

ŚABDAKHAṆḌA OF THE NYĀYASIDDHĀNTAMUKTĀVALĪ

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1. *pramāṇa*

The Naiyāyikas conceive four kinds of *pramā*, true cognition: perceptual (*pratyakṣa*), inferential (*anumiti*), analogical (*upamiti*), and verbal (*śabda*). Each cognition is differentiated from the other by its own cause, i.e., *karāṇa*, an instrument. When one sees a pot on the ground, he obtains the perceptual cognition that there is a pot on the ground. Here, the eyes of the perceiver are the instruments of getting the cognition through the contact between the eyes and the pot.

What is the definition of *karāṇa*, then? *Vyāpāravat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karāṇam*. An instrument is a particular cause which has *vyāpara*, intermediate function. What is *vyāpara*? *Tajjanyatve sati tajjanyaajanako vyāparaḥ*. Intermediate function is that which is produced by *x* (cause) and which produces *y* (effect) produced by *x*. The intermediate function of getting the perceptual cognition of the pot on the ground is the connection of the eyes with the pot, *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*. This connection is produced by the pot, i.e., the object (cause), and it produces the perceptual cognition (effect).

What is *kāraṇa* in the definition of *karāṇa*? *Kāryaniyatapūrvavṛtti kāraṇam*. A *kāraṇa* is that which invariably precedes *kārya*, effect. When one perceives a pot on the ground with his eyes, his perceptual cognition that there is the pot on the ground is the *kārya*. The things prior to the existence of this *kārya*, e.g., the pot, the perceiver's eyes, his soul and so on, are *kāraṇas*.

2. *śābdabodha*

Among the four types of true cognition, *śābdabodha* or *śābdajñāna*, verbal knowledge, is caused by a sentence of an authoritative person, *āpta-vākya*. *Śābdabodha* is the understanding of the meaning of a *vākya*, a sentence. *Śābdajñānam śābdajñānam*. A *vākya* is *ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhi-mat-padasamūha*, a collection of *padas*, possessing expectancy, compatibility and proximity. *Śaktaṃ padaṃ*. A *pada* is *śakta*, and *śakta* is paraphrased as *śaktiviśiṣṭa*, which means 'possessed of *śakti*'. *Śakti* in Nyāya is the relation of an expressive unit or a word with its meaning. Thus, a *pada* is one that is possessed of the relation with its meaning, and it is a minimum meaningful unit. It corresponds to the concept of morpheme in modern linguistics. For

example, the word 'ghaṭam' consists of two parts: 'ghaṭa' (stem) and 'am' (the accusative case-ending). According to the grammarians, this word is one *pada*, because Pāṇini's definition of *pada* is 'suptiñantam padam'. A *pada* is that which terminates in either a case-ending or a verbal suffix. According to the Naiyāyikas, however, that word consists of two *padas*, because a *pada* is a minimum meaningful unit. Consequently, the word, 'ghaṭam' is called a *vākya* or a collection of *padas* and not a *pada*. But it is a *khaṇḍavākya* (phrase or clause) and not a *mahāvākya* (a sentence in a normal sense).

Śābdabodha is the understanding of *vākyaṛtha*, the meaning of a *vākya*. A *vākya* is a collection of *padas*, as explained above. The meaning of the *padas* consisting a *vākya* can be obtained through the remembrance of those meanings, *padārthasmarana*. What is new in a *śābdabodha* or *vākyaṛthajñāna*? The relation, *saṃsarga*, *sambandha*, or *anvaya* among those meanings is not understood when they are individually remembered. Hence, the understanding of this relation is a new product when the *vākya* is understood, and so *śābdabodha* means the understanding of the relation, the relation among the meanings of the *padas*.

3. The process of getting *śābdabodha*

Padajñānam tu karaṇam dvāraṃ tatra padārthadhīḥ/ śābdabodhaḥ phalam tatra śaktidhīḥ sahakāriṇī// Padajñānam tu karaṇam. The knowledge of a word is a *karaṇa* or instrument. *Padārthadhī*, the remembrance of the meaning of a word is a *dvāra*, function (*vyāpāra*) or intermediate cause. Function or *vyāpāra*, as we have already seen, is *tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakaḥ*. *Padajñāna*, the knowledge of a *pada*, will produce *padārthadhī*, the remembrance of the meaning of the *pada*, and *padārthadhī* will produce *śābdabodha*. Therefore, *padārthadhī* is the *vyāpāra*, the intermediate cause or *dvāra*. *Śābdabodhaḥ phalam*. The result is the verbal understanding, which is the knowledge of the relations between meanings. That is why *śābdabodha* is called *saṃsargabodha*, *padārthasaṃsargabodha*, *anvayabodha*, *padārthānvayabodha*, *sambandhabodha*, or *padārthasambandhabodha*. *Śaktidhīḥ sahakāriṇī*. An auxiliary cause is the knowledge of the relation between a word and its meaning. *Śakti* stands for the relation between a word and its meaning, i.e., the primary relation.

Śābdabodhaprakāram darśayati, padajñānam tv iti. The author demonstrates the process of getting verbal understanding, starting with 'padajñānam tu'. *Na tu jñāyamānam padam karaṇam, padābhāve 'pi mauniślokātau śābdabodhāt*. The earlier writers had a different kind of notion of the *karaṇa* of *śābdabodha*. That is being refuted here. The view is that a word which is being known at present (*jñāyamāna*) is the *karaṇa*. *Jñāyamāna* means *śrūyamāna* or *paṭhyamāna*. The author does not accept this view and gives the

reason: *padābhāve 'pi mauniślokādaḥ śābdabodhāt*. Suppose a man has taken a vow not to speak. He writes on paper and gives it to you. Even then understanding takes place. Even after reading a *śloka*, i.e., even if a *pada* is not uttered, the understanding of the *śloka* occurs. Hence, a *pada* which is being known or heard at present is not the *karaṇa* of producing verbal understanding, but simply a *pada* is the *karaṇa*.

Mauniślokādaḥ means *maunikṛtaslokādaḥ*. *Ādi* may include gesture or writing.

Padārthadhīr iti. It is an intermediate function, *vyāpāra*, and it is *padārthasmarāṇa*. But it should specially be understood that *padārthasmarāṇa* means *padajanyapadārthasmarāṇa*. Why is this explanation given? *Anyathā padajñānavataḥ pratyakṣādīnā padārthopasthitāv api śābdabodhāpatteḥ*. Suppose someone has the knowledge of the word 'ghaṭa' (*ghaṭajñānavataḥ*), and that he is looking at a pot, *pratyakṣādīnā padārthopasthitau*. The object of the word 'ghaṭa' enters the content of the knowledge of the *ghaṭa* by perception, i.e., the connection between his eyes and the pot, *indriyārthasannikarṣa*. If '*padārthadhīr vyāpārah*' is not stated, such knowledge of the pot will be verbal understanding. To exclude this knowledge from being verbal understanding, it is mentioned that *vyāpāra* is *padajanyapadārthasmarāṇa*. Since the knowledge of the pot in the above case is not caused by the word 'ghaṭa' but by *pratyakṣa*, perception, it is not verbal understanding.

Tatra api vṛtīyā padajanyatvaṃ bodhyam. *Padārthadhī* is a product, *kārya*, which is produced by *padajñāna*. But the relation between a *pada* and its *padārtha* is not specified. Contingency will then occur. To remove the contingency, the relation must be *vṛtī*. In other words, the remembrance of the meaning of a word should be produced by *vṛtī*, which is the relation between a word and its meaning, *padapadārthasambandha*. If that relation by which word-meaning is remembered is not determined, *ghaṭādīpadāt samavāyasambandhena ākāśasmarāṇe jate ākāśasya api śābdabodhāpatteḥ*. Suppose, you heard the word 'ghaṭa', and you know that the word is a *śabda*, a *guṇa* of *ākāśa*. *Śabdaḥ kutra tiṣṭhati? Ākāśe tiṣṭhati*. So *ghaṭapada* and *ākāśa* have the relation, the relation between a *guṇa* and a *guṇin*. Such relation is *samavāya* in Nyāya. If I do not specify the relation between a *pada* and its *padārtha*, then I may immediately remember *ākāśa* after hearing the word 'ghaṭa' on the basis of *samavāya*. But this remembrance of *ākāśa* caused by the word 'ghaṭa' is not the word-meaning of the word *ghaṭa*. Therefore, the remembrance of a *padārtha* by any relation will not do.

What is *vṛtī* then? *Vṛtīś ca śaktīlakṣaṇānyatarāḥ sambandhaḥ*. *Vṛtī* is the relation between a *pada* and its meaning, and it is in the form of either *śakti* or *lakṣaṇā*. If the meaning of a *pada* is presented through *śakti* or *lakṣaṇā*, it is alone the content of verbal understanding.

Atraiva śaktijñānopayogaḥ. *Śaktīdhī* in the verse or *śaktijñāna* is the

auxiliary cause for producing verbal understanding. In this sense, *śaktijñāna* carries utility. *Atraiva* means *padajanyapadārthasmarāṇe eva*. The ground for the utility is ‘*pūrvam śaktigrahābhāve padajñāne ’pi tatsambandhena tatsmaraṇānutpatteh’*. If there is no knowledge of *śakti*, the relation between a word and its meaning earlier, then even after knowing a word (*padajñāne ’pi*) there will arise no remembrance of the meaning of the word due to the relation of the word (*tatsambandhena*). ‘*Tatsambandhena tatsmaraṇa*’ means that the relation of a word reminds another relatum of the relation, the meaning of the word. By knowing one relatum, another relatum is known. To say this, the author states ‘*padajñānasya hi ekasambandhijñānavidhayā padārthopasthāpakatvam*’. In other words, *ekasambandhijñānam aparasambandhismārakam iti nyāyaḥ*.

4. *śakti*

What is *śakti*? *Śaktiś ca padena saha padārthasya sambandhaḥ*. *Śakti* is the primary relation between a word and its meaning. It is *vācyavācakabhāva*. What is the nature of *śakti*? *Sā ca asmāt padāt ayam artho boddhavya iti īśvarecchārūpā*. *Sā śaktiḥ*. It is of the form of God’s desire, *īśvarecchā*. So desire is the relation, and it is also a *guṇa*. This desire has the form that this meaning should be understood from this word.

Some objection arises. *Ādhunike nāmni śaktir asty eva “ekādāse ’hani pitā nāma kuryāt” iti īśvarecchāyāḥ sattvāt*. The point of this objection is whether *śakti* exists or not when one coins a word. The opponent argues: even a word coined by a man has *śakti*: *ādhunike nāmni śakti asty eva*. How? The following is a sentence occurring in the Veda: *ekādāse ’hni pitā nāma kuryāt*. On the eleventh day a father should give a name to his child. Suppose the name ‘Devadatta’ is coined by the father. The object of the name is his son. The relation between his son and the name, i.e., *śakti*, is established by him. The *śakti* in this case is supported by the sentence occurring in the Veda, and the Veda is created by God, *īśvara*. So the *śakti* established by the father is related to God’s desire, *īśvarecchā*. Even when a new name is coined, *īśvarecchā* operates.

The tradition does not accept the above views and hold that a new name does not possess *śakti*: *ādhunikasaṅketite tu na śaktir iti sampradāyakaḥ*. The term *saṅketa* appears in the earlier literature, and *śakti* is observed in later Nyāya literature. Later newly coined words are called *pāribhāṣika*.

The new Nyāya school holds that a newly coined word possess *śakti*: *navyās tu īśvarecchā na śaktiḥ, kin tv icchaiva, tena ādhunikasaṅketite ’pi śaktir asty eva ity āhuḥ*. Not only God’s desire, *īśvarecchā*, but also any desire can be *śakti*. Hence, any man can establish the relation between a fresh word and its object. The author of the *Muktākalī* does not refute this view.

5. śaktigraha

How is śakti known? There are several ways: śaktigrahas tu vyākaraṇā-ditah. The following śloka states those ways. *Tathā hi — śaktigrahaṃ vyākaraṇopamānakosāptavākyād vyavahārataś ca/ vākyasya šeṣād vivṛter vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ/ / Śakti* is apprehended from grammar, analogy, a dictionary, a statement of a reliable man, verbal behavior of elder people who know the language, the description in a particular context, paraphrase, and the vicinity of a word whose relation with its meaning is already known. This is stated by the elder. The above śloka is not an exhaustive list but only some of the ways are mentioned here. Pictures may also inform you of śakti. Each of the eight ways in the śloka is exemplified in the following.

Dhātuprakṛtipratyayādīnām śaktigraho vyākaraṇād bhavati. The śakti of dhātu or a root, prakṛti or prātipadika or a nominal stem, pratyaya or a suffix, and so forth is understood from grammar. The list of roots, dhātupāṭha, is given in Pāṇini's grammar: *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ*. Say, *pācaka* is derived from the root *pac* and the suffix *aka*. The meaning of the nominal stem of *pācaka* is understood as the meaning of *pac*, i.e., cooking, and the suffix *aka* is understood as *karṭṛ*, an agent in Pāṇini's grammar. Thus, from grammar, the meaning of '*pācaka*' is understood as a cook.

Kvacit sati bādhake tyajyate. This is the Naiyāyikas' attitude all and through. Nyāya will accept the view of its opponent as long as it is not contradicted. *Yathā vaiyākaraṇair ākhyātasya kartari śaktir ucyate. Caitraḥ pacati ityādau kartrā saha caitrasya abhedānvayaḥ. tac ca gauravāt tyajyate.* Let us say '*caitraḥ pacati*'. The word '*caira*' stands for Caitra. The word '*pacati*' is derived from the root *pac* and the verbal suffix *laḥ* which is called *ākhyāta*. This suffix expresses present tense and an agent, *karṭṛ*, according to the grammarians. *Laḥ karmani ca bhāve ca akarmakebhyaḥ* (P 3.4.69). The word *kartari* in the preceding rule can come into this rule, *sūtra*, by the process of *anuvṛtti*. So the present rule means *laḥ kartari karmani ca*. *La* is used in the sense of *karṭṛ* or *karman*. When *la* forms a word with other elements, it is replaced by *ti* which is a replacement *ādeśa*. So *ti* stands for an agent. This is the position of the grammarians about the verbal suffix. But this position is given up by the Naiyāyikas, because it involves illogical complexity, *gaurava*.

How is it *gaurava*? If '*ti*' means a *karṭṛ*, '*ti*' is a śakta and a *karṭṛ* is a śakya. Śakyatā exists in the śakya which is the *karṭṛ*. A *karṭṛ* is a *kṛtimat* or the possessor of inclination, so śakyatā lies in the *kṛtimat*. That śakyatā exists only in the *kṛtimat* can be known when the śakyatāvacchedaka, the delimitor of śakyatā, is given. What is the *avacchedaka* of śakyatā? If the locus of *x* is *viśiṣṭa*, the *viśeṣaṇa* is the *avacchedaka* of *x*. The *kṛtimat* is *kṛtiviśiṣṭa*. Hence,

the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is the *viśeṣaṇa* of *kṛtimat*. Since the *viśeṣaṇa* is *kṛti*, the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is *kṛti*. *Kṛti* is not a single entity, and it differs from locus to locus. In order to describe the *śakyatāvacchedaka*, one must refer to all *kṛti* which differ in all persons. This work is very troublesome. In this interpretation of *ti*, if the sentence ‘*caitraḥ pacati*’ is provided, Caitra has identity relation with the *karṭr*: *caitraḥ pacati ityādau karṭrā saha caitrasya abhedānvayaḥ*.

The above standpoint cannot be accepted, because the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is a cumbersome property. If the suffix *ti* means *kṛti*, inclination, the *śakya* is *kṛti*. In *kṛti śakyatā* exists, and the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is *kṛtitva* residing in *kṛti*. *Kṛtitva* is a *jāti*, a generic property, in Nyāya, so it is a single entity. That *śakya* is only *kṛti* can be known when the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is given. Now the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is a single entity, *kṛtitva*. As far as the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is concerned, this view is simpler than the view that the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is *kṛti*. Therefore, the view of Nyāya that *ti* means *kṛti* is simpler from a logical point of view.

What is the *śābdabodha* in the case of ‘*caitraḥ pacati*’? According to the Naiyāyikas, the principal element of verbal understanding is the meaning of the word which ends in the nominative case-ending: *prathamāntārthamukhya-viśeṣyakaśābdabodha*. ‘*Caitraḥ pacati*’ is interpreted as ‘*pākānukūlakṛtimān caitraḥ*’ in Navya-nyāya. The *viśeṣya* of this *śābdabodha* is Caitra, and in him there exists *kṛti*. This *kṛti* is the *prakāra* of Caitra: *kṛtiś caitrādau prakāribhūya bhāsate*. A *prakāra* is one variety of *viśeṣaṇa* or qualifier. It is employed in connection with knowledge only, while a *viśeṣaṇa* is employed in a general field.

Na ca kartur anabhidhānāc caitrādipadānantaraṃ tṛtīyā syād iti vācyam. The part between ‘*na ca*’ and ‘*vācyam*’ is the grammarians’ objection to the Naiyāyikas. It means: there will arise the contingency of using the instrumental case-ending after the base ‘*caitra*’ in the sentence ‘*caitraḥ pacati*’. If according to the Naiyāyikas, a *karṭr* is not expressed by the personal suffix *ti*, there will arise the contingency that one gets the sentence ‘*caitreṇa pacati*’.

Why has this contingency come? In Pāṇini’s grammar, ‘*anabhihite*’ is an *adhikārasūtra*, and it comes down to the following *sutras*. One of them is ‘*karṭṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā*’. Now, *anabhihite karṭṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā*. When a *karṭr* or a *karaṇa* is not expressed by the suffix, e.g., *ti*, *tṛtīyā* or the third case-ending results. Then one arrives at ‘*caitreṇa pacati*’, not ‘*caitraḥ pacati*’.

The Naiyāyikas refute the above view of the grammarians. *Karṭṛsaṃkhyānabhidhānasya tatra tantratvāt*. *Tantra* means *prayojaka*, a prompting cause or *nimitta*. The *nimitta* for using the instrumental case-ending is not expressing an agent or an instrument. *Anabhihite* in Pāṇini’s rule means *karṭṛsaṃkhyānabhihite*. If the number of an agent is not expressed by the suffix, then *prātipadika*, e.g., ‘*caitra*’, will receive the instrumental case-

ending. The suffix *ti* also express the number of an agent, e.g., Caitra in the sentence ‘*caitraḥ pacati*’, so the third case-ending has no space in the sentence.

The grammarians will object to the Naiyāyikas. How can one decide that only the number of the agent Caitra is expressed by *ti*? Let us take ‘*caitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati*’. Here, the *karman*, or the object of the verb is also in singular.

The Naiyāyikas answer ‘*saṃkhyābhīdhānāyogyāś ca karmatvādyanavaruddhaḥ prathamāntapadopasthāpyaḥ*’. That which is not associated with *karmatva* etc. and which is presented in mind or remembered by a word ending in the nominative case-ending is fit (*yogya*) to having its number expressed. ‘*Samkhyābhīdhānāyogyā*’ is paraphrased as ‘*saṃkhyāprakārabodhaviśeṣyā*’. Such a *viśeṣyā* is the *mukhyaviśeṣyā* of the *śābdabodha*, and it is expressed by a word which ends in the first case-ending. That *viśeṣyā* should not be associated with *karmatva*, *karaṇatva*, and so forth. For instance, the *śābdabodha* of ‘*caitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati*’ is ‘*taṇḍulakarmakapākānukūlakṛtimān ekatvaviśiṣṭacaitraḥ*’. Since only ‘*caitra*’ has the first case-ending and has no *karmatva* etc. there, Caitra is the *mukhyaviśeṣyā* and his number is expressed by *ti*.

In the case of ‘*caitra iva maitro gacchati*’, both ‘*caitra*’ and ‘*maitra*’ have the first case-ending and both the persons have no connection with *karmatva* etc. So *ti* of *gacchati* would express the number of Caitra, too. But this is not the case. The intension of ‘*karmatvādyanavaruddha*’ is being not an object of the intention of the speaker as an adjunct or an *viśeṣaṇa* of anything else: *itaraviśeṣaṇatvena tātparyāviśayatvam*. Now, the *śābdabodha* of ‘*caitra iva maitro gacchati*’ is ‘*gamanānukūlakṛtimān caitrānirūpitasādrśyavān maitraḥ*’. Here, Caitra is related to *sādrśya*, similarity, and *sādrśya* is related to Maitra. But Maitra is related to nothing. So he is not the object of the intention of the speaker as an adjunct of anything. But Caitra is the *viśeṣaṇa* of *sādrśya*, so it is the object of the intension as the adjunct of *sādrśya*. Therefore, *ti* expressed not the number of Caitra but the number of Maitra: *na caitre saṃkhyānvayaḥ*.

What is the intention of ‘*prathamāntapadopasthāpya*’ in the explanation of *saṃkhyābhīdhānāyogyā*? Let us take ‘*caitras taṇḍulam pacati*’ Suppose the speaker of this sentence does not intend *karmatva* in *taṇḍula* but that he has employed the accusative case-ending: *karmādau na viśeṣaṇatvatātparyam*. In this case, *karmatva* is not the object of the speaker’s intention. Then, the first condition of *saṃkhyābhīdhānāyogyā*, i.e., *karmatvānyanavaruddha*, is satisfied. The contingency will arise that *ti* will express the number of *taṇḍula*.

To avoid this contingency, *prathamāntapadopasthāpya* is mentioned. Since *taṇḍula* is not expressed by a word ending in the first case-ending, it cannot become fit for having its number expressed by *ti*. This is the view of the old Nyāya.

The Navya-nyāya states the intention of the first condition, *karmatvādy-*

anavaruddha, as follows: *dhātvarthātiriktvāviśeṣaṇatvam*. This satisfies not only the Nyāya theory but also the Vaiyākaraṇa theory. This intention means that *x* whose number is going to be expressed should not be an adjunct to anything other than *dhātvartha*. *Dhātvartha*, the root meaning, is *vyāpāra*. According to the grammarians, the *śābdabodha* of '*caitraḥ pacati*' is *caitrābhinnakartṛkaḥ pākaḥ*. *Pāka* is *dhātvartha*. It is *vyāpāra*, and it is the *mukhyaviśeṣya* of the *śābdabodha* in the grammarians' view. What is not an adjunct to anything other than *dhātvartha*? It is *Caitra*. So *ti* expresses the number of *Caitra*.

The above interpretation of *karmatvādyanavaruddha* holds true in the case of '*caitra iva maitro gacchati*'. The *śābdabodha* according to the grammarians is *caitrānirūpitasādrśyavanmaitṛakartṛkagamanam*. Here, *Caitra* is the adjunct to *sādrśya*, the meaning of *iva*, which is other than the *dhātvartha*, i.e., *gamana*. But *Maitra* is the adjunct to *gamana*, so he is not an adjunct to anything other than *gamana*, or the *dhātvartha*. Hence, *ti* expresses the number of *Maitra*. Thus, expressing the number of *Caitra* is avoided.

What is the necessity of the second condition, *prathamāntapadopasthāpya*? In the case of '*stokaḥ pacati*', the *śābdabodha* according to the grammarians is *kartṛvṛttistokābhinnapākaḥ*. Here, *pāka* is the *viśeṣya*. The number of *stoka* will be expressed by *ti*, because *stoka* is not an adjunct to anything other than *pāka* or the *dhātvartha*. *Stoka* is the *viśeṣaṇa* of *pāka*. If *prathamāntapadopasthāpya* is not mentioned, the number of *stoka* is not expressed by *ti*. For *stoka* is not presented by a word ending in the first case-ending but by a word ending in the second case-ending, *dviṭyāntapadopasthāpya*. Thus, expressing the number of *stoka* is avoided.

Now the Mīmāṃsakas come and point out: if *kṛti* is the meaning of the personal suffix *ti*, as the Naiyāyikas argue, what kind of *śābdabodha* occurs in the case of '*ratho gacchati*'? It is '*gamanānukūlakṛtīman rathaḥ*'. *Kṛti* is an *ātmagūṇa* according to Nyāya. How can *kṛti* exist in the *ratha*, which is not sentient? It is a *jaḍapadārtha*. Hence, the Mīmāṃsakas propose a better theory. The meaning of *ti* is not *kṛti* but *vyāpāra*. *Vyāpāra* means both external activities and internal activities. Then, the *śābdabodha* will be '*gamanānukūlavvyāpāravān rathaḥ*', which is quite all right now.

This view is refuted by Nyāya. *Evam vyāpāre 'pi na śaktir gauravāt*. *Vyāpāra* is not accepted as the meaning of *ti*, because the same contingency as that of the grammarians' interpretation of *ti* continues. How? If the suffix *ti* means *vyāpāra*, the *śakya* is *vyāpāra*. *Śakyatā* exists in *vyāpāra*. The *śakyatāvacchedaka* is *vyāpāratva* in *vyāpāra*. The *avacchedaka* and the *avacchedya* should remain in one and the same locus, in *vyāpāra*. What is *vyāpāratva*? It is not a single property. *Tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvaṃ vyāpāratvam*. This property is not as simple as a *jāti*. As the Vaiyākaraṇas do not accept *kṛti* as the meaning of *ti* because, in that case, the *śakyatāvacchedaka* will become a cumbersome property, similarly (*evam*),

vyāpāra is not accepted as the meaning of *ti*.

How do the Naiyāyikas account for the case '*ratho gacchati*'? They can explain that *ti* means *kṛti* through *śakti*. In that case, the *śābdabodha* will be '*gamanānukūlakṛtimān rathaḥ*', which is not proper. For, the *ratha* which is insentient cannot possess *kṛti*. They accept two kinds of *vṛtti* in a *pada*. One is *śakti*, and another is *lakṣaṇā*. If *śakti* fails, they take recourse to *lakṣaṇā*, the secondary relationship between a *pada* and its *artha*. Through this function, *ti* means *vyāpāra*. Now the *śābdabodha* is '*gamanānukūlavvyāpāravān rathaḥ*'.

Someone may argue that *vyāpāra* is the meaning of *ti* due to *śakti*, so it is not necessary to accept *vyāpāra* as the secondary meaning of *ti*. the Naiyāyikas answer that in that case *ti* means *āśrayatva* by *lakṣaṇā*. Then, the *śābdabodha* will be '*gamanāśrayatvavān rathaḥ*'. (*Ratho gacchati ityādau tu vyāpāre āśrayatve vā lakṣaṇā*.)

Let us take an example, '*devadatto jānāti*'. If *ti* means *kṛti*, the *śābdabodha* of this will be '*jñānānukūlakṛtimān devadattaḥ*'. '*Anukūla*' means *janaka*. The *śābdabodha* suggests that *kṛti* produces *jñāna*, but in Nyāya *jñāna* produces *icchā*, and *icchā* produces *kṛti*. So the *śābdabodha* does not make sense. But if *ti* means *āśrayatva* by *lakṣaṇā*, the *śābdabodha* will be '*jñānāśrayatvavān devadattaḥ*', which makes sense.

Let us take another example, '*ghaṭo naśyati*'. Since the subject of this sentence, namely, *ghaṭa*, is not sentient, *ti* does not mean *kṛti* here but *āśrayatva* only. The *śābdabodha* of this sentence will be '*nāśāśrayatvavān ghaṭaḥ*'. The locus (*āśraya*) of *nāśa* is the locus of the *ghaṭa*, and not the *ghaṭa* itself. So *nāśāśrayatvavān* is the locus of the *ghaṭa*. Thus *āśrayatva* as the meaning of *ti* does not work properly. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas propose that in this case *ti* means *pratiyogitva*. A *pratiyogin* is a *viroddhin* of *abhāva*. A *viroddhin* is that which does not allow the knowledge of its absence to occur. The *ghaṭa* is a *pratiyogin*, so it is *pratiyogitvavān*. Now the *śābdabodha* will be '*nāśapratyogitvavān ghaṭaḥ*'. (*Jānāti ityādau āśrayatve, naśyati ityādau pratiyogitve nirūḍhalakṣaṇā*.)

Kim nāma nirūḍhatva? Anāditātparyaviṣayībhūtatvam. Āśrayatva or *pratiyogitva* is an object of the intention of the speaker from time immemorial. This means that since the day when they say '*jānāti*' or '*naśyati*', they understand *āśrayatva* or *pratiyogitva* from the suffix *-ti*. '*Nirūḍha*' can be combined with '*śakti*' or '*lakṣaṇā*' and it only points out that the meaning due to *śakti* or *lakṣaṇā* is not a mental creation.

Here ends the discussion that you get the knowledge of the relation between a word and its meaning by grammar.

Another process of knowing *śakti* is *upamāna*. Suppose, one does not know the meaning of the word '*gavaya*' but he knows the meaning of the word *go*, 'a cow'. He approaches a person and wants to know the meaning of the word *gavaya*. The person tells him that a *gavaya* is similar to a cow. Then, he keeps

watch on some place and sees an animal similar to a cow. He observes similarity in the *piṇḍa*, that individual in front of him. The similarity of *x* to *y* is found when *x* is recognized different from *y* and *x* has a bundle of features shared with *y*: *tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhuyōdharmavattvam*. The man is looking at the common features of a *go* and a *gavaya*, and he has the knowledge of the similarity, *sādrśyajñāna*. This knowledge is called *upamānapramāna*. The man undertands ‘*ayam piṇḍo gavayapadavācyah*’. This animal should be called a *gavaya*. Thus, the man understands the meaning of the word ‘*gavaya*’ by *upamāna*. This understanding includes the relation between ‘*gavaya*’ and the meaning, i.e., *śakti*. Therefore, *śakti* is understood by *upamāna*. *Upamānād yathā śaktigrahas tathoktam*.

Evam, similarly, *kośād api śaktigrahaḥ*. From a dictionary also you can have *śaktigraha*, the knowledge of *śakti*. Here also the basic attitude of the Naiyāyikas is ‘*sati bādhave kvacit tyajate*’. If some theory does not stand the scrutiny of logic, it is given up. For example, *yady api nīlādīpadānām nīlarūpādaū nīlādīviśiṣṭe ca śaktiḥ kośena vyutpādītā, tathāpi lāghavān nīlādaū eva śaktiḥ*. In a dictionary, two meanings of the word ‘*nīla*’ are given: *nīlarūpa* and *nīlarūpaviśiṣṭa*. *Guṇe śuklādayaḥ puṃsi guṇi līṅgās tu tadvatī*. The words ‘*śukla*’ etc. convey *guṇa* and also *tadvat* or *śuklarūpavat*. Here the word ‘*nīla*’ has two *śaktis* with reference to the two meaning. Instead of this theory, the Naiyāyikas accept that ‘*nīla*’ means *nīlarūpa* by *śakti* and this word means *nīlarūpaviśiṣṭa* by *lakṣaṇā*.

If ‘*nīla*’ stands for *nīlarūpaviśiṣṭa* as stated in a dictionary, the *śakya* of the word ‘*nīla*’ is *nīlarūpaviśiṣṭa*. The *śakyatāvachchedaka* is *nīlarūpa*, and it is innumerable. But if ‘*nīla*’ stands for *nīlarūpa* as stated by the Naiyāyikas, the *śakyatāvachchedaka* is *nīlatva*. It is a *jāti* and a single entity. Hence, the Naiyāyikas’ theory which maintains a single *śakyatāvachchedaka* is simpler and more preferable. ‘*Lāghava*’ means *śakyatāvachchedakalāghava*.

Evam, similarly, *āptavākyād api*. *Yathā ‘kokilaḥ pikapadavācyā’ ityādi śabdāt pikādīpadānām kokile śaktigrahaḥ*. *Śakti* is also understood from a sentence of a believable person, *āpta*. If such a man says that a *kokila* is denoted by the word ‘*pika*’, the hearer understands that ‘*pika*’ means a *kokila*. Thus, the *śakti* possessed by the word ‘*pika*’ is understood.

Evam vyavahārād api. *Śakti* is also understood from observing linguistic behavior. *Yathā prayojakavṛddhena ghaṭam ānāyety uktam, tac chrutvā prayojakavṛddhena ghaṭa ānītaḥ, tadavadhārya pārśvasṭha balo ghaṭānayanarūpaṃ kāryam ‘ghaṭam ānāye’ti śabdaprayojyam ity avadhārayati*. Suppose, a *guru* (teacher) says to his *śiṣya* (disciple), “Bring a pot”. Hearing this injunctive sentence, the *śiṣya* brings a pot to his *guru*. Seeing this situation, a learner sitting on the side of them comes to know that the action of bringing is caused by the cognition arising from the utterance ‘*ghaṭam ānāya*’. Here, the *guru* is a *prayojakavṛddha*, or an elder person who is an inducer of action. The

śiṣya is a *prayojyavrddha* or a person who is induced to do action. The learner understands the meaning of 'ghaṭam ānaya', hearing the words of the *prayojakavrddha* and observing the action of the *prayojyavrddha*.

Furthermore, the learner can understand the meaning of 'ghaṭa', hearing 'ghaṭam naya' ("Take the pot away") and 'aśvaṃ badhāna' ("Tie the horse"). After hearing these sentences, he observes the actions of bringing a pot and taking a pot away. These actions are the result (*kārya*) of the cognition arising from those sentences, and a pot is connected to or involved in the result: *kāryānvitaghata*. The learner comprehends that the object *ghaṭa* is such a *kāryānvitaghata*. Considering a common factor of these two sentences, 'ghaṭam naya' and 'ghaṭam ānaya', and watching the two actions, the learner understands the object. Removing a common factor in two sentences too, the learner can grasp the meaning of two kinds of action. *Tataś ca ghaṭam naya gāṃ badhānetyādivākyaḍau āvāpodvāpabhyāṃ ghaṭādīpadānāṃ kāryānvitaghataḍau śaktiṃ grhṇāti*.

This view that the relation between a word and its object is understood from an injunctive sentence is of Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā. This is called *kāryānvitābhīdhānavāda*. This theory implies that a learner comes to know the meaning of a word in terms of some action.

Up to this stage, the Naiyāyikas can accept that *śakti* is understood from an injunctive sentence. But the next sentence is not acceptable as a generator of understanding according to the Prābhākaras. *Ithañ ca bhūtale nīlo ghaṭa ityādivākyañ na śābdabodhaḥ*. Thus, from the sentence 'there is a blue pot on the ground', there will arise no verbal understanding. For, the sentence is not injunctive. The Prābhākaras say: since the learner determines the power (*sāmarthya*) of a word with reference to the knowledge of *ghaṭa* which is related to or involved in *kārya*, and since the injunctive suffixes have the power to cause a knowledge of *kārya*, the sentences devoid of those suffixes does not cause *śābdabodha*. The word *sāmarthya* means *śakti* in Nyāya. In short, verbal understanding cannot take place unless a sentence contains *kāryatābodhakapada*, a morpheme expressive of injunction.

The Naiyāyikas refute the Prābhākara view. They say: although the relation between the word 'ghaṭa' and the object *ghaṭa* is determined with reference to *ghaṭa* which is involved in *kārya*, still because of simplicity we should give up this view, and this is proper. To certain degree, it is a fact that many a time a learner learns the relation between a word and its meaning when the meaning is involved in activity.

'*Lāghava*' (simplicity) means *śakyatāvachedakalāghava* here also. Suppose, the relation is established between a *ghaṭa* and action (*ānayana*). According to the Prābhākaras, *kāryānvitaghata* is the meaning of the word 'ghaṭa', and this is the *śakya*. *Śakyatā* exists in *kāryānvitaghata*. For specification of *śakyatā* we need its *avachedaka*, this must also exist in *śakya*, *kāryānvitaghata*.

Śakyatāvachchdaka is *kāryānvitaghāṭatva*. Instead of this, if *śakya* is simply *ghāṭa*, the *śakytāvachchedaka* is *ghāṭatva*. This is a simpler property than *kāryānvitaghāṭatva*. The Naiyāyikas prefer *ghāṭapadārtha* as the meaning of 'ghāṭa' to *kāryānvitaghāṭa*.

The Naiyāyikas accept the process of learning the meaning of a word. But so far as the *śakya* is concerned, they accept only *ghāṭa* because of the above-mentioned *śakyatāvachchedakalāghava*. *Prathamataḥ kāryānvitaghāṭādaḥ śakty-avadhāraṇe 'pi lāghavena paścāt tasya parityāgaucityāt*.

Atha eva caitra putras te jātah, kanyā te garbhini jātā ityādaḥ mukhaprasādamukhamālinyābhyām sukhaduḥkhe śābdabodham nirṇīya taddhetutayā taṁ śabdāḥ avadhārayati. Suppose, a Naiyāyika has come and says to Caitra. "Oh, Caitra, your son is born", and then "Your unmarried daughter has become pregnant". When the Naiyāyika tells Caitra the first sentence, Caitra's face is very joyful. The moment Caitra hears the second sentence, his face becomes gloomy. The states of Caitra's face in these two cases are visible, and these states indicate Caitra's happiness and unhappiness. On the basis of *mukhaprasāda*, *sukham anumāya*, and on the basis of *mukhamālinya*, *duḥkham anumāya*, one ponders what can be the cause of Caitra's happiness and unhappiness. By eliminating non-cause of Caitra's state, one can conclude that the knowledge of the two sentences caused happiness and unhappiness in Caitra's mind. '*Pariśeṣa*' means *pariśeṣānumāna*. A sentence cannot directly generate happiness in one's mind, but the knowledge of a sentence can do so. Hence, the knowledge of those two sentences caused happiness and unhappiness. In *taddhetutayā*, '*tad*' means *śābdabodha*, and as the cause of *śābdabodha*, *śabda* is established. Therefore, it is concluded that a sentence, even though it does not contain the optative form, can convey its own meaning. *Tathā ca vyabhicārāt kāryānvite na śaktiḥ*. Cause and effect relationship is established on the basis of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. '*Anvaya*' means '*tatsattve tatsattvam*', and '*vyatireka*' means '*tadabhāve tadabhāvaḥ*'. If *kāryānvitaghāṭa* is the cause of the understanding of the meaning of the word 'ghāṭa', *kāryānvitaśaktisattve śābdabodhasattvam*. *Kāryānvitaśaktyabhāve śābdabodhābhāvaḥ*. In the example of Caitra's face, there is no injunctive form in the two sentences, so there is no *kāryānvitārtha*. But one can determine that Caitra has understood the meaning of the sentences. In other words, Caitra has got *śābdabodha*. *Kāryānvitaśaktyabhāve 'pi śābdabodhasattvam*. Hence, there is *vyatirekavyabhicāra: tadabhāve tatsattvam*.

The Prābhākaras may supply '*taṁ paśya*' ("Look at that (son)") to the sentence "*putras te jātah*". Then the sentences can involve *kārya*, namely, the action caused by the injunctive sentence, and then *kāryānvitātva* is obtained. The Naiyāyikas refute this view. *Na ca tatra taṁ paśya ityādi śabdāntaram adhyāhāryam, mānābhāvāt*. Because there is no ground for supplying such words. No body understands the meaning of '*putras te jātah*' after supplying

'*taṃ paśya*'.

Though the Naiyāyikas think that no one supplies '*taṃ paśya*' to '*putras te jātaḥ*', the Prābhāskaras may argue to supply '*taṃ paśya*' following their own way. The Naiyāyikas refute even this way. Suppose, Caitra has said, "*putras te jāto mṛtaś ca*'. Supply "*taṃ paśya*'. Caitra's son was born and died. How can he look at his dead son? It is impossible to supply that expression in this case. *Caitra putras te jāto mṛtaś cetyādau tadabhavāc ca*.

Thus (*itthañ ca*), on the basis of simplicity (*lāghavāt*), namely, *śakyatāvachchedakalāghavāt*, we should discard *śakti* with reference to an *anvitaghata*, namely *anvayaviśiṣṭaghata*, and determine that the word '*ghata*' has *śakti* with reference to only a *ghata* (pot), i.e., any member of the class of entities called '*pot*', *ghaṭamātra*.

Evam vākyaśeṣād api śaktigrahaḥ. Similarly, the relation is grasped from *vākyaśeṣa*: description available in a particular type of literature. By means of this, the Mīmāṃsakas determine the meaning of a word. The rule of determination is *saṃdigdheṣu vākyaśeṣāt*: a word, the meaning of which is in doubt (*saṃdigdheṣu padeṣu*), is to be determined on the basis of *vākyaśeṣa*, description.

An example is given as follows: *yathā yavamayaś carur bhavaty ity atra yavapasya dīrghaśūkaviśeṣe āryānām prayogaḥ kaṅgau ca mlecchānām*. '*Yavamayaś carur bhavati*' is a vedic injunction. '*Caru*' means cooked rice to be offered to a sacrifice as oblation. What is this *caru* made of? Which grains should be used? The answer is *yavamaya*: made of *yava*. What is the meaning of '*yava*'?

People belonging to Aryan clan (*ārya*) use the word '*yava*' in the sense of grain which has got long shoots (*śūka*). Non-aryans, the Mlecchas, employ the same word in the sense of '*kaṅgu*', another kind of grain. Now, there is a doubt as to which meaning should be taken, *dīrghaśūka* or *kaṅgu*. The Mīmāṃsakas' dictum is '*saṃdigdheṣu vākyaśeṣāt*'. The meaning of '*yava*' should be determined from the description of *yava* in literature.

Viśvanātha points out the description and states: *tatra hi "yadānyā oṣadhayo mlāyante 'thaite modamānās tiṣṭhanti"*. *Ete yavāḥ*. When *oṣadhi* plants wither, *yavas* stand cheerfully. We can select the meaning of '*yava*' between *dīrghaśūka* and *kaṅgu* on the basis of this description. The commentator of the *Muktāvalī* attributes that sentence to *śruti*. In corroboration of this fact, a *smṛti* sentence is found: *vasante sarvasasyānām jāyate patraśātanam/ modamānās ca tiṣṭhanti yavāḥ kaṇiśāśāliṇaḥ*// 'In spring, the leaves of all corns fall down (*śātana*), but *yava* plants full of grains (*kaṇi*) stand erect pleasantly'. On the basis of these two sentences, we can decide that '*yava*' means grains which have long shoots (*dīrghaśūka*): *iti vākyaśeṣād dīrghaśūke śaktir nīrṇīyate*.

Why do the Mlecchas use '*yava*' in the sense of '*kaṅgu*'? They use this

term misunderstanding the *śakti* of the term. If *kaṅgu* is accepted as the meaning, 'yava' will have two meanings. Then *śakyatā* exists in *dīrghaśūka* and *kaṅgu*. *Śakyatāvacchedakas*, which also exist in them, are *dīrghaśūkatva* and *kaṅgutva*. It is cumbersome to accept two *śakyatāvacchedakas*. If 'yava' means only *dīrghaśūka*, the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is *dīrghaśūkatva*. Here, only one *avacchedaka* is obtained, and this is simpler than to accept two *avacchedakas*. The Nyāya position is to avoid getting more than one *śakyatāvacchedaka* as far as possible. In case two meanings are available, the Naiyāyikas assume that one of them is *śakyārtha* and another is *lakṣyārtha*. Even then *lakṣyārtha* must be connected with *śakyārtha*. *Lakṣyārtha* is the meaning indirectly related to a word through *lakṣaṇā*. *Lakṣaṇā* is *śakyasambandha*, namely, the relation with the meaning of a word obtained through *śakti*.

If a word means two objects independent of each other, they cannot be connected by *lakṣaṇā*. In this case, we must admit that the word has two meanings through *śakti*. For instance, the word 'hari' has several meanings: Viṣṇu, a monkey, etc. The Naiyāyikas clearly state that in such a case, there is no way to explain the meanings by *lakṣaṇā*, so we have to accept independent relations to each and every meaning. *Haryādīpade tu vinigamakābhāvān nānāśaktikalpanam*.

Evam vivaraṇād api śaktigrahaḥ. After *vākyaśeṣa*, the next way to know *śakti* is *vivaraṇa*, paraphrasing. The author explains: *vivaraṇam tu tatsamānārthakapadāntareṇa tadarthakathanam*. *Vivaraṇa* is the expressing of the meaning of a word by another word having the same meaning. *Yathā ghaṭo 'stītyasya kalaśo 'stītyanena vivaraṇād ghaṭapadasya kalaśe śaktigrahaḥ*. Suppose the word 'kalaśa' is not known to you but 'ghaṭa' is known. If one paraphrases 'ghaṭo 'stī' as 'kalaśo 'stī', from replacing 'ghaṭa' by 'kalaśa', you understand the word 'kalaśa' is related to *ghaṭa*. In this way, we know the relation between the word 'kalaśa' and its meaning.

Evam pacatītyasya pākaṃ karotītyanena vivaraṇād ākhyātasya yatnārthakatvam kalpyate. 'Pacati' is paraphrased as 'pākaṃ karoti'. The word 'pacati' has two parts: the root *pac* and the suffix *-ti*. The root is replaced by 'pāka' in the paraphrasing, and 'ti' by 'karoti'. We come to understand that 'ti' means *kṛti* or *yatna*. The suffix 'ti' is *ākhyāta*, a verbal suffix.

The word 'ākhyāta', according to the Niruktakāra or Yāska, means the whole form of a verb. But according to the Naiyāyikas, it means the verbal suffix.

Evam prasiddhapadasya sānnidhyād api śaktigrahaḥ. Here is the last way of knowing *śakti* listed in the *kārikā*. Because of the proximity or closeness of a known word also, *śakti* is understood. For example, *yathā iha sahakārataraū madhuram piko rautītyādaū pikapadasya kokile śaktigraha iti*. 'On this mango tree a *pika* is melodiously cooing'. The meaning of 'pika' is not known to you, but the meaning of all other words are known. You can easily guess 'pika'

means a cuckoo. Here ends the discussion on the ways of knowing *śakti*, the relation between a word and its meaning.

6. The meaning of *pada*

What is the meaning of a nominal base actually? The Naiyāyikas hold that *jātiviśiṣṭavyakti* is the meaning of a nominal base. The Mīmāṃsakas say that *jāti* is the meaning of a nominal base. They used the word *ākṛti* for *jāti*. The same word '*ākṛti*' is used by Patañjali. The Vedāntins also used this word.

The Mīmāṃsakas state that *śakti* is with regard to a universal only and not an individual: *tatra jātau eva śaktir na tu vyaktau vyabhicārād ānantyāc ca*. The first reason for the Mīmāṃsaka view is *vyabhicāra*. Let us see what kind of *vyabhicāra* occurs. Suppose the word '*ghaṭa*' is uttered and that the word denotes an individual *ghaṭa*. Then at a time one *ghaṭa* is presented by the word. When another *ghaṭa* is presented, can it be called '*ghaṭa*' or not? If '*ghaṭa*' means the first particular *ghaṭa* only, then it cannot mean the second *ghaṭa*. The hearer of the word '*ghaṭa*' can get the knowledge of a particular *ghaṭa* but no knowledge of another *ghaṭa*. Though the cause of the knowledge is available, the effect of this cause namely the knowledge of another *ghaṭa* does not take place. This is the violation of the negative rule, *vyatireka-vyabhicāra*.

The second reason for '*jātau śaktiḥ*' is *śakyānantya*. If the word '*ghaṭa*' presents a particular *ghaṭa*, we must coin a new word to present another *ghaṭa*. In other words, we must accept many distinct words to denote many distinct individuals belonging to one class. This means there are many relations between a word and its meanings which are the members of one class. This is *śakyānantya*.

The Mīmāṃsakas anticipate the objection as to how an individual comes into the object of the cognition if a word means only a universal. The Mīmāṃsakas continue to state '*vyaktim vinā jātibhānasyāsambhavād vyakter api bhānam iti*'. Here '*bhāna*' stands for *jñāna*. Since the knowledge of *ghaṭatva* is impossible without the knowledge of *ghaṭa*, the locus of *ghaṭatva* is automatically presented by the word '*ghaṭa*'. How is *āśraya* of *ghaṭatva* remembered? It is through *lakṣaṇā*, the secondary denotative function. *Lakṣaṇā* is the relation with *śakyārtha*. Now, the *śakya* or *śakyārtha* is *ghaṭatvajāti* according to the Mīmāṃsakas. The word '*ghaṭa*' means a *ghaṭa* by *lakṣaṇā*, so a *ghaṭa* is a *lakṣyārtha*. The relation between the *śakyārtha* and the *lakṣyārtha*, namely, *ghaṭatva* and a *ghaṭa* is *samavāya*. Hence, *lakṣaṇā* in the present case is *samavāya*.

The Naiyāyikas refute the Mīmāṃsaka view. *Tan na, śaktim vinā vyakti-bhānānupapateḥ*. Unless you accept the relation with regard to an individual, an individual cannot form the concept of Verbal understanding. An

individual must also be the content of verbal understanding. Otherwise, in the case of 'ghaṭam ānaya', the hearer never brings an individual pot.

The Mīmāṃsakas may object to the Naiyāyikas, stating that an individual can enter the content of verbal understanding through *lakṣaṇā*. *Lakṣaṇā* is a kind of *vṛtti* like *śakti*. Verbal understanding must be caused by *vṛtti*, so if the understanding generated by *lakṣaṇā* functions well, we should accept the explanation of verbal understanding by means of *lakṣaṇā*. The Naiyāyikas refute this view also. In the above case, *lakṣaṇā* cannot be established with regard to an individual.

Why? *Anupapatipratisamdhānaṃ vināpi vyaktibodhāt*. There must be some condition to accept *lakṣaṇā* to function. The condition is *anvayānupapatti*: impossibility of relation. If two meanings remembered cannot be directly related, then we go to *lakṣaṇā*. It means that if two meanings can be related, we should not take recourse to *lakṣaṇā*. When a person hears 'ghaṭam ānaya', he will understand that *ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭaghaṭavyakti* should be brought. There is no difficulty to bring *vyakti* into the verbal understanding, because *ghaṭatvajāti* and *ghaṭavyakti* are connected by *samavāya*. Thus, we have no problem of *anupapatti*, so we need not take resort to *lakṣaṇā*. 'Pratisandhāna' means *jñāna*. In Alaṅkāra śāstra also, *lakṣaṇā* is defined: *śakyārthabaddhe sati lakṣaṇā*.

Some one may propose that a word means an endless number of individuals. This amounts to saying that a word has an endless number of *śakti*.

The Naiyāyikas reject this view. The reason is 'sakalavyaktau ekasya śakteḥ svikārāt'. With reference to all members of one class, only one *śakti* is accepted. *Śakti* is God's desire that all members of one class should be denoted by this word, and it is *nityecchā* 'permanent desire'. This *icchā* is *eka*, single, so *śakti* which is nothing but *īśvarecchā* or simply *icchā*, is also single.

If all members of a class are denoted by a single word, the Mīmāṃsakas may ask, "What will be the *anugamakadharmā* of them?" *Anugamakadharmā* is a combining factor of all individuals denoted by a word. The Naiyāyikas accept one *anugamakadharmā*, because *śakti* is single. For instance, the word 'go' denotes all cows, and the common property of them is *gotva*, cowness. *Na cānanugamaḥ, gotvāder evānugamakatvāt*. Here, *anugamakadharmā* is *pravṛttinimitta*. *Pravṛttinimitta* is a property which combines all entities denoted by a single word.

Now the Naiyāyikas put some problems to the Mīmāṃsakas. In what form is *śakti* understood according to them? *Kiñ ca gauḥ śakyeti śaktigraho yadi tadā vyaktau śaktiḥ*. If *śakti* is understood in the form 'gauḥ śakyah' (a cow is the meaning of 'go'), then the word 'go' means an individual cow. *Yadi tu gotvaṃ śakyam iti śaktigrahas tadā gotvaprakārapādarthasmaranaṃ śābdabhodas ca na syāt*. If *śakti* is understood in the form of 'gotvaṃ śakyam', then the verbal understanding or remembrance of meaning which has *gotva* as a *prakāra* will not arise. But when we hear 'gām ānaya', we understand that a

cow should be brought, and he has understood that *gotvaviśiṣṭago* should be brought. In this case, he remembers an individual cow, and his remembrance has *gotva* as the *prakāra* and *go* as the *viśeṣya*. Thus, if we grasp *śakti* in the form ‘*gotvaṃ śakyam*’, we do not have the remembrance whose *prakāra* is *gotva*. Unless we have the remembrance, *padārthasmarāṇa*, of a cow, we do not have the verbal understanding, *śābdabodha*, of ‘*gām ānaya*’.

Why doesn’t *śābdabodha* arise when *padārthasmarāṇa* does not occur? Here is the maxim: *samānaprakāratvena śaktijñānasya padārthasmarāṇaṃ śābdabodhaṃ ca prati hetuvāt*. In the manner you learn *śakti* ‘relation’, you remember the object of the word. And you have *śābdabodha*. *Yene prakāreṇa śaktigrahas tenaiva prakāreṇa smaraṇaṃ tenaiva prakāreṇa ca śābdabodhaḥ*. In other words, if something is a *prakāra* at the stage of learning the meaning of a word, the same is the *prakāra* of the remembrance of the meaning and the *prakāra* of the *śābdabodha*. Hence, if *gotva* is the *prakāra* at the stage of learning the meaning of a word, *gotvatva* will be the *prakāra* of *padārthasmarāṇa* and *śābdabodha*. But nobody will understand, from ‘*gām ānaya*’, *gotvatvaprakāragotvaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*. Everybody will have *gotvaprakāragoviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*.

Further the Naiyāyikas say. *Kiñ ca gotve yadi śaktis tadā gotvatvaṃ śakyatāvachedakaṃ vācyam*. If *gotva* is the meaning of ‘go’ as the Mīmāṃsakas argue, the *śakya* is *gotva*, and the *śakyatāvachedaka* is *gotvatva*. Then, what is *gotvatva*? *Gotvatvaṃ tu gavetarāsamavetatve sati sakalagosamavetatvam*. *Gotva* is a *jāti*, so *gotvatva* cannot be a *jāti*. Because *jāti* cannot exist in another *jāti*. Then *gotvatva* is an *upādhi*. The simple rule to distinguish an *upādhi* from a *jāti* runs as follows: a *jāti* cannot be defined and an *upādhi* can be. *Gotvatva* is the state of being that which does not exist by the relation of *samavāya* in anything other than cows: *gavetarāsamavetatve sati*. *Samavetatva* means ‘*samavāyasambandhena vartamānatva*’, and *asamvetatva* means ‘*samavāyasambandhena avartamānatva*’. At the same time, *gotvatva* must be the state of being that which exists by the relation of *samavāya* in all cows: *sakalagosamavetatvam*.

In the above case, to know *gotva* namely the *śakyatāvachedaka*, the Mīmāṃsakas depend upon the notion of ‘go’. To know *go*, *gotva* is required. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas hold that the *gotvaviśiṣṭago* is *śakya* and that the *śakyatāvachedaka* is *gotva*. Since *gotva* is a *jāti*, we need nothing more to know *gotva*. In the Mīmāṃsaka view, the process to know the *śakyatāvachedaka* is more cumbersome than that in the Naiyāyika view.

Now, conclusion. *Tasmāt tattajjātyākṛtviśiṣṭatadvyaktibodhānupapattyā kalpyamānā śaktir jātyākṛtviśiṣṭavyaktau viśrāmyatīti*. Unless we accept all relations between a *jāti* and *vyaktis* and between *ākṛti* and *vyaktis*, they cannot appear in verbal understanding. So the Mīmāṃsaka view that only a *jāti* is the meaning of a word cannot be maintained. *Śakti* ultimately results into

jātyākṛtīviśiṣṭavyakti because without postulating such *śakti* we cannot explain the verbal content in which *vyakti* appears as qualified by a *jāti* and *ākṛti*.

7. The kinds of *pada*

So far we have discussed how *śakti* is understood. *Śakti* is the relation between a word and its meaning, and also *śakti* exists in a *pada*. In other words, a *pada* is *śaktiviśiṣṭa* or qualified by *śakti*. *Yat śaktiviśiṣṭam tat śaktam*. A *pada* is therefore called *śaktam*. Whatever has a meaning is called a *pada* in the Nyāya system, so even the stem of a noun, the root of a verb, an affix, etc. are called a *pada*. A *pada* is a minimum meaningful unit. This corresponds to a *morpheme* in linguistics.

Tac caturvidham. Tat padam. Caturvidham, of four kinds. *Kvacid yaugikam, kvacid rūḍham, kvacid yogarūḍham, kvacid yaugikarūḍham*. ‘*Yaugika*’ means ‘derivative’ or ‘etimological’, and this notion comes from *yoga* which means *sūtra*, a grammatical rule. ‘*Yaugika*’ means that which is derived by grammatical rules. *Tathā hi yatrāvayavārtha eva budhyate tad yaugikam, yathā pācakādipadam*. Suppose, *pada* A contains two elements *x* and *y*. When only the meanings of *x* and *y* are understood from A, A is ‘derivative’ or ‘etimological’. For instance, from *pācaka* is understood the meaning of its components *pac* and *aka*. The root *pac* means *pāka*, and the suffix *aka* means *karṭṛ*. So we can understand the meaning of ‘*pācaka*’ as ‘a doer of the action of cooking or a cook’.

The second variety is *rūḍham*, conventional. *Yatrāvayavaśaktinirapekṣayā samudāyaśaktyā budhyate tad rūḍham, yathā gomaṇḍalādipadam*. Independently of the *śakti* of the components of a *pada*, the meaning of the *pada* is understood on the strength of the *śakti* of the whole *pada*. The examples are ‘*go*’, ‘*maṇḍala*’, etc.

The third variety is *yogarūḍham*, etimologically conventional. *Yatra tu avayavaśaktiviśaye samudāyaśaktir apy asti tad yogarūḍham, yathā paṅkajādipadam*. Where the object referred to through the partial *śakti* of the components of a *pada* is also referred to through the collective *śakti* of the whole word. For instance, ‘*paṅkaja*’ denotes a *padma* (lotus), and ‘*paṅka*’ (mud) and ‘*ja*’ (arising) together denotes those which arise in mud. One of them is a lotus. Hence, the partial *śakti* and the collective *śakti* work with reference to *padma*. *Paṅka* is the *karṭṛ* of the action of *janma*. *tathā hi — paṅkajapadam avayavaśaktyā paṅkajanikarṭṛrūpam arthaṃ bodhayati, samudāyaśaktyā ca padmatvena rūpeṇa padam bodhayati*. Here the collective *śakti* or the *śakti* of the whole *pada* gives delimitation of the meaning conveyed by the *śakti* of the components.

In the above case of the word ‘*paṅkaja*’, some one may argue: *kevalāvayavaśaktyā kumude prayogaḥ syāt*. Let the word mean a *kumuda*, a

lily, on the strength of the *avayavaśakti* of the word. Because *avayavaśakti* made the word mean something that arises in mud.

This view is refuted. Why? *Rūdhijñānasya kevalayaugikārthabuddhau pratibandhakatvād iti prāñcaḥ*. The earlier Naiyāyikas explain the answer in this manner. There is a maxim: *yogād rūdhiḥ balīyasī*. A conventional sense superseeds an etimological sense. *Avayavaśakti* conveys an etimological sense, while *samudāyaśakti* conveys a conventional sense. What is the necessity for accepting such a maxim? When we are simultaneously presented an etimological meaning and a conventional meaning, we will have to accept the latter one. In other words, the knowledge of an etimological meaning will obstruct, *pratibandhaka*, the arising of the knowledge of a conventional meaning.

The author of the *Kiraṇāvalī* gives an answer to this problem. *Vastutas tu samudāyaśaktiyupasthitapadme 'vayavārthapañkajanikartur anvayo bhavati sānnidhyāt*. Really speaking, to a lotus remembered on the basis of *samudāyaśakti*, the agent of the action of growing in mud is related, because a lotus is presented in our mind as the meaning of 'pañkaja' before something that grows in mud. *Sānnidhyāt* means *prathamopasthitatvāt*. Here the Navya-naiyāyikas take a lotus as the prominent meaning and 'what grows in mud' as the secondary meaning. And they try to connect the latter to the former in analyzing the meaning of 'pañkaja'.

If '*pañkajam asti*' is uttered when there is no lotus but there is a *kumuda*, a lily, then '*pañkaja*' means a *kumuda* and not a *padma*. In this sense, *rūdhyaṛtha* or the conventional meaning is known as contradictory to the fact, but the etimological meaning is not conveyed on the basis of *avayavaśakti*. Because the etimological meaning is only that which arises in the mud. Hence, the word '*pañkaja*' can convey a *kumuda* on the strength of *lakṣaṇā*. *Yatra tu rūdhyaṛthasya bādhaḥ pratisandhīyate tatra lakṣaṇayā kumudāder bodhaḥ*. *Pratisandhīyate* means *jñāyate*. The *lakṣaṇā* here is a *śakyasambandha*, and the *śakya* is a *padma*, and the *sambandha* between a *padma* and a *kumuda* is the relation of 'growing in the same locus, i.e., mud', i.e., *sāmānādhikaraṇya*.

Another type of situation is given: *yatra tu kumudatvena rūpeṇa bodhe na tātparyajñānam padmatvasya ca bādhas tatrāvayavaśaktimātreṇa nirvāha ity api āhuḥ*. Some Naiyāyikas say: Suppose, in the above case of the utterance '*pañkajam asti*', the speaker does not intend '*pañkaja*' to mean a *kumuda*, and there is no lotus, either. In such a case, there is no chance of applying *samudāyaśakti*, and then only *avayavaśakti* or *śakti* of the components of the word can function.

The expression '*ity api āhuḥ*' suggests that the author, Viśvanātha, does not agree with the above view. One meaning, a lotus, is the primary meaning of '*pañkaja*' obtained on the basis of *samudāyaśakti*, and all other meanings will have to be obtained on the basis of *lakṣaṇā*.

The Naiyayikas attempt to connect any other meanings of 'pañkaja' to a lotus either by śakti or by lakṣaṇā. One example can be given of a *sthalapadma*, which grows on the ground and whose flower is like that of a lotus. The meaning of 'pañkaja' contradicts the meaning of 'sthalapadma', because a *sthalapadma* does not grow in mud. The śakti of the components of 'pañkaja' cannot convey a *sthalapadma*, but the collective śakti or *samudāyaśakti* can convey a *sthalapadma* simply as a *padma* not as a *sthalapadma*. *Yatra tu sthalapadmādāv avayavārthabādhas tatra samudāyaśaktyā padmatvena rūpeṇa bodhaḥ*. Here not *avayavaśakti* but *samudāyaśakti* functions unlike the case in which 'pañkaja' means a *padma*. In that case both *avayavaśakti* and *samudāyaśakti* function. The present case of a *sthalapadma* shows that the *samudāyaśakti* decisively plays an important role in getting the meaning of a word.

If a *sthalapadma* or a ground lotus is considered to be of a different kind, then a *sthalapadma* is presented by 'pañkaja' through lakṣaṇā. *Yadi tu sthalapadmam vijātiyam eva tadā lakṣaṇayaiveti*.

Now the fourth variety of pada, *yaugikarūḍha* or etimological and conventional. *Yatra tu yaugikārtharūḍhyarthayoḥ svātantryeṇa bodhas tad yaugikarūḍham, yathodbhidādipadam*. When the etimological and conventional meanings of a word are independently understood, the word is a etimological and conventional *pada*. An example is 'udbhid'. What is the primary meaning? 'Piercing up'. Hence, what pierces the ground or coming up on the ground is called *udbhid*: for example, *taru* (tree), *gulma* (bush), and so forth. On the other hand, in the sacrificial literature this word 'udbhid' is used: *udbhidā yajeta paśukāmaḥ*. Here 'udbhid' is a name of a sacrifice, and a person who desires cattles should perform *Udbhid* sacrifice. The etimological meaning of 'udbhid' is a tree, bush, etc, and the conventional meaning is the name of the sacrifice. Both the meanings are obtained independently of each other and in both these senses the word is used.

8. lakṣaṇā

Lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhas tātparyānupoapattitaḥ. The definition of *lakṣaṇā* is *śakyasambandhaḥ*: the relation with the primary meaning of a word. And the necessity for accepting *lakṣaṇā* is *tātparyānupapattitaḥ*: otherwise the intention of a speaker cannot be understood.

There are two views on the necessity for accepting *lakṣaṇā*. One view is *anvayānupapatti*. 'Śābdabodha' means *anvayabodha*. If the relation between a word and its meaning is only śakti, the meanings of the components of a sentence cannot sometimes be related. In other words, the meaning of a sentence cannot be conveyed. Then the intention of a speaker is not understood. To get the meanings related, we require *lakṣaṇā*. Another view is

tātparyānupapattiḥ. If only *śakti* is accepted as the relation, we cannot get the intention of a speaker in many cases. So we should accept *lakṣaṇā* in analyzing a sentence.

According to the latter view, the direct cause of *lakṣaṇā* is *tātparyānupapatti*, and it is not necessary to postulate *anvayānupapatti* between *tātparyānupapatti* and *lakṣaṇā*. This is the main difference between those two views. *Tātparyānupapatti* is *lakṣaṇābīja*. If *anvayānupapatti* were *lakṣaṇābīja*, there will be difficulties in analyzing a sentence. Later, the author will explain what difficulties occur.

Lakṣaṇeti. Gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa ityādau gaṅgāpadasya śakyārthe pravāharūpe ghoṣasyānvayānupapattis tātparyānupapattir vā yatra pratisandhīyate tatra lakṣaṇayā tīrasya bodha iti. 'Gaṅgā' in 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ' means pravāha, stream by śakti, and ghoṣa means a residence of a milk man by śakti. Because a residence of a milk man cannot stand in the stream of the Ganges, there arises the understanding of impossibility of the relation between those two meanings (anvayānupapatti) or the impossibility of the intention of the speaker of the sentence (tātparyānupapatti). In other words, the speaker does not want to mean by that sentence that the residence stands in the stream of the Ganges. In such a case, we should understand that 'gaṅgā' means tīra, the bank of the Ganges, on the strength of lakṣaṇā.

Sā ca śakyasambandharūpā. Sā lakṣaṇā. what is lakṣaṇā in this case? Tathā hi pravāharūpaśakyārthasambandhasya tīre gṛhītatvāt tīrasya smaraṇam. The bank is understood to have a relation with the primary meaning of 'gaṅgā', namely, *pravāha*, the stream of the Ganges. So 'gaṅgā' reminds us of the bank. Then we understand that there is a residence of the milk man on the bank of the Ganges: *tataḥ śābdabodhaḥ*. The relation between the bank and the stream is contact, and this contact is *lakṣaṇā* in the present case.

Paran tu yady anvayānupapattir lakṣaṇābījam syāt tadā yaṣṭīḥ praveśayety atra lakṣaṇā na syāt, yaṣṭiṣu praveśānvayasyānupapatter abhāvāt. The sentence in question is 'yaṣṭīḥ praveśaya'. 'Yaṣṭi' means a *daṇḍa* a stick, and the meaning of the sentence would be 'Make the sticks enter'. It is possible for the sticks to enter some place, for instance, a room. Thus we can get 'yaṣṭīḥ' and 'praveśaya' connected, and there is no *anvayānupapatti*. If *anvayānupapatti* is the cause of *lakṣaṇā*, i.e., *lakṣaṇābīja*, then we need not take recourse to *lakṣaṇā* in interpreting that sentence.

On the other hand, if the intention of the speaker of 'yaṣṭīḥ praveśaya' is to give meals to the *sannyāsins* or stick-holders, then the entering of the sticks is not compatible with the intention. Because that the speaker wants the stick-holders to enter the room for meals implies that their sticks are also allowed to enter there: *yaṣṭipraveśana* or *daṇḍapraveśana*. If the cause of *lakṣaṇā* is *anvayānupapatti*, there is no room for *lakṣaṇā* because a *daṇḍa* and *praveśana* can be connected to each other. But the speaker does not intend

daṇḍapraveśana by that sentence but *daṇḍipraveśana* or *yaṣṭidharapraveśa*. So 'yaṣṭi' should mean *yaṣṭidhara* or a stick-holder by *lakṣaṇā*: *tena yaṣṭipraveśe bhojanatātparyānupapattiyā yaṣṭidhareṣu lakṣaṇā*. What is *lakṣaṇā* in this case? *Lakṣaṇā* is *śakyasambandha*, and *śakya* of 'yaṣṭi' is a stick. The relation of the *śakya* is the relation of a stick and its holder, so the relation turns out to be *samyoga*.

Similarly, *evaṃ kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām*. This means 'Protect the curd from crows'. Does this mean that a cat does not eat the curd? How about crains? The curd must be protected from anything that spoils the curd, so 'kāka' in that sentence must mean anything that spoils the curd, *dadhyupaghātaka*. This meaning must be intended through *lakṣaṇā*, because the protection of the curd from all is to be done. *Kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām ityādau dadhyupaghātake lakṣaṇā, sarvato dadhirakṣāyās tātparyaviśayatvāt*.

The author affirms with the above two examples that *tātparyānupapatti* is the ground for *lakṣaṇā*. Another example is given: *chatriṇo yānti*. Suppose, some people are found going and a few of them hold umbrellas in their hands. Here, 'chatriṇaḥ' primarily means only those people who possess an umbrella, and the sentence means that only those few are going. The speaker, however, intends to say that all that have or do not have an umbrella in the group or *ekasārthavāhin* (a collection of the people) are going. The *śakyārtha* 'chatriṇaḥ' is only those that have an umbrella or a part of the group, so the *śakyasambandha* or *lakṣaṇā* is *samudāyi-samudāya-sambandha* or a member-group relation. *Evaṃ chatriṇo yantītyādau chatripadasyaikasārthavāhitve lakṣaṇā*. This type of *lakṣaṇā* is called *lakṣaṇā* which does not give up its own primary meaning: *iyam evājahatsvārthā lakṣaṇety ucyate. Ekasārthavāhitvena rūpeṇa chatritadanyayor bodhāt. 'Tadanya'* means an *achatrin*. The reason why the *lakṣaṇā* in the case of 'chatriṇo yānti' is called *ajahatlakṣaṇā* is that the word 'charinaḥ' conveys both a *chatrin* and an *achatrin*.

To conclude, *yadi cānvayānupapattir bījam syāt, tadā kvacit gaṅgāpadasya tīre, kvacit ghoṣapadasya matsyādau, lakṣaṇeti niyamo na syāt*. If we accept that only *anvayānupapatti* is the ground for *lakṣaṇā*, we can get no rule to decide whether 'gaṅgā' of 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' means the bank of the Ganges by *lakṣaṇā* or 'ghoṣa' means fish by *lakṣaṇā*. We do not necessarily accept only *lakṣaṇā* in the word 'gaṅgā', and we may postulate *lakṣaṇā* in the word 'ghoṣa' also. In the latter case, 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' may mean 'there is a fish in the Ganges'. This is a possible interpretation. It depends upon the intention of the speaker, which one is the correct interpretation out of those two.

Now, a new topic starts. Just as *śakyatāvacchedaka* is included in the *śakya*, is *lakṣyatāvacchedaka* included in the *lakṣya* or not? For instance, the word 'gaṅgā' in 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' means *pravāha* by *śakti*. The *śakyārtha* is *pravāha*, and the *śakyatāvacchedaka* is *pravāhatva*. The *śakyārtha* is not only *pravāha*, but *pravāhatvaviśiṣṭaprāvāha*, because Navya-nyāya maintains that

śakyārtha is *jātivīśiṣṭavyakti*. The *lakṣyārtha* of 'gaṅgā' is, as mentioned previously, *tīra*, and the *lakṣyatāvachedaka* is *tīratva*. The question is whether the *lakṣyārtha* involves this *lakṣyatāvachedaka* or not. Viśvanātha concludes that *lakṣaṇā* need not convey *lakṣyatāvachedaka*. He provides the ground for this. *Idaṃ tu bodhyam. Śakyārthasambandho yadi tīratvena rūpeṇa gr̥hītas tadā tīratvena tīrabodhaḥ. Śakyārtha* of 'gaṅgā' is *pravāha*. *Pravāhasambandhaḥ kutra? Tīre. Kena rūpeṇa? Tīratvena rūpeṇa. Tīratvaviśiṣṭaḥ arthaḥ gaṅgāpadajanyabodhaviśayah bhavatu*. Then, the meaning of 'gaṅgā' is understood as the bank. The *lakṣyārtha* is the bank, and the *lakṣyatāvachedaka* is bankness. But *yadi tu gaṅgātīratvena rūpeṇa gr̥hītas tadā tenaiva rūpeṇa smaraṇam*. If the relation of 'gaṅgā' is understood as the relation with the bank of the Ganges, then the bank of the Ganges is remembered from 'gaṅgā'. The *lakṣyatāvachedaka* is *gaṅgātīratva*. In those cases, how can the *lakṣyatāvachedaka*, *tīratva* or *gaṅgātīratva*, enter into the verbal content? For instance, if the *lakṣyatāvachedaka*, *tīratva*, is conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*, this *lakṣaṇā* is the relation with the *śakyārtha* or *pravāha*. This is *pravāhasamīpasamavāya*. *Pravāhasamīpa* is the *tīra*, and in this *tīra* there exists *tīratva* by *samavāya*. From the above example, we can conclude that *lakṣyatāvachedaka* is not presented by *lakṣaṇā*: *ata eva lakṣyatāvachedake na lakṣaṇā*. Because *tatprakāraḥ bodhasya tatra lakṣaṇām vināpi upapatteḥ*. If the *tīra* is remembered by *lakṣaṇā*, then *tīratva* has already been included in this *lakṣyārtha* or the *tīra* without taking recourse to *lakṣaṇā*, namely, *pravāhasamīpasamavāya*.

Some one may argue: if *lakṣyatāvachedaka* is not conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*, *śakyatāvachedaka* also will not be conveyed by *śakti* likewise. *Paran tu evaṃ krameṇa śakyatāvachedake 'pi śaktir na syāt*. Because *tatprakāraśakyārthasmarāṇam prati tatpadasya sāmāthyam ityasya suvacatvād iti vibhāvanīyam*. Let us take for example *ghaṭapadam*. What is *śakya*? *Ghaṭārtha* or *ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭa*. The *śakyatāvachedaka* is *ghaṭatva*. *Ghaṭatvena rūpeṇa yadi śaktigrahaḥ ghaṭatvaprakāraśābdabodhaḥ. Tatprakāraḥ ghaṭatvaprakāraḥ, śakyārthaḥ ghaṭārthaḥ, tasya smaraṇam prati, tatpadasya ghaṭapadasya, sāmāthyam śaktatvam* namely *śakti*. *Suvacatvāt*, it can be easily said. *Vibhāvanīyam*, One must think over. Thus, even if *śakti* with reference to the *śakyatāvachedaka*, *ghaṭatva*, the *avachedaka* will appear in the verbal understanding. This view can be accepted even by the Naiyāyikas.

Yatra tu śakyārthasya paramparāsambandharūpā lakṣaṇā sā lakṣitalakṣaṇety ucyate. Suppose, the word *x* primarily denotes the *artha* *y*, and *x* means *z* by *lakṣaṇā*. Suppose further, from *z* *z'* is remembered. The word *x* has an indirect relation *paramparāsambandha* with *z'* through *y* and *z*. Here also *x* means *z'* by *lakṣaṇā*, but this *lakṣaṇā* is particularized as *lakṣitalakṣaṇā*. The *lakṣaṇā* in this case consists of the relation between *y* and *z* and the relation between *z* and *z'*. The former relation is nothing but *lakṣaṇā*, and the latter is

lakṣitalakṣaṇā.

Substitute *x* for *dvirepha* and *y* for *rephadvaya* (two 'r's). From the word *dvirepha*, we understand *rephadvaya*. From *rephadvaya*, we understand *bhramarapada* because of the relation of two 'r's (*rephadvayasambandha*) or because of *bhramara*'s two 'r's. We can substitute *z* for *bhramarapada*. From *bhramarapada* (*lakṣitārtha*), we can remember a *bhramara* (bee). Thus, we can comprehend a *bhramara* from the word *dvirepha*. This is an example of *lakṣitalakṣaṇā*. *Yathā dvirephādīpadāt rephadvayasambandho bhramarapade jñāyate bhramarapadasya ca sambandho bhramare jñāyate iti tatra lakṣitalakṣaṇā.*

Now, a very peculiar view is presented. That is maintained by the Prābhākaras, I think. But the commentator says that it is a *prācīna* view. *Śābdabodha* has been said to be produced by *padajñāna* which is the *kāraṇa*. *Padajñāna* should be associated with *vṛttijñāna*. So *vṛttijñānasahakṛtapada-jñānaṃ śābdabodhaṃ janayati*. Since *vṛtti* has two varieties, *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā*, there are four interpretations of the above Sanskrit sentence. (1) *śaktijñānasahakṛtapadajñānaṃ śābdabodhaṃ janayati*, (2) *lakṣaṇājñānasahakṛtapadajñānaṃ śābdabodhaṃ janayati*, (3) *śaktīlakṣaṇobhayasahakṛtapadajñānaṃ śābdabodhaṃ janayati*, (4) *śaktīlakṣaṇānyatarajñānasahakṛtapadajñānaṃ śābdabodhaṃ janayati*. Some accept only (1), so a word having a primary meaning can alone produce *śābdabodha*, but not a word having a secondary meaning. A word having a secondary meaning is a *lakṣaṇika* word, e.g., '*gaṅgā*' in '*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*'. To mean this, the author introduces the view: *lakṣaṇikaṃ padaṃ nānubhāvakaṃ*.

How does *śābdabodha* occur in the above case? How can we understand the meaning of '*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*'? The *lakṣaṇikapada* '*gaṅgā*' does not produce *lakṣaṇikārthānubhava*, *tīrānubhava*. But the other word '*ghoṣa*' does make '*gaṅgā*' mean *lakṣaṇikārtha* or *tīra* in *śābdabodha*. *Lakṣaṇikārthasya śābdabodhe tu padāntaraṃ kāraṇam*. This implies that we should have at least one word which has *śakti*. Why does the other word '*ghoṣa*' cause '*gaṅgā*' to mean the *tīra*? Because *śaktīlakṣaṇānyatarasambandhenetarapadārthānsvasvaśakyārthāśābdabodhaṃ prati padānāṃ sāmāthyāvadhāraṇāt*. *Śaktapada* has power or capacity *sāmāthyā* to generate *śābdabodha* of its own primary meaning (*svaśaktapadaṃ tatpadasyārthaḥ svaśakyārthaḥ*) associated with another *padārtha* (e.g., *gaṅgā*) which is obtained either by *śakti* or by *lakṣaṇā*. Suppose, in the case of '*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*' the word '*ghoṣa*' has the primary meaning. This meaning is *svaśakyārtha*. But '*ghoṣa*' here conveys not only the *svaśakyārtha* i.e., the residence of a milk-man but also the residence standing on the bank of the Ganges. The meaning of 'the bank of the Ganges' is conveyed by '*gaṅgā*' through *lakṣaṇā*. Thus, the word '*ghoṣa*' generates the verbal understanding of its own meaning *ghoṣa* associated with the *lakṣaṇikapadārtha* or *gaṅgātīra*.

But we can provide a sentence in which all the words are *lākṣaṇikapadas*. Suppose, when you abuse someone, you will say, ‘*kumatih paśuḥ*’. This means that a person of poor knowledge behaves like a beast. The primary meaning of ‘*paśu*’ is a beast, but by *lakṣaṇā* it means *paśusadrṣa*. The word ‘*ku*’ means bad or poor, and ‘*mati*’ means knowledge. The word ‘*kumati*’ means not only bad or poor knowledge but also a person who possesses poor knowledge. That word is a *bahuvrīhi* compound. This compound conveys the meaning other than the meanings of the components of the compound: *anyapadārthapradhāno bahuvrīhiḥ*. In other words, the compound means neither *ku* nor *mati*, but it means ‘*kutsitā matih yasya sa*’ by *lakṣaṇā*. Thus, we can understand that both the words in the sentence are *lākṣaṇikas* and the sentence contains no *śaktapada*. However, the sentence is meaningful. Therefore, it is not true that a *lākṣaṇikapada* cannot produce *śābdabodha*.

Viśvanātha does not refute the view that a *lākṣaṇika* cannot produce *śābdabodha*. He seems to think that it is easy to refute that view by an example such as ‘*kumatih paśuḥ*’, and so he does not present any discussion.

Vākye tu śakter abhāvāc chakyasambandharūpā lakṣaṇāpi nāsti. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the *āśraya* of *śakti* is a *pada* and also a *vākyā* or a sentence. For example, an *arthavādavākya* in the vedic literature is connected with a *vidhivākya*. In what way? Through *prāśastya*. How does an *arthavādavākya* mean *prāśastya*? By *lakṣaṇā*. To take an example, ‘*kumati*’ is a sentence according to the Navya-naiyāyikas. Its components are ‘*ku*’ and ‘*mati*’. A sentence is a collection of *padas*: *padasamūhaḥ vākyam*. The sentence ‘*kumati*’ does not convey *kutsitamati* by *śakti*. We must accept *lakṣaṇā* in ‘*kumati*’ with reference to *kumatimat*. The Mīmāṃsakas argue that to make a sentence meaningful, we must hold that a sentence possesses *lakṣaṇā*.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept that a sentence has *śakti*, so a sentence has no *lakṣaṇā*. For example, *yatra tu gabhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣa ity uktaṃ tatra nadīpadasya nadītīre lakṣaṇā. Gabhīrapadārthasya nadyā sahābhedānvayaḥ*. Now ‘*gabhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*’. The word ‘*nadī*’ means *tīra* by *lakṣaṇā*. Then, what is the meaning of ‘*gabhīra*’? Can *gabhīra* be connected to *tīra* ‘bank’? We should take *nadītīra* and not simply *tīra* as the meaning of ‘*nadī*’. Now we can relate *gabhīra* to *nadī* in *nadītīra* which is the meaning of ‘*nadī*’ due to *lakṣaṇā*. Then *śābdabodha* will be *gabhīrābhinnanadītīravṛttighoṣaḥ*, and the relation between *gabhīra* and *nadī* is *abheda*.

Some one may object to the Naiyāyikas saying that *gabhīra* is related to a part of the meaning of ‘*nadī*’, namely, *nadītīra*. Because there is the rule ‘*padārthaḥ padārthena anveti na tu padārthaikadeśena*’. The Naiyāyikas admit that the meaning of a word can sometimes have a relation with a part of the meaning of another word: *kvacid ekadeśānvayasyāpi svikṛtatvāt*. Hence, the above interpretation to postulate *abheda* relation between *gabhīra* and *nadī* of

nadītīra is possible. This type of interpretation quite often occurs. For instance, *devadattasya gurukulam*. This means 'devadattasya guroḥ kulam'. Here, *padaikadeśānvaya* is allowed, because *devadatta* is connected with only *guru* and not with *gurukula*.

Generally such a connection between a word-meaning and a part of another word-meaning is not allowed. Because *padārthaḥ padārthenānveti*. For example, '*ṛddhasya rājamātaṅgaḥ*' is impossible if it means '*ṛddhasya rajñāḥ mātaṅgaḥ*'. But Patañjali provides a rule for exception. When there is *nityasākāṅkṣāpada* like *guru*, it always demands another words, and *sāpekṣātve 'pi gamakatvāt samāsaḥ*. The expression '*devadattasya gurukulam*' means '*devadattasya guroḥ kulam*'. The compounded form and the un-compounded form convey the same meaning, because the word '*guru*' is a *sāpekṣapada*. So the *sāpekṣapada*, '*guru*', can be compounded with the other word, '*kulam*'.

Yadi tatraikadeśānvayo na svīkriyate tadā nadīpadasya gabhīranadītīre lakṣaṇā, gabhīrapadaṃ tātparyagrāhakam. If the above interpretation of the relation between a word-meaning and a part of another word-meaning in the case of '*gabhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*' is not acceptable, one can interpret it as follows: '*nadī*' means *gabhīranadītīra* by *lakṣaṇā*, and the word '*gabhīra*' indicates the speaker's intention that '*nadī*' means *gabhīranadītīra*.

The Naiyāyikas continue to explain that *lakṣaṇā* exists in a *pada* only and not in a *vākya*. *Bahuvrīhāv api evam*. In the case of a *bahuvrīhisamāsa* also, we accept *lakṣaṇā* in a *pada*. *Tatra hi citragupadādau yadi ekadeśānvayāḥ svīkriyate tadā gopadasya gosvāmini lakṣaṇā, gavi citrābhedaṅvayaḥ*. The compound in question is '*citragu*'. Let us make a sentence like '*citragauḥ devadattaḥ*': Devadatta possesses cows of verigated colors. '*Citragu*' is interpreted as '*citrāḥ gavaḥ yasya saḥ*'. No element in '*citraguḥ*' expresses '*yasya saḥ*', and so the Mīmāṃsakas postulate *lakṣaṇā* in '*citraguḥ*' to mean '*yasya saḥ*'. Instead, the Naiyāyikas contend that '*gu*' or '*go*' means *gosvāmin* by *lakṣaṇā*. From '*citraguḥ devadattaḥ*', we can get the *sābdabodha* '*citrābhinnagosvāmī devadattaḥ*'. The relation between *citra* and *go* is *abheda*. Now *citra* is related to a part of the meaning *gosvāmin*, namely, to *go*. *Yadi tatraikadeśānvayo na svīkriyate, tadā gopadasya citragosvāmini lakṣaṇā, citrapadaṃ tātparyagrāhakam*. If the word-meaning '*citra*' is not allowed to be related to a part of the meaning of another word, i.e., to '*go*', then '*go*' means *citragosvāmin* by *lakṣaṇā*. The word '*citra*' indicates the speaker's intention that '*go*' should mean *citragosvāmin*.

Similarly, '*ārūdhavānaro vṛkṣaḥ*' is also interpreted as a tree on which a monkey climbs. The *vigrahavākya* of '*ārūdhavānaraḥ*' is '*ārudhaḥ vānaraḥ yaṃ saḥ*'. The object of *ārohana* or climbing is a *vṛkṣa*, so the *sābdabodha* will be '*vānara-arohana-karma-abhinnavṛkṣaḥ*'. So '*ārūdhavānara*' should stand for *vānara-arohana-karman* by *lakṣaṇā*. Then *ārūdhā* will be redundant. But it is *tātparyagrāhaka*, and it causes *vānara* to mean *vānararohanakarman*. *Evam*

ārūḍhavānaro vṛkṣa ity atra vānarapadasya vānarārohanakarmani lakṣaṇā, ārūḍhapadaṃ tātparyagrāhakam.

In the case of a *tatpuruṣasamāsa*, *lakṣaṇā* exists in the first member of the compound. *Tathā hi rājapuruṣa ityātau rājapadārthena puruṣapadārthasya sākṣān nānvayaḥ*. The *viśrahavākya* of 'rājapuruṣa' is 'rajñāḥ puruṣaḥ'. The *śābdabodha* will be *rājasambandhyabhinnapuruṣaḥ*. From 'rāja' we get a *rājan* and a *puruṣa* from 'puruṣa'. The meaning of the genitive case-ending, *sambandhin*, should be understood by *lakṣaṇā*, because no element of 'rājapuruṣaḥ' has that meaning.

Without the help of the case-endings, *rājan* and *puruṣa* cannot be connected: *sākṣān nānvayaḥ*. If they are connected directly, the relation between them can be either *bheda* or *abheda*. In the present case, identity relation is impossible between *rājan* and *puruṣa*, but non-identity relation is possible.

The reason for this is that no one accepts the following rule. We can understand the relation between the two meanings of two *nāmans* other than *nipātas* when those meanings are connected by the relation of difference: *nipātātiriktanāmārthayor bhedenānvayabodhaḥ*. 'Nāman' includes *nipātas*, and *nipāta* means an *avyaya* or a particle. This rule is *avyutpanna* or *aprasiddha*. As a result, we cannot understand the relation between the two meanings of two *nāmans* other than *nipāta* when connected with each other by non-identity relation. A particle such as 'na' can be directly connected with other *nāmārtha*. For instance, from 'ghaṭo na paṭaḥ' we can understand 'ghaṭaprativyogikabhedavān paṭaḥ'. The particle 'na' can directly be connected to a *ghaṭa*. But the present case of 'rājapuruṣaḥ', a *rājapadārtha* and a *puruṣapadārtha* are connected to each other by non-identity relation, so the relation between them is not understood directly. In other words, we do not know what kind of non-identity relation connects a *rājan* and a *puruṣa*. Consequently, a *rāja* and a *puruṣa* cannot be directly connected.

If we can understand the relation between the two meanings of two *nāmans* other than *nipātas* when those meanings are connected by non-identity relation, we will understand non-identity relation between the two meanings in the case of 'rājapuruṣaḥ'. If this is not accepted, we will understand non-identity relation between two *namārthas* even in the case of 'rājapuruṣaḥ': *anyathā rājapuruṣa ity atrāpi tathānvayabodhaḥ syāt*.

Why is 'nipātātirikta' stated in 'nipātātiriktanāmārthayor bhedenānvayabodhāvyutpannatvāt'? In other words, what is the reason for saying 'other than *nipātas*' when no one can understand the relation between the two meanings of two *nāmas* other than *nipātas* if those meanings are connected with each other by non-identity relation? The reason is that *nipātas* can directly connect itself with other *nāmārthas*. For instance, in the case of 'ghaṭo na paṭaḥ' the *nipāta* 'na' means *bheda* and can directly connect itself with *ghaṭa* or *paṭa*. So

the *śābdabodha* is 'paṭapratyogikabhedavān ghaṭaḥ'. The *nipāta* 'na' does not need any element to be expressed in the sentence to connect itself with *ghaṭa* or *paṭa*. 'Ghaṭo na paṭa' ityādaḥ ghaṭapaṭābhyāṃ naṅaḥ sāksād evānvayāya nipātātirikteti.

Why is 'bhedena' stated? Because if identity relation connects two *namans*, there is no need for a medium like *vibhakti*. For instance, in the case of 'nīlo ghaṭaḥ' 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa' are *nāmans*. The former means *nīlarūpaviśiṣṭa*. There is identity relation between *nīlapadārtha* and *ghaṭapadārtha*. To understand the relation between them, namely, identity relation, no one needs a medium such as *dvitīdyā* and *tritīyā*. *Nīlo ghaṭa ityādaḥ nāmārthayor abhedasambandhena anvayād bhedeneti*.

Some one may argue: *rājapuruṣa ityādaḥ luptavibhakter smaraṇaṃ kalpyam*. There is no need for accepting *lakṣaṇā* of the first *pada* 'rājā', because the meaning obtained by *lakṣaṇā* comes from the remembrance of the *vibhakti* of that first *pada*.

Na ca vācyam. This view is refuted, because even if the *vibhakti* is not remembered one can understand the meaning of 'rājapuruṣa': *asmṛtavibhakter api tato bodhodayāt*. One does not always know the *vibhakti* elided in between the components of a compound.

To conclude *tāsmat*. *Rājapadādaḥ rājasambandhini lakṣaṇā, tasya ca puruṣeṇa sahābhedānvayaḥ*. The *śābdabodha* of 'rājapuruṣa' is 'rājasambandhyabhinnapurūṣaḥ'.

Dvandve tu dhavakhadirau chindhītyādaḥ dhavaḥ khadiraś ca vibhaktiyarthadvitvaprakāreṇa budhyate tatra na lakṣaṇā. The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that we should accept *lakṣaṇā* in a *vākya*. A compound is a *vākya* according to the Naiyāyikas, so *lakṣaṇā* should be accepted in a compound. The Naiyāyikas object to this view of the Mīmāṃsakas, and they hold that *lakṣaṇā* exists in a *pada* only. There are two kinds of *dvandva*: *itaretaradvandva* and *samāhāradvandva*. In the first kind, no component of a compound possesses *lakṣaṇā*.

The example is 'dhavakhadirau chindhī'. The *śābdabodha* will be 'dhavaṃś ca khadiraṃś ca chindhī'. 'Cut dhava and khadira'. The Mīmāṃsakas may say that the meaning of 'ca' in the *śābdabodha* will be got by *lakṣaṇā* existing in the compound, 'dhavakhadirau'. The Naiyāyikas refute this view. According to them, the *śābdabodha* will be 'dhavakhadiradvayakarmakachedanānukūla-kṛtimān tvam'. *Dvaya* or *dvitvaviśiṣṭa* and *karman* are obtained from the second case-ending of 'dhavakhadirau'. To be precise, *dvitva* appears as the *prakāra* to *dhava* and *khadira* in the *śābdabodha*, and this is the meaning of the *dvitīyavibhakti*. And *dhava* and *khadira* are understood as qualified by this *prakāra*.

Some one may say that *sāhitya* or *sahitasya bhāvaḥ* is understood in the case of a *dvandva* compound. He understands the closeness between *dhava*

and *khadira*. This meaning is not obtained from any member of the compound.

The Naiyāyikas say 'no': *na ca sāhitye lakṣaṇeti vācyam, sāhityaśūnyayor api dvandvadarśanāt*. Even if *dhava* grows far from the place of *khadira*, we can say 'dhavakhadirau'. A *dvandva* compound does not convey closeness or nearness.

The objector may hold that *sāhitya* means *ekakriyānvayitvam* or the connection with one and the same action. In 'dhavakhadirau chindhi', *dhava* and *khadira* are connected to one action of cutting.

Na caikakriyānvayitvarūpaṃ sāhityam astīty vācyam. The Naiyāyikas refute the above view. We can find the example of 'dhavakhadirau paśya chindhi', and there *dhava* and *khadira* are connected not to one action but separately to two actions: *kriyābhede 'pi dhavakhadirau paśya chindhityādidarśanāt, sāhityasyānanubhavāc ca*. We can say 'dhavakharirau chindhi', but *sāhitya* does not exist in *dhava* and *khadira*. And we have no awareness of nearness. So the objector's view is not acceptable.

Ata eva, 'rājaprohitau sāyujyakāmau yajeyātām' ity atra lakṣaṇābhayād dvandva āśriyate. How should the compound 'rājaprohitau' be solved? 'Rājā ca prohiṭas ca' or 'rajñāḥ prohitau'. *Dvandva* or *tatpruṣa*? If a *tatpuruṣa* is accepted, *lakṣaṇā* is to be accepted. But if a *dvandva* is accepted, no *lakṣaṇā* is to be accepted. To avoid *lakṣaṇā*, we have to accept a *dvandva*, an *itaretaradvandva*. It is a general rule to avoid *lakṣaṇā* as far as possible.

Tasmāt sāhityādikaṃ nārthaḥ. To conclude, *sāhitya* etc. are not the meaning of *dvandvasamāsa*. *Kin tu vāstavabhedo yatra tatra dvandvaḥ*. Where actual difference exists, a *dvandva* is allowed.

The Mīmāṃsakas will say: in the case of 'nīlaghaṭayor abhedah', how can 'nīlaghaṭa' be a *dvandvasamāsa*? Because *nīlapadārtha* and *ghaṭapadārtha* are one and the same thing, *nīlarūpaviśiṣṭaghāṭa*, and so a *dvandvasamāsa* is not admissible. The Naiyāyikas deny this view, saying 'na ca vācyam'. According to the Naiyāyikas, 'nīlaghaṭa' can be a *dvandvasamāsa*, also. The word 'nīla' means *nīlatva* by *lakṣaṇā*, and 'ghaṭa' means *ghaṭatva* by *lakṣaṇā*. Then since *nīlatva* differs from *ghaṭatva*, 'nīlaghaṭa' can be a *dvandva*. What does 'abhedah' mean in 'nīlaghaṭayor abhedah'? It is *abhedah* of the two loci of *nīlatva* and *ghaṭatva*: *āśrayābheda*. *Nīlatva* exists in *nīlarūpa*, which also exists in *nīlarūpaviśiṣṭaghāṭa*. *Ghaṭatva* exists in a *ghaṭa*. *Nīlatvaviśiṣṭa* is identical with *ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭa*. *Na ca nīlaghaṭayor abhedah ityādau katham iti vācyam, tatra nīlapadasya nīlatve ghaṭapadasya ghaṭatve lakṣaṇā. Abhedah ity asya cāśrayābheda ity arthaḥ*.

Samāhāradvandve tu yadi samāhāro 'pi anubhūyata ity ucyate, tadā 'hinakulam ityādau parapade 'hinakulasamāhāre lakṣaṇā, pūrvapadam tu tātparyagrāhakam. Some people say that *samāhāra* is understood from a *samāhāradvandva*. Its example is 'ahinakulam'. What is the *vigrahavākya*? *Ahinakulayoḥ samāhārah. Ahiḥ nakulaś ca tayoh samāhārah*. A collection of

an *ahi* and a *nakula*. From the compound, the notion of collection, *samāhāra*, is not understood. How to understand *samāhāra*. Which element conveys the notion of *samāhāra*? Those people accept *lakṣaṇā* in the *parapada* i.e., *nakulapada*, and this word means *ahinakulasamāhāra*. Then the word 'ahi' will become redundant. No, it is *tātparagrāhaka*. The same way should be followed in the case of a *bahuvrīhisamāsa*.

Some people say: if a *samāhāradvandva* conveys *samāhāra*, they do not get a proper *śābdabodha* in the case of 'bherīmṛdaṅgaṃ vādaya'. From this sentence, we may get the following *śābdabodha*: *bherīmṛdaṅgasamāhāra-karmakavādanānukūlakṛtimān tvam*. What does 'samāhārakarmakavādana' mean? We can beat a *bherī* and a *mṛdaṅga* but not their *samāhāra*. So this *śābdabodha* will make no sense. *Bherīmṛdaṅgaṃ vādayety atra katham samāhārasyānvayaḥ*.

Apekṣābuddhiviśeṣarūpasya tasya vādanāsambhavāt. This is the reason why *samāhāra* and *vādana* cannot be connected. *Samāhāra* is the object of a particular *apekṣābuddhi*. *Apekṣābuddhi* is *aneka-ekatva-buddhi*, or a knowledge in which many *ekatvas* are objects. Such a knowledge is produced by the knowledge 'this is one', 'this is one' and so on. Objects of *apekṣābuddhi* are number and collection, and they exist in those objects. Since they are not substances, they cannot become the objects of *vādana*.

Na ca vācyam'. The Naiyāyikas refute the above view. *Paramparā-sambandhena tadanvayāt*. According to them, *samāhāra* and *vādana* can be connected by the indirect relation. *Samāhāra* exists in a *bheri* and a *mṛdaṅga*, where *vādana-karmatva* exists. *Samāhāravādanakarmatvayoḥ samānādhikaraṇatvam*.

Evaṃ pañcamūlītyādāv api. 'Pañcamūlī' is analyzed in the same way. 'Pañca' is *tātparagrāhaka*, and 'mūlī' means *pañcamūlasamāhāra*. The compound means a collection or group of five roots. The ground for the feminine gender of 'pañcamūlī' is the following rule in the *Vārttika*: *akārānatarottarapado dvigu strīyāṃ iṣṭaḥ* (on P 2.4.17).

Some Navya-naiyāyikas present a different interpretation of *samāhāradvandva*. *Pare tu ahinakulam ityātau ahir nakulaś ca budhyate, pratyekam ekatvānvayaḥ, samāhārasamjñā ca yatraikatvam napuṃsakatvam ca 'prāṇitūrye' tyādisūtroktaṃ tatraiva, anyatraikavacanam asādhu ity āhuh*. According to those Navya-naiyāyikas, *samāhāra* is not the content of the understanding of the compound. From the compound 'ahinakulam', an *ahi* and a *nakula* are understood but not their *samāhāra*. We took recourse to *lakṣaṇā* to get the notion of *samāhāra* from the compound. But since the compound does not convey *samāhāra*, *lakṣaṇā* becomes unnecessary.

If the singular number of 'ahinakulam' is not connected to *samāhāra*, the above interpretation causes the question as to what the singular number is connected. Those Navya-naiyāyikas answer: *ekatva* goes to each of an *ahi* and

a *nakula*. According to them, '*samāhāra*' is a technical term, *pāribhāṣika*. It does not mean a collection. The name *samāhāra* is given to a compound which has a singular number and a neuter gender on the basis of the two Pāṇini's sutras '*dvandvaś ca prāṇituryāsenāṅgānām*' (P 2.4.2) and '*yeṣāṃ ca virodhaḥ śāsvatikah*' (P 2.4.9). The author uses '*ity āhuḥ*', so he does not completely agree with this view.

Next comes *ekaśeṣa*. '*Pitarau*' means '*mātā ca pitā ca*'. Similarly, '*śvaśurau*' means '*śvaśrū ca śvaśuraś ca*'. The word '*pitṛ*' in '*pitarau*' presents the parents by *lakṣaṇā*, and '*śvaśura*' in '*śvaśurau*' presents the two parents of the wife. Let us see '*caitrasya pitarau*'. *Caitraniṣṭhajanyatānirūpitajanakatvavāṃsau janakadampatī*. '*Caitrasya śvaśurau*' will be paraphrased as '*caitraniṣṭhapatītvānirūpitastrīniṣṭhajanyatānirūpitajanakatvavāṃsau dampatī*'.

Is *lakṣaṇā* accepted in '*ghaṭaḥ*' in the similar way? The word '*ghaṭa*' means *ghaṭatvavisiṣṭa*, and hence it can represent any number of pots. The number is remembered from the suffix added to '*ghaṭa*'. Here, we need not assume *lakṣaṇā*. *Pitarau śvaśurāv ityādau pitṛpade janakadampatyoh, śvaśurapade strījanakadampatyor lakṣaṇā. Evam anyatrāpi. Ghaṭa ityādau na lakṣaṇā, ghaṭatvena rūpeṇa nānāghaṭopasthitisambhavāt.*

Next comes a *karmadhāraya*. *Karmadhārayasthale tu, nilotpalam ityādau abhedasambandhena nīlapadārtha utpalapadārthe prakārah*. '*Nilotpalam*' means '*nīlam ca tat utpalam ca*'. '*Nīla*' stands for *nīlarūpaviśiṣṭa*, and '*utpala*' for an *utpala*. *Nīlarūpaviśiṣṭābhinnotpalam. Nīlarūpaviśiṣṭa is a viśeṣaṇa or prakāra of utpala, and the relation between them is abheda. Nipātātiriktanāmārtayor bhedasambandhenaiva vibhaktiyarthopasthiter tantratvam. When abhedasambandha exists, no vibhakti is necessary. So a medium like a vibhakti is not needed to connect nīlarūpaviśiṣṭa and utpala. Thus we do not need lakṣaṇā to interpret a karmadhāraya: tatra ca na lakṣaṇā.*

The *Mīmāṃsakas* also accept the above view on a *karmadhāraya*. *Ata eva 'niṣādasthapatiṃ yājayet' ity atra na tatpuruṣo lakṣaṇāpatteḥ, kin tu karmadhārayo lakṣaṇābhāvāt. 'Niṣādasthapatiḥ' means 'niṣādānām sthapatiḥ' or 'niṣādaś ca sthapatiś ca'? Tatpuruṣa or karmadhāraya? There is a long discussion in the Śābarabhāṣya, and the conclusion is that a karmadhāraya should be accepted. Because a karmadhāraya does not involve lakṣaṇā. If tatpuruṣa interpretation is accepted, we must assume lakṣaṇā in the genitive case-ending of 'niṣādānām'. The Naiyāyikas agree to Śābara's conclusion.*

In the *Śābarabhāṣya*, the *pūrvapakṣa* is as follows: if *karmadhāraya* interpretation is accepted, *Niṣāda* people will also be eligible to perform vedic sacrifice and to study the Vedas. Actually speaking, they are of a hybrid caste, and they should not be allowed to perform vedic sacrifice and to study the Vedas. Because only three castes, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kṣatriya*, and *Vaiśya*, can perform sacrifice. This is a contingency in *karmadhāraya* interpretation. *Tatpuruṣa* interpretation does not imply that *Niṣāda* people are eligible to perform vedic

sacrifice and to study the Vedas. This conclusion is fit to the basic idea that only the three castes are eligible to do so.

Śabara's answer is to interpret 'niṣādasthapatiḥ' as a *karmadhāraya*, because a *karmadhāraya* does not have *lakṣaṇā*. The interpretation including no *lakṣaṇā* is *lāghava*. Then a question comes. How can it be tolerated that Niṣāda people can perform vedic sacrifice and study the Vedas like the three castes? This point is argued as follows: *niṣādasya saṅkarajātiviśeṣasya vede 'nadhikārād yajanāsambhavaḥ*.

The Naiyāyikas deny this view: *na ca vācyam. Niṣādasya vidyāprayuktes tata eva kalpanāt. 'Tataḥ'* means '*vedavidheḥ*'. Niṣāda people are in fact admitted to perform sacrifice in restricted cases, and so because of that vedic injunction they are allowed to perform sacrifice. Without the study of the Vedas, people cannot be allowed to perform sacrifice, so Niṣāda people are allowed to study the Vedas, also.

As a result, a caste other than the three becomes eligible to perform sacrifice, and this is actually *gaurava*. To make this idea simpler (*lāghava*), Niṣāda people should not be eligible to perform sacrifice. But this is contradictory to the fact. They are allowed to do some sacrifice. So we have to postulate that that vedic injunction admits Niṣāda people to perform sacrifice. This result is *gaurava*, as mentioned before. But this much *gaurava* is not a fault, because this *gaurava* can properly explain why Niṣāda people can perform sacrifice actually. *Lāghavena mukhyārthānvaye tadanupapattyā tatkalpanāyāḥ phalamukhagauravatayā 'doṣatvād iti*.

Now an *avyayībhāva*. *Upakumbham ardhapippalītyādau parapade tatsambandhini lakṣaṇā, pūrvapadārthapradhānatayā cānvyabodha iti*. From '*upakumbham*', there arises the *śābdabodha* '*kumbhasya samīpam*' (the place near to the pot). Due to the compounding rules '*upa*' is placed before '*kumbham*' though the meaning of '*upa*' is the *viśeṣya*. Its meaning is *samīpam*. From '*kumbham*' *kumbhasambandhin* is got by *lakṣaṇā*, and from '*upa*' *samīpam* is got. *Kumbhasambandhin* is nothing but *samīpam*. The relation between them is *abheda*. The *pūrvapada* is the *viśeṣya* or *pradhāna*, so the *śābdabodha* will be '*kumbhasambandhyabhinnasamīpam*'. *Ardhapippalī. Pippalyā ardham. Pippalīsambandhin* is the meaning of '*pippalī*' by *lakṣaṇā*. *Ardham* is the meaning of '*ardham*', and this is the *viśeṣya*. The *śābdabodha* will be '*pippalīsambandhyabhedārdham*'.

Ithañ ca samāse na kvāpi śaktiḥ padaśaktyaiva nirvāhād iti. To conclude, the Mīmāṃsakas' view that a *vākya* has *lakṣaṇā* is negated. *Lakṣaṇā* exists only in a *pada* not in a *vākya*. Such *lakṣaṇā* is explained as *śakyasambandha*, so *lakṣaṇā* is based upon the *śakti* of a *pada*. A *vākya* does not have *śakti*.

9. āsatti, yogyatā, ākāṅkṣā, and tātparya

Now starts the explanation of four *sahakārikāraṇas* of *śābdabodha*. *Āsattiyogyatākāṅkṣātātparyajñānam iṣyate kāraṇam*. The knowledges of all these, *āsatti*, *yogyatā*, *ākāṅkṣā*, and *tātparya* are the auxiliary causes of *śābdabodha*. *Āsattir iti. Āsattijñānam yogyatājñānam ākāṅkṣājñānam tātparyajñānam ca śābdabodhe kāraṇam*.

10. āsatti

Sannidhānaṃ tu padasyāsattir ucyate. Sannihitatvam samīpe vartamānatvam. Tatrāsattipadārtham āha — sannidhānam tv iti. Anvayapratiyogyānuyogipadāyor avyavadhānam āsattiḥ. To take an example, ‘*ghaṭam ānaya*’. From this sentence, *ghaṭa*, *karmatva*, *ānayana*, and *kṛti* are got. For instance, *anvaya* is the relation between *ghaṭa* and *karmatva*. *Ghaṭa* is the *pratiyogin* of the *anvaya*, and *karmatva* is the *anuyogin* of the *anvaya*. *Ghaṭapada* is the *bodhaka* of the *pratiyogin*, and *am-pada* is the *bodhaka* of the *anuyogin*. Hence, if we put ‘*bodhaka*’ between ‘*anuyogin*’ and ‘*pada*’, the meaning will become clearer. *Avyavadhānam* means non-intervention. As a result, *āsatti* is non-intervention between two *padas* one of which expresses the *pratiyogin* of *anvaya* and another of which expresses the *anuyogin* of the same *anvaya*. *Tasya jñānam śābdabodhe kāraṇam. Kvacid vyavahite ’pi avyavadhānabhramāc chābdabodhād iti*. For instance, ‘*nīlam kapālam, dravyaṃ vastram*’. Some one may by mistake understand ‘*nīlam vastram*’ and ‘*kapālam dravyam*’. Others may correctly understand ‘*nīlam kapālam*’ and ‘*dravyaṃ vastram*’. Thus we sometimes get *śābdabodha* from *avyavadhānabhrama*. Hence, *avyavadhāna* in *padas* is not the cause of *śābdabodha* but *avyavadhānajñāna* is the cause. Even though *padas* are not put closely to each other, we may recognize that those *padas* are not intervened. And we may get wrong *śābdabodha*.

Some Navya-naiyāyikas do not agree to the above view. *Vastutas tu avyavadhānajñānasyānapekṣitatvāt yatpadārthena yatpadārthasyānvayo ’pekṣitas tayor avyavadhānenopasthiṭḥ śābdabodhe kāraṇam*. For instance, somebody says ‘*girik bhuktam agnimān devadattena*’. One may properly understand ‘*girik agnimān*’ and ‘*bhuktam devadattena*’. Here he connects ‘*girik*’ with ‘*agnimān*’ and ‘*bhuktam*’ and ‘*devadattena*’, then he generates the above *śābdabodha*. The words ‘*girik*’ and ‘*agnimān*’ are not intervened by anything else, nor are ‘*bhuktam*’ and ‘*devadattena*’ intervened. The cause of this *śābdabodha* is the remembrance of the two meanings of the two *padas* with non-intervention of the two *padas*. Hence, if one hears ‘*girik bhuktam agnimān devadattena*’ without any change of word-order, he does not get *śābdabodha*. Because the sequence of ‘*girik*’ and ‘*agnimān*’ is intervened by ‘*bhuktam*’. *Tena girik*

bhuktam agnimān devadattenetyādau na śābdabodhah. From the same sentence, we sometimes get *śābdabodha* and sometimes not. This can be explained through the difference of the above situation.

Nilo ghaṭo dravyam paṭa ityādāv āsattibhramāc chābdabodhah. Suppose, some utters the sentence ‘*nīlo ghaṭaḥ dravyam paṭaḥ*’, and his intention is to say ‘*nīlo paṭaḥ*’ and ‘*ghaṭaḥ dravyam*’. But suppose, the listener of this sentence understands ‘*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*’ and ‘*dravyam paṭaḥ*’. Here, the listener has *āsattibhrama*, but he has got true *śābdabodha*. In this case, the *kāraṇa* of *śābdabodha*, *āsatti* is wrong, but its result is good. This contradicts the general rule that a defective *kāraṇa* generates a defective *phala*. The Naiyāyikas say that it does not matter: *āsattibhramāc chābdabodhābhava ’pi na kṣatiḥ*. This point is the difference between old Nyāya and new Nyāya. Actually speaking, the Navya-naiyāyikas hold that *yogyatājñāna* is the *sahakārikāraṇa* of *śābdabodha*. They do not maintain that *āsattijñāna* is the *sahakārikāraṇa*. This *jñāna* is not essentially required for *śābdabodha*.

When we use many adjectives and one substantive, the first adjective is placed far from the substantive. Then intervention comes between these two words because of other adjectives. *Śābdabodha* occurs in this case also? An example of this case is ‘*cchatrī kundalī vāsasvī devadattaḥ*’. From ‘*vāsasvī devadattaḥ*’, we can get *śābdabodha*. But ‘*cchatrī*’ and ‘*devadattaḥ*’ are intervened by ‘*kundalī*’ and ‘*vāsasvī*’, and so are ‘*kundalī*’ and ‘*devadattaḥ*’ by ‘*vāsasvī*’. Does *śābdabodha* not arise? This objection starts with ‘*na nu yatra cchatrī kundalī vāsasvī devadatta ityādy uktaṃ tatrottara padasmarāṇena pūrvapadasmarāṇasya nāsād avyavadhānena taduttara padasmarāṇāsambhava iti cet*’.

The Navya-naiyāyikas clarify the doubt. *Chatrīpadānubhava* causes *chatrīpadaviśayakasamskāra*, and *kundalīpadānubhava* causes *kundalīpadaviśayakasamskāra*, and *vāsasvīpadānubhava* causes *vāsasvīpadaviśayakasamskāra*. These *samskāras* produce their *smarāṇas*, and they have non-intervention with the last word ‘*devadattaḥ*’. *Iti ced, na, pratyekapadānubhava-janyasamskārais caramasya tāvatpadaviśayakasmarāṇasyāvyavadhānenotpatteḥ*.

Nānāsannikarṣair ekapratyakṣasyeva nānāsamskārair ekasmarāṇotpatter apī sambhavāt. As mentioned above, one *smarāṇa* can occur from many *samskāras*, just as one perception or *pratyakṣa* is produced by many *sannikarṣas* or the connections of a sense-organ with its many objects. For instance, we may perceive by the eyes that there are a pot, a stick, a pen, and so on put in front of us. Here there exist many connections of the eyes with those objects, and we have a single perception. *Tāvatpadasamskārasahita-caramavarāṇajñānasyodbodhakatvāt, katham anyathā nānāvārṇair ekapadasmarāṇam.* The understanding of the final letter or sound associated with the *samskāras* of all *padas* stimulates or produces the remembrance of all the words. For instance, the final *visarga* of ‘*devadattaḥ*’ revives the remembrance

of all the words 'cchatrī', 'kundalī', 'vāsasvī' and 'devadattaḥ'. Otherwise, how one word is remembered? A word contains letters, and each letter causes its own *anubhava*. When the final letter is heard, the *anubhavas* of all the previous letters has been destroyed. If we do not agree to the above view, we would have only the *anubhava* of the final letter, and we can never understand a single word.

So far we have seen the theory that senses remembered of each element are related in a particular sequence. Viśvanātha agrees with this theory. But he also introduces another theory that senses remembered of each element get related at a time: *paran tu tāvat padārthānāṃ smaraṇād ekadaiva khale kapotanyāyena tāvatpadārthānāṃ kriyākārahāvenānvayarūpaḥ śābdabodho bhavatīti kecit*. *Khala* is a place where grains are separated from the plants, and *kapota* is a pigeon. When grain is scattered in that place, pigeons come down there at a time to eat the grains. *Kapotanyāya* is the analogy of this phenomenon. According to those who hold this view, *śābdabodha* is nothing but the connection of the meanings of all the *padas* in a sentence through the verb and verb-case relation (*kriyākārahāva*).

Vṛddhā yuvānaḥ śiśavaḥ kapotāḥ khale yathāmī yugapat patanti, tathaiva sarve yugapat padārthāḥ paraspāreṇānvayino bhavanti. Just as old, young, and small pigeons simultaneously come down to the place of grains, the meaning of all the words of a sentence simultaneously get related with each other.

To explain the first theory, *pare tu "yad yad ākāṅkṣitam yogyam sannidhānam prapadyate. Tena tenānvitāḥ svārthāḥ padair evāvagamya"*. See this example: *ghaṭam ānaya*. The first word 'ghaṭam' has two parts: 'ghaṭa-' and '-am'. From 'ghaṭa', the hearer understands a pot and from 'am', *karmatva*. *Ampada* is *ākāṅkṣitam*, *yogyam*, and *sannihitam* with the *ghaṭapada*. From 'ghaṭa' and 'am', conected in such a manner, the hearer gets the *śābdabodha* of the *khaṇḍavākya*, i.e., 'ghaṭam'. Similarly, he gets the *śābdabodha* of another *khaṇḍavākya*, i.e., 'ānaya'. And then remembering those two *khaṇḍavākya*rthas, he will obtain the *śābdabodha* of the whole sentence or the *mahāvākya*, i.e., 'ghaṭam ānaya'. *Tathā ca khaṇḍavākya*rthabodhānantaram tathaiva padārthasmrṭyā mahāvākyarthabodha ity āhuḥ. The commentary *Kiraṇāvalī* states that this is Viśvanātha's view.

Next *sphoṭa* theory is refuted. *Etena tāvadvarṇābhivyaṅgyaḥ padasphoṭo 'pi nirastāḥ. Tattadvarṇasaṃskārasahitacaramavarnopalambhena tadvyāñjakena ivopapatter iti*. 'Sphoṭa' means bursting. In other words, it means *abhivyañjaka* or revealer. Revealer of meaning. For instance, no single sound in 'devadatta' does mean the person called Devadatta. A collection of all the sounds designates Devadatta. But each sound vanishes one after another, and we cannot catch all the sounds at a time. To get *vācaka* apart from physical sound, the *Vaiyākaraṇas* establish *sphoṭa*, and it is conceptual word. Conceptual word is manifested (*abhivyaṅgya*) by physical sound.

Sphoṭa reveals conceptual meaning or *vācya*, and this meaning reflects the object of word. According to Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* or *vācaka* and conceptual meaning or *vācya* are identical with each other. They both are *śabda* or *sphoṭa*, and the external world ultimately does not exist. *Sphoṭa* is regarded as the Brahman, and Bhartṛhari's view is called Śabdādvaita.

The grammarians devise *sphoṭa* to get a collection of sounds, for instance, /d/, /e/, /v/, /a/, /d/, /a/, /t/, /t/, /a/, and /ḥ/. If the Naiyāyikas can bring all the sounds into association, they do not need *sphoṭa* theory. When one hears the final *visarga* of 'devadattaḥ', the *saṃskāras* of other sounds remain in his mind. And that *visarga* causes the *smaraṇa* of all the sounds from all the *saṃskāras* of all the sounds. Then the whole *pada* 'devadattaḥ' is remembered. Thus, the final letter or sound associated with the *saṃskāras* of all the sounds causes *jñāna* of the whole conceptual *pada*.

Next a problem of an omitted word is discussed. The Prābhākaras are of the opinion that the meaning of an omitted word is directly comprehended from an incomplete sentence. For instance, only 'dvāram' is uttered, and not 'dvāraṃ pidhehi' (close the door). From 'dvāram', 'close the door' is understood. The Prābhākaras do not presuppose the word 'pidhehi' before they understand 'close the door'. They assume that directly 'close the door' is understood. This theory is called *Arthādhyāhārapakṣa*.

On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that meaning is understood from an elided word. This theory is called *Śabdādhyāhārapakṣa*. In this theory, to the word 'dvāram', one adds the word 'pidhehi' and he understands the meaning of 'dvāraṃ pidhehi' or 'close the door'. *Yatra dvāram ity uktam tatra pidhehityādipadasya jñānād eva bodho, na tu pidhānādirūpārthajñānāt*. The Nyāya position is that the content of *śabdabodha* should come from the *padas* only: *padajanyatattatpadārthopasthites tattacchābdabodhe hetutvāt*. If the existence of the *pada* is not presupposed, the understanding of 'dvāraṃ pidhehi' will not be a *śabdabodha*.

Another reason is given: *kiñ ca kriyākarmapadānāṃ tena tenaiva padena sahākāṅkṣitatvāt, tena kriyāpadaṃ vinā kathāṃ śabdabodhaḥ syāt*. In the example 'dvāram', 'am' expresses *karmatva*, so it needs a *kriyāpada* or a verbal form. Without a verbal form, the *śabdabodha* of 'dvāram' does not occur.

Another case is presented: *tathā puṣpebhya ityādau sprḥayatītyādipadādhyāhāraṃ vinā caturthyanupapateḥ padādhyāhāra āvaśyakah*. From the sentence 'puṣpebhyah', one will understand 'puṣpebhyah sprḥayati'. By Pāṇini's rule 'sprḥer īpsitah', what is most desired is expressed by a *pada* plus the dative case-ending. But unless the root *sprḥ* follows, the dative case-ending is not used. The case-ending is prescribed on the basis of the form of the verb and not on the basis of the meaning of the verb. So from the sentence 'puṣpebhyah', the complete sentence 'puṣpebhyah sprḥayati' is constructed,

and this sentence is understood.

11. *yogyatā*

Padārthe tatra tadvattā yogyatā parikīrtitā/183/ 'Tadvattā' means 'padārthavattā'. Look at the sentence 'ghaṭam ānaya'. From 'ghaṭam', a *ghaṭa* and *karmatva* are got, and from 'ānaya' *ānayana* and *kṛti* are got. The *śābdabodha* will be 'ghaṭaniṣṭhakarmatvanirūpakānayanajanakakṛtimān tvam bhava'. Here *karmatvarūpapadārthe ghaṭarūpapadārthavattā*. The suffix 'tā' can imply relation, so *karmatvarūpapadārthe ghaṭarūpapadārthasya sambandho yogyatā*. Similarly *ānayanapadārthe karmatvapadārthasambandho yogyatā*. Hence, *ekapadārthe aparapadārthasambandhaḥ yogyatā*.

*Yogyatām nirvakti — padārthe ityādinā. Ekapadārthe 'parapadārthasambandho yogyatety arthaḥ. Tajjñānābhavāc ca vahninā siñcatiṭyādau na śābdabodhaḥ. See 'jalena siñcati'. From this sentence, we understand 'jalakaraṇakasecanānukūlakṛtimān kaścana or devadattaḥ'. The karaṇatva of secana or sprinkling exists in water, so there is compatibility or successive relation between karaṇatva and water. Next, see 'vahninā siñcati'. From 'vahninā' we understand vahnikaraṇatva, and from 'siñcati' secanakṛti or secanakṛtimān. Unlike the case of 'jalena siñcati', karaṇatva in vahni contradicts secana, because we cannot sprinkle with fire. There is no connection (*anvaya*) between vahnikaraṇatva and secana. We can say otherwise that there is no *anvaya* between vahni and secanakaraṇatva, because vahni cannot possess the karaṇatva of secana. Thus, since there is no compatibility or *yogyatā* between vahnipadārtha and secanapadārtha, *śābdabodha* does not occur from 'vahninā siñcati'.*

Some objection by the Mīmāṃsakas: *na nu etasya yogyatāyā jñānam śābdabodhāt prāk sarvatra na sambhavati, vākyaṛthasyāpurvatvād iti cet. Yogyatā or 'ekapadārthe aparapadārthasambandha'* is understood after understanding the meaning of a sentence. Then it is impossible to understand the relation or *yogyatā* between two *padārthas* before understanding the meaning of the sentence involving the two *padas*. *Śābdabodha* is nothing but the knowledge of the relation among the *padārthas* referred to by a sentence including the *padas*, and that relation is nothing but *yogyatā*. If *yogyatājñāna* is the cause of *śābdabodha*, *śābdabodha* which is *pramā* according to the Mīmāṃsakas has something new as its own content. *Prāmatva* according to them is *anadhigatārthagantṛtva*. In other words, *pramā* is the knowledge which has something new as its object. *Pramā* or *śābdabodha* is of something *apūrvā* or not known previously. As long as the Mīmāṃsakas' theory of *pramā* is valid, we cannot have *yogyatājñāna* before *śābdabodha*. Then *yogyatājñāna* cannot be the cause of *śābdabodha*.

Na, tattatpadārthasmarane sati kvacitsamśayarūpasya kvacinnīścayarūpasya

yogyatājñānasya sambhavāt. The Naiyāyikas maintain yogyatājñāna is the cause of śābdabodha and explain that *ekapadārthe aparapadārthasambandhaḥ kvacit samśayaḥ* or doubtful and that *ekapadārthe aparapadārthasambandhaḥ kvacit niścayaḥ* or definite. And such yogyatāsamśaya or yogyatāniścaya generates śābdabodha.

Navyās tu yogytājñānam na śābdabodhe kāraṇam. If yogyatājñāna is not the cause of śābdabodha, immediately a question comes. From 'vahninā siñcati', śābdabodha does arise? The Navya-naiyāyikas also do not accept that śābdabodha is generated from this sentence. Then how to explain? *Vahninā siñcatītyādau seke vahnikaraṇakatvābhāvarūpayogyatāniścayena pratibandhāna na śābdabodhah.* Because of yogyatāniścaya, śābdabodha does not arise. *Tadvattābuddhiṃ prati tadabhāvavattābuddhiḥ pratibandhikā.* It is well-known that *seka* or sprinkling does not have *vahni* for its *kaṛaṇa* or instrument. And *pratibandhakābhavaḥ kāryamātraṃ prati kāraṇam.* The absence of hinderence is the cause of all effect. If there is hinderence to effect, no effect occurs. Now the definite knowledge of *seka*'s not being *kaṛaṇa* hinders the arising of the knowledge of *seka*'s being *kaṛaṇa*. The general rule on *kāryakāraṇabhāva* of knowledge is '*tadvattābuddhiṃ prati tadabhāvavattābuddhiḥ pratibandhikā*'. But with reference to knowledge two cases are exceptional. One case is *laukikasannikarṣajanyajñāna*, and another is *doṣaviśeṣajanyajñāna*. An example of the first case is '*pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*'. Someone who suffers from jaundice recognizes a white conch-shell as yellowish. He knows that the *śaṅkha* has *pītābhāva*. *Pītābhāvavattābuddhi* does not hinder the arising of *pītavattābuddhi*. This case is excluded from the application of the general rule.

An example of the second case is '*rajjuḥ sarpah*' or '*śuktiḥ rajatam*'. Someone may recognize a rope as a snake. This cognition occurs because of *doṣaviśeṣa*. Maybe his mind is disturbed. He does not correctly perceive the object though he looks at it. This is an illusion.

Except those two cases, the general rule operates well that *tadvattābuddhiṃ prati tadabhāvavattābuddhiḥ pratibandhikā*. The knowledge of '*seke vahnikaraṇatvābhavaḥ*' does not belong to either a category of those two. Therefore, this knowledge hinders the knowledge '*seke vahnikaraṇatvam*'. *Tadabhāvaniścayasya laukikasannikarṣajanyadoṣaviśeṣajanyatajjñānamātre pratibandhakatvāc chābdabodham praty api pratibandhakatvam siddham.*

Someone may say that the delay in getting yogyatājñāna causes the delay in getting śābdabodha. But as explained earlier, yogyatājñāna is not the cause of śābdabodha but ayogyatāniścaya is the cause. So this opinion is untenable: yogyatājñānavilambāc ca śābdabodhāvilambo 'siddha ity āhuḥ.

12. ākāṅkṣā

The third cause of śābdabodha is ākāṅkṣā, and it is defined as follows:

yatpadena vinā yasyānanubhāvakatā bhavet ākāṅkṣā. Ākāṅkṣām nirvakti — yatpadeneti. Yena padena vinā yatpadasyānvayānanubhāvakatvam tena padena saha tasyākāṅkṣety arthaḥ. Suppose, there are two words, *x* and *y*. If *y* is omitted and *x* does not cause the understanding of the relation between the two meanings of *x* and *y* (*ananubhāvakatva* or *anubhavājanakatva*), then *x* has *ākāṅkṣā* or expectancy of *y*. *Ākāṅkṣā* is a property of a *pada*.

For instance, in '*ghaṭam ānaya*' the *kriyāpada* '*ānaya*' has expectancy of the *kārapada*, *ghaṭam*. The reverse is also true. Without the *kriyāpada*, *am-pada* does not produce the understanding of the relation of *karmatva* and *kriyā*. Therefore, *kriyāpadaṃ vinā kārapadaṃ nānvayabodhaṃ janayatīti tena tasyākāṅkṣā*.

Vastutas tu kriyākārapadānām sannidhānam āsattiyā caritārtham. Paraṃ tu ghaṭakarmatābodhaṃ prati ghaṭapadottaradvitīyārūpākāṅkṣājñānām kāraṇam, tena ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛtir ityādau na śābdabodhaḥ. To understand a sentence, the words put in the sentence must have proximity with each other. So '*ghaṭam ānaya*' is understood, because the *sannidhāna* between the *kriyāpada* '*ānaya*' and the *kārapada* '*ghaṭam*' are already obtained: *sannidhānam āsattiyā caritārtham*. Not only this condition but also that those words are put properly in the sentence or *khaṇḍavākya* is a necessary condition to understand the meaning of the *khaṇḍavākya*. Take '*ghaṭam*' in '*ghaṭam ānaya*'. The proximity between '*ghaṭa*' and '*am*' is obtained from the *āsatti* of the words. But the proper order of the words is obtained not from *āsatti* but from *ākāṅkṣā*. If we put '*am*' before '*ghaṭa*', we cannot have the knowledge of the meaning of '*ghaṭam*'. So it is required to put '*am*' after '*ghaṭa*'. Then we understand the meaning of '*ghaṭam*'. *Ākāṅkṣājñāna* is the knowledge of words put in a particular order and manner.

If we are given '*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛtiḥ*', we do not have the *śābdabodha* '*ghaṭaniṣṭhakarmatvanirūpitānayanānukūlakṛtimān bhava*'. So it is not enough for understanding the meaning of a sentence to show the meaning of each word in the sentence, and the words should be put in the order shown by the form of '*ghaṭam ānaya*'. This does not mean that we can have the same *śābdabodha* from '*ghaṭaḥ am ānayanam kṛtiḥ*'. These words should be put in a particular form of words, '*ghaṭam*' and '*ānaya*'. Thus, *ākāṅkṣājñāna* demands the condition that words are arranged not only in a particular order but in a particular manner.

Ayam eti putro rājñah puruṣo 'psāryatām ityādau tu putreṇa saha rājapadasya tātparyagrahasattvāt tenaivānvayabodhaḥ. Puruṣeṇa saha tātparyagrahe tu tena sahānvayabodhaḥ syād eva. Take the example '*ayam eti putraḥ rājñah puruṣaḥ apasāryatām*'. The word '*rājñah*' is derived from '*rājan*' and the genitive case-ending '*as*'. This '*rājñah*' is connected with '*putraḥ*' or '*puruṣaḥ*'? In other words, '*ayam rājñah putraḥ eti, puruṣaḥ apasāryatām*' or '*ayam putraḥ eti, rājñah puruṣaḥ apasāryatām*'. As far as *ākāṅkṣā* is

concerned, 'rājñah' can have *ākāñkṣā* not only with 'putrah' but also with 'puruṣah'. So we cannot decide to which the word 'rājñah' should be related. *Ākāñkṣā* leads us to the understanding of the sentence meaning in either way, but *ākāñkṣā* cannot lead to one decisive understanding. The choice of those alternatives depends upon speaker's intention, *tātparya*.

13. *tātparya*

The last factor for generating *śābdabodha* is *tātparya*. *Vaktur icchā tu tātparyam parikīrtitam/ /84/ /* This factor is introduced as *vṛtti* by Jayanta. *Tātparya* is speaker's intention.

Tātparyam nirvakti — vaktur iccheti. Yadi tātparyajñānaṃ kāraṇam na syāt tadā saindhavam ānāyetyādau kvacid aśvasya kvacil lavanasya bodha iti na syāt. If *tātparya* is not the cause of *śābdabodha*, we will not know the case in which one sometimes understands a horse and sometimes salt after hearing 'saindhavam ānaya'. 'Saindhava' means 'horse' and 'salt'. *Tātparya* helps decide whether the sentence means 'Bring a horse' or 'Bring salt'. Context will tell speaker's intention. When the sentence is uttered at the occasion of a lunch, the sentence means 'Bring salt', and when it is uttered at the time of going for hunting it means 'Bring the horse'.

Then, the process goes as follows: context or *prakaraṇa*, *tātparya*, and then *śābdabodha*. Why is *prakaraṇa* not the cause of *śābdabodha* directly? The answer is that *prakaraṇa* is not the cause. *Na ca tātparyagrāhaka-prakaraṇādīnām śābdabodhe karaṇatvam asti iti vācyam.* *Tātparyagrāhaka* is *prakaraṇa*. If we take *prakaraṇa* as the cause, we cannot list all *prakaraṇas* such as *yoga*, *viyoga*, etc. to understand the sentence, There is no common character or *anugamakadharmā* of these factors excepting *tātparyajñāna-janakatva* or the state of generating the knowledge of speaker's intention. If *prakaraṇas*, such as *yoga*, *viyoga*, and so forth are the cause of *śābdabodha*, *tātparyajñānanajanakatva* will be the *kāraṇatāvachchedaka* of *śābdabodha*. Such *janakatva* is not a *jāti* and it is numerous. To establish *kāryakāraṇabhāva*, it is preferable to regard as simple an entity as possible to be the *kāraṇatāvachchedaka*. *Tātparyajñānatva* is simpler than *prakaraṇādi* or *tātparyajñānanajanakatva*, so *tātparyajñānatva* is selected as the *kāraṇatāvachchedaka*. It means that *tātparyajñāna* is the *kāraṇa* of *śābdabodha*.

Even to understand the *tātparya* of the Vedas, the author of them should be assumed, and He is *Īśvara*. *Ithañ ca vedasthale 'pi tātparyajñānārtham īśvaraḥ kalpyate.* If there is no *vaktā* of the Vedas, we cannot understand the intention. Then no *tātparya* is understood. Without *tātparyajñāna*, *śābdabodha* does not arise. Finally we will not be able to understand the meaning of the Vedic sentences at all.

Someone may say: the *tātparya* understood from the Vedas is derived from

the *tātparyas* of the teachers. Viśvanātha denies this view: *na ca tatrādhyāpakatātparyajñānam kāraṇam iti vācyam*. Because there is no teacher in the beginning of the creation of the universe: *sargādau adhyāpakābhāvāt*.

Another objection. According to Mīmāṃsā, the universe has no beginning and no end. Since there is no dissolution of the universe, there is no beginning of the universe. It is tedious to speak of the beginning of the world to establish the existence of Īśvara. This view is easily refuted: *na ca pralaya eva nāsti kutaḥ sargādir iti vācyam, pralasyāgameṣu pratipādyatvāt*. In the Vedas *pralaya* is described as follows: *nāho na rātriḥ na nabho na bhūmiḥ nāsit*. Since there is the dissolution of the world, there must be the beginning of the world.

How about sentences uttered by parrots? Do we understand parrot's intention from a sentence uttered by the parrot? Sentences spoken by a parrot are divided into two: those in agreement with fact (*saṃvādivākya*) and those not in agreement with fact (*viśaṃvādivākya*). *Samvādivākye saphalapravṛtti-janakatvam asti. Kim tu viśaṃvādivākye viphalapravṛttijanakatvam asti*. When a parrot utters *saṃvādivākya* and the hearer understands the *tātparya* of Īśvara, the hearer gets the *śābdabodha* in his mind. When a parrot utters *viśaṃvādivākya* and still the hearer understands the *tātparya*, such *tātparya* is that of the trainer. *Ithañ ca śukavākye 'pi īsvariṇyatātparyajñānam kāraṇam. Viśaṃvādiśukavākye tu śikṣayitur eva tātparyajñānam kāraṇam*.

Anye tu nānārthādaḥ kvacid eva tātparyajñānam kāraṇam. Here, Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's view is introduced. When a word has various meanings, *tātparya* is helpful to choose one meaning in a particular context. Otherwise, *tātparyajñāna* is not required to understand very simple sentences like 'devadatto gacchati', 'caitraḥ pacati', and so on. *Tathā ca śukavākye vinaiva tātparyajñānam śābdabodhaḥ, vede tv anādimīmāṃsāpariśodhitatarkair arthāvadhāraṇam ity āhuḥ*. When a parrot utters a simple sentence, the hearer understands it without *tātparyajñāna*. In the case of the Vedic literature, the meaning of ambiguous sentences is ascertained by means of principles fixed by rules of interpretation occurring in the texts of ṛṣis and they have no beginning. Mīmāṃsā is defined as *pūjītavacāravacanam*: statements or rules coming out of thought which is honored. Thus, *tātparyajñāna* is not the *kāraṇa* of *śābdabodha* in all cases but in particular cases only.

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