cause of Helen's infidelity. Let the young man not form the habit of regarding any one of these things as witty and adroit, and let him not smile indulgently, either, at such displays of verbal ingenuity, but let him loathe the words of licentiousness even more than its deeds.

9. Now in all cases it is useful also to seek after the cause of each thing that is said. Cato, for example, used, even as a child, to do whatever the attendant in charge of him ordered, yet he demanded to know the ground and reason for the order. And so the poets are not to be obeyed as though they were our keepers or law-givers, unless their subject matter be reasonable; and this it will be if it be good, but if it be vile, it will be seen to be vacuous and vain. But most people are sharp in demanding the reasons for trivial things like the following, and insist on knowing in what sense they are intended :

Whoso from his car can reach the car of another
Let him thrust with his spear.

But in far weightier matters they take things, but faith without testing them at all, such, for example, these as

A man, though bold, is made a slave whene'er

and

He learned his mother's or his sire's disgrace,

Who prospers not must be of humble mind. And yet these sentiments affect our characters and disorder our lives, by engendering in us mean judgements and ignoble opinions, unless from habit we can say in answer to each of them, " Why must the man who has not prospered be of humble mind,' and why must he not rather rise up against Fortune, and make himself exalted and not humbled? And why, though I be the son of a bad and foolish father, yet if I myself am good and sensible, is it unbecoming for me to take pride in my good qualities, and why should I be dejected and humble on account of my father's crassness ? " For he who thus meets and resists, and refuses to entrust himself broadside on to every breath of doctrine, as to a wind, but believes in the correctness of the saying that " a fool is wont to be agog at every word that's said" will thrust aside a good deal of what is not true or profitable therein. then, will take away all danger of harm from the perusal of poetry.

10. But, just as amid the luxuriant foliage and granaries of a vine the fruit is often hidden aud unnoticed from being in the shadow, so also amid the poetic diction and the tales that hang out, much that is to the (diverted from the facts, but he should ding especially (lose to those that lead toward virtue (and have the power to mold character. In which received it may not be a bad thing to treat this topic but (touching summary the principal points, but living any extended and constructive treatment, and long exist of examples, to those who

write more for dismay. in the Illiacus, then, as the young man takes note of good and bad characters and persons, let him pay attention to the lines and the diction which the poet assigns to them as respectively befitting. For example, Achilles says to Agamemnon, although lie speaks with anger;

Never a prize like yours is mine where'er the Achaeans
Capture and sack some goodly and populous town of the Trojans.

But Therites in reviling the same man says;

Full of bronze are your quarters, and many, too, are the women,
Chosen from all the captives for you, and these we Achaeans
Give to you first of all whenever we capture a city.

And on another occasion Achilles says,

If perchance Zeus ever
Grants to us that we plunder 'Troy, the well-walled city,

but Therites,

One that I or another Achaean may bring in as captive.a At another time, in the Inspection, when Agamemnon upbraided Diomede, the latter made no answer,

Showing respect for the stern rebuke of a king so respected.

But Sthenelus, a man of no account, says :

Son of Atreus, speak not to deceive, knowing how to speak clearly :
We can avow ourselves to be better far than our fathers.

A difference of this sort then if not overlooked, will teach the young man to regard modesty and moderation as a mark of refinement, but to be on his guard against boasting and self-assertion as a mark of meanness. It is useful to note also the behaviour of Agamemnon in this case ; for Sthenelus he passed by without a word, but Odysseus he did not disregard, but made answer and addressed him,

When he saw he was wroth, and tried to retract his saying.

For to defend one's actions to everybody smacks of servility, not of dignity, while to despise everybody is arrogant and foolish. And most excellently does Diomede in the battle hold his peace, although upbraided by the king, but after the battle he uses }}lain speech to him

First let me say that you 'mid the Danaans slighted my prowess.

It is well, too, not to miss a difference that exists between a man of sense and a seer who courts popularity. For example, Calchas f had no regard to the occasion, and made nothing of accusing the king before the multitude, alleging that he had brought the pestilence upon them but Nestor, though anxious to put in a word for the reconciliation with Achilles, yet, in order that lie may not seem to discredit Agamemnon with the multitude as having made a mistake and indulged ill anger, says,

Give a feast for the elders; 'tis fitting and not unbefitting;
'Then, when many are gathered. whoever shall offer best counsel
Him you will follow,

and after the dinner lie sends forth the envoys. 1 or this was the way to amend an error; the other was

arraignment and foul abuse.

Moreover, the difference between the two peoples should be observed, their behaviour being as follows ; the Trojans advance with shouting and confidence, but the Achaeans

silently, fearing their captains.

For to fear one's commanders when at close quarters with the enemy is a sign of bravery and of obedience to authority as well. Wherefore Plato tries to establish the habit of fearing blame and disgrace more than toils and dangers, and Cato used to say that he liked people that blushed better than those that blanched.

There is also in the promises of the heroes a special character. For Dolon promises :

Straight to the midst of their host shall I go till I come to the vessel
Which Agamemnon commands.

Diomede, however, promises nothing, but says that he should be less frightened if he were sent in company with another man. Prudence, then, is characteristic of a Greek and of a man of refinement, while presumption is barbaric and cheap the one should be emulated and the other detested. And it is not unprofitable to consider how the Trojans and Hector were affected, at the time when Ajax was about to engage with him in single combat. Once when a boxer at the Isthmian games was struck in the face, and a clamour arose, Aeschylus said, " What a thing is training. The onlookers cry,, out ; it is the man who is struck who says nothing. In like manner, when the poet says b that when Ajax appeared resplendent in his armour, the Greeks rejoiced at seeing him, whereas

Dreadful trembling seized on the limbs of every Trojan ;
Even Hector himself felt his heart beat quickly in his bosom,

who could fail to admire the difference? For the heart of the man who is facing the danger only throbs, as though indeed he were simply going to wrestle or run a race, while the onlookers tremble and shiver in their whole bodies through loyalty and fear for their king. Here, too, one should carefully consider the difference between the very valiant man and the craven. For Thersites

Hateful was most of all to Achilles as well as Odysseus,

while Ajax was always friendly to Achilles, and says to Hector regarding him---

Now alone from one man alone shall you learn quite clearly What sort of men with us are the Danaans' chieftains
Even after the smiter of men, lion-hearted Achilles.

This is the compliment paid to Achilles, but these succeeding lines in behalf of all are put in such a way as to be useful:

Yet are we of such sort as are ready to face you,
Yea, and many of us.

thereby declaring himself not the only man or the best, but only one among many equally capable of offering defence.

This is enough on the subject of differences, unless perhaps we desire to add, that of the Trojans many were taken alive, but none of the Acherons; and that of the Trojans some fell down at the feet of the enemy, as did Adrastus, the sons of Antimachus, Lycaon, and Hector himself begging Achilles for burial, but of the Achaeans none, because of their conviction that it is a trait of barbarian peoples to make supplication and to fall at the enemy's feet in combat, but of Greeks to conquer or to die fighting.

11. Now just as in pasturage the bee seeks the flower, the goat the tender shoot, the swine the root, and other animals the seed and the fruit, so in the reading of poetry one person culls the flowers of the story, another

rivets his attention upon the beauty of the diction and the arrangement of the words, as Aristophanes I says of Euripides,

I use the rounded neatness of his speech;

but as for those who are concerned with what is said as being useful for character (and it is to these that our present discourse is directed), let us remind that how strange it is if the lover of fables does not fail to observe the novel and unusual points in the story, and the student of language does not allow faultless and elegant forms of expression to escape him, whereas he that affects what is honourable and good, who takes up poetry not for amusement but for education, should give but a slack and careless hearing to utterances that look toward manliness or sobriety or uprightness, such, for example, as the following:

Son of Tydeus, what has made us forget our swift prowess?
Hither, stand my friend, by me. Disgrace will befall us
If yon Hector, gleaming-helmed, shall capture our vessels.

For to observe that the most wise and prudent man, when he is in danger of being destroyed and lost, together with the whole host, fears shame and disapprobation, but not death, will make the young man keenly alive to the moral virtues. And by the line,

Glad was Athena because of the man that was prudent and honest,

the poet permits us to draw a similar conclusion in that he represents the goddess as taking delight, not in some rich man or in one who is physically handsome or strong, but in one who is wise and honest. And again when she says that she does not overlook Odysseus, much less desert him,

Since he is courteous and clever of mind and prudent,

her words indicate that the only one of our attributes that is dear to the gods and divine is a virtuous mind, if it be true that it is the nature of like to delight in like.

Since it seems to be, and really is, a great thing to master one's anger, and since a greater thing is the exercise of precaution and forethought so as not to become involved in anger or to be made captive by it, we must make a point of indicating to our young readers such matters as this: that Achilles, being not tolerant or mild in temper, bids Priam in these words to be quiet and not to exasperate him:

Anger me now no more, old man (to ransom your Hector
I myself and disposed; from Zeus has conic such a message),
Lest, old man, even here 'neath my roof I leave you not scatheless
Suppliant though you are, and sin against Zeus's commandments,

and having washed and shrouded the body of Hector, he places it with his own hands on the wagon before its disfigurement was seen by the father,

Lest with heart so distressed he fail to master his anger,
Seeing his son, and Achilles' heart be stirred with resentment,
So that he slay him there, and sin against Zeus's commandments.

For it is mark of a wondrous foresight for a man whose hold on his temper is uncertain, who is naturally rough and quick-tempered, not to be blind to his own weakness, but to exercise caution, and to be on his guard against possible grounds for anger, and to forestall them by reason long beforehand, so that he may not even inadvertently become involved in such emotions. After the same manner should he that is fond of wine be on his guard against drunkenness, and he that is amorous against love. So did Agesilaus, who would not submit to being kissed by the handsome boy who approached him, so did Cyrus, who durst not even to look at Pantheia; but the uneducated, on the contrary, gather fuel to kindle their passions, casting themselves headlong into those

wherein they are weakest and least sure of themselves. Yet Odysseus not only restrains himself when enraged, but perceiving from some words of Telemachus that he too is angry and filled with hatred of the wicked, labours to mitigate his feelings and prepares him well beforehand to keep quiet and restrain himself, bidding him,

Even if they within my own house shall dishonour me sorely,
Let your heart within you endure all the wrongs that I suffer:

Though through the house they should drag me out by the feet to the open,
Yea, or with missiles smite me, still you must patient behold it.

For just as drivers do not curb their horses during the race, but before the race, so with those persons who are quick-tempered and hard to hold back when dangers threaten, we first gain control over them by reasoning, and make them ready beforehand, and then lead them into the strife.

While it is also necessary not to pass over the words carelessly, yet one should eschew the puerility of Cleanthes; for there are times when he uses a mock seriousness in pretending to interpret the words,

Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida,

and

Zeus, lord of Dodona,

Bidding us in the latter case to read the last two words as one (taking the word "lord " as the preposition "up ") as though the vapour exhaled from the earth were "updonative " because of its being rendered up! And Chrysippus also is often quite petty, although he does not indulge in jesting, but wrests the words ingeniously, yet without carrying conviction, as when he would force the phrase "wide-seeing " son of Cronos to signify "clever in conversation," that is to say, with a widespread power of speech.

It is better, however, to turn these matters over to the grammarians, and to hold fast rather to those in which is to be found both usefulness and probability, such as

Nor does my heart so bid me, for I have learned to be valiant,

and

For towards all he understood the way to be gentle.

For by declaring that bravery is a thing to be learned, and by expressing the belief that friendly and gracious intercourse with others proceeds from under-standing, and is in keeping with reason, the poet urges us not to neglect our own selves, but to learn what is good, and to give heed to our teachers, intimating that both boorishness and cowardice are but ignorance and defects of learning. With this agrees very well what he says regarding Zeus and Poseidon:

Both, indeed, were of one descent and of the same birthplace,
Yet was Zeus the earlier horn and his knowledge was wider.

For he declares understanding to be a most divine and kingly tiling, to which he ascribes the very great superiority of Zeus, inasmuch as he believes that all the other virtues follow upon this one.

At the same time, the young man must get the habit of perusing with a mind wide awake such sayings as these;

Falsehood he will not utter because he is very prudent,

and

What an act is this, Antilochus, prudent aforetime!
You have put my skill to disgrace and hindered my horses,

and

Glaucus, what cause has a man like you for words so disdainful ?
Truly I thought, my friend, that in sense you excelled all the others,

the implication being that men of sense do not lie or contend unfairly in games, or make unwarranted accusations against other people. And from the poet's saying that Pandarus was persuaded because of his want of sense to bring to naught the sworn agreement, he clearly shows his opinion that the man of sense would not do wrong. It is also possible to give similar intimations in regard to self-control, by directing the young man's attention to statements like these:

Mad for him was Proetus' royal wife Anteia
Lusting to make him her lover in secret, but could not persuade him,
Since the wise Bellerophon thought more of virtue,

and

She at the first would not consent to a deed so unseemly, Royal Clytemnestra, since her thoughts were for virtue.
In these lines the poet attributes to understanding the cause of self-control; and in his exhortations to battle he says on the several occasions:

Shame, men of Lycia, whither now flee ye ? Now be ye valiant,

and

But let all your minds be imbued with Shame and resentment, for now, as you see, great strife
has arisen,

and thereby lie appears to represent the men of self-control as brave because of their being ashamed of disgrace, and as able to overcome pleasures and to undergo dangerous adventures. Timotheus also adopted this point of view, when in his Persians he urged the Greeks, not infelicitously, to have

Respect for shame that helps the brave in war;

and Aeschylus sets it down as a point of good sense not to be puffed up with fame, nor to be excited and elated by popular praise, when he writes of Amphiaraus,

His wish is not to seem, but be, the best,
Reaping the deep-sown furrow of his mind
In which all goodly counsels have their root.

For to take pride in oneself and in one's state of mind when it is altogether good, marks the man of good sense; and since everything may be referred to understanding, it follows that every form of virtue is added unto him from reason and instruction.

12 Now the bee, in accordance with nature's laws, discovers amid the most pungent flowers and the roughest thorns the smoothest and most palatable honey; so children, if they be rightly nurtured amid poetry, will in some way or other learn to draw some wholesome and profitable doctrine even from passages that are suspect of what is base and improper. For example, Agamemnon is suspected of having, for a bribe, released from service in the army the rich man who made him a present of the mare Aetha,

Gift so he fare not with him to Troy where the wind never ceaseth,
But enjoy himself at home; for wealth in abundance
Zeus had bestowed upon him.

But, as Aristotle observes, he did quite right in preferring a good mare to a man of that type. For a coward, and a weakling, made dissolute by wealth and soft living, is not, I swear, worth a dog or even an ass. Again, it appears most shameful in Thetis when she incites her son to pleasures and reminds him of love. But even there we must contrast Achilles' mastery of himself, that although lie is in love with Briseis, who has come back to him, and although he knows that the end of his life is near, yet he does not make haste to enjoy love's pleasure, nor, like most men, mourn for his friend by inactivity and omission of his duties, but as he refrains from such pleasures because of his grief, so he bestirs himself in the business of his command. Agaiii, Archilochus cannot be commended, because while grieving over his sister's husband, who was lost at sea, he is minded to fight against his grief by means of wine and amusement ; he has, however, alleged a cause that has some appearance of reason,

By my tears I shall not cure it, nor worse make it
By pursuing joys, yea, and festivities.

For if he thought that he should not make matters "worse by pursuing joys, yea, and festivities," how shall our present condition be any the worse if we engage in the study of philosophy or take part in public life, if we go out to the market~place or down to the Academy, or if we pursue our farming? Wherefore the corrected versions which Cleanthes and Antisthenes employed are themselves not without value. Antisthenes, observing that the Athenians had raised an uproar in the theatre at the line,

What's shameful if its doer think not so?
at once interpolated,
A shame's a shame, though one think so or no and Cleanthes, taking the lines about riches,

Give to your friends, and when your body's ill,
Save it by spending,

rewrote them in this manner,

To harlots give, and when your body's ill
Waste it by spending.

And Zeno in amending the lines of Sophocles,

Whoever Comes to traffic with a king
To him is slave however free he come"

rewrote it thus;

Is not a slave if only free he come,

by the word "free " as he now uses it designating the man who is fearless, high-minded, and unhumbled. What, then, is to hinder us also from encouraging the young to take the better course by means of similar rejoinders, dealing with the citations something like this;

Most enviable is the lot of him
The shaft of whose desire hits what he would.

Not so," will be our retort. " but

The shaft of whose desire hits what is good."

For to gain and achieve one's wish, if what one wishes is not right, is pitiable and unenviable.
Again,

Not for good and no ill came thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon, but joy
Thou shalt find interwoven with grief.

"No, indeed," we shall say," but you must find joy and not grief if your lot be but moderate, since

Not for good and no ill came thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon;"

and :

Alas, from God this evil comes to men,
When, knowing what is good, one does it not.

"No, rather is it bestial," we reply, " and irrational and pitiable that a man who knows the better should be led astray by the worse as a result of a weak will and soft living."
And again:

'Tis character persuades, and not the speech."

"No, rather it is both character and speech, or character by means of speech, just as a horseman uses a bridle, or a helmsman uses a rudder, since virtue has no instrument so humane or so akin to itself as speech." And:

To women more than men is lie inclined?
Where there is beauty, either suits him best.

But it were better to say

"Where there is virtue, either suits him best,
of a truth, and there is no difference in his inclination; but the man who is influenced by pleasure or outward beauty to shift his course hither and thither is incompetent and inconstant." Again:

God's doings make the wise to feel afraid
"Not so by any means, but
God's doings make the wise to feel assured,
but they do make the silly and foolish and ungrateful to feel afraid, because such persons suspect and fear the power which is the cause and beginning of every good thing, as though it did harm." Such then is the system of amendment.

I 3. Chrysippus has rightly Indicated how the poet's statements can be given a wider application, saying that what is serviceable should be taken over and made to apply to like situations. For when Hesiod says,

Nor would even an ox disappear were there not a bad neighbour,

he says the same thing also about a dog and about an ass and about all things which in a similar way can "disappear." And again when Euripides d says,

What man who recks not death can be a slave?

we must understand that he makes the same statement also about trouble and disease. For, as physicians who have learnt the efficacy of a drug adapted to one malady take it over and use it for every similar malady, so also

when a statement has a general and universal value, we ought not to suffer it to be fixed upon one matter alone, but we ought to apply it to all the like, and inure the young men to see its general value, and quickly to carry over what is appropriate, and by many examples to give themselves training and practice in keen appreciation; so that when Menander says,

Blest is the man who has both wealth and sense,

they may think of the statement as holding good also about repute and leadership and facility in speaking; and so also that when they hear the rebuke which was administered by Odysseus to Achilles as he sat among the maidens in Scyrus

Dost thou, to dim the glory of thy race,
Card wool, son of the noblest man in Greece?

they may imagine it to be addressed also to the profligate and the avaricious and the heedless and the ill-bred, as, for example,

Dost drink, son of the noblest man in Greece,

or gamble, or follow quail-fighting, or petty trading, or the exacting of usury, without a thought of what is magnanimous or worthy of your noble parentage ?

Speak not of Wealth. I can't admire a god
Whose ready favour basest men secure.

Therefore speak not of repute, either, or of personal beauty, or the general's cloak, or the priestly crown, to all which we see the worst of men attaining.

For ugly is the brood of cowardice,

and the same we may also aver of licentiousness, superstition, envy, and all the other pestilent disorders. Most excellently has Homer said

Paris, poor wretch, excelling in looks,
and
Hector, excelling in looks

(for he declares the man deserving of censure and reproach who is endowed with no good quality better than personal comeliness), and this we must make to apply to similar cases, thereby curtailing the pride of those who plume themselves on things of no worth, and teaching the young to regard as a disgrace and reproach such phrases as "excelling in wealth" and " excelling in dinners " and " excelling in children " or " oxen," and in fact even the use of the word " excelling " in such a connection. For we ought to aim at the pre-eminence which comes from noble qualities, and we should strive to be first in matters of first importance, and to be great in the greatest ; but the repute which comes from small and petty things is disreputable and paltry.

This illustration at once reminds us to consider carefully instances of censure and commendation, particularly in Homer's poems. For he gives us expressly to understand that bodily and adventitious characteristics are unworthy of serious attention. For, to begin with, in their greetings and salutations, they do not call one another handsome or rich or strong, but they employ such fair words as these-

Heaven-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices,
and
Hector, son of Priam, peer of Zeus in counsel,
and
Son of Peleus, Achilles, great glory to the Achaeans,

and
Noble son of Menoetius, in whom my soul finds pleasure.

In the second place they reproach without touching at all upon bodily characteristics, but they direct their censure to faults;

Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer's courage,
and
Ajax, excelling at wrangling, ill advised,
and
Why, Idomeneus do you brag so soon? Unfitting is it for you to be braggart,
and
Ajax, blundering boaster,
and finally Thersites is reproached by Odysseus, not as lame or bald or hunchbacked, but as indiscreet in his language, while on the other hand the mother of Hephaestus affectionately drew an epithet from his lameness when she addressed him thus :

Up with you, club-foot, my child !

Thus Homer ridicules those who feel ashamed of lameness or blindness, in that he does not regard as blameworthy that which is not shameful, or as shameful that which is brought about, not through our own acts, but by fortune.

Plainly, then, two great advantages accrue to those who accustom themselves carefully to peruse works of poetry: the first is conducive to moderation, that we do not odiously and foolishly reproach anybody with his fortune; while the second is conducive to magnanimity, that when we ourselves have met with chances and changes we be not humiliated or even disturbed, but bear gently with scoffings and revilings and ridicule, having especially before us the words of Philemon:

There's naught more pleasing or in better taste
Than having strength to bear when men revile.

But if anybody is plainly in need of reprehension, we should reprehend his faults and his giving way to emotion, after the fashion in which Adrastus of the tragedy, when Alcmaeon said to him,

You are the kin of her who slew her spouse,
replied
And you have murdered her who gave you birth.

For just as those who scourge the clothes do not touch the body, so those who scoff at misfortune or low birth, do but vainly and foolishly assail externals, never touching the soul or even such matters as really need correction and stinging reproof.

14. Moreover, just as in what we have said above we felt that by setting against cheap and harmful poems the sayings and maxims of statesmen and men of repute, we were inducing a revolt and revulsion of faith from such poetry, so whenever we find any edifying sentiment neatly expressed in the poets we ought to foster and amplify it by means of proofs and testimonies from the philosophers, at the same time crediting these with the discovery. For this is right and useful, and our faith gains an added strength and dignity whenever the doctrines of Pythagoras and of Plato are in agreement with what is spoken on the stage or sung to the lyre or studied at school, and when the precepts of Chilon and of Bias lead to the same conclusions as our children's readings in poetry. Hence it is a duty to make a point of indicating that the lines

You, my child, have not the gift of arms in battle,
Your concern must be for loving arms in wedlock,
and

Seeing that Zeus is wroth if you fight with a man far better,

do not differ from " Know thyself," but have the same purport as this ; and the lines,

Fools! They know not how much more than all a half is,
and
Evil counsel is the worst for him who gives it

are identical with the doctrines of Plato in the Gorgias and the Republic upon the principle that to do wrong is worse than to be wronged "and " to do evil is more injurious than to suffer evil." And on the words of Aesehylus,

Fear not ; great stress of pain is not for long,

we ought to remark that this is the oft repeated and much admired statement originating with Epicurus, namely " that great pains shortly spend their force, and long continued pains have no magnitude." Of these two ideas Aesehylus has perspicuously stated the one and the other is a corollary thereto; for if great and intense pain is not lasting, then that which does not last is not great or hard to endure. Take these lines of Thespis:

You see that Zeus is first of gods in this,
Not using lies or boast or silly laugh;
With pleasure he alone is unconcerned.

What difference is there between this and the statement, " for the Divine Being sits throned afar from pleasure and pain," as Plato has put it ? Consider what is said by Baechylides:

I shall assert that virtue bath the highest fame, But wealth with even wretched men is intimate,

and again by Euripides a to much the same effect:

There's naught that I hold
In a higher esteem
Than a virtuous life;
'Twill ever be joined
With those that are good.

and
Why seek vain possessions? Do ye think
Virtue by wealth to compass ?
Wretched amid your comforts shall ye sit.

Is not this a proof of what the philosophers say regarding wealth and external advantages, that with-out virtue they are useless and unprofitable for their owners?

This method of conjoining and reconciling such sentiments with the doctrines of philosophers brings the poet's work out of the realm of myth and impersonation, and, moreover, invests with seriousness its helpful sayings. Besides, it opens and stimulates in advance the mind of the youth by the sayings in philosophy. For he comes to it thus not altogether without a foretaste of it, nor without having heard of it, nor indiscriminately stuffed with what he has heard always from his mother and nurse, and, I dare say, from his father and his tutor as well, who all beatify and worship the rich, who shudder at death and pain, who regard virtue without money and repute as quite undesirable and a thing of naught. But when they hear the precepts of the philosopher, which go counter to such opinions, at first astonishment and confusion and amazement take hold of them, since they cannot accept or tolerate any such teaching, unless, just as if they were now to look upon the sun after having been in utter darkness, they have been made accustomed, in a reflected light, as it were, in which the dazzling rays of truth are softened by combining truth with fable, to face facts of this sort without being distressed, and not to try to get away from them. For if they have previously heard or read in poetry such thoughts as these:

To mourn the babe for th' ills to which lie comes; But him that's dead, and from his labours rests,
To bear from home with joy and cheering words,
and
What needs have mortals save two things alone,
Demeter's grain and draught from water-jar?
and
O Tyranny, beloved of barbarous folk,
and
And mortal men's felicity
Is gained by such of then' as feel least grief,

they are less confused and disquieted upon hearing at the lectures of the philosophers that " Death is nothing to us," f and " The wealth allowed by Nature is definitely limited," and " Happiness and blessed-ness do not consist in vast possessions or exalted occupations or offices or authority, but on impassivity, calmness, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limitations to accord with Nature."

Wherefore, both because of these considerations and because of those already adduced, the young man has need of good pilotage in the matter of reading, to the end that, forestalled with schooling rather than prejudice, in a spirit of friendship and goodwill and familiarity, he may be convoyed by poetry into the realm of philosophy.

ON LISTENING TO LECTURES

(DE RECTA RATIONE AUDIENDI)

1. THE discourse which I gave on the subject of listening to lectures I have written out and sent to you, my dear Nicander, so that you may know 1)0w rightly to listen to the voice of persuasion, now that you are no longer subject to authority, having assumed the garb of a man. Now absence of control, which some of the young men, for want of education, think to be freedom, establishes the sway of a set of masters, harsher than the teachers and attendants of childhood, in the form of the desires, which are now, as it were, unchained. And just as Herodotus says that women put off their modesty along with their undergarments, so some of our young men, as soon as they lay aside the garb of childhood, lay aside also their sense of modesty and fear, and, undoing the habit that invests them, straightway become full of unruliness. But you have often heard that to follow God and to obey reason are the same thing, and so I ask you to believe that in persons of good sense the passing from childhood to manhood is not a casting off of control, but a recasting of the controlling agent, since instead of some hired person or slave purchased with money they now take as the divine guide of their life reason, whose followers alone may deservedly be considered free. For they alone, having learned to wish for what they ought, live as they wish; but in untrained and irrational impulses and actions there is something ignoble, and changing one's mind many times involves but little freedom of will.

2. We may find a comparison in the case of newly naturalized citizens ; those among them who were alien born and perfect strangers find fault with many of the things that are done, and are discontented whereas those who come from the class of resident aliens, having been brought up under our laws and grown to be well acquainted with them, have no difficulty in accepting what devolves upon them and are content. And so you, who have been brought up for a long time in contact with philosophy, and have from the beginning been accustomed to philosophic reasoning as an ingredient in every portion of early instruction and information, ought to feel like an old friend and familiar when you come to philosophy, which alone can array young men in the manly and truly perfect adornment that comes from reason.

I think you may not find unwelcome some preliminary remarks about the sense of hearing, which Theophrastus asserts is the most emotional of all the senses. For nothing which can be seen or tasted or touched brings on such distractions, confusions, and excitements, as take possession of the soul when certain crashing, clashing, and roaring noises assail the hearing. Yet this sense is more rational than emotional. For while many places and parts of the body make way for vice to enter through them and fasten itself upon the soul, virtue's only hold upon the young is afforded by the ears, if they be uncontaminated and kept from the outset unspoiled by

flattery and untouched by vile words. For this reason Xenocrates advised putting ear-protectors on children rather than on athletes, on the ground that the latter have only their cars disfigured by the blows they receive, while the former have their characters disfigured by the words they hear; not that he would thus court heedlessness or deafness, but he advises vigilance against vile words, until such time as other words, of good sort, fostered in the character by philosophy, should, like watchmen, have taken under their charge the post chiefly exposed to influence and persuasion. And Bias of old, on receiving orders to send to Amasis the portion of the sacrificial animal which was at the same time the best and the worst, cut out the tongue and sent it to him, on the ground that speech contains both injuries and benefits in the largest measure. Most people in bestowing an affectionate kiss on little children not only take hold of the children by the ears but bid the children to do the same by them, thus insinuating in a playful way that they must love most those who confer benefit through the ears. For surely the fact is plain, that the young man who is debarred from hearing all instruction and gets no taste of speech not only remains wholly unfruitful and makes no growth towards virtue, but may also mind, like that of fallow and untilled piece of be perverted towards vice, and the product of his ground, will be a plentiful crop of wild oats. For if the impulses towards pleasure and the feelings of suspicion towards hard work (which are not of external origin nor imported products of the spoken word, but indigenous sources, as it were, of pestilent emotions and disorders without number) be allowed to continue unconstrained along their natural channels, and if they be not either removed or diverted another way through the agency of goodly discourse, thus putting the natural endowments in a fit condition, there is not one of the wild beasts but would be found more civilized than man."

3 Therefore, since listening to lectures is attended by great benefit, but by no less danger, to the young, I think it is a good thing to discuss the matter continually both with oneself and with another person. The reason for so doing is because we observe that a poor use is made of this by the great majority of persons, who practise speaking before they have acquired the habit of listening. They think that there must be study and practice in discourse, but as for hearing, benefit will come however it be used. It is true that, in the case of persons playing ball, learning to throw and learning to catch take place at the same time ; but in the use of discourse its proper reception comes before its delivery, just as conception and pregnancy come before parturition. It is said that when fowls labour and bring forth wind-eggs, these result from some imperfect and infertile residue from conception; and if young men have not the power to listen, or the habit of getting some profit through listening, the speech brought forth by them is windy indeed, and

Void of repute and unheeded beneath the clouds it is scattered.

For although they can incline and turn vessels properly to receive any liquid which is being poured into them, in order that there may actually be a filling and not a spilling, they never learn to apply themselves to a speaker and to accord attention to his lecture so that none of its good points may escape them. But here is the most ridiculous thing in the world : if they chance upon somebody who is giving an account of a dinner or a procession or a dream or a wordy brawl which he has had with another man, they listen in silence, and importune him to continue yet if anybody draws them to one side and tries to impart something useful, or to advise them of some duty, or to admonish them when in the wrong, or to mollify them when incensed, they have no patience with him ; but, eager to get the better of him if they can, they fight against what lie says, or else they beat a hasty retreat in search of other foolish talk, filling their ears like worthless and rotten vessels with anything rather than the things they need. As skilful horse-trainers give us horses with a good mouth for the bit, so too skilful educators give us children with a good ear for speech, by teaching them to hear much and speak little. Indeed, Spintharus declared in commendation of Epameinondas that it was not easy to find a man who knew more and has given to each of us two ears and one tongue, spoke less. And it is a common saying that nature because we ought to do less taking than listening.

4. In all cases, then, silence is a safe adornment for the young man, and especially so, when in listening to another he does not get excited or bawl out every minute, but even if the remarks be none too agreeable, puts up with them, and waits for the speaker to pause, and, when the pause comes, does not at once interpose his objection, but, as Aeschines puts b it, allows an interval to elapse, in case the speaker may desire to add something to what he has said, or to alter or unsay anything. But those who instantly interrupt with contradictions, neither hearing nor being heard, but talking while others talk, behave in an unseemlv manner ; whereas the man who has the habit of listening with restraint and respect, takes in and masters a useful discourse, and more readily sees through and detects a useless or false one, showing himself thus to be a lover of

truth and not a lover of disputation, nor froward and contentious. Wherefore it is sometimes said not unaptly that it is even more necessary to take the wind of self-opinion and conceit out of the young, than to deflate wine-skins, if you wish to fill them with something useful ; otherwise, being full of bombast and inflation, they have no room to receive it.

5. Now the presence of envy, attended by malice and hostility, is not a good thing for any undertaking, but it stands in the way of all that is honourable and it is the very worst associate and counsellor for one that would listen to a lecture, inasmuch as it makes what is profitable to be vexatious, unpleasing, and unacceptable, because envious persons are pleased with anything rather than with the good points of a discourse. Now the man that is stung by the wealth, or repute, or beauty possessed by another, is merely envious ; for he is depressed by the good fortune of others ; but one who feels discontentment at an excellent discourse is vexed by what is for his own good. For just as light is a good thing for those who can see, so is discourse for those who can hear, if they be willing to receive it.

Now while envy in other matters is engendered by certain untrained and evil dispositions of a man, the envy that is directed against a speaker is the offspring of an unseasonable desire for repute and a dishonest ambition, and it does not suffer the person in such a mood even to pay attention to what is being said, but it confuses and distracts his mind which at one moment is engaged in reviewing its own condition to see whether it be inferior to that of the speaker, then anon it turns to dwell on the other persons present to see whether they are showing any pleasure or admiration; it is disconcerted by their approval, and irritated at the audience if they find the speaker acceptable; disregards and dismisses the part of the discourse already delivered because the memory of it is painful, but for what still remains trembles with anxiety lest that part prove better than the part already delivered ; eager that tile speakers may most quickly have done when they are speaking most excellently ; and when the lecture is over, it does not ponder upon any point of the discussion, but proceeds to count as votes tile comments and attitudes of those present; if any approve, fleeing and recoiling from these as though frantic ; if any disapprove or distort the things said, hastening to join their comp ally; and if it be impossible to distort, then it falls to making comparisons with others who could have spoken better and more forcibly to the same purport - until by spoiling and maltreating the lecture it has succeeded in making the whole thing useless and unprofitable to itself.

6. Therefore a man must let his desire to hear make truce with his desire for repute, and listen cheerfully and affably as though he were a guest at some dinner or ceremonial banquet, commending the speaker's ability in those parts wherein he achieves a success, and favourably accepting the good-will, if nothing else, of the speaker who propounds his opinions and tries to persuade others by the reasons which have persuaded himself. Where he is successful we must reflect that the success is not due to chance or accident, but to care, diligence, and study, and herein we should try to imitate him in a spirit of admiration and emulation; but where there are mistakes, we should direct our intelligence to these, to determine the reasons and origin of the error. For as Xenophon asserts that good householders derive benefit both from their friends and from their enemies, so in the same way do speakers, not only when they succeed, but also when they fail, render a service to hearers who are alert and attentive. For poverty of thought, emptiness of phrase, an offensive bearing, fluttering excitement combined with a vulgar delight at commendation, and the like, are more apparent to us in others when we are listening than in ourselves when we are speakers. Wherefore we ought to transfer our scrutiny from the speaker to ourselves, and examine whether we unconsciously commit such mistakes. For it is the easiest thing in the world to find fault with one's neighbour, and also a useless and inane proceeding unless it be applied in some way to correcting or avoiding similar faults. And everyone ought to be ready ever to repeat to himself, as lie observes the faults of others, the utterance of Plato, " Am I not possibly like them? " For as we see our own eyes brightly reflected in the eyes of those near us, so we must get a picture of our own discourses in the discourses of others, that we may not too rashly disdain others, and may give more careful attention to ourselves in the matter of speaking. To this end the process of comparison is useful, if, when we have come away from the lecture and are by ourselves, we take some topic that seems to have been ineffectually or inadequately treated, and try our hand at the same thing, and address ourselves to supplying a deficiency here, or amending there, to saying the same thing in other words, or attempting to treat the subject in a wholly new way; and this is what Plato a actually did for the discourse of Lysias. For to offer objections against a discourse which has been delivered is not difficult, but very easy ; but to set up a better against it is a very laborious task. As the Spartan b said, on hearing that Philip had razed the city of Olynthus to the ground, " Yes, but even he could not possibly set up such another." Whenever, therefore, in discoursing thus upon a given subject, we find that we do not much excel those who have already spoken, we abate much of our disdain, and our presumption and self-esteem are

very speedily cut short by being put to the test in such comparisons.

7. Now admiration, which is the antithesis of disdain, obviously betokens a kindlier and gentler nature, but even this requires certainly no little caution, perhaps even more. For while it is true that disdainful and self-confident persons are less apt to get benefit from the speakers, yet the enthusiastic and ingenuous are more apt to get harm and they cause no one to question the saying of Heracleitus, that " A fool is wont to be agog at every word that's said." In praising a speaker we must be generous, but in believing his words cautious; as touching the style and the delivery of the performers, we should observe with a kindly and simple mind; but as for the utility and the truth of what they say, we must play the keen and heartless critics, that the speakers may feel no hatred, yet 1their words may do no harm. For we unwittingly receive into our minds a great many false and vicious doctrines by feeling goodwill and confidence towards the speakers. Upon a time the Spartan officials, after approving the proposal made by a man whose life had not been good, appointed another man of good repute in his life and character to present it, thus quite rightly and for the good of the State trying to accustom the people to being influenced more by the behaviour than by the speech of their counsellors. But ill a philosophic discussion we must set aside the repute of the speaker, and examine what he says quite apart. For as in war so also in lectures there is plenty of empty show. For example, a speaker's grey hair, his formality, his serious brow, his self-assertion, and above all the clamour and shouting of the audience as he brings them to their feet, combine to disconcert the young and inexperienced listener, who is, as it were, swept away by the current. The speaker's style also has a spice of deception when it is pleasing and copious, and is applied to the subject with dignity and artfulness. For as most of the mistakes of persons singing to the flute escape tile audience, so an exuberant and impressive style flashed upon the listener blinds him to the matter set forth. It seems to have been Melanthius,, who being asked about Diogenes' tragedy said he could not get a sight of it, there were so many words in the way; and the discussions and exercises of most popular lecturers not only use words to conceal their thoughts, but they so sweeten heir voice by certain harmonious modulations and softenings and rhythmic cadences, as to ravish away and transport their hearers. It is an empty pleasure they give, and an even more empty renown they acquire, so that the remark of Dionysius fits their case exactly. For he, as it appears, at some performance promised to a harp-player of great repute certain large gifts, but afterwards gave him nothing, on the ground that he had already discharged his obligation. " For," said he, " all the time that you were giving pleasure to us with your singing, you were enjoying the pleasure of your hopes." And this is just the meed that such lectures have for those who deliver them; for the speakers are admired in as far as they are entertaining, and afterwards, no sooner has the pleasure of listening passed away, than their repute deserts them, and so the time of their hearers and tile life of the speakers is simply wasted.

8. One ought therefore to strip off the superfluity and inanity from the style, and to seek after the fruit itself, imitating not women that make garlands, but the bees. For those women, culling flower-clusters and sweet-scented leaves, intertwine and plait them, and produce something which is pleasant enough, but short-lived and fruitless; whereas the bees in their flight frequently pass through meadows of violets, roses, and hyacinths, and come to rest upon the exceeding rough and pungent thyme, and on this they settle close, and when they have got something of use, they fly away home to their own special work. In such wise, then, the sincere and single-minded student ought to regard flowery and dainty language and theatrical and spectacular subject matter as the pasturage of drones who practise the popular lecture; these lie should leave alone and use all diligence to sound the deep meaning of the words and the intention of the speaker, drawing from it what is useful and profitable, and remembering that he has not come to a theatre or music-hall, but to a school and class room with the purpose of amending his life by what Is there said. Hence it follows that in making his examination and forming his judgement of the lecture he should begin with himself and his own state of mind, endeavouring to estimate whether any one of his emotions has become less intense, whether any one of his troubles weighs less heavily upon him, whether his confidence and his high purpose have become firmly rooted, whether he has acquired enthusiasm for virtue and goodness. As a matter of course, when he rises to leave the barber's shop, he stands by the mirror and feels his head, examining the cut of his hair and tile difference made by its trimming; so on his way home from a lecture or an academic exercise, it would be a shame not to direct his gaze forthwith upon himself and to note carefully his own spirit, whether it has put from it any of its encumbrances and superfluities, and has become lighter and more cheerful. " For," as Ariston says, neither a bath nor a discourse is of any use unless it removes impurity."

9. Let the young man, then, find pleasure when he finds profit from a discourse; but he should not hold that the pleasure derived from the lecture is end in itself, nor would I have him hum a merry note or show a jovial face as he leaves the philosopher's school, any more than he should seek to be sprinkled with perfume

when lie needs a fomentation and a hot poultice ; but he should feel grateful if by pungent discourse someone has cleansed his mind teeming with fogginess and dullness, as a beehive is cleared by smoke. For even though it is quite right for a speaker not to be altogether neglectful of pleasantness and persuasion in his style, yet the young man should make least concern of this, at any rate at first. Afterwards no doubt he may have an eye to that; for just as those who drink, after they have quenched their thirst, begin then to observe the ornamentation of the drinking-cups and to turn them about, so the young man, when he is well replenished with doctrines and has some respite, may be allowed to inspect the style to see whether it contains any-thing elegant and exquisite. But he who at the very outset does not stick to the subject matter, but insists that the style shall be pure Attic and severely plain, is like the man who is unwilling to swallow an antidote for a poison unless the cup be of the finest Attic ware, or unwilling to put on an overcoat in winter unless the wool be from Attic sheep, but must needs sit still and inactive, with a delicate thin jacket of Lysias's language cast over him. Indeed, this sort of unhealthiness has produced much barrenness of mind and of good sense, much foolery and bibble-babble in the schools, since younger men do not keep in view the life, the actions, and the public conduct of a man who follows philosophy, but rate as matters for commendation points of style an(l phrasing, and a fine delivery, while as for what is being delivered, whether it be useful or useless, whether essential or empty and superfluous, they neither understand nor wish to inquire.

10. This leads up to the matter of proposing problems. Now the person who comes to a dinner is bound to eat what is set before him and not to ask for anything else or to be critical; so he who comes to a feast of reason, if it be on a specified subject, must feel bound to listen to the speaker in silence. For those persons who lead the speaker to digress to other topics, and interject questions, and raise new difficulties, are not pleasant or agreeable company at a lecture; they get no benefit from it, and they confuse both the speaker and his speech. However, when the speaker requests his hearers to ask questions or to propose problems, one should always manifestly propose some problem which is useful and essential. Now Odysseus among the suitors is derided for

Asking for morsels of food and not for swords or for cauldrons,

for they regard it just as much a sign of magnanimity to ask for something great as to give it. But there is more reason for ridiculing a hearer who diverts the speaker to petty and frivolous problems, such as some of the young men are in the habit of proposing when they are only fooling and withal showing off their skill in logic or mathematics ; take, for example, the question about the division of indeterminate propositions or "What is movement as determined by the bounding side or by the diagonal? " To such by the position of its diagonal (i.e. interior lines) or of its exterior lines ?

persons we may retort with the remark of Philotimus to the man who was dying of consumption. When he had addressed the physician, asking him for something to cure a sore finger, Philotimus, perceiving his condition from his colour and respiration, said," My dear sir, your concern is not about a sore finger." And so for you, young man, it is not the time to be inquiring about such questions, but how you may be rid of self-opinion and pretension, love affairs and nonsense, and settle down to a modest and wholesome mode of living.

11. It is quite necessary that in formulating questions the questioner should accommodate himself to the proficiency or natural capacity of the speaker, to those matters "in which lie is at his best" ~ ; not forcibly to divert one who is more concerned with the ethical side of philosophy, by plying him with questions in natural science or mathematics, or to drag the man who poses as an authority on natural science into passing judgement on the hypothetical propositions of logic or solutions of quibbles like the Liar Problem. For just as one who should go about to split wood with a key, or to open his door with an axe, would not be thought to offer an indignity to those instruments but to deprive himself of the proper use and function of each, so those persons who ask of a speaker something for which he is not apt by nature or by practice, and do not gather and take what he has to offer, not only suffer harm thereby, but also incur the name and blame of malice and hostility as well.

12 A man must also guard against proposing many problems or proposing them often himself. For this is, in a way, the mark of a man who is taking occasion to show himself off. But to listen good-naturedly when another advances them, marks the considerate gentleman and the scholar. The only exception is in case some matter of his own is troublesome and urgent, some emotion requiring repression, or a disorder requiring relief. For perhaps it may not even be " better to conceal ignorance," as Heracleitus a puts it, but to set it forth in public, and cure it. And if some fit of temper, or attack of superstition, or an intense disagreement with members of our own household, or a mad desire born of love,

Stirring the heart-strings never stirred before,

brings confusion to our thoughts, we must not run of these very matters both at the formal exercises, away to other kin(1s of discourse to escape being taken to task, but we must listen to the discussion and after the exercises, when we approach the men privately and question them further. But save us from the contrary course, followed by the majority, who are delighted with the philosophers and admire them when they are discoursing about other people but if the philosopher leaves the other people alone, and addresses himself frankly and freely to them, and sets them in mind of matters that much concern them, they are annoyed and think him officious. For as a rule, they imagine that they ought to listen to the philosophers in the schools as they listen to the tragedians in the theatres ; but in matters out of school they think the philosophers are no better men than themselves. Now there is some reason that they should feel thus towards the popular lecturers fur when these get up from the speaker's chair, and put away their books and lecture notes, it is apparent that in the real pursuits of life they are small men and rank lower than the average ; but towards philosophers of the real sort it is not right that they have such a feeling, not realizing that seriousness and Jest in them, nod, or smile, or frown, and, above all, what they say to each person apart, may yield a return which is profitable for those who have acquired the habit of patient attention.

13 The proprieties in regard to bestowing commendation also require some caution and moderation, for the reason that neither deficiency nor excess therein befits the free man. An offensive and tire-some listener is the man who is not to be touched or moved by anything that is said, full of festering presumption and ingrained self-assertion, as though convinced that he could say something better than what is being said, who neither moves his brow nor utters a single word to bear witness that he is glad to listen, but by means of silence and an affected gravity and pose, seeks to gain a reputation for poise and profundity; as though commendation were money, he feels that he is robbing himself of every bit that he bestows on another. For there are many who take that saying of Pythagoras wrongly and out of harmony with his meaning. He declared that he had gained this advantage from philosophy, to wonder at nothing; but these men think that their advantage gained is to commend nothing, to show respect for nothing, holding that immunity from wonder lies in disdain, and seeking to attain to dignity by means of contempt. Now it is true that philosophic reasoning, through knowledge and acquaintance with the cause in every case, does away with the wonder and amazement that spring from blindness and ignorance, but at the same time it does not destroy our serenity, moderation, or human interest. For to persons who are truly and consistently good it is the highest credit to bestow credit upon someone deserving of credit, and the most Conspicuous honour to honour such a man, since this argues a superabundant and generous store of repute; whereas those who are niggardly in their commendation of others give the impression of being pinched and starving for their own.

On the other hand, however, the opposite type of person, light-minded and flighty, who uses no judgement, but hangs intent on every word and syllable with an ejaculation ready on his lips, is frequently no satisfaction to the disputants themselves, and is always a painful affliction for the audience, startling them as he does and exciting them to join him contrary to their judgement, as though they for shame could not help being dragged into the applause. He gets no benefit from the lecture because for him it has been made full of confusion and fluttering excitement by his continual applaudings, and he departs with the name of being one of three things : a dissembler, a flatterer, or a boor in all that relates to discourse.

Now a man sitting as a judge in court is bound to listen without regard either to enmity or favour, but in sober judgement with regard to justice ; but at scholarly lectures no law and no oath prohibits us from receiving the lecturer with goodwill. Indeed, the ancients gave Hermes a place beside the Graces from a feeling that discourse demands, above all, graciousness and friendliness. For it is not possible for a speaker to be a failure so abject and complete that he does not afford something meriting commendation, an original thought, a reminiscence from others, the very subject and purpose of his discourse, or at least the style and arrangement of his remarks,

Just as amid urchin's foot and the rough rest-harrow
Flowering snowdrops grow, delicate in their bloom.

For .when some have declaimed a panegyric upon vomiting or fever, nay I vow, even upon a kitchen-pot, not without a certain amount of plausibility, how could it be that a discourse delivered by a man who in some sort bears the repute and name of philosopher, should not offer, at some point, to benevolent and humane hearers

some respite and opportunity for commendation? We know, at any rate, that all persons in the bloom of youth do some-how or other, as Plato says, act as a stimulus upon the man inclined to love; the fair ones he names "children of the gods," the dark "manly," while the hook-nosed he endearingly terms "kingly," the snub-nosed "fetching," the sallow " honey-hued," and so welcomes and likes them all; for love, like ivy, is clever in attaching itself to any support. Much more, then, will the scholar and diligent hearer always be ready to discover some cause for which he may openly bestow on every speaker some commendation not inappropriate. So Plato, although he cannot commend Lysias's speech for invention, and although he condemns its arrangement as disorderly, nevertheless commends the style, and that "each word was clearly and roundly turned." One might find fault with Archilochus for his subject matter, Parmenides for his versification, Phocylides as commonplace, Euripides for his loquacity, and Sophocles for his unevenness; and it is equally true of the orators that one of them has no power to portray character, another is slow to rouse emotion, another is lacking in grace ; yet it is a fact that each one of them is commended for the special faculty with which Nature has taught him to move us and draw us on. It follows, then, that there is ample and abundant opportunity for hearers to show friendliness toward those who are speaking. For some it is quite enough, even if we do not attest this by the voice, that we vouchsafe to them a gentleness of glance, a serenity of countenance, and a disposition kindly and free from annoyance.

Finally, the following matters, even with speakers who make a complete failure, are, as it were, general and common requirements at every lecture: to sit upright without any lounging or sprawling, to look directly at the speaker, to maintain a pose of active attention, and a sedateness of countenance free from any expression, not merely of arrogance or displeasure, but even of other thoughts and preoccupations. Now in every piece of work, beauty is achieved through the congruence of numerous factors, so to speak, brought into union under the rule of a certain due proportion and harmony, whereas ugliness is ready to spring into being if only a single chance element be omitted or added out of place. And so in the particular case of a lecture, not only frowning, a sour face, a roving glance, twisting the body about, and crossing the legs, are unbecoming, but even nodding, whispering to another, smiling, sleepy yawns, bowing down the head, and all like actions, are culpable and need to be carefully avoided.

14. There are others who think that the speaker has a function to perform, and the hearer none. They think it only right that the speaker shall come with his discourse carefully thought out and prepared, while they, without consideration or thought of their obligations, rush in and take their seats exactly as though they had come to dinner, to have a good time while others toil. And yet even a well-bred guest at dinner has a function to perform, much more a hearer; for he is a participant in the discourse and a fellow-worker with the speaker, and he ought not rigorously to examine the speaker's little slips, applying his criticism to every word and action, while he himself, without being subject to any criticism, acts unhandsomely and commits many gross improprieties in the matter of listening. On the contrary, just as in playing ball it is necessary for the catcher to adapt his movements to those of the thrower and to be actively in accord with him, so with discourses, there is a certain accord between the speaker and the hearer, if each is heedful of his obligation.

15. Then also the terms used in commendations must not be indiscriminate. For Epicurus himself is displeasing when he says of his friends' letters that they give rise to hullabaloos. And those persons who nowadays introduce into our lecture-rooms outlandish expressions, who are wont to exclaim over a lecture "Divine," and " Inspired," and "Unapproachable," as though it were no longer enough to say "Hear, Hear!" and "Good!" and Right! " as Plato and Socrates and Hypereides and their friends used to do to show their commendation, behave in a most unseemly manner, and traduce the speakers, as though these desired such high-flown and excessive commendations. Exceedingly displeasing also are those who use an oath in testifying to their approval of the speakers as though in a law court. No less so are those who fail to respect the quality of persons, and cry aloud to a philosopher" Smart ! "or to an aged man" Clever or " Flowery ! ", thus transferring to the philosophers the expressions of those who make a sport and an opportunity to show off out of their scholastic exercises, and applying meretricious commendation to sober discourse, as though they should put on an athlete's head a crown of lilies or roses instead of laurel or wild olive ! Once when Euripides the poet was going over for the members of his chorus a lyric passage set to music one of them burst out laughing; whereat Euripides remarked, "If you were not so stupid and ignorant, you would not have laughed while I was singing in most solemn measure." And so, as I think, one who is a philosopher and statesman might repress the exuberance of a graceless hearer by saying, " You seem to me to be an ill-bred fool; else, while I am giving instruction or admonition, or discoursing upon the gods or the State or its government, you would not be whistling and dancing a jig to my words." Just consider what it really means, if, when a philosopher is speaking, the people outside, by

reason of the clamour and shouting of those within, are unable to make out whether the applause is for some flute-player, or harper, or dancer.

16. Moreover, admonitions and rebukes must be listened to neither with stolid indifference nor with unseemly emotion. For those who can submit to being reproved by philosophers so light-heartedly and heedlessly as to laugh when being taken to task and to commend those who take them to task, as parasites do when abused by those at whose expense they live, are utterly froward and bold, and they give no good or genuine proof of manliness by their shameless behaviour. As for a pleasant scoff, wittily delivered and in pure fun, if a man know how to take it cheerfully and without offence, his conduct argues no ignoble or uncultured mind, but one altogether generous and Spartan. On the other hand, to hear a reprehension or admonition to reform character, delivered in words that penetrate like a biting drug, and not to be humbled at hearing it, not to run into a sweating and dizziness, not to burn with shame in the soul, but, on the contrary to listen unmoved, grinning, dissembling in the face of it all, is a notable sign of an illiberal nature in the young, dead to all modesty because of an habitual and continued acquaintance with wrongdoing, with a soul like hard and calloused flesh, upon which no lash can leave a weal.

Such is the behaviour of those who belong to this class. But young men of the opposite temperament, if they ever hear a single word directed against themselves, run away without looking back, and try to desert philosophy ; and, although the sense of modesty which Nature has bestowed upon them is an admirable beginning for their salvation, they lose it through effeminacy and weakness, since they display no firmness under reproof, nor do they accept corrections with the proper spirit, but they turn away their ears toward the agreeable and gentle converse of sundry flatterers or voluble talkers, who enchant them with useless and unprofitable but nevertheless pleasant utterances. Just as one who runs away from the physician after an operation, and will not submit to be bandaged, sustains all the pain of the treatment, but waits not for its benefits so when the word has cut and wounded a man's foolishness, if he give it no chance to heal and quiet the wound, he comes away from philosophy with a smart and pain but with no benefit. For not only the wound of Telephus, as Euripides a says,

Is soothed by fine-rasped filings from the spear,

but the smart from philosophy which sinks deep in young men of good parts is healed by the very words which in6icted the hurt. For this reason he who is taken to task must feel and suffer some smart, yet lie should not be crushed or dispirited, but, as though at a solemn rite of novitiate which consecrates him to philosophy, he should submit to the initial purifications and commotions, in the expectation that something delectable and splendid will follow upon his present distress and perturbation. Indeed, even if the reproof seems to be given unjustly, it is an admirable thing to endure it with continued patience while the man is speaking ; and. when he has come to the end, to go to him with an explanation, and beg him to reserve for some real misconduct the frankness and earnestness that he has employed in the present instance.

17 Moreover, just as in learning to read and or in taking up music or physical training, the first lessons are attended with much confusion, hard work, and uncertainty, but later, as the learner makes progress, by slow degrees, just as iii his relations with human beings, a full familiarity is engendered and knowledge which renders everything attractive, feasible, and easy, both to say and to do, so also is it with philosophy, which undoubtedly has something knotty and unfamiliar in its terms and subject matter at the outset; yet one ought not to take fright at its beginnings, and to abandon it in timorous and craven fashion; rather should he examine each point, and persist and stick to the task of getting on, while awaiting that familiarity which makes every noble thing a pleasure. For come it will without long delay, bringing with it abundant light for the subject of study ; it will inspire also a passionate love for virtue ; and anyone who could endure to pass the rest of his life without this passion, because he has exiled himself from philosophy for want of true manliness, brands himself either as a very presumptuous man or else a coward.

It is quite possible that the subject of philosophy contains some matter which is difficult for young and inexperienced students to apprehend at the outset. But, at the same time, they must hold themselves responsible for most of the uncertainty and misunderstanding in which they find themselves involved, since quite opposite characters come to fall into the same error. Some, because of a feeling of shame and a desire to spare the speaker, hesitate to ask questions and to get the argument firmly fixed in their minds, nodding their heads in assent as though they comprehended it; others, led by an unseasonable ambition and inane rivalry with their fellow-students, to show off their acuteness and their ability to learn easily, avow that they have the meaning before they have grasped it, and so do not grasp it at all. Then the result is that those modest and silent persons, after

leaving the lecture, distress themselves over their difficulties, and finally, driven by necessity, with even greater shame this time, they trouble the lecturers with questions which they should have asked before, and try to catch up; but with the ambitious and self-confident young men, the result is that they are all the time trying to cover up and conceal the ignorance that abides with them.

18. Let us therefore put from us all such foolishness and pretension, and, as we go onward to the task of learning, let us take pains thoroughly to comprehend all profitable discourses ; let us submit with patience to the laughter of those reputed to be clever, as did Cleanthes and Xenoerates, who, although they seemed to be slower than their schoolmates, yet did not try to escape learning or give it up in despair, but were the first to make jokes at themselves by comparing themselves to narrow-necked bottles and bronze tablets, as much as to say that they found great difficulty in taking in what was said, yet they kept it safely and securely. For not only is one bound, as Phocylides says,

Many a time to be cheated of hope when he seeks to be noble,

but he is bound also many a time to be laughed at and to be in disrepute, and to put up with joking and buffoonery as he struggles with might and main against his ignorance and overthrows it.

On the other hand, however, we certainly must not neglect the mistake that leads to the opposite extreme, winch some persons are led to commit by laziness, thus making themselves unpleasant and irksome. For when they are by themselves they are not willing to give themselves any trouble, but they give trouble to the speaker by repeatedly asking questions about the same things, like unfledged nestlings always agape toward the mouth of another, and desirous of receiving everything ready prepared and predigested. There is another class, who, eager to be thought astute and attentive out of due place, wear out the speakers with loquacity and officiousness, by continually propounding some extraneous and unessential difficulty and asking for demonstrations of matters that need no demonstration, and so, as Sophocles puts it,

Much time it takes to go a little way,

not only for themselves but for the rest of the company too. For holding back the speaker on every possible occasion by their inane and superfluous questions, as in a company of persons travelling together, they impede the regular course of the lecture, which has to put up with halts and delays. Now such persons are, according to Hieronymus, like cowardly and persistent puppies which, at home, bite at the skins of wild animals, and tear off what bits they can, but never touch the animals them-selves. But as for those lazy persons whom we have mentioned, let us urge them that, when their intelligence has comprehended the main points, they put the rest together by their own efforts, and use their memory as a guide in thinking for themselves, and, taking the discourse of another as a germ and seed, develop and expand it. For the mind does not require filling like a bottle, but rather, like wood, it only requires kindling to create in it an impulse to think independently and an ardent desire for the truth. Imagine, then, that a man should need to get fire from a neighbour, and, upon finding a big bright fire there, should stay there continually warming himself; just so it is if a man comes to another to share the benefit of a discourse, and does not think it necessary to kindle from it some illumination for himself and some thinking of his own, but, delighting in the discourse, sits enchanted; he gets, as it were, a bright and ruddy glow in the form of opinion imparted to him by what is said, but the mouldiness and darkness of his inner mind he has not dissipated nor banished by the warm glow of philosophy.

Finally, if there be need of any other instruction regard to listening to a lecture, it is that it is necessary to keep in mind what has here been said, and to cultivate independent thinking along with our learning, so that we may acquire a habit of mind is not sophistic or bent on acquiring mere information, but one that is deeply ingrained and philosophic, as we may do if we believe that right listening is the beginning of right living.

HOW TO TELL A FLATTER FROM A FRIEND

(QUOMODO ADULATOR AB AMICO INTERNOSCATUR)

1. PLATO says, my dear Antiochus Philopappus, that everyone grants forgiveness to the man who

leaving the lecture, distress themselves over their difficulties, and finally, driven by necessity, with even greater shame this time, they trouble the lecturers with questions which they should have asked before, and try to catch up; but with the ambitious and self-confident young men, the result is that they are all the time trying to cover up and conceal the ignorance that abides with them.

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Part 4

A List of Alciato's Sources

Since the publication of Peter M. Daly, *Andreas Alciatus: 1 The Latin Emblems, Indexes and Lists (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1985)*, emblem scholars do not have to cram the memory with every motto and picture of Alciato's *Emblemata*.. We can compare passages in classical and Alciato's contemporary literature with his work far more easily than before. The trouble with Daly's precious achievement is that it does not mention any sources from which Alciato might possibly draw his emblems. Fortunately, we have another resource when we locate what reference each emblem has in his work: Arthur Henkel and Albrecht Shöne, *Emblemata: Handbuch zur Sinnbildkunst des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967). It cites emblems with its sources. This voluminous dictionary of emblem books arranged the emblems according to the animal and plants kingdoms and the human world. Its encyclopedic coverage of the diversity of emblems completely broke down an original order of emblems in each emblem book. Consequently, we have to jump one page after another within the bulky dictionary when we want to accumulate information on Alciato's work.

The following is a list of Alciato's sources with its reference to his *Emblemata* and Henkel and Shöne's *Handbuch.*

Alciato' *Emblemata* (Padua, 1621)	**Motto**	**Counterparts of Alciato's Earlier Editions, and Henkel's *Emblemata***	**Source of Alciato's *Emblemata***
ALC. Nr.1	INSIGNIA DVCATVS MEDIOLAN.	Alc.(1531) A 2 Held Nr.1_EHS627	No Source
ALC. Nr.2	MEDIOLANUM.	Alc.(1550) S.8 Held Nr.3_EHS545	Ovid, *Metamorphoses* IV. 712ff
ALC. Nr.3	NUNQUAM PROCRASTINANDUM.	Alc.(1550) S.9 Held Nr.4_EHS466	No Source
ALC. Nr.4	IN DEO LAETANDVM.	Alc.(1531) (B 6) Held Nr.42_EHS1726	Homer, *The Iliad* XX 232ff
ALC. Nr.5	SAPIENTIA HUMANA, STULTITIA EST APUD DEUM.	Alc.(1550) S.11 Held Nr.144_EHS1607	No Source
ALC. Nr.6	FICTA RELIGIO.	Alc.(1550) S.12 Held Nr.143_EHS1866	Cicero, *De Officiis* 17
ALC. Nr.7	NON TIBI SED RELIGIONI.	Alc.(1531) (B 7) Held	Aristophanes, *Frogs* . 159; Aesop, *Fables* 324

		Nr.150_EHS512	
ALC. Nr.8	QVA DII VOCANT EVNDVM.	Alc.(1531) (D 8 b) Held Nr.41_EHS1776	No Source
ALC. Nr.9	FIDEI SYMBOLVM.	Alc.(1531) (E 6 b) Held Nr.24_EHS1559	No Source
ALC. Nr.10	FOEDERA ITALORVM.	Alc.(1531) (A 2 b) Held Nr.23_EHS1297	Cicero, *De Re Publica.* II 69; Horapollo, *Hieroglyphica.* II 116
ALC. Nr.11	[IN] SILENTIVM.	Alc.(1531) A 3 Held Nr.30_EHS1823	*The Greek Anthology* X 98; Erasmus, *Adages* IV 38
ALC. Nr.12	NON VVLGANDA CONSILIA.	Alc.(1531) (A 4 b) Held Nr.29_EHS1595	Pliny, *The Natural History* X 16
ALC. Nr.13	NEC QVESTIONI QUIDEM CEDENDUM.	Alc.(1531) D3 Held Nr.31_EHS374	Pausanias, *Description of Greece* I 23; Pliny, *The Natural History* XIC 70, XXXIV8
ALC. Nr.14	CONSILIO, ET VIRTUTE CHIMAERAN SUPERARI, ID EST, FORTIORES ET DECEPTORES.	Alc.(1550) S.20 Held Nr.34_EHS1661	Hesiod, *The Thegony* 319
ALC. Nr.15	VIGILANTIA, ET CUSTODIA.	Alc.(1550) S.21 Held Nr.36_EHS1215	No Source
ALC. Nr.16	SOBRIE VIUENDUM: ET NON TEMERE CREDENDUM.{SOBRIEUS ESTO, ET MEMINERIS NON TEMERE CREDERE: HAEC SUNT MEBRA MENTIS.}	Alc.(1550) S.22 Held Nr.37_EHS1010	Pythagoras, *Fragments* 255; Erasmus, *Adages* I 730.
ALC. Nr.17	LAPSUS UBI? QUID FECI? AUT OFFICII QUID OMISSUM EST?	Alc.(1550) S.23 Held Nr.40_EHS818	No Source
ALC. Nr.18	PRUDENTES. PROBLEMA.	Alc.(1500) S.24 Held Nr.33_EHS1818	Ovid, *Fasti* IV 123
ALC. Nr.19	PRUDENS, MAGIS QUAM LOQUAX.	Alc.(1550) S.25 Held Nr.32_EHS890	Ovid, *Metamorphoses* II. 551ff
ALC. Nr.20	MATVRANDVM.	Alc.(1531) (C 6 b) Held Nr.35_EHS713	No Source
ALC. Nr.21	IN DEPREHENSVM.	Alc.(1531) (D d) Held Nr.123_EHS707	Erasmus, *Adages* I 417.

ALC. Nr.22	CVSTODIENDAS VIRGINES.	Alc.(1531) C 2 Held Nr.75_EHS1732	Pausanias, *Description of Greece* I 24, 7;
ALC. Nr.23	VINO PRUDENTIAM AUGERI.	Alc.(1500) S.29 Held Nr.39_EHS1828	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 183, 7-10
ALC. Nr.24	PRVDENTES VINO ABSTINENT.	Alc.(1531) (C 5 b) Held Nr.38_EHS208	No Source
ALC. Nr.25	IN STATVAM BACCHI.	Alc.(1531) D 4 Held Nr.156_EHS1825	No Source
ALC. Nr.26	GRAMEN.	Alc.(1550) S.33 Held Nr.13_EHS1254	Aeschines, *The speeches of Aeschines* III 187
ALC. Nr.27	NEC VERBO NEC FACTO QUENQUAM LAEDENDUM.	Alc.(1531) (A 7) Held Nr.71_EHS1811	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 223
ALC. Nr.28	TANDEM TANDEM IVSTICIA OBTINET.	Alc.(1531) (B 8) Held Nr.66_EHS1686	*The Greek Anthology* IX 115 and 116
ALC. Nr.29	ETIAM FEROCISSIMOS DOMARI.	Alc.(1531) A 3 Held Nr.124_EHS386	Pliny, *The Natural History* VIII 55
ALC. Nr.30	GRATIAM REFERENDAM.	Alc.(1531) (A 3 b) Held Nr.72_EHS827	Pliny, *The Natural History* X 16; Plato, *Alcibiades* 135E
ALC. Nr.31	ABSTINENTIA.	Alc.(1550) S.38 Held Nr.11_EHS1354	Horace, *Satires* I 4
ALC. Nr.32	BONIS A DIVITIBVS NIHIL TIMENDUM	Alc.(1531) F.2 Held Nr.67_EHS1354	Valerius Flaccus, *Argonauts.* IV 344-636
ALC. Nr.33	SIGNA FORTIVM.	Alc.(1531) E 2 Held Nr.7_EHS757	*The Greek Anthology* VII 161
ALC. Nr.34	SUSTINE ET ABSTINE	Alc.(1550) S.41 Held Nr.43_EHS526	Pliny, *The Natural History* XXIV 124
ALC. Nr.35	IN ADULARI NESCINETEM.	Alc.(1550) S.42 Held Nr.45_EHS1069	Livy, *The History of Rome.* IV 9
ALC. Nr.36	OBDVRANDVM ADVERSUS URGENTIA.	Alc.(1531) B 3 Held Nr.44_EHS192	Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* III 6
ALC. Nr.37	OMNIA MEA MECUM PORTO.	Alc.(1550) S.44 Held	Strabo, *The Geographica* IX 507

		Nr.63_EHS1190	
ALC. Nr.38	CONCORDIA SYMBOLUM.	No Citation	No Source
ALC. Nr.39	CONCORDIA.	Alc.(1531) A 4 Held Nr.28_EHS882	Aelian, *On the Characteristics of Animals* III 9
ALC. Nr.40	CONCORDIA INSUPERABILIS.	Alc.(1550) S.47 Held Nr.26_EHS1649	Lucian, *Toxaria.* 63
ALC. Nr.41	VNUM NIHIL, DUOS PLURIMUM POSSE.	Alc.(1550) S.48 Held Nr.27_EHS1687	*The Greek Anthology* VII 225
ALC. Nr.42	FIRMISSIMA CONVELLI NON POSSE.	Alc.(1531) (C 8) Held Nr.6_EHS220	*The Greek Anthology* IX 291
ALC. Nr.43	SPES PROXIMA.	Alc.(1531) (B 6 b) Held Nr.68_EHS1462	Cicero, *Letters to Families* XII 25, 30
ALC. Nr.44	IN SIMVLACHRVM SPEI.	Alc.(1531) (D 8 b) Held Nr.69_EHS1557	No Source
ALC. Nr.45	IN DIES MELIORA.	Alc.(1550) S.53 Held Nr.62_EHS552	No Source
ALC. Nr.46	ILLICITVM NON SPERANDVM.	Alc.(1531) (A 6 b) Held Nr.70_EHS1558	*The Greek Anthology* IX 146
ALC. Nr.47	PVDICITIA.	Alc.(1550) S.55 Held Nr.77_EHS841	No Source
ALC. Nr.48	IN VICTORIAM DOLO PARTAM.	Alc.(1531) A 5 Held Nr.115_EHS1685	*The Greek Anthology* VII 145
ALC. Nr.49	IN FRAUDULENTOS.	Alc.(1550) S.57 Held Nr.181_EHS662	Ovid, *Metamorphoses* V 451ff
ALC. Nr.50	DOLUS IN SUOS.	Alc.(1550) S.58 Held Nr.113_EHS836	No Source
ALC. Nr.51	MALEDICENTIA.	Alc.(1550) S.59 Held Nr.178_EHS928	No Source
ALC. Nr.52	IN RECEPTATORES SICCARIORUM.	Alc.(1531) (E 6 b) Held Nr.117_EHS1622	Pliny, *The Natural History* X 182, XIX 154, XX 19
ALC. Nr.53	IN ADULATORES.	Alc.(1550) S.61	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 183, 7-10

		Held Nr.164_EHS664	
ALC. Nr.54	EI QVI SEMEL SVA PRODEGERIT ALIENA CREDI NON OPORTERE.	Alc.(1531) (E 8 b) Held Nr.112_EHS1640	*The Greek Anthology* IX 146
ALC. Nr.55	TEMERITAS.	Alc.(1550) S.63 Held Nr.111_EHS1072	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 250
ALC. Nr.56	IN TEMERARIOS.	Alc.(1531) D 3 Held Nr.109_EHS1614	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 207
ALC. Nr.57	FUROR, ET RABIES.	Alc.(1550) S.64 Held Nr.138_EHS373	No Source
ALC. Nr.58	IN EOS QVI SVPRA VIRES QUICQUAM AUDENT.	Alc.(1531) (B b) Held Nr.110_EHS1653	Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III 10
ALC. Nr.59	IMPOSSIBILE.	Alc.(1531) (E 3) Held Nr.182_EHS1087	*The Greek Anthology* XI 428
ALC. Nr.60	CUCULI.	Alc.(1550) S.68 Held Nr.88_EHS869	Alciato, *Parergon* VII 5
ALC. Nr.61	VESPERTILIO.	Alc.(1550) S.69 Held Nr.179_EHS899	Seneca the Elder, *Controversies* Paref. 16
ALC. Nr.62	ALIUD.	Alc.(1550) S.70 Held Nr.180_EHS900	Aristotle. *History of Animals* 488a; Isidore of Seville,. *Etymologies* XII 7, 36; Alciato, *Parergon* IX 10
ALC. Nr.63	IRA.	Alc.(1550) S.71 Held Nr.142_EHS374	Pliny, *The Natural History* VIII 49
ALC. Nr.64	IN EVM QVI SIBI IPSI DAMNUM APPARAT.	Alc.(1531) (E 5 b) Held Nr.116_EHS532	*The Greek Anthology* IX 47
ALC. Nr.65	FATUITAS.	Alc.(1550) S.73 Held Nr.175_EHS889	Aristotle. *History of Animals* 597b
ALC. Nr.66	OBLIUIO PAUPERTIS PARENS.	Alc.(1550) S.74 Held N.174_EHS458	Pliny, *The Natural History* VIII 84
ALC. Nr.67	SUPERBIA.	Alc.(1550) S.75 Held	Homer, *Iliad.* XXIV 602ff

		Nr.140_EHS1656	
ALC. Nr.68	IMPUDENTIA.	Alc.(1550) S.78 Held Nr.149_EHS1699	Homer, *The Odyssey* XII 73ff and 223ff
ALC. Nr.69	φιλαυτία	Alc.(1550) S.77 Held. Nr.148_EHS1627	No Source
ALC. Nr.70	GARRULITAS.	Alc.(1550) S.78 Held Nr.177_EHS873	*The Greek Anthology* IX 70, I
ALC. Nr.71	INVIDIA.	Alc.(1550) S.79 Held Nr.141_EHS1570	Ovid, *Metamorphoses* II 760ff
ALC. Nr.72	LUXURIA.	Alc.(1550) S.80 Held Nr.91_EHS1836	Pliny, *The Natural History* X 182, XIX 154, XX 19
ALC. Nr.73	LUXURIOSORUM OPES.	Alc.(1550) S.81 Held Nr.93_EHS240	Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* VI 60
ALC. Nr.74	TVMULVS MERETRICIS.	Alc.(1531) (B 3 b) Held Nr.87_EHS375	Pausanias, *Description of Greece* II 2, 4ff
ALC. Nr.75	IN AMATORES MERETRICUM.	Alc.(1531) (B 4 b) Held Nr.86_EHS716	No Source
ALC. Nr.76	CAUENDUM A MERETRICIBUS.	Alc.(1550) S.84 Held Nr.85_EHS1694	*The Greek Anthology* X 50
ALC. Nr.77	AMULETUM VENERIS.	Alc.(1550) S.85 Held Nr.90_EHS344	Pliny, *The Natural History* XIX 127
ALC. Nr.78	INVIOLABILES TELO CUPIDINIS.	Alc.(1531) (B 6) Held Nr.89_EHS887	Pindar, *Pythian Odes.* IV 214
ALC. Nr.79	LASCIUIA.	Alc.(1550) S.87 Held Nr.92_EHS464	*Suida Lexion "Mus kakos"*
ALC. Nr.80	ADVERSUS NATURAM PECCANTES.	No Citation	No Source
ALC. Nr.81	DESIDIA.	Alc.(1550) S.88 Held Nr.171_EHS1188	Pliny, *The Natural History* V 73
ALC. Nr.82	DESIDIAM	Alc.(1531) (A7b)	Plutarch, *Research on Rome*

	ABIICIENDAM.	Held Nr.172_EHS985	(*Quaestiones Romanae*) 109
ALC. Nr.83	IN FACILE A VIRTVTE DESCISCENTES.	Alc.(1531) C 5 Held Nr.173_EHS712	Aristotle. *History of Animals* 505 b
ALC. Nr.84	IGNAUI.	Alc.(1550) S.91 Held Nr.170_EHS862	Aristotle. *History of Animals* IX 18, 617a
ALC. Nr.85	AUARITIA.	Alc.(1550) S.92 Held Nr.157_EHS1654	No Source
ALC. Nr.86	IN AVAROS.	Alc.(1531) (C 6) Held Nr.158_EHS511	No Source
ALC. Nr.87	IN AULICOS.	Alc.(1550) S.94 Held Nr.160_EHS1047	No Source
ALC. Nr.88	IN SORDIDOS.	Alc.(1550) S.95 Held Nr.169_EHS793	Pliny, *The Natural History* VIII 97
ALC. Nr.89	IN DIUITES PUBLICO MALO.	Alc.(1550) S.96 Held Nr.118_EHS1114	Aristotle. *History of Animals* VIII 2 (592a)
ALC. Nr.90	IN AVAROS, VEL QVIBVS MELIOR CONDITIO AB EXTRANEIS OFFERTUR.	Alc.(1531) (A 6) Held Nr.159_EHS1608	*The Greek Anthology* VII 216
ALC. Nr.91	GULA	No Citation	No Source
ALC. Nr.92	OCNI EFFIGIES DE HIS QVI MERETRICIBUS DONANT, QUOD IN BONOS USUS UERTI DEBEAT.	Alc.(1531) (A 8 b) Held Nr.95_EHS517	Pliny, *The Natural History* XXXV; *Plutarch, Resorcefullness of Animals* (*Sollertia animalium*) 14
ALC. Nr.93	IN PARASITOS.	Alc.(1531) (B 3 b) Held Nr.161_EHS722	No Source
ALC. Nr.94	PARVAM CVLINAM DVOBVS GANEONIBUS NON SUFFICERE.	Alc.(1531) (B 5 b) Held Nr.162/163_EHS743	Erasmus, *Adages* II 123
ALC. Nr.95	CAPTIVVS OB GVLAM.	Alc.(1531) (E 3 b) Held Nr.168_EHS590	*The Greek Anthology* IX 86
ALC. Nr.96	IN GARRULUM ET GULOSUM.	Alc.(1550) S.103 Held	Paulus Diaconus, "Epitome Sexti Pompeii Festi" 367, 10

ALC. Nr.97	DOCTORVM AGNOMINA.	Nr.167_EHS836 Alc.(1550) S.104 Held	*The Greek Anthology* V 233, 5f
ALC. Nr.98	[VIS] NATURA	Nr.53_EHS1054 Alc.(1500) S.106 Held	No Source
ALC. Nr.99	ARS NATURAM ADIUUANS.	Nr.57_EHS1832 Alc.(1500) S.107 Held	Galen, *Protrepticus* 2ff
ALC. Nr.100	IN IUUENTAM.	Nr.58_EHS1796 Alc.(1500) S.108 Held	No Source
ALC. Nr.101	IN QUATUOR ANNI TEMPORA.	Nr.50_EHS1827 Alc.(1500) S.109 Held	No Source
ALC. Nr.102	SCYPHUS NESTORIS.	Nr.60_EHS743 Alc.(1550) S.110 Held	Homer, *The Iliad* XI 632f
ALC. Nr.103	QVAE SVPRA NOS NIHIL AD NOS.	Nr.52_EHS1401 Alc.(1531) B 4 Held	Hesiod, *The Thegony* 521ff
ALC. Nr.104	IN ASTOLOGOS.	Nr.106_EHS165 7 Alc.(1531) (C 7) Held	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 107
ALC. Nr.105	QVI ALTA CONTEMPLANTUR CADERE.	Nr.107_EHS105 6 Alc.(1531) (E 2 b) Held	*The Greek Anthology* VII 172
ALC. Nr.106	POTENTISSIMVS AFFECTUS AMOR.	Nr.108_EHS110 4 Alc.(1531) (A 4 b) Held	*The Greek Anthology* IX 221
ALC. Nr.107	POTENTIA AMORIS.	Nr.99_EHS385 Alc.(1531) (D 8) Held	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 207
ALC. Nr.108	VIS AMORIS.	Nr.98_EHS1761 Alc.(1531) (D 7) Held	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 250
ALC. Nr.109	IN STVDIOSVM CAPTUM AMORE.	Nr.97_EHS1761 Alc.(1531) (D 6) Held	No Source
ALC. Nr.110	Α΄ντέπως, ID EST, AMOR VIRTVTIS.	Nr.100_EHS105 4 Alc.(1531) (E b) Held	No Source
ALC. Nr.111	Α΄ντέπως, AMOR	Nr.104_1767 Alc.(1531) (D 6	Isidore of Seville,. *Etymologies* XII 53

	VIRTVTIS, ALIUM CUPIDINEM SUPERANS.	b) Held Nr.103_EHS1767	
ALC. Nr.112	DVLCIA QVANDOQUE AMARA FIERI.	Alc.(1531) (E 4 b)u. E 5 Held Nr.101 u.102_EHS1758	No Source
ALC. Nr.113	FERE SIMILE EX THEOCRITO.	No Citation	No Source
ALC. Nr.114	IN STATVAM AMORIS.	Alc.(1531) (E 7 b) Held Nr.96_EHS1759	Theocritus, *Idylls* XII
ALC. Nr.115	IN OBLIUIONEM PATRIAE.	Alc.(1550) S.125 Held Nr.105_EHS1691	Homer *The Odyssey* IX 82ff
ALC. Nr.116	SIRENES.	Alc.(1550) S.126 Held Nr.94_EHS1697	Homer *The Odyssey* XII 39ff, 158f
ALC. Nr.117	SENEX PUELLAM AMANS.	Alc.(1550) S.127 Held Nr.84_EHS891	Athenaeus, *Sophists at Dinner (Deipnosophistai)* XIII 7
ALC. Nr.118	IN COLORES.	Alc.(1550) S.128 Held Nr.61_EHS1292	No Source
ALC. Nr.119	VIRTVTI FORTVNA COMES.	Alc.(1531) B Held Nr.65_EHS1779	No Source
ALC. Nr.120	FORTVNA VIRTVTEM SUPERANS.	Alc.(1531) C Held Nr.136_EHS1181	Plutarch, *Brutus* 51f
ALC. Nr.121	PAVPERTATEM SVMMIS INGENIJS OBESSE NE PROVEHANTUR.	Alc.(1531) (A 7 b) Held Nr.64_EHS1022	No Source
ALC. Nr.122	IN OCCASIONEM.	Alc.(1531) (A 8) Held Nr.187_EHS1809	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 275
ALC. Nr.123	IN SUBITUM TERROREM.	Alc.(1550) S.134 Held Nr.176_EHS1835	No Source
ALC. Nr.124	IN ILLAVDATA LAVDANTES.	Alc.(1531) (B 7) Held Nr.151_EHS419	Lucian, *Zeuxis or Antiochus* 8ff
ALC. Nr.125	IN MOMENTANEAM	Alc.(1531) D5	Crinitus, *On Disciplined Honesty (De*

	FELICITATEM.	Held Nr.185_EHS331	*honesta disciplina*) II 14
ALC. Nr.126	EX DAMNO ALTERIUS, ALTERIUS VTILITAS.	Alc.(1550) S.137 Held Nr.184_EHS788	No Source
ALC. Nr.127	BONIS AUSPICIIS INCIPIENDUM.	Alc.(1550) S.138 Held Nr.186_EHS462	Aristophanes, *Women at the Assembly* (*Ecc*lesiazusai). 792
ALC. Nr.128	NIL RELIQUI.	Alc.(1550) S.139 Held Nr.191_EHS936	No Source
ALC. Nr.129	MALE PARTA, MALE DILABUNTUR.	Alc.(1550) S.140 Held Nr.183_EHS792	Aesop, *Fables* Nr. 7
ALC. Nr.130	SEMPER PRAESTO ESSE INFORTUNIA.	Alc.(1531) (C 4 b) Held Nr.188_EHS1120	*The Greek Anthology* IX 158
ALC. Nr.131	REMEDIA IN ARDVO MALA IN PRONO ESSE.	Alc.(1531) (E 5 b) Held Nr.189 _EHS1791	Homer, *The Iliad* IX 502ff, XIX 91ff
ALC. Nr.132	EX ARDVIS PERPETVUM NOMEN.	Alc.(1531) (B 2 b) Held Nr.16_EHS623	Homer, *The Iliad* II 308ff
ALC. Nr.133	EX LITTERARVM STUDIIS IMMORTALITATEM ACQUIRI.	Alc.(1531) (C b) Held Nr.20_EHS1795	Macrobius, *Saturnaria* I 8
ALC. Nr.134	TUMULUS IOANNIS GALEACIJ VICECOMITIS, PRIMI DUCIS MEDIOLAENSIS.	Alc.(1550) S.145 Held Nr.2_EHS1197	*The Greek Anthology* VII 73
ALC. Nr.135	OPTIMUS CIUIS.	Alc.(1550) S.146 Held Nr.14_EHS1254	Pliny, *The Natural History* XXII 6-12
ALC. Nr.136	STRENUORUM IMMORTALE NOMEN.	Alc.(1550) S.147 Held Nr.12_EHS1687	Homer, *The Iliad* X 219ff
ALC. Nr.137	NOBILES ET GENEROSI.	Alc.(1550) S.148 Held Nr.15_EHS1271	Thucydides, *A History of the Peloponnesian War* I 6
ALC. Nr.138	DUODECIM CERTAMINA HERCULIS.	Alc.(1550) S.149/150 Held Nr.17 1645	*The Greek Anthology* IV 92
ALC. Nr.139	IN NOTHOS.	No Citation	No Source
ALC. Nr.140	IMPARILITAS.	Alc.(1550) S.152 Held Nr.135_EHS780	Pindar, *Olympian Odes* II 95ff

ALC. Nr.141	IN DESCISCENTES.	Alc.(1550) S.153 Held Nr.134_EHS533	Erasmus *Adages* I 912
ALC. Nr.142	AEMULATIO IMPAR.	Alc.(1550) S.154 Held Nr.133_EHS787	Aristotle. *History of Animals* 609a; Alciato, *Parergon* VI 12
ALC. Nr.143	ALBUTII AD D. ALCIATUM, SUADENTEIS, ET DE TUMULTIBUS ITALICIS SE SUBUDUCAT, ET IN GALLIA PROFITEATUR.	Alc.(1531) B 5 Held Nr.5_EHS236	No Source
ALC. Nr.144	PRINCEPS SVBDITORVM INCOLUMITATEM PROCURANS.	Alc.(1531) D Held Nr.10_EHS1039	Pliny, *The Natural History* IX 20
ALC. Nr.145	IN SENATVM BONI PRINCIPIS.	Alc.(1550) S.160 Held Nr.114_EHS1669	Diodorus Siculus, *A History of the World* (*Bibliotheke Historike*) I 48, 6; Plutarch, *On Isis and Osiris* 10
ALC. Nr.146	CONSILIARII PRINCIPUM.	Alc.(1550) S.159 Held Nr.119_EHS992	Plutarch, *Symposiciaca* (*Quaestiones conviviales*) V 2
ALC. Nr.147	OPULENTIA TYRANNI PAUPERTAS SUBIECTORUM.	Alc.(1531) (D 2 b) Held Nr.120_EHS1355	No Source
ALC. Nr.148	QVOD NON CAPIT CHRISTVS RAPIT FISCUS.	Alc.(1550) S.161 Held Nr.9_EHS918	Aurelius. Victor, *On the origin of the Romans* (*De Romanae gentis origine*) 42, 21
ALC. Nr.149	PRINCIPIS CLEMENTIA.	Alc.(1550) S.162 Held Nr.46_EHS649	Suetonius, *The Lives of the Caesars*, Vespasian. 16
ALC. Nr.150	SALUS PUBLICA.	Alc.(1550) S.163 Held Nr.155_EHS1499	Aelian, *On the Characteristics of Animals* V 15
ALC. Nr.151	RESPUBLICA LEBERATA.	Alc.(1531) (E 7) Held Nr.192_EHS1157	Plutarch, *Research on Rome* (*Quaestiones Romanae*) 91
ALC. Nr.152	IN VITAM HVMANAM.	Alc.(1531) E 3 Held Nr.193_EHS460	Dio Cassius, A *Roman History* XLVII 25, 3
ALC. Nr.153	AERE QVANDOQVE SALVTEM REDIMENDAM.	Alc.(1531) (C 8 b) Held Nr.197_EHS397	Pliny, *The Natural History* XXXII 26
ALC. Nr.154	CVM LARVIS NON	Alc.(1531) (D 3	*The Greek Anthology* XVI 4

	LVCTANDVM.	b) Held Nr.194_EHS1581	
ALC. Nr.155	DE MORTE ET AMORE.	Alc.(1550) S.168 Held Nr.195_EHS1582	No Source
ALC. Nr.156	IN FORMOSAM FATO PRAEREPTAM.	Alc.(1550) S.169 Held Nr.196_EHS1248	No Source
ALC. Nr.157	IN MORTEM PRAEPROPERAM.	Alc.(1500) S.170 Held Nr.199_EHS1777	Valeriano, Hieroglyphica. XXV 10
ALC. Nr.158	TERMINUS.	Alc.(1550) S.171 Held Nr.198_EHS1688	Erasmus, *Letters.* 1. 8
ALC. Nr.159	OPULENTE HAEREDITAS.	Alc.(1531) (A 6) Held Nr.49_EHS259	Homer *The Iliad* XVII 1ff
ALC. Nr.160	AMICITIA ETIAM POST MORTEM DVRANS.	Alc.(1531) B2 Held Nr.47_EHS990	*The Greek Anthology* IX 231
ALC. Nr.161	MVTVVM AVXILIVM.	Alc.(1531) (C 2 b) Held Nr.48_EHS1491	*The Greek Anthology* IX 12
ALC. Nr.162	AVXILIVM NVNQVAM DEFICIENS.	Alc.(1500) S.175 Held Nr.50_EHS1782	*The Greek Anthology* IX 42
ALC. Nr.163	GRATIAE.	Alc.(1550) S.177 Held Nr.132_EHS933	Hesiod, *The Thegony* 907ff
ALC. Nr.164	IN DETRACTORES.	Alc.(1550) S.178 Held Nr.131_EHS563	No Source
ALC. Nr.165	INANIS IMPETUS.	Alc.(1531) D Held Nr.121_EHS1381	Erasmus, *Adages* IV 672
ALC. Nr.166	ALIQVID MALI PROPTER UICINUM MALUM.	Alc.(1531) (D 7 b) Held Nr.122_EHS684	Aesop, *Fables* Nr. 422
ALC. Nr.167	IN EVM QVI TRVCVLENTIA SUORUM PERIERIT.	Alc.(1550) S.181 Held Nr.139_EHS1682	*The Greek Anthology* VII 216

ALC. Nr.168	IN DONA HOSTIUM.	Alc.(1531) (C 7 b) Held Nr.127_EHS763	No Source
ALC. Nr.169	A MINIMIS QVIQVE TIMENDUM.	Alc.(1550) S.183 Held Nr.190_EHS715	Zenobius., *Proverbs* I 209
ALC. Nr.170	OBNOXIA INFIRMITAS.	Alc.(1550) S.184 Held Nr.128_EHS1517	No Source
ALC. Nr.171	VEL POST MORTEM FORMIDOLOSI.	Alc.(1531) (B 7 b) Held Nr.129_EHS1692	Oppianus, *On Hunting* (*Cynegetica*) III 262fff
ALC. Nr.172	IVSTA VINDICTA.	Alc.(1531) (D 7) Held Nr.130_EHS878	Homer *The Odyssey* IX 105ff
ALC. Nr.173	IVSTA VLTIO.	Alc.(1531) (C 7 b) Held Nr.126_EHS1063	*The Greek Anthology* IX 339
ALC. Nr.174	PAREM DELINQVENTI ET SUASORIS CULPAM ESSE.	Alc.(1531) (D 5 b) Held Nr.125_EHS562	Aesop, *Fables* Nr. 289
ALC. Nr.175	ALIVS PECCAT ALIVS PLECTITUR.	Alc.(1550) S.189 Held Nr.137_EHS1684	Plato, *Repulbic* 469E
ALC. Nr.176	INSANI GLADIUS.	Alc.(1531) E Held Nr.152_EHS418	Sophocles, *Ajax* 14ff
ALC. Nr.177	PAX.	Alc.(1531) (C 3 b) Held Nr.153_EHS1489	*The Greek Anthology* IX 285
ALC. Nr.178	EX BELLO PAX.	Alc.(1531) (B b) Held Nr.154_EHS840	No Source
ALC. Nr.179	EX PACE VBERTAS.	Alc.(1531) (E 8 b) Held Nr.56_EHS872	Aristotle. *History of Animals* V 8,542b; *Plutarch, Resorcefullness of Animals* (*Sollertia animalium*) 35; Plutarch, *On Fortune of the Romans* (*Fortuna Romanorum*) 9
ALC. Nr.180	DOCTOS DOCTIS OBLOQUI NEFAS ESSE.	Alc.(1531) (E 6) Held Nr.18_EHS1651	*The Greek Anthology* IX 122
ALC. Nr.181	ELOQVENTIA FORTITVDINE PRAESTANTIOR.	Alc.(1550) S.195 Held Nr.19_EHS315	Aristides., .*Panathenaic Oration and In Defence of oratory* XL 4

ALC. Nr.182	FACUNDIA DIFFICILIS.	Alc.(1500) S.196 Held Nr.53_EHS1794	Homer *The Odyssey* X 302-306
ALC. Nr.183	ANTIQUISSIMA QUAEQUE COMMENTITIA. APOLOGESIS.	Alc.(1550) S.197 Held Nr.21_EHS814	Heraclitus, *Allegories of Homeric Poems* (*Allegorica Homericae*) 64ff
ALC. Nr.184	INSIGNIA POETARUM.	Alc.(1550) S.198 Held Nr.22_EHS932	Plato, *Phaidrus* 84E
ALC. Nr.185	MUSICAM DIIS CURAE ESSE.	Alc.(1550) S.199 Held Nr.51_EHS1620	*The Greek Anthology* VI 54
ALC. Nr.186	LITTERA OCCIDIT, SPIRITUS VIUIFICAT.	Alc.(1550) S.200 Held Nr.54_EHS1291	2nd Corinthians 3:6.
ALC. Nr.187	DICTA SEPTEM SAPIENTUM.	Alc.(1531) (C 3 b) Held Nr.147 _EHS1789	*The Greek Anthology* IX 366
ALC. Nr.188	SVBMOVENDAM IGNORANTIAM.	Alc.(1531) C5 Held Nr.146_EHS454	Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannous* 391ff
ALC. Nr.189	MENTEM, NON FORMAM, PLUS POLLERE.	Alc.(1531) E 4 Held Nr.165_EHS163 3	Phaedrus, *Fables:* Appendix I 7
ALC. Nr.190	DIVES INDOCTVS.	Alc.(1531) D2 Held Nr.80_EHS966	Antisthenes, *Fragments* (*Fragmenta*); Galen, *Protrepticus.* VI
ALC. Nr.191	IN FIDEM UXORIAM.	Alc.(1531) (A 5 b) Held Nr.79_EHS659	Ovid, *Metamorphoses* X 644ff
ALC. Nr.192	REVERENTIAM IN MATRIMONIO REQVITI.	Alc.(1531) (B 8 b) Held Nr.81_EHS179	Basil of Caesarea, *Hexaemeron.* VII
ALC. Nr.193	IN FERTILITATEM[FOECU NDITATEM] SIBI IPSI DAMNOSAM.	Alc.(1531) C 3 Held Nr.74_EHS861	*The Greek Anthology* IX 3
ALC. Nr.194	AMOR FILIORVM.	Alc.(1531) D 5 Held Nr.73_EHS1703	*The Greek Anthology* IX 95
ALC. Nr.195	PIETAS FILIORVM IN PARENTES.	Alc.(1531) F b Held Nr.78_EHS1749	*The Greek Anthology* IX 163
ALC. Nr.196	MVLIERIS FAMAM NON FORMAM UULGATAM ESSE OPORTERE.	Alc.(1550) S.211 Held Nr.76_EHS1701	Pausanias, *Description of Greece* VI 24; Plutarch, *Marital Precepts* (*Conjungalia Praecepta*) 32; Plutarch,

			On Isis and Osiris . 75; Plutarch, On Women's Vitures (*De Mulierum Virtutibus*) A. A.Is. 75,
ALC. Nr.197	IN PUDORIS STATUAM.	Alc.(1550) S.212 Held Nr.82_EHS1708	Pausanias, *Description of Greece* III 20, 10
ALC. Nr.198	NUPTA CONTAGIOSO.	Alc.(1550) S.213 Held Nr.200-202 _EHS215	Virgil, *Aeneid* VIII 485ff
ALC. Nr.199	CUPRESSUS.	Alc.(1550) S.214 Held Nr.205/206 _EHS219	Paulus Diaconus, "Epitome Sexti Pompeii Festi" 56L; Plutarch, *Phocion* 23
ALC. Nr.200	QUIRCUS.	Alc.(1550) S.215 Held Nr.215_EHS244	No Source
ALC. Nr.201	SALIX.	Alc.(1550) S.216 Held Nr.213_EHS254	Homer *The Odyssey* X 510
ALC. Nr.202	ABIES.	Alc.(1550) S.217 Held Nr.214_EHS252	Theophrates. *Inquiry into Plants* (*Historia Plantarum*) I 9, 3. III 3
ALC. Nr.203	PICEA.	Alc.(1550) S.218 Held Nr.207_EHS239	Theophrates. *Inquiry into Plants* (*Historia Plantarum*) I 2, c. pl. I 2, 2
ALC. Nr.204	COTONEA.	Alc.(1550) S.219 Held Nr.217_EHS275	Pliny, *The Natural History* XV 116; Plutarch, *Research on Rome* (*Quaestiones Romanae*) 65; Plutarch, *Marital Precepts* (*Conjungalia Praecepta*) 1
ALC. Nr.205	HEDERA.	Alc.(1550) S.220 Held Nr.216_EHS219	Horace, *Carmina*. I 1 29f; Plutarch, *Symposiciaca* (*Quaestiones conviviales*) III 2
ALC. Nr.206	ILEX.	Alc.(1550) S.221 Held Nr.208_EHS238	Livy, *The History of Rome*. X 46, 3
ALC. Nr.207	MALUS MEDICA.	Alc.(1550) S.222 Held Nr.209_EHS251	Theophrates. *Inquiry into Plants* (*Historia Plantarum*) IV 4, 2
ALC. Nr.208	BUXUS.	Alc.(1550) S.224 Held Nr.211_EHS232	Theophrates. *Inquiry into Plants* (*Historia Plantarum*) I 9, 3
ALC. Nr.209	AMYGDALUS.	Alc.(1550) S.223 Held Nr.212_EHS249	Pliny, *The Natural History* XVI 103.
ALC. Nr.210	MORUS.	Alc.(1550) S.225 Held Nr.203/204 _EHS202	Pliny, *The Natural History* XVI 102.
ALC. Nr.211	LAURUS.		Caesar, *Civil Wars* (*De Bello Civile*). III

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71, 3; Plutarch, *Pompeius* 41
Ovid, *Heroides* IX 64