INFERENTIAL MARKS IN THE *VAIŚEṢIKASŪTRA*

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Key terms of the theory of inference in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (abbr. VS) are *dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgam* (abbr. *dl*), *adṛṣṭaliṅgam* (abbr. *adl*) and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam* (abbr. *sd*). The interpretation of these terms, especially that of *sd*, varies considerably among scholars.

Frauwallner left some brief comments on the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference,[1] which have introduced a little confusion into the understanding of the theory. Following his suggestion, Schuster published a paper,[2] where she took *dl* and *adl* as technical terms and translated *dl* as 'a perceived mark' and *adl* as 'an unperceived mark' with a note that it does not mean that the mark itself has not been perceived, but that its connection with its possesor has not been perceived (p.387). And she concluded that much of what VS discussed was borrowed directly from the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (p.352).

Matilal expressed disagreement with her conclusion in his compact survey of VS.[3] And Wezler critisized her interpretation at some length.[4] According to him *dl* means 'a mark that has been perceived' (p.45), and the existence of a technical term *adl* is extremely doubtful (p.45). The sūtras 2-1-15 ~ 17 in which *adl* is mentioned are of later origin (p.50), since Dignāga does not know of a distinction between *dl* and *adl* (p.49). The term *adl* in 2-1-10 is equivalent to '*adṛṣṭe* or *adṛṣṭasya liṅgaṃ yasya saḥ*' and should be taken as the subject word of the sūtra (p.53), so that the latter half of the sūtra 2-1-10 is interpreted as follows: 'that of which [this] conclusive mark (namely touch , or tangibility) [allows inference] is an [entity] not seen (i.e., perceived), [namely] wind' (p.52).

the theory of twofold division of inferential marks in VS

We have still an open question whether the theory of twofold division of inferential marks was held by the early Vaiśeṣikas. It appears difficult to solve as far as we try to gain some clue to it in Sanskrit materials. Research among Tibetan and Chinese materials will be indispensable.

In this case Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* gives a relevant answer to the question. When dealing with *svārthānumāna* of the Mīmāṃsakas, he mentions a Vṛttikāra's theory which divides inferential marks into two types, *dl* and *sd*, and describes it as nothing but theVaiśeṣikas'.[5]

This theory is traced back to VS: *dl* is explained in 2-1-8, which no one would deny, but it is controversial whether *adl* as the pair to *dl* is found in

VS. It depends on the reading of a phrase *adṛṣṭaliṅgo vāyuḥ* in 2-1-10. *Adṛṣṭaliṅgo* is a *bahuvrīhi* compound, which bears a character of an adjective. When used with a noun, it usually serves as a qualifier of the noun. In the present case a noun *vāyuḥ* stands at the end of the sūtra. We often find a subject comes last in Sanskrit. Therefore a natural translation of 2-1-10 would be like this:

'Since this touch does not belong to any perceptible [substances], Wind has this *adl.*'

Candrānanda's interpretation agrees to this reading,[6] in which what is explained in 2-1-9,10 is *adl* as the pair of *dl* in 2-1-8. And *adl* is identified with *sd* in 2-1-16.

Dignāga, in another place of the *svārthānumāna* chapter which will be given later in the present paper, also refers to these two types of inferential marks held by the Vaiśeṣikas. This argument is made along the structure of VS 2-1-8 ～ 10,15 ～ 19 and forms a complete criticism on *sd* of the Vaiśeṣikas. This seems to be the reason of his silence on these marks in his attack on the Vaiśeṣika theory of *svārthānumāna.*

As far as we follow Candrānanda's and Dignāga's interpretation of the sūtras 2-1-15～19, we have to see that *adl* is used as a technical term in VS.

dl and *adl*

If *dl* and *adl* are to be taken as technical terms, how should these terms are interpreted? Candrānanda makes a definite answer to this question. He explains *dl* in 2-1-15 as this:

'When a cow and the eyes are in conntact, together with the perception that this is a cow, horns etc. are observed belonging to it. These become an inferential mark sometime or other.' (p.13.11)

Here *dl*-s are used not in the sense of 'marks which themselves are seen', but in the sense of 'marks which are observed belonging to the object of inference' (*tadyogitayā dṛṣṭāni* p.13.11). As regards *adl,* we also find the similar expression: that is, 'Touch is not observed to be a quality belonging to the object of inference' (*na...tadguṇatayā sparśa upalabdho* p.13.12).

The difference between this interpretation and Śaṅkaramiśra's is remarkable. The latter explains *dl* as 'marks of which invariable relation [to the object of inference] has been perceived' (*liṅgāni grihītavyāptikāni*) and *adl* as 'marks of which invariable relation [to the object of inference] has not been perceived'.[7]

There appears, not to mention *vyāpti*, no specific notion of a relation of *liṅga* and *liṅgin* in Candrānanda's interpretation of *dl* and *adl.* Although we find several examples of this relation in VS such as those enumerated in 3-1-8 and 9-18, there is no trace of conceptualization of this relation by abstraction from these examples. Candrānanda's interpretation could be construed as

reflecting the original meaning of VS.

A preferable interpretation of *dl* would be 'a mark which is or has been observed belonging to the object of inference' and *adl* 'a mark which is not or has not been observed belonging to the object of inference'. It is obvious that the name of *adl* comes from the invisibility of its object.

sāmānyatodṛṣṭa

Candrānanda gives no definition of *sd*, he cites only an example of this type of inferential mark when introducing 2-1-16:

'Since this touch is different in its nature from that of Earth etc. and since no [quality] exists without its substratum, Wind is the substratum [of this touch].' (p.13.14)

Dignāga remarks on this inference as follows:

'This is not an inference of Wind etc. Because what is pointed out here is that touch etc. have the general property of belonging to a substratum for the reason that they are qualities.' (K 109b8-110a2) [8]

This remark reveals the origin of the name *sd*: that is, it comes from the fact of being based on a general property observed in the mark; in this case the general property of qualities, that is 'belonging to a substance' or 'having a substance as their substratum'.

Vātsyāyana explicitly expresses this characteristic in his second definition of *sd*:

'*sd* is a case where, when the relation of a mark with its bearer is not perceived, the imperceptible bearer is known from the general property of the mark with some other entity. For example, [the inference of] Self from desire etc.: that is, desire etc. are qualities, and qualities have a substance as their abode. Therefore that which is their abode is Self.' [9]

Here *sd* is defined as not a type of inferential mark but a type of inference, and besides there appears the relation of *liṅga* and *liṅgin* which is not consciously used in VS. Taking these differences into account, we could get the original meaning of *sd* in VS: that is, *sd* is a mark which is not observed belonging to the object of inference, and from the general property of which the object is known.

This type of inference of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is recorded by Vasu who flourished somewhere during A.D.150-300. [10] He quotes the same example as Vātsyāyana's and calls it sd (共見) [11] in his commentary on Āryadeva's *Śataśāstra*. Moreover, he cites examples of the inference of Time by the name of *sd*, of which last part almost corresponds to VS 2-2-6: *aparasmin param yugapad ayugapac ciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni*.

'Some entities exist, although they are imperceptible. They are thought to be existent by means of *sd* inference; for example, Time. Although it is subtle and invisible, we can know that Time exists through the seasons, flowers, and

fruits. This is [a case of an inference where] we know a cause through seeing an effect. And again through these marks such as 'the same moment (一時 yugapad)', 'not the same moment (不一時 ayugapad)', 'farness (久 param)', 'nearness (近 aparam)' and so on, we can know that Time exists.'[12]

Another similar example of the inference of Time is found in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* ascribed to Nāgārjuna by tradition.

'Although Time is imperceptible, we can know that Time exists (雖不可見 時可知有時). Why do we know that an effect exists (何以知果有)? Because there is a cause (因有故). This is why [we know] that Time exists (以是故有 時法).'[13]

Here is also used a general property of effects, that is, 'having a cause'. Although the name *sd* is not mentioned, we could take this as an example of *sd*.

These materials show that *sd* of the Vaiśeṣikas were well-known to the Mādhyamikas from considerably early times. Vasu refers to not only *sd* inference of Self but also that of Time. It would be very difficult to regard *sd* of the Vaiśeṣikas as a borrowing from Vṛṣagaṇa who is dated at around A.D.300 by Frauwallner.[14]

Two traditions of the interpretaion of *sd*

The above mentioned Dignāga's reference to the twofold division of inference held by both a Mīmāṃsā Vṛttikāra and the Vaiśeṣikas occurs just after his criticism on a Sāṃkhya theory which divides inference into *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* and *sd*. This context would show that he was well aware of the difference between the Vaiśeṣikas' theory and the Sāṃkhya's, although they assume superficially very similar appearance of the twofold division.

This difference is made much clearer by Kumārila who criticizes Vṛttikāra's division of inference into two types, *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa* and *sd*, and then mentions, instead of it, *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* and *sd* as a proper division of inference on the authority of a Sāṃkhya author Vindhyavāsin.[15]

The *sd* in a line of VS is quite different in its denotation from Vṛṣagaṇa's which includes *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* as its subdivisions and has much more broader sense than that of VS. The former is paired with *dl* or *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa*, while the latter is paired with *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*, an inference of a very particular object, of which equivalent is not found in VS.[16] There seems to have been at least two different traditions of the interpretation of *sd*, that is the Vaiśeṣikas' and Vṛṣagaṇa's or Vindhyavāsin's.

Candrānanda's interpretation of 2-1-15〜19

Candrānanda reads the paragraph 2-1-15〜19 as dealing with the problem

whether or not the existence of Wind is established by *sd*.

The Vaiśeṣikas prove the existence of Wind by *sd*, which needs a help of elimination (*pariśeṣa*) to discriminate an intended object from the others and again elimination presupposes verbal testimony (*āgama*) for limiting the number of items to be examined. An opponent, saying that *āgama* is nothing but a hearsay (*pravāda*), tries to deny the authority of verbal testimony. His final intention lies in proving inefficiency of *sd* by destruction of the authority of verbal testimony which is the necessary premise of *sd*. This opponent must be some non-brahmanical thinker, probably a Buddhist. Answering the objection, the Vaiśeṣika justifies elimination by establishing the authority of verbal testimony and proves the existence of *īśvara* as the author of sacred texts.

This interpretation is very peculiar to Candrānanda. The pecuriality is especially distinct in taking *āgama* as *pravāda*. And again reading here the proof of *īśvara* also appears a forced interpretation.[17] Therefore the authenticity of this interpretation is rather doubtful. It would not reflect the original intention of the sūtras.

Dignāga's interpretation of 2-1-15～19

Dignāga criticizes the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference in the first part of the second chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, the chapter on inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*). There appears an argument whether the inference of Wind from touch is possible or not, which is obviously based on VS 2-1. It becomes valuable materials for the theory of inference in VS, from which we are informed of a very clear logical structure underlying the sūtras 2-1-15～19.

The Vaiśeṣikas make proof of the existence of Wind by *adl* in the sūtras 2-1-8 ～ 10. An opponent, who insists that Wind should be known only from verbal testimony (*āgama*), first points out in the sūtra 15 that there is no *dl* type of inferential mark of Wind, and then in the sūtra 16 contends that *sd* cannot discriminate the object. The Vaiśeṣikas remove this difficulty by the aid of elimination (*pariśeṣa*). But elimination presupposes a limitation of the number of objects put to the test. When they mention verbal testimony as the basis for elimination, the opponent asserts in the sūtra 17 that then it follows that the knowledge of the existence of Wind depends on nothing but verbal testimony. Answering this, the Vaiśeṣikas say in the sūtras 18,19 that verbal testimony is not different from inference and its authenticity is based on perception as in the case of inference. And thus showing that it is possible to prove the existence of substances by a type of inference called *sd*, and at the same time taking words as conventions based on perception, they express the view of the origin of words, which has a tendency to conventionalism.

This opponent may be a Mīmāṃsaka.[18] It is also to be noted that here it

is pointed out by Dignāga that this *sd* applies not only to Wind but also to any other substances. The main theme of the second and third chapters of VS is the proof of existence of substances. Their interest lies mainly in the proof of invisible substances, among which Wind is the first in their order of nine substances. The argument of Wind is a typical case which holds good to other substances as well. Therefore it is not accidental that a similar argument appears again in the section of Self (*ātman*) in VS 3-2.

sd in 3-2-6~14

The sūtras 3-2-6~8 give virtually the same contention as that of 2-1-15~17. This repetition seems to show the importance of *sd* for the Vaiśeṣikas.

Usually the paragraph 3-2-9~14 is interpreted as an independent proof of Self.[19] But as far as we follow Candrānanda's commentary, it is not the case. Just as 2-1-15~19 form a section to prove the efficiency of *sd* as a means of inference, 3-2-9~14 is the answering part to the criticism of *sd* expressed in 3-2-6~8, so that these sūtras 3-2-8~14 should be taken as forming one section as a whole.

In this place the Vaiśeṣikas attempt to ward off the attack in a different way from that of 2-1-15~19, in which verbal testimony is presupposed for *sd*, while here they prove the efficiency of *sd* in a more direct way without using such premise.

The point at issue is whether the word 'I' (*aham*) denotes Self or a body. The Vaiśeṣikas' reasoning is this: breath (*prāṇa*) etc. cannot be without any cause, so that there must be some substance as their cause, therefore Self exists as the cause. Against this *sd* inference an opponent contends that when imperceptible substances such as Ether etc. are not excluded, the argument is not determinable, since these also have the possibility of being the cause of 'breath' etc. The Vaiśeṣikas answer that breath etc. are used as belonging to the same substratum as the word 'I' in a sentence, and the word 'I' denotes Self, which excludes the other substances, therefore Self is inferred from breath etc. The opponent again contends that the word 'I' does not mean Self, but a body, and that therefore it is impossible to infer Self from breath etc. The Vaiśeṣikas answer that the word 'I' is used for an individual and not for the other (i.e. a body), accordingly it directly denotes Self.

This argument has a merit of not being based on verbal testimony; nevertheless, it applies only to the inference of Self, while the theory in 2-1 applies to all the nine substances. This seems to be the reason of the repetition of a similar argument.

Conclusion

The Vaiśeṣikas shared a physicalistic view with the Sāṃkhyas and assumed imperceptible entities behind the phenomena.[20] They proved those entities in

a rational way. It could readily be imagined that they were severely attacked by traditionalistic thinkers such as the Mīmāṃsakas or those with a phenomenalistic mind such as Buddhists. They had to develop the theory of inference to withstand the attack and to maintain their basic tenets of categories (*padārtha*) and atoms (*paramāṇu*). It is natural that the theory of inference, especially that of *sd* as a means of proving invisible substances, should play an important role in VS, although it was not systematically explained, since their main interest lay not in establishing epistemology but in accomplishing a system of categories. Therefore it would not be appropriate to see the necessity of developing the theory of inference only in the Sāṃkhyas and not in the Vaiśeṣikas.

A sūtra text might be compared to an iceberg. It shows only part of arguments with ample content behind it. Commentaries will help us to realize a whole context. But often their interpretations are under the influence of thoughts of later times. We have to confirm the reliability of their reading by comparison with other materials dated at earlier times. As regards the explanation of *dl*, *adl* and *sd* by Candrānanda, we have traced it back to the days of Dignāga and the early Mādhyamikas. According to this interpretation, the theory of *dl* and *adl*, especially that of the latter, forms the logical basis for the proof of substances in the second and third chapters of VS. The circumstances would suggest the possibility that the theory of these two inferential marks was included as an essential part in VS from its early stage.

Translation—Candrānanda's commentary on VS 2-1-15~19

Before showing Dignāga's argument, Candrānanda's interpretation of this section is given here. The comparison between his commentary and the following Dignāga's will reveal how much Dignāga's argument is in accordance with this part of VS.

(Obj) 《15. When [the skin and Wind are] in contact, there is no perception [of touch as its quality together with the cognition] that [this is] Wind, so that there is no observed mark [of Wind].》
When a cow and the eyes are in contact, together with the perception that this is a cow, horns etc. are observed belonging to it. These become an inferential mark sometime or other. Unlike this, when the skin and Wind are in contact, together with the perception that this is Wind, there is no perception of touch as its quality. How could imperceptible Wind be inferred from such a mark ?
(Ans) This touch is different from those of Earth etc. and cannot be without any substratum. Therefore Wind is the substratum. [Thus the existence of Wind is established.]

(Obj) 《16. The discrimination [of Wind] is not [known] from a generally observed mark.》

Ether etc. are also imperceptible. Without excluding them, the discrimination that this touch belongs only to Wind is not understood by the generally observed mark.

(Ans) It is denied that omnipresent substances [such as Ether etc.] have touch.

(Obj) How, then, is it known that this touch belongs only to the well-known substance Wind and not to the tenth substance ?

《17. Therefore [the knowledge of Wind] is based on a tradition.》

Therefore the word that Wind exists is nothing but a tradition, that is a hearsay.

(Ans) It is not so.

《18. The name-giving of those who are superior to us is the mark [of the existence of nine substances].》

The name-giving of *Maheśvara* who is superior to us as regards wisdom etc. is the mark for the inference that substances are only nine in number. The name of the tenth substance is not known. Accordingly, substances are nine only. Therefore it (i.e. the touch in question) is indeed the touch of Wind.

The plural form of 'those who are superior to us' is the plural of respect.

Someone asks how he (*īśvara*) is known ? The author of the sūtra answers.

《19. Name-giving is based upon the perception [of *īśvara*, therefore *īśvara* exists].》

Names are given by those who see things by perception. It is experienced when giving a name to a child. These are all given names. Therefore we guess that there is some divine being superior to us who perceives those things imperceptible for us. And he gave these names.

Skeleton of Dignāga's argument against *sd*

This is an outline of the first part of the *svārthānumāna* chapter in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. Two modern translations of this part have been so far published. The one is Kitagawa's Japanese translation,[21] and the other is Hayes' English translation.[22] Both of them are excellent pieces of work, but the text is very difficult and sometimes their interpretations are different from each other, and sometimes I cannot agree with either of them.

Here **Dig** stands for Dignāga, **Vai** for a Vaiśeṣika, K for Kanakavarman's translation, and V for Vasudhararakṣita's. Folio numbers are those of Peking edition. Kitagawa's critical edition of K (Kitagawa pp.450-455.) has been used for the basic text.

Dig holds the view that perception has the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as its

object, while inference has the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). **Vai** proves the existence of substances, i.e. particular entities, by inference. And so they deny that all inference has the universal as its object. Referring to VS 2-1-10,[23] they insist that although Wind is not the universal in its nature, it should be inferred from touch. (K 109b6-8, V 28b3-4)

Dig refutes the inference of Wind from touch. Since it is not the particular, Wind etc, but the general property of not being without any substratum, i.e. a general property of qualities, that is pointed out in this inference. (K 109b8-110a2, V 28b4-6)

Vai answers that Wind is proved by elimination (*pariśeṣa*), since [it is said in our sūtra:] 'This touch does not belong to perceptible substances' (2-1-10). (K 110a2-3, V 28b6-7)

Dig criticizes that elimination presupposes the existence of Wind but Wind has not been proved to exist, and that a particular touch must eliminate the other substances as well as Wind itself which is not the substratum of this particular touch. (K 110a3, V 28b7)

Vai says that the existence of Wind cannot be denied, and that a particular substance can be inferred from a particular quality by removing general qualities on the basis of the relation with the particular quality. (K 110a3-4, V 28b8)

Dig points out the difficulty of elimination. If the existence of touch in Wind is not established, it is denied in Wind in the same way as it is denied in the other substances such as Earth etc. It cannot be said to be a specific quality. It is not right that [the other] imperceptible substances [than Wind] is eliminated on the mere basis of invisibility. Incorporeal substances are not eliminated, so that there remains the possibility of the touch belonging to Mind (*manas*). Touch is experienced in perceptible substances as well, and so it might belong to percepible substances. Thus there are too many possibilities, therefore doubt arises as to which substance this touch belongs to. It is impossible to infer Wind from denying the existence of this touch in all other substances than Wind. (K 110a4-7, V 28b8-29a3)

Vai answers that the number of substances is determined by verbal testimony (*āgama*), and so Wind will be established in this way that one first infers substances in general and then eliminates the other substances [on the ground that touch, being a quality, must inhere in one of the nine substances], and that the same argument applies to other substances as well. (K 110b1, V 29a4-5)

Dig says that therefore it is on the basis of verbal testimony that Wind is established. (K 110b1, V 29a5)

Vai asserts that since there is no difference between verbal testimony and inference, it is ascertained that inference has the particular as its object. (K 110b1-2, V 29a5)

Here are introduced various theories on which verbal testimony is construed as different from inference. (K 110b2-111a1, V29a6-29b4)

Dig expresses his own view that verbal testimony is not different from inference. But his standpoint is not the same as that of **Vai.** He says that since verbal testimony does not apply to the particular, it is classified as inference. As inference is of two types according as its object is visible or invisible, it is also the case with verbal testimony. In the case of a visible object, when a name is taught with pointing out the object, knowledge of the particular arises, which is, however, not from verbal testimony but from perception. In the case of an invisible object, there is only concept, i.e, the universal, as its object, and there is no cognition of the particular. (K 111a1-3, V 29b5-6)

Vai refutes this. If it were not for any object denoted by a word 'heaven' etc, how could verbal testimony be a type of inference giving rise to a correct cognition ? (K 111a3, V 29b6)

Dig answers that verbal testimony is a type of inference insofar as they have common characteristic of not being false. (K 111a3, V 29b7)

Vai, referring VS 2-1-19, says that verbal testimony is to be classified as inference, 'because the name-giving [of credible persons] is based upon perception' (VS 2-1-19).[24] (K 111a4-5, V 29b7-8)

Dig rejects the view, saying that this view denies the possibility of inference of imperceptible substances such as Direction (*diś*) and Self (*ātman*). And he concludes the argument with a remark that therefore inference does not have the particular as its object. (K 111a5, V 29b8)

Translation—Candrānanda's commentary on VS 3-2-6~14

Key terms of this paragraph are *pratyakṣaḥ* and *upacāraḥ*, which are generally interpreted as 'perception' and 'a figurative meaning'. But Candrānanda reads *pratyakṣa* as *vācaka* and *upacāra* as *prayoga*.[25]

(Obj) 《6. When [the eyes and an object are] in contact, there is no perception [of breath etc. connected to Self together with the cognition] that [this is] Yajñadatta, so that there is no observed mark [of Self].》

When the eyes and an object are in contact, there is a perception that this is Yajñadatta. Unlike this there arises no knowledge that this one connected to breath, pleasure and so on is Self. Then how could breath etc. which are not observed to be connected to [Self] be the mark of Self?

(Ans) And so it is said that breath etc. are not an observed mark.

(Obj) 《7. The discrimination [of Self] is not [known] from a generally observed mark.》

Even if you say that breath etc. cannot be without any cause and pleasure etc. cannot be without any substratum, and that therefore a certain cause or substratum of these [qualities] must exist, Ether etc. are not excluded by

means of this generally observed mark, so that the discrimination [of Self] is not known, since there remains the possibility of these also being the cause.

《8. Therefore [the knowledge of Self] is based on a tradition.》

It means [the word] that Self exists is nothing but a hearsay.

(Ans) It is not so.

《9. Since [the other substances are] excluded by the word 'I', it is not based on a tradition.》

In the sentences 'I have breath' or 'I have pleasure', [breath etc. are used] as belonging to the same substratum as the word 'I', which denotes Self, namely the substance discriminated from Earth etc. Therefore [the knowledge of Self] is not based on a tradition, since breath etc, are the inferential mark of it.

(Obj) 《10. If [the words] 'I am Devadatta' and 'I am Yajñadatta', which directly denote perceptible things, [would be concerned with Self, then the word 'I' could denote Self].》

If [the words] 'I am Devadatta' and 'I am Yajñadatta', which directly denote perceptible things, would be concerned with Self, then the word 'I' could denote Self. As far as the word 'I' is used as having the same substratum as the word Devadatta which signifies a body, it also denotes a body. Therefore breath and pleasure etc. are not the determinable reason of Self.

Why the word Devadatta signifies a body?

(Obj) 《11. Since there are usages that Devadatta goes and that Viṣṇumitra goes, [it] directly denotes a body.》

Since the word Devadatta is used with the word 'go' signifying action, it is ascertained to mean a body. Because action cannot take place in Self. Therefore the word 'I' also denotes nothing but a body, since it is observed [to be used] with the word Devadatta.

(Ans) It is not so.

《12. The usage is doubtful.》

The usage of the word 'I' [which is regarded as] signifying a body because of having the same substratum as the word Devadatta is doubtful. [It remains questionable] whether the word 'I', of which original meaning is Self, is figuratively used in the sense of a body because a body is in the service of Self, or it denotes a body in the primary sense. Therefore it is not determined which is the primary meaning of the word 'I', a body or Self.

The conclusion of our own is expressed.

《13. The word 'I' is used for an individual and not for the other, and so it directly denotes something else.》

An individual means Self. The other means a body. If the word 'I' would denote a body, then every one would use it to indicate that man just as the word Devadatta. But such is not the case. Therefore the word 'I' directly denotes something else, namely Self.

(Obj) It would not be so, since it is not used for a body nor for Self by the

others.

(Ans) 《14. But because of the difference of bodies of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra their specific knowledge [of self consciousness] does not arise [to the others].》

Since different bodies are connected to Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra, the knowledge of their pleasure etc. will not arise to us from what is seen. Just like that their self consciousness based on which the word 'I' is used is not understood by us. But if [the word 'I' would] denote a body, it could be used just like the word 'Devadatta' which we, after seeing a body, use for it. It is, however, not the case. Therefore it does not mean a body. Since it denotes Self, it is not used by the others. Thus because of belonging to the same substratum as the word 'I' [in a sentence 'I have pleasure' etc.] pleasure etc. are related to Self and breath etc. have Self as their cause.

NOTES

1) Frauwallner, 'Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram', *Studia Indologica*, 1955, p.79,n.30, 'Die Erkenntnislehre des Klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems' *WZKS* 2, 1958 p.134.

2) Schuster, 'Inference in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras', *JIPh* 1, 1970-72, pp.341-395.

3) B.K. Matilal, *A History of Indian Literature, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, Wiesbaden 1977, p.55.

4) Wezler, 'A Note on Concept adṛṣṭa as Used in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra', *ARUṆA-BHĀRATĪ*, Baroda 1983, pp.35-58.

5) *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Peking ed.) K123b3-4: Vṛttikāra divides inference with the division of *sd* etc. just like the Vaiśeṣika's. *ḥgrel pa byed pas ni spyi las mthoṅ ba la sogs paḥi khyad par gyis phal cher bye brag paḥi rjes su dpag pa ñid rnam par phye ba yin no.*

Jinendrabuddhi coments on this passage as this: It is said that because of dividing *dṛṣṭam* (*mthoṅ ba*) and *sd* (*spyi las mthoṅ ba*) etc. *Dṛṣṭam* is the case where the relation of a mark with its bearer is perceived. *Sd* is the case where, after the relation has been perceived in a certain thing, an imperceptible object is understood through the generality with it. (148a4-5)

Vasudhararakṣita gives another translation. 'Since *dṛṣṭa-sāmānyam* (*mthoṅ baḥi spyi*) and *adṛṣṭam* (*ma mthoṅ ba*) etc. are divided.' (V42a1) This division appears very similar to Candramati's, but we don't find any such division of inference in Mīmāṃsā literatures; while *dṛṣṭam* and *sd* corresponds to *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭam* and *sd* of the Vṛttikāra's theory in the *Śābarabhāṣya* (ASS p.36,37), so that K's reading is preferable to V's. Frauwallner, *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā*, Wien 1968, pp.86,87.

6) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, Baroda 1961, p.12.17.

7) *Upaskāra* on 2-1-10 (KSS 1969) p.131.

8) V gives a slightly different translation: [This is not a proof of the particular], since this is not an inference of [a particular substance] Wind etc. Because it is pointed out that [Wind exists] for the reason that touch etc. have a substratum since they are qualities. (V28b4-6)

9) *NBh* (CalSS 1936) p.156: *sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ nāma—yatrāpratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhe kenacid arthena liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate. yathecchādibhir ātmā. icchādayo guṇāḥ, guṇāś ca dravyasaṃsthānāḥ, tad yad eṣāṃ sthānaṃ ātmeti.*

10) Ui, *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, London 1917, rpt. Varanasi 1962, p.46.

11) T 1569, 大正 30, p.172a11, 25: 有法雖不可現見。以共相比知故信有。如是時。 雖微細不可見。以節気花果等故知有時。此則見果知因。復次以一時不一時久 近等相故。可知有時。Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Source*, GOS 49 1929, rpt. Madras 1981, *Śataśāstra*, pp.28,29.

12) T 1569, 大正 30, p.179c29-180a4. Tucci, p.76.

It is interesting to note that here the inference of Time is described as *sd* and an inference of a cause from an effect as well. This shows that they were not aware of the problem of cross definition of *sd* and *pūrvavat* etc., which is found in the *Yukitidīpikā* (Delhi 1967 pp. 38,39). And again this will give some hint to understand the relation of *sd* to the examples of *liṅga* enumerated in 3-1-8 and 9-18. Just like Praśastapāda who, after showing twofold division of inference, mentions some examples of *liṅga* without making clear to which type of inference these examples belong (VizSS p.205.14), there seems to have been no definite notion of the relation between two inferential marks and the examples of *liṅga* in 3-1-18 and 9-18 at that time. Candramati treats this problem in a different way. See Ui, p.97.

13) T 1509, 大正 25, p.65b19-21, Ui, p.46.

14) Frauwallner 1958, p.270. Vasu's commentary on the *Śataśāstra* and Nāgārjuna's *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* were translated by Kumārajīva in A.D.404 and 409, who is said to have learned these texts in A.D.353. Ui, p.45.

15) *Ślokavārttika*, anumāna kk.138-145. Bhatt, *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, Varanasi 1962, pp.256f.

16) As to the definition of *viśeṣatodṛṣṭam*, see Frauwallner 1958, p.128. This type of inference is

found in some works such as Yāmuna's *Siddhitraya*, Vedāntadeśika's *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, Umāpati's commentary on *Pauṣkarasaṃhitā*, and Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, but none in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literatures. Narasimhachary, 'Viśeṣatodṛṣṭa—A Type of Anumāna Referred to by Yāmunācārya', *AOR Silver Jubilee Volume* 1975, pp.536-540.

17) Chemparathy, 'Theism and Early Vaiśeṣika System', *Kaviraj Abhinandana Grantha*, Lucknow 1967.

18) Kawasaki, 'Quotations in the Mīmāṃsā Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā', *JIBSt* 22-2, 1974, p.1126.

19) The proof of Self directly through *ahaṃśabda* or *ahaṃkāra* is found in the *Śābarabhāṣya* (ASS pp.66,67), and among later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literatures such as the *Nyāyakandalī* (VizSS p.85.20). But it cannot be traced back to VS. As to Praśastapāda's argument on *ahaṃkāra*, see Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika System*, Amsterdam 1918, p.258.

20) VS 4-1-1～5, *Sāṃkhyakārikā* k.6. The theory of conditions of perception in 4-1-6f. is introduced so as to justify the perception of inferential marks. Attacks on VS 4-1-1～5 are found in the *Śataśāstra* 大正 30, 180b14f, (Tucci, p.79.) and the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on BS 2-2-15.

21) Kitagawa, *Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyu*, Tokyo 1965, p.79f.

22) Hayes, 'Dignāga's views on Reasoning', *JIPh* 8, 1980, pp.219-277.

23) K 109b7: *ji skad du 'reg bya yaṅ mthon ba rnams kyi reg bya ma yin no'* (2-1-10) *shes bya ba la sogs pa bśad pa lta buho.*

24) K 111a4-5: *de ltar yaṅ 'miṅ gi las ni mṅon sum snon du ḥgro ba can'* (2-1-19) *shes bya ba yin no.* This quotation has not been identified in either of the two modern translations.

25) For the word *śarīra-pratyakṣaḥ* in 3-2-11 Candrānanda gives other expressions of *śarīra-vacanaḥ* (p.30.9,20), *śarīra-abhidhāyakaḥ* (p.30. 4) and *śarīra-vācakaḥ* (p.30.5, 31.3). And for the word *arthāntara- pratyakṣaḥ* (=*ātma-pratyakṣaḥ*) in 3-2-13 we find those corresponding words, *ātma-vācakaḥ* (p.30. 4), *ātma-abhidhāyakaḥ* (p.30.15), and *ātma- vṛttiḥ* (p.31.4). These synonymous words *-vacana, -vācaka, -abhidhāyaka, -vṛtti* are all here used as the other expression of *-pratyakṣa*. And so this *pratykṣa* with a masculine nominative case ending is not taken in the sense of 'perception' or 'perceptible' but of 'direct' or 'directly denoting or meaning'. Another key word *upacāra* is used in two different meanings in NS: i.e., in the sense of *bhākta* (NS 1-2-11,14) and of *prayoga* (NS 2-2-59,60 CalSS=61,62 ChSS). Candrānanda chooses the latter meaning to interpret 3-2-11,12. He gives the word *prayogād* for *upacārāt* in 3-2-11 (p.30.9).

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