

**Theory of Civil Society Development within state-society synergy**

**A Case study of Uzbekistan**

**by**

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## ABSTRACT

This is a summary of the research that devoted to illuminate the theory of civil society development in transition country Uzbekistan. It is based on extensive literature review upon the theory of civil society and its contemporary role in developmental studies and governance. Theoretical ground for the case study and research questions was developed from; a) the classical narrations of state-society relations and role of the modern state vis-à-vis civil society b) impact of the social capital theory and c) state-society synergy as a conceptual reconciliation and precondition for civil society development in developing countries.

Main part of the research begins from Chapter 2, where concept of the civil society is discussed through historical period of its understanding to the gradual expansion of it into the developing countries. Literature review of civil society concept aims here to draw important criteria in order to clarify why and how *neo-liberal concept* of civil society has been raised from. Another essential part of Chapter 2 is that exposing *conceptual travel* of civil society from one value to the different according to the time and space and the recent one is social capital theory. The next is Chapter 3, where discussion is taken to next step where civil society concept has been interpreted within the concept of *Social Capital*. In this concept civic associations were seen similar as Tocquevillian interpretation but in the context of the increasing role of modern states and institutions. In this discussion Social Capital concept is brought as an attempt of *reconciliation* between increasing role of the State and Civil society. P. Evans successfully took this debate in to another level by introducing *State-Society Synergy* that is the concept which promises prosperity for civil society and efficiency of developmental policies by the state. This concept has been developed from developing countries' case studies and it provides with clear examples of beneficial relations that State and Civil society could arrange. Since this research's argument poses synergy environment as precondition to the development of civil society, target of analysis will be the quality of the state-society relations

in developing countries.

Case study is started from Chapter 4, and it begins with explanation of *transitional period* of Uzbekistan from communist regime in order to have general picture about introduced socio-economic and political reforms in the country. After that, in following sections, it is discussed how civil society concept has been introduced to Uzbekistan, and its expansion in the country. In this chapter author criticized scholars' view that civil society is *absent* in Uzbekistan referring to the decline of NGOs. Historical evidences show that in Uzbekistan there were some 'patterns' of civil society development within the context of both Tocquevillian autonomous civic community and modern civil society representing social movements for modernization, reforms in state affairs. However, civil society concept introduced to Uzbekistan in the form of non-governmental organizations did not find its roots in the country and in Chapter 4 it is observed in detail to show the reasons both from *foreign aid* perspective and *local perception* of civil society. Chapter 5 starts with illustration of *pre-existing relations* between the public – private spheres or state and society. In order to discuss this issue research looked in to historical evolution of state-society relations from the period of Soviet regime. Tracing back the history brought up interesting insights into the current structure and process of state-society relations. There appeared two distinct view; centralized modern *state vs. patronage clan* politics, which is totally unacceptable from the theories of Western scholars. Nevertheless, this chapter goes to the detail explanation for such unusual reality. This chapter also, deals with the questions of International intervention into state-society relations in Uzbekistan and it intends to express that such intervention was not as successful as in other developing countries (may it be Latin American, Asian countries). Finally, last Chapter 6, is the main conclusion of the Dissertation. It consists of research analysis, meaning final overview in order to put it in logical stream so that it helps to construct research findings among extensive data and reviews. Research findings are explained by additional paragraphs and it is continued through implications on further

studies.

Transition of civil society concept in early 1990s, has been accompanied with several other issues such as transition from Soviet regime, democratization, decentralization and one even can find ironically Westernization of Uzbekistan. However, what was introduced at that moment can be simply phrased as 'proxy-NGOs' which raised the wonder as if these NGOs are really capable of bringing those promises. After several years of 'NGO promotion' projects, scholars citing to decreasing number of these new 'entities' of democracy came to general conclusion that "the basis for creating civil society" or "a framework conducive to establishing a civil society remains largely non-existent" in Uzbekistan (Polat 1999, p.135; Kangas D 1995, p.271; Carley 1995, p.292).

What was the reason behind these unsuccessful transition of civil society has been acute topic of discussions among many foreign scholars, donor institutions as well as Uzbek scholars of Uzbekistan (Adamson 2002, pp.137-144; Alimov 1996, pp.281-296; Stevens 2005, pp.281-296; 2007, pp.49 - 64; 2004, pp.49 - 64; Sievers 2002, pp.91-158; Pottenger R 2004, pp.55-77; Polat 1999, pp.137-144; Seiple 2005, pp.245-259; Suda 2005, pp.335-365; Giffen & Buxton 2004; Ilkhamov 2005, pp.297-317). Each of them has contributed to answer the question why civil society is in decline in Uzbekistan, but few gave suggestion how to develop it.

There are extensive numbers of literatures about the regime in Uzbekistan which discussed transition process from authoritarian regime and from command economy after the collapse of Soviet Union. It shows that lack of political will within the government and desire to move toward actual liberalizations in Uzbekistan (Abdullaev 2005, pp.267-296; Adams 2004, pp.93-119; Collins 2002, pp.137-152; Dadabaev 2007, pp.407-428; Djumaev 2001, pp.320-344; Ilkhamov 2007, pp.65-84; Kandiyoti 2007, pp.31-48; Naumkin 2006, pp.127-140; Kangas D 1994, pp.178-182). The common views among public officials are that liberalization

is not necessary for successful development and it can be dangerous for domestic stability, because society is not ready for being liberal. Not being ready for liberalizations is partially true due to the impact of 'path dependency' meaning that former legacy of Soviet regime has been deeply penetrated in Uzbekistan. In Soviet regime, lack of the private interest within society which could bring alternative thinking and criticism has been generated by imposing communal interest for public good – and that public good was shaped by the Communist Party branches and incorporated Public Associations. Pottenger (2004, p.58) described it as:

*“One consequence of the Soviet attempt to overcome the public–private dichotomy was to render irrelevant the raison d’être of civil society: the maintenance and fostering of a tension between the contrary and competing values of private interest and public good. Since the claims of private interest and public good had become synonymous according to the Soviet model, the tension between the two dissolved.”*

Such legacy had led people to accept the centralized state as a sole agent of reforms, decisions, production, distribution and policy making. The regime has been strong enough to keep its legacy for 75 years intact which today is refurnished under modern democratic dresses of independent country. Therefore, sudden change of current regime or its values is not an option and such change of the regime does not automatically bring a democratic one<sup>1</sup>. Although this kind of view furnishes the state as strong dominant institutions, research data revealed rather different reality. According to Bartol'd, before the 20<sup>th</sup> century clans and larger tribes were the predominant mode of political and social organization in Central Asia, because, no modern state bureaucracy or direct states rule existed prior to the Soviet Union. Only since Central Asian republics were incorporated into USSR, modern state backed by Moscow attempted to eradicate clan system. However, such policy has failed due to those inadvertently

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<sup>1</sup> Colorful revolutions resulted in overthrow of former authoritarian regimes did not automatically brought democratic governance. Instead, it resulted in further destabilization as a matter of choice for the Western support (U.S., EU and other Western countries) or former Communist regimes' support (Russia, China).

created Soviet institutions that clan networks could use to persist. Regardless of periodical purges from Moscow, clans have been able use social inter-ethnic instabilities, corrupted party officials and lack of close monitoring from Moscow to their own benefit to reassert their political interest.

So, since mid-1990s, Collins (2004, pp.224-261) argues, that the clans re-appeared within the emergence of an informal regime of clan politics in Central Asian republics including post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Her argument is based on few propositions; one is that clans can persist under strong states, especially when they serve as passive resistance, but with access to institutional channels to survive. Another important proposition of her is that convergence of regimes to informal clan politics makes clans as the primary source of political and economic power. In such case, informal networks, clans pervade the regime and its institutions which it means that clan politics will inhibit consolidation of any type of regime be it democratic or authoritarian (Collins 2004, pp.235-236). As an evidence of that, Ilkhamov mentioned about a new type of patronage network which has came into existence as an expansion of patronage networks around key administrative departments in the central government of Uzbekistan. The main arena of inter-clan competition became a struggle not between regional factions, but between patronage groupings associated with security, law enforcement, tax collection, custom, finances and export procurement departments of central government (2007, p.76). .

Few scholars came up with some suggestions to develop civil society regardless of the regime type in Uzbekistan. Sievers (2002, pp.91-158) implied that Mahalla could be possible space for the development of traditional civil society if proper measures are taken, since it was most autonomous and self-governed apolitical associational life in pre-Soviet period in this region. It is unclear that as if Sievers prefers absolute autonomy of this space from the penetration of state through modern public services. If so, he did not provide with the solution of these two incompatible status quo; one is the autonomy of associational life with private

particular social services and another is dependence over formal nation-wide public services.

Ilkhamov (2005, pp.297-317) gave his comprehensive viewpoint on possible direction for the Poland's experience. He suggested that "... program of evolution should be addressed to independent public opinion and not just to the totalitarian authorities. Instead of acting as a prompter to the government, telling it how to improve itself, this program should tell society how to act. As far as the government is concerned, it can have no clearer counsel [advise] than that provided by social pressure from below" (Bernhard 1993, p.314; Michnik 1976, p.274; Ilkhamov 2005, p.315). However, the situation in 1980s of Poland and rest of the countries in Eastern Europe is different from the present situation of Uzbekistan. Collapse of Soviet Union was major interest of the West and it did utmost assistance to the reviving opposition groups, leaders and grassroots against socialist regime in Eastern Europe. But neither West nor local population are interested in collapse of Uzbek regime. [after collapse of USSR, different priorities have appeared for the West and U.S. global politics]. The West and especially U.S. considers the regime not as a threat or competitor like former USSR but ally in combat against terrorism (Seiple 2005, pp.245-259). Moreover, it is more preferable if the region is stable and reciprocal with the U.S.

The Uzbek regime's legitimacy rested in peoples' desire for peace, order and stability in the country. For local population, [society has the perception that ...] social movements or revolutions give no guarantee for democratic change as it did not for neighboring countries. Moreover, President Karimov (1990 - present) has ensured society that government has chosen socially protected market economy meaning 'social democracy' and society should not necessarily be civil but being 'decent' society is what the country requires (Pottenger R 2004, pp.55-77). In brief, I may conclude that the public sphere and social perception is under such strong intellectual and political doctrine, but the citizens did not choose for contradictions with

it, instead as Radio Liberty (2010b) has mentioned they are voting with their feet<sup>2</sup>.

Analysis of above mentioned arguments, draws following framework. There are two levels of state-society relations in Uzbekistan. In lower level state-society relations are based on top-down and zero-sum approach. In higher level there is long time existence of state-elite synergy under the 'packed stability' (Luong Jones 2002, pp. 25-102). State-elite synergy exists in every level of political system, administration, decision making and implementation of developmental policies. Such environment actually is the reason for the division of state-society relations in to low and high levels. As a result, "clans' elites" became mediator between public and private sphere through informal channels.

Westerns scholars, developmental institutions did not consider such informal sphere of state-society relations in Uzbekistan; instead, they paid attention only to the formal side of political system. The main reason is that Western understanding of political system always insists on building formal institutions, transformation of primordial kinship, and patronage network relations into formal procedures, norms and institutions. It ignores and opposes modern institutions and procedures to such informal networks and associations. For instance, Edward condemns such Weberian understanding of informal institutions, because in reality, clans and resemble informal channels have been essential part of social and political structure within the transition period of Central Asian countries (Collins 2004, pp.235-236; Edward 2005, p.233).

Additional comment is that donors approach in civil society development programs were based on zero-sum approach which means empowering the society at the expense of minimizing the state. It assumes that state and society relations are counterproductive and dichotomist. The nature of the civil society development programs being zero-sum can be

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<sup>2</sup> Some 3,200 Uzbek citizens receive USA Green card each year leaving Uzbekistan permanently or temporary and over 8 million people have left as a immigrants to the Russia and Kazakhstan for seeking employment.

found in total picture of democracy assistance and decentralization initiative projects in Uzbekistan (Adamson 2002, pp.177-206; Noori 2006, pp.533-549). In brief, those projects insisting on that civil society should be independent from the state, implies that state and society stand up for different values whereas the space they share is public sphere. Probably in case of Uzbekistan it is true that existing state-society relations are not mutually enforcing or not positive-sum relations yet, but rather than decreasing this gap between state and society, donors' intervention had generated government suspicion over private sphere.

As a result of such analysis, and review, we have proposed following research findings:

**1. Major factor of civil society decay is *weakness* or *lack* of commitment of the state to direct informal state-elite relations into public interest.**

Internal structure of state power and process of decision making have been penetrated by the 'clans' – powerful and influential local elites grown to represent their clans in national level. This process of state-elite relations is informal and invisible to the public, but it is called as 'pact' meaning that resources are allocated, distributed within the negotiation pacts with those elites. State *weakness* is that rather than directing those private interests in to public ends by collaborative relations, it has chosen regime's durability and stability by complying with them. As a result non-clan portion of society either joining radical religious groups and associations or looking for possibility to build their own small clans within competitive clannish polity. *Lack* of commitment of the state is partially based on "fast and loose" international support for transformational reforms in Uzbekistan and lack of expertise on possible mechanism of transformation.

**2. Civil society concept introduced to Uzbekistan is *impediment* for building state-society synergy.**

Since the research is constructed based on theory of state-society synergy, it considers such interaction as a precondition to develop civil society. On the one hand, introduced concept of civil society is incompatible to the socio-economical environment in Uzbekistan, such as lack of clear public-private distinction, and unequal size of occupied space and uneven number of actors in allocated spaces from both sides (narrow circle of state-elite combination occupies large part of the socio-economical and political space while large portion of society outside of state-elite channels have to remain in small part of the space). On the other hand, introduction of neo-liberal concept of civil society was concentrated on liberalization and transformation of regime via articulation of bottom-up social demands and pressure upon the state. In order to achieve this, the space occupied by civil society has to be independent, autonomous from state intervention. Government of Uzbekistan has accepted such status for civil society by enacting Law on NGOs in 1999 which stipulated that neither state nor civil society organizations should intervene into each others' affairs. According to that law government can intervene for the sake of public order, to preserve social justice and protect public interest, but civil society has no justification to do so. Besides, the shared space by both state and civil society is a public sphere; therefore it is not possible not to intervene.

But contemporary civil society definition and concept approved by Uzbek government is good justification not to deal with social interests, not to assimilate alternative thinking or not to facilitate private interests of social forces in to civic ends. Government intervention in to the private sphere does not deal with those aspirations but only under the values of public order, social justice and public interest measured by the state. Therefore, status of 'non-intervention' and 'autonomous' between state and civil society in fact isolates both public and private sphere from being potential synergies.

Based on abovementioned findings, this research aims at scholars' attention to be directed toward following question: Why bottom-up social pressure and demand cannot be

articulated within general society up on the state. It is not possible due to the following factors:

a) In Uzbekistan, primordial traditional clannish and kinship bonds are survived and remained strongly persistent to any external intervention. But it does not necessarily means that there is no civil society in the country. It means that clans and patronage networks do not go against each other because of the same religion, same culture and same values shared over centuries, unless there is no mutual agreement among elite leaders.<sup>3</sup>

b) Because of the long period existence of clans, Uzbekistan could not develop equal citizenship status. May be it could develop citizenship if Russian colonial policies and especially communism ideology did not let primordial social structure to flourish within the socialist institutions by gaining more power.

Therefore, neo-liberal concept of civil society concentrated on NGOs' development cannot have any positive future, and even may undermine possible emergence of country specific civil society through emancipation of state-society synergy in Uzbekistan.

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<sup>3</sup> During the Russian Empire's modernization policy in the region, several intellectuals and elites have joined in order to fight against despotic monarchial system which did not support modern education, modern industrialization and reforms. The reason is that the political system was consisted of khanates, monarchies, but the government of Uzbekistan provided an access to all major clan elites in decision-making and resource mobilization within the country. Since, the authority is shared within the government, consisting clan elites within the same institution choose stability and equal share.

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## Acronyms

<b>ADB</b>	<b>ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK</b>
<b>AGN</b>	<b>ADVOCACY GROUPS AND NETWORK</b>
<b>CBO</b>	<b>COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>CDD</b>	<b>COMMUNITY DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT</b>
<b>CIA</b>	<b>THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b>
<b>CP</b>	<b>COMMUNISTIC PARTY</b>
<b>CSO</b>	<b>CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>DVO</b>	<b>DEVELOPMENT ORIENTED ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>EBRD</b>	<b>EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT</b>
<b>E.U.</b>	<b>EUROPEAN UNION</b>
<b>FSU</b>	<b>FORMER SOVIET UNION</b>
<b>GDP</b>	<b>GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT</b>
<b>GONGO</b>	<b>GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED NGO</b>
<b>GRO</b>	<b>GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>IA</b>	<b>IRRIGATION AGENCY</b>
<b>ICG</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP</b>
<b>IMF</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL METALWORKERS FEDERATION</b>
<b>INGO</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL NGO</b>
<b>JICA</b>	<b>JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY</b>
<b>KGB</b>	<b>KOMITET GOSUDARSTVENNOI BEZOPASTNOSTI (The Committee For State Security)</b>
<b>MDG</b>	<b>MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL</b>
<b>MI</b>	<b>MAHALLA INITIATIVE INITIATIVE</b>
<b>NANGOUz</b>	<b>NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OF UZBEKISTAN</b>
<b>NGO</b>	<b>NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>NPM</b>	<b>NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT</b>
<b>NPO</b>	<b>NOON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>PA</b>	<b>PUBLIC ASSOCIATION</b>
<b>PM</b>	<b>PRIME MINISTER</b>
<b>RSFSR</b>	<b>RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATIVE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC</b>
<b>SME</b>	<b>SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE</b>
<b>SOE</b>	<b>STATE ORGANIZED ENTERPRISE</b>
<b>SOROS</b>	<b>FOUNDATION OF GEORGE SOROS</b>
<b>SU</b>	<b>SOVIET UNION</b>

<b>UN</b>	<b>UNITED NATION</b>
<b>UNESCO</b>	<b>UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>UNDAF</b>	<b>UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK</b>
<b>UNDP</b>	<b>UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM</b>
<b>U.S.</b>	<b>UNITED STATES</b>
<b>USAID</b>	<b>UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT</b>
<b>USSR</b>	<b>UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS</b>
<b>WB</b>	<b>WORLD BANK</b>
<b>WHO</b>	<b>WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>WTO</b>	<b>WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION</b>

## **Chapter 1 Introduction**

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### **1.1 Background**

The research is dealing with issues of civil society building in Uzbekistan. Since this issue has become a popular phrase within Central Asia, especially during the transition process of Uzbekistan, there were several successful attempts to describe, analyze and reveal problematic factors. Bearing these works in mind, I hope to contribute to this ongoing debate by exploring my original point of view on civil society development in this country. In this section I describe background of the research which will illustrate brief circumstances that necessitated civil society building and its present assessment.

#### ***Uzbekistan: Post Soviet country in transition.***

Almost two decades past since Uzbekistan became independent from Soviet rule in 1991. Within these years Uzbekistan has been considered as transition country toward free market economy and democratic system of governance. Such anticipation was based on several factors; a) lessons from destructive and fragileness of previous authoritarian communist regime,

b) pledge of the Uzbek government to engage in democratization process by joining the United Nations and other International Organizations in 1990s, c) deliver structural adjustment aids, conditioning institution building and liberalization toward free market and democracy during 1994-2005. American politicians and scholars believed that those factors should have motivated the transition from authoritarian regime toward liberalism, development of free market economy and civil society building.

Since the beginning of nation state building process, almost all of the countries in Central Asia remained in their old existing ruling institutions, as long as the collapse of Soviet Union did not mean collapse of existing regime in each country. Instead, all the same institutions which were established and used by Moscow to control political, economical and social life of the country remained as necessary pillars of nation state building.<sup>1</sup> Besides, the time of crisis and priority for the peace and security in the early 1990s, made it necessary to have strong state as well as to remain existing experienced cadres and institutions to perform reformations.<sup>2</sup> However, according to foreign experts, the same old institutions, style of governance and cadres made transition slow and dead end (Kandiyoti 2002, pp. 279-297, 2003, pp. 143-162; Adamson 2002, pp.177-206; Akiner 2003, pp.518-519; Rumor 2005, pp.10-21).

Although, certain authors discuss the ‘puzzling success’ of Uzbek economy comparing to few neighboring countries<sup>3</sup>, overall assessment is dominance of state monopoly in all spheres of life. Although there are legislative, executive and judicial authority enriched with multiple political parties for the balance of power, pre-existing state-society relations and ruling institutions are seen as window dressing by promising developmental policies which in reality

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<sup>1</sup> J. Giffen, L. Earle and Ch. Buxton 2005 *The Development of Civil Society in Central Asia*. U.K.:INTRACT, pp 49-50

<sup>2</sup> There is a famous motto repeatedly and proudly said by president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov “Do not ruin old house unless you have built a new one”. It represents the idea that old house, old institutions old methods are all important and necessary until certain and benign replacements occurs.

<sup>3</sup> See detail explanation observed by Terry McKinley. 2010 “The Puzzling Success of Uzbekistan’s Heterodox Development” from [<http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/file56073.pdf>] p2

did not bring visible reforms toward expected liberalizations<sup>4</sup>. Instead, as international watching institutions criticize that Uzbek government still pursues for concentration of public authority in the hands of a central government that ignores evolved social unrest toward authoritarian rule, massive emigration and poverty, increasing number of asylum seekers in abroad and most importantly social distrust in government.<sup>5</sup>

Nevertheless, in the early 1990s civil society was introduced to Uzbekistan by international donors' as a part of liberalization programs. The aim of the donors was to enable society to articulate its interests, to shape civic values as replacement of patrimonial relations<sup>6</sup> and to generate collective action for protection of those values. Besides, civil society organizations were predicted to play an important role in transition through generation of social demand for reforms and development of awareness within the society on public affairs so state-society relations could be reconsidered for new creative directions. Although the aim and hope from civil society building was strong enough to facilitate massive flow of financial aids to this sector, its implementation did not approve expectations.

### **Building civil society in Uzbekistan.**

As it comes to the transition of civil society in Uzbekistan, the concept's interpretation varies in terms of political, social and cultural dimension in the country. Majority believed that "the conventional definition of civil society put forward by American political theorists in the early 1990s and adopted by Washington was the outgrowth of Western political thought"<sup>7</sup>. It defined civil society as space where "free, self-determining individuality

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<sup>4</sup> Collins Kathleen 2002 "Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia" *Journal of Democracy*, 13(3): 137-152; Ilkhamov, 2002 "Controllable Democracy in Uzbekistan," *Middle East Report* No.222, pp. 8-10; Kangas, 1994 "Uzbekistan: Evolving Authoritarianism" *Current History*, 93(582 ):178-82

<sup>5</sup> International Crisis Group, "Central Asia: Uzbekistan at 10—Repression and Instability," p8; Polity IV Project, "Polity IV Country Report 2003: Uzbekistan".

<sup>6</sup> Ilkhamov A, 2007 "Neo-patrimonialism, interest groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the governance system in Uzbekistan", *Central Asian Survey*, 26(1): 65-84

<sup>7</sup> Chris Seiple 2005 Uzbekistan: Civil Society in the Heartland *Orbis* 49 (2): 245-259

sets forth its claims for satisfaction of its wants and personal autonomy.”<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, it is a “realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules, affording individual opportunities to participate in multiple associations and informal networks at multiple levels of society.”<sup>9</sup>

Indeed, the claim for civil society proposed to Uzbekistan was based on Western political thought, assuming that “civil society helps to generate a transition from authoritarian rule....deepens and consolidates democracy once it is established.”<sup>10</sup> Because, where authoritarian rule has tended to be highly “personalistic” and “neo-patrimonial” – the real impetus for democratic change tends to originate outside the regime in the mobilization of civil society.<sup>11</sup> Such understanding was developed to undermine constant emphasize of literatures given to the primary role on elites in leading, crafting, or imposing transitions. It is important to stress how crucial the role of commoners has been which was organized and mobilized through civil society in the end of 1980s in Eastern Europe. The idea of civil society building and its support by the developmental aid in Uzbekistan deserves considerable attention in this perspective.

The first reason is that civil society transition in to Uzbekistan based on above mentioned American conception is considered as irrelevant. Because, pre-existing soviet type Public Associations (PAs - GONGOs) and ‘traditional civil society’ still have certain role and it shapes contemporary perception of civil society in this country. Moreover, civil society building and its role in the country is subject to the dichotomist authoritarian state-society relations, which has impact on – whether it is western or traditional conception – the development of civil society.

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<sup>8</sup> Adam B. Seligman, 1992 *The Idea of Civil Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Larry Diamond, 1994 “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3): 14–15.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid* p28

The second reason is the lack of legal or democratic channels for the expression of social discontent. Control over CSOs (civil society organizations), window dressing political parties, censorship in mass media and lack of other alternative means of secular civic involvement in public sphere paving the way for emergence of non-constitutional opposition like Islamic radical groups, or attempt of religious associational life to establish social mobilization from below.

The **first reason** was not apparent until scholars and practitioners engaged in this field realized the dilemmas of developmental aid on western type NGOs in Uzbekistan. Since 1990s' international aid, nearly 3500 NGOs were established and sponsored by USAID, EBRD, UNDP and other donor countries. In addition, there were nearly 20 international NGOs actively networking with local NGOs through various trainings, seminars and financial supports. Local NGOs were mainly non-membership NGOs (managed and run by the single owner) or with few paid staffs to accomplish developmental projects. Initial target of local NGOs was to introduce American politics, culture, liberal values and notion of civil society through educational projects. This stage gradually evolved to the process of 'civic' culture development in Uzbekistan. Donors were inclined to believe that Uzbekistan has ground and values of civil society.

However, the government of Uzbekistan both conservative elites and nationalistic intellectuals looked at these events with suspicion, dislike and sometimes open criticism. Especially, the influence of globalization, introduction of market economy, and NGOs activities in the country were propagated as raising poisonous alien culture to Uzbek 'Eastern' traditions and values. In the midst of such suspicion and dislike for NGOs activities (financed by Donors); there were colorful revolutions one after another (in 2003 (Rose-Georgia), 2004 (Orange - Ukraine) and 2005 (Tulip - Kyrgyzstan) which ended with the change of regime) in these post-Soviet countries.

Such destabilization and massive social mobilization in neighboring countries and former Soviet regimes have alarmed Uzbeki government to take drastic precautions. The term non-government was seen as anti-government, and the tension between NGOs and government became very high. In order to ensure tight control, the NGOs were integrated in to an umbrella association called “National Association of NGOs” to comply their activities with government policies and tighten their movement within the country. More drastic measures were taken by criminalization of NGOs relations with foreign developmental institutions in terms of treason or even espionage against Uzbekistan if any valuable secret information was passed by.

As a result, international donors had no choice but to look for alternative agents for aid projects. It required a greater awareness among donors of the need to engage with social systems already present, which were more familiar to local inhabitants than proxy NGOs. One alternative choice was social and public associations inherited from past regime but re-invented in new terms after independence. Those institutions were remedies of Moscow reign for ideology expansion, politicization of private life to comply with communistic discourse and control intelligentsia in favor of regime consolidation in colonial countries. After independence, their role was remained as it was; only financially they had to search for other sources than public budget. Because of budget cuts in to social institutions during privatization and transition, Public Associations receive only salary from government while they have to finance social activities from the donations of private sector. International donors’ attitude was changed toward these PAs after NGOs were criticized. Donors began to find ways to involve such PAs in to grant projects and respectively it was favorite relationship for PAs, except that donors had to comply with pro-government discourse.

The same issue is relative to the case of ‘traditional civil society’. The imposition of western civil society concept to the country of shared Muslim values, self-realized nation

based on preexisting cultural elements could not adapt itself. Pre-soviet social structures; community based and linked through bonds of kinship, geography, and mutual patronage had been strong enough to survive in Soviet rule. Communist regime had used such social affiliations to clans, and regional bosses for the regime advantage. Uzbek government repeatedly announced that this country has its own 'traditional civil society' which bonded with Eastern values, collective harmony and social consensus rather than individual liberty, demanding authorities or western type society full of conflict spirit.

However, mahalla being traditional institution, as well as social groupings based on regional division is not allowed to involve voluntarily and it does not let community members to discuss debate or represent members' interests. Besides it does not include pluralism and participatory principles of civil society. But it does distribute social welfare services through appointed Mahalla leaders and staffs following exactly provisions of Law on "Self-Government Organizations" on how to do their jobs. It replicates function of local government. If such community groups could relieve themselves from being strong leverage of government to control deepest social strata, probably it would be a part of civil society – traditional civil society – comprising indigenous, traditional and religious values in it, but the structural change or reforms in this community groups is far from being realized in near future.

The **second reason** is that existing suppression, top-down and dichotomist state – society relations based on clan, kinship and patron-client bias have led to social discontent and distrust to the government (Ilkhamov 2007, pp.65-84). Islamic groups and movements are taking their chances to recruit their members among those dissatisfied, distrusted and poor part of the society. They then use these peoples' anger against the government in their radical, non-constitutional and non-democratic, violent revolutionary ideology. Uzbek society's culture and traditions are very closely linked to the Islamic teaching. After the independence,

these traditional values re-captured the majority of the society in rural areas where more than 60% of population live. However, from the beginning of nation state building, the government has announced the separation of religion from state and has promised reforms toward modern civil society where any religious belief is tolerated.

Separation of religion from state did not mean its limitation in social life. Instead, initial international politics of the country linked it to the societies with the same religion like Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. These countries have opened their doors to the Uzbek society for modern and Islamic education, aided in re-building traditional and religious infrastructures inherited from pre-Soviet rule of empires or kings. In brief, missing the most valuable source of high morality, harmony and peace for this region, Islam was taken away in Soviet rule and replaced it with socialist ideology and atheism. So its return<sup>12</sup> was celebrated by the netire Uzbek population, which also gave strong support for the government policies. In the early 1990s, as Naumkin recalls, groups formed under Hanafi doctrine closely connected with Sufi tradition and ideas of 'Pure Islam' or *Salafism* have managed to gain control over a significant number of mosques, including the sites in Tashkent<sup>13</sup>. In a number of towns in the Ferghana Valley, they even began to exercise their *sharia* rules in maintaining law and order, supervising markets, managing certain spheres of community life, and settling disputes. They have openly criticized government officials and interior affairs' officers for regarding bribes and jailing innocent people by calling for practice of open public punishment by sharia rules. The government did not react until the group has managed to gain support in Feghana and Namangan valleys (combined population of nearly 5 million people) enabling them to negotiate with government to build Islamic state so the president would resign (Naumkin 2006: 129). After the government ceased their operations, Islamic militants immediately fled

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<sup>12</sup> Return is a metaphor but actually the original transcription of Koran (Islamic Holy book) taken by Russian empire was returned in 1995 to Uzbekistan with the help of other Muslim countries as it belongs to Uzbekistan.

<sup>13</sup> Vitaliy Naumkin 2006 "Uzbekistan's State-Building Fatigue" *The Washington Quarterly*. 29(3): 127-140

the country and established IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) which strove for the violent overthrow of the Karimov (president of Uzbekistan, 1991 – present) regime through 1999's assassination attempts against his life and the establishment of sharia rule.

Government has launched a number of policies against radical Islam, which were criticized by Western observers as 'illiberal'. But Naumkin, approves it, "because resisting this Islamist threat is easier for an illiberal regime to accomplish", as Uzbek government has made "suppression as the main instrument for opposing radical Islam" rather than letting radical groups to increase their influence<sup>14</sup>. However, the point is not about whether or not Islamic state is good or bad for the society, but the fact that government has made suppression as an instrument for opposing anything that challenge its legitimacy. In the aftermath of Andijon bloodshed<sup>15</sup> in 2005, the Uzbek regime became much more cautious of Islamist influence in the country. For Naumkin (2006, p.130), "it was clear that poverty, authoritarianism, the closed nature of society, suppression, and the lack of any opportunities for protest had led to an influx of people into the ranks of supporters of radical Islamists". International Crisis Group's Asia Report No.76 (March 2004) condemns that "increased poverty, socioeconomic decline, and high levels of corruption and injustice are fueling support for more radical Islamist alternatives to the present secular regime." Also the report points out that reason for emerging Islamist political groups is the lack of channels for expression of social discontent.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, there is a need for reciprocal link between state and society through revitalizing civil society. As Howel and Pearce (2001, p.63) argue that support for the public sphere is the most useful way to promote civil society through cooperation. It means that rather than regarding state and civil society via 'non-interference' or autonomous spheres,

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid* p130

<sup>15</sup> Formal and informal statistics vary but around 200 people were shot when anti-governmental movement in Andijon city in Uzbekistan. There were Islamic groups called *Akramiya*, members were local entrepreneurs whose leaders was jailed before the event.

<sup>16</sup> [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/076\\_failure\\_of\\_reform\\_in\\_uzbekistan.ashx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/076_failure_of_reform_in_uzbekistan.ashx)

building and promotion of their cooperation for tackling public issues are crucial. However, such cooperation should not be based on top-down relations. Next section will explore the theoretical aspects of this approach.

## **1.2 Theoretical and Conceptual Issues.**

The neo-liberal concept of civil society has been traveling the world for over three decades now. International assistance has helped civil society organizations to take steps toward public sphere through the provision of basic public services, increase of social support in to the voluntary sector, organization of independent mass media and articulation of public narratives to raise public demands to the governments (Algappa 2004, pp.64-191). But, it has yet to take a strong root in developing nations as some scholars<sup>17</sup> argue due to the nature of the concept, and the regimes and misguided international aid.

Contemporary definition of civil society has emphasized on the importance of autonomous, independent sphere occupied by voluntarily joined non-state and non-commercial actors. It is distinct from general society by "...acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable" (Diamond 1997, p.6).

Scholars allocate civil society between state (administration, government and public institutions) and private sector (commercial entities and profit seeking enterprises), because it does not seek for political power or authority as well as it does not seek for profit accumulation. Therefore it creates the *third sector* (Kumar 1993, pp.375-395; Hyden 1997, pp.3-30; White 1994, pp.375-390; Warren E 2001). Abovementioned understanding assumes that there are

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<sup>17</sup> By scholars, I mean both Western and scholars in developing countries (Kurzman 1998, pp.42-64; Ilkhamov 2005, pp.297-317; Clark 1995, pp.593-601; Julio de Santa 1994; Diamond 1994, pp.4-17; Gelner 1994; Kumar 1993, pp.375-395; Algappa 2004; Howell & Pearce 2001; Hanafi 2001)

basically two, public and private sectors respectively former is the government, public institutions – executive, legislative and judicial power and latter is privately owned enterprises, SMEs and other commercial organizations. So the third sector is civil society, meaning the rest of the large open space between those two sectors are social networks and associations in various spheres such as economic, informational, educational, cultural, developmental associations, as well as interests groups, independent mass media etc.


However, the border between public and private sector is different in developing countries perspective and “...it may be a mistake to import obsolete Western notions of public and private, state and society, sovereignty and autonomy into political and economical life” (Schak & Hudson 2003, pp.10-16). The state, executive power is much expanded into legislative, judicial branches of power. Furthermore, economical, social and political life of the society is also under executive power control in developing countries. There are state organized enterprises (SOEs) that occupy large part of space, which generally belong to the private sector such as manufacturing, production, sales, import, export, construction, transportation and services. The market that was not occupied by the SOEs is gradually occupied by the increasing crony capitalism. Society and its private life have become a target of ideological indoctrination, politicization and, transformation into direction that people are enforced to think as the government wishes (basically through schools, mass media, law enforcement bodies, and political socialization processes). In case of political sphere, pro-government political parties, GONGOs and pro-government media are the main structure of political society in developing countries. I believe that this is what Antonio Gramsci had predicted more than seven decades ago that *Cultural Hegemony*<sup>18</sup> is the biggest problem of civil society (figure 1: State occupied large space whereas non-state sphere has small, but in this small space larger part of population are located comparing to the population in State occupied space). Whereas international

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<sup>18</sup> See page 3 of this paper.

pressure demands for civil society building, the painful question for both states and civil societies, as I assume, becomes that where the space for civil society should be located. (e.g., in opposition to being anti-government<sup>19</sup>, in government side being co-opted and incorporated<sup>20</sup> or in the midst of both being autonomous, apolitical sphere of parochial associational life<sup>21</sup>).

(Figure 1 – author’s own calculation in e.g. of Uzbekistan)



While scholars search a space for civil society in developing countries where the public sphere is dominated by the state, there are scholars interested in the capacity of the state ‘being such enormous and large but weak in developmental achievements’. So, they revealed that in fact, states are weak and inexperienced in dealing with their own societies which are able to constantly *challenge* the state and its structure in both national and regional dimension of states’ political power and developmental policies (Migdal 1988, pp.181-203). Where are these

<sup>19</sup> Advocacy groups, Human Rights organizations, transparency or anti-corruption grassroots are mainly supported by the international aid in developing countries. These non-government organizations are considered as anti-government or Trojan horses.

<sup>20</sup> There are also increasing number of GONGOs which organized by the government. It usually incorporates people in order to pursue pro-government ideology or political discourse. Moreover, privately organized associations sometimes become trapped into rent seeking behavior of their leaders.

<sup>21</sup> This is a part of society living based on traditional community style life. Hence, major part of society in developing countries is still belongs to the rural areas - out of industrialization and social mobilization, they seem to keep remoteness from the center, decision making and developmental discourse.

challenges coming from if not from civil society? The problem is that these social challenges on “developmental” policies of the state are not organized civil society for public ends but rent seeking private interest groups (clans, regional bosses, informal influential elites), which according those scholars, have the potential to undermine modern state building and divert the profit from reforms into their wealth. If it is true, in such situation, international intervention concentrated upon civil society empowerment or political reformations decreases state’s capacity even more, not only in implementation of developmental policies but also in imposition of public order (Wang 1999, pp.231-249).

In the late 1980s, theory of developmental state has started to attract international institutions, donors and scholars’ attention into capacity building of the state and public institutions in order to achieve developmental goals and to have autonomy from external influence. Theory of Social Capital developed in the 1990s, emphasized on associations, social networks and civil society as a ‘missing link’ in developmental discourse, hence without social network, trust, associational life and bridging, bonding social capitals economic development is unachievable. So, again, does it require strong, coercive state that can stand against external influence and pursue transition, or it is important to strengthen civil society, social control upon the state which actually becomes an ‘external influence’?

Recently, scholars began to question such limited understanding of state and society relations. They realized that they were addressing symptoms rather than cause of the problems. Rather than emphasizing on the importance of the state or the role of civil society in development separately, theory of *synergy* argues “...to bring these two disparate traditions together by examining the potentially positive role of relations which will join state and society in shared development projects” (Evans 1996a, pp.1119-1132). This theory criticizes long term survival of ‘zero-sum’ and ‘dichotomist’ approach on state and society relations and proposes integration between ‘developmental’ state and ‘civil’ society. The neglect of capacity which

either state or society acquires in developmental process should be replaced by mutual empowering state-society relations (Wang 1999, pp.231-249). Civil society scholars also started to point out the importance of 'public sphere' where collaboration between state structures and civil society groups should work for common good (Howell & Pearce 2001, p.13; Giffen et al. 2005, p.153). Edwards (2004, p.58) criticizes conservative tendency to view associations in a neutral role of counterweight to the state, or existing donor approach on this tendency as a function to check on the state which denies potential alternative forms of governance or cooperation between sectors.

What are the main attributes of state society synergy? Synergy is a collective action in order to achieve desired outcomes. It implies coproduction or partnership of public and private spheres that requires sharing of tangible and intangible resources, information, and skills. Reciprocity between state and society can be measured either in decision making level for developmental discourse or its implementation level. For instance, there are cases in developed and high level income countries of Asia where economic growth and its direction have been discussed through collaboration of public and private sectors. Also, there are many cases in developing countries (see Chapter 3) where civil society groups and organizations are involved in public service provision as an implementer of policies. Their cooperation with central or local governments makes services cheaper, equally accessible and suitable to the local context. It is not the case that civil society organizations are in charge of services but the duties and risks are shared between public and private institutions.

The core value of this approach is that it implies for creative collaborations between state and non-state actors rather than top-down process of policy implementation or command and control type of decision making which developing countries yet to transform from. It is also about transformation of narrow interest of social forces in to civic ends to work in public sphere for public interest. As Howell and Pearce (2001, p.60) argue that support for the public sphere is

perhaps the most useful way to promote civil society (also cited in (Giffen et al. 2005, p.153)). Nevertheless, civil society groups, associations in developing countries practicing synergetic relations do not necessarily witness an actual cooperation or 'partnership' with the government, rather their effort to cooperate for the developmental ends were seen as cheap outsourcing, putting heavy burdens of the public duties on the shoulders of people who has limited access to information, resources and decision making process. Therefore, it entails that there are certain factors that can impede achieving successful, sustainable synergies for developmental ends vis-à-vis instrumental state-society relations where the state seeks to co-opt and use civic associations to escape from accountability or civic groups seek to gain some privileges and incentives from partnering with the state. Therefore, while this theory promises an access for civil society in to public sphere to work with the state as a partner, it must be carefully analyzed if such relations are not based on rent seeking behavior or just utilized for instrumental purposes.

#### **1.4 Aims and Objectives of the study**

Imposition of Western civil society concept has been criticized in Uzbekistan. Instead, government preferred pre-existing pro-government Public Associations (GONGOs) and traditional associational life Mahalla. While international donors have begun to lean on to support pre-existing conception of civil society, this research argues that it will only assure sustainability of dichotomist state-society relations and suppression of civil society in Uzbekistan. Therefore, this research addresses state-society relations in Uzbekistan under the synergy perspective and analyses concept of civil society as dependent variable to the quality of relations between state and society in public sphere.

In order to support the argument, research aims to:

- a) Analyze the evolution of Western concept of civil society and its contradictions to the

contemporary implications on state-society relations;

- b) Explore developmental interventions of donors for civil society building and its failure in Uzbekistan;
- c) Observe state-society interaction under the synergy perspective in the case of Uzbekistan;
- d) Describe the negative impact of Western concept of civil society upon existing state-society relations in Uzbekistan.
- e) Discover impediments of building positive-sum relationship between state and society.

**Hypothesis:** Civil Society concept introduced to the country was concentrated on neo-liberal values of empowering non-state actors at the expense of minimizing the state (zero-sum approach). Such attitude reinforced existing *dichotomist* state-society relations. Civil society building and its consolidation depends on mutual empowering, *positive-sum* relations between state and non-state actor.

#### **1.4 Research Questions:**

1. Why Civil Society is weak in Uzbekistan?
2. Does the relationship between state and society matter in development of civil society in Uzbekistan?

#### **1.5 Significance of Research**

This research addresses the issue of civil society development in Uzbekistan which has been a crucial one for almost two decades. Therefore, the topic is not new or

extraordinary issue to discuss. In contrast, author attempts to bring in front repeatedly asked questions as a target of research, but in different perspective. Because, it seems that recent studies of Uzbekistan as a transition country begin to omit or avoid raising such issue in developmental discourse of this country. Moreover, it seems that the reason for such lack of interest is that the society in this country might be considered as never able to become a civil one. Therefore, this research is an expression of optimism and attempt to direct interested audience's attention in to the sides which was not deeply addressed.

The significance of it lies upon the contemporary shift of conventional approach on state-society relations and its contradictions with controversial concept of civil society based on Western traditions. Based on this position, this research reveals an importance of shift in state-society relations for reciprocity or collective action and analyses civil society concept as contradiction to this new phenomenon. Author attempts to analyze it in the case study on Uzbekistan. Several scholars both foreign and domestic have repeatedly debated this issue by pointing at the nature of the regime, social, economical and political pre-conditions but only few (Giffen et al. 2005, pp.153-175; Stevens 2005, pp.281-296) addressed the importance of state-society relations in order to discuss civil society development in Uzbekistan. This research while supporting this kind of approach, also looks at the civil society concept as a serious impact on the quality of state-society relations not always "vise versa" (to the impact of state-society relations upon civil society building process), in Uzbekistan as an example of one of the developing countries in Central Asia. By exploring the reality and quality of state-society relations in the country this research aims to attract scholars' attention to the impediments of building state-society synergy and suggests reconsidering the possible direction for civil society development in Uzbekistan.

## **1.6 Methodology**

The methodology of the research combines two different steps. On one hand, theory of civil society has been explored in order to reveal the origin, values and implications of the civil society concept. It is to compare genuine theoretical concept with the instrumentalist concept applied to the civil society assistance projects in Uzbekistan. Based on data analysis of literature review and case study, this paper criticized the instrumentalist approach and framework exploited by the scholars on civil society building projects in Uzbekistan. The basic critique is that the same old approach started in 1990s on civil society building in Uzbekistan remained intact regardless of theoretical development afterwards or regardless of negative results of such concept application.

Therefore, on the next level author intended to explore how the theory of civil society has been discussed within the concepts of social capital and state-society synergy. Through these latter theoretical discussions, research aimed to construct alternative conceptual approach on civil society building for case study of Uzbekistan. In this part of the research, obtained data was analyzed to compare this alternative theory and the situation in Uzbekistan.

The comparison of the civil society theory with the instrumentalist application of the concept required much effort on literature review in order to measure how instrumental the theory has become in application process. In order to explore the impact of the concept application, research data was obtained through field work in Uzbekistan. Due to the sensitivity of the issue in the country, scale of the fieldwork was limited to interviews with government organized NGOs, privately organized NGOs and UNDP office in the country, which was actively involved in this issue. Research data also consist of legal documents open to public usage, government approved documents and publications of those NGOs. On the latter part of the research, author compared the alternative conceptual approach with the

situation in Uzbekistan. In this part, data was collected by the analysis of recent scholars' fieldwork on Uzbekistan case, as well as reviews of the literatures, online sources, and government issued documents published in Uzbekistan.

### **1.7 Structure of the Dissertation**

The main part of the research begins from **Chapter 2**. In this chapter, the concept of the civil society is discussed through historical period of its understanding to the gradual expansion of it into the developing countries. Literature review of civil society concept aims here to draw important criteria in order to clarify why and how neo-liberal concept of civil society has been raised from. Another essential part of **Chapter 2** is that exposing conceptual travel of civil society from one value to the different according to the time and space and the recent one is social capital theory.

The next is **Chapter 3**, where discussion is taken to next step, meaning that civil society concept has been interpreted within the concept of Social Capital. In this concept civic associations were seen similar as Tocquevillian interpretation but in the context of the increasing role of modern states and institutions. In this discussion Social Capital concept is brought as an attempt of reconciliation between increasing role of the State and civil society. Although there are criticisms on this concept, in this research, the purpose is to show that Social Capital in fact was first step to distance from antagonistic state-civil society relations to mutual reciprocal relations. Such mutual reciprocal relations have been developed by developmentalist scholars in order to utilize powers of both State and Civil Society for the sake of developmental ends. P. Evans successfully took this debate in to another level by introducing State-society synergy. It is a concept which promises prosperity for civil society and efficiency of developmental policies by the state.

This concept has been developed from developing countries' case studies and it

provides with clear examples of beneficial relations that State and civil society could arrange. Since this research's argument poses synergy environment as precondition to the development of civil society, target of analysis will be the quality of the state-society relations in developing countries.

Case study will be started from **Chapter 4**, and it begins with explanation of transitional period of Uzbekistan from communist regime in order to have general picture about introduction of socio-economical and political reforms in the country. The following sections discussed how civil society concept has been introduced to Uzbekistan, and its expansion in the country. Literature review on the Uzbekistan case explored two main arguments; one is the decline of civil society in the country is associated with the nature of the current regime; second is that international assistance on civil society promotion did not take local context in to account which caused suppression of civil society organizations. These two arguments were discussed to answer the question why civil society in the country is in decline. Besides, in this chapter author criticized scholars' view that civil society is absent in Uzbekistan referring to the historical evidences showing some patterns of civil society development within the context of both Tocquevillian autonomous civic community and modern civil society representing social movements for modernization, reforms in state affairs.

However, civil society concept introduced to Uzbekistan in the form of non-governmental organizations did not find its roots in the country and in **Chapter 4** it is observed in detail to show the reasons both from foreign aid perspective and local perception of civil society. Argument which points at the reason for civil society decay is that zero-sum approach of donors' introduced civil society concept intensified existing dichotomist state-society relations in Uzbekistan. Aim of this research was to introduce state-society synergy as a reconciliation of antagonistic relations between state and civil society.

**Chapter 5** starts the with illustration of pre-existing relations between the public –

private spheres or state and society. In order to discuss this issue, the research looked into historical evolution of state-society relations from the period of Soviet regime. Tracing back the history brought up interesting insights into the current structure and process of state-society relations. There appeared two distinct view; centralized modern state vs. patronage clan politics, which is totally unacceptable from the theories of Western scholars. Nevertheless, this chapter goes to the detail explanation for such unusual reality. This chapter also, deals with the questions of International intervention into state-society relations in Uzbekistan and it intends to express that such intervention was not as successful as in other developing countries (may it be Latin American, Asian countries).

Finally, **Chapter 6** is the main conclusion of the Dissertation. It consists of research analysis, meaning final overview in order to put it in logical stream, which helps to construct research findings among extensive data and reviews. Research has brought two essential findings and in this Chapter it is discussed how and what factors also have an impact on this particular research field. Finally, this chapter concludes this dissertation with brief implications for further research if possible.

## **Chapter 2. Civil Society**

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The research begins with the discussions about the concept of civil society and its evolution, in order to explore concept application upon civil society building in developing countries or transition countries like Uzbekistan. Building civil society in Uzbekistan has become both impossible and desirable realm of public sphere. On the one hand, there is no clear commitment from the government, and on the other there is no clear desire from the society in Uzbekistan. In this case, we need to understand how civil society was emerged in the first place and what values it brings to the society wherever it is built. Therefore, this chapter aims to explore historical review of civil society building and its development in the Western societies where they came from. The task of this chapter is not to find one answer or one 'right' concept, but to reveal the values, principles that civil society bears and make it important.

### **2.1 Conceptual history of Civil Society**

There are increasing numbers of arguments over definition, values and role of the civil society in contemporary thinking of democracy and development. What makes this concept so

vital is that all those theorists and supporters emphasize on importance of an intellectual space, one in which it is recognized that all individuals through their diverse associations and organizations have the right to contribute to discussions about how to organize their society, deal with its problems and ultimately define what kind of development is required and desired (Howell & Pearce 2001, p.13). The need for such space is not new and not just appeared; it has long historical past and own justifications to become dominant and even paradigmatic concept in the field of development policy and practice. However, observation of historical development of civil society itself poses a difficulty to assess it in proper logic of sequence of events. The reason is that interpretations, narratives and reviews of those events are multi-dimensional regarding in time and space.

### **2.1.1 Introduction to the history of civil society**

The concept is resultantly multilayered and complex. It is shrouded in layers of meanings and significations, coming from many traditions (Seligman 1995; Chandhoke 1995; Diamond 1994; Howell & Pearce 2001). For instance, there are classic political theory interpreters which explore it going deep in to the past up to the emergence of societies and communities on Earth who were involved in debates of politics to decide how their elected leaders and chiefs should define prosperity of own communities and kinds. Those scholars link those events to the first emerged city-states or *polities* in ancient Greek communities where human beings come to realize and actualize their potential which means in civil society. They also successfully link civil society with the theological thoughts of emerged Christian communities where people voluntarily devoted their lives to serve God's will in the Church to find a salvation. They also call for 'civil society' when intellectuals denounced overwhelming dominance of the Church and successfully transformed that divine service for the God in to the sphere of political sovereign organizing the first Christian nation states by God-given rights

(Seligman 1995, pp.15-59). The notion of political sovereign – state, and dominant Christian culture were the dichotomist institutions which one over another was supposed to bring social order and social cohesion.

From other side, classical political economy theories takes us back to the Age of Enlightenment where most of the European region in 18<sup>th</sup> century had questioned traditional institutions, customs, and morals, and a strong belief in rationality and science. The Enlightenment is held to be the source of critical ideas, such as the centrality of freedom, democracy, and reason as primary values of society. Such emancipatory values had created a notion of individualism, human rights and freedom of associations against divine rights of monarchy and aristocracy (Chandhoke 1995, pp.88-112). I believe that it was a first time when those enlightening intellectuals and philosophers being a part of civil society by themselves brought the role and importance of space for free individuals where they pursue their private beliefs and interests and protect themselves from abusive power and coercion of absolutist states.

Therefore, the *liberal* thinkers like Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Ferguson came out with strong protection for civil liberties and civil society against external intervention and abusive control, instead, they believe that only civil society should held the power to demand accountability and transparency from the state for keeping it legitimate (Warren E 2001, pp.3-4). Social associations, to the liberals, are aggregates of individual wills, and the individual is free to join or leave them as he wishes. Liberal individualism, in fact, attacked all supra-individual associations such as religious communities, or feudal privileges which subordinate the individual to their dictates. Therefore, classical political and polity-economical theories located the emancipatory potential of civil society within the state and social relations. Civil society in this sense is an arena in which *modern man* legitimately indulge his self-interest and develops his individuality. But it is precisely in this sphere that the

individual 'also learns the value of group action, social solidarity and the dependence of his welfare on others, which educate him for citizenship and prepare him for participation in the political arena of the state' (Pelczynski, 1988:364).

In brief, definition of civil society was quite vague all the way of the modernization process of Europe and America from 18<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> century. The first stage of European history was remarkable with limitation or abolition of the absolute monarchy in 18<sup>th</sup> century in England, in 19<sup>th</sup> century France and 20<sup>th</sup> century in Germany, Spain and Italy. It was remarkable because it provided with civil rights and building citizenship in Europe derived its origin from Magna Carta or Great Charter of Liberties in England. It was first attempt of English men to limit absolutist power of the monarchy and give liberties to Barons and other accompanied feudals in 13<sup>th</sup> century but later spread to whole citizens of Britain up to 17<sup>th</sup> century with Glorious Revolution of 1688. America used liberal rights given to British citizens to demand independence from tyranny of colonialism in 18<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore, in America, civil rights were much sensitive to and protective from any hierarchical power. Consequently it was remarkable with Industrial revolution and modernization of Britain in 18<sup>th</sup>, of America in 19<sup>th</sup>, and rest of the European region in 20<sup>th</sup> centuries paved a way for modernization of the regions through intensive urbanization, increasing literacy, technological and infrastructural development. It also increased economical growth via extended exchange of commodities and expansion of market. Consequently, population was increased and they began to loose traditional bonds to family and particular region, instead social mobilization was expanded parallel with the demand for political participation. The second stage is building modern republican states in the West from 19<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> century and non-Western countries in latter half of 20<sup>th</sup> century. However this period is also can be divided in to modern history up to World War II with full of revolutions devoted to totally get rid of monarchy and fully establishment of republican states and after the war up to the collapse of Soviet Union where new nation-states

emerged after decolonization.

Civil society concept was interpreted within these remarkable turns of events in its time. Enlightenment and period of Industrial revolution have given civil liberty, freedom of speech and expression, protection of private property, representation of people's will in the politics and so other means of freedom were announced as unalienable rights<sup>22</sup>. For the first time humanity could be free from absolute power and totalitarian despotism and could freely engage in market and politics.

### **2.1.2 19th Century's Narratives on Civil Society: Tocqueville, Hegel, and Marx**

This period of time has been essential for civil society concept to emerge as a property of modern society. Hegel and Karl Marx were prominent philosophers who could cover this period with their ideas and thoughts of civil society in Europe. But Tocqueville as a French philosopher dedicated himself to describe this concept by his ideologies covering this period in America. According to them modernization in Europe and America which came much earlier than the rest of the world (except Japan) has brought a notion of *independent* sphere from family, tribe, clan and the state. An emancipation of individualism has created vacuum between old and new social order which found solution for itself in this sphere. Early understanding of civil society in Europe and America closely accompanied with the sphere of private interests in contest and exchange within the economic community. Such human activities are motivated by private ends and objectives but those individuals recognize others' needs in order to satisfy their own. It is a free exchange of goods and services and this space has its own rules. Only here, individuals can pursue their private needs and interest without relating to any other institutions such as family, community or state. Here civil society is no longer conceptual opposite of the

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<sup>22</sup> At that time such rights and liberties were limited to only people with higher ranks or owners of large lands and other properties.

state as it was in early period of Enlightenment where tyranny of absolutist state was abusive and destructive of civic and human rights. Civil society becomes a sphere of universal egoism, where one treats another as a means of own ends (Avineri 1972, p.134). It emerges as not only the system of want satisfaction, but as the home of the self-conscious individuals and 'system of needs'. Individual is egoistic, but his self-interest is mediated by the realization that the satisfaction of his interest depends on the satisfaction of interests of other individuals. Thus the rational pursuit of self-interest leads to social cohesion; it encourages division of labor and enhances the productivity. In both Europe and America, civil liberties gave a way for modernization and it enhanced expansion of civil society as a sphere of new forms of associational life

In America, 18<sup>th</sup> century was remarkable with gaining independence from Britain and adoption of Bill of Rights which guarantees of civil liberties and freedom. Therefore, American people always approach any absolutism of power with intolerance. Civil society in America was a space of free expression and pursuance of one's interests, rights collectively to control the state power. Tocqueville develops his ideology through studying associational life and further emancipation of individual rights and freedom. Individualism was central point of liberalism and it leads to form associations with own kinds and common interests not with traditional kinship bonds. Tocqueville admired how much this associational life is protected against state's intervention in America. Therefore, state's role was restricted to the minimal so it should not intervene in to self-regulating process of society and its productivity. It had not only to restrict itself from intervening in civil society; it had to follow the path shown by civil society. It means that the decision to make on political discourse was relocated in to the civil society rather than the state. In order words, civil society was the basis for the state building in America.<sup>23</sup> However, Tocqueville has also defines 'political society' is a 'law' controlling human societies

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<sup>23</sup> Here the emphasis was on revolutionary power of independence movements against Britain's dominancy.

as an 'art of association'. He distinguishes this sphere as political associations, such as, juries, parties and public opinion; from civil associations, such as churches, moral crusades, schools, literary and scientific societies, newspapers and publishers, professional and commercial organizations, organizations for leisure and recreation. But he also argues that civic associations pave the way for political societies. (Kumar 1993, p.381).

Hegel as he concentrated on Europe, has distinguished civil society from the state as an arena of self-maximizing individuals and necessitated the role of the state as an independent, autonomous universal institution. Besides, for Hegel, civil society was not only a part of economic society or market but it was also sphere of ethical community or modern society as a transition from the family as a mode of social organization. Civil society is equally distinguished from the state as the state is representation of universality and civil society is the domain of particularity. Therefore, civil society is located between family and the state. Hegel's privilege of ethical life and admiration of morality comes from unequal market relations and instrumentalist social interactions of individuals who are self-interested and egoist. He recognizes the rights of self-determinant individuals and individualism as a result of modern industrial society. He was concerned against the harmful effects of modernity which destroyed traditional social structure and left rootless individuals vulnerable to external or internal threats. Besides, he reminds us harmful effects of market, since it causes alienation and deprivation of the poor who were prevented from participating in the rich and full ethical life. Therefore, he sees the state as a universal final social organization which puts particularity of egoistic and greedy social interactions in to harmony with the unity of ethical life (Stillman 1980, pp.628-630). The state should be the primary universal institution which must legitimize and organize ethical civil society. Through institutionalization of commerce and industry, individuals are incorporated in to estates and corporations based on their abilities and they are rewarded accordingly. Such division of labor creates associations and enterprises of

commercial individuals and these associations represent members' interests or establish relations with the state. Hegel's civil society was incorporated in to such institutionalized estates, enterprises and entrepreneurship where their aspirations are mediated and represented. Individuals could communicate and channel their interests through estates, welfare institutions provided by the state. "Through participation in civil society, then, the individual is acculturated and cultivates himself to the intellectual, universal, and objective" (Stillman 1980, p.631). So, it seems that Hegel emphasizes the state as an ultimate legitimate institution that should hold the political power and guide political discourse and civil society being arena of particularity should follow universal guide given by the state. So the solutions of civil society problems were laid up on the universality of the state and its institutions.

Karl Marx, another influential philosopher of his time attempts to cover the period from 18<sup>th</sup> to early 20<sup>th</sup> century and describe the civil society in his own way. He also confirms the idea of civil society as property of modern world. He admits that civil society is the sphere of egoism and particularity, so the state is essential in the formulation of universalistic principles (Chandhoke 1995). However, he doubts that the state is able to organize, institutionalize and guide the civil society. He gives an example of bourgeois revolutions which intensified capitalist formation of society and state become the product of the same historical event that brought civil society in to existence. "Mainstream' or academic history in the 19th century by and large shared the understanding of Marx and the Marxists that the English and French revolutions were bourgeois revolutions....which ended feudalism and brought in economic, political and religious freedom" (Macnair n.d., sec.3-4). Therefore, same logic of capitalist exploitation continues to govern both state and civil domains. According to his criticism, the state is mere instrument of bourgeois society and some of the powers formerly exercised by political power have been privatized or given to propertied classes; therefore, problems of civil society cannot be solved by the state.

In both Hegel and Marx's argument, inequality and freedom were considered as problems of civil society where access to and benefit from civil society cannot be shared equally between have and have-nots. It was an issue of those excluded and marginalized poorest exploited part of the society and in both philosophers' mind those were major problems that modern industrial society has created. Therefore, civil society was considered as arena of alienation, inequality, conflict and threat to the stability, which Hegel saw the state as solution but Marx denied it (Avineri 1972; Chandhoke 1995; Kumar 1993, pp.375-395). For Marx, the solution was a revolutionary transformation of civil society. He assures that the state cannot be relied on due to its nature and existing influence over it. But he knew that production and reproduction depends up on working class - labors and the construction of bourgeois society has been possible because it is built on the backs of this class. Therefore, he points out organized working class movements and sees political consciousness of the proletariat. For Marx, revolution was the only way out, so it delivers transformation of bourgeois society to civil society. He was one of the major critics of capitalist formation of state and society which brought delusion of freedom and equality.<sup>24</sup>

If we re-phrase early ideas on civil society from 18<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> century in a general picture, civil society becomes a sphere of modern and ethical associational life distinct from tribes, clans and communities which distances individual from family. Here, individuals are given new status of citizenship, and they are bond with wider society under universal laws and constitutions therefore, they are free to pursue private interests in the market and polity while they recognize others interests too.

The relations between state and civil society were concerned from different perspectives in modern Europe and America. European civil society as modern associative life

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<sup>24</sup> Freedom and equality could not be co-exist, since freedom expands to the people with property and wealth so the rest are not equal to them. If the state intervenes to correct this reality then it won't be freedom as the conceptual promise. Therefore, scholars consider these two terms as an illusion which capitalist society provides with.

is subject of state guidance, because it is the sphere of particularities and selfish interests where state is to impose universal norms on behalf of 'public interest'. But also it is the sphere that influences the state and the discourse which state is about to choose. It means that particularities are dominated by the universality, but that universality is subject to the constant modifications from challenges of the particularities. Therefore, in Europe, civil society is closely bonded with the state, because both gives each other status of legitimacy and neither should dominate the public sphere. However, the sphere itself is under constant conflict as long as the access is limited and values are fragmented. Therefore, the sphere of civil society is not always democratic, but its vibrancy is important for the democracy.

American perspective is quite different. Civil society is an autonomous sphere of associational life, and this sphere is independent from the state. Decentralized and disintegrated power of the state is under constant check of the civil society. Civil society is the sphere of associated individuals in order to educate, nurture, and recognize each other that encourages trust and reciprocity and, develops political consciousness. It paves the way for political society where political consciousness are expressed and professed.

### **2.1.3 Revival of Civil Society in Early 20<sup>th</sup> century: Gramscian 'Cultural Hegemony'**

The concept re-appeared only in early 20<sup>th</sup> century, as a revival of Gramscian ideology on *Cultural Hegemony* of 1930s. Pre-war environment dramatically changed the earlier thoughts on civil society as a free and protected sphere of associational life. Scholars have realized correctness of given definitions on civil society by earlier scholars. Gramsci was one of these revolutionary philosophers who were able to define the close relationship between the state and civil society. He also reveals relations of civil society with the political society. For Gramsci also, civil society is not immediately democratic, but it is subject to the transformation through interaction with the state and political society. Gramsci gives evidences of civil society

in Germany and Italy have gradually been occupied by public propaganda to impose on it at first capitalistic and later fascistic aggressive ideologies. General society was compelled by this sort of enforced 'consensus' therefore there was not a possibility for resistance. Therefore, Gramsci disagrees with Marx in terms of revolutions as a solution of transformation of civil society.

We remember the history of proletariat revolution that was able to overthrow Russian empire and its political system in early 20<sup>th</sup> century. We also can recall the revolution in France in 19<sup>th</sup> century where main supporting power was granted by the commoners. However, Gramsci reminds us the nature of the state and its ideology that was able to control and direct the civil society so no revolution could occur in Italy (Chandhoke 1995, pp.148-150).

He distinguishes coercion and consent, which state coercive power is concentrated in prisons, the judicial system, armed forces, police but civil society is the location where the state operates to enforce intangible and subtle forms of power to achieve 'consent'. Therefore, civil society becomes a sphere for the production of consent, but it is equally the sphere where this consent can be modified for new forms of policies. He conceptualizes the production of consent through use of symbols, education, institutions and practices as hegemony of civil society. By this, he refers to the co-optations and controls by the state, all of the organized labor unions, social institutions and associations where state-sponsored ideology and programs were promoted and propagated. Thus a consensus culture developed in which people in the working-class identified their own good with the good of the bourgeoisie, and helped to maintain the *status quo* rather than revolting. So, he examines such *cultural hegemony* of one dominant class over another and he distinguishes civil society as a sphere of confrontation and contest between dominant and excluded, capitalist and socialist ideologies (Chandhoke 1995, pp.148-157; Kumar 1993, pp.382-385).

In Gramsci's view, any class that wishes to dominate in modern conditions has to move

beyond its own narrow interests, to exert intellectual and moral leadership, and to make alliances and compromises with a variety of forces so that, *cultural hegemony* is achieved first. He asserts that the solution of civil society is in political society – state, it needs to transform through intervention of challenging ideologies and new forms of social order. Only after these new norms fully occupied political society by the challenge of civil society, it is then possible to change the nature and order of political system. Gramsci's ideas on the civil society issue are remarkable. He reveals that civil society can not be just democratic as a given, but it must be transformed to be the one. Civil society can be sphere of discourse domination by the state sponsored ideologies such as capitalistic or nationalistic and even fascistic radical discourse that is intolerant to the pluralism, freedom and equality. He gives evidences to prove that it is not important just to have civil society. It is important to know on what political ends it is built up and then to define it as democratic or not. If possible, civil society must be challenged for the universal access and to modify whatever dominant ideology it holds. It is possible only if the vibrancy and freedom of plurality is accepted and granted to be able to transform to democratic civil society.

The solution given by Gramsci is not simple to achieve. In order to challenge dominated state-sponsored ideology or hegemony of particular class in civil society, those excluded and marginalized groups should have political consciousness to understand an importance of such challenge, always need to be aware of changing environment within this sphere. Secondly, as long as civil society is about the sphere of plurality, and space for interest articulation, excluded social groups have to pursue for universal access to this sphere. They need to gain organizational principles and unity against hegemonic culture of this sphere. Unfortunately, those excluded social groups are fragmented and separated in to diverse social issues. For instance, gender inequality, environmental and racial issues and so on, it proves that these issues and particularities make those social organizations vulnerable to appropriation and

control by the well organized and institutionalized state (Chandhoke 1995, pp.210-215).

From early 1950s and 1960s, post-war Europe has begun to reconstruct from the ruins of old legacies. German and French philosophers, Habermas and Foucault, were also contributors of the debate on post-war civil society after Gramsci. Both agree that civil society must be free from state intervention and it should be strengthened if democracy is to survive. However, they confront each other on the issue whether the sphere should reach consensus or should remain as conflict bias. Foucault's argument was justified based on the strength of growing social mobilization and political aspirations in French as well as in the U.S. from 1960s and onward to move the country for further democratization. Habermas's view was influenced by the relatively passive German society who was concentrated on economic performance of the government established based on the post-war constitution of 1949 (Kumar 1993; Chandhoke 1995).

Habermas offers a way to achieve agreement between social forces and the state that is different than Gramscian formulation of enforced 'consensus' as it was during pre-war Germany and Italy. For instance, limitation of influence through power or wealth up on state and civil society in their mediation process is important. So the participants of 'communication' will have a proper process and this process must be democratic in order to have democratic consensus. In other words, his focus is not on subjects or actors of particular interests but he develops inter-subjective approach to modernity using the concept of 'communicative rationality'. In such communication, individuals enter communication with their claims on norms to be discussed and to become valid for each participant. As for the validity claims, Habermas explains that validity is defined as consensus without force, and all affected can freely accept the consequences and side effects of general expectation that such acceptance will benefit each individual of communication (Andrew & Cohen L 1992, p.225; Bent 1998, p.220).

Important point of this concept is that the discourse which civil society pursue, should

be rationally bond to achievement of consensus which he calls for discourse ethics without external power or money influence. His concern was about democratic principles of mediation between civil and political society (parliamentary debates, state councils, municipal assemblies). And such ethics is comprised with five principles as quoted “(1) no party affected by what is being discussed should be excluded from the discourse (the requirement of generality); (2) all participants should have equal possibility to present and criticize validity claims in the process of discourse (autonomy); (3) participants must be willing and able to empathize with each other's validity claims (ideal role taking); (4) existing power differences between participants must be neutralized such that these differences have no effect on the creation of consensus (power neutrality); and (5) participants must openly explain their goals and intentions and in this connection desist from strategic action (transparency). And finally we could add a sixth: unlimited time.” (Bent 1998, p.213).

In this concept, argumentation insures that all concerned in principle take part, freely and equally, in a cooperative search for truth, where nothing coerces anyone but only for the better argument. Habermas's view on solution is institutions and clear procedures where all alternative interests and claims are expressed, mediated and agreed. Such universal procedure, laws and institutions strengthen civil society to exist, because both sides of agreement – written dispositions, conditions and norms stick to it. Habermas is one of the admirers of constitution writings building norms and procedures but all should have democratic purposes and based on equality and freedom. Habermas was one of the first scholars who were able to distinguish an important of institutionalization of public and political sphere.

However, such discipline is given from ‘above’, which means enacted laws, regulations and norms imposed by the state. The critique on communicative rationale is that the opening up ‘from above’ of political spaces for dialogue and participation in response to struggles does not necessarily meet those aspirations of participants. Therefore, it should not

depend on the formal spaces that those in power agree to open up (Howell & Pearce 2001, pp.54-55). Social movements and grassroots organizations aspire to activate people to participate in any space they consider appropriate, not to limit their political engagement to the institutionalized spaces of formal democracy that reflect the structure of power. Habermas himself admits lack of 'crucial institutions', lack of 'crucial socialization' and 'poverty, abuse, and degradation' as barriers to reap the benefit of discursive decision making. But he does not give a proper attention to relations of power that create those barriers and how to lower the barriers. He ignores the reality of power relations by emphasizing that the reached agreement is more valuable than the constant struggle.

However, as Foucault argues, power is everywhere and it intervenes in to any, discursive or not, aspirations of individuals. He provides evidence of intensive mobilization of social groups, riots and discontents against French government, and the cases of oppression of those social forces by the government. Therefore, "the law, institutions – or policies and plans – provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy, even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely to be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or 'correct' thinking" (Bent 1998, p.222). Given this background theory-based writing of constitutions, it would not be seen as an effective way of empowering civil society. More importance given here is to the actual interpretations and practice of written constitutions in specific society. In other words, Foucault focuses more on how existing constitutions and their associated institutions can be utilized more democratically. The solution he gives is resistance and struggle in contrast to consensus, because freedom and rights are not things to be given but it is to be taken and this is what constitutes civil society.

Therefore, we can assume that post-war edifice of civil society was divided between society and state centric approaches. It was mainly justified by both political expansions of state power and social movements which constantly questioned legitimacy of such expansion. Offe

(1974, p.33) argues that primary economic function of the state is capital accumulation and primary political function is to achieve legitimacy. He points out some evidence of social movements and profound dissatisfaction to pressure the state for an equality and access for public goods and services for the poor and marginalized in 1960s. Offe welcomed the emergence of such new social movements that was not within the boundaries of capital accumulation and production. Those were groups raising social issues and equal civic rights. Therefore, the state must acquire certain autonomy and legitimacy in order to fulfill those demands, otherwise such capitalist state or 'bureaucratic bourgeois' is destined to collapse. Also the state should be relatively autonomous, because it was constituted as the factor of social cohesion, mediating the conflicts within and between the social classes. Therefore, the state cannot and should not be instrument of civil society. On the same ground Poulantzas criticizes the idea of state being dominant and confident institution over civil society. Since the state is entering in to mediation of battle within and between social classes, its policies become incoherent and chaotic (1978, p.135). The class struggle not only modifies the state apparatus but goes beyond it (1975:27). Such struggles generally make the state inconfident and incapable of managing future of political system. Although both Offe and Poulantzas agree with that state has relative autonomy, civil society also has profound input in to state institutions and its political discourse. Offe proves that by giving example of economic crises where state intervenes in to economic sphere to correct the market but it is counterproductive because it leads to political crisis as numerous social movements arise to make their demands upon the state. He raises the problem within the achievement of both political legitimacy and capital accumulation functions of the state which according to him, as Chandhook puts it, creates 'legitimacy deficit' (1995, p.22). While state addresses social issues such as an inequality, in order to gain political legitimacy, it weakens the achievement of the primary function of the state – economic growth which creates inequality based on freedom of the market. Thus, if the

political practices of states are largely dependent up on the practices of civil societies and the states are constituted by self-conscious civil societies as much as they seek to constitute this sphere, then there cannot be a persuasive theory of the state without a theory of civil society. A theory of the state presupposes a theory of how the boundaries of the political discourse sponsored by the state are mediated by those emerging from civil society. A statist perspective, therefore, which focuses on the state in abstraction from civil society, is simply inadequate (Evans et al. 1985, pp.60-65). It is inadequate because it fails to perceive the dialectic relationship between state and society. It is myopic perspective because it does not offer any understanding of the manner in which states can become irrelevant, as for instance the colonial state became irrelevant, or the states in East Europe in 1980s became irrelevant, simply because society managed to wrest political initiative from the state. It is about power politics.

## **2.2 Disappearance of Civil Society: Political Development and Stability**

However, from the 1960s, the process of modernization and building modern states was replaced by the issues of political development. Post-war civil society concept gave its way to the political side of the public sphere. And this sphere from 1960s up to 1980s was occupied by the challenges of the political power of the state and the increasing aspirations of the society for the liberalizations. These challenges were framed under strong terms of political development which ensured development of political science in the West. Especially American political science of the 1960s has become dominant, which could dictate the direction and values of the scientific research in the region. It was accompanied with the American growing dominancy in global arena in economic and military indices. The political science itself was concentrated on importance of political development within growing social and political mobilization and instability, which it brings in western and non-western polities. It was based on value free approach on American science and the predominant focus was on comparative

political analysis (Chandhoke 1995, p.18; Huntington 1965, p.410). Post-war western countries and especially Americans were rigor though ambiguous on the issue how to stabilize democratic as well as capitalist political system in their hand against growing communistic ideology spreading through its own societies in the regions. Therefore, first priority they assumed was to restore democracy in the West by responding to growing social forces and second to assist new nation-states in non-Western countries after decolonization. Another crucial point is that in the midst of existing democracies and new coming 'non-modernized' independent states, there were 'transition' countries in Latin America, Asia and South – Asia who found themselves incapable of dealing with increasing social unrest and growing number of social and political mobilization to challenge their political systems. Therefore, such social movements and mobilization was very much under concern of comparative political science and scholars were concentrated on stability in democratic systems and stable democratic transition in non-Western countries. Although interest in civil society has become invisible, or limited as it was replaced by the political system and institutions, the concept was enriched through the political science and theories of political development

### **2.2.1 Civil Society within Political Development: Civic Culture**

There are two interesting research on political development which has essential contribution to the debate on civil society concept. One is *civic culture* and second is *political institutionalization*. Both are results of tremendous scholars' effort on study of political development in the Third World. Although the term of political development was meant to be a certain goal or ends of the transitional and new emerged nation-states, the aim of the U.S. and Europe was to initiate modernization or as it was claimed to be 'westernization' of those countries. Therefore, export of western norms, values and institutions was necessary, but the problem was that utilization of those within the cultural and pre-modern values of non-Western

societies.

Almond and Verba have observed the differences of cultural aspects among nations. In other words, it looks in to the differences between societies in the West and the rest of the world. It is the differences between colonized and colonial cultures, capitalist and communist societies and finally developed and developing world. The difference is in the *political culture* and its development in those societies. It is in the modernization processes of those societies and states *according to that culture*. Almond and Verba concerned about the dramatic emergence of new sovereign states after decolonization. It is believed that the problems of the new states are in some sense problems of other states have faced in the past: how to create a stable political system; how to make such system effective in meeting demands placed up on it, what is the significance of the contention between traditional values and modern practices for the stability and maintenance of the political order. Above all, to what extent is it possible to accelerate and direct political change, and how can traditional societies be best transformed in to democratic polities? These are the kinds of questions that plague the leaders of the new states as they contemplate the differences between contemporary politics in their societies and their vision of the kind of polities they would build (Pye & Verba 1965, p.4; 512).

This approach emphasizes that in spite of the great potentialities for diversity in political orientations, in any particular community there is a limited and distinct *political culture* which gives meaning, predictability and form to the political process. The concept suggests that the traditions of a society, the spirit of its public institutions, the passions and the collective reasoning of its citizens, and the style and operating codes of its leaders are not just random products of historical experience but fit together as a part of a meaningful whole and constitute an intelligible web of relations. It is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life of histories of the individuals who currently make up the system; and thus it is rooted equally in public event and private experiences. These empirical beliefs,

combined with expressive symbols and values that defines the situation in which political action takes place, all of them comprises a political culture. It is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects as a special set of social objects and processes. It forms an important link between the events of politics and the behavior of individuals in reaction to those events. It refers not to what is happening in the world of politics but what people believe about those happenings. It emphasizes that existing political culture influences and controls political behavior of individuals which means what actions and non-actions they choose as a reflection to the political system process and performance. Therefore, history is full of examples of constitutions that did not 'take' as the constitution writers had hoped because their application was mediated through a particular political culture, and history is full of examples of the ways in which political ideologies have been adapted to fit the pre-existing culture of the nation into which they were introduced. It is a helpful concept in understanding and explaining problems of political change and modernization (Pye & Verba 1965, pp.6-10).

Almond and Verba are political scientists, thus they were involved in the research of comparative political development. They were interested in understanding commonalities and uniqueness of each nation-state in their endeavors for political development. Authors by putting clear criteria on attributes of political development such as 1) development of political identity and national integration, 2) rational impersonal political community 3) democratization – pluralism and equality 4) mobilization and participation, have aimed at finding a focal point which defines a common factor that plays as a support for political development. Their discovery was *political culture* (Almond & Verba 1989; Verba 1980, pp.394-410).

Political culture is a set of orientation toward political objects and processes. Orientation refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It includes 1) *cognitive* orientation, that is knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs; 2) *affective* orientation, or feelings about

the political system, its roles, personnel and performance and, 3) *evaluation* orientation, the judgments and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings (Almond & Verba 1989, pp.13-16). These orientations are directed to the political objects which are also categorized as ‘political system’ as general object. It is general, because it is a summary and combination of three broad classes of objects 1) *roles* or *structures*, legislative bodies and executive or bureaucracies 2) *incumbents* of roles, legislators, and administrators 3) *policies*, *decisions*, or *enforcements* of decisions. These three, structures, incumbents and policies, are divided in to two by their involvement in political or “input” process and administrative or “output” process. At the other extreme we distinguish orientations toward the “self” as political actor (1989, p.14).

So the basic diagram will be that individual’s cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations toward political system in general, input and output objects and finally how he sees himself, his role, rights and obligations as a political actor can determine for us *types* or characteristics of political culture that particular society gained. For instance, *parochial* political culture is characterization of zero frequency of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations that people have toward political objects in that society. Zero means that for instance individual has no knowledge, feeling or opinion about political system of nation he inhabits, or roles and policy making process of political elites, and finally his role in this whole system, structures, input and output processes. If individuals’ cognition, affective and evaluative orientation is active toward political system in general and their orientation is concentrated on structures of administration and its policy enforcement role, then the political culture is defined as *subject political culture*. Subject political culture emphasizes on individuals knowledge, feeling and opinions to general political system or regime and to the output of its performance. There is no orientation or interest in policy making process (input) and peoples’ role in this system, because, individuals are just beneficiaries and receivers of the

outcome. However, they may have feelings and opinions about the whole system, they may like or dislike the government performance, but they don't consider decision making or policy formulation process because of lack of information, knowledge and interest in it. Subject political culture therefore is a passive relationship, although there is limited form of competence. The last characterization is *participant political culture*, which defines active orientations like knowledge, feelings and judgment on policy making process and its administration, as well as individual's role in this system as an active political actor. Individuals of participant culture may be favorable or unfavorable oriented to the various classes of political objects but the point is that they are fully aware of their politically system and they feel themselves as active participants in decision making and administration or governance of the country. From such division of categories in political culture, we determine if individual orientations, and political culture congruent with the structure of the political system they have. Basically, we can say that parochial, subject and participant culture would be most congruent with respectively, a traditional political structure, a centralized authoritarian structure and a democratic political structure. This can justify one of the reasons for allegiance, apathy or alienation of individuals with their political system and regime. Allegiance means that a structure if the political system is well fit to the political culture of that nation. Apathy and alienation is the opposite, for instance, it is difficult to build modern nation state, strong administrative institutions and modern bureaucracy if majority of that society is within traditional political structure based on communities of regional kinships. Same thing we can see in participant political culture of society. It creates alienation of participant society from centralized authoritarian structure of political system but congruent with democratic structure of political system.

So one can ask how come there can be such difference between political culture and structure, while we tend to think that the culture is the basis for structure. The decisive feature is

the interaction between both; one is affected and affects another. Also, political culture is not homogenous where we can see several structures of the political culture. For instance, political culture of rulers and ruled or elites and masses are different. Same as the temptation of modern acculturated individuals is different than those privileging traditional orientations, as well as one group's political culture different than another. Therefore, there is a notion of 'mixed' political culture which distinguished from but mixed with parochial, subject and participant political culture with relation to political structures of political system. .

*Parochial-subject political culture* – is early period of state building, where large portion of population was able to reject primordial, feudal and communal structures and preferred allegiance with some centralized power structures holding all portions together as one nation. *Subject-participant political culture* –represents only part of population, probably intellectuals and elites have acquired input orientations and activist set of self-orientations, while most of the population continues to be oriented toward authoritarian governmental structure and have relatively passive set of self-orientations. Participant orientations spread only in part of society are not based on experience or on confident sense of legitimacy. Furthermore, the structural instabilities that frequently accompany the mixed subject – participant culture, the frequent ineffectiveness of the democratic infrastructure and of the governmental system tend to produce alienative tendencies among the democratically oriented elements of the population. Therefore, the tendencies toward more democratic participant political culture transformation go through gradual growth of demand and social mobilization.

*Parochial-participant political culture* – is the most difficult mixture of traditional orientation of the people and democratic structure of political system. Such kind of mixed political culture is widely spread among recent transition and post-colonial countries. These new emerged nations and their new established governments tend to establish more democratic structure and modern institutions of political system to catch up with the rest of the world. The

structural norms that have been introduced are usually participant; for congruence, therefore, they require a participant culture. However, regardless of new set of democratic institutions, major part of society still allocates themselves outside of those institutions while they have pre-existing deep rooted traditional parochial political structures and cultures. One of the predominant features of the cultural patterns in most of the transitional nations is that belief systems stressing modernity in politics are sharply different from the more traditional beliefs associated with other aspects of life, and this may cause severe strain for those who are forced to act within the political culture and the more general culture at the same time (Pye & Verba 1965, pp.523-524).

What does it tell us about? This study was examined in order to reveal that how political culture has influence on individual or groups' behavior toward state and its policies so it can strengthen or weaken the process of political development. Although the desire is to encourage participant political culture in parochial and subject political cultures to move toward democracy building, emancipation and expansion of associational life, the cautious issue was the intense growth of participation would endanger stability of political systems. Therefore, important aspect of political culture issue is the transformation or change from one political culture to another as a means of political development and modernization of the nation. Such transformation is necessary but difficult process because answers chosen to questions of what happens to old ones or how transformation is to be accomplished may become main reasons of instability and failure of transformation. It is customary to think that cultural dimensions are unchanging factors that form the setting within which politics is carried on; that culture conditions politics, but not vice versa. But the situation is sharply different today. Basic beliefs have now become the object of direct concern and attempted manipulation by the political elites in many nations. (Pye & Verba 1965, p.520). In general the problem here is the extent to which change and modernization in political culture involve rejection of earlier, more

traditional patterns or incorporation of the new beliefs in to pre-existing ones. So the suggestion these authors provide is that if one can build new political beliefs upon a firm base of traditional ones, where new beliefs appear while old ones rarely disappear – it may be possible to achieve change without severe social disruption. However, there is a danger of stagnation in transformation if privilege of peace comes at the expense of prioritizing traditional patterns of political beliefs which temper the demands for transformation of political culture (Pye & Verba 1965, pp.543-544). Therefore, successful transformation of political culture from one to another does not means the rejection or denial of previous but possible combination and tolerance for both old and new which in total becomes *civic culture*. The attitude, feelings and behavior of societies of those nations toward their political systems, structures and performance of governments were main attributes of their democratic transformation and its consolidation. But such transformation should be emphasized on civic culture in order to build stable democracy. As Almond and Verba argue: “the ability freely to form groups for political activity appears to be related to the general nature of the ‘citizens’ commitment to politics: it is “balanced” or “managed.” Americans and Britons are involved in politics, but the involvement is held within limits....[This balance] is needed for a successful democracy: there must be involvement in politics if there is to be sort of participation necessary for democratic decision making; yet the involvement must not be so intense as to endanger stability.” (quoted from (Howell & Pearce 2001, p.46)). They concluded that it is the balance between commitment to politics and autonomy from politics, a balance related to more basic social values such as trust and solidarity among people in associational form. Almond and Verba (1965) revealed the secret of American associational life as an embedded *civic culture*. They were pessimistic about the development of such culture in the third world. They have suggested that stable democracy requires a “mixed political culture” in which the “participant” orientation – to vote, demonstrate and organize on the basis of rational interests – is tempered by a “subject” orientation of loyalty

to the political community and constitutional order and by a “parochial” orientation that involves the individual in more traditional or at least private and non-political concerns (Diamond 1997, p.11). Civic culture means a mixture of different stages of political culture which each individual bears, and such mixture is essential to balance human emancipation and its role in public sphere. Such mixture was essential to bring stable democracy and to ‘civilize’ growing unstable social movements and their endeavors for political participation.

The reason we brought this concept up to our concern is that existing link between civic culture and civil society. It seems obvious by looking at the similar words ‘civic’ and ‘civil’ in both concepts, but actually it needs more than that to explore their relevance. Civic culture as we mentioned above is distinguished from political culture which was about political attitudes and beliefs on political structure, its performance and system as a whole. Such attitude and beliefs are what guides and motivates society to react or behave in public sphere. In other words, this is what moves and mobilizes society to certain direction of act. For instance, primordial, kinship and clan based communities are characterized as parochial political culture. Therefore, their reciprocal interaction within these communities is bond only within this community which has no connection with political system and its performance. Although, it is an associational life, it does not represent modern society and does not link it to wider society, individuals in it has only hierarchical constructed identities. As we mentioned earlier civil society is a product of modernization. Only in modern society we can claim for the link between civil society and civic culture. But in the modern society, we have democratic and authoritarian type of political regimes or systems. Correspondently, both have participant and subject political cultures. Authors’ definition is clear; one is a culture of people who are determined by the beliefs and attitudes toward public sphere as a participant actors, another is the obedient, passive citizenry of political system. To the question of which of these actors are members of civil society, as Almond and Verba implies, we can answer neither of them. Because, authors are clearly

arguing that stable democracy requires something in between of these two, which means, a society with self-limited limited civic culture. Here is the link that connects them. So, these scholars indirectly have tried to distinguish another definition to the civil society, as a *public sphere comprised with people bearing 'civic culture'*. Therefore, civic culture is what motivates and guides the civil society. Well, the reason why parochial political culture of primordial society was included in their discussion is simple. They were also strong admirers of Tocquevillian democratic thinking and his preference on the role of associational life derived from early growing and expanding nature of communities in 19<sup>th</sup> century of America. Therefore, they saw in parochial political culture a factor of autonomy from public, solidarity within the community and households and everything that belongs to that inward looking community values. They also believed that the change and influence of modernization or transformation of these communities and parochial culture they bear can raise instability, thus authors warned about dangers of ignorance or neglect of traditional basis of a society. However, as many scholars have pointed out, civil society is the property of modern society emerged from industrial and political revolution in early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Civil society does not seek for political power which distinguishes it from political society. Civil society is in between family, economy and the state which allocates it perfectly in the public sphere of associational life. Therefore, civil society is the sphere that gathers associational life of people with civic culture. In this sense, Almond and Verba did not strongly admire freedom of this sphere in new transitional countries, but also they did not approve public authority to strongly intervene. Instead, as Berman (1997, p.565) puts it, “democracy requires a mixture of behavior” (democratic, constitutional, and authoritarian).

### **2.2.2 Civil Society within Political Development: Political Institutionalization**

Another author who contributed to the continuing debate over the stability of

democracy and political development was Samuel Huntington. He also admires Tocquevillian democratic thinking and quotes from “if men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased” (Huntington 1965, p.386). Although he deals with political development as Almond and Verba did, he does not see modernization and transformation as a political development as they do. Instead he proposes political institutionalization as an identification of political development (1965, p.386). He was concerned with the rates of mobilization and participation being high against the rates of organization and institutionalization being low which was the main cause for instability brought on by early stages of modernization and transformation. In this sense, he was also concerned with stable democracy as Almond and Verba did in their civic culture concept. If civic culture concept strongly supported for stability through nurturing civic culture during transformation and modernization of societies within civil society, Huntington’s support of stability was in institutionalization of civil society as it was in Habermas thinking of institutionalization of public sector.

Huntington’s effort can be described in three stages. In the first stage, he aims to define the concept of political development against political decay. Here, proposition is that modernization does not necessarily mean or bring political development. Modernization is rather process of social and economic change in individuals’ life, which distances them from their traditional bonds with family, clan, tribe and particular regions and it mobilizes people according to their aspirations and demands, hence it causes new social and political consciousness. It is a process that cannot be substantiated unless those causes are addressed. Evidence that he describes is that development of group consciousness leads to make claims on the political system and to demand participation in the system. The crucial moment of modernization is at this stage, which allowing such political participation can turn the path to

political development or decay. He gives various examples of events in Latin America, South-East Asia and Africa where the process of modernization and change has been simultaneously occurring with growth of social mobilization comparing the similarities earlier back in 18<sup>th</sup> century in the West. He points out that modernization did not bring naturally political development, but in most of the cases it brought political decay. The second stage of proposition is that what modernization brings as he mentioned as *instability* is the natural cause of it and this what must be expected first rather than development. There are two factors of instability; social mobilization and economic development. Social mobilization brought by modernization increases aspirations and awareness thus it acquires particularistic but plural mass diversification of society which creates antagonistic behavior among groups of fragmented society and social frustration. Economic development increases the capacity of society to satisfy those aspirations, which was to reduce social frustration and the instability. However, economic growth is accompanied with increasing gap between rich and poor thus creates inequality. At the same time those who gained property increases own capacity to strengthen their demands on government which government is unable to satisfy. Besides inequality and discontent to government, economic development aggravates regional and ethnic conflicts over the distribution of investment and consumption (Huntington 2006, pp.45-50). In these conditions, as he asserts, political participation becomes a road for advancement of the socially mobilized individual. The third stage of proposition is that political institutionalization is a valid and necessary precondition for enhance political participation and tackle modernization reforms. As long as social frustration leads to demands on the government and the expansion of political participation to enforce those demands, there is need for legitimate channel to express and demands should be moderated and aggregated within the political system. The absence of participation opportunity for social groups or proper political institutionalization to respond creates more dangerous instability, which is political instability.

Political instability is dangerous because it challenges legitimacy of whole political system; it raises dissatisfaction on government and violence among people. Such instability is fearsome since it destroys public and political order in changing societies.

Therefore, what Huntington suggests is that in order to cope successfully with modernization, political system should be able to assimilate in to the system the social forces produced by modernization and achieve a new social consciousness as a result of modernization (Huntington 2006, p.140). The successful assimilation of these demands depends up on both receptivity of the system and the adaptability of the entering group that is willingness of the groups to relinquish some of its values and claims in order to gain admittance to the system. It means that it requires both institutionalization of polity and society within that political system. Such institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability (Huntington 2006, p.12). For the society, if social and economic change during modernization process undermines prior traditional bases of association, political development depends on the capacity of the people to develop new forms of association. Chaotic and mass social groups undermine stability but complex, flexible and institutional form of associational life can ease adaptation of political system to the demands of modernity from society. Receptivity of the political system to such demands also depends on level of political modernization and its institutionalization. For polity, he defines two political systems. One is praetorian polity where level of emerging social groups and demands upon the system exceeds the level of political institutionalization. In a praetorian system, social forces confront each other out of any legitimate procedure; no political institutions, no political leaders are recognized or accepted as intermediaries to moderate conflict. There is no general agreement on procedures or authoritative methods to resolve conflict. Therefore, in such system power is fragmented and authority is easily acquired and lost thus, no incentive exists for a leader or group to make significant concessions in the search for authority. In praetorian system

the scope of political participation endangers political stability because the demands from social groups are in harsh competition so the techniques and methods they use like bribes, student riot, workers strike, mobs demonstration and military coup easily can raise the violence and instability. Another type of political system he defines is *civic polity* (Huntington 2006, p.80). Civic polity is the political system where government itself is modernized in terms of its bureaucratic apparatus and public institutions. It is adaptive, complex, coherent and autonomous. However, civic polity requires assimilation of social forces and demands in to the system through political institutionalization. He suggests that best option is expansion of political participation through organized political parties. All fragmented social groups should be absorbed by the political parties where interests and aspirations must be articulated and shaped. Therefore, political institutionalization occurs when government is modernized and institutionalized as well as political parties are organized. The factor what makes polity as civic polity, is that level of institutionalization of public sector and politics.

As reader can see that Huntington is very much concerned with stability and political development which can be achieved by political institutionalization. Also, he is keen upon associative capacity of society to be able to pursue political participation in civilized manners. His concept does not distinguish this sphere of social mobilization and participation as a civil society; instead he refers to it frequently as 'social forces'. Therefore, he proposes these activities and processes to be institutionalized to give a value and stability. His wise attempt to solve the problems between social forces and the state for the sake of stability and development lies on political institutions – parties, thus we assume that his solution on issues of civil society growth also is in political parties. Indeed, as scholars of modern democracies asserted that civil society can not develop unless their value and resources are accommodated in political parties. Political parties are what civil society enriches and strengthens, but civil society needs political parties for strengthening demands on political system as a whole. However, incorporation of

‘social groups’ in to political parties does not necessarily satisfies demands of those groups right away, instead it leaves no choice but to incorporate their interest with other members of the party. He asserts that social groups should relinquish some of their demands in order to successful assimilation of these demands in the system. It is a nature of political society and indeed it must be institutionalized, but by incorporation of social forces in to political parties as a sole legitimate space for them, leaves rest of the unincorporated social groups as illegitimate or chaotic.

Therefore, for civil society as a distinct sphere from political society, Huntington gave an idea of institutionalization to this sphere too. He reveals that how institutionalization can bring legitimacy, value and stability to any particular organization, if it reaches autonomy against subordination, complexity against simplicity, coherence against disunity and adaptability against rigidity. If any organization achieves those elements, it becomes stable, organized and valid social institution. Therefore, the value of his work related to the concept of civil society is institutionalization of this sphere which brought civil society organizations. It means that civil society as a sphere of contest and mediation to shape a public interest and demand its satisfaction can be found even in non-Western societies, and they are chaotic, instable and violent but institutionalized civil society is what Western societies own.

### **2.3 Revival of Civil Society within Developing World**

Indeed, this is true in matter of latter half of 20<sup>th</sup> century when the concept of civil society was not found in the Third world yet. Whatever social unrest and struggle have been happening they were considered as ‘backwardness’ of political institutions of those societies pointing at inability to impose public order (Huntington 2006, pp.192-195). Therefore, political institutionalization concept was first attempt to criticize many facts of governmental violent cease of social unrest, legitimate social demands and suggested to build civic political system

where such demands can be assimilated. Also it was first attempt to criticize violent, chaotic and fragmented social mobilization for private interests rather than institutionalized civil society for public good. Migdal (1988, pp.52-97) has pointed how strong society can affect weak states in developmental process and implementation of state policies which undermines institutional capacity. Therefore, he proposes directional change in existing social control mechanism of the state and warns the lack of modern institutions in developing countries to address social forces appealing to the state power. There was need to distinguish between civil and 'uncivil' societies. Hence, each social group is distinguished via specific issue and target of concern, each has own agenda in order to challenge existing old social norms and orders. To be civil, means to have criteria for measurement of various groups and movements who are always eager to enter to this sphere. Therefore, the state and its institutions must bring expected transformation and development through assimilating articulated public interest.

However, in early 1970s, as a wave of democratization following the first (started in 1828, America, up to 45% of all nations in 1922), second (after WWII picked to 32% in 1962), has started the third one from Portuguese Revolution in 1974 (Kurzman 1998, p.43). The 1974 revolution had overthrown both the dictatorship and those economic forces that had benefited from it. Although, there were Hungarian Uprising (1956) and Prague Spring (1968) with Soviet- led invasions, the successful cases of such social movements have started from Portuguese revolt. Soon, in 1980s, 'Solidarity' – anti-bureaucratic social movement of trade unions started in Poland also successfully overthrown communistic regime following Czech, Romania and Baltics up to the 1990s, which led to the collapse of Soviet Union. These were transition of civil society from its origin to the politics of despot, totalitarianism and coercion grounded by the political power it held. As Ignatieff describes it:

*“...The teachers, writers, and journalists of the Czech underground, the shipyard workers and intellectuals of Poland's Solidarity... philosophical study groups in basements and boiler*

*rooms, the prayer meetings in church crypts, and the unofficial trade union meetings in bars and backrooms were seen as a civil society in embryo. Within those covert institutions came the education in liberty and the liberating energies that led to 1989. In the revolutions of that year —in Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltics —civil society triumphed over the state....” (Ignatieff 1995, p.128)*

Indeed, the power to challenge the totalitarian state and empowerment of socio-political interests outside of the state was possible only through revival of the civil society in those nations to transform a communist dogma entrenched deepest social strata for over four decades.<sup>25</sup> The collapse of the USSR in the end of 1980s was celebrated as a victory of liberal ideologies and revival of civil society instead of earlier critique on ‘backward’ political institutions and ‘uncivil’ societies. Although it did not take the same path as Huntington suggested institutionalization and guidance by the political party, the sense of acknowledgment of civic power immediately has expanded the concept usage in the third world. Western social and political science was rigor to provide with conceptual basis to give an impulse of civil society transition in to new emerged independent states from the ruins of the Soviet Union. But most important role of civil society was acknowledged and admitted that without it and its freedom from state intervention, democracy and liberalism can not be reached in non-Western societies. Since the state could not be immediately expected to bring modernization and transformation, civil society has become alternative source for the demand and pressure for such ends. The major point here is that if in the West the state and its institutions were main agent of transformation, modernization and development, in the Third World civil society has become to play such role.

From early 1990s, the dichotomist global polity between Capitalist and Communist block has ended its determinism and reductionist approach on nation states. Instead, if the term

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<sup>25</sup> Poland was invaded in 1939.

of Western global political trend was political development and modernization up to the 1980s, it was replaced by neo-liberal developmental discourse. At this point, civil society was supposed to play an agent and the facilitator of these trends of development and transition process of developing countries. The bureaucratic totalitarian states could not be trusted and relied upon in this process anymore; instead, civil society organizations were essential to import values of liberalism, free market economy and democracy. Thus, Western donor countries have encouraged and supported emerging civil society institutions such Non-Governmental and Non-Profit organizations (NGOs&NPOs) as well as social movements in those transition countries. Organization of civil society institutions in developing countries meant that correspondent norms which guarantee rights and freedom of civil society are enacted and approved by the democratic constitutions. Organizations of civil society should bear duties to educate civil rights, exchange and share knowledge and information about liberal values and pursue actual implementation by the government officials. The norms that give a freedom of speech and expression would be vital weapon to pressure the state for further reforms and criticize it if there is no such commitment.

The transitional concept of civil society is worth to elaborate here to compare with the conceptual values up to 1980s in the West. In brief, civil society was the sphere where state finds its political legitimacy, as well as source to enhance its political capacity. The state was essential for survival of civil society, to remain 'civil', and finally to intervene when inequality and discrimination endangers the sphere. Nevertheless, both sustain their relative autonomous status from direct domination and appropriation. In term of Tocqueville, civil society was also distinct from the political society, but both reciprocal to each other. Civil society was a source of warning whenever the state crosses the limit or abuses the authority given by the constitution. In both conceptions, civil society did not directly oppose the state in its existence in the West. Instead, pre-war and post-war edifice of the concept had been brought to the institutionalization

and acculturation of the sphere to the discourse posed by the political society. The confrontations, representations and criticism of this discourse must be within the democratic institutions and processes, otherwise such civil society was not considered as 'civil' in the West. In brief, civil society was a result of modernization brought by Enlightenment and Industrial revolution in the Western societies therefore; civil society was essential phenomena for them.

But somehow, in the case of its transition beginning from the Eastern Europe, the concept has been polarized to the civil society as against the state and even better than the despotic states of the Third World. The only assumption is that 'civil' society should transform 'uncivil' incapable bureaucracy dominated by one-party system toward liberalization and democratization since the state did not show such willingness. Only through vibrant and active civil society, it should be able to pressure the state toward industrialization, transformation of old institutions to the modern ones. Since the role of the civil society is to be empowered then the limitation of state power was necessary. Such limitation of state power has been a favorite issue of American developmental donor-ship in developing countries through introducing decentralization, power check and balance of American political system. Moreover, introduction of free market economical values has been essential tool to enhance such limit on the state. From other side, Europeans were rigor to introduce their primacy on parliamentary rule where state was merely executive order. In both cases, civil society must play the role of 'watch-dog' and the state must insure civil liberties of citizens.

Favorably, developing countries have embraced transformations toward democratic republican states as expressing the rule of the peoples not by Kings. Election for the democratic institutions, decentralization, representation through parliament deputies and political parties all have been welcomed in these developing countries to show modernity and their readiness for change and cooperation economic integration with the West. However, civil society was not at popular demand, and the authority was still centralized. It seems that 'enlightenment' and

enlightened 'civil' society was exported to the Third World without necessary pre-conditions meaning industrial development and civil rights as it was in case of Europe and America. Therefore, enlightened people were eager to organize civil society organizations, movements, and organize opposition parties to demonstrate the need for industrialization and guarantees of civic liberties which were the missing part of developmental change occurred in the West but they were not supported by majority. Civil society is a modern term as it was in the early modernized 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe, and has become something annoying in 'non-modern' societies in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It was believed that the pressure and demand from civil society would ensure to put the state on the right track, but instead, states of developing countries have attempted to undermine legitimacy of claims raised by civil society organizations on the basis of their relevance to public interest of their nation and national cultural values.

North (1990, p.6) once admitted that formal rules, institutions can change overnight, as a result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies. Algappa (2004, pp.12-18) gives example of arguments that civil society is a Western concept that is not applicable to Confucian societies, citing tradition – conformity, benevolent rule by dominating state and penetration of society by the state, they advance a cultural distinctiveness argument which mirrors Asian values. Even the case of liberal democracy, argument of Asian political elites in 1980s and early 1990s were against transition as long as it was not suited to an Asia with its own distinctive value system, which supports a strong state, one-party dominancy and developmental-state economic model. It means that although formal rules and institutions exported to non-Western societies represented modernization and modern state building, but the state and society relations were still remaining as predatory as it was before. It was like an old wine in new bottle. Instead, later many scholars of developing countries have managed to

do their own research pointing at irrelevance of direct relationship between civil society and democracy or civil society and development. Their strong claim was that civil society is a sphere full of particularistic interests, sometimes irrational, discriminative and 'undemocratic'; therefore, emphasis must be made on characteristics of comprising destructive elements of organizations and their activities in context rather than claiming that it brings democracy (Algappa 2004, p.40). However, such point is probably made to represent intolerance of civil society organizations to authoritarian governments.

Nevertheless, Algappa reveals the facts of self-governing non-state associations that thought to influence state politics though the term civil society was not used during mass rallies and protests of Filipinos in the end of 1980s. "Mass rallies and protests have also figured prominently at critical junctures in South Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma and China..." within a decade of civil society transition period from the end of 1980s and the early 1990s (Algappa 2004, p.4). But later throughout much of Asia, organizations and individuals later self-consciously identifying themselves as belonging to civil society, seek to affect the identity and structure of their respective states, its policies on matters of political and civil rights, minority and women's right, environmental and socio-economic conditions. Diamond (1996, pp.15-20) assures that democratic change in South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, Poland, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, Nigeria and Benin, among other countries can not be comprehended without reference to civil society. Cohen and Arato (1992, p.2) insist that the concept of civil society is essential to understand dramatic changes that occurred in Latin America and Easter Europe.

From 1990s and onward, civil society concept has become a key word on democratic transition in developing countries in spite of resistance and antagonism of the governments toward this term in early 1980s. Of course, the transition of the concept was not only due to admirations and support of the developing societies, but much of the effort was made by the

International Developmental institutions like World Bank, IMF, USAID, UNDP and UN. Therefore, gradually, civil society organization began to appear like mushrooms in all corners of the world. Another reason is that civil society was not only the term to use for political challenges and discontents upon governments in those nations, but the term was also a home for poverty reduction movements in South Asia, Africa and other low income countries. United Nations mainly supported cooperation between civil society organizations and governments to arrange and manage poverty reduction strategies and MDGs. Such cooperation was admired due to the scale and mobility of the voluntary groups in indigenous societies which enables them to deliver foods, drinks, medicine and other facilities with low cost. Moreover, dense network and high sequence of communication among voluntary groups has been used to engage in relief and rescue missions in remote areas of emergency and natural disaster. Therefore, the possible and useful collaboration between public institutions and civil society organizations also encouraged admitting the role of the civil society. But again, those civic groups and associations seeking for political transformation, economic development and democracy were rare case if not through strong international pressure. Most of the cases, as reminder of Gramsci, governments have managed through pro-government leaders and elites to manage so called GONGOs (Government Organized NGOs) in order to play counterweight to those financed by foreign donors.

From overall assessment and review of civil society transition in developing countries, we may conclude that concept's definition and values have been altered in due process of early social movements from the end of 1970s, 1980s up to 1990s on the basis of polarization the state and society over the quality of the state they live with. The main assumption probably could be an inquiry of not 'what kind of society the state needs', but what kind of state the society needs. If the challenges by the social forces in post-colonies of Europe, North America

and Latin America of 1960s during the Cold War period<sup>26</sup> were widely disregarded and called up on political institutionalization of ‘backward’ society, but since the 1980s’ social movements which led to collapse of the Soviet Union and other communistic regimes were cheerfully welcomed by Western scholars linking it to civil society. That was the point which the term of ‘civil’ society was used once again to point at ‘democratic values’ of civil society that was able to overthrow ‘backward’ regimes. So, the society chooses what state they prefer backward or democratic. However, the response from the developing countries governments, politicians, and intellectuals were skeptical and disapproval of the concept transition in to political domain of their soil. Although they claim that they had such ‘civilized’ (not civil) society concept such as Muslim solidary communities, Asian community values and indigenous communal live style as an autonomous sphere of social life, they ignore the role civil society should play in public participation. Such individualistic, liberal and participatory culture was not congruent with existing communitarian social values of those disapproving countries. It led to antagonism, cooptation and even criminalization of activities conducted by civil society organization thus such polarized dichotomist relations between state and civil society cannot be reconciled.

## **Conclusion**

The discussion of the civil society concept in this chapter has been searching for the values and intrinsic features that only belong to her. It became clear that it cannot be studied as independent phenomena without looking in to the role of the state, market, society or even a culture. When the research traced back to the historical evolution, it seems that civil society also has been regarded differently according to the time (early period of state building, social mobilization and capitalism) and space (America, Europe and Developing countries).

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<sup>26</sup> Those social forces were against capitalism. Communistic and socialistic ideology of Soviet Union was intensively flowing in to post-colonial independent states in every corners of the world.

Therefore, in this chapter we realized that “it is mistake to associate civil society with a single concept, with capitalism, with Western modernity, with modern society, with ‘bourgeois society’ or with economic modernization”<sup>27</sup> without extensive qualifications. Also, it seems that there is no consensus about what civil society is or how it is derived if we look in to such confusions:

- it can be referred to the economy, to non-economic realms or to both;
- it can include elements of the state and state organized institutions or be non-state;
- it can be wholly private or public;

Arguments that constructed this chapter show even more confusions about the values that civil society supposed to bear. It became clear that there is no strong reason to believe that civil society is always morally positive, modern or that civil society necessarily promotes democracy. If voluntary associations and movements can overthrow despotic regimes, it does not mean that they automatically create a democratic one. Civil society sometimes can be seen as not the precondition of liberalizations but in contrast the result of it, the result of rule of law, freedom of press, speech, assembly, the practice of civility, publicity, respect for human rights, the existence of public-private distinction, pluralism, civic participation and citizenship. Therefore, the scholars who realized how Western theories of civil society can be confusing to adopt particular concept, they suggested to pay “... high level of attention both to the definition of the concept proposed and to how it can be related to the particularities of the culture, politics, economics and social life of the country concerned” (Schak & Hudson 2003, p.16). In this sense, it explains why there is constant resistance to implement so called ‘Neo-Liberal’ concept of civil society via ‘proxy-NGOs’ expansion in developing countries. It also explains why civil society concept cannot be allocated since there is no clear distinction between public and

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<sup>27</sup> Usually scholars before going into specific argument on civil society, selectively put own literature reviews in order to point out in which direction they want to move on. See (Schak & Hudson 2003, p.12)

private in developing countries. In this case, why developing countries are supposed to build civil society and what they have to understand as civil society?

This part of review shed a light on instrumentalist approach on civil society building in Uzbekistan. On the one hand, it has become clear that civil society concept is not a product of recent socio-political environment emerged in Eastern Europe but it has deeper roots in modernization and rationalization process in the West. On the other hand, conceptual approach on developing countries like Uzbekistan is narrow to assess actual situation in target countries.

This chapter ends with a question rather than an answer which enables the discussion to move on to the following chapter where the research describes broadly the concept's evolution. There, the research poses the civil society in different perspective rather than conflicting sphere between state and society. Social capital is the concept which confirms the goodness and civicness that associational life preserves. It brings up another debate about how such associational life can promote social, economic and even political development which in this chapter it was not explored.

### **Chapter 3. Social Capital and initial State-Society Synergies**

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Historical processes and transformations of both states and societies necessitated the space where political discourse of the state and alternative ideologies of citizens could be contested and mediated and that space became civil society. Inhabitants of civil society are politically conscious, bearers of civil rights and motivated in such contestations with the state because they are conscious of the fact that state politics and its discourse directly affects the changes in social life toward development, stagnation or even destruction.

The recent literatures on the role of the state and civil society in public sphere have come to consensus that the public sphere is shared by the state and civil society and their interaction is not necessarily zero sum. The abstract privilege given to one at the cost of another is far from being real. An emphasis on civil society as a public space to limit the state or put it independent from the state also has become far from being rational. It means that the state intervention to practices of civil society or intervention of civil society to political action of the state is actually mutually productive and can be reciprocal. The capacity of both state and civil society to perform given tasks efficiently is, as described, depends on extent and the quality of their interaction with each other. As long as public sphere is shared, it does not necessarily

mean that the sphere is for confrontations but it can be for constructive and mutual relations between both. And such relations results the cohesion of both state and civil society.

The *state-society synergy concept* tells us more about this relationship between state and civil society, besides it tells us possibilities to establish in those countries where such relations are absent. However, it gives credit to social capital theory which enabled a change from dichotomist attitude to reciprocity between state and civil society.

### 3.1 Social Capital

The collapse of Soviet Union in the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century and the democratization wave in the Third World had given great impetus for the further liberalizations. The dominancy of Neo-liberal values of the 1980s up to the end of 1990s has played essential role in expansion of Western policy in to developing countries. Such policy constantly pressured states toward market liberalizations and decentralization of state power hence it must empower propertied class who would be able to mobilize society to demand equal access in decision making process. Neo-liberalists prioritized freedom of private sector as well as civil society which must be guaranteed under democratic constitutions and norms.

As already mentioned, transitional concept of civil society was enriched with the political dimension of society. Ability to associate and organize collective action was ‘civic’ness since it must challenge non-democratic regimes and such political consciousness should be able to demand, criticize and keep the state accountable. Moreover, it should be able to demand for equality, provision of public services, and express their opinion on political discourse. Without vibrancy and constant check on the state, it is not possible to guarantee the transition. Nevertheless, neo<sup>28</sup>-liberal values have become paradox of its own policies in the

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<sup>28</sup> Prefix ‘neo’ means *resumed, recent or contemporary* which is supposed to give a modern value to the ideologies used to dominate in the ancient West to enable its export to the developing countries. Neo-liberal values were actually values of liberalism in the ancient England and America. Same as Tocquevillian ideologies of 18<sup>th</sup> century

Third World as liberal values were questioned once in the West of the 1960s.<sup>29</sup> It was not possible to achieve equality without state intervention in to competitive market. It was not possible for the state to impose public order, improve quality of public services and guarantee for equal access to market without ‘rolling back’ the state in again. But it poses a question like how is it possible to bring the state back in if it endangers neo-liberal values where state must be limited?

The answer to above mentioned question was given by neo-Tocquevillian scholar Robert Putnam from his 20 years research on *Social Capital*. He explains that institutions and norms implemented to facilitate economic, social or even political development do not immediately do so if the social context (civic involvement, trust and reciprocity among members of civic community) is not developed first. Such social context, which is full of civic participation in associational life, generates trust, reciprocity, sense of common interest and collective action. He puts the state as essential ‘third party’ in order to encourage trust, honesty, solidarity and mutual aid against free-riders and defectors. Therefore, he concludes that both institutions and civic community are mutually reinforcing factors (Putnam 1993c, pp.163-175) and in this sense empowering the state does not endanger neoliberal values.

His case study on Italy from 1970s up to 1990s was focused on the fact that institutional reforms meaning decentralization of governance and policy making to regional governments did not change the difference between institutional performance of *civic*-North and un-civic Southern part of Italy. Therefore, he has analyzed the factors that divided Italy to North and South regardless of parallel institutional reforms in both. His analysis can be compared with the unequal expansion of neo-liberal values and civil society in developing countries regardless of similar democratic constitutions, representative institutions and

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were resumed as neo-Tocquevillian theories to apply in developing countries of 21<sup>st</sup> century.

<sup>29</sup> Beginning from 1950s to 1980s, after the war, and Great Depression, it was seen how reliance on market and its liberalization in the West could do more harm than good. Therefore, state intervention was necessary to ‘correct’ market failures. Therefore, state could not become mere instrument of market neither to be excluded.

universal suffrage implemented there.

He distinguished the difference in reciprocity, trust, solidarity among community members in the Northern and Southern part of Italy. The historical analysis of community development by Putnam brought inspiring facts showing how society of Northern part was rich of mutual aid groups, various cooperatives, educational associations, choral groups and entertaining clubs. Correspondingly, the readership of newspaper, discussions and informal information exchange was well developed in such *civic* communities. Although these were inward looking parochial associations, he asserts that they were associated with “...other manifestations of civic involvement and sociability, including electoral participation, cultural and recreational associations, and mass-based political parties” (Putnam 1993c, p.148).

In brief, civic involvement in associational life and its vibrancy was not directly allocated within political society as in neo-liberal perspective or European conceptualization; instead this sphere is ‘apolitical’. Such definition literally negates the polarization between state and civic community as they existed since 1980s. Although it is apolitical, civic community generates political attitude, belief, and judgment of institutional performance. Political expression and participation is allocated within the political society which Putnam does not deal in detail, instead, he emphasizes on how apolitical side of the society ‘civic community’ can facilitate institutional performance which is political.

Neo-Tocquevillian view on development of associational life and its conjuncture with the institutional performance turned earlier polarized developmental discourse toward building social capital. Social capital concept has attracted not only scholars, but also multinational developmental institutions, donors and Western politicians. Admitting the importance of the state in this process, suggested seeking not for good governments, charismatic leaders or elites but *good governance*. The role of the civil society was also distanced from being political, antagonistic and opposed sphere in to apolitical civic

community, neighborhoods, choral and parochial associations, mutual aid, and self-help groups. Bonds of kinship and community seen here is not as primitive and ritualistic constrain on development but rather the positive source of solidarities which could restrain the individualism and egoistic greed made rampant by capitalistic development (Howell & Pearce 2001, p.32). These groups do not necessarily challenge the state policies but may function as "...source of discipline and information for public agencies, as well as on-the-ground assistance in the implementation of public projects" (Putnam 1993b, p.42).

Therefore, from the early years of 21<sup>st</sup> century, scholars have begun to analyze social capital aspect in developing countries such as the density of voluntary associations, communities and parochial groups, which represents informal network of society. Search for social capital is much easier since it is not labeled as Western 'product' and it does not require building from scratch which neo-liberal civil society concept required. Instead, scholars gave attention to the traditional and cultural aspects of society existing for long times to find roots of associations and trust among members of communities which can be facilitated.

### **3.1.1 Social Capital in Developmental Discourse**

Although social capital theory has become popular recently, the concept can be traced back in to the late 1890s in pure sense of community movement for moral education, sympathy and solidarity among community members in America, which was developed by John Dewey and later by Hanifan in 1910s (Farr 2004, pp.6-15). Messages from early notion of social capital tell us that it "...took a stance against any agency that denied or deprived the democratic goods of sympathy and cooperation – in short, social capital – to individuals or communities". It supported sympathy and trust which were "...cultivated imagination, for what men have in common and a rebellion at whatever unnecessarily divides them" (Farr 2004, p.16). In essence, it was an early sense of reaction toward fragmented capitalist society embraced by

the poverty, unemployment, ignorance, isolation, racism and nationalism in the late 1890s of the American society. Social sympathy, solidarity and mutual trust were necessary elements in order to keep moral dignity for social cohesion and unity.

Indeed, neo-Tocquevillian or the re-appearance of social capital in 21<sup>st</sup> century has been celebrated to comply with the similar anger and frustration against capitalist developmental discourse in the Third World. Indeed, as it was in 1890s' Social Capital of Dewey, governments have become important intervention in order to solve deprivation brought by the neo-liberal values. The solution or 'missing link' in development has become social capital – civic associations, networks and the trust generated via reciprocity. What it suggests is that social capital is good for government and good for economic development.

Important aspect of social capital theory is that it provides with possible variants of social access to resources through associating with each other. Bonding and bridging social capitals represented horizontal formal and informal social networks and their link in to hierarchical power structures where resource mobilization is decided. It can increase productivity by reducing the costs of doing business. It facilitates coordination and cooperation, while trust and reciprocity allows exchange of information and risk sharing. One's reciprocity and aid in to other's work can in return bring such intangible investment and as well as increased value to both participants of such relations. Social cohesion and solidarity established within associational life can help poor to overcome burdens of transition period of developing countries. In such circumstances the state must be a 'third party' which enables to reveal free-riders and defections and imposes sanctions and in return social networks and trust can serve the government as source of information, capacity and legitimacy.

These and other evidences gathered by admirer scholars of social capital enabled the World Bank, IMF and other developmental institutions to popularize importance of social networks, civic associations and civil society in order to achieve good governance in

developing countries. Such governance could be achieved in relevance to vibrancy of associations, networks and its participation in public life concentrated on economic development, poverty reduction and socio-economic change.

Political dimension of development and democratization also became an important part of such popularization of social capital by the international institutions. According to the theory, associational life and social interaction is a sphere of individual education and sharing of knowledge. The more associations a society has, the better it is informed and politically conscious. Public policies emphasized on improvement of political participation, transparency and accountability in return develop political trust and conformity on developmental policies by the society.

### **3.1.2 Social Capital and Democratization**

Democratization or consolidation of democracy in developing countries in earlier discussions required civil society and its empowerment. However, democratization also found its value in social capital theory. Theory argues that a dense network of voluntary associations and groups generates trust and cooperation between citizens and a high level of civic engagement and participation. Thus "... they create the conditions for social integration, public awareness and action, and democratic stability" (Newton 2001, p.201). Moreover, social networks are said to elicit reciprocal norms and trust in other people, and such trust is considered another core element of political revitalization and effective governance, resulting in democratic stability.

Although scholars used both social capital and civil society interchangeably, and even sometimes consider as 'cousins'<sup>30</sup>, in reality they are two different approaches and

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<sup>30</sup> Newton discussing relevance of community trust to individual trust has mentioned that civil society is close cousin to the theory of social capital (Newton 2001, p.201).

differently conceived. Social capital theory emphasizes on civic communities and informal networks, and these networks are precondition for political consciousness and political socialization which are the backbones of political community. It encourages reciprocity, mutuality of dense association as a source of information and capacity for the public institutions – the state, in joint projects. While it is supportive for both political community and the state, social capital and civil society are reinforcing spheres to each other. In this sense, this theory promises each sector striving to strive for involvement in public sphere meaning civil society, political society and the state a source of information, trust and collective share of interests. As far as consolidation of democracy in developing countries is concerned, the distinctiveness of social capital theory seems to be that it extracts political consequences from apolitical social interactions (Norris 2002, p.137; Newton 2001, p.202; Kim 2005, p.194). Because, it does not necessarily relies on formal advocacy, interest and lobbyist groups and associations with political demands, instead, it gives greater effort on informal flow of information, awareness of political system and attitudes articulated within social networks. Trust and reciprocity should be facilitated through vertical and horizontal networks between public and social institutions which pave the way for political participation such as growth of voting rate, sharing common interest in public policies and for public good.

The recent research from Harvard scholar (Baggetta 2009) also gave evidence of civic opportunities<sup>31</sup> generated more in apolitical associations rather than political one. He compares sequence, rate of participants in example of choral societies – choruses in U.S. The need for this comparison was the anxiety that civicness can be generated only within political interest groups and organizations since the rest are inward looking associations which only can produce cultural values (Diamond 1997; Stolle 2001). He demonstrated how choruses,

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<sup>31</sup> Civic opportunities are described as possibility for the individuals to increase knowledge, skills and attitudes for political participation, trusting others and to become more democratic. It is studies within three stages; interpersonal interactions, governance experience and institutional relations (Baggetta 2009, pp.178-181)

churches and other apolitical associations could give more civic opportunities by providing: 1) higher rate of interpersonal interaction within larger participants than in political oriented associations, 2) governance experience for more participants with flexible management than in political interest groups, 3) institutional relations of choruses with other social institutions and associations gives better understanding of civic values for participants. In brief, civicness and political culture could be cultivated within dense associative life which is not limited to political interest groups. Instead, non-political social groups, choruses, neighborhoods, communities, churches, bowling and sport clubs are all in sum "...found to provide more opportunities for individual civic development than their politically and service oriented counterparts suggesting their potential for shrinking the political communication gap between naturally politically interested and disinterested citizens" (Baggetta 2009, pp.175-176).

Moreover, social capital theory initiated for synergy. Prominent supporters of social capital Ostrom and Evans, delivered their case studies to bring this issue in front while acquiring their theoretical basis from Putnam (Ostrom 1996, pp.5-12; Evans 1996b, p.1120). They criticize a long period domination of state-society dichotomy and zero-sum approach since 1960s (Migdal 1988). In the context of developing countries, we can see such dichotomy and zero-sum game continue in terms of state and civil society relations, thus, synergy is a gate to open productive win-win state-society relations. Evans and Ostrom assert that regional developmental projects and small-scale infrastructure building in local governance of Brazil, Thailand, India and Nigeria were relied on social capital, apolitical indigenous communities and their informal reciprocity and solidarity.

It is difficult to assume that contemporary neo-liberal civil society can enter in to such interaction with the state without relinquishing or adapting their interests and political virtue like the one Huntington suggested three decades ago. However, Diamond (1997, pp.5-6) still objected to incorporate civil society in to social capital on the ground that civil society is a

public sphere of political conscious people and their objective is of ‘civic ends’. Kenneth Roth (2010b) in his speech on latest HRW report also praises civil society organizations (especially NGOs) and leaders of such organizations because of their criticism of regime and system performance in developing countries.

Also, the difference between the social capital and civil society can be clearly seen if we look at how both conceptions are conceived in developing countries. These two concepts might literally be related, but the states of developing countries prefer civic community rather than civil society. If the civil society is dominated by the state sponsored discourse as Gramsci predicted, that is political society are full of silenced pro-government parties and mass-media, then only the social capital becomes possible version of neo-Tocquevillian civil society for developing countries today, but not neo-liberal. Indeed, in Central Asian developing countries like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, community and village level of self-governing associational life has become ‘traditional’ civil society. Their argument is based on the reference to Eastern values and state controlled Asian style neighborhoods and communities evolved in Japan, Singapore and Malaysia from 1940s. Moreover, Hann and Dunn based on case studies from Albania, Syria, Indonesia and Japan called for greater openness to the particular ways in which human communities create their own versions of civil society (cited by (Howell & Pearce 2001, p.5)).

### **3.1.3 Dilemmas of Social Capital**

With all tremendous respect given to the theory of social capital, yet, it was criticized for claiming a role of ‘panacea’ to all issues of developmental studies. Criticism of social capital is concentrated on almost each claim that social capital was to solve or ease pains of developmental discourse in developing countries. Those are economic prosperity, poverty reduction, democratic consolidation and finally good governance.

Interestingly, even civil society admirers criticized social capital though civil society and social capital are considered as mutual self-supporting spheres. They have claimed that social capital theory does not necessarily create 'civic'ness. Although it does represent formal and informal associative life within a particular society, social capital can not claim for public sphere since the participants are not pluralist but particularistic. Moreover, activities of so-called civic associations are not always for public end but rather serve for the private concerns (Diamond 1997, p.9; Stolle 2001, pp.202-244).

If this argument is further investigated, it warns social capital admirers that the expectations from vibrant and dense social networks to serve for economic development, actually generates more exclusion and intolerance. This is to say, in example of Molenaers work (2003, pp.113-132), with scarcity of resources and limited access in mind, it creates a condition where certain social bond and connections intolerant for others to join it. Such limited and intolerant links and networks usually bond narrow circles vertically to local leaders who are entitled to decide over resource mobilization and distribution. As a result, same social capital can encourage local bossism, clientelism and patron-client relations (Molenaers 2003, pp.113-132; Harriss 2001b; Harriss 2001a, pp.9-13). Another criticism also derived from pluralistic approach that since the group of people in associations are inward looking and do not persuade 'outsiders' to join, then the trust and reciprocity are not delivered to wider society. From economic point of view, Harriss argued that it is illogical to think that two or more people doing business under the trust-ship can easily spill over outsiders to benefit from cost free transactions among them. Instead, sanctions, effective institutions of the government can ensure safety and trust for wider society. Therefore, the link between voluntary civic associations and trust does not automatically bring economic prosperity to all, but again to limited circles of people who benefits from such connections.

From economic perspective, social capital theory is also criticized on the ground

that it does not look in to political side where leaders and elites can choose whom to support. Molenaers in her second example in Nigeria, showed example of horizontal relations of people in rural areas which is not limited to narrow circles. In this case, she mentioned that political institutions and leaders are supportive and confirm the social base of economic relations. In other words, reciprocity and mutual aid of rural farmers to produce crops are open relations to everyone and this relations are supported by the local political leaders which in time sanctions free-riders and defectors of trust among farmers (Molenaers 2003, pp.118-125). Therefore, political ground and institutional structure is essential if social capital is to work (Harriss 2001a, pp.45-61; Evans 1995, pp.21-43).

Another influential criticism that appeared earlier than others was from Tarrow (1996, pp.389-397). The author pointed out two important issues: first is that institutional performance does not directly reasoned by density of civic associations and civic engagement but political circumstances created by both institutional performance and civic associations positive sum. The second point is that if the admirers of social capital will target lack of civic associations, trust and reciprocity, they are unwise to think that those are causes but in reality they are symptoms. It means that the lack of civicness and associational life are actually symptoms of either non-democratic institutions or political backwardness therefore, the target must not be society but the state and politics.

Above mentioned criticisms, as well as other works have been the results of extended research of scholars to test the concept for pragmatic applicability in developing countries. It was considered that Northern and Southern part of Italy is a metaphor to represent and imply on the case of difference between North – industrialized developed West and South – impoverished Third World countries. However, two of non-Western developed industries such as South Korea and Japan also have shown their social capital research in the regions. Kim (2005) was mainly concerned about Putnam's theory of trust and its role in political

revitalization. Social capital is about reciprocal norms and trust in other people, and such trust is considered another core element of political revitalization and effective governance, resulting in democratization. It regards apolitical social interactions as an essential antecedent of revitalization of participant political culture. However, in case of South Korea, as Kim puts it, social trust does not naturally mirror the political trust. It means that the trust and attitude within social groups and associations do not represent the same attitude toward public institutions and political discourse of the government (Kim 2005, pp.195-200). Since the associational life leads to exposure to public life and political culture, negative aspects of institutional performance would lead to distrust in political institutions and disengagement from institutional politics. Because, political trust depends upon rational evaluations from individuals of institutional performance, hence "...the level of such trust in government is highly associated with government performance" (Kim 2005, p.197).

In Japan the theory was tested on formal and informal as well as vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal social networks in order to define their equilibrium of impact upon political culture of society. Ikeda and Richey (2005, pp.239-260) conducted such research with positive result. In Japan, it seems that the formal – NGOs, NPOs and informal – interpersonal social networks did help Japanese society to upgrade their political attitudes and behaviors. If the vertical networks as a bonding social capital was supposed to be next to horizontal networks to develop civicness, in Japan, both were equally helpful in engaging politics. This research was to show that political participation does not only depend on political trust which South Korean case argued. Political trust in South Korea has become low because of bad government performance hence, the participation in politics was low. But Japanese case shows that low participation is not the cause of trust decline in political institutions, instead, social networks could upgrade participation. It is difficult to judge which one is right since South Korean case also has provided with evidence of stable associative density and social networks, but their trust

in politics has been low thus participation is also declined. In the case of Japan, political participation was growing because of formal, informal, vertical and horizontal social networks. However, Japanese case also confirms the fact that government institutions and politics in Japan have been changing toward positive relations with civil society organizations since the 1970s. The relations between state and society have become more open and democratic since political competition and democratic reforms were introduced.

Nevertheless, common ground for all critics was the weakness of Putnam's argument by relying on voluntary associations and social networks as a source of economic growth and democratization. Instead, as suggested earlier by many critics, government institutions and their performance have to be thoroughly examined from one side and, political background from another in order to enable social capital work and trust is shared in developing countries. These questions and issues raised by critics were partially answered in later works by Putnam and other contributors. Putnam introduced later bonding and bridging social capital in order to describe how to extend the trust to wider society. He also admitted an importance of institutions in facilitating social capital accumulation. In his article Putnam assures that "...policy can encourage social capital formation, and social capital itself enhances the effectiveness of government action" (1993a, p.10). On the same page he mentioned about '...the potential *synergy* between private organization and the government'. These and other additions have helped to develop a new shift – state-society synergy<sup>32</sup>. State society synergy therefore can be understood as a by-product of social capital theory because until then scholars were stuck in dichotomist state-civil society relations. However in fact, social capital is best accumulated, and civil society is developed if state-society synergy works, which will be explored further in next section.

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<sup>32</sup> Synergy means increase of capacity and ability achieved by two or more actors joining their efforts.

### **3.2 From Social Capital to Synergy**

The inter-dependency and interaction relationship between state and society has been a paradigm shift from state-society dichotomy. Putnam (e.g., 1993b: 42) argues for synergy. The concept of “synergy” implies that social engagement strengthens capacity of state institutions, and effective state institutions create positive environment in which civic engagement is more likely to develop. “Engaged citizens are a source of discipline and information for public agencies, as well as on-the-ground assistance in the implementation of public projects” (Evans 1996: 1034). He has conceptualized this synergy idea through examination of developing countries. He confesses that indeed relations between state and society are characterized often by zero-sum conflicts rather than synergy, because “state intervention sometimes destroys developmentally promising social networks and undermines developmentally useful social norms”.<sup>33</sup> However, the significance of his work is that it contests the idea that some inescapable structural logic makes zero-sum relations between the state and civil society necessary or normal, but there seem to be possibilities to establish productive relations too.

#### **3.2.1 Reconciliation Between Theories of the ‘State’ and ‘Society’**

What possibly can be understood when the research implies the shift of state-society relations being under-zero sum to positive sum approach? Its initial stage begun with referring to the capacity of the state and the external social forces that was located outside the state meaning society. It has been realized that capacity of administration and performance of the government is in most cases relevant to the relations of the state with non-state actors in modernization and developmental transition. Emphasis on the state’s relationship with other

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<sup>33</sup> Evans, Peter 1996 “Introduction: Development strategies across the public-private divide” *World Development*. 24 (6): 1033-1037, 1996

actors also has been questioned on the ground of conventional status quo it held, such as high degree of state autonomy, absolute independence in discretion, judgment and implementation (Leftwich 2000, pp.171-191; Howell & Pearce 2001, pp.14-16; Chandhoke 1995, pp.46-76).

The core point of this challenge was that targeting an old tradition, practice and belief that increase of state capacity and power meant the decrease of power, influence and forces in private sphere. As much as state intervenes into, occupies and administers the society it has to be more capable of transformation, modernization of that society by using its authority. Otherwise, state autonomy is gradually undermined in the long run as social actors strengthen their power too. Such thinking focused on post-colonial developing countries in the 1960s up to the 1980s that were considered as backward primordial political systems. They had to be modernized by strong, efficient and modern states through implementation of universal rules, institutions to the society and in contrast society outside of the state institutions were considered as resisting forces based on particularities which seek to corrupt or challenge the state.

Such approach is zero-sum, and it puts state in opposition with its own source of organization - society. In the early 1980s, neo-Weberians still regarded the state as possessing high degree of autonomy and they believed that successful economic development rested in state's capacity to implement relevant institutions. Later, the issue of dealing with the particular interests and the influence outside the state became acute concern of those scholars. The solution was discovered in new five industrialized *developmental states* in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia) which had utilized common economic strategies (state embeddedness with key corporate actors and private sector) to achieve industrial transformation (Johnson 1982; Leftwich 2000; Evans 1995). It meant that developmental state represents not full but 'embedded autonomy' in reference to the capacity of the state for industrialization and economic growth. It also meant a sort of approval of possibilities that

‘non-Western’ institutions or political systems can also achieve development, growth and progress.

In the late 1990s, abovementioned narrow sense of state’s embeddedness within key corporate actors was challenged by more views that are more progressive. In broader definition, states now are most effective when they are embedded across a broad range of social actors rather than exclusively within the dominant class (Hobson 2000, p.207). In general, if state is assumed to have political and administrative capacity, both are equally weak if they are considered in separate from social strata. Political capacity of the state refers to the ability of resource allocation, distribution and mobilization which has become consensual and embedded in a wide spectrum of social forces. Administrative capacity represents the quality of civil servants, technical and implementative ability which also are increased if the resources, skills and expertise are shared within the relations with ‘actors outside the state’ (we referred to those actors as civil society in most cases of this research) (Cummings & Nørgaard 2004, pp.685-708).

The point of discussion is that the importance of change the relations between state and society in theory and practice has become common agreement in both discussions of state, its nature, capacity in development and the role of the society in this process. Both schools of state and society have realized that unless the dichotomy, antagonism and theoretical wall between the two is abolished, the processes and endeavors of political, economic and social development in developing countries would not reach its ends. Initial push for a new scheme of state-society relations given by social capital concept was a clear expression of this mutual dependence and interaction. By synergy, Putnam just illustrated simple possibility that both state and society can gain strength from each other and it encouraged other research in this field. Elinor Ostrom (1996: 2-4) has initiated a conception of ‘co-production’. She indicates that great divide between state and society is a conceptual trap. By developing more fully the theory of

co-production and its relevance to the study of synergy and development, it is possible to change the views toward the hypothetical “Great Divide.” She brings several examples in poor countries tackling social issues with or without partnership and explores difference of outcomes pointing at benefits of partnerships.<sup>34</sup> Osborne (2000: 42-50) explores a concept of public-private partnerships a necessary tool for tackling local developmental issues including state, business and non-profit sector in to joint agreement. Evans has brought more insight into this discussion by exploring synergetic state-society relations and by categorizing them which had helped to conceptualize it as new developmental direction.

According to Evans, the scheme of such co-production, partnership and synergy is characterized through *complementarity* and *embeddedness*. Former means reciprocal productive cooperation between public and private spheres. It can be achieved through involving profit or nonprofit sectors in provision of public goods together with government institutions to improve the quality and efficiency of public services. However, such cooperation does not necessarily share resources and do not oblige on responsibilities from outcome of partnerships. They simply agree to bring their own efforts, to distinguish each side’s job to do for common purpose and joint project. A more comprehensive way of synergy is described in embeddedness as formal and informal ties between the state institutions and social groups. Such network is based on trust and consensus on cooperation by sharing resources, ideas and values. They share responsibilities on decisions they came up with and it is concentrated on achievement of agreed quality and efficiency in provision of goods and services. Embeddedness and complementarity is practiced interchangeably because, simple cooperation can grow to be trustful long-term relations, and such relations also depending on circumstances can again become just cooperation in certain issues.

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<sup>34</sup> Ostrom V. Elinor 1996 “Crossing the Great Divide: Co-production, Synergy and Development” World Development, 24(6): 1073-1087

What is worth mentioning is that a synergy or partnership is built to address the same issues which traditionally single agent or institution had to deal with. It can be a government's concern on resource scarcity which triggers such partnership to combine efforts, or crisis requires immediate relief action from both governors and governed sides. Both examples can be described as *inner-dependency* which Osborne (2000, p.149) gives examples from South-East Asian countries' experience on 'decline of Leviathan' – strong authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states had to share a power and decisions with non-state institutions to tackle economic and social crisis in the 1980s. In addition, he mentions *developmental* orientation of East Asian countries, emphasizing on strong government's reforms combined with 'reformist' elites' interests to tackle global competition and strive to the market economies in same period. It means that severe global economic competition may lead developmental oriented governments to share interests of reformist groups outside the bureaucracy. Thus, it can trigger mutual partnership between public and private sphere from one side for the developmental goals and other to address social issues appearing from market inequalities. Final view comes from experience of Western public policy and 'New Public Management' (NPM) reforms in 1990s, toward *modernization* of existing public management toward welfare and public services. It is not concentrated on efficiency like in case of resource scarcity or growth orientation, which required less public cost and more investment in private sector. However, modernization is about upgrading quality of service provision through involvement of private sectors and non-profit voluntary organization. Such combination of partnerships has given expected results from U.S policy on social welfare and Tony Blair's campaign on NPM.

### **3.2.2 How to Allocate Civil Society within the State-Society Synergy?**

The research discussed how two concepts civil society and social capital were accorded with the same substance – society; hence the supporters of these concepts inclined to

emphasis empowerment of society, private sphere, social mobilization, free exchange of opinion knowledge, information within these networks. The density of these social networks, associations and their vibrancy can be posed as either a counterweight (to the state), an independent sphere of civil society or integration of inter-dependent interaction of social capital (bounding and bridging) with the public institutions, administration and polity in the public sphere. On the one hand, civil society has become a stage of mediation, confrontation, consent and even hegemonic buffer which protects society or even the state depending on time and space (Chandhoke 1995; Kumar 1993, pp.375-395). On the other hand, social capital, its dense networks and the trust within it, has opened a vision for reciprocity, synergy and mutual aid of both state and society. This concept has revealed that both public and private, state and society not always cross each other's site as a matter of power and domination. Such cross-pass is natural due to the single sphere they have been established within – public, so scholars assert the utilization of that moment into developmental ends.

As if we have been given this promising theory of state-society synergy into our consideration, which implies that the density, vibrancy and speed of the interaction of social networks, associations could be directed for joint developmental efforts with the public institutions, how would be the role, values and definition of the civil society in this interaction. Not only neo-liberal civil society but also, how the definition of Weberian autonomous state can possibly find its space in these synergetic relations is because synergistic, positive-sum relationship undermines the core values – independence and non-interventionist approach of earlier definitions given to the state or civil society. This sort of argument is subject to the matter of prioritization by contemporary global trends. For instance, the classical priorities had emphasized on transformation of primordial, tribal, ethnical, kinship groups in to the citizenship and national state building, whereas later, theories of political –economy manifested itself as a force of modernization and industrialization of capitalistic states. If the capitalism and

market priorities had been a strong protection of private property owners as individual rights within the market, socialism showed a privilege of proletariat and imposed public interest. These and other priorities and ideologies such as liberty, freedom and equality had been captivating both states and societies under the conflict of interests, conflict of priorities and need for the consolidation of necessary discourse and goal to achieve it. In this sense, it is important to clarify what priorities or desirable goals that current global trend is about. Although this research does not deal in detail, but for the clarity of argument here we briefly give an example of shift in developmental paradigm.

The collapse Keynesian state in the West<sup>35</sup> and collapse of SU (Soviet Union) in the late 1980s has facilitated a neo-liberal developmental discourse in global trend. It has prioritized liberalization of both markets and political systems where civil society should have played an important role to demand and pressure despotic states of Third World countries to pursue those goals. According to Algappa (2004), Schak and Hudson (2003), civil society has been successful in to some extent<sup>36</sup>, but it did not necessarily bring liberal minded transitions in economies nor regimes. The political ambitions of neo-liberal values gradually shifted to the socio-economic priorities such as human development, social development, sustainable development and poverty reduction (Leftwich 2000, pp.105-127). Respectively, civil society has begun to transform itself from massive informal social pressure against the states into active *agents* of development such as CSOs (civil society organizations), NGOs (non-governmental organizations), CBOs (Community Based Organizations), NPOs (Non-governmental Organizations), GROs (grassroots organizations), DVOs (development oriented organizations) in order to address developmental aid programs. Within this *apolitical* instrumentalist approach on society, it has facilitated an admiration for the prompt, efficient and active collaboration of

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<sup>35</sup> Because of the oil and energy crisis in 1970s

<sup>36</sup> It has been mainly social movements, demonstrations and riots against non-democratic regimes which successfully mobilized society, media and achieved the regime transformations in Asia, Africa, and some former SU countries.

those voluntary organizations with the state in poverty reduction and aid projects. Nevertheless, it did not mean that political liberalization was omitted from concern, but it has become a domestic matter of each sovereign state where loan conditionality would not appeal and only domestic so called proxy-NGOs had to raise the issue through AGNs (Advocacy groups and Networks) or human rights organizations.

On the other hand, the role of the state also was undermined. Neo-liberalism was not a trend directed to the West but to the political and economical systems of Third World countries or new established independent states in transition which have been in the process of state building, building a political identity and finally citizenry in their respective societies. In this slow and difficult process, governments of those countries had to deal with economic crisis, transform their institutional structure, and implement neo-liberal institutions and concepts in order to liberalize their markets. The result was that neither state nor market could claim to be panacea of development or poverty reduction but important shift was moved toward *governance*. The term governance did not develop its roots within developing countries or in the programs of developmental aid, but from the conceptual shift of conventional public administration to 'new public management' in developed countries (Leftwich 2000, pp.113-118; Turner & Hulme 1997, pp.229-235). An important point of it is that governance involved not simply the role of the government in economy, but the "transformation in the role, range, and reach of the state activities in economy and society and a considerable blurring of the *public-private distinction*<sup>37</sup> in service provision" (Leftwich 2000, p.118).

In this scheme of prioritization we have reviewed, it seems that both civil society and the state have to concentrate on the issues of how to address poverty, efficient, equal service provision, public interest and finally developmental goals. Through mutual reciprocity and interactions between state institutions and civic associations grounded by the common interest,

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<sup>37</sup> Author's emphasis

interdependency and supporting developmental politics seems to have better outcomes for both rather than working alone. Under such reciprocal atmosphere, civil society can be expanded freely, social capital can be accumulated and the lack of it is the symptoms rather than cause. The cause is as mentioned already, dichotomies between state and society derived from concepts of both 'Weberian' state and 'Neo-liberal' civil society. Since the fight against the 'wall' between public and private or state and society has begun (Ostrom 1996, pp.85-118), evidences of such reciprocal synergetic relations in developing countries were discovered. It confirms that civic involvement, associational life is better protected and stronger where there are synergies. It means that in order to expand the share of civil society within public life, it should not happen through replacements but through integration.

There are also cases highlighting different priorities such as democratization, political development or decentralization of power. These are different goals that require clarification of certain questions such as, a) was the priority originated from the external interest (donors) or governments, b) have those involved social groups, civic associations enough experience of reaching popular agreement or not, c) do they have experience to work for public interest or not, and finally d) does the concept of civil society necessarily enable her to pursue these goals genuinely and unilaterally. In this sense, as state-society synergy has suggested, priorities must be selected and developed within the social-economic and political conditions and must be derived from inter-dependency between state and civil society. In other words, civil society depends on government's commitment to nurture 'civic' virtue within the society, and the population and facilitate narration, articulation of public interests, and opinions among competing, particularistic, narrow interest groups of social strata. On the other hand, government depends on legitimacy from the dense, vibrant civil society in order to expand prioritized reforms, consolidation of those policies and sustainability of chosen discourse. Therefore, whether it is developmental or democratic priorities, developing countries should be

able to pursue these goals from the reciprocity, mutual aid and genuine collaboration between state and society. Neither part should abuse a given space in public sphere, but to co-exist for collective action and common goal, hence, zero-sum conception of state or civil society should be reconsidered due to these emerged essential priorities in the global trend.

### **3.3 Search for the Synergy in Developing Countries**

The concept of synergy is the result of case studies in developing countries and it implies the possible direction of management, administration of developmental discourse. On the other hand, these case studies also relied on the methodology which was derived from the notion of ‘governance’ and new public management utilized in the Western countries like U.S. and U.K. in the 1990s. Western experience provides with comprehensive and complex interactions between state and society, public and private sectors. Japanese experience also shows some specific fields like in health care, social services, etc., governments have utilized so called partnerships with private and voluntary sectors to implement respective policies. Public management has become key term to express less bureaucracy, less rigidity and more actors, and flexibility in public administration (Osborne P 2000, pp.163-265). Of course, there are certain issues such as transparency, accountability and mutual trust come to the surface which were the factors that enabled such interactions in developed countries in the West, but certain works in this trend also provides some cases that developing countries have such opportunity too.

#### **3.3.1 Micro changes and Macro benefits**

Development or developmental goals does not necessarily implies sole economic growth, but incorporates, social, sustainable developments as well as several key terms such as rural-urban development, development of various industrial infrastructures, access to the

services, facilities and etc. Basic distinction from non-development is the increase in quality and quantity of target field. A few cases were taken from this perspective and they emphasized on micro-level reforms that benefited larger part of society in urbanization of developing countries. Some other cases show that similar mechanism adapted in rural areas also brought permissible solutions to the problems of agricultural life. That micro-level reform is as mentioned above, an innovative approach on public administration even in small towns, cities, villages and so on. The approach was not based on conventional top-down policy implementation, but policy discussions, social mobilization and partnership between social groups and actors of public administrations.

In the case of Ostrom (1996, p.99), she and her colleagues had developed the term *coproduction* to “describe the potential relationships that could exist between the ‘regular’ producers and ‘clients’...” and it is defined as “...one way that synergy between what a government does and what citizens do can occur”. The conclusion was derived from the two cases; one from Brazil and another in Nigeria. These cases brought common conclusion that “...the production of a service, as contrasted to a good, was difficult without the active participation of those supposedly receiving the service” (1996, p.99). In case of Brazil, actually, there were two potential ‘synergy’ evidences; one is what was evaluated by Ostrom ‘ownership of condominial systems’ and another is comprehensive PhD research by Genoveva Maya Fruet (2002, pp.129-179) on ‘housing cooperatives’ in the city Porto Alegre. The reason for mentioning both cases rather than one of them is that one case is actually essential factor to bring the next.

In brief, Maya Fruet successfully explored in detail how Brazil has been addressing reformation challenges from both international and local society upon public administration. Finally, in the mid-1980s, small changes started to appear when several municipal governments had faced the devastation of urban life, economy and its declining infrastructure. Especially,

urban housing policies were worst among others leaving rapidly growing population without proper shelter, housing facilities, etc. Due to the social pressure and commitment of the municipal administration of Porto Alegre, new housing programs were launched in the end of 1980s. The program's goal was to establish large amount of 'housing cooperatives' in order to enable people to purchase a land and have municipal government assistance to increase number of co-owned apartment buildings. This approach was very successful based on two points. First is that regardless of high prices on land or ready apartments in the city, not for the income of family or citizen but through housing cooperatives, they were able to collect necessary amount of money to purchase un-occupied land. Second is that since the land was purchased by citizens, government subsidized the building process of cost-effective co-owned apartments (Maya Fruct, 2002). As a result of both unprecedented mutual aid and collective action between municipal administration and community groups that facilitated by the governments has solved one of the major urban issues.

The benefit from the partnership went both to the administration because people were satisfied with their new homes and community groups that established the trust, cooperation with the government. Another problem was how to provide urban dwellers in such co-owned apartments with proper condominium facilities and infrastructural services. These apartments were outside of conventional urban system and owned by poor households. Besides of high cost and poor households in the cities: a) centralized infrastructure provision kept municipalities from access to decision-making and resources; b) high engineering standards were inappropriate for bringing better service to poorer regions (Ostrom 1996, p.88). The solution came from an engineer De Malo, who brought a new design of condominium infrastructure but also this design needed an active role for citizens. He has proposed smaller feeder lines run through urban blocks by extending them until these lines are connected to larger trunk lines that are located under urban cities and lead to treatment plants. The cost of constructing the feeder

section was extremely reduced due to the skills and active participation of local residents in digging and maintaining the feeder lines. According to Ostrom the success of this project lies not only the design of the facility but the activation of block communities, neighborhoods from the very start of the planning their own condominium system. They had been actively involved in planning, work management and cost sharing which made them aware of every detail procedure. Although extensive participation required time and effort on the part of municipalities, or some groups need more effort from facilitators than others or the problems of monitoring the performance, "...many of these systems have been successful, and increased the availability of lower cost, essential urban services to the poorest neighborhoods of Brazilian cities" (Ostrom 1996, pp.81-118).

Another example was provided by the case study of Taiwan irrigation system. In general, irrigation of agricultural fields is the rural bias which embraces many criticisms upon government bureaucratic agencies. Literatures inclined to praise self-governance of rural communities, farmers and peasants for outperforming irrigation agencies because they have ownership sense more than public officers do. Wai Fung Lam, however, believes that such criticisms on public institutions are based on the desires of researchers' policy recommendations to downsize the state intervention. Although such self-reliance and ownership of local communities can work, administration of public affairs is quite complex which often cases exceeds the capacity of ordinary citizens (1996, pp.12-13). Therefore "...instead of trying to get rid of government agencies, it would be more useful to study how government agencies can be designed to perform effectively, and complement citizens' efforts in broader institutional settings, in conducting public affairs"(Lam 1996, p.13). Lam gave decisive example of such interaction between public and private efforts within the Taiwanese irrigation framework. He did not privilege 'scientific' knowledge of public officials concerning some physical aspects of irrigation systems, since the farmers have time-specific and

place-specific local knowledge of the systems upon which their livelihood depends. He asserted positive impact of those institutional arrangements in irrigation system by the central government. The main task force and facilitator of irrigation management is the Irrigation Agency (IA), however it is decentralized to the local management of working stations, as well as to the Irrigation Groups and at the lowest level Irrigation Teams. Both team and groups of IA were recruited from the local farmers meanwhile they were respectively guided by the regional IA offices through representatives from the farmers. The provincial level policy implementation was responsibility of the Provincial Water Conservancy Bureau. The bureau also supervises the IAs. At the national level, meaning that lead agency for formulation of irrigation policies and monitoring operation of provincial bureaus is the Council of Agriculture. Such institutional design had helped to generate reciprocity and “co-production” between public officers and farmers. Embeddedness of public institutions with the farmers at the local level has generated regular communication, trust hence better management of irrigation (Lam 1996, pp.29-32).

### **3.3.2 Outlines of the Outcomes**

Evans assures that “norms of cooperation and networks of civic engagement among ordinary citizens can be promoted by public agencies and used for developmental ends” (1996a, p.178). Indeed, abovementioned cases show that collective action and collaboration is possible between state and society. Main concern is how to measure outcome from these non-traditional interactions and sustainability of the collaboration. There are two possible measurements; one is the outcome of the project. By outcome, it is understood that the achievement of common good, or goal. In the first case, the outcome was the created possibility for poor families to find accommodation in urban areas and the next was the provision of condominium facilities to them. If we look at these cases, it is obvious that goals have been achieved and both municipal

administration and dwellers were satisfied by the result. In some cases efforts of the government institutions, private and social associations can be very much concentrated on achievement of good results but at the end outcome might be different. Often the sustainability of the partnership involves and depends on such good outcomes otherwise the incentive for collective action becomes invisible to partnering sides.

Nevertheless, there is difference between good outcome and good partnership in the collective action. Good partnership is the extent of equal opportunities to access the essential information, to raise alternative opinions and freedom of participation. Good partnership is also commitment, mutual respect, long-term goals and finally its gradual transformation from random projects in to institutional mechanism or upgrade from implementation up to the decision making level. There are several cases in developing countries where bureaucratic decision making and its implementation have not changed yet but under the pressure of developmental aid conditionality, local civic groups, community organizations were incorporated in to projects. The obvious emphasis would be given on outcome since the size and the frequency of the aid depends on the performance of the beneficiaries – governments. Such short-noticed projects are heavy burden on the shoulders of the communities and social organizations, since they have no clear image of the project context, actual allocated resources, and the issues integrated in to the already decided implementation plans. Often, to avoid extra questions, a few leaders of community-based organizations easily are co-opted and projects are run through them. Can it be called partnership, although the outcome from the projects benefited final beneficiaries?

Examples of ‘condominiums’ and ‘irrigation mechanism’ clearly can be candidate for good outcome or even for good partnership. In both cases both public institutions and citizens were closely bonded and had reciprocity for the achievement of common goal. The reason is that on the one side the partner was not some specified professional NGO or some sophisticated

social organization but direct beneficiaries of the project. Therefore, even if their desires and opinions were not incorporated, probably just the outcome would satisfy. However, these cases are given to generate a bigger picture out of these micro changes. The partnership which state-society synergy or public-private partnership not only considers small scale interaction but wider arrangements of relations between field based social organizations (environmental associations, trade associations, business clubs, NGOs concentrated on education, health, culture) and various respective public institutions (ministries of education, economy, agriculture etc). Therefore, in this sense, the measurement of the partnership cannot be relied on sole outcomes but as mentioned above the entire operation of the collective action becomes essential.

## **Conclusion**

Elaborated review of discussion above evokes civil society theory within the social capital concept. The aim of this chapter was to bring a light on the conceptual travel of the civil society notion in recent theories. Civil society has been gradually taken from being antagonistic radical watching eye of the society over the despotic states to the space of accumulated or generated social capital. This space is not political or demanding but rather apolitical massively cumulated social networks that have potential affect both economic and political development in developing countries.

Beginning part of the chapter aimed to explore how theory of social capital was developed and embraced within developmental discourse emerged at the end of the twentieth century. Social capital was discussed as a matter of ‘missing link’ of the both development and democratization endeavors. Nevertheless, the concept was also target of scholars’ critique which was referred as ‘dilemmas’ of the social capital. Through such discussion, research has revealed that civil society and social capital can be seen as conceptual ‘cousins’ but at the same

time both have different purpose and promise.

The correspondent section of this chapter shortly attempted to illuminate actual values of these two phenomenon, but the overall research aim was to show that at the end developmental “priorities” of the government and the extent of its dependency on private sphere or social associations enables to utilize collective values of the both civil society and social capital. Highlighted argument of this chapter was that contemporary theories of state or society are clear about the fact that upcoming developmental challenges cannot wait until state or society gets advantage, increases possible capacities to address them. Instead, it has become important to avoid antagonistic approach and zero-sum calculations of state-society relations. Given case studies tried to express that co-production is possible, synergy is permissible and partnership is necessary in order to deal with developmental goals.

The following chapter is another case study which aims to bring the issue of civil society in Uzbekistan. Since the concept has been introduced in early 1990s, neither Uzbek government nor society could find the essence of it in the country. In previous chapters research explored some reasons for hostility toward this concept expressed by developing countries too, but by the time of Uzbekistan acquired its independence donors must have learned lessons from earlier experience from them. So next chapter aims to answer to the question, why civil society concept could not find its roots in Uzbekistan?

## **Chapter 4. Civil Society in *Eastern* Democracy of Uzbekistan.**

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The name of the chapter already can tell us that intangible conflict of values between two West and East. It implies that the concept of civil society belongs only to the Western and *Uzbeki* society to Eastern culture. But this chapter is not about old traditional conflict of *Asian* value theories. It is about generated, imposed and facilitated social perception within the transition country Uzbekistan upon civil society. It discusses the early transition process of Uzbekistan leading to the emergence of modern state in international community. The mixture of traditional, socialist and finally liberal values within the transition period brings interesting insight in to issue of civil society building in Uzbekistan. Regardless of commonly agreed presumption that Uzbekistan lacks ground to build civil society, in this chapter this research argues that the Western ‘device for digging to find a core of civil society’ in Uzbekistan is not well sharp yet. Given examples are discussed on the tone that it emphasizes upon strong civic virtue exists in Uzbekistan and it was missed by many scholars.

#### **4.1 Transition Process and its Challenges.**

Almost two decades past since Uzbekistan became independent in 1991 from Soviet rule. Within these years it has been considered as transition country toward free market economy and democratic system of governance. Such anticipation was based on several factors; a) lessons from destructive and fragileness of previous authoritarian communist regime, b) pledge of the Uzbek government to engage in democratization process by joining United Nations and other International Organizations in 1990s, c) delivered structural adjustment aids conditioning institution building and liberalization toward free market and democracy during 1994-2005. In the minds of American politicians and scholars those factors should have motivated the transition from authoritarian regime toward liberalism, development of free market economy and civil society building.

After Uzbekistan became independent and joined the international community, it became a part of transition process and indirectly linked to the process of developmental discourse as a developing country too. Neo-liberal values of market liberalizations and decentralization process of public authority to the local governments were introduced by the World Bank and IMF adjustment projects. Uzbekistan also became a part of MDGs' target to emphasize on poverty reduction<sup>38</sup>, social welfare and sustainable development. In brief, international donors' assistance was enforcing anticipated transition but it was overlapping, sometimes confronting each other and most importantly clashing with interests of Uzbek authority. Why?

Since the beginning of nation state building process, almost all of the countries in Central Asia remained in their old existing ruling institutions, as long as the collapse of Soviet Union did not mean collapse of existing regime in each country. Instead, like in case of

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<sup>38</sup> Uzbek government did not accept the term 'poverty reduction', instead used 'improvement of the Living Standards'.

Uzbekistan, chiefs of former communistic parties in each country were elected as the presidents of their countries, and recruitment to highest positions was chosen from the same generation taught by communism and socialism theories of state and state building. All the same institutions which were established and used by Moscow to control political, economic and social life of the country remained as necessary pillars of nation state building.<sup>39</sup>

Furhermore, the time of crisis and priority for the peace and security in early 1990s, made it necessary to have strong state as well as to remain existing experienced cadres and institutions to perform reformations.<sup>40</sup> However, according to foreign experts, the same old institutions, style of governance and cadres made transition slow and dead end (Kandiyoti 2002, pp.279-297; 2003, pp.143-162; Adamson 2002, pp177-206; Akiner 2003, pp.518-519; Rumor 2005, pp10-21).

Although, certain authors discuss the ‘puzzling success’ of Uzbek economy comparing to few neighboring countries<sup>41</sup>, overall assessment is dominance of state monopoly in all spheres of life. In brief, earlier mentioned developmental projects went through scrutiny of conservative ruling elites and implemented by picking out only those that do not expose or jeopardize nature of state building and decision making of the government.<sup>42</sup> Although there are legislative, executive and judicial authority enriched with multiple political parties for the balance of power, pre-existing state-society relations and ruling institutions are seen as window dressing by promising developmental policies which in reality did not bring visible reforms

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<sup>39</sup> J. Giffen, L. Earle and Ch. Buxton 2005 *The Development of Civil Society in Central Asia*. U.K.:INTRACT. pp 49-50

<sup>40</sup> There is a famous motto repeatedly and proudly said by president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov “Do not ruin old house unless you have built a new one”. It represents the idea that old house, old institutions old methods are all important and necessary until certain and benign replacements occurs.

<sup>41</sup> See detail explanation observed by Terry McKinley. 2010 “The Puzzling Success of Uzbekistan’s Heterodox Development” from [<http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/file56073.pdf>] p2

<sup>42</sup> These are key words reference to the nature of state and politics in the country *Clan politics, neo-patrimonial regime and patronage networks*. See for details Collins Kathleen 2002 “Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia” *Journal of Democracy*. 13 (3): 137-152;

toward expected liberalizations<sup>43</sup>. Instead, as international watching institutions criticize that Uzbek government still pursues for concentration of public authority in the hands of central government ignoring evolved social unrest toward authoritarian rule, massive emigration and poverty, increasing number of asylum seekers abroad and most importantly social distrust in government.<sup>44</sup> However, the fear from conflict which liberalization can evoke<sup>45</sup>, fear from non-democratic revolution<sup>46</sup> and fear from external influence<sup>47</sup> of public majority<sup>48</sup> justifies the centralization of power and its coercive nature.

Abovementioned assessment over the transition process of the country was not a work of one scholar or based on single research, but there have been various interests expressed by Western scholars to explore and define the nature of the process. For instance, Kandiyoti (2007, pp.31-48) describes government land reforms and change in public service provision to illustrate transition process to market economy. She pointed out that the process of transition accompanied with "...perpetuation of administratively controlled resource allocation mechanisms in a context of commodification created by partial market reforms" (Kandiyoti 2007, p.48). Luong (2000, pp.563-592) when she was professor at Yale, devoted herself to observe transition process of Central Asia. Her analysis of early reforms in Uzbek new parliament, for instance, illustrated that "adoption of new institutions during a transition does not necessarily indicates either fundamental break with the past or its continuation, but rather a change through continuity" (P. J. Luong 2000, p.591).

<sup>43</sup> Collins Kathleen 2002 "Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia" *Journal of Democracy*, 13(3): 137-152; Ilkhamov, 2002 "Controllable Democracy in Uzbekistan," *Middle East Report* No.222, pp. 8-10; Kangas, 1994 "Uzbekistan: Evolving Authoritarianism" *Current History*, 93(582 ):178-82

<sup>44</sup> International Crisis Group, "Central Asia: Uzbekistan at 10—Repression and Instability," p8; Polity IV Project, "Polity IV Country Report 2003: Uzbekistan"

<sup>45</sup> Struggling Clan interests see Shane A. Smith 2007 "Leadership transition in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Implications for Policy and Stability in Central Asia" *MA Thesis*  
<http://www.stormingmedia.us/77/7744/A774474.html> pp80-85

<sup>46</sup> IMU and other religious violence feature on revolution see Vitaliy Naumkin 2006 "Uzbekistan's State-Building Fatigue" *The Washington Quarterly*. 29(3): 127-140

<sup>47</sup> Russia, China, U.S competing influence and particularistic politics see Naumkin 2006 pp 135-140

<sup>48</sup> Such fear is debatable, it can be instrument to legitimize authoritarianism, to increase social dependence on strong leader or such fear is rational.

A bit non-traditional research was conducted by Collins (2004, pp.224-261), who observed informal ties and clan networks in Central Asia. Her analysis shows that kin patronage and clan politics were able to survive the Soviet onslaught and reemerged in post-Soviet period because of their informality, strong kin-based network and ability to use Soviet institutions to further their ends. Their existence is likely to impede not only transition process but also long term regime durability. Because, as she suggests that in highly uncertain political and economic conditions like in Uzbekistan, "...clans will likely increase in salience, feeding their network by stripping the state and weakening or undermining other potential forms of organization and representation" (Collins 2004, p.258). A deeper analysis on clans and patronage relations in post-Soviet Uzbekistan was represented by Ilhamov (2007, pp.64-84). He tests old theory of neo-patrimonialism referred to the postcolonial African states in 1970s. As roots of clan politics and patronage networks in Uzbekistan, he shows poverty, inequality, incomplete market mechanisms, institutional and functional gaps, low social mobilization, poor exchange and communication between ethnicities and regional divisions. Ilkhamov points out that neo-patrimonial regime in transitional country Uzbekistan creates a system of rule where the boundaries between state and society are blurred. As a result, patronage formations can be formed around public offices, so state can be privatized to serve the interests of particular clans (2007, pp.78-82).

Another research devoted to the transition process in Uzbekistan was presented by Abdullaev (2005, pp.267-296) who argues that modernization and anti-modernization reforms are both equally represented transition process in the country. He supports his argument through case studies on transitional process of official ideology, personal policy of president and educational system in the country. Through these examples he reveals the fact that strict centralization in the political and administrative system not only remained as it was in Soviet regime but re-invented within modern institutions. From economical perspective, Eshref and

Eskender Trushins (2005, pp.329-384) also confirmed that economic transition in the country was impeded by centralized government intervention, rent seeking behavior of public officials and competition between clans to extract maximum rents.

Above mentioned works gave us general picture of reforms and its quality within transitional process of the country. It also showed lack of regime's political will and desire to move toward actual liberalizations. The common views among public officials are that liberalization is not necessary for successful development and it can be dangerous for domestic stability. Nevertheless, government of Uzbekistan has realized that without introducing Western institutions, without involving in globalization and economic integration, it is not possible to sustain regime durability. Therefore, government of Uzbekistan has announced that this country follows principles of Eastern democracy and initiated coexistence of new liberal institutions on the surface but deeply rooted Asian values in the substance. This can be clearly observed in the case of introduction civil society concept as a Western institution which faced to adaptation in to local interpretation of it within Mahalla concept which was inherited from national values of Uzbekistan.

#### **4.2 Transition of former Communist Society in to Civil Society.**

Ongoing process of transition has been challenged from various forces namely international pressure for liberalization, modernization of institutions, pressure from neighboring countries to address intra-regional issues accompanied with re-construction of former integrated energy consumption, and finally internal social pressure emphasizing on raising nationalistic pride and widening distance from colonial past history. However, government priority on transitional reforms was first concentrated at transformation of society which was indoctrinated for more than seven decades to be communist society and Soviet citizens. Best option for the government was of course social transformation correspondent

with discourse of the state building reforms which required obedient, rule abiding ‘decent’ society in words of Pottenger (2004, pp.55-57). The decent society is the one that seems to be modernized and mature to understand importance of state performance but it is not quite liberal yet to participate in the process of state building. As Suda (2005, pp.335-365) argues that it is important to be cautious not to misrepresent decent society as turning to liberal one any sooner or to think it as if some other kind of modified democratic society. Therefore, there is a need to understand the process of external and internal intervention in to the process of social transformation which on the surface both seem to support civil society but the beneath shows different story.

#### **4.2.1 Introduction and Expansion of NGOs**

Since the dominance of state power in public affairs remains unchanged, there is a need to examine of legitimacy of public policies and representation of public opinion on government policies. Since the means of representation through political parties, local legislative assemblies, courts and government institutions is weak, the above mentioned inquiry should be articulated through a vibrant civil society, civic involvement and demand for liberal state-society relations. At least, that was the marketing slogan for the civil society proliferation projects of donors’ aid. In early 1990s civil society was introduced to Uzbekistan by international donors’ as a part of liberalization and democratization programs. The aim of the donors was to enable passive beneficiary society to articulate its interests, to shape civic values as replacement of patrimonial and dichotomist relations<sup>49</sup> and to generate collective action for the protection of those values. Moreover, civil society organizations were predicted to play an important role in transition through the generation of social demand for reforms and

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<sup>49</sup> Ilkhamov A, 2007 “Neo-patrimonialism, interest groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the governance system in Uzbekistan”, *Central Asian Survey*, 26(1): 65-84

development of awareness within the society on public affairs so that state-society relations could be reconsidered for new creative directions. Although the aim and hope from civil society building was strong enough to facilitate a massive flow of financial aid to this sector, its implementation did not meet expectations.

The majority of scholars believed that “the conventional definition of civil society ...was the outgrowth of Western political thought”<sup>50</sup>. Such political thought defined civil society as that space where “free, self-determining individuality sets forth its claims for satisfaction of its wants and personal autonomy.”<sup>51</sup> Also, it was considered to be a “realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, and autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules, affording individual opportunities to participate in multiple associations and informal networks at multiple levels of society.”<sup>52</sup>

Indeed, the claim for civil society proposed to Uzbekistan was based on neo-liberal political thought, assuming that “civil society helps to generate a transition from authoritarian rule....deepens and consolidates democracy once it is established.”<sup>53</sup> Because where authoritarian rule has tended to be highly “personalistic” and “neo-patrimonial” – the real impetus for democratic change tends to originate outside the regime in the mobilization of civil society.<sup>54</sup> Such understanding was developed to undermine the constant emphasis in the literature given to the primary role of elites in leading, crafting, or imposing transitions; it was important to stress how crucial has been the role of commoners who were organized and mobilized through civil society in the end of 1980s in Eastern Europe. The idea of civil society building and its support by the developmental aid in Uzbekistan derives considerable attention in this perspective. Because, regardless of the rich and multi-dimensional feature of civil

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<sup>50</sup> Chris Seiple 2005 Uzbekistan: Civil Society in the Heartland *Orbis* 49 (2): 245-259

<sup>51</sup> Adam B. Seligman, 1992 *The Idea of Civil Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press p. 3.

<sup>52</sup> Larry Diamond, 1994 “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3): 14–15.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid* p28

society that has been witnessed in developing countries, Western donors brought 'proxy' NGOs as civil society institutions in to Uzbekistan. Non-governmental organizations were supposed to represent various social issues, articulate raising interests and make demands in the public sphere.

According to statistics, since 1990s' international aid into Uzbekistan, nearly 3500 NGOs have been established and sponsored by USAID, SOROS, UNDP and some donor countries. In addition, there were near 20 International NGOs (INGOs) actively networking with local NGOs through various kinds of training, seminars and financial support. Local NGOs were mainly non-membership NGOs or with few paid staff to undertake developmental projects. The initial target of local NGOs was an introduction of Western society, politics, culture, liberal values and notion of civil society through educational projects. This stage gradually evolved to the process of political culture development in Uzbekistan. This means that gradually NGOs began to invite public officials to their seminars involving intellectuals, professionals and ordinary citizens to create a certain public opinion on particular issues nurtured by Western values (e.g.: freedom of speech and association was encouraged as public officials and citizens came together in seminars to reach a consensus on those principles that are important in society as well in public).

With the help of foreign donors, NGOs began to push for independence from the arbitrary state interventions as being 'non-government'. As a result of successful collective campaign of both international and domestic NGOs, new law on NGOs activities was enacted in 1999 which stipulates 'non-interference' between GO-NGO relations. The trauma caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., brought additional aid to Uzbekistan as a geo-strategic alliance on war against terrorism in the neighboring country Afghanistan. Thus, between 2001 and 2003, there were more opportunities for local NGOs and international NGOs to expand their influence and capacity to bring more transition and reforms to Uzbekistan through close

connection with Western donors. Earliest assessment of INGOs, donors' relationship with local NGOs was quite optimistic. Those 11 years (1992-2003) of NGO involvement in the country brought a sense of globalization, integration and slow but visible movement toward civil society building. However, the government of Uzbekistan accompanied with conservative elites and nationalistic intellectuals looked at these events with suspicion, dislike and sometimes with open criticism. In particular, the influence of globalization, the introduction of a market economy, and NGOs activities in the country were propagated as raising a poisonous alien culture to Uzbek 'Eastern' traditions and values. In the midst of such suspicion and dislike for NGOs activities (financed by Donors); there were a series of colorful revolutions (in 2003 (Rose-Georgia), 2004 (Orange - Ukraine) and 2005 (Tulip - Kyrgyzstan) which ended with a change of regime) in those post-Soviet countries.

Although some experts believe that those events have affected NGOs in Uzbekistan, there was already raised anxiety and suspicion over donors' overwhelming efforts on support for NGOs activities as well as dislike of the 'invasion' of Western culture to the Eastern soil<sup>55</sup>. Gradually it has become apparent that the concept of civil society introduced to the country implied not only 'civic' virtue on Uzbek society, but its mobilization and building a civic counterweight to the public authority as a target which civil society should criticize and, demand accountability and transparency from. From 2003 the government of Uzbekistan has managed to eradicate International NGOs from the country, and has banned their activities as interference in domestic affairs. Local NGOs have faced a heavy burden of re-registration procedures, surveillance and financial control over donor funding to them. Extension of control over NGOs was seen also in February 2004, when the definition of crime of 'treason' stated in

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<sup>55</sup> Western culture was perceived in Uzbekistan primitively and simply through expansion of Hollywood movies, fashion, public appearance of male and female, vulgarism and lack of discipline in family, etc. The elites of the country in particular did not approve of the non-traditional family relations, equality of the sexes, disrespect between parents and the children, the violence and too shallow a life style. Public mind was set as if liberalization and freedom meant little more than the absence of public order in a Uzbeki sense, destruction of traditional values, destabilization of social beliefs.

article 157 of the Criminal Code was extended to the dissemination of secret information to organizations, thus opening the door for repressive measures and criminalization of NGOs and defenders in contact with international NGOs or bodies.<sup>56</sup> The term non-government was seen as anti-government, and the tension between NGOs and government was increased greatly. Thus to ensure tight control, they were integrated into an umbrella association the “National Association of NGOs,” to ensure their activities complied with government policies. The movement of the NGOs within the country was also restricted (Ilkhamov 2005, pp.297-317).

Nevertheless, government refused such allegations and justified their action as ‘proper’ mechanism to confine with the public interest. Dr Saidov as a permanent mission of Uzbekistan in United Nations has mentioned that Uzbekistan is taking measures to address “...the task of elevating the level of legal culture and adaptation of the mentality of the population to the demands of development of civil society”<sup>57</sup>. He also confirmed that government is doing everything to encourage NGOs by facilitating public funds and additional support in the parliament level which indicates that civil society has become a high priority for Uzbekistan. Under this umbrella association, NGOs are able to apply for public grants or subsidy on social contracts with the amount of given aid decided by a Parliament committee on NGOs activities.

However, according to local NGOs’ view, Association of NGOs does not initiate social development projects but functions merely as a government agency where all NGOs would report back on whatever activities they would plan to do. NGOs have a very narrow space in which to work, meaning that there are barriers. These include barriers to entry (costly fees, bureaucratic discretion power); barriers to operational activities (the burden of reports and monitoring of public activities); barriers to speech and advocacy (unpredictable regulations,

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<sup>56</sup> Open letter in view of the 6<sup>th</sup> EU-Uzbekistan co-operation council 1st of February 2005  
[http://www.omct.org/pdf/OMCT\\_Europe/2005/EU-UZB-pressrelease\\_28\\_01\\_05.pdf](http://www.omct.org/pdf/OMCT_Europe/2005/EU-UZB-pressrelease_28_01_05.pdf)

<sup>57</sup> [http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw36/intro\\_statement\\_uzbek.pdf](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw36/intro_statement_uzbek.pdf)

surveillance and harassment); barriers to international contact (requirements for government approval and criminalization of international contact); and finally barriers to resources (burden of report on income and cost). Giving parliamentary discretion for NGOs funding actually implies tighter control and centralization of financial support. Earlier scholars' assessments on civil society building in the country reflected their elite-oriented, state-centric views, which emphasized government will and power (Polat 1999, pp.137–144). Such orientation assured that civil society is unlikely to develop in Uzbekistan since the regime and political system is despotic. Therefore, scholars' conclusion also do not differ from each other in the sense that in order to have civil society in Uzbekistan there should be democratic government or change of the Uzbeki regime.

However, later scholars from donor countries themselves raised criticism of the donors' persistence in their dogmatic perception of neo-liberal civil society concept by empowerment of NGOs (Seiple 2005, p.257; Suda 2005, pp.354–356; Stevens 2007, pp.54–58). A common argument was that creation and expansion of donor driven NGOs has made them dependent on financial aid from abroad, which impeded them from gaining popular support from the grassroots; therefore, NGOs have become vulnerable to the government suppression. Moreover, they insisted on a broad definition of civil society emphasized on pre-existing social institutions, and state-society relations. In reality donors' projects focusing on NGOs expansion were helpful in raising people's awareness of public affairs not only as a matter of state or public institutions but also ordinary citizens. It also altered public officials' views on the importance of non-state actors in the public sphere. However, as was mentioned, NGOs were seen merely as agents of Western ideology expansion in the country. Although, donors and International NGOs have increased their criticism of the Uzbek regime and government policies for suppressing NGOs activities, the main dilemma was lack of grassroots support.

#### 4.2.2 Preference Change toward GONGOs

As far as, the scholars' criticism of the Uzbek government did not have much result, meaning that it did not give clear strategy for the solutions and it probably would limit research area on civil society building issue in Uzbekistan, scholars realized that pre-existing social institutions, social perception and traditional forces could be the target of research in this issue. As a result of such approach change, there emerged a greater awareness among donors of the need to engage with social systems already present in Uzbekistan. It is based on assumption that it may provide more appropriate structures for citizens to have some influence on developments than structures imported from the West.<sup>58</sup> Besides, different types of association that were established during the Soviet period still exist although they have transformed themselves in some way. They had a significant impact on the way in which individuals interacted with each other and continue to have resonance and a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the population of this country (Giffen et al. 2005, pp.75-80).

One of these pre-existing institutions were Soviet forms of social organizations or Public Associations (PAs – in present terms are GONGOs) were established and guided by the Communist Party<sup>59</sup> in pre-independence period. Therefore, the main feature was political integration of social organizations under the same ideology as a channel to provide a link between state and society. Some of the most influential PAs were the Pioneers' League, Komsomol, the Women Committee and Professional, Scientific and Technical associations. Trade Unions, Foundations and Co-operatives were also important part of such PAs, but they have been transformed to various structures after independence. Pioneers' League and Komsomol has been combined in to 'Kamolot' (Growth) (GONGO) organization of youth, while the Women Committee and professional associations remain unchanged.

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<sup>58</sup> J. Giffen, L. Earle and Ch. Buxton 2005 *The Development of Civil Society in Central Asia*. U.K.: INTRACT. pp 70-75

<sup>59</sup> The Communist party was the ruling institution, not the government or executive; therefore it has established and organized activities of all of public associations.

In terms of structure and process, these associations borrowed its context from the Soviet Law on Public Organizations and Unions which became the Uzbek law on Public Associations in 1991. Such law in Soviet time was developed when the purpose was to control the activities of PAs and it still applies in case of Uzbekistan. Although Law on NGOs was enacted in 1999 in Uzbekistan, the main regulating norm is still the law on Public Associations which was also integrated in to the Civil Code of the country.<sup>60</sup> This situation creates an image of people about social organizations, NGOs and other associations as if they are a part of public associations which are subject of state control and guidance was done by the Communist Party. Foundations such as ‘Veterans’ foundation – ‘Nuroni’ (elders), ‘Soglom avlod uchun’ (for a healthy generation) and others are government organized funds which propagate government policies on these issues. The predominance of this organizational form “...colors people’s and groups’ idea of what a public association or organization should look like” (Giffen et al. 2005, p.96).

Therefore, there is no general notion among the population that associational life should be created from below and separated from state’s control as civil society concept implies. Local NGOs admit that “...dominant perception in the country is still that social involvement in public sphere or public affairs should be through public associations, guided by the government, funded from the budget or by the SOEs enforced donations”.<sup>61</sup> International donors’ attitude has changed toward these PAs after NGOs were criticized. They began to find ways to involve such PAs in grant projects. For instance, the Women Committee has been the most powerful PA in gender issues and it has a direct link with Women Business Associations with regional

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<sup>60</sup> **Law on Public Associations** (1991:2004(2) – 1:2): Political parties, movements, trade unions, organizations of women, youth and children, veterans and disabled peoples organizations, technological, scientific, cultural, educational, sport clubs, and other civic unions are public associations. **Law on Non-Government Organizations** (1999:10:1): Non Governmental Organizations are established in the form of public associations, public funds, and public agencies

<sup>61</sup> Author’s interview with the group of NGOs

offices<sup>62</sup> in each provinces. Kamolot is also one of the biggest pro-government associations of youth combining over 5 million members between 14-30. Donors began to work with these associations and public funds on developmental projects such as the promotion of healthy and productive life among younger generation, empowerment of female and gender issues.

From the surface of these endeavors we can imagine how ‘benevolent’ Public Associations exist in the country. However, they function as usual GONGOs in developing countries meaning that strictly within the state ideology and public policies. They pose a counterweight to neo-liberal NGOs in order to direct foreign aid. In fact, these GONGOs are not only for the attraction of donors’ aid, but also to intervene in donor driven social, economic and political agenda so they can direct it to government approved discourse. For instance, Adams’ observation (2004, pp.96-110) of cultural elites and state ideology in Uzbekistan reveals that state or public institutions attached to the central government such as Ministries, impose direction and a framework for public affairs within which GONGOs have to deliver their message to the society. Her evidence is that cultural elites of Uzbekistan are subordinated to the state so they echo government ideology through Public Associations in ordinary people’s language, making it sound like those ideologies actually belong to the society. GONGOs play an important role in implementing or execute government will and power over society. Such state funded system inherited from Soviet era ensures state domination of communication which is not only anti-democratic; it is also dangerous hence “...it only gives the illusion of control over society” (Adams 2004, p.118). Nevertheless some scholars see government funded Public Associations as reflecting the perception in society that state still has the responsibility and power to deliver on social issues and to support groups of citizen who are involved in the public sphere (Giffen et al. 2005, p.96).

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<sup>62</sup> Another feature of PAs is having branches or offices in each province with paid staffs also based on the law on Pas (1991).

However, this raises doubt about aim from this aid, though the projects have good intentions. Support for civil society organizations or proxy NGOs was to empower associational life, to encourage social awareness and involvement in their issues, create a demand within society for the effective provision of public goods, transparency and accountability from government. But what can explain foreign aid to the GONGOs if overall government institutions' credibility and their values are not grounded by social trust or satisfaction from majority? International donors' support for government organized social institutions is appreciated if the pro-government associations have willingness to provide equal access to the benefit from the aid delivery, which is not the case in Uzbekistan. Donors' inclination to such GONGOs and dominant public perception of civil society increased up to 2005 when Western influential politicians were seeking to revitalize relations with Uzbekistan that was ruined as a result of destabilizations in neighboring countries. The Uzbek government directly considered U.S. embassy, USAID and Counterpart Consortium as a threat to the regime maintenance as they were accused of supporting revolutionary activities and social mobilization from radical parts of society. Also, it is closely linked to the fact that EBRD refused the Uzbek government anticipated financial aid on the ground of human rights violations, torture and abuses in prisons. Therefore, donors' attention has moved to re-build positive relations of Uzbekistan with the U.S. and Western countries.

At this point, we can see that government suspicion and its antagonistic attitude toward NGOs and the attachment of civil society concept to it in Uzbekistan has points in common with earlier experiences of developing countries in Africa, Asia and South-East Asia. Political ambitions which those neo-liberal NGOs attempted to raise in local society was considered as an attempt to intervene in to domestic politics and internal affairs of sovereign states. The answer to these criticisms was introduced in new terms of social capital to the developing countries which were sovereign earlier than Uzbekistan. This concept which we

discussed in earlier chapters had helped to reevaluate state-civil society relations in developing countries since social capital placed emphasis on apolitical but developmental aspects of associations. Reintroduction of social networks, communities, trust and reciprocity which social capital invests into the public domain has facilitated NGOs involvement in aid delivery, poverty reduction projects, and public service provision, relief and rescue missions but not in decision making process. Moreover, donors started to work closer with neighborhoods, communities and local governments to pursue basis for accumulation of social capital for developmental ends. However, in Uzbekistan, state and civil society relations remained harsh. NGOs were restricted from participating in service delivery or any activities in public sphere without approval of public institutions. Instead, GONGOs took a leading position in the public sphere representing how the public domain has been monopolized by the government political discourse. In fact, the biggest GONGO, the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations, has combined more than three thousands of NGOs, Public Associations and public funds in order to institutionalize state-society relations in public sphere. According to UNDP staff in charge of democracy assistance in Uzbekistan “...after unexpected colorful revolutions in post-Soviet countries, government had to take measures in order to control all NGOs funded by the donors, and umbrella institution like Association of NGOs plays that role”.

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Instead of gradual liberalization of state-civil society relations, the government of Uzbekistan later pronounced local version of civil society pointing at residential associational life Mahalla. The term of residential associational life in the country were re-invented as traditional civil society combining old institutional structure and traditional patterns of state-society relations. It is interesting that civil society scholars and donors discovered it as the ground or basis for social capital as well as building civil society in Uzbekistan.

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<sup>63</sup> Authors interview conversation.

#### 4.2.3 Search for the Community Driven Development or ‘traditional’ Civil Society

Mahalla residential communities as a traditional civil society may comprise up to several hundred households, with the total number of residents usually no more than 5,000. Councils of elders, or *aksakals*, consisting of six to eight people were formed within these communities, through which the government channels public services to the whole community members. It represents a native neighborhood, as some scholars mentioned, a civil society which built on “...collective identities and the reciprocal relationships necessary to get things done.”<sup>64</sup> This is ‘Uzbek civil society’ they say.

An interest was expressed in to these Mahalla residential associations by various academics to understand its nature, functions and role in the country. The earliest work on Mahalla was conducted by Sievers (2002, pp.91-158) where he has shown how the role of residential associations changed gradually from medieval, Soviet and post-independent period of Uzbekistan. In the medieval era he explains that Mahalla was seen as autonomous associational life providing framework for social networks. It facilitated communication with the state by representing social issues, demands and interests. Mahalla were also a sphere of feedback, evaluation of state performance since the dense network existing there enabled the sharing and exchanging of information. Such autonomy and self-governance of Mahalla was possible because of internal economic and entrepreneurial relations among many Mahalla residential associations and they did not depend on the state.

In the Soviet period Uzbekistan, although many pre-Soviet social and economic institutions were abolished such as various forms of land and properties, traditional structures of such as nomadism, customary law courts, Mahalla were incorporated into the Soviet system.

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<sup>64</sup> David M. Abramson, “Identity Counts: The Soviet Legacy and the Census in Uzbekistan” in David Kertzer and Dominique Arel, eds., (2001) *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*. Cambridge University Press , pp. 186–99

The cornerstone of this policy involved creating homogenous set of institutions across the country to establish supranational Soviet *citizenship* in multi-ethnic society. Hence in this period Mahalla residents have become parastatal social self-government associations as basic administrative units. The leaders – *aksaqal* (*white-beard*) became elected chairperson for particular Mahalla, whose appointment was controlled by local party apparatus. There established advisor committees that were attached to the Mahalla to which the chairperson could rely on family matters, gender issues or other social agenda. The activities of these association “... included presenting state agencies with the opinions and ideas of constituents and facilitating rights of citizens to participate in managing the state and society” (2002, p.115). Important statement of Sievers is that if pre-Soviet Mahalla residents expected nothing from the state, late Soviet Mahalla residents’ perception required strong state to have good schools, adequate medical care and crime prevention (2002, p.118). In late period of Soviet regime, the country has witnessed a growth of population, urbanization and modernization of economic relations which in turn also affected self-governing Mahalla residents. Instead of widely expanded rural type residents, there began to be an increase in apartments of modern cities and a flow of migration from traditional type Mahalla into these cities. Therefore in the late 1980s those who remained in rural Mahalla shared little with new Mahalla residents in cities (*Ibid*).

Suda (2005, pp.336-368) has mentioned about ‘neo-traditional’ communities in contemporary Uzbekistan referring to Mahalla. She claimed that Mahalla was re-invented after independence, and was a very important institution in pre-Soviet and during Soviet period. This is because, whilst it had a traditional outlook, it was also “...equipped with an institutional body in support of penetrating modern power into the daily life of the population” (2005, p.350). By this she wanted to point out how Soviet regime had used traditional medieval Mahalla in order to monitor and govern private lives of population.

Post-independent revitalization of Mahalla is closely related to its role in

Soviet-period, and that role it played before has become handful in contemporary Uzbekistan as well as received tremendous attention from the Western donors (Noori 2006, pp.533-549; Suda 2005, pp.335-365; Giffen et al. 2005, pp.131-151). Some scholars refer to donors' attention being increased in the early period of restructuring Mahalla in the 1990s. Rest of the scholars has mentioned that donors have started supporting Mahalla after 2000. Therefore, we need to explain this difference first. Mahalla residential associations have been officially integrated in to government state building policy since early 1990s. Since the first Constitution of independent Uzbekistan was accepted in 1992, it has mentioned that Mahalla are given a legal status and handle certain policies regarded as local and regional development issues (article 105: Constitution of Republic of Uzbekistan ). There has been government support in order to utilize Mahalla residential associations by integrating it to local government administrative bodies. This task was given to the *Mahalla Fund* in 1993 operating as Government Organized social institution (GONGO). Only after six years in 1999 the Law on Self-Government Associations was enacted to bring Mahalla in frontier of public sphere. Also some amendments have been made to this law in 2003; hence the purpose of Mahalla policies was to strengthen this institution's role.

According Noori (2006, pp.535-549), since Mahalla Initiative (MI) policy started in the 1990s, it was integrated in to World Bank's advocacy for decentralization and the devolution of public service delivery. Therefore, MI reforms received considerable aid from United National Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, and US Agency for International Aid (USAID). Consequently, these policies on Mahalla reformations have attracted the majority of development interventions by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in Uzbekistan. It means that earlier donors' attention was on *decentralization policies* of Uzbekistan in transition period which MI reforms had represented in their perception. Noori also provided with observations conducted by Kamp (2004,

pp.29-58) who emphasized the dilemmas of decentralization process based MI by pointing at frustrations and dissatisfaction of women from welfare service distribution by Mahalla committees. She rather supported donors' projects on NGOs expansion in gender issues rather than Mahalla service provision. Noori's argument also confirms Kamp's criticism that decentralization policy based on MI in reality brought more state rather than self-governance of local and regional communities as it was expected. Moreover, Mahalla administration "...was designed to widen state control by ensuring that all Uzbeks fell under the supervision of Mahalla and to free the state from the costly expense of service provision" (2006, p.534)

Since the criticism over foreign aid on Mahalla reforms became increasingly vocal, central government of Uzbekistan has announced its democratization path as if it was following 'Eastern' democratic values and Mahalla represented traditional version of civil society. The manipulation of Mahalla perception from decentralization to civil society building took place in 2003 and that year was announced as the Year of Flourishing Mahalla (Suda 2005, p.355). This time of period was the beginning of government suppression of NGOs, suspension of International NGOs activities and decay of diplomatic relations with the U.S. Therefore, it gave a clear message that if the West was insisting so forcefully on building civil society, then it must know that Uzbek society has built already its own civil society based on traditional values, and closer to the perception of Uzbek citizens. The willingness of the U.S. and other donor countries to rehabilitate relations with the government of Uzbekistan as a strategic ally in combating terrorism pushed for delivering more aid in to re-furnished interpretation of Mahalla associations. Although the concept of civil society did not fit in any possible way to the structure and role of the Mahalla in Uzbekistan, scholars began to analyze it as an alternative institution to work with for improving living conditions of people in the country.

Although scholars and donors did not immediately regard the Mahalla reforms of 2003 as civil society building the World Bank instead has initiated Community Driven

Development (CDD). Mahalla associations were closer to community based organizations (CBO) in the Western sense since the majority of Mahalla associations were densely allocated in rural areas (Giffen & Buxton 2004, pp.4-5). The idea introduced by community driven development was focused on organization of initiative groups or in other words empowerment of community initiatives. Those initiatives could be to repair village infrastructure, water supplies, schools and houses. The purpose from support for such initiatives gradually could lead to the involvement of community initiative groups in pro-poor policy making process (Giffen et al. 2005, pp.133-135).

From the viewpoint of Mahalla inhabitants, there is a sharp distinction between the Mahalla as the community and the Mahalla as an administrative organization. Because the community, inhabitants or residents of Mahalla, joined together to address their most urgent and pressing problems (asphalting the road, repairing water pipes and arranging garbage clean) without seeking any support from the Mahalla committee, while the committee functions merely as watching eyes doing or providing nothing. Therefore, when we say Mahalla it can be understood as referring to residents, inhabitants and people within that Mahalla territory or administration and committee of Mahalla which is in charge of governing and management of those people paid by government.

The Uzbek government repeatedly announced that the country has its own ‘traditional civil society’ which bonded with Eastern values, collective harmony and social consensus rather than individual liberty, demanding authorities or western type society full of conflict spirit. However, Mahalla being traditional, social groupings based on regional division does not let community members discuss debate or represent members’ interests. Moreover, it does not include pluralism and participatory principles of civil society. It does, however, distribute social welfare services through appointed Mahalla leaders and staffs following exactly provisions of Law on “Self-Government Organizations” on how to do their jobs. It replicates function of

local government. In brief, as Suda pointed out “...it is designed to foster civic obligation, rather than to directly engage citizens in contested political activity” (2005, p.367).

Also we can see confrontations among scholars about supporting Mahalla as a part of civil society. Regardless of earlier mentioned criticisms, Stevens (2004, pp.110-111) and Seiple (2005, pp.245-259) argues that Western conception of civil society is too narrow to observe possible development of self-governing autonomous associational life in traditional context of Uzbekistan. Seiple for instance suggests that “...Americans need to find a way to participate in this discussion ...preferably with Uzbeks”, because “...it is extremely difficult for the American conception of civil society to allow for existing traditional structures—e.g., clan networks and the Mahalla—that are tied to religion” (2005, p.257). Their argument is based on the fact that the U.S. did not give closer attention to the indigenous context of society where community consciousness could be enlightened. Instead, the U.S. aid policy gave too much effort on NGOs expansion in the country. The importance of cultural, religious aspects and internal power structure in the country were most of the time overseen since the aid policy was based on the Western doctrine of democratization. Therefore, as Stevens suggests that “...a more communitarian approach to civil society is needed, one that would support pre-modern communities” (2004, pp.110-111).

However, it seems to me that an answer to this debate is already provided by an earlier work of Sievers (2002, pp.91-158) and additional evidences given by Suda (2005, pp.335-365) supports that answer. An answer is that Mahalla residential associations cannot be a part of civil society since it has government paid administration body. This administration has been designed to preserve one-sided communication between state and society meaning top-down. Sievers expressed his regret that gradual intervention of the state (meaning even more intervention than Soviet period) increasingly seems to be destructive of social cohesion, reciprocity and mutual aid of Mahalla inhabitants. In particular, the artificial election of

Mahalla leader (meaning that a leader most of the time appointed by District level governors – *hokim*), and Mahalla committees were seen as the expansion of an omnipotent state but weak at providing modern public services. It actually is weakening the traditional service provision too (*hashar* – is one of those traditional services, the collective physical help of neighboring residents to repairs infrastructures, residents' tutorship on cultivating good manner and common sense in young generation in particular Mahalla, dispute resolution between husband and wife and so on). There are also more supporting arguments that criticize change of course in civil society building toward Mahalla, but the main point is that the Uzbek government aimed at two targets, namely 'decentralization' and 'civil society' issues of international pressure, with the one bullet – Mahalla. The shot, I believe, missed due to the deep and thorough analysis of scholars that exposed actual intention of the Uzbek government.

#### **4.3 Is Civil Society Really New for Uzbekistan?**

In brief, if we recast civil society building in Uzbekistan, we can be witness of doubt, uncertainty and unclearness that surround this issue. First of all, as we discussed in chapter 1, the concept of civil society was always subject of redefinitions, arguments and clarifications by scholars in the West and later in the rest of the World. It has been always a question of what was considered as civil society in a particular period of time. Only from the 1980s, the concept became a cornerstone for political ambitions of liberals, admirers of change and transformations in developing countries. It was overdosed by neo-liberal ideology to replace the state (meaning weak, incapable totalitarian states) and become an agent of democratizations. The same desire pursued by social movements, riots to change and to live in better life earlier in between 1960s and 1980s was seen as barbaric, uncivil and danger of political system which the call was for political institutionalization. But the possibility of these desires to join and overthrow communist regimes made them civil society since 1980s. This society is against

undemocratic, totalitarian, despotic regimes which makes public sphere as domain of conflict, debate and demand over the process of developmental discourse. This is what Foucault supported and this is what Diamond defined as civil society, meaning that voluntary cohesion, collective act of social forces in the public realm for civic ends. Moreover, two famous American political scientists of the 1980s Almond and Verba (1989, pp.110-115), observing transition period of non-Western political systems had already suggested to transform primordial culture to political one which serves as a basis for civil society. That is why it has become public sphere. And according to Western scholars and politicians, Uzbekistan does not have “the basis for creating civil society” or “a framework conducive to establishing a civil society remains largely non-existent” (Polat 1999, p.135; Kangas D 1995, p.271; Carley 1995, p.292). Only USAID announced that civil society was “beginning to develop in Uzbekistan” citing to the few NGOs that had been established in 2003 (Seiple 2005, p.256). But, it seems far from being true.

#### **4.3.1 Search for the Civil Society in history.**

If we look in to history of Uzbekistan, at least in the period when the country was under Russian Empire and early period of Soviet rule (1860 – 1930), I think we can see the patterns of civil society existed for long time. By ‘patterns’ we mean the desire of society to articulate their interests and pursue them associatively, collectively in order to challenge occupying and dominating ideology. Or the patterns of harmony, reciprocity and social trust existed among inhabitants in that period. Before presenting that pattern, it is important to admit an impact of earlier history of the country comprising more than four centuries when the region first was called *Movoraunnahr* (translation – region between the two lakes *Amu* and *Sir*). This region experienced numerous invasions and occupations until 15<sup>th</sup> century by various imperialist powers. Only in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the tribes, kinships and various ethnic groups

allocated in Central Asia, or at least in the territory that is today called Uzbekistan, had been joined under centralized state by strong warrior Amir Temur (1336 – 1405) before this region found itself as one of the strongest and richest states in the World. Later he was able to conquer territories from Europe to China establishing the first trading road *Great Silk Road*.

However, the territory later has been divided in to three Khanates as a result of more invasions by bigger tribes *Sheybanees* and later *Ashtarkhanees* up to the mid of 17<sup>th</sup> century. Three Khanates namely Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara became independent states while they had common religious belief, language, economy and even institutional structure. Islam in general, Islamic rules (*sharia*) and customary law (*adat*) was main source of guidance for public order, social life and pursuance of private interest by the population. According to Uzbek historians, constant inter-ethnic wars among these khanates, fights for the throne within the khanates, heavy taxation on ordinary people because of those wars, and unchanged primordial economic relations (based on agriculture and crop) had been main reasons for lacking behind in modernization from rest of the world (Usmonov et al. 2005, pp.160-170).

Regardless of the decline in economic and political aspects in all three khanates, social life was a source of harmony, reciprocity and mutual trust. Sukhareva (1976, pp.15-20) described an example of late feudal city of Bukhara covering 18<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> century where she explored common features preserved over more than three centuries. The city usually was divided in to more than 200 blocks or Mahalla and each block comprising on average 80 households. Important feature was that preservation of strong community ties. People in those blocks had to meet each other in any social event such as wedding, funeral, religious activities and also according to the entrepreneurship group activities (craftsmen, artisans, singers and merchants). These events were costly and time consuming which is why they enforced community to share responsibilities among community members, neighbors, relatives and households in particular block. Sometimes, relations could be expanded from one block to

several others since the cases of inter block marriages were common thing and customary rules obliged relatives from different blocks to join public events in various blocks.

Such self-governed community life has been independent and could arrange every necessary condition without external intervention. For instance, household in each community usually shared costs of internal infrastructure like building mosque, roads, public bath and tea houses where later they uses them for free. Each block in the city was sometimes specified in certain type of entrepreneurship which created economic relations among blocks and facilitated exchange of goods and services. Both rich and poor equally used to join religious events, weddings and funerals although the duties were different. For instance rich people sometimes paid bigger fee for building infrastructure and sustainability while poor usually were servants of those facilities. The community life divided in blocks was represented as Mahalla and leaders as *aqsaqal* has been common feature in all three khanates. Aqsaqals served people rather than ruled it. This part of history which shows a harmony, mutual aid and trust in Uzbek Mahalla could fit in to the terms of Tocquevillian civil society or apolitical Social capital of Putnam which Sievers aimed to expose (2002, pp.99-110). However, as we earlier mentioned, after the occupation by Russian Empire there was a pattern of social mobilization, movements and raised political consciousness of ordinary people in order to fight against long time existing religious based Monarchial legacy in the region. This is important period of time in history of Uzbekistan which resembles to early notions of civil society in Europe and also re-incarnated civil society in Eastern Europe.

The occupation of the three Khanates (if combined it makes whole territory of contemporary Uzbekistan) by the Russian Empire was considered as colonization or sometimes invasion or even destruction of traditional life in the region, but according to Khalid (2010b, pp.74-82) it was the end of 'isolation'. Underdeveloped infrastructure, weakness of military

power, lack of loyalty to despotic rulers in all three Khanates<sup>65</sup> made it easy for Russian modernized military forces to occupy the territory regardless of comprehensive military tactics of Khanates army. Not only in military, but in general existing progress in Russia stood in contrast to fanaticism and barbarity of Central Asians resided in Islam and isolation. This isolation could be breached by replacing despotism of rulers by modern state building, and the increase in trade and prosperity. However, this isolation had been protected for very long time which made social transformation hard to achieve (Khalid 2010b, pp.65-80).

The way to go through this protection at first was by attacking Islam and by the introduction of modern infrastructure, means of transportation, communication and production in late 1880s. Suppression of Islam was the hardest task. It had started from Russification policy of General von-Kaufman enabling establishment of Russian villages in the big prefectures such as Samarkand, Fergana and Sirdarya. The motive was simple that to introduce either secular life or tolerance to other religious beliefs. Later on, Kaufman introduced a status of 'honourable' citizens among those who welcomed conquest, who admired Russians existence, administration, and life style. Whoever acquired this status could be appointed in considerably higher ranks of various administrative positions in local regions or could receive various incentives (Usmonov et al. 2005).

One of the wisest colonial administration methods was to keep key administrative institutions intact to use them as leverage for sustaining society in calm and stable environment as well as for implementation of Empire's policies. Also most of the time the policy of the Russians was intolerant and severe, exemplified in how they abolished the highest religious status which majority of Muslims would respect, obey and pray '*Shayh-ul Islom*', burned religious holy books and ruined the mosques, etc., whenever local people tried to resist.

An introduction of modern means of transportation, communication and production

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<sup>65</sup> Three Khanates – Kokand, Bukhara, Khiva: all together today comprise total territory of Uzbekistan.

was accompanied with true motive of occupation in the first place, such as building cotton plantations, exploitation of existing natural resources and withdrawal of as much as possible profit. Nevertheless, there were quite important benefits for local inhabitants too which was the early steps of getting the region out of isolation. Only between 1890–1905 years there were established more than three directions of internal and external railways connecting largest cities with Empire. More than thirty cotton factories, three hundred industrial corporations were built until 1910 enabling thirty thousand jobs in industrial sector for local inhabitants. As long as Russians had penetrated in to the region deeper, they felt it necessary to import Russian language, literacy and education in order to fill new public institutions with local population in the region. Starting in 1884, ‘new-schools’ were established, the number of which grew rapidly during the 1890s. By the end of the decade there were hundreds of these schools. A modern health care system was also introduced that provided services equally for males and females. This equal treatment of the sexes later created discomfort for the local people as did the fact that nurses and doctors were Russian nationals. Gradually, these reforms gathered pace as they sought to ‘civilize’ the region through the introduction of suffrage, equal rights of men and women, and equal access to public services and facilities (Usmonov et al. 2005, pp.182–185).

However, one may wonder of the native populations’ reaction to both altering the centuries old traditions, values and increasing desire of population for civilization. Although there was resistance against intervention in social life of local population by foreigners, early reforms had already built hopes on certain amount of local elites to see their own old villages and cities full of electric trains, modern departments, libraries, schools, hospitals and modern social intercourse. Moreover, popular February Revolution in 1917 (aftermath of World War I) had brought up new Provisional Government replacing Russian Empire with Social Communist party. It propagated a strong ideology of ‘national in form but socialist in content’ that expanded equal citizenship, integration of economy even for entire colonial regions (Khalid 2010a,

pp.98-100). So the reaction was obviously directed in two sides representing people who prefer non-intervention and people who desired 'civilization' following the events within the Empire.

#### **4.3.1.1 Insurgencies against the colonial power**

Starting from 1880s, local population of the khanates began to express their intolerance of colonial policies. Earlier notion of dissatisfaction had started against heavy taxation upon peasants, land owners and craftsmen in Fergana valley. Although people claimed on illegal tax collections on surface, they were deeply angry about those reforms and changes happening in their soil. In 1879, nearly five hundred people gathered in front of Fergana administration building to demand reduction of taxes in certain areas due to the loss of harvest and low level of income. The military governor of the region could feel easily the anger of people and did not see any alternative decision but to promise them tax reduction. According to historians, just in Fergana there were more than two hundred demonstrations and insurgencies raising various issues related to economic and social life between 1880s and 1890s.

In 1892 summer, the Tashkent city population was suffering the ravages of the plague and the number of death were increasing. Meanwhile, governor of the city did not fulfill his promise to open a new graveyard outside the city, people had started to question for such delay and disrespect for the death of local people. Unsolved problem led to the massive social mobilization of near one thousands or more people. When they realized that military governor had no intention to listen, people started to throw stones and occupied the building. Consequently all the people who were involved in this incident were harshly shot by the army which came soon after the incident.

Later, when people gradually had realized that their needs and interests were not included at all and they began to see themselves as mere exploited slaves; people began to join in to more violent insurgencies. For instance, in 1898, more than two thousands of civilians

with knives and cudgels attacked military bases of Russian army in small towns and villages of Andijan valley. In 1916, as a result of massive pressure into the Russian army<sup>66</sup> there was popular uprising started from simple demonstrations of two or three thousands of people in city Xodjand (July 4<sup>th</sup>). The clash between police forces and demonstrators had killed several civilians but the anger had spread to other cities like Tashkent (July 5<sup>th</sup>), Samarkand (July 11<sup>th</sup>), Fergana (July 14<sup>th</sup>) and Jizzah (July 13<sup>th</sup>). It is difficult to give exact numbers but it is estimated that civilian casualties reached over two thousand. While these huge civilian losses were not reported to the Emperor's administration, fewer than one hundred Russian soldiers killed or wounded was seen as a dramatic loss. Brutal suppression of demonstrations, death of civilians and injuries had not stopped people from more uprising till Russian Monarchy was replaced by February Revolution<sup>67</sup> of *Bolsheviks* (majoritarian).

As result of massive social mobilization and weakening control over the region, Russians had started to search for peaceful ways of transitions from backwardness to civilization of region. It is difficult to term this as "civilization" when it involved expansion of cotton plantations, cheap labor, exploitation, and the shipment of valuable resources, literature and gold to St. Petersburg. But also there were new industries, modern technologies, communication and transportation, new public services and facilities. Anyway, Russian governors in the region had attempted to attract influential local elites, intelligentsia and *imams* to convince the people as if the policies dictated by the 'White King' (Russian Emperor) were for the wellbeing of native population. Such pacific approach, tolerance and respect for indigenous culture increased mutual reciprocal reaction from local elites to collaborate with new reforms.

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<sup>66</sup> Since the Russian Empire was involved in World War I, its military power gradually had been weakened. Therefore near 170 000 people had to be gathered from colonized territory of Uzbekistan, such as Samarkand, Fergana and Sirdarya.

<sup>67</sup> In 1917 there were two February and October Revolutions. The first revolution aimed at ending Monarchy and the second one brought new government in to power to establish USSR.

In brief, the examples described above were voices of the people, their demands which questioned what they regarded as a despotic Russian administration and its policies. They were not divided into social classes, instead, collective action of voluntarily joined rich, poor, peasants, merchants, elites attempted to resist to the authoritative rule of colonial regime. Wasn't it civil society?

#### **4.3.1.2 Pro-civilization movements of 'Jadids'**

Ideology of Jadidism (from Arabic word – new) was developed by Crimean Tatar (one of the ethnicity) Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (1851–1914) one of the intellectuals who had realized first that Turkic nations (historically Central Asian nations were closely related as Turkic) were lagging much behind from Europe so should strive for modern education (Khalid 2010a, pp.100–102; Kimmage 2005; Usmonov et al. 2005, pp.192–195). The modern school he had introduced to Bukhara khanate was '*usuli Jaddid*' (Jadid's methodology) which later spread to Kokand, Andijan and to many other prefectures of contemporary Uzbekistan. Gradually, the number such schools increased until they were in total nearly one hundred in 1907. As earlier mentioned, Russian military governors attempted to collaborate with local elites and search for peaceful ways of reforms, so they did not oppose to Jadids. Even when Jadid schools sometimes meant a replacement of teaching system imposed by Russians.

Active leaders of Uzbek Jadids were Behbudiy, Shakuriy, Munavvar Qori, Avloniy, Fitrat, Cholpon, Fayzulla Xujaev. At the beginning they aimed at educational reforms through expansion of Jadid schools in several fields including religion, physiology and health, chemistry, biology, algebra, geometry as well as increasing the speed of the education process. Among these especially, students were taught intensive courses of Turkic history in order to instill them a nationalistic perception. Jadid leaders were prominent scholars and authors of several textbooks for the schools they opened, newspapers and journals where they expressed

and propagated modernization of the region through educational progress. Later on Jadid schools had even initiated to send excellent students abroad. Interested local elites and rich merchants were very supportive of this idea and arranged scholarships for students. As a result in early 1910s, more than fifty prospective students had graduated universities in Germany, Egypt, and Turkey and in big cities of Russia.

The next step of Jadids endeavors was to establish their own press. In 1906, Munnavar Qori started to publish and edit the journal “Xurshid” (prosperity). In this journal he emphasized people’s rights and freedoms, enlightenment of nationalism based on modern perspectives. Behbudiy also had started newspaper “Samarkand” (name of city) from 1913 where he supported articles calling for literacy, freedom and pride for the mother land. In the same year another Jadid leader Ubaydullaxodja was able to organize political party of intellectuals “Tarakkiparvarlar” (pro- progressionists) and next year in 1914 he published party’s newspapers “Sadoi Fargona” (Voice of Fergana) and “Sadoi Turkiston” (Voice of Turkestan). Also Munavvar Qori had initiated a first theatre in native language in 1913 with the drama artists where many spectacles were devoted to describe dilemmas of traditional backwardness of people, corruption in religious courts, unequal circumstances for the women and polygamy. In brief, as Khalid (2010a, p.101) puts it that their project “...saw the problem as dialectic between modernity and authenticity...”

In the aftermath of February and later October Revolutions in 1917, Jadids felt more free to expand their missions in the region regardless of local *imams* and fanatics (meaning conservative Muslims) criticisms. Those revolutions had occurred in Russian Empire impressed Uzbek Jadids to acknowledge a possibility of revolutionary transformation of society in the region. A common view appeared among them was “...the change had to be radical, sudden, and imposed; and it was to be above all, revolution of the mind” (Khalid 2010a, p.102). Jadids were main and solid actors of political conscious building in the process of

political reforms after the Revolutions. They had established political party ‘Shoroi Islomiya’ (Islamic Party) to represent overall Uzbek population (meaning that Jadids were supported and deeply rooted in every big cities and villages of all khanates) in the political process in March 14<sup>th</sup> of 1917. Their mission was seen as honorable devotion for the freedom and prosperity therefore, they had support from the majority, but later in the same year the party ‘Shoroi Islomiya’ had lost a number of Jadids to coalition party ‘Shoroi Ulamo’ (Party of Intelligencia). The difference between them was that latter aimed at more radical activities, open conflicts while former wanted peaceful political and democratic ways of freedom. The division of social forces in that way obviously affected to the efficiency of the Jadids endeavors. For instance, members of Shoroi Islom had started to see collaboration with new provisional government first and later even socialist regime as remedy to achieve stronger support in order to persuade population for the reforms and to show that Russians also welcome these efforts.

However, Russians were seeking their own goals from collaboration meaning that remained Monarchial reign in Bukhara and Khiva khanates had to be abolished by bottom-up mobilization of local people but not from foreign invasion again. In Bukhara Jadids and regional Soviets in the region together successfully organized social movements ‘Bukharian Youth’ and in Khiva also soviet propaganda had helped local population to mobilize under ‘Khiva’s Youth’. These collaborations gradually produced results later with overthrown of khans and establishments of Bukhara Soviet Socialist Republic and Khorezm Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920. The reason for establishing Republics in these regions was to integrate colonized regions under voluntarily joined federation of Soviet Socialist Republics which had happened in 30<sup>th</sup> December 1922 and became Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, two years later in 1924, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) imposed the policy of ‘divide and rule’ that brought totally new Socialist Republics which today we call Central Asian states.

In brief, Jadids were high rank intellectuals who knew importance of progress for the people. To this end, they had established schools, published newspapers and journals relying on their own resources. They also realized how political consciousness of people is important to participate in reforms, modernization process of their own country. Finally, Jadids were strong opposition against despotic rule of Monarchy, restricted women rights and backwardness of rulers. Wasn't it Civil Society?

#### **4.3.1.3 Collapse of the Soviet Union and Awakening Civic Virtue**

Soviet regime governance was based on two main pillars; one is ideological indoctrination and expansion of artificial legitimacy and the second was to use coercive force by regular purges of local intellectuals, imprisonment of nationalist writers, thinkers as political dissidents. Iron administration of Stalin through Gulags of People's Commissariat (Ministry) for Internal Affairs, and KGB (Committee for National Security) had imposed social fear from the regime administration for long time even after he died in 1953. Psychiatric hospitals were widely used as prisons to isolate political dissidents since the official explanation was that "...no sane person would declaim against Soviet government and Communism"<sup>68</sup>. Moreover, family, relatives and even children of whoever was sent to the Gulags were largely condemned as a public enemy and discredited within society. On the other hand, support and patriotism toward the socialist regime was very much encouraged.

Nevertheless, due to the purges provoked from the 'cotton incident' in Uzbekistan SSR<sup>69</sup>, society was deeply humiliated. The first secretary of the Uzbekistan CP (communist party) Sharaf Rashidov was sentenced and later died from heart attack; over 4000 corruption cases were openly published in Soviet media humiliating Uzbekistan in front of all Soviet

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<sup>68</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punitive\\_psychiatry\\_in\\_the\\_Soviet\\_Union](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punitive_psychiatry_in_the_Soviet_Union)

<sup>69</sup> Dense and vibrant corruption cases based on clan and elite's intrusion in to Polit-Bureau had become apparent due to the large amount of cut in cotton production and delivery to the Moscow.

Union member countries. It was actually clear to all that not only Uzbekistan but all other union socialist countries were plagued by corruption, but Moscow's aim was to escape the blame for being an impotent state by pointing at Uzbekistan SSR. At the end of prosecution it became clearer that actually the link of corruption cases were leading to the Central Committee of Communist Party in Moscow (Лагунина 2008)). Leading investigators' confession unfortunately was silenced through KGB's involvement.<sup>70</sup>

As a result, Uzbekistan became synonymous with corruption and this resentment led to a strengthening of Uzbek nationalism. Especially, during the 'perestroyka' (перестройка – referring to the restructuring of the Soviet political and economic system.) and 'glasnot' (гласность – referring to maximum transparency of public institutions and freedom of media of Gorbachev policy (Chief of the USSR Communist Party from 1985 - 1990)) Uzbekistan SSR has begun to show openly social anger and dissatisfaction with reformation policies. On the other hand, several other socialist countries also radically refused socialist regime which generated massive social unrest and demonstrations against the regime. The waves of the nationalism, freedom from socialist ideology, regime and culture of neighboring countries had spurred awakened political mobilizations in Uzbekistan. Nationalist movements and strong pressure for independence was gradually combined within the new political parties of 'Erk' (Freedom) and 'Birlik' (Union) from Xorezm (South –West part of Uzbekistan) and Ferghana valley. These parties were a very strong to influence upon national legislative chamber Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan SSR to draft a new constitution of independent Uzbekistan, they have supported a unique presidency status for Uzbekistan SSR so they could have more distance from the Moscow rule. Although, after indolence has been achieved, these parties disappeared in the country, it shows that Uzbek society has a political and even civic culture mature enough to mobilize the society for common interest.

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<sup>70</sup> <http://sobchak.org/rus/books/vhvovl/5.html>

## Conclusion

International intervention in civil society building has been criticized most of the time because it ignored local context, persistence on 'proxy-NGOs'. Such an approach did not let civil society concept gain support from social context. In this sense, Ilkamov correctly argues that (and former 'Solidarity' movement's spiritual leaders) the real civic 'actors' are allocated outside the state. There is a difference between civil society organizations and civil society actors. Actors are people, individuals regardless of their gender, race, age or views who is able to articulate interests and make effort for collective action. Therefore, we should not necessarily define NGOs as civil society but rather need to pay attention to the actors, who organized such institutions. These actors indeed may seek neither political power nor profit from their organizational interest of civil society but they could be from both state and private sector. It means that important level for source of civil society is allocated in state and non-state sphere. Ilkhamov rightly has pointed out earlier the importance of those school teachers, university professors, SMEs' executives and wide range of intellectuals who seem to be ready to express alternative interests, opinions upon ongoing developmental policies in the Uzbekistan. From other side, organizations of civil society are the shape and framework of what actions and behavior civic actors have chosen to take. For example, proxy NGOs were introduced as civil society organizations into Uzbekistan whilst we are also aware of other more radical organizational forms of civil society such as civic movements, lobbyist groups and other ways of representing intensive social mobilization around the raised issues in public sphere. NGOs are more salient, institutionalized and in its sense more civic style of organization that able to represent same interests as movements does. From this sense, I would view NGOs are not so destructive or potential danger to the regime and its policies, thus, international intervention through NGOs is better if we compare it to Cold War international intervention in its more

violent form such as the creation social and ethnic conflicts using confidential agents, KGB's and CIA's involvement in political turmoil, assassinations and raising ethnic, religious conflicts in post-colonial transformation process of nations.

Nevertheless, it is naïve to believe that in post-Soviet environment of Uzbekistan civil society can develop within NGO form, without looking into deeper picture of state-society relations in Uzbekistan. Also, it is difficult to link civil society decline with the regime existing in the country without unpacking state-society relations. The result of failing to analyze this relationship can be seen in scholars' conclusions pointing at 'absence of civil society' in Uzbekistan.

This chapter has unfolded this missing point more or less. The decline or increasing number of such NGOs does not necessarily mean that civil society is in decline or in prosperity in Uzbekistan, since NGOs has failed to become an institution of civil society. The suppression of independent voices, the dominance of the government over the private sphere and control of the associational life through political socialization had a strong impact on such failure. The form and shape that civil society actors may be in an attempt to appear in public depends greatly on the definition of civil society we aim to locate in Uzbekistan. It does not mean that civil society does not exist but it means that it is not supported yet. So, the support for civil society today depends on its organizational form in public and the definition as if it can attract support from both society and the state in Uzbekistan.

## **Chapter 5. State-Society Relations in Uzbekistan within the Prism of Synergy**

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In recent years, a voice of criticism has emerged from both statist schools and civil society scholars arguing that under certain circumstances states and social forces may be mutually empowering. It means that “...some interactions between the state and social forces can have the effect of creating more power for both sides” (Wang 1999, pp.231-249). Political reform in many developing countries, as Wang asserted, often entails the weakening of the power of preexisting states during a period when these states are promoting economic transformation and providing for effective governance. Thus, the argument of mutual empowerment becomes tenable, and points a way for these countries to bypass the dilemma and

develop a positive relationship between state and society that is reciprocal and concentrated on developmental ends. Of course the role of civil society in this scheme is favored more.

This chapter explores the case of Uzbekistan, where the central government has been arguing that a strong and effective state is essential to perform economic reforms whereas parallel political reforms would undermine the effectiveness of the central government. This approach is taken for granted in Uzbekistan, but what impact it entails to the state-society relations in the country has recently become of interest in the academic community. Whether it entails a positive mutually empowering state society relations or it enables the dilemma of public vs. private in Uzbekistan to be overcome is the departure point for us to think about the future of civil society development in this country. In this chapter, research will elaborate the on quality of state-society relations in Uzbekistan searching for the reciprocity and state-society synergy in practice, policy analysis where we can find interaction between state and non-state actors in public sphere. The important point is the source – its historical evolution and impact of transformation as an affecting variable which defines present quality and motivations of such interaction between state and society in Uzbekistan. The following step is to examine the implementation of present government policies and how they affect the interaction between the public and private spheres.

### **5.1 Transition of state-society relations from Soviet regime: size and space occupied by public and private spheres.**

State-society relations and synergetic perspective in Uzbekistan directs immediate attention to the regime, political system and established structure and procedure of governance. Contemporary Uzbekistan combines three layers of formal and informal institutions mixed in to the single political system meaning; traditional religious values and nationalism, patterns of Soviet regime and its remedies and finally post-independent institutions of Western democracy.

All three layers can be observed within the process of state-society relations.

Traditional values and nationalism often shape the very perception of general public in Uzbek state-society relations. This illustrates remained social cognition, traditional old perception of social justice; apolitical values of social structure and communal values over individual as a reminiscent of Monarchism existed in this region up to early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Levitin 2001, p.132). It also indicates the strong persistence of informal regionalism, nepotism and kinship in Uzbekistan regardless of constant modernization efforts. In contrast, patterns of the Soviet regime perceived as a part of efforts in rationalization, institutionalization and modernization of primordial traditional mode of production and polity as at least those were 'promises' of Soviet ideology. Its rule had facilitated social mobilization toward public sphere, attempted to generate socialist political culture and behavior that would serve the Soviet regime. It also had left public institutions focusing on control over the society, economy and polity in Uzbekistan as a former colony. If the rule of the Soviet regime has been dictated from Moscow, it was replaced by the central apparatus of Uzbek government and centralized state institutions after the collapse of Soviet Union.

Modern democratic institutions introduced in early 1990s, as usual case in democratic states, were expected to function as means of representation of social interests, priorities and will of public. Those institutions formally has been accepted and allowed to function but within the framework introduced by the central government. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the same fate has been faced by civil society institutions. Such an environment was not favorable for the civil society as it was considered as dichotomist and zero-sum state-society relations. In the following section, this paper discusses a brief historical evolution of state-society relations from Soviet Uzbekistan until its independence.

#### **5.1.1 State – society relations in Soviet Uzbekistan prior to the independence of the**

**country.**

When this paper discusses Soviet Uzbekistan, it refers to the specific region appeared as a result of 1920s' delimitation policy of Soviet authority in Central Asia. Since the occupation of the region (territory of current Central Asia) by Russian Empire in 1860s, there were independent Uzbek Khanates Kokand<sup>71</sup>, Buhara and Xiva, Kazakh-Kirghiz Hordes, Turkmen, and Tajik nationalities. Prior to the establishment of modern Socialist states, relationship of those nationalities with Russian Empire was based upon series of treaties signed separately. This separation has remained until the Bolshevik revolution which brought its political Party as a ruling power of Russia replacing the Empire. Sabol (2010, pp.148-150) described early Bolshevik attitudes toward those various nationalities in the region as artificial obstacles that prevented unification of international proletariat in Central Asia. In contrast, Muslim elites, who believed in unity, perceived it based on single religion or single origin of culture against the alien ideology. Therefore they initiated Pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideologies within the Central Asia. The fear has become that Soviet regime could lose control over the territory if social forces would unite against it (Levitin 2001, p.140; Usmonov et al. 2005). As a result, pro-unification movements that arose have been severely suppressed and enforced delimitation started from 1924. It created later Soviet Socialist Republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in Central Asia which enabled consolidation of further policies by Soviet ideology. Policies toward establishment of union within the Soviet Republics have required their universal imposition throughout the region. Therefore it is difficult to define that Soviet Uzbekistan was treated differently neither we can assert that following assessment of Soviet legacy in the region is exceptional to the case of Uzbekistan.

Shahrani (2010, p.456) raised his doubt on scholars assessment upon Soviet style of

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<sup>71</sup> This khanate was soon abolished and incorporated into Turkestan autonomous region.

modernization. According to him, for many western sociologists Soviet policies in Central Asia failed due to the serious challenge from Islam and Muslims of the region who could resist to the Russian dominated Communist system. He points out scholars' evidences of riots and rebels of elites against alien culture or static rural traditions regardless of Russian penetration in Soviet Uzbekistan. On the other hand, Kandiyoti (2010, p.442) recalled ideologically inspired celebrations of the achievements of Soviet-style modernization, pointing at emancipation of women, universal literacy, and the triumph of Soviet forms of expression over 'traditional' cultures. The reason for such contradictions is that strong impact of western theories and conceptions over the modernization which was derived mainly from post-colonial scholarship. It caused the misjudgment of imposed Soviet style 'modernization' in Central Asia. Shahrani clarified that scholars evaluated Soviet modernization as 'failure' for 'its deviance from the path taken by western societies', instead of looking at Moscow's own goals and objectives in the region (2010, p.458). He defined four core elements of policies which represented the colonization goals of the Soviet reign and assessed them as the 'success': a) absolute control of political power, b) economic extraction and creation of economic dependency on Russia, c) destruction of traditional Muslim societies and cultures, d) creation and establishment of new alternative Soviet society and culture to replace the old.

Indeed, the abovementioned policies toward power consolidation and extraction in Central Asia were commonly shared between both western and native scholars. In terms of political power control, Soviet Russians used national intellectuals and elites Jadids movement<sup>72</sup> in order to abolish Monarchial authorities in the region by promise of modernization reforms but later when the goal achieved Jadids became the target of the earliest purges. Russians also defeated the anti-Bolshevik Muslim resistance movement the basmachi<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Intellectual elites' movement for educational reforms and development

<sup>73</sup> Elites and former land lords loyal to their overthrown khanates

during the consolidation of Soviet regime. Systematic purges, liquidations and decapitations of potential and actual native leaders were strategies of Russia to suppress the emergence of any opposition in the process of ideological transformation and for the rest of regime duration (Kandiyoti 2010, pp.443-445; Shahrani 2010, p.460; Usmonov et al. 2005). Also many agree that cultural and ideological transformation arose through the destruction of traditional Muslim societies and cultures rather than actual implementation of promised policies toward 'freedom of self-determination'. Ideologically, Russians considered nationalism, Islam and religions as incompatible with the requirements of modern socialist way of life. But pragmatically, Islam was only source of challenge on Soviet hegemony. Therefore, Islam and Muslim practices in Central Asia became the target of systematic and sustained attack by the Soviet state. The Soviets also targeted traditional kinship structures of communal society in order to impose 'modern culture' and Soviet morality, since "... the highest point of modernization was represented by the merging of ethnic particularisms into a new super-ordinate entity – the Soviet people" (Kandiyoti 2010, p.446).

Thus, in Soviet Uzbekistan, the regime has been able to generate to a certain extent a convergence between indigenous and new polity by enforced legitimacy of socialist communism. Social activities and participation in public sphere had to be convergent with existing dominant ideology and should be directed in to the support and expansion of that ideology. Such initiative from local society was very much rewarded (Barghoorn 1969, pp.450-511). State-society relations were quite reciprocal and mutually supportive, if the purpose was both political and ideological legitimization of communism in deeper social strata in Muslim nations. Although such reciprocity was leaded by the Russian nationals and only within entrusted circles of loyal Uzbeks to Russia, these groups had generated social inclusion in to public sphere. But social groups that disliked the Soviet intervention and colonial policies had faced severe punishments, while those who stayed neither as supporter nor against the

regime were always under the pressure to choose the former under the fear of being accused to be as latter (Usmonov et al. 2005). Support and participation in public was essential for in one's career as the regime had institutionalized a process of rewarding natives for supporting the regime. In brief, the part of supporters in society has been gradually expanded through reward and punishment, through entitlements of social status in public. That part of society has felt free and strongly believed in what they were in support for especially in urban population (Usmonov et al. 2005; Kandiyoti 2010, pp.441-456).

Although political and economic control was consolidated in such a way, imposition of Soviet morality was evaluated as less effective in rural Central Asia. Instead of replacing pre-existing religious values and traditional institutions, Soviet systems operated in parallel to them (Shahrani 2010, p.464). The same view can be applied to the production mode, social structure and communal authority in the Central Asia (Poliakov & Olcott 1992). The contention lying beneath of such view is that "...untransformed traditional society has resisted and subverted Soviet attempts to change property relations and the moral/cultural bases of community life" (Kandiyoti 2010, p.448). Kandiyoti criticized constant emphasis much on endogenous factor as if it was blocking development. According to her, it is not 'traditionalism' or resistance facilitated sustainability of pre-existing values, instead "...Soviet system in Central Asia, far from effecting a progressive transformation leading to modernity actually reinforced and gave longer lease of life to pre-capitalist forms of production and social organization" (2010, p.449). Malashenko even tried to explore the cultural fit between ideologies of Islam and Communism. As both are supportive of social justice, the primacy of the community over the individual and obedience to authority, they were able to co-exist for such long period and did not conflict with each-other strongly except during the brutality of the early invasion and intervention (1993, pp.63-79). Scholars in this field, took this issue more radical by pointing at cases and evidences showing 'colonization' or capture of Soviet

institutions by pre-Soviet forms of social organization. Verdery (1996) remarked that Communist party states were constantly undermined by internal resistance and hidden forms of sabotage at all level of the system so they had to establish paternalistic social contracts where personal political freedom were traded in for social protection and entitlement. It also implied that real structure of local power was controlled by traditional clan leaders behind a facade of Communistic party organization (Kandiyoti 2010, p.450; Critchlow 2010, pp.416-438; Collins 2002, pp.137-152). Most visible evidence for the co-existence of both pre-Soviet and Soviet institutions was extensive collective farming reforms in Soviet Uzbekistan (and elsewhere in Central Asia). According to Bouchet, the kolkhoz did not abolish tribalism, it became its context, whereas, tribal formations, local bossism and kinship relations served significant socio-economic roles and "...it was endemic rather than residual" (Kandiyoti 2010, p.450).

Another argument has been made by Critchlow (2010, pp.416-439) who pointed out that nature of modernization pursued by the Soviet regime. He believes that it has made Moscow dependent on local elites as a 'transmission belt' and to ensure regime's stability in Soviet Uzbekistan. The reason is that post war demand for and priority of immediate economic growth from 1950s, required strong centralized economic planning and implementation. If those plans were met by subordinate republics, other matters could be deferred. Under such conditions, surveillance and suppression of Islam also changed to tolerance and permissiveness; if a person worked well at his job, then religion was a matter of individual consciousness. The native first secretaries, Republican Party leaders were in charge of their own nation's achievements in front of Moscow, but also they became strong and powerful 'patron' in front of the people they rule. As a result, Central Asian first secretaries have become middlemen between Moscow and own nation. In Soviet Uzbekistan, for instance, Rashidov (CP First Secretary from 1959 - 1983) was responsible to keep Soviet authority happy with high cotton harvest and ongoing expansion of Soviet ideology in the republic, while informal

economic activities, corruption and bribery have spread to the whole region. Public offices and funds have often viewed as conferring legitimate opportunity for enrichment. Those in high ranking positions in Uzbekistan could hire relatives and people close to them to public offices. Such kinship and nepotistic based appointments generated ethnic or kinship networks among elite officials. Davletov (1978, p.193) has listed most common forms of embezzlement encountered at industrial enterprises in Soviet Uzbekistan:

- Obtaining raw materials at excessive rates;
- Diverting stocks of raw materials and sub-assemblies saved through technological advance;
- Using improper norms to record raw-materials consumption;
- Padding actual usage of raw material and its production rate.

Nevertheless, such negative phenomena have been tolerated up to late 1980s, because according to Kandiyoti, they have helped to make this whole system work, by stimulating initiative, cementing working relationships, and easing popular dissatisfaction (2010, pp.425-432). Moreover, expanded ethnic networks among elites was the main support for the illegal economy which helped to remedy shortages of goods and services and provided alternative sources of income for citizens in a given state-controlled sector of the economy that would otherwise be unavailable. At the same time, the elites were viewed as the buffer between the masses and outright russification. Therefore, "...the legitimacy of the elites were actually enhanced and their abuses overlooked since they were perceived by the masses as devising extra-legal solutions to pressing economic and social problems, while forming native buffer between the masses and an alien authority" (Kandiyoti 2010, p.432).

Illustrations we have made on Soviet Uzbekistan imply a wider image of where the state and society were allocated. If we take the entire Soviet Union as if it was a single country, the possible institution that can play the role of the state is Russia and its central state apparatus in Moscow. It implies first that policies and orders came from the center, the second is that rest

of the member countries of the USSR were considered as barbaric, traditional that is to say unable to build a modern state on their own. They need to be governed as the conventional principle of administration told the state to govern the society. In this framework, it becomes more clear and obvious that the relations between the state (Moscow) and society (e.g. Soviet Uzbekistan) based on top-down, dichotomist and zero-sum attitude. A clear example can be the fact that Moscow has sought to extract as many resources as possible from those republics while distancing them from participation in decision making. On the other hand, elites of Soviet Uzbekistan had sought to strengthen own internal network and penetrate into the Soviet institutions so they could extract much benefit from this superficial ideology for own social strata although it was later criticized by Moscow as criminal activities. But Kandiyoti pointed out that “Robin Hood, too, was called a criminal” (2010, p.432). So the vantage point of state-society relations was the elites who stood between Moscow and Soviet Uzbekistan, who could serve as ‘a buffer’ from coercive russification, from alien authority and culture. Also elites served as a remedy for Moscow to ease the social dissatisfaction which later became target of purge in the 1980s.

### **5.1.2 The nature of post-Soviet state-society relations in independent Republic of Uzbekistan.**

In various research and observations we can consider the separate two directions of transition in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. On the one hand, it is naïve to think that nature of state-society relations constructed between formal authority (Soviet type modern bureaucracy) and informal social structure (regional clan elites and their networks which have generated ‘informal authority’ in Soviet Uzbekistan) has been transformed already. Therefore, it is important to clarify the impact of independence on such factors. On the other hand, the formal authority of the Soviet regime was based on socialist ideology where dominance of public over

private interest (controlled economy and polity), Soviet culture over national or traditional culture, atheism over religion was coercively legitimized. The collapse of the Soviet Union should have dramatically changed those colonial values and replaced them with values defined by each post-Soviet countries in Central Asia. So the assumption to be posed here is that the relations between formal and informal power structure existed in Soviet Uzbekistan has to be changed since the independence of the country must have erased the communism that had facilitated it.

According to Bartol'd, before the 20<sup>th</sup> century clans and larger tribes were the predominant mode of political and social organization in Central Asia, because no modern state bureaucracy or direct states rule existed prior to the Soviet Union. Only since Central Asian republics were incorporated into the USSR, did modern state backed by Moscow attempt to eradicate the clan system. However, such policy has failed due to those inadvertently created Soviet institutions that clan networks were able to use in order to remain a significant influence. Regardless of periodical purges from Moscow, clans have been able use social inter-ethnic instabilities, corrupted party officials and the lack of close monitoring from Moscow to their own benefit to reassert their political interest. In Soviet Uzbekistan, clan elites representing powerful clan networks, informally selected new leaders who could manage informal pacts among elites, and continued to balance clan interests and thus stabilize the country.

Because of the informality of clan elites, there are only few sources of conceptualization and definition of clans, but in general many are familiar with its characteristics and nature from the early decolonization period of African and Asian countries. The simple explanation given by Collins is that clan is an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin-based bonds (2004, pp.224-261). Clan members share network and organizational identity and their size may vary. So, since mid-1990s, Collins argues, that the clans re-appeared within the emergence of an informal regime of clan politics in

Central Asian republics including post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Her argument is based on a few propositions; one is that clans can persist under strong states, especially when they serve as passive resistance, but with access to institutional channels to survive. This proposition is derived from Soviet regime and clans' persistence in Soviet Uzbekistan to the regime's penetration as we have discussed earlier. It means that since clans survived and persisted during the strong socialist regime, they have retained their influence even after independence of the country. Another proposition is that, under certain conditions, clans make informal pacts which serve to ensure the regime stability in the transition period but it does not cause democratic change. This proposition implies that post-Soviet Uzbekistan is a transition country and its stability is backed by the informal 'pacts' of clans<sup>74</sup> not solely dependent on government efforts. Another important proposition of hers is that convergence of regimes to informal clan politics makes clans as the primary source of political and economic power. In such cases, informal networks – clans pervade the regime and its institutions which it means that clan politics will inhibit consolidation of any type of regime, be it democratic or authoritarian. This proposition is discussed later comparing other scholars' assessment on this issue.

In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, transition started from the early 1990s but most Uzbek elites "favored a continuation of the current system only without communist ideology" (Collins 2003, p.241). New elected leader who was former Chief of CPSSRU (Communist Party of Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan) Karimov also did not push for outright reforms, and sought to consolidate centralized control over economic and political power in Uzbekistan. In this effort, he has aimed at maintaining state power apart from clan domains and by this he entered into conflict with clans' interest over controlling resources. In this battle, Collins placed

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<sup>74</sup> There is an interesting work by Luong who proposes TBG (Transitional Bargaining Game) concept to clarify competition and consensus making process within the conflict of interests in Central Asian states. According to her, during transition process and immediate reforms, interested groups have limited time and choice to calculate the lost and benefit from the decisions they have to make. Therefore, each groups (regional elites, clans) seek to choose minimum risk but maximum priority for peace and stability so no one gets more than others (J. P. Luong 2002)

emphasis on the weakness of the state in three scenes. First, Karimov has proposed to establish a new parliament which had to be free from single Party domination and based on the democratic principles. In that case, elections into the parliament should be based on competitive multi-party system so that competitive regional interests can be taken into national considerations. However, in the case of Uzbekistan, such multi-party system was chosen to ensure that pro-government national parliament can attract loyal elites and represent legislative interest of the central government (Kul'chik 1995). In order to do this he initiated the organization of four pro-government political parties so they could have the majority sits, but due to the strong clan pressure, the majority of seats were occupied by non-party affiliated deputies from regional clan notables (Kul'chik 1995; Collins 2004). This statement also was confirmed by Luong's research on parliamentary reforms of 1990s in Uzbekistan, where she poses a new concept of transitional bargaining game. According to her, central government and regional leaders had to come to compromise when the initial desire of the Karimov to weaken regional interests did not materialize (J. P. Luong 2002, pp.189-210). The second part of the battle with clans was on the control of economic resources. Karimov has launched anti-corruption policy to attack clan notables and elites from three Samarkand, Tashkent and Ferghana clan networks. However, those decrees were not implemented by his subordinates which gave clans a greater share of the state's natural resources (gold, oil, gas and cotton) (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2003). The last issue is weakness of super-presidential decree power of the Karimov to consolidate state autonomy in policy making. A given example is that monopolization of key industries by powerful clans and other elites did not let president Karimov implement currency convertibility. Because these clans were known to monopolize and manipulate the bank and black market exchange rates, and antagonizing these clans was too risky, Karimov has avoided making necessary economic reforms (Collins 2002; Collins 2003; Collins 2004).

Supportive material prepared by the International Crisis Group (ICG Asia Report 46, 2003, p.25), has asserted that Karimov's agenda was largely controlled by informal politics. In addition, it says that Karimov is dependent on clan support and the clan elites are highly dependent on his patronage, what observers call a 'symbiotic' relationship between the two inhibits any possibility for reform. Therefore, the fragility of the system is reflected in clan rivalries over Karimov's successor and there is yet to be found a mechanism for a transfer of power. This statement is in agreement with Collins's last proposition where she assessed convergence of regimes to informal clan politics in Uzbekistan. Moreover, recent work on informal politics and its impact in governance of Uzbekistan has been published by Ilkhamov. He posits a concept of neo-patrimonialism as a convergence of formal and informal power structure in social, economic and political development in Uzbekistan. He asserts that "... the arbitrariness and interference of informal forces invoking the will of the supreme ruler and the clout of patronage networks tend to be frequent and systematic in dealing with political issues and comparatively significant economic resources" (Ilkhamov 2007, p.67).

If previous statements were sympathetic to Karimov's standpoint against clans, and the struggle between central government and regional clans, Ilkhamov illustrated a gradual change which brought neo-patrimonialism. At the beginning Karimov did not hide his awareness of that 'clans' had not disappeared but was still a part of reality in Uzbekistan (Karimov 1997). To minimize the sway of regional clans, regional hokims (prefecture and municipal governors) have been ousted from their posts every 3 years on average (Ilkhamov 2004, pp.159-182). Step by step, the major export resources were concentrated in the hands of the central government, under the President's personal control. Thus, he managed to liquidate the influence of some powerful clans around him, but not the 'clan' politics itself. As an evidence of that, Ilkhamov mentioned about a new type of patronage network which has come into existence as an expansion of patronage networks around key administrative departments in

the central government. The main arena of inter-clan competition became a struggle not between regional factions, but between patronage groupings associated with security, law enforcement, tax collection, custom, finances and export procurement departments of central government. Ilkamov assures that by allowing such environment in Uzbekistan, the president only strengthened the neo-patrimonial hierarchy and played off factions against each other as the cornerstone of his personal regime of power (2007, p.76). Collins is certain about that "...Karimov can control democratic dissent – the weakest form of opposition, but not clan dissent" (2004, p.253).

It has been argued in this paper that independence of the Uzbekistan would dramatically change previous socialist ideology and its culture, which in turn would destroy 'clan politics' inherited from previous regime or co-exist. Indeed, the early transition process of the country has shown that Uzbekistan put much effort into distancing herself from Moscow's control and dependence on economic and political resources. Not only from Moscow, Uzbekistan also successfully was relieved from regional inter-dependency in energy and food resources by late 1990s (Karimov 1997). National identity has been rehabilitated through national language, official symbols and the traditional basis of social organization within mahalla institutions. Moreover, economic reforms initiated by central government in the early 1990s have announced protection of rights for the private property, its accumulation and, freedom of economic activities. In brief, the new Constitution of Uzbekistan adopted in 1992 announced civil, economic and political rights as an entitlement of Uzbek citizens and they are guaranteed by the government. However, in reality, those socio-economic and political freedoms were opposed to the growing external (Afghanistan) and internal (Islamic radicalism) threats for stability thus enhanced and legitimized strength of central government to control both public and private sector in Uzbekistan. Levitin has described similarities of early post-Soviet leadership in Uzbekistan to Roosevelt's policy (2001, p.144). According to him,

president Karimov is a 'conservative' reformer who advocates for strong, forceful, central government as Roosevelt did. For conservative reformers, as he continues, "...individual and society must be unit within which the individual is subordinate to the community and their rights always must be weighed in the light of their effect on the public interest" (2001, p.144). In order to achieve full control, central government has established quasi-public institutions which would ensure and enable top-down policy implementation in both the public and private sphere of social life. Kandiyoti (2007, pp.31-48) has brought to our attention a few such institutions including the dehkan and farmers' associations, mahalla and GONGOs (Women Committee and Kamolot). Her assessment is that "partial market reforms gave the main instruments of command economy a longer lease of life and ... series of piecemeal institutional adjustments ... intensified surveillance and control on behalf of the state" (2007, p.32).

Another point to make concerns the implementation process of government policies. Strongly centralized authority can be seen in following assessment<sup>75</sup>:

a) Government policies are subject to implementation. The process of implementation is a very complicated combination of structuralism and the process itself. The main policy maker is the president of the country. He can design public policies either as a president or Chief of the Cabinet of Ministries. When he delivers a policy as a president, Prime Minister to be held responsible for the implementation. The PM summons members of cabinet ministries to organize and discuss priorities of implementation, distribution of responsibilities or share responsibilities among ministries and committees. Such an assembly declares its decision which puts in charge independent ministries to discuss among each other how to organize implementation priorities and shared responsibilities set by the assembly of the cabinet. Accordingly, a single ministry or several ministries declare decision (or joint decision) which

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<sup>75</sup> Authors own analysis through research of data base on LexisUz legal document: laws, decrees, provisions, instructions and codes.

specifies implementation and execution framework through local branches of the ministries and integrated public institutions. In such a decision, ministries attach a charter of the implementation which is compulsory in the organization and process of the implementation in local institutions. Based on the charter local institutions have to make their own decision and announce it as a confirmation of the “starting the implementation” which the date of the starting day basically should be shown in the decision where charter is attached. Thus, mid instances like city mayors, or prefecture chiefs are responsible for the reports of implementation and their job is to ensure that implementing low level institutions are doing the job properly and in time. However, the president can declare himself a policy as a chief of the cabinet ministries. Such policies are more specified and directly declare what ministries should do the job and how. Although the PM is in charge of reporting back, specific ministries already get clear directions from the president about accomplishment, but they have to set a decision as compliance and prepare charter of implementation attaching to the decision. The President declares policies referring to the constitution, existing laws or personal ideology. However, the PM and Assembly of Cabinet Ministries always refer to the president’s policy decision or declaration, although it is not rare case it can be referred as “on behalf of execution articles of the law on...”.

b) The process of implementation is the most sophisticated case in the country. When the president gives order for the new policy, it comes in two channels, namely, the parliament for the creation of legal basis and to the cabinet ministries. Parliament is responsible for discussion and preparation of new laws if the policy is broad and requires long term implementation. Cabinet ministries will work on mechanisms of implementation. In this process, cabinet ministries can create new committees or commissions in charge of direct control of the policy implementation. At the same time, while committees consist of several ministries, it will follow directions of cabinet of ministries. Decision of the cabinet of ministries again set responsible ministries for the policy implementation who should directly report back to the special

committee on the policy implementation. Meanwhile, joint teams of several ministries or each ministry can establish subordinate public centers which are founded by them and they are in charge of collecting paper work and mediating between ministries and local execution institutions. Same way, public funds and social institutions are established to tackle issues of implementation in local regions. Parliament puts legal ground and hears reports of ministries. Some cases explain how cabinet of ministries initiates some policies independently from direct presidential influence; for example, the provision and supply some public institutions work, financial support for certain sectors usually done without direct imposition of the president. However, the cabinet still refers to the presidential orders or declarations , even laws which cover the area or the issue of the target. At the lowest level of implementation, public policies are fragmented. Each ministry fulfill obligations through own institutions, except the cases where president or cabinet of the ministries list additional organizations to take part in the implementation. In such cases, these additional organizations participate in planning of the implementation with their opinions related to their profession and public duties, and have to cooperate with ministerial agencies. Municipal authorities, public organizations and social organizations are there to cooperate in the organization of implementation, maintain public order and achieve good results. Government uses all institutions from top to bottom level in order to implement public policies and even establishes additional institutions, centers and committees if necessary. It uses police, village administration and government sponsored associations in the lowest level to achieve social compliance for the policies declared.

c) There is no code or law guiding the implementation process or principles of the implementation process, but each policy may give basic instructions. The ultimate goal is to obey the order in any possible means, without external influence meaning social resistance or at least feedback from the beneficiaries. Mass media is powerful tool of the government in propagating new policies and its implementation. It is set as compulsory in each decisions of

the cabinet of ministries or the order of the president to implement brain washing activities through television, radio, concerts and other entertaining projects to show evidences of social acceptance and admiration for the public policies.<sup>76</sup> Newspapers are filled with such cases and the task of searching for such evidence is put on the local mahalla, women committees, and public sponsored associations and so on. TV studios and channels are required to cooperate in this process. As we can see that in majority cases public policies are designed from the top, president or cabinet of ministries. However, each Ministry also has been given freedom of discretion in order to fulfill their developmental plans. Ministries are busy with working on the implementation of top policies, but also they have to show some initiatives to prove the credibility of their institutions in their field of development. Each ministry can declare their own direction of work and tasks to generate income for the ministry budget and mobilize resources and set priorities. In general, such direction always is referred to presidential decrees on this area, or confirms correspondence to the law regulating the target field, and finally such direction must be registered by the Ministry Justice with consultations.

d) It is important also to notice the distinction between policies and existing laws in the country regulating a certain sphere. There is often impact on the law and it is the subject of amendments or denouncement. For example, when there is a law on regulation of some activities, each ministry can make orders and, decision in orders to clarify how to obey to the law in engagement in subject activity. Such orders serve as instructions and compliance to the law and regulations so it minimizes bureaucratic discretion. However, when it comes to the policy implementation made by the president or cabinet of ministries, such laws are exposed to change. In such cases, automatically, earlier Ministerial orders, instruction and guidance loose their power. Instead, they have to establish new ones to comply with the new policy. Such new

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<sup>76</sup> Almost all national level government policies have such instruction which directly appointed certain government TV channels to broadcast.

policies have top priority. It has impact on changing laws, amending or denouncing it and requires new laws from the parliament. There is no case if ministry or join ministries could affect the law or parliament. Only the president and Cabinet of the ministries (PM) can challenge the parliament and existing laws. However, parliament has privilege in approving law. President can deny it once but if the majority members of parliament re-submit, president has to sign it. At this moment, we can see that President has top authority in policy making, but the power the PM and parliament also is increasing<sup>77</sup>.

Concentration of authority at the center and institutionalization of its administrative power in transition process of Uzbekistan also has been discussed in two separate directions. On the one hand, government officials and intellectuals serving the government strongly stand on the point of Eastern style of development, referring to the cases of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore where state intervention and strong central guidance was necessary to bring economic growth. Neighboring leaders of Central Asian countries, except the Kyrgyz officials, also join this perspective since it approved intensive intervention from central government in order to 'correct' market failures and sustain stability in the period of crisis and transition from past legacy. On the other hand, Western, especially American policy makers and diplomats who closely have been monitoring transition process, believed in the values of liberalization and consolidation of democratic principles. They evaluated transition process in Uzbekistan as from totalitarianism to authoritarianism, meaning that there is no difference from the previous regime. Yet at least in former regime, certain social classes or institutions (Party) were given privilege rather than prevailing authority of a single person or single (Levitin 2001, p.152; Ilkhamov 2002, pp.8-10). The West condemns Uzbek government for authoritarianism and Uzbek officials justify the nature of regime from the perspective of stabilization and effort

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<sup>77</sup> Recently, President of Uzbekistan, Karimov, has been praising for increasing number of parliament members and active participation of political parties in elections. Also, the last speech of the President in Senate summit has initiated a temporary executive power to be given to Chair of the Senate till new election of the President will be announced (InoCMI 2010).

on economic growth rather than political. Nevertheless, scholars have been raising doubt that central government is strong as it is claiming since a considerable amount of evidence indicates that political system and its administration is deeply rooted in the patrimonial and 'clannish' nature of polity (Ilkhamov 2010, pp.218-239; Ilkhamov 2010, pp.195-210; Demian 1995, pp.109-110; Collins 2002, pp.137-152).

It means that, the dominance of the state and authoritarian nature of its leader is not complete assessment. It gives us different conclusion then. On the one hand, president Karimov's earlier stand point against the clans and patrimonial social roots (as an undermining factor for development) either was not devoted on total cleansing or the power and authority concentrated on presidential apparatus was not strong enough to transform that social structure. On the other hand, transformation efforts from the past socialist ideology emphasized greatly market reforms with direct control of the state. Nevertheless, these reforms too did not impact on clan politics but instead it caused on proliferation within the state apparatus and its capture by clan elites. So either the state serves the interest of clans (captured by clan elites or bourgeoisie society) or Uzbekistan has yet to build a Weberian modern state. Obviously both conclusions take us again back to the conflicting zero-sum conceptualization of Weberian statism or Marxist instrumentalism. For instance, Edward's research on clans in neighboring Kazakhstan has different perspective. He argues that to the Weberian, clans are traditional social organizations which subvert efforts to construct modern institutions and hence they are subject to diminish when such institutions established (Collins 2004, pp.235-236; Edward 2005, p.233). It entails that clans and states are fundamentally opposed to each other so either state succeeds in imposing its normative and coercive order or clans remain outside of its reach as a 'zone of dissidence' (Edward 2005, p.233). Nevertheless, clans have not only survived but have been essential part of social and political structure within the transition period of Central Asian countries. It proves that clans and states can adapt to new environments, thus, "...if clans and

the state begin in fundamental opposition, this opposition is not fate” (Edward 2005, pp.232-233). For instance, state-clan relations in Kazakhstan suggest the possibility of endogenous balancing of clans by government policies. Such policies in Kazakhstan have been successful in minimizing clan-based egoism. Therefore, he proposed mutual accommodation between the two which can soften antagonism (that exists only in theory) (Edward 2005, pp.231-254). In this case the possible view would be that there is reciprocity and mutual positive sum relations, but only it can be referred as ‘state-elite’ synergy rather than open and transparent state-society synergy for public interest which we were looking for.

## **5.2 Impact of international intervention in to the process of developmental reforms (after civil society concept has been introduced) upon state – society relations in public sphere.**

The independence of Central Asian countries along with other former communist regimes under Soviet Union has attracted both scholars and leaders of the Western countries as a new field of studies, new market and new allies in geo-strategic positions in global community or as new big ‘laboratory’ Especially Uzbekistan with her rich historical heritage, undiscovered political and social culture, variety of natural resources (oil, gold, gas and etc.), and its location at the heart<sup>78</sup> of Central Asia, made her at the special interest of the U.S. and E.U. countries. Independence of Uzbekistan gave her access to international community, global market which was necessary to be recognized as new nation, new equal member. This process itself required the country to embrace a new trajectory meaning acquirement of resemble modern, liberal and market institutions from the West or at least approval of them as goals to be achieved by the government of Uzbekistan.<sup>79</sup> Since then, international cooperation with

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<sup>78</sup> Seiple refers to it as ‘heartland of Central Asia’ (2005, pp.245-259) due to its landlocked allocation at the center of five Central Asian states.

<sup>79</sup> The new constitution of Uzbekistan of 1992 was prepared and advised by Western legal, constitutional and political experts.

developmental institutions and donor countries has become inevitable for directing developmental aid through joint agreement on transition policies.

The past twenty years of international collaboration with the Western donors, has shown that it did indeed bring essential and remarkable change to Uzbekistan. Collaboration with the West has helped Uzbekistan to be a part of globalization, to have foreign investment, to perceive values of liberalization and civil society and also to be at the side of supporters for the MDGs. However, compared to other developing countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa, there is relatively weak influence of the West to Central Asia, especially to Uzbekistan. This section discusses the issues of Western influence on the transition process of Uzbekistan and fluctuation of the Western pressure for liberalization of the country. It argues that Western leaders had clear vision of neither productive collaboration nor pressure for liberalization which undermined their impact on reforms in Uzbekistan. Regardless of modern and western institutions introduced, it did not affect much the existing state-society relations deriving from socio-economic and political trajectory of transition in Uzbekistan.

### **5.2.1 Western ambitions on Uzbeki reforms: attempting challenges on state-society relations**

To explore international aid and cooperation in Uzbekistan, this section will present some examples of how international intervention has proceeded. Among them, economic and political reforms were at the core of Western ambitious developmental intervention in this country. At the early stage of international collaboration with the West, priority has been given to privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and abolishment of State Planning system. As supporting remedies, it was essential to upgrade judicial and legal system to protect property rights, to ensure fulfillment of contracts between private firms, implement laws to facilitate entrepreneurship. Ultimately, these reforms would increase private sector's share of Gross

Domestic Products, generate more private income and government dependency on tax and remedies from the private sector. The stable judicial protection of private property equally with protection of consumer rights should gradually decrease the role of the state in the market. In this sense, the relations between state and society would be seen in terms of interaction between public and private sectors whereas; the only expected outcome is partnership between the two for further economic growth and liberalization of this field.

Political reforms and its development was another essential part of aid strategy. It has included reforms in central government decision making process, social and political participation which would enable demand for accountability and transparency of public institutions. In general picture, the financial aid flow to Uzbekistan was not stable, but the amount of the aid was the result of the joint effort of several agencies in to these fields of development.

Both transnational organizations and donor organizations of individual countries in the West have been involved in transition process of the Uzbekistan. The analysis of developmental intervention could be based on the extent of each donor's involvement and share, or total effort in the specific fields which this section focused on. Therefore, three donor institutions are analyzed based on the issues of Intervention on Economical and Political liberalizations. Although the analysis was neither focused on detail exploration nor did we seek to give full statistical data, it is useful for pointing out project goals and expectations so later the actual result or assessment of those donors are described.

#### **5.2.1.1 Example of USAID**

In brief, projects on economic reforms of the USAID in Uzbekistan were concentrated on increasing privatization capacity of the government in the first stage. Programs included efforts to assist private sector development, drafting of new tax, securities, and commercial law;

distribution of credit to SMEs and provision of expertise to farmers and businessmen. Later programs planned to approach private sector and work with business associations to effect policy improvements by building their advocacy skills for policy change. By providing a qualified training program it was expected that by the end, entrepreneurs and new labor entrants would "...have business skills, knowledge, and information to better compete in a market economy". Public policy dialogue would improve. "Think tanks and universities will be better equipped to conduct policy-relevant research. Entrepreneurs will have access to financial services, and Uzbekistan will have made significant progress towards WTO accession".<sup>80</sup>

On the other hand USAID's democracy efforts focused on "creation of stronger and more sustainable civic organizations; increase the availability of information on civic rights and domestic public issues; enhance opportunities for citizen participation in governance; and develop more effective, responsive, and accountable public institutions". By the program's end, "there will be stronger and more sustainable civic organizations; increased availability of information on civil rights and domestic public issues; enhanced opportunities for citizen participation in governance; and more effective, responsive, and accountable public institutions."<sup>81</sup>

Nevertheless, USAID admits at the end that "...gross domestic product (GDP) growth remains relatively unchanged ... other key economic indicators are on a definite downward trend. Fearing unrestricted trade, the Government is making it difficult, if not impossible, for citizens to cross borders. The excessive import controls led to several public outbreaks of unrest between traders and government officials. With approximately 50% of the population below the age of 30, and youth unemployment estimated as high as 30%, the risk of instability is

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<sup>80</sup> [http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ce/pdf/uz\\_122-0131.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ce/pdf/uz_122-0131.pdf)


<sup>81</sup> [http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ce/pdf/uz\\_122-0211.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ce/pdf/uz_122-0211.pdf)

significant.”<sup>82</sup>

USAID continues in its assessment on democratization efforts made that “the development of civil society and democracy strengthening programs are overburdened with bureaucratic procedures for registration of international NGOs. Highly restrictive banking control measures for granting funds to local organizations are affecting all sectors. These restrictions have resulted in significant delays in approving grants to NGOs, independent media, and Civil Society Support Centers. Government restrictions and harassment of our implementing partners created difficult conditions, especially for media and civil society. USAID's chances of increasing judicial independence to promote fair and accountable law enforcement also stagnated with the lack of political will.”<sup>83</sup>

Another issue is the change of geo-strategic priorities of the U.S. toward Uzbekistan. In the figure 2, it can be seen that economic reforms were quite essential comparing to the security and democracy in 1995. Although the efforts of the USAID as developmental organization has been directed more on democracy than security, total amount of U.S. aid went to economic growth, humanitarian and security issues.

**(Figure 2)**




<sup>82</sup> <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/uz.html>

<sup>83</sup> <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/uz.html>

However, from 2005, the priority of the U.S. aid has been changed to more on security issues in Uzbekistan. Aid to the democracy reforms also went up reducing both economic and humanitarian aid. The main reason for such change of priorities was the terrorist attack in September 2001 in the U.S., and close alliance with the Uzbekistan in fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Another reason is that colorful revolutions in neighboring FSU countries. Those revolutions which have resulted in the overthrow of the regime leaders increased the suspicion of the Uzbek government upon liberalization aid of the Western donors. So, the last and remained chance to have some extent collaboration from the Uzbek government was security issues (Figure 3). In this field, not the U.S. but Uzbekistan can impose pressure upon conditionality of collaboration between the two.

**(Figure 3)**



#### **5.2.1.2 Example of EBRD**

Abaturov and Turdimov have given their assessment on EBRD activities in Uzbekistan on behalf of the Center for Economic Research. According to the assessment “EBRD and Uzbekistan have established broad cooperation in such spheres of reforms as the development of small and medium business. EBRD greatly contributed to resolving a problem related to private sector financing” (Abaturov & Turdimov 2005). The main target of the EBRD

was the banking system of the country. Through multiple credit projects<sup>84</sup>, EBRD had supported financial flow to SMEs enabling to acquire mini-technologies, to increase their share in service and industry.

However, a larger part of the aid was distributed to the state owned industries in production, manufacturing and services. The aid went through various forms such as grants, loans or other technical assistance to those monopolies.<sup>85</sup> Although a general assessment of this aid is to show prosperity of a certain industry, the actual situation shows that government diverted large amount of aid only to monopolized industries to innovate technologies and services there. It increased sustainability and long life for monopolies, rather than facilitating further privatization and competitive environment. Therefore, EBRD itself admits that:

“...there remain serious shortcomings in the transparency, quality, and consistency of macroeconomic data. Current growth rates are unlikely to be sustainable, given the poor investment environment, and pervasive restrictions on external trade, and on domestic currency in circulation. Corporate governance and transparency of asset quality in the financial system have not improved, and no progress was made on the privatization of the large state-owned banks. Confidence in the banking sector was further damaged by the sudden withdrawal of private banks’ license. A further manifestation of the policy of curbing informal transactions has been the persistent restrictions on external, as well as domestic, trade. Despite Uzbekistan’s continued engagement in various regional and multilateral fora, only limited progress has been made in bilateral trade relations, and several additional restrictions were imposed in 2004, in particular on the trade by individual entrepreneurs.”<sup>86</sup> Shortly after this assessment, in 2005 EBRD approved a new country strategy for Uzbekistan that limits assistance to only those

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<sup>84</sup> Total 21 projects involving both national and private banks (available at <http://www.review.uz/page/article/133.htm>.)

<sup>85</sup> There are more than 20 large joint-stock corporation which dominate that sector. Other private owned firms are not in equal position comparing to government owned corporation.

[http://www.gov.uz/cn/other\\_institutions/companies?PAGEN\\_1=&code=companies&id=](http://www.gov.uz/cn/other_institutions/companies?PAGEN_1=&code=companies&id=)

<sup>86</sup> <http://www.ebrd.com/pages/country/uzbekistan/strategy.shtml>

private sector projects that are not linked public projects (distanced itself from Government)<sup>87</sup>. However, after the 2005 Andizhan events in May, Bruno Balvanera, head of business development at the EBRD declared that "...there is pressure from shareholders to pull out completely and not engage in Uzbekistan at all".<sup>88</sup>

So far, EBRD's assessment is close to the reality and it again points out the shortcomings of the multi-national Western institutions' effort to liberalize private sector, which would affect public-private relations in Uzbekistan. In both cases, we can see reluctance of Western donors to fully cooperate with the government and persuade for economic and political liberalizations in long term. The reason is that it would make the West ally with the undemocratic regimes. But also these donors did not strongly pressure for liberalizations through criticism, sanctions or other means since U.S. and European leaders were very much tied to the geo-strategic interests in Uzbekistan against the increasing influence of Russian Federation in the region and intense rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan. Of course, it is not to criticize such a policy but to mention how it has represented the controversial needs of Western politicians as weakness in pursuing those goals that brought them to Uzbekistan in the first place.

#### **5.2.1.3 Example of UNDP**

United Nations Development Program is the most experienced developmental institution in Uzbekistan. It has established extensive project cooperation with national and local public officials within 18 years of presence in the country. All data bases on development projects can be accessed at their web page, including data on completed projects according to each sector and schedule of activities. Any interested person can access and acquire files

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<sup>87</sup> <http://www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/UZB/2006/csp500.asp>

<sup>88</sup> <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3605>

expressing the extensive contribution of the UNDP, successful stories of projects and improvements that government of Uzbekistan has been achieved. The reason for such optimistic stand point is that UN programs do not seek for certain partial interests in the country neither do they take one side over another. The UNDP in particular is most appreciated development program which is neutral, collaborative with the central and local governments. UNDP's priority since the beginning was to generate an ownership commitment by the national and local government over the developmental policies. Therefore, "...comparative strengths of UNDP lie in its work in rural areas and in its access to central government" in Uzbekistan (Saraswathi 2009, p.46).

Basically, what UNDP has been doing is to deliver the aid under framework of collaborative projects which is mainly drafted or at least agreed by the central government. Accountability of the UNDP to the central government is strong and correspondingly it has close ties with the government. In the areas of economic and political reforms, UNDP took a position of Human Development approach, which in my opinion is very much similar to the provision of minimum welfare and life standard. It means that UNDP's approach was quite non-interventionist and always limited itself to respond to the demands raised by the government without a closer glance at efficiency. For the assessment of UNDP's efforts, evaluation office has published 2009 report. It shows that "...inadequate use of capacity assessments has led to reduced effectiveness, efficiency of interventions and limited sustainability of results. At the same time, project design has sometimes led to inefficient approaches to capacity development" and "in UNDP support for democratic governance, important and high-priority projects were not conducted strategically" (Saraswathi 2009, p. executive summary)). In addition UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework) also has published its assessment on how different agencies of the UN have been coordinated and the objectives of each have been achieved (Stevens 2009). The result is that

UNDP has failed to bring an initiative or put criteria upon developmental aid it aimed to deliver. Instead, it privileged its closeness with the government and lost sight of collaboration with UN's other integrated agencies in Uzbekistan. So each UN agencies including UNDP, UNESCO and WHO has been eager to find own channels within the government independently and as result none of them could generate original UN's mandate over developmental aid (ibid p,10-28).

The purpose of these examples is not to put aid delivering agencies in charge of the slow and inefficient liberalization process in Uzbekistan. In contrast, they have played a crucial role in addressing issues of water and energy consumption, public health and education, welfare improvement and so on which government alone was facing difficulties in solution. The point here is that those issues which were considered sensitive and politically bounded to the internal affairs of the government were difficult for aid interventions to access. Those are economic and political liberalizations. Nevertheless, there are some commentators who consider the aid interventions as pivotal facilitator of liberalization since the government of Uzbekistan has no expertise, source or experience to initiate it. The collaboration of the government with aid institutions was the key to introduce these values. Therefore, it would be wrong to neglect the aid collaborations' outcome, regardless of the filtrations and scrutiny imposed by the government.

### **5.2.2 Uzbekistan model of adaptation: 'quasi liberal' or 'semi-government' institutional state-society relations**

In the mid of state and aid agencies collaboration in Uzbekistan, both sides have tried to reach an agreement or balance of both sides' interests. The government of Uzbekistan promoted its own 'gradual' transition process in contrast to radical 'shock therapy' reforms which would lead to deterioration of living conditions for the people. A gradualism approach

aimed at the concentration of power within the central government so it could perform deliberate reforms whereas the collapsed socialist regime has also destroyed its legitimate authority that would place it in charge of transition. So the question is to what extent this gradualism approach has reached the point where the building of new mutual empowering state-society relations can be started from. In case of economy, the gradualism has been apparent from the privatization through quasi-governmental market institutions<sup>89</sup> and public – private relationship is guided within such institutions according to the central government authority. Since our interest is civil society, following sections illuminates gradualism within the state-civil society relations refraining from repetition of arguments brought in previous chapter.

#### **5.2.2.1 National Association of NGOs of Uzbekistan**

The relations between state and civil society in Uzbekistan was heading in a promising direction meaning that the number of registered NGOs, trainings and seminars organized by them together with the government institutions have been increased up to 2003. It was possible thanks to the financial and technical aid of foreign donors; on the other hand the government of Uzbekistan also showed positive sign of collaboration. However, it has become difficult to distinguish if those non-governmental organizations were really working for the civic interest. Regardless of the increasing number of NGOs in Uzbekistan, the actual extent of social perception on this new phenomena (meaning neo-liberal concept of civil society) did not change, instead, for the government, it has become a ‘field of mushrooms grown up from rain of foreign currency’<sup>90</sup>. Besides, these organizations (except few) did not bring visible notion of civicness and public interests, but merely have been doing the projects imposed by the donors.

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<sup>89</sup> Former kolkhozes were partially privatized through farmer and *dekhkan* (peasant) cooperatives. Those cooperatives are semi-state institutions closely subordinated to the regional hakims (regional governors) representing government policy on agriculture, but also partial market interests of farmers and peasants were incorporated. The same framework has been used for privatization of SOEs by reorganizing them in to Joint Stock corporation where government package is over 50%.

<sup>90</sup> Author’s emphasis.

Although there was already counterweight Public Associations (GONGOs) to represent and articulate public interest of society in various issues, they lacked the expertise, and skills necessary to implement donor driven projects. Therefore, establishment of national association of NGOs (NANGOUz) in 2005 was the way that would enable government to coordinate and find a balance between Western aspirations and national values (legacy of the regime). Through NANGOUz, government was able to share those issues that it presumes to be priority for public interest, and to direct available resources into those projects through member NGOs' groups.<sup>91</sup> Although scholars criticized it as the corporatist approach on civil society or government control over NGOs, it has reduced the number of 'shadow' NGOs and left only the strongest, best trained and skilled groups among civil society organizations that were able to demonstrate long term vision in their activities and were devoted for the civic interest. Within this association, NGOs are supported for sharing information, skills and best practices regardless of high competition for the grants, fear of government surveillance and imprisonment for the treason if such dissemination goes abroad. Nevertheless, the umbrella organization like this association again becomes a semi-government institution from where the state-civil society relations are directed. As an interviewee from this association commented: "we are not ready to give total freedom to these organizations, because they are not ready to have it"<sup>92</sup>, on the one hand civil society organizations should have reached a common sense of civic interest within the period of foreign aid raise, and on the other hand, government should have supported only those which showed genuine care and responsibility for the wellbeing of the society they represent. Therefore, establishment of national association can be considered as starting point of gradualism approach in state-civil society relations.<sup>93</sup>

The continuance of such approach also can be found in government initiative policy

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<sup>91</sup> This association has attracted almost all registered NGOs operating in the country by the promise of grants and tenders from the government budget. [http://ngo.uz/index.php?do=cat&category=norm\\_docs](http://ngo.uz/index.php?do=cat&category=norm_docs) and <http://ngo.uz/index.php?newsid=145>

<sup>92</sup> Authors' interview with the NANGOUz staff (09.2008)

<sup>93</sup> It implies the government preference for institutional approach through central government monitor.

on ‘social-contract’ to be conducted with NGOs in Uzbekistan. In 2008, under the Parliament jurisdiction, “National Committee on NGOs support” was established in order to guide such contractual relation with civil society organizations. It has created an opportunity for collaboration between state and civil society for addressing social issues. Several social issues were raised as eligible for applying to grants and social contract mechanism by NANGOUZ<sup>94</sup> but NGOs did not take the chance. The reason is twofold; firstly, it implies that NGOs enters in to contractual relations with the government institutions where sides of the contract are not in equal position, thus many NGOs refrained from entering in unequal relations, and the second is that government also had no clear view on social contract. Besides, it is already well known practice in the world that central government does not enter in to social contract with NGOs but local governments should arrange its implementation. Only in early 2009, did UNDP initiate Social Partnership concept to the National Association of NGOs under the aid programs for the following financial year. In February of the same year, association of NGOs conducted open seminar on this issue in several regions of Uzbekistan. For instance, according to the news agency ‘Uzbekistan Today’, participants of the meeting in Samarqand and Namangan “... considered the priority tendencies for the social partnership development”, and the evidence is that “...the NGOs of the region take an active part in implementation of governmental programs, including the program the Year of Comprehensively Advanced Generation which 60% of the mentioned state program is carried out by means of participation of civil society institutes.”<sup>95</sup> It implies that NGOs role in public policy implementation has been increased and it shows a possible liberalization of state-civil society relations. Nevertheless, only a closer examination of the policy implementation process of government would reveal the actual role of the civil society in this process. The next section explores the nature of civil society inclusion

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<sup>94</sup> Association of NGOs has close relationship with the UN agencies and some other donor organizations, so such innovative ideas were usually initiated by them. <http://ngo.uz/category/konkursi/>

<sup>95</sup> [http://www.ut.uz/eng/today/uzbek\\_ngos\\_association\\_promotes\\_social\\_partnership.mgr](http://www.ut.uz/eng/today/uzbek_ngos_association_promotes_social_partnership.mgr) (brought by Kamila Sharipova)

in policy implementation process in Uzbekistan.

#### **5.2.2.2 Change in National Strategic Policies: inclusionary path**

One of the main requirements to have World Bank and United Nations aid for addressing poverty reduction is that active participation of civil society organizations in those projects. Due to the wide range of developmental interventions and the collaboration of the Uzbekistan with the donors to pursue Welfare Improvement Strategy (Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper), access of the non-governmental organizations in to the public sphere was gradually extended. Previously, state policy implementation has sought to use public associations (GONGOs) as propaganda tools in achieving legitimacy of those policies as the method of former SU (Soviet Union). Even in times of NGOs proliferation up to 2005, government hesitated to engage with voluntary organizations due to the lack of knowledge, proper mechanism and commitment to do so. Therefore, the primary source of encouragement and support came from foreign donors, via the invitation to the aid projects funded by them, whereas government gets to select among NGOs which could take part in. This arbitrariness of the government often lets those politically integrated GONGOs such as Kamolot, Women's Committee, mahalla or vocational centers which are subordinated to the regional municipal administrations to have privilege in the access of development projects. Only in rare cases NGOs have been invited and it is also through the given recommendation by the National Association of NGOs. However, since the first in 2005 and recent Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (Improvement of Welfare Standards) have been approved by the government, it has become possible for NGOs to be involved in policy implementation process. The important point to consider is how those NGOs are involved and what duties they become in charge of. As an example, this research briefly explores three national strategic programs declared in 2006,

2008 and 2010 in order to show the gradual inclusion of NGOs in policy implementations.<sup>96</sup>

In 2006, the government of Uzbekistan initiated a program for further strengthening measures of targeted social protection and social services for lonely elders, pensioners and disabled people within 2007 - 2010 years. The aim from this national program is three fold: 1) improvement of social services to lonely disable and elderly people; 2) coverage of health-care services, improvement of the quality of social care, and living conditions of lonely elders, pensioners and the disabled; 3) introduction of new forms, methods and techniques of social services. On the draft of this program there is an attachment instruction to it<sup>97</sup> which shows what public, private and voluntary institutions are ‘recommended’ to participate. So, it means that government or directly speaking, the president signs these national programs with its attachment by giving detail instruction on who should be in charge of and what has to be done by those particular institutions. Following is a brief list of non-government, non-commercial organizations (in bold letters) which were enforced or allowed to participate in implementations of this program and the only activities among thirty are listed that they are involved.<sup>98</sup>

(Table 1)

Activities and Duties	Responsible Institutions
Arrangement of “social services at home” for all lonely elders, pensioners and the disabled who needs constant care and assistance, through the involvement of the unemployed and paid public works	Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, Ministry of Finance, Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakistan <sup>99</sup> , regional and Tashkent city administration, <b>Public Funds:</b> “Mahalla” and “Nuroni” (Elder), <b>Int.NGOs:</b> Red Crescent Society of Uzbekistan.

<sup>96</sup> These are authors analysis based on review of draft of the past implemented policies and supporting norms.

<sup>97</sup> This is usual case for national or regional policies. They come with detail instructions on implementation methods, but final discretion is given to the institutions been put in charge.

<sup>98</sup> No individual task is given to any NGO or there is no single activity that NGOs are put in charge in these programs. Therefore, they involve in implementation as collaborators rather than independent actor.

<sup>99</sup> Autonomic Republic of Karakalpakistan is also part of Uzbekistan subordinate to the president of the Uzbekistan and it has same government structure as Uzbekistan except presidency and prime minister.

Strengthening the logistics and maintenance of existing centers of communication and entertainment alone, improving social services and expanding the types and volumes of services provided.	Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, Ministry of Finance, Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, regional and Tashkent city administration, <b>Public Funds:</b> “Mahalla”, “Nuroni” (Elder), “Mehr-shavqat-Salomatlik” (Sympathy & Health) and “Sog’lom Avlod uchun”(For the Healthy Generation). <b>Int.NGOs:</b> Red Crescent Society of Uzbekistan.
Advocacy and the general propagation of healthy lifestyles and active longevity among the population (the creation of TV shows, radio programs, special columns in newspapers and magazines, seminars, round tables, etc.)	Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the National TV Broadcasting, Agency for Press and Information of Uzbekistan, <b>Public Funds:</b> "Mahalla" and “Nuroni”(Elder), <b>Public Center:</b> “Oila” (Family).

As it is clear from this table, it is the GONGOs and government institutions that are the main participants in implementation, whereas social and health care is the best area for NGOs’ partnership in developed and other developing countries in the world. So we take another program as example to see in what extent this condition has been changed.

The president of the Uzbekistan has announced 2008 as the year of Youth in the country and declared the government program by the name of ‘Year of Youth’<sup>100</sup> in early 2008. The aim of this strategic program was to upgrade education, health and mentality of youth, but for the first time government policy has mentioned the necessity to give support and incentive to those NGOs which are actively involved in this field (meaning the NGOs dedicated themselves for the care of young generation outside of the government policies). This time we list only non-state, non-commercial organizations, comparing with the GONGOs, without

<sup>100</sup> Presidential Decree of Uzbekistan on the Government Program “The Year of Youth” No.805 29.02.2008

mentioning what activities they are in charge for in this program. This time we list only non-state, non-commercial organizations, comparing with the GONGOs, without mentioning what activities they are in charge for in this program (This information was introduced earlier) (Table 2)

NGOs	GONGOs
1) “Xayot” (The Life) NGO; 2) “Ayollar Kengashi” (Women Council) NGO; 3) “Salomatlik + Ekologiya” (Health + Ecology) NGO;	1) National Association of NGOs 2) Republican Association of Writers; 3) Republican Association of “Tasviriy Oina” (Fine [Arts] Mirror); 4) Uzbekistan Academy of Art 5) Republican Society of Disabled People 6) Republican Center of “Oydin Xayot” (Bright Life); 7) Culture and Art Forum of Uzbekistan 8) Social Movement of Youth “Kamolot” 9) Republican hands-on training center “Oila” (Family) 10) Republican Creative Association of Journalist 11) Republican Creative Association of Painters 12) Council of the Trade Unions Federation; Republican 13) Republican Cultural-Spiritual Educational Center 14) Republican Center of National Ideology; 15) Republican Center for Social Adaptation of Children; 16) “Kamalak” (Rainbow) Organization for Children (Subordinate of Social movement of Youth “Kamolot” ) 17) Center of the Initiative Youth “Kelajak Ovozi” (Voice of the Future)

Abovementioned list on table 2 shows only three NGOs involved in this program and they have been attracted to the propagation activities such as organization of festivals, entertaining contests among children and distribution of presents to the winners and so on. On the other hand the vast majority of organizations are GONGOs and they are involved in each steps of implementation. These GONGOs are established by several Ministries and Public Institutions as well as by the central government. Nevertheless, the trend is changed from using GONGOs only for propagation process and refusing NGOs' access to using NGOs in propagation but GONGOs for active involvement in the implementation. It means that before even GONGOs, Public Associations and Funds were involved only in fund raising and propagation campaigns while NGOs were not even invited. But 2008 program has shown that GONGOs' role have been increased in implementation process. Therefore, final example should describe recent situation in GO-NGO relations.

(Table 3)

NGOs	GONGOs
N/A	1) Social Movement of Youth "Kamolot"; 2) Center of the Initiative Youth "Kelajak Ovozi" (Voice of the Future); 3) Mahalla – self-government residential associations; 4) Republican Association of "Tasviriy Oina" (Fine [Arts] Mirror); 5) Republican Public Association "Women Council"; 6) Republican Society of Disabled People; 7) Culture and Art Forum of Uzbekistan; 8) Republican hands-on training center "Oila" (Family); 9) Republican Creative Association of Journalist; 10) Council of the Trade Unions Federation;

	11) Republican Cultural-Spiritual Educational Center; 12) Republican Center of National Ideology; 13) Republican Center of “Oydin Xayot” (Bright Life); 14) Academy of Sciences
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The new government program has started by the announcement of 2010 as the “Year of Comprehensively Advanced Generation”. From the title of the program it is clear that government will mobilize its material and human resources toward physically, socially, economically and spiritually prosperity of young generation. We will now try to explore the list of NGOs and GONGs involvement in this program too (table 3). As it is clear that there is no single NGO involved but only GONGOs have participated. However, the NGO “Ayollar kengashi” (Women Council) which participated in the previous program has appeared in this program as Republican Public Association of Women Council. In another program of 2007 (based on the same tradition that the year of 2007 was announced as the ‘Year of Social Protection’ by the President and it has become government strategic program) which will not be described here, there was “Women Council” Ltd instead of “Women Council” NGO of 2006 program (table 1- mentioned program). So it means that in existed NGO “Women Council” in 2006 has changed its status to the limited company of “Women Council” and now it has become Republican Public Association. In the interview with the leader of this association<sup>101</sup>: “this association was simple NGO with few volunteers and limited resources because of the policy change in Uzbekistan toward NGOs’ activities during 2005-2007. In order avoid any misperception about our NGO, we have transformed our status in to Ltd (limited company) and tried to continue our activities working closer with GONGOs and Women Committee. Such collaboration gradually has been expanded to not only GONGOs but active NGOs too and we

<sup>101</sup> Phone conversion of the author with the interviewee / 12.2010

again became NGO. Later in 2008 we were able to initiate multiple projects and received funds from the Parliamentary Committee which enabled us to expand our activities within the country and have necessary human and material resources. At this moment we have become Republican Association but we are not GONGO. Although we are an NGO with headquarter in capital city Tashkent, we have several regional branches which makes us Republican Association. My success is based on my altruism in activities and pure civic interest” (Salakhitdinova Gulnoza, 2010, interview).

Nevertheless, the true story lies behind the scene. The main activity of this association is that prevention and protection of women from breast cancer.<sup>102</sup> The exact activities against this disease was started and later funded by Public Funds “Mehr Nuri” (Light of the Grace) and “Xayot Uchun” (For the Life) which are under Gulnora Karimova’s<sup>103</sup> supervision. She has also established and runs some other funds concentrated on social initiatives and social research but she does not lead any NGO activities. So, Karimova might have appointed an ambitious NGO leader whose activity was closely related to the field of her interest but became weak after integration in to the National Association of NGOs. On the website of the “Women Council” it is said that “the author of all initiated activities is the Chair of the Public Board of this NGO – Gulnara Karimova”<sup>104</sup>. ”NGO “Women Council” is good example to show that the control of the government through National Association of NGOs is directed to gradual co-optation of NGOs and integrate their activities in to already existing GONGOs. It is worth mentioning that for the former NGO “Women Council” it is good to have stable income, to be funded from the budget, freedom of activities and collaboration within the country as it is now as republican public association, rather than being under surveillance and restrictions. So, at the end, all earlier established Western style NGOs are either co-opted or integrated in to GONGOs or

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<sup>102</sup> <http://www.women.uz/>

<sup>103</sup> President’s daughter: <http://gulnarakarimova.com/uz/pages/tashkilotlar-mehr-nuri-xayriya-jamoat-jamgarmasi/>

<sup>104</sup> <http://www.women.uz/>

disappear.<sup>105</sup> Only those integrated or co-opted NGOs under the supervision of influential political actors are able to participate in implementation of government policies as shown in the case of recent government program of 2010.

## **Conclusion**

This part of the research was also related to the case study in Uzbekistan, but its purpose was different. If previous chapter dealt with the concept of civil society concept and its instrumental application in to Uzbekistan, this chapter reviewed the state-society synergy concept and its assessment in the case study. In order to present clear research analysis, this chapter also addressed the past, a bit of history then its development up to present situation. Earlier sections of this chapter attempted to foreground the historical evolution of state-society relations in Uzbekistan. It showed that important impact of the Russian colonization and its 'effort' to modernize the country. Although the scholars had argued as if colonization has brought modern state building or in fact 'modernization' policies of the Russian Empire and later Soviet regime were just exploitation, those years have been seen as early emerging conflict between modern and traditional institutions. Regardless of continuous attack on traditions, religion, cultural roots of the Uzbek nation, the Soviet regime could not fight against socially supported informal clannish networks. Scholars had pointed the existence of such a network in Central Asia as endemic rather than failure of the modern institutions, and Soviet regime most of the times had been using it for advantage.

Post-soviet Uzbekistan has faced dramatic changes and transition, so we attempted to explore how it affected state-society relations. This chapter has revealed that the claim of the central government having a strong state brings more benefit during transition is far from reality.

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<sup>105</sup> The both NGOs "Health + Ecology" and "The Life" participated in 2008 program do not exist any more.

The question of concern was the extent of ‘strength’ that state has and how it was concentrated. In Uzbekistan there is mixture of both patterns of modern state and traditional clannish polity but both can co-exist which is impossible for Western theories, since one of these two (modern state and clannish polity) should not let the other to survive. Nevertheless, modern bureaucracy can indeed exist under centralized administration but it is backed by stabilization ‘pacts’ of the major clan elites among themselves. General administration, policy implementation is run through the bureaucracy but political issues go through confining with elites’ interest. Therefore, in upper level meaning the decision making process and its implementation are based on state-elite synergy and it benefits only narrow circle of people. Traditional, primordial social structure and informal institutions are present and integrated in to the polity of the Uzbekistan, but the concern has become as if Western definitions and, theories are ready to embrace or be against it.

The analysis of the case study of Uzbekistan and its governance did not bring a particular solution to it, neither did we suggest that the case exacerbates the current situation in the country. The intention of the chapter was to point at existing complex state-society or public-private interactions at the top of the system which scholars and, Western donors oversee hence those are informal, invisible and not public.

Another important issue is that vague and blurry Western political interests have undermined potential possible pressure for liberalizations in Uzbekistan. Earlier developmental interventions were gradually improving the living conditions of the people but as soon as government discovered a leverage to manipulate Western interests in the country (U.S. and EU. military bases in Uzbekistan), those interventions also started to benefit the same narrow interests. Government successfully managed to direct developmental aids in to the quasi-liberal process of implementation, through umbrella associations, using GONGOs in foreign funded projects.

## **Chapter 6. Main Conclusion: *Research analysis, Findings and Implications***

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### **6.1 Research analysis**

This section aims to clarify once more what research questions were analyzed within this dissertation and what answers can be draw out from these four main chapters. The significance of this section is that it helps to understand the main points of this research and to summarize into findings.

#### **6.1.1 Why Civil Society is Weak in Uzbekistan?**

Transition of civil society concept into Central Asian states in the early 1990s, as in Uzbekistan has accompanied several other issues such as transition from the Soviet regime, democratization, decentralization and one even can find ironically Westernization.

However, what was introduced at that moment can be simply phrased as ‘proxy-NGOs’ which raised the question of whether NGOs are really capable of bringing those promises. And unfortunately after several years of ‘NGO promotion’ projects, scholars citing to decreasing number of these new ‘entities’ of democracy came to general conclusion that “the basis for creating civil society” or “a framework conducive to establishing a civil society remains largely non-existent” in Uzbekistan (Polat 1999, p.135; Kangas D 1995, p.271; Carley 1995, p.292).

Parallel with NGO initiatives, World Bank’s advocacy for *decentralization* in 1992 has

attracted additional donors' intervention to the 'Mahalla Initiative' reforms (Noori 2006, pp.533-549) – “package of policy directives that deferred the administration of critical state services to community-based institutions” – the mahalla<sup>106</sup>. It received support from UNDP, WB, USAID and JICA and many international donors “promptly tailored their development projects to work with the mahalla” (2006, p.533). Karimov (President of the country 1991 – present) in his speech on January 2000 defined the mahalla as a “...non-governmental ‘social’ organization, or as a bridge connecting people with the government” (Noori 2006, p.536). Although the decentralization project is supposed to loosen state power, increase non-state sectors involvement in public sphere, promote democratization, and increase public access to state institutions in Uzbekistan, it led to a robust build-up of state institutions, failed to meet any of the World Bank's expectations.

Adamson (2002, pp.177 – 187) described this issue within *democratization* assistance of Western donors in Uzbekistan. According to him the logic behind the assistance was that funding local and independent advocacy NGOs generates independent interest groups in civil society that in turn can provide impetus for democratic reform or transition. Regardless of the few achievements, she regrets that democracy assistance programs have not been successful in effecting large-scale structural changes. A surprising fact for her is that “...despite attempts by international donors to strengthen civil society in Uzbekistan by supporting the development of third sector and independent civic advocacy groups, popular opposition in the region comes not from Western style NGO sector but from religious movements” (2002, p.178).

What was the reason behind these unsuccessful transition of civil society has been acute topic of discussions among many foreign scholars, donor institutions as well as Uzbek scholars of Uzbekistan (Adamson 2002, pp.137–144; Alimov 1996, pp.281-296; Stevens 2005,

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<sup>106</sup> Mahalla – community level of associational life allocated within towns, villages comprising 2 or 3 thousands households. In general every district of the cities and towns are divided in to several mahalla. The chief of Mahalla is respected elder who deals with administrative and managerial issues of residents' life. Currently near 10 000 mahalla were registered in the country.

pp.281-296; 2007, pp.49 - 64; 2004, pp.49 - 64; Sievers 2002, pp.91-158; Pottenger R 2004, pp.55-77; Polat 1999, pp.137-144; Seiple 2005, pp.245-259; Suda 2005, pp.335-365; Giffen & Buxton 2004; Ilkhamov 2005, pp.297-317). Each of them has contributed to answer the question why civil society is in decline in Uzbekistan, but few gave suggestion how to develop it.

The common ground we can derive from these literatures are follows:

**a) The nature of the regime existing in the country is primary impediment for development of independent civil society.**

There is extensive literature on the regime in Uzbekistan which discusses the transition process from authoritarian regime and from command economy after the collapse of Soviet Union (Abdullaev 2005, pp.267-296; Adams 2004, pp.93-119; Collins 2002, pp.137-152; Dadabaev 2007, pp.407-428; Djumaev 2001, pp.320-344; Ilkhamov 2007, pp.65-84; Kandiyoti 2007, pp.31-48; Naumkin 2006, pp.127-140; Kangas D 1994, pp.178-182). But it is quite difficult to describe whole nature of the regime and link each factor's impact on civil society building.

For instance, Kandiyoti (2007, pp.31-48) described government land reforms and change in public service provision in order to illustrate how government has kept its control over resource allocation while the transition process to market economy has been only partial. Luong (2000, pp.563-592) also confirmed similar outcome from reforms of legislative power in Uzbekistan. She assured that motivation from these reforms was not directly showing intention to liberalize legislative power. Instead, all participating parties and the process of legislation were vulnerable to interventions from executive power and central authority (2000, pp.563-592).

Collins observed informal ties and clan networks in Central Asia (2004, pp.224-261).

Kin patronage and clan politics were able to survive the Soviet onslaught and reemerged in post-Soviet period because of their informality, strong kin-based network and ability to use Soviet institutions to further their ends. She suggests that in highly uncertain political and economic conditions like in Uzbekistan, clans will likely undermine potential forms of organization and representation (Collins 2004, p.258). A deeper analysis on clans and patronage relations in post-Soviet Uzbekistan has been presented by Ilkhamov (2007, pp.64-84). He argues that the roots of clan politics and patronage networks in Uzbekistan lied within poverty, inequality, incomplete market mechanisms, institutional and functional gaps, low social mobilization, poor exchange and communication between ethnicities and regional divisions. Neo-patrimonial regime in transitional country Uzbekistan creates a system of rule where the 'boundaries between state and society' are blurred. As a result, patronage formations can be formed around public offices, so state can be privatized to serve the interests of particular clans (2007, pp.78-82).

Another piece of research devoted to the transition process in Uzbekistan was presented by Abdullaev (2005, pp.267-296) who reveals the fact that strict centralization in the political and administrative system not only remained as it was in Soviet regime but re-invented within modern institutions. From economical perspective, Eshref and Eskender Trushins (2005, pp.329-384) also confirm that economic transition in the country has been impeded by centralized government intervention, rent seeking behavior of public officials and competition between clans to extract maximum rents.

The above mentioned works shows that lack of political will and desire to move toward actual liberalizations in Uzbekistan. The common views among public officials are that liberalization is not necessary for successful development and it can be dangerous for domestic stability. Nevertheless, government of Uzbekistan has realized that without introducing Western institutions, without involving in globalization and economic integration, it is not

possible to sustain regime durability. Therefore, government of Uzbekistan has announced that this country follows principles of 'Eastern democracy' and initiated coexistence of new liberal institutions on the surface but deeply rooted Asian values in the substance.

However, I believe that scholars' assessment about 'absence of civil society' in Uzbekistan due to the nature of the regime is not fully acceptable. Carley's work (1995, pp.292-317) even suggests that Uzbekistan does not bear essential 'civic' and political culture, thus, civil society building programs must consider deeper look in to elevation of democratic culture in society. But in this research we have explained that the definition that has been imposed by donors easily can mislead one to see civil society as mere collections of NGOs or look in to society as 'uncivil' without seeing that 'civicness' of society could easily be dominated by the state intervention and social control in to desired direction for the government. The period of history when society was within the apolitical side of the life, or when there was potential threat and humiliation toward the traditional values or when there was positive convergence of interest between state and society in Uzbekistan (1860 - 1930)<sup>107</sup>, we witness patterns of civil society. History revealed that there existed reciprocity, mutual aid in the society and associational life independent from the state. Sievers calls it as 'social mahalla' which we already mentioned. Other important finding from that period could be that the moment of 'social movement' of local elites, peasants and intelligentsia in order to challenge pre-existed primordial life style and backwardness of ordinary people.<sup>108</sup> Therefore, I refrain from saying that civil society should be built from scratch in Uzbekistan, but I would agree that state-society relations in public sphere has an important role on its today's survival.

It should also be pointed out that donors approach in civil society development programs were based on zero-sum approach which means empowering the civil society at the

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<sup>107</sup> This is period right before the Russian occupation and right after that, it means the period where social structure and associational life was about to be altered and new transitional culture had to be introduced

<sup>108</sup> I refer to the social movements and early establishments of free and active political parties, free press, modern schools between 1870s and 1920s (see (Usmonov et al. 2005, pp.210-218)).

expense of minimizing the state. It assumes that state and society relations are counterproductive and dichotomist. The nature of the civil society development programs being zero-sum can be found in the total picture of democracy assistance and decentralization initiative projects in Uzbekistan (Adamson 2002, pp.177-206; Noori 2006, pp.533-549). In brief, those projects insisting on that civil society should be independent from the state, implies that they stand up for different values whereas the space they share is public sphere. Probably in the case of Uzbekistan it is true that existing state society relations are not mutually enforcing or not positive sum relations yet, but rather than decreasing this gap between state and society, donors' intervention had generated government suspicion to work with civil society. Nevertheless, I admit that the impact of 'path dependency' meaning that former legacy of Soviet regime has been deeply penetrated in Uzbekistan and it still puts the government as a sole capable modern institution to decide what is good for its own citizens and to deal with public interest. In the Soviet regime, lack of the private interest within society which could bring alternative thinking and criticism has been generated by imposing communal interest for public good – state ideology and that public good was shaped by the Communist Party branches and incorporated Public Associations. Pottenger (2004, p.58) described it as:

*“One consequence of the Soviet attempt to overcome the public-private dichotomy was to render irrelevant the raison d'être of civil society: the maintenance and fostering of a tension between the contrary and competing values of private interest and public good. Since the claims of private interest and public good had become synonymous according to the Soviet model, the tension between the two dissolved.”*

Such a legacy had led people to accept the centralized state as a sole agent of reforms, decisions, production, distribution and policy making. The regime has been strong enough to keep its legacy for 75 years intact, which today is refurnished under a modern democratic guise of independent country. Therefore, sudden change of current regime or its values is not an

option and such change of the regime does not automatically bring a democratic one<sup>109</sup>.

In other words, scholars' argument about the nature of the regime (authoritarian, totalitarian or despotic) being as an impediment of civil society development is not persuasive. This is because, it basically embraces criticism of the regime and its authoritative nature, but it does not point at clear cause except emphasizes on symptoms. Wang (1999, p.231) for instance implies that some dimension of state power requires an ability to work through and with other social actors and therefore disconnectedness from social groups turns out to be associated in many cases with weakness rather than strength of the state. So, empowerment of the state capacity to solve this weakness is what assumed to be a 'zero-sum' approach.

I assume that the weakness of the Uzbek government is that inability to initiate productive negotiation, mediation and collective work with the society for civic ends rather than serving private interests. This could be the main reason for civil society decline in the country. The correct approach would be the one which suggests the way how power of the state and social forces can be mutually enhanced but not at the cost of one another.

**b) The strategies and perception of international community upon civil society building projects in Uzbekistan mostly ignored local context.**

This argument implies that donor intervention we may refer to as, civil society development assistance, decentralization programs, democracy assistance – were based on neo-liberal values integrated in to the context of assistance – import of liberal institutions from the West, empowerment of non-state sector (private sector and civil society) at the cost of minimizing state power. Especially in the case of civil society building programs, scholars wildly criticized the perception of donors upon the concept of civil society – promotion of

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<sup>109</sup> Colorful revolutions resulted in overthrow of former authoritarian regimes did not automatically brought democratic governance. Instead, it resulted in further destabilization as a matter of choice for the Western support (U.S., EU and other Western countries) or former Communist regimes' support (Russia, China).

NGOs (non-governmental organizations) in Uzbekistan. Moreover, the nature and function of NGOs that largely had been supported were advocacy and protection of human rights. Of course, there were programs for NGOs promotion to enable them to participate in poverty reduction and socio-economic issues, but such involvements were in compatible framework approved by the government. In fact, in the majority of cases, government organized NGOs (GONGOs) were active participants of donor financed projects which otherwise their activities in the region would easily be suspended (Ilkhamov 2005, pp.65-84).

So, the reason for civil society decay in the country is that Western donors did not look for social context, for patterns of civil society within the country, but instead insisted on 'proxy-NGOs' expansion. Seiple (2005, pp.245-259) condemns that "donors appear to lack a common definition of civil society" and they "... are reluctant to engage traditional structures that seem to be at odds with the Western values the donor is trying to inculcate". Stevens (2004, pp.94-110) also suggests a more communitarian approach to civil society, "one that would support pre-modern communities: valuing their functions of solidarity and sociability and allowing them to structure participation in both a parochial sense, and politically". Adamson (2002, pp.177-206) in her research concludes that "...international actors need to be more willing to work with a variety of local groups, such as local community structures (mahallas), government NGOs (GONGOs), and religious organizations". This is because by working exclusively with so-called "independent NGO sector", donors will continue to reach only a small sector of society. As a result of such motivation, donors gradually have started to engage with traditional basis of associational life – mahalla.

One of the earliest calls for attention to be given to donors involvement with traditional social structure and institutions of mahalla was made by Sievers (2002, pp.91-158). He also criticized donors' ignorance of the local context and expressed appreciation for the assistance that has started for Mahalla. However he warned that donors' assumption over what 'traditional

associational life' represents is slightly different for the actual situation. He pointed out that "whereas pre-Russian mahalla residents<sup>110</sup> expected almost nothing from the state in the way of public goods (and expected a lot from mahalla), late Soviet mahalla residents imagined that the only way to good schools, adequate medical care, potable water, and crime prevention was through a strong state" (2002, p.118). So, gradually after independence, by dispersing some authority to Mahalla, the government has turned it to an instrument of social control which he calls as 'administrative mahalla' and the one existed before Russian colonization of the country as 'social mahalla'. He assures that "...it is impossible to reconcile efforts by the state to consolidate control at the expense of autonomous associations with development of civil society" and "at best, Uzbekistan's current trajectory is towards an, albeit organizationally rich, parastatal civil society" (2002, p.122). Later on independent research was conducted by Kamp (2004, pp.29-58) and Suda (2005, pp.335-365) with more supportive materials confirming Sievers' argument that Mahalla can substitute for neither civil society nor social capital, therefore, donors' support for mahalla should be reconsidered. According to these scholars, traditional associational institutions were utilized in the Soviet regime in order to penetrate in to Uzbek society through pre-existing institutions and they succeeded. Therefore, it has already lost its original identity within 75 years of the Soviet rule. The promise to revitalize traditional culture and values by current the government of Uzbekistan also does not have the intention to bring autonomous sphere of associational life as it was pre-Soviet regime, but it is to justify preserving Soviet style administration in the process of distancing the country from the past-legacy.

Ilkhamov (2005, pp.297-317) also criticized donors in terms of perceptions and strategies used in the process of civil society building in Uzbekistan. He argues that "...one

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<sup>110</sup> Mahalla residential associations existed even before the Russian occupation and its nature has been changing through the changes of regimes in the country.

cannot expect an automatic conversion of external financial support into improved capacity of civil society unless the proper strategy is applied and shared by the international community” (2005, p.305). In case of mahalla, he refers to some features it has, such as strong kinship and inter-household social networks which create social capital in general. But these networks have not yet transformed themselves into activities for the public interest. Therefore, “social capital locked into neighborhood communities and kinship networks can evolve into civil society only if the moral codes of the social ties help to overcome the finiteness of community life and enable its members to engage in the public sphere” (2005, p.308).

So, we can pursue two different flows of arguments here. The first is that donors should think of pre-existing social networks, associational life and seek for patterns of civil society within the country rather than imposing Western NGOs (Giffen et al. 2005, pp.34-53). But this argument has found an answer in the second argument, namely that, donors should not support pre-existing social institutions without paying attention to the context of associational life which might be called a ‘parastatal’ civil society (Sievers 2002, pp.91-158; Suda 2005, pp.335-365; Noori 2006, pp.533-549; Kamp 2004, pp.29-58). So, basically we have now clear image of scholars view point about the reason why civil society is weak in Uzbekistan. It is because of the state weakness to engage with civil society<sup>111</sup> and also incompatible conception of donors’ civil society development projects in to local context.

There are only a few scholars who have offered any suggestions on this issue. One of these is Sievers (2002, pp.91-158) who calls for sympathy of international community over primordial ‘social mahalla’ that is turning into parastatal civil society converging with state institutions in charge of modern public services. He implies that Mahalla could be a possible space for the development of traditional civil society if proper measures are taken, since it was

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<sup>111</sup> Uzbek government still can not get rid of dichotomist state – society relations under zero-sum approach. State is still weak to pursue integrative, constructive mutual empowering strategies with civil society except the fact that neo-patrimonial relations are increasing (Ilkhamov 2007, pp.65-84; Collins 2004, pp.224-261).

most autonomous and self-governed associational life before in this region. But what is unclear for me is that as if Sievers prefers absolute autonomy of this space over the penetration of state through modern public services. If so, he did not provide us with the solution of these two incompatible status quo; one is the autonomy of associational life with private particular social services and another is dependence over formal nation-wide public services.

Ilkhamov (2005, pp.297-317) gave his comprehensive viewpoint on possible direction for civil society development. He discussed the applicability of Habermas' 'communicative theory' of civil society where interaction is to be presented in all aspects of civil society taken in its communicative structure. This aspect, the communicative interaction, is a "core of the nature of civil society and a fabric of informal networks of information, ideas and discourse exchange and production" (2005, p.315). It is supported by dissemination of free media and grass-root communicative networks, both formal and informal, such as churches, mosques, all kinds of social gatherings, coffee-shops, tea houses, home parties and so on. Through intensive communicative interaction it is possible to create public narratives and opinion in dealings with the state at all levels. Finally, these communicative networks with articulated certain public opinion need to evolve and transform into social movements as one of the characteristics of civil society development – social action, engagement in public sphere, a non-conformist stance, targeting social change. He assures that "...only if civil society develops in this direction, the patriarchal foundations of the current political regime can be changed without the danger of creating chaos and anarchy in its aftermath" (2005, p.315).

It seems that Ilkhamov is admirer of Poland's experience and one of its spiritual leaders Adam Michnik. He also suggested that "... program of evolution should be addressed to independent public opinion and not just to the totalitarian authorities. Instead of acting as a prompter to the government, telling it how to improve itself, this program should tell society how to act. As far as the government is concerned, it can have no clearer counsel [advise] than

that provided by social pressure from below” (Bernhard 1993, p.314; Michnik 1976, p.274; Ilkhamov 2005, p.315). Ilkhamov supports his argument with those SMEs, middle class, professionals, students, and women whose motivation for self-expression and self-actualization is high hence their frustration with the current political regime is already well articulated.

However, the situation in 1980s of Poland and rest of the countries in Eastern Europe is different from the present situation of Uzbekistan. The collapse of the Soviet Union was of major interest to the West and it did utmost assistance to the reviving opposition groups, leaders and grassroots against socialist regime in Eastern Europe. But neither the West nor local population are interested in collapse of Uzbek regime. [after collapse of USSR, different priorities have appeared for the West and U.S. global politics]. The West and especially U.S. considers the regime not as a threat or competitor like former USSR but ally in combat against terrorism (Seiple 2005, pp.245-259). Moreover, it is more preferable if the region is stable and reciprocal with the U.S.

In my view the Uzbek regime’s legitimacy rested in peoples’ desire for peace, order and stability in the country. Those values have been prioritized since the early 1990s, the beginning of civil war in neighboring Tajikistan and Afghanistan, 1992 bombings in capital city Tashkent by Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), colorful revolutions in Georgia (Rose 2003), Ukraine (Orange 2004) and Kyrgyzstan (Tulip 2005), radical Islamic groups’ bombings in Bukhara, Tashkent and Jizzah regions and Andijan violent demonstrations in 2005. Such environment in the country creates a paradox whereas government assumes to empower its capacity to impose ‘public order’ for the sake of stability and peace; it attracts much energy and resources from fully embracing socio-economic development, which in turn generates more frustration and radicalization from unemployed, illiteracy, poor and dissatisfied part of society. Thus, for the local population, [society has the perception that ...] social movements or revolutions give no guarantee for democratic change as it did not for neighboring countries,

except the threat of radical Islamic forces may take power over the region using opportunity from instable environment as the leader of the country warned (Pottenger R 2004, pp.55-77). Moreover, President Karimov has ensured society that before this country goes for democratic consolidation; it requires full economic preparedness and a well-functioning market economy. Since a market economy does not directly address inequality and exclusion, there is an important role for the state to protect society. Therefore, government has chosen socially protected market economy meaning social democracy and society should not necessarily be civil but being 'decent' society is what the country requires (Pottenger R 2004, pp.55-77). In brief, I conclude that the public sphere and social perception is under such a strong intellectual and political doctrine, but the citizens did not choose for contradictions with it, instead as Radio Liberty (2010a) has mentioned they are voting with their feet<sup>112</sup>.

Stevens (2007, pp.49 - 64; 2005, pp.281-296; 2004, pp.10-110) also one of the prominent scholars who was following these debates since his PhD research in 2004. His first analysis is critical in order to have clear assessment of international assistance on civil society building in the country. He correctly stated that instead of empowering local support and social participation in civil society building process, donors have created 'donor dependent NGOs' unable to initiate self-supporting activities (2005, pp.281-296). Later, he has analyzed possible state-society synergy between 'Mahalla and neo-liberal NGOs' to expect grass-root support for civil society building (2005, pp.281-296). Unfortunately, he was dissatisfied with the political environment in Uzbekistan where only small scale synergy projects – involving NGOs and local government<sup>113</sup> – was successful. He implied that small scale synergetic relations can be facilitated in Uzbekistan regardless of some limits. And those are not related to the weakness of

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<sup>112</sup> Some 3,200 Uzbek citizens receive USA Green card each year leaving Uzbekistan permanently or temporary and over 8 million people have left as immigrants to the Russia and Kazakhstan for seeking employment.

<sup>113</sup> In his paper he defines Mahalla as local government referring to strong administrative intervention it has gained.

civil society<sup>114</sup>, but “...the limits to synergy are located in government rather than in civil society” (2005, p.292). Stevens concludes that “...the prospects for scaling up developmentally effective community mobilization is constrained by the macro-political context”, therefore, it is suggested to think of “...the possibilities of constructing a ‘state–society–donor’ model of synergy” (2005, p.293) in Uzbekistan. He did not return to this issue again but moved on his research toward analyzing ‘political society’ of the country in order to have clear image of macro-political context (2007, pp.49 – 64). In that research he assures that liberal democracy requires political society in order to adopt and process political demands from civil society – acting in a mediatory role between civil society and the state. However, he concludes that in Uzbekistan “political society was severely limited” and “there is no political competition” (2007, pp.49 – 64).

Finally in his last research on civil society in Uzbekistan (2010, pp.355-374) he implies that “as long as democracy promotion and ‘color revolutions’ are associated with bilateral aid, coming from foreign governments, there will always remain a suspicion that support for civil society is a Trojan horse for foreign power interests”. His conclusion is that “a more plausible strategy for civil society support and democracy assistance is to make better use of the international organizations, of which Uzbekistan is a part, to apply pressure on the government” (2010, p.370).

Summarizing his logic, it seems that after his observation civil society building process and international aid to this sector in Uzbekistan, he realized that there is a need for mutual collaboration between state and society. He examined small scale project of synergy between NGO and Mahalla, but macro-political context in the country was seen as impediment to scale up the process. By applying Evans’ analysis (Evans 1996a, pp.1119-1132; Stevens 2005, p.292)

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<sup>114</sup> According to the theory of synergy, building synergy can be complicated and difficult if there is no endowment of e.g. civil society (Evans 1996a, pp.1119-1132). But for Stevens, Uzbekistan has endowments of civil society

he asserts on the role of political context of Uzbekistan. After he found out that there is no political competition in the country, he suggested that there is a need for stronger international pressure for democratic change to Uzbekistan. So, in other words, it seems to me that international pressure must generate democratic reforms, tolerance for political competition and then there would be an opportunity to scale-up state-society-donor synergy.

I admire and agree with Stevens that state-society synergy is the key for civil society development in the country. It addresses the cause, (zero-sum approach, dichotomist state-society relations) but not the symptoms (nature of regime, weak civil society etc.) of the problem. However, the solutions he implied, seems to bring more international intervention which he was against in his earlier critics of donors' intervention. In fact, I believe that foreign aid, pressure for democratization have made Uzbek government suspicious, more suppressive and intolerance for alternative voices, therefore, international pressure (e.g Iran, North Korea) has no value today. Even internal bottom-up pressure also has nothing to do with democratization since 'pressure' brings conflict, antagonism and more distance between state and society. Any approach should consider mutually empowering, mutually supportive and positive-sum relations between state and civil society in Uzbekistan.

#### **6.1.2 Does the relationship between state and society matter in development of civil society in Uzbekistan?**

After analyzing the concept of civil society in chapter 2, we have come to the basic criteria which combines earlier interpretations and neo-liberal definition of civil society and affects the future of civil society in Uzbekistan; a) civil society exists between clearly distinct public and private sector; b) civil society posits itself as autonomous public realm (meaning that allocated within public sphere) in order to be out of state intervention so it can impose social control, demand for liberal values from the state; c) civil society has many organizational forms,

but the core of all is collective, associative action to pursue articulated interests and goals. Do these criteria match with the conditions existing in Uzbekistan?

**a) Civil society exists between clearly distinct public and private sector.**

As we mentioned in earlier chapter, the post-Soviet transition of the country did not bring visible changes. The state still occupies a large portion of socio-economic sphere in Uzbekistan. The private sector, meaning the market sphere did not distinguished itself because of monopolized government industries, manufacturing and services. We cannot also distinguish political society the importance of which has been mentioned by certain scholars in order to link civil society to so one can serve as raw material to another (Stevens 2007, pp.49 – 64). The reason is that supposed political society – political parties which must have competition ability to attract public vote – has no potential due to mono-political discourse. Therefore, only possible division is state and society.

Due to the inherited Marxism and Leninism ideologies of political-economy, government of Uzbekistan strongly prefers role of the central government and its institutions. Hierarchical institutionalism and top-down decision making is what constitutes current regime's governance mechanism (Spechler 2008; Polat 1999; Adams 2004; Ilkhamov 2002; Eshref Trushin & Eskender Trushin 2005; Stevens 2005). Therefore, that division between state and society has left widening gap between the two. Possible interaction between state and society occurs through institutional representation (trade unions, affiliation to political parties, and representation through local assemblies) or direct citizen's approach to the public institutions. Institutional representation is not bottom-up, but as in early 13<sup>th</sup> century Britain<sup>115</sup>, from top to down. 'Representation' actually means that parliament, local assemblies and

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<sup>115</sup> S. Huntington described early period of political institutionalization in Britain in 13<sup>th</sup> century (Huntington 2006, pp.93-134).

committees of political parties function to represent central government's will to the society. In case of direct citizens' approach to public institutions, is not worth mentioning. Anyway, the point is here, the gap for social participation, cooperation, interaction between state and society is very wide, though state intervention, social control and political socialization is quite active and is also top-down process. What part of society we are talking about is also important, but for now we want to emphasize the importance of state-society relations and narrowing this gap between the two for collaboration.

However, the strength of the central government and its capacity is not as we assumed it to be. The dominance of the state and authoritarian nature of its leader is not complete assessment (Collins 2006; Collins 2004, pp.224-261; Ilkhamov 2010, pp.195-210; Ilkhamov 2010, pp.218-239). Penetration of informal social forces such as clans and patrimonial kinship network into decision making process of the government shows that president Karimov's earlier stand point against the clans and patrimonial social roots (as an undermining factor for development) either was not devoted on total cleansing or the power and authority concentrated on presidential apparatus was not strong enough to transform that social structure. Gradually, it caused the proliferation of clan politics within the state apparatus. We named this interaction as not state-society synergy but 'state-elite synergy'. If it is so, what are we to make of the widening gap of interaction between state and society while in reality such representation and interaction exists between state and clan elites? This condition can give us only one possible answer that is, state-society relationship is *informal* and generated *channels* between central government and several clan elites is unique source for the dialogue, interaction, collaboration that society can have with the government. The strong nature of bureaucracy and top-down implementation is in order to secure implementation of those policies that decided by such informal dialogues, otherwise the government can lose its credibility to ensure balance of interests within those clans (Collins 2006, pp.62-102). At the same time such rigidity and

centralization of government actually facilitates the appearance of new clans in order to open new informal channels since the formal channels of representation or interaction is only for 'window dressing' (dominancy of executive over legislative power, non-competitive political parties, NGOs control through umbrella institutions etc).

It is obvious that these available informal channels are not accessible by large portion of the population and it makes them dependent upon limited formal public services and they have to comfort themselves within restricted market and social relations. This kind of environment makes this large part of society mere beneficiaries of whatever is provided regardless of its quality and quantity. Both ordinary citizens and small and medium property owners who do not belong to the clanship are the part of society that we call today as suppressed, because even "...non-elite clan members have some benefit for supporting and being loyal to the clan leaders" (Collins 2004, pp.224-261). Civil society organizations established by those belonging to the suppressed part of society today with the help of the foreign donors have no possible strength to alter neither current clan politics nor limited provision of public services in Uzbekistan. Therefore, weakness of civil society rests in existence of such informal state-elite synergy in the country and it implies that state-society relations in essential pillar to look before measuring the role of civil society in Uzbekistan.

**b) Civil society posits itself as autonomous public realm (meaning that allocated within public sphere) in order to be out of state intervention so it can impose social control, demand for liberal values from the state.**

The applied theory of state-society synergy implies the access of ordinary people into implementation process of government policies. It assures that both state and society can upgrade, nurture own capacity through building reciprocity and mutual aid. In this sense, it is necessary to ask how and in what form this non-clan part of society, small and medium property

owners, teachers, peasants, unemployed men and women, who comprise the majority of the population, be involved in these policy implementation processes? Generally, social participation in policy implementation is almost nonexistent because of vast number of public institutions and politically integrated GONGOs. However, there is ongoing empowerment of Mahalla authority over public service provision, developmental initiatives within the mahalla residents. Mahalla residents are actively encouraged to participate in developmental projects by the support of both developmental aids and mahalla administration. Nevertheless, each mahalla is concentrated on rather small territory and with small amount of available resources to mobilize. Most of the cases, mahalla residents partially bear the burdens of developmental projects and often such participation is enforced rather than encouraged voluntariness. Besides, no mahalla leader can initiate socio-economic reforms within the given territory without permission of district governors. Even there, sometimes extended families and influential social groups can take the discretion power from the mahalla chiefs.

Another option is that implementation process can involve civil society organizations. Actually this is one of the most favored mechanisms of social participation including community organizations, or developmental movements based on certain social issues in developed and developing countries. Why is this not possible in Uzbekistan? The problem is that applied and legitimized Western concept of the civil society in Uzbekistan by the law enacted in 1999. It stipulates that civil society is autonomous sphere and both state and civil society does not intervene to each other's affairs. Although government has the right to enter contractual relations with the CSOs or CSOs can appeal for grants via social contracts, there are already many GONGOs that easily can replace such civil society organizations established by ordinary citizens. The concept applied to Uzbekistan puts potential civil society organizations outside of the legitimate public sphere since the sphere is occupied by the state and because of the 'non-intervention' status quo. It means that law on NGOs allows NGOs to exist but not to

function. One example is that an NGO staff who tried to disseminate HIV prevention pamphlets, as one of the activities of his NGO was arrested in 2009, and jailed for 7 years. Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty (24th February 2010) published an online detail of his imprisonment:

“The Russian-language booklet at issue, "HIV and AIDS Today," gives detailed information about preventive measures to avoid the deadly disease, including the importance of sterile syringes for drug users and ways to practice safe sex. It explains, for example, how to use condom. In a society where discussing sex is taboo, the court found the brochure amounted to a how-to guide for young people to have sex and use drugs. The court declared the booklet's contents "illegal" and ordered all copies to be seized by police and immediately destroyed. Strongman President Islam Karimov, who has ruled for more than 20 years, takes a dim view of dissent and authorities are highly suspicious of even apolitical NGOs”<sup>116</sup>.

This kind of case creates a precedent for other NGOs to acknowledge that their activities are under government's jurisdiction. In other words, I want to say that this civil society concept has created much suspicion between state and civil society because state always antagonize civil society for being sort of 'social control' or 'potential social demand and criticism' to the government (Stevens 2010, pp.355-374). Besides, because of this concept, not only civil society, but the whole sphere outside of the state cannot enter into positive state-society relations or freedom of pursuing for private interests except through clan channels. One example is that in late 2004, 23 entrepreneurs were arrested under the suspicion of being some radical religious movement called Akramiya and some said it was a measure to solve minor 'inter-clan' dispute. Although all of those 23 businessmen have clearly stated that there was no religious link to their private business, government jailed them. These entrepreneurs believe that "...government jailed them because of their successful business, generated social networks and support from the population" (all of them were from the same region Andizhan

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<sup>116</sup>[http://www.rferl.org/content/Uzbeks\\_Give\\_AntiAIDS\\_Campaigner\\_SevenYear\\_Sentence/1967550.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Uzbeks_Give_AntiAIDS_Campaigner_SevenYear_Sentence/1967550.html)

and they actively involved in political and social donations). This accident later sparked off bigger conflicts between civilians and law enforcement bodies.<sup>117</sup>

**c) Civil society has many organizational forms, but the core of all is collective, associative action to pursue articulated interests and goals**


Thanks to the earlier strong support, the non-clan members of society, vulnerable but massive part of property owners (I can't refer them as the "private sector" since their share in state – elite monopolized market sphere is very low) started to involve in public affairs and enable few changes in social life. Although neo-liberal proxy NGOs have attracted them at first, the government has frozen all the material, vocational, and political support from the donors since the 2003 colorful revolutions in neighboring former SU republics. From 2005, Western politicians, donors also began to cut their aid to the state owned industries and GONGOs as retaliation measures (Synovitz 2004). Nevertheless, later from 2007, they have reconsidered their priority from liberalization in Uzbekistan to privileging the geo-strategic influence in whole Central Asia as a counterweight to Russian Federation. So instead, Western aid targeted greater support for state owned industries and GONGOs leaving the non-state sphere alone. As a result, there are a few NGOs (700-800) actively trying to continue their function, the rest of them are transformed into GONGOs (case of Women Council) or disappeared. There are recent data (Table 1, 2, 3) provided by USAID experts which shows recent sustainability level of NGOs in Uzbekistan up to 2009 it is still in "early transition level".<sup>118</sup>

(Table 4)

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<sup>117</sup> "Trial of businessmen" [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andijan\\_massacre](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andijan_massacre). Also on YouTube, participant entrepreneurs in exile gave extensive interviews to the foreign media

<sup>118</sup> [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe\\_eurasia/dem\\_gov/ngoindex/2009/uzbekistan.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2009/uzbekistan.pdf)



**Capital:** Tashkent

**Polity:**  
Republic


**Population:**  
27,865,738 (July 2010 est.)

**GDP per capita (PPP):**  
\$2,800 (2009 est.)

**NGO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.7**

(Table 5)

(Table 6)



The scholars who devoted their effort to study civil society development in Uzbekistan also use such data and conclude that civil society in Uzbekistan does not exist or Uzbek society has no deep democratic culture which represents vibrant associative, collective action, social mobilization to enforce liberalizations or development. As we discussed in Chapter 4, historical evolution of civic engagement in Uzbekistan and also in a previous section of this Chapter, understanding and measuring civil society through proxy-NGOs' number is not persuasive in the case of Uzbekistan. Patterns of civil society exist in the country and it existed from long time ago. These patterns were developed since the space of private sphere was *apolitical* and harmonious in 19<sup>th</sup> century Movorounahr and when freedom for such space to grow has been provided by the state. Occupation of Russian Empire has provoked political side of this society by facilitation of social mobilization, alteration of traditional values. Successful rise of local

political movements, political parties for better education and for modernization of social life can be seen within the close partnership built between reformation oriented colonial Russia and intellectuals of Uzbek society. The same partnership between state and society can be found in nationalistic movements for freedom from the Soviet regime by Uzbek state and intellectual elites against Moscow reign (colonial Russia). In both latter cases we can realize that society had chosen best option that matches for their interests; first was modernization and second was freedom, but in each case they have chosen partnering 'state' (partnering with the colonial Russia was to modernize traditional backward life style and with Uzbek government society wanted to achieve freedom from Russia).

It is now possible to summarize our research analysis for the second question on state-society relations. Indeed, state-society relations matter to the development of civil society, and it matter in the extent that how collaborative and reciprocal those relations are. In this research we did not seek development of NGOs, but no matter what form it would be eligible, it must be intrinsic to the future of the state-society relations. In the case of Uzbekistan, we have following factors that strongly undermine the future of state-society relations;

1) Upper level state-society interactions are mostly private interest based, a situation that causes centralization and rigidity of state. On the other hand, the centralized closed nature of governance evokes other non-clan suppressed society to build own clans (vicious circle<sup>119</sup>) and find a channel for dialogue with the public institutions. As a result, excessive increase of informal state-society relations in Uzbekistan has become one of the strong obstacles to initiate state-society synergy.

2) The Western concept of civil society is an obstacle to initiate state-society synergy too. Since civil society is understood and perceived by the government as anti-government and

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<sup>119</sup> Ilkhamov described how patronage network do not let transformation of public institutions by creating vicious circle (2007, p.80).

autonomous sphere, this concept undermines the possibility to build partnership between public institutions and non-state actors.

3) An elephant's roar does not come from an ant no matter how much power it is given. Giving more authority and responsibility to the Mahalla will not facilitate developmental change. Mahalla chiefs are not professional nor skillful and they have limited tangible and intangible resources to initiate any developmental goals. Moreover, the age of the aksakals (Chiefs of mahalla) is over 50, a fact which probably does not motivate them to be part of any innovation or reformations. In contrast, reverse action – giving more initiative freedom to district and municipal governors can bring more benefit to build wider state (local governments) – society partnerships.

## 6.2 Research Findings

▪ 1. Major factor of civil society decay is *weakness or lack* of commitment of the state to direct informal state-elite relations into public interest.

The internal structure of state power and the process of decision making have been penetrated by the 'clans' – powerful and influential local elites that have developed to represent their clans at a national level. This process of state-elite relations is informal and invisible to the public, but it is known as a 'pact' meaning that resources are allocated, distributed within the negotiation pacts with those elites (Chapter 5). State *weakness* is that rather than directing those private interests in to public ends by collaborative relations, it has chosen regime's durability and stability by complying with them. As a result the non-clan portion of society either joins radical religious groups and associations or looking for possibility to build their own small clans within competitive clannish polity. *Lack* of commitment of the state is partially based on "fast and loose" international support for transformational reforms in Uzbekistan and lack of

expertise on possible mechanism of transformation.

**▪2. Civil society concept introduced to Uzbekistan is *impediment* for building state-society synergy;**

Since the research is constructed based on the theory of state-society synergy, it considers such interaction as a precondition to develop civil society. On the one hand, the introduced concept of civil society is incompatible with the socio-economic environment in Uzbekistan, such as lack of clear public-private distinction, and unequal size of occupied space and uneven number of actors in allocated spaces from both sides (narrow circle of state-elite combination occupies large part of the socio-economic and political space while large portion of society outside of state-elite channels have to remain in small part of the space). On the other hand, the introduction of neo-liberal concept of civil society was concentrated on liberalization and transformation of regime via articulation of bottom-up social demands and pressure upon the state. In order to achieve this, the space occupied by civil society has to be independent, autonomous from state intervention. The government of Uzbekistan has accepted such status for civil society by enacting Law on NGOs in 1999 which stipulated that neither state nor civil society organizations should intervene into each other's affairs. According to that law government can intervene for the sake of public order, to preserve social justice and protect public interest, but civil society has no justification to do so. Moreover, the space shared by both state and civil society is a public sphere; therefore it is not possible not to intervene.

But contemporary civil society definition and concept approved by Uzbek government is a good justification not to deal with social interests, not to assimilate alternative thinking or not to facilitate private interests of social forces in to civic ends. Government intervention in to the private sphere does not deal with those aspirations but only under the values of public order, social justice and public interest measured by the state. Therefore, the status of

‘non-intervention’ and ‘autonomy’ between state and civil society in fact isolates both public and private sphere from being potential synergies.

### **6.3 Research Implications**

Research analysis and the main findings of the research have raised interesting direction for the further studies of civil society development in Uzbekistan. One issue is that scholars, experts and developmental institutions who are working on expansion of civil society in this country did not find an interest to look deeper in to state-society relations. Another issue is that conceptual application of civil society in to transition country like Uzbekistan.

The exploration of those issues shows that there are two levels of state-society relations in Uzbekistan. In lower level state-society relations are based on top-down and zero-sum approach. In higher level there is long time existence of state-elite synergy under the ‘pacted stability’ (Luong Jones 2002, pp. 25-102). State-elite synergy exists in every level of political system, administration, decision making and implementation of developmental policies. Such an environment actually is the reason for the division of state-society relations in to low and high levels. As a result, “clans’ elites” became the mediator between public and private sphere through informal channels.

Westerns scholars and, developmental institutions did not consider such informal sphere of state-society relations in Uzbekistan; instead, they paid attention only to the formal side of political system. The main reason is that Western understanding of political system always insists on building formal institutions, transformation of primordial kinship, and patronage network relations into formal procedures, norms and institutions. It ignores and opposes modern institutions and procedures to such informal networks and associations. For instance, Edward condemns such Weberian understanding of informal institutions, because in reality, clans and resemble informal channels have been essential part of social and political structure

within the transition period of Central Asian countries (Collins 2004, pp.235-236; Edward 2005, p.233). It proves that clans and states can adapt to new environments, thus, "...if clans and the state begin in fundamental opposition, this opposition is not fate" (Edward 2005, pp.232-233). State-clan relations in Kazakhstan suggested the possibility of endogenous balancing of clans by government policies. Such policies in Kazakhstan have been successful in minimizing clan-based egoism. Therefore, he proposed mutual accommodation between the two which can soften antagonism (that exists only in Western theory) (Edward 2005, pp.231-254).

So the problem is how to bring in to the public sphere those clan elites and clan members, striving for their private interest through informal channels. Of course finding an answer to that question is beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, the research implies that scholars' attention must be paid not only to the formal institutions such as the state (as usually they do) or NGOs, but to the informal institutions like clans and clan elites. There are comprehensive works done by Collins on studying clans, characteristics of clans and socio-political behavior. Her approach is developed from case studies of Central Asian countries. She argued that clans are not constructed by or originated within the state, but socially generated groups (Collins 2004, p.230), which gives them great potential for building strong civil society if certain changes can be done.

For instance, when, the concept of civil society has been introduced to Uzbekistan, they have assumed that given freedom of associations, exchange of information and articulation of valid interests would frame a positive bottom-up demand for liberalization and for evenly distributed economical resources. This research suggests that, rather than applying this concept in to the country where informal clan politics dominates the formal polity, it must be applied to the liberalization of informal networks, meaning clans and clan elites are a part of society that have direct access to the decision making and policy articulation process in Uzbekistan. What kind of liberalization is possible within the clans?

Let's imagine that clans, patronage networks are public sphere, and which is in fact the situation in Uzbekistan<sup>120</sup>. This sphere is divided into a) clan elites, b) non-elite clan members and c) non-clan population who lives in the same region which particular clan was originated. According to Collins, clans are socially originated informally (meaning kinship, blood and same region based) bounded networks. Clan elites are supported by non-elite clan members submitting their loyalty and in exchange clan elites share certain benefit with them (2004, pp.224-261). In addition, non-clan population who inhabit the same region in which that particular clan originated and was rooted, also receives indirect benefit as a mechanism of 'trickle down'. Based on the three layers; clan elites, non-elite clan members and non-clan inhabitants in the 'holy' region for particular clan, we imply following stages:

1) Expanding access of non-clans to the clan membership based on regional affiliation so clan elites would feel stronger support from both non-elite clan members and non-clan society who shares the same region.

It resembles with the civil society concept which requires social pressure for the equal access to the public sphere based on the shared space, traditions, interests and needs. It also resembles the Western political system where particular party feels stronger when it gets more members and votes. Also, it resembles the political leader who stays longer in his position the more support he has. In brief, opening an access for the people based on regional affiliation (who lived there for many years, or those families in the same region whose generation knew that clan elites for long time) is likely to happen comparing to the totally stranger whose loyalty and extent of bond to the particular clan is not accurate. When such access is open, non-clan people becomes a part of the public sphere within the network. After that, next stage is essential to happen.

2) Gradually provoking bottom-up demands within particular clan boundaries

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<sup>120</sup> It is not important for one what s/he knows but it is important whom s/he knows.

(demands from non-elite clan members, and non-clan regionally affiliated society to clan leaders).

Actually, in theory let me say in the developed world, this bottom up demand (from society to state) is allowed and expressed freely. But in Uzbekistan, states already have various tools to avoid or cease it. Therefore, if such demand is articulated within the clans' boundaries e.g., for more equal distribution of resources (from clan elites and leaders to the bottom supporters, non-elite clans, non-clan regionally affiliated society), it cannot be persecuted by the formal government institutions. It would be shameful for the clan elites or a leader of the clan to ignore bottom-up demand within his leadership.

If it were the leader of the country or president, it would be easier to maneuver such social demand by refusing it and opening door to different patronage links and have loyalty from them for the exchange of access to the resources (presidents in Central Asia changes clan loyalties by replacing particular high rank public officer, or decreases increasing influence of certain clans). But in case of clan leaders and elites, there is no such option. If such bottom-up demand for more equal sharing of benefits and resources is facilitated, then clan elites must either refuse own affiliation to particular clan (which makes him vulnerable to the co-optation or subordination by the state = also good if that clan is diminished) or clan elites must initiate further economic liberalizations.

When we predict such opening access to the clans or generating bottom-up demand within clan boundaries, it must be applied to all major clans not only one. Bottom-up demand should not be directed toward the state or government but to the clan elites and clan leaders within those clan boundaries. In order to articulate such bottom-up demand and pressure within the clans 'communicative action' concept of Habermas can be quite useful. Such implication predicts that each clan leader should face the same difficulty to choose between refusing or meeting those demands from own clan networks. The first choice and the easy one would

abolish the leadership status of particular clan elite since there wouldn't be recognition from members or at least the support for that leader dramatically would be dramatically reduced. In both cases, the clan leader and elites become weak and vulnerable to losing their share in economic and political space. It can also lead to divisions within the same clans over the choice upon who should take a new leadership position. In any case, the refusal of clan elites and leaders to satisfy bottom-up demand would catastrophically impact the future of that clan. When such instability and bottom-up social demand is facilitated within all major clans, all of them will be under similar conditions therefore whoever decides to meet the demands and stabilize the situation within his clan will have better chance to survive and even get expanded. So naturally, every strong clan would try to deal with this problem within own clan members and elites, but the solution, meeting those demands is external factor – socio-economic and political resources, therefore, the final stage which we predict is:

3) Gathering and negotiation phase of clan elites and leaders from each major clans.

So, may be this is naïve thinking, but not all clan elites would openly initiate for liberalizations so they have to refuse being clan leader and loose his roots; meanwhile, clans without a leader would gradually sink into social strata and diminish or they diminish over the fight to choose a leader. Those elites who is actually able to initiate some reforms for public interest, must come to negotiation table with other clan leaders since he is also pressured by own members for better distribution of resources. But clan elites cannot just initiate and have those reforms done immediately, so, they must use existing synergistic ties with the state and that reciprocity would be defined as for public interest. Why? Because, even though, each clan leader would be thinking of his own clan's benefit, in order to meet bottom-up pressure coming from each clan equally there must be radical reformations in economic, social and political sphere. If this is possible then state – elite synergy becomes state-society synergy, which opens up an access for civil society intrinsic to the Uzbekistan but may not be NGOs.

The obvious question is why the same bottom-up social pressure and demand cannot be articulated within general society up on the state. It is not possible due to the following factors:

a) In Uzbekistan, primordial traditional clannish and kinship bonds are survived and remained strongly persistent to any external intervention. But it does not necessarily means that there is no civil society in the country. It means that clans and patronage networks do not go against each other because of the same religion, same culture and same values shared over centuries, unless there is no mutual agreement among elite leaders.<sup>121</sup>

b) Because of the long period existence of clans, Uzbekistan could not develop equal citizenship status. May be it could have developed citizenship if communism ideology had not let primordial social structure to flourish within the socialist institutions by gaining more power.

Therefore, neo-liberal concept of civil society concentrated on NGOs' development cannot have any positive future, and even may undermine the possible emergence of country specific civil society through emancipation of state-society synergy in Uzbekistan.

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<sup>121</sup> During the Russian Empire's modernization policy in the region, several intellectuals and elites have joined in order to fight against despotic monarchial system which did not support modern education, modern industrialization and reforms. The reason is that the political system was consisted of khanates, monarchies, but the government of Uzbekistan provided an access to all major clan elites in decision-making and resource mobilization within the country. Since, the authority is shared within the government, consisting clan elites within the same institution choose stability and equal share.

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