

KAUNḌA BHATṬA ON THE MEANING OF SANSKRIT VERBS (1)*

An English Translation and Annotation
of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*,
Chapter 1 with the Introduction

Shivaram Dattatray JOSHI

Acknowledgements

I take this opportunity to acknowledge my gratefulness to two great teachers, at whose feet I had the honor and privilege of studying the chief grammatical texts of the Sanskrit language: the late Śaṅkarśāstri Mārulkar and the late Maheśvarśāstri Joshi, my paternal uncle. These teachers had carried on a worthy tradition unbroken from the time of the great Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita. The latter in particular was a constant guide to me. Without his affectionate encouragement it would have been impossible for me to carry on my study of grammatical texts.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Harvard Yenching Institute whose assistance made it possible for me to study at Harvard.

Finally I know not how to express my gratitude adequately to my most revered *guru*, Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls, whose boundless

* This is a reproduction of Professor S. D. Joshi's Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Harvard University in 1960. It is so voluminous that we cannot publish it at a time. We have, hence, divided it into three parts and are to publish it serially in the volumes of *Sam̐bhāṣā*. The table of contents of the original dissertation reads as follows: A Introduction: 1 The Author, 2 The Kārikās of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, 3 Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, 4 Commentaries on the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, 5 Indian Semantics: an Historical Sketch, 6 Contents of Dhātvarthanirṇaya, 7 *Vyāpāra*, 8 *Kriyā*, 9 *Bhāva*, 10 *Ākhyāta*, 11 Verbs and Nouns, 12 Verb Governing Verb: Argument with Nyāya, 13 *Phala*, 14 Transitive and Intransitive, 15 The Double Designation of Roots, 16 The Nyāya Theory of the Denotation of Root and Verb Ending, 17 The Mīmāṃsā Theories of Verbal Denotation, 18 Note Concerning Translation; B An English Translation and Annotation of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, Chapter 1; C Excursus; D Works of Reference.

Parts A and D are put together in part I of the present article; parts B and C, in part II which is to appear in the fifteenth and sixteenth volumes of *Sam̐bhāṣā*. The table of contents of the original dissertation misses the title "Three types of action" in part A, though this topic is actually discussed therein. We have, hence, inserted this title as the eleventh subject of part I into the table of contents of the present article. As a result, part I contains nineteen chapters. For convenience' sake of readers, the excursus will be put in the proper places in part II. We have kept ourselves preserving the original style as possible and correcting minimal spelling mistakes and italicization. (This is a note by the editors)

knowledge, sympathy and instruction were a constant source of inspiration to me. The fatherly care which I have received from him kept me encouraged. He took a generous interest in my work and improved and re-improved the drafts of my thesis. His wide experience as a scholar and editor was always beneficial to me. There are no lines which have not witnessed improvement and accuracy from his hand. Whatever merit is found in this work goes to my honored teacher and for whatever faults remain the blame must attach to my ignorance.

*Yad atra sauṣṭhavaṃ kiṃ cit tad guror eva me na hi/
yad atrāsauṣṭhavaṃ kiṃ cit tan mamaiva guror na hi//*

Prastāvanā

*Śabdānuviddhaviṣayādhigamāṃ susūkṣmāṃ
prastaumi vācam akhilārthanidhisvarūpāṃ /
śrī-Saṃkaraṃ gurum upāśya Maheśvaraṃ ca
sāriyatattvavivṛtiṃ sugamāṃ tanomi //*

*Mamāsīt saubhāgyaṃ trimunivacanāniha paṭhituṃ mayā labdham
premnā harivacanatattvaṃ gurumukhāt /
na kartuṃ jāne'haṃ param ativiśuddhārtha-racanāṃ vicintyaivaṃ doṣā
mama hi parihāryāḥ pathitṛbhiḥ //*
*Śāstram vyākaraṇaṃ kuśāgradhiṣaṇair āloḍanīyaṃ kva nu kvāhaṃ
mandamatir na yasya savidhe sā granthakṛccātūrī /
evaṃ saty api cāpale kṛtamatir yāsyāmyahaṃ hāsyatām pāraṃ neṣyati
māṃ paraṃ gurukṛpā sai`vāsti me kāmadhuk //*
*Sampradāyāgataṃ kiṃ cit pratīcyāgamasambhavam /
jñānaṃ gurukṛpālabdham bhūyān matkṛtividhinaḥ //*
*Śuddham yadi syād upalabdham asmin vibhāvanīyaṃ vibudhair guros
tat/
aśuddham asmin yad asaṃmataṃ ca vibhāvanīyaṃ vibudhair mameti //*

Śrīh

Arpana-patrikā

Śrīmad-guruvarya-Ingalls-kulabhūṣaṇa-Daniel-mahodayānāṃ

Caraṇāravindayugule sādaram

Samarpaṇam

*Nānāśāstravicāracarcanarataṃ śiṣyapradeyāgamaṃ vidyāmandīramāṇḍa-
naṃ bahuvidhe vaiśeṣike kovidam /*

*Aiṅgāliyakulāravindatarāṇiṃ nānopavidyānidhiṃ vande madgurum
ādareṇa sumatiṃ vedābdhipāraṅgataṃ //
Na vāgarthajñānaṃ na ca paricitaḥ śāstrasamayāḥ na vā'ste prauḍhā dhīḥ
jaṭilaviśayābhyāsanipunā /
tathāpīyaṃ tīkā yadadhikṛpayā'labdha jananaṃ amuśyāntarbhaktyā
padakamalayor arpyata iyam //*

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

1. The Author

What is known of Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa is derived from his statements at the opening and closing of his books and from what we know of his family from other sources. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa himself tells us in the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*¹ that he was the son of Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa and nephew of Bhaṭṭoji. This establishes his position in what was one of India's most famous families of scholars.

The date of Bhaṭṭoji has been the subject of much discussion. The facts are best treated by P. K. Gode, who has fixed Bhaṭṭoji's literary career as between about A.D. 1560 and 1620.² Various opinions have been held regarding the caste to which Bhaṭṭoji belonged: that he was a Deśastha Brahmin, that he was a Sārasvata Brahmin, or, what is now the most generally accepted view, that he was a Telanga Brahmin originally from the south. Bhaṭṭoji was the author of numerous works on grammar, law and philosophy. A list of such works preserved in manuscripts may be found in Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum*. The following have been printed.

1. *Śabdakaustubha*
2. *Siddhāntakaumudī*
3. *Praudhamanoramā*
4. *Caturviṃśatimatasaṃgraha*
5. *Tithinirṇaya*
6. *Vedabhāṣyasāra*

Finally, Bhaṭṭoji was part author and part compiler of the *Vaiyākaraṇa-matonmajjina*, a collection of pithy verses described below, on which Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa composed as a commentary the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* which we propose to translate.

Raṅgoji, the brother of Bhaṭṭoji and father of Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa, was famed as a scholar of Advaita Vedānta. He was a devotee of the god Kālahastīśa as may be seen by reference to the last portion of his *Śivollāsa*.³ His son pays homage to him as his *guru*⁴ and speaks of him as an incarnation in male form of the goddess of learning. When a discussion turns to a problem of Vedānta Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa naturally quotes his father as an authority.⁵ Other references by his son show us that Raṅgoji

1. p. 1.

2. *Studies in Indian Literary History*, vol. II, pp. 65-74.

3. *Studies in Indian Literary History*, vol. III, p. 206.

4. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, p. 259.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

composed a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*⁶ and that he defeated a Mādhva philosopher named Vaderu in public debate at the court of a King Venkaṭappa. King Venkaṭappa was one of the Keladi rulers of Ikkeri⁷ in the Shimoga District of the present Mysore State. The date⁸ of Venkaṭappa, the Keladi king, is A.D. 1560-1630. The last verse⁹ of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* shows us that Raṅgoji enjoyed the patronage of this Venkaṭappa. Thus, it seems certain that Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's family originated in south India. Several of its most prominent members, however, including Bhaṭṭoji and Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa himself, migrated to Benares.¹⁰

Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa continued in worthy fashion his family's tradition of scholarship. The books which he wrote deal specifically with Nyāya and grammar, but his numerous references to other disciplines show that he was equally versed in Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. According to Aufrecht Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa composed the following works:

1) *Tarkapradīpa*: written at the instance of Vīrabhadra, a manual of Vai-śeṣika doctrine. Cf. Hall, p. 78.

2) *Tarkaratna*: an elementary treatise on the Vaiśeṣika system. Cf. Hall, p.78.

3) *Nyāyapadārthadīpikā*: a work of modest size explaining Nyāya doctrine in simple language. It has been published in the Benares Sanskrit series.

4) *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntabhūṣaṇa*: published in the Benares Sanskrit series and in the Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit series.

5) *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*: frequently printed. See list of editions, pp. 36-37.

6) *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntadīpikā*

7) *Sphotavāda*

Items 4 and 5 are two forms, detailed and concise respectively, of what is essentially the same work, a commentary on Bhaṭṭoji's *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana*. Manuscripts of these works are extant bearing dates equivalent to A.D. 1650, 1663, 1706 and 1710.¹¹ In his *Tarkapradīpa* Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa refers to King Vīrabhadra, the son of Bhadrappa Nāyaka, a Keladi king who ruled A.D. 1629-1645. From his information we may safely conclude that Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa lived in the first half of the 17th century.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 269.

7. *Studies in Indian Literary History*, vol. III, p. 203.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

10. *Studies in Indian Literary History*, vol. II, p. 322.

11. *Studies in Indian Literary History*, vol. III, pp. 207-211.

2. The Kārikās of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita

Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* and its abridgement, the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* are commentaries on a number of verses or kārikās by the author's uncle, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. In a manuscript preserved in the Adyar library the verses bear the title *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana*¹² and are ascribed to *Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita*.

The kārikās of Bhaṭṭoji summarize the essence of philosophical doctrines of the grammarians in 74 or 76 verses. The number 76 is doubtless the correct one, for the first two verses of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* and its summary, the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* are surely by Bhaṭṭoji. I say this because it is the practice of scholastic authors to remark on the *maṅgala* of the text on which they comment, saying that this *maṅgala* is for the removal of obstacles and is written down in order to instruct pupils. In view of the general habits of grammatical literature it is hardly likely that these remarks refer to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's own *maṅgala*. Moreover, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa ends his comment with a verb in the third person which can hardly apply to himself. I believe, therefore, that we must ascribe the first two verses of the *Bhūṣaṇa* and of the *Sāra* to Bhaṭṭoji.

These 76 kārikās are not all originally from the pen of Bhaṭṭoji. Twelve of them can be shown to be borrowed from the *Vākyapadīya*. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his *Laghumañjūsā* (p. 747) tells us that kārikā 21 also is by Bhartṛhari (harikārikā) although the verse is not found in the printed editions of Bhartṛhari's work. At least one kārikā (number 12) is borrowed from Kumārila's *Tantravārtika* (page 349). Bhaṭṭoji in his *Śabdakaustubha* (p. 7) himself tells us that kārikā 71 is taken from Vopadeva and kārikās 28, 31 and 32, when Bhaṭṭoji quotes them in another of his works, the *Śabdakaustubha*, are introduced by the words *Yathāhuḥ* and *Tad uktam*.

It is quite possible that more of the kārikās are borrowed. In the present editions of the *Vākyapadīya* many verses are not found which are quoted as being from the *Vākyapadīya* by authors like Bhaṭṭoji, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa. It is regrettable that we have no good edition of the *Vākyapadīya*, and still more regrettable that Bhartṛhari's Commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* is lost.¹³

Not all unidentified kārikās, however, can be by Bhartṛhari, for several of them contain doctrines that first appear many centuries after his time.

12. Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS in Adyar Library. Paṇḍit. V. Kṛṣṇamacarya, 1947. Cata. No. 575, p. 219.

13. Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, in his system of Sanskrit Grammar (p. 41) tells us that according to Bühler fragments of this commentary of Bhartṛhari exist in the Royal Library at Berlin and in the Deccan. See also Kielhorn's ed. of the *Mahābhāṣya*, vol. II, p. 12. The fragments of this commentary of Bhartṛhari are preserved in a manuscript in the Adyar Library, p. 30, no. 110.

It would seem to me, then, that the *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana* is a collection of useful verses composed by no single author but gathered together by Bhaṭṭoji, who doubtless composed many of them himself, for the instructions of his students. These kārīkās are not concerned with morphology or grammar in the narrow sense. Rather, they explain structure, syntax, semantics and the philosophy of grammar.

3. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanasāra*

Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa claims no great originality for the semantic doctrines that he elucidates in the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanasāra*, his concise commentary on the kārīkās of Bhaṭṭoji. For the most part he relies upon older authorities. In one of the opening verses of his commentary he tells us that his aim in writing the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana* was to refute the theories of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas concerning constructional and morphemic meanings. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa accepts the authority of Gautama and Jaimini but criticizes their commentators, who, he claims, misinterpreted their meaning.

Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa was well-grounded in all forms of shastric learning, as will be clear from the works and authors that he mentions in his *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣana* and its summary, the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanasāra*. Naturally, the most frequently quoted author is Pāṇini. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* is accepted as an unquestionable guide to the interpretation of Pāṇini and support for the theories which Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa advocates. Next to Pāṇini the most frequently quoted author is Bharṭṛhari.

Of his references to disciplines other than grammar those to the Mīmāṃsā are the most frequent and detailed. Occasionally he quotes from the Jaimini sūtras verbatim, but more often he refers to topics of the discipline, e.g. Aruṇādhikaraṇa, Rathantara, or to particular sections (*adhyāya*) such as the Ninth or Tenth. In such references Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa is thinking of, and indeed had probably memorized, the composite *śāstra*: Sūtras plus Śabarsvāmin's *Bhāṣya* plus Kumārila's *Vārtikās*. He refers only rarely to the Prabhākara School, his main argument being directed against the school of Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila). Occasionally, however, he quotes Bhaṭṭapāda (Kumārila) with approval¹⁴ and he seems generally to approve of Maṇḍana Miśra.¹⁵

His references to Vedānta show that he had been won over by his father to the strict Advaita school. When discussing the doctrines of *sattā*,

14. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana*, p. 61.

15. *Sāra*, p. 20.

sphoṭa, *pañcakōśa*, or *vākyārtha* he quotes from the *Brahmasūtras*,¹⁶ Śaṅkara, Vācaspati Miśra and the *Parimala*.¹⁷

In Nyāya Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa is *au courant* with the very latest theories. Of the Navya Naiyāyikas he quotes not only Raghunātha Śiromaṇi but even Raghunātha's pupil, Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya.¹⁸

While Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's references to Vedānta and Nyāya are both numerous, there is a difference between his attitudes to the two disciplines, and this same difference holds of most neo-grammarians. The Vedānta furnished him with doctrine for belief and he writes no arguments that could be termed 'against the Vedānta.' The Nyāya, on the other hand, furnishes only a technique. The doctrines in order to prove which the Naiyāyikas had invented their technique are not accepted. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa like other grammarians of his time composes numerous arguments 'against the Nyāya.'

This sympathy of the grammarians with Vedānta goes back to the work of Bharṭṛhari. Hari grounded the whole of grammar on Vedānta metaphysics. All morphemes and their sequences ultimately mean *sattā*, pure existence. It is due only to nescience (*avidyā*) that this *sattā* assumes different forms. Thus the 'word' is ultimately identical with the 'it', undifferentiated, unchangeable *Śabdabrahma*.

Since the time of Bharṭṛhari Indian grammarians have regarded themselves as Advaita Vedāntins, and there is among them scarcely any innovation in metaphysics from Bharṭṛhari to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa. If anything on this score there is decay. But the later grammarians have a technique that is vastly superior to that of the *Vakyāpadīya*. It is not only the corruptions of our manuscripts and the faults of modern editors that make Bharṭṛhari so difficult an author. Even when these faults are some day rectified many of his pronouncements will remain ambiguous or at least will lack that crystal clarity which we observe in the 16th and 17th century grammarians. The difference is only in part due to subject matter. Granted that metaphysics is more prone to ambiguity than semantics and syntax, much light can be generated by a careful definition and concatenation of terms. It is in this respect that the later grammarians profited from the Nyāya. The elaborate semantic paraphrases (*śābdabodha*) of Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa, to which we shall introduce the reader in a later section of this introduction, have the same analytical merit that is shown in Navyanyāya statements of relationship. The grammarians learned much from the Naiyāyikas, in fact everything except what the

16. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, pp. 254, 257.

17. *Sāra*, p. 59.

18. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, p. 29. *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 84, 234, etc.

Naiyāyikas most wanted to teach, the pluralistic realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

4. Commentaries on the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*

I know of no Commentary on the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*. On the other hand, eight commentaries have been published in whole or in part on the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*.

1) The *Bhūṣaṇavyākhyā* of Kṛṣṇamitra, known also as Kṛṣṇamiśra, son of Paṇḍita Rāmasevaka Tripāthi. The commentator was a resident of Lakṣmaṇapur in the District of Sultanpur. He wrote other works also: a Commentary called *Kuñjikā* on Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa's *Laghumuñjūṣā*, a *Ratnārṇava* on the *Siddhāntakaumudī*, and a *Kalpalatā* on the *Praudhamanoramā*. This commentary is brief and good, its approximate date A.D. 1750.¹⁹ It has been published in the Kāśī Sanskrit Series.

2) The *Laghubhūṣaṇakānti* of Manudeva, known also as Gopāladeva. The author was the pupil of Bālabhaṭṭa Pāyguṇḍe who was himself a pupil of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (who flourished towards the end of the 17th century and first quarter of the 18th century). This Commentary seems to have been written between A.D. 1760 and 1780. Fragments of it have been found by Mr. K. Tripathi, who furnishes extracts of the work in his Bombay edition of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*.

3) The *Darpaṇa* of Harivallabha Utrabhāṭīya. The commentator himself tells us that he was the son of Śrī Vallabha, who composed a book called the *Vinodamañjarī* on Vedānta. The *Darpaṇa* is valuable for its explanation not only of the theories of the grammarians but also of the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, in which disciplines Harivallabha shows great learning. The *Darpaṇa* is earlier than the *Kāśikā* of Harirāma Kāle and may be dated approximately between 1770 to 1790.

4) The *Kāśikā* of Harirāma Kāle. At the end of the work the author gives the date of composition as 1853, presumably of the Vikrama Era, i.e., A.D. 1797. The *Kāśikā* refers to the *Darpaṇa* of Harivallabha. A very extensive commentary, generally clear, published in the Bombay Sanskrit and Prākṛit Series, vol. LXX, 1914.

5) The *Parīkṣā* of Bhairava Miśra, a famous commentator on Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa's work. He was the son of Bhavadeva Miśra of the Agastya family. The author himself gives the date of composition,²⁰ which is equivalent to

19. Cf. *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, second ed., by Abhyankar, pp. 530, 531, 533; see also *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, Kāśī Sanskrit Series, vol. 133, Intro., p. 5.

20. Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. in the Adyar Library, vol. VI, p. 348, MS. No. 348; see also MS. 521.

A.D. 1823, in the colophon of his commentary on the *Laghuśabdenduśekhara*. The *Parikṣā* is a good commentary written in simple language. Published, Kāśī Sanskrit Series.

6) The *Prabhā* of Balakṛṣṇa Pancoli. This is an extensive commentary, written A.D. 1947. It is not original in its interpretation but is clear and faithful to the tradition. Published, Ādarśa Granthamālā, Benares.

7) The *Saralā* of Gopālasāstri Nene, A.D. 1952. A brief, modern commentary, occasionally helpful. Published, Śrīharikṛṣṇanibandha-*maṇimālā*, vol. VII, Benares.

8) The *Śāṃkarī* of Śāṃkaraśāstri Mārulkar, my teacher. The *Śāṃkarī* follows the traditional interpretation. It is composed in simple language, well suited to the needs of students. Published Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, vol. CXXXV, 1957.

It remains only to remark on a misconception that has appeared in print²¹ that the *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjinī* is a commentary on our work, or if not on it, on the detailed version, the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*,²² from which it was abbreviated.

Actually, the *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjinī* is an independent commentary on Bhaṭṭoji's *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana*., written by a pupil of Bhaṭṭoji named Vanamāli Miśra. This appears with certitude from the introductory verse²³ and from the colophon²⁴ of a R.A.S.B. Calcutta Manuscript of the work.

Thus, there were two commentaries on Bhaṭṭoji's *Kārikās*, one by his nephew, which we propose to translate, and one by a pupil. The pupil's, to judge from Mr. Trivedi's description,²⁵ for I have not seen the manuscript of the work myself, is very brief. One may suppose on this ground and also from the fact that its author was a direct pupil that it is somewhat earlier in date than the commentary of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.

5. Indian Semantics: an Historical Sketch

To write a proper history of the Indian study of Semantics would require a volume if not more. And yet some awareness of early work in semantics is necessary if one is properly to understand Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.

21. *Studies in Indian Literary History*, vol III, pp. 13-14; cf. also K.P. Trivedi, *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, Intro. p. 18.

22. Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum*.

23. *Descriptive Catalogue of Vyākaraṇa MSS. R.A.S.B. Calcutta*, vol. VI, p. 13. The MS. No. 4229 speaks of Bhaṭṭoji as the author's *guru: jagataḥ pitarau natvā parvatiparameśvarau/ gurubhir ye kṛtāḥ ślokās ūkā teṣāṃ vitanyate//*

24. *Ibid.* Śrīvanamāliviracitāyāṃ *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjanaṭikāyāṃ prātipadikārthollāsaḥ caturthaḥ.*

25. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, Intro. p. 18.

What I propose to furnish, then, is a historical skeleton of the subject. Let us hope that in the future some scholar will clothe it with flesh.

The germs of an interest in semantics may be traced back to the Tenth Book of the Rigveda. Hymns X. 71, X. 114, X. 125 begin with philosophical speculations concerning speech (*vāk*) and its relation to meaning. Here and elsewhere the Veda raises such problems as the origin of language, the different forms of speech, the relation of a word to its meaning. Such speculations form the background to a regular philosophy of language such as we find fully developed in Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadiya*.

But the Indian interest in semantics was interrupted and then for many centuries overshadowed by a scientific investigation of phonetics and morphology. We meet with interest in what might be called descriptive linguistics in the Sūtra period. In the *Prātiśākhya*s, the *Nirukta*, and in Pāṇini the science of language is no longer something new.

In Yāska's *Nirukta* the two interests exist side by side. The fourfold classification of parts of speech is given a semantic basis. Thus, to distinguish verb from noun, Yāska says that a verb denotes activity in process²⁶, denotes that which is composed of preceding and following parts, whereas a noun denotes frozen action or action in the form of substance.

In Pāṇini (5th century B.C.) descriptive linguistics has won the upper hand. Pāṇini²⁷ avoids problems of semantics as studiously as do the modern Western linguists. The *Aṣṭādyaī*, *Gaṇapāṭha* and *Dhātupāṭha* describe the grammatical or linguistic structure of the Sanskrit language in terms of morphemes (base form and suffix) and rules of combination. The phonemes are systematically listed in the *Śivasūtras*, morphemes in the *Gaṇapāṭha* and *Dhātupāṭha*. Using these phonemes and morphemes as basic units Pāṇini built a detailed and comprehensive grammar of the language. Pāṇini's genius lies in morphological description and allomorphic statements. The concept of zero (*lopa*) as an allomorph is a marvelous invention of Pāṇini's, as remarkable if not as influential on human culture as the later Indian invention of zero as a mathematical symbol. Terms such as *dhātu*, *sarvanāmasthāna*, *sarvanāma* etc. are not defined by Pāṇini on the basis of semantics. His method of analysis is purely formal.

It is true, of course, that in a sense Pāṇini's system is not quite free from semantics. Pāṇini collected and classified types of meanings under the terms *kṛt*, *apatya*, *rakta*, *cāturarthika* etc. What I mean by saying that his system is free from semantics is simply that his process of

26. *Nirukta* 1.1.

27. *Pāp.* 1.2.56.

grammatical description does not involve meaning, but is formal; matters of semantics are implicit only.

Between Pāṇini and Kātyāyana and between Kātyāyana and Patañjali many works were written which are lost to us. Of these the *Samgraha* of Dākṣāyaṇi is worth mentioning. Patañjali²⁸ several times mentions the name of *Samgraha* in the *Mahābhāṣya* and praises Dākṣāyaṇi highly. Patañjali tells us that the question is fully discussed in the *Samgraha*²⁹ whether word is eternal or ephemeral, and Puṇyarāja in his Commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* quotes three verses from the *Samgraha*.³⁰

Unlike Pāṇini Kātyāyana (3rd century B.C.) gave his attention not only to descriptive grammar but also to philosophical problems such as the features of words, the definition of sentence³¹ and theories on syntax. But Kātyāyana did not write an independent work. He found it more convenient to append *vārtikas* to certain rules of Pāṇini. The main aim of Kātyāyana was to amplify and revise the rules of Pāṇini rather than to broach a new system of philosophy.

Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* [150 B.C.] in its opening section (*paspaśā*) deals with the nature of language from a philosophical point of view, a subject excluded by Pāṇini and Kātyāyana from their grammars. Patañjali with a scientific curiosity for the first time raises the question what it is that we call a word. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* is a storehouse of information concerning general matters connected with the science of grammar. Patañjali, like his predecessor, was not only interested in the investigation of correct forms but also in theories of syntax and semantics. For discussion of semantics and the philosophy of language one may see *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini 1.3.1; 1.2.64; 2.1.1; 2.2.24; 3.3.19; 3.4.26 etc. But Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* does not deal with semantics systematically. Rather, it touches on various semantic problems as they arise in the course of explaining Pāṇini.

Bharṭṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* about A.D.400³² is the first systematic work on semantics and the philosophy of language that we have preserved to us in India. It deals with these subjects exclusively and is not concerned with the philosophy of grammar. Bharṭṛhari is a remarkable philosopher. He treats metaphysical and semantic problems side by side. This unusual juxtaposition makes his work difficult and has resulted in diverse interpretations of his teaching. He was the first to formulate the

28. *Mb* vol. I, p. 6.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 468.

30. *Vāk.* 1.14.

31. *Vārtika* on *Pān.* 2.1.1.

32. Cf. Bharṭṛhari's date, Prof. Sādhurām, Gaṅgānāth Jha Research Institute, vol. IX, 1952, pp. 135-151.

philosophy of *Śabdabrahma*, wherein the essence of word is regarded as the essence of reality and the source of cosmic evolution.³³ All words denote primarily pure existence (*sattā*).³⁴ The word cow means basically that something exists, to which the designation 'cow' is given.

Bhartrhari's contributions to metaphysical problems such as his theory of *sphoṭa* etc. were criticized by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārtika* and by Kumārila in his *Ślokavārtika*. In later times interest in Bhartrhari's metaphysics declined. All later commentators interpret the metaphysics of the *Vākyapadīya* as Vivartādvaita in the form in which that doctrine was later masterfully presented by Śaṅkara in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Bhartrhari's metaphysical contributions are quite forgotten in the light of Śaṅkara. And so it happens that while Bhartrhari is an often quoted author he is quoted not for his metaphysics but for his contributions to semantics and grammar. This holds for the writers on Alamkāra and Nyāya as well as for the grammarians. Bhaṭṭoji and Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa do quote his theories on *Sattā* or *śabdabrahma* but they read into these theories the whole of Śaṅkara's Advaita philosophy. One may conclude from this that as a metaphysician Bhartrhari has suffered in turn opposition, neglect, and finally misinterpretation. His influence on Indian thought, then, has been primarily as a semanticist.

Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya* consists of about three thousand kārīkās divided into three chapters. The first chapter is called Brahmakāṇḍa or Āgamakāṇḍa, the second, Vākyakāṇḍa, and the third, Padakāṇḍa or Prakīrṇakāṇḍa.

The first chapter of the *Vākyapadīya* deals with metaphysical and semantic problems side by side. In it Bhartrhari maintains that the eternal word is the supreme reality. It is transcendent and devoid of all qualities. *Śabdabrahman* is the originator of *śabdaprapañca* as well as *arthaprapañca*. It is existence in essence. From this śabdabrahman the whole universe is evolved. It does not change nor cease. That which cannot be subjected to the expression of articulated sound cannot be the content (object) of thought and must therefore be regarded as illusion.³⁵ On the other hand, things³⁶ such as sky-flowers and the sons of barren women, which have no external existence but can be subjected to the expression of articulated sound, are the contents of knowledge and in virtue thereof must be regarded as real. This articulated form gives the object existential status.

33. *Vāk.* 1.1.

34. *Vāk.* 2.121.

35. *Vāk.* 1.124.

36. *Ibid.*, 1.125.

Bhartrhari was the first author to elaborate the doctrine of *sphoṭa* and to identify *sphoṭa* with the Vedānta *brahman*. Hence the first chapter of this work is called Brahmakāṇḍa. He also maintains the validity of sacred doctrine (*āgamaprāmāṇya*, *śabdaprāmāṇya*) against the Vaiśeṣika opposition. Accordingly, another name of this first chapter is Āgamakāṇḍa.

In the second chapter Bhartrhari deals with sentences. The division of sentences into words and that of words into base form and suffix is, in his opinion, a grammatical fiction useful to students in order to understand the structure of language. According to him the sentence is distinct from the group of words and it is endowed with separate denotative power. He records eight different theories on the nature of the sentence. He claims that suffixes, prepositions and particles are not denotative but are suggestive of meaning, which is already denoted by the base form. He records different theories of the denotation of words and gives his own view that all words denote pure existence.

The first two chapters of the *Vākyapadīya* deal with the general characteristics of language as seen by Bhartrhari. The third chapter, appropriately called Prakīrṇakāṇḍa (miscellaneous section), deals with a variety of topics. This third chapter is divided into fourteen parts. Such matters are discussed as the grammatical categories of gender, number, time and the *kāraṅkas*. Theories are furnished on the nature of action, *vṛtti* etc. The third chapter of the *Vākyapadīya* is the most valuable portion to the semanticist.

Bhartrhari packed his arguments into small verses and thus this *Vākyapadīya* is unintelligible without a Commentary. It is generally believed that Bhartrhari himself wrote a commentary on the first chapter. Besides this, there are said to have been four commentaries on his work, by Helārāja, Puṅyarāja, Phullarāja and Vṛṣabhadeva. Puṅyarāja's commentary, the *Prakāśa*, on the first chapter of the *Vākyapadīya* has been published in the Benares Sanskrit Series. On the third chapter, Helārāja's commentary has been published both in the Benares Sanskrit Series and in the Trivendrum Sanskrit Series. The commentaries by Phullarāja and Vṛṣabhadeva have not been printed. The date of these commentators is uncertain, but they are separated by at least three or four centuries from Bhartrhari. Helārāja and Puṅyarāja are careful commentators and no doubt a great help to the understanding of Bhartrhari.

Between Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya* (A.D. 400) and Bhaṭṭoji's *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana* (A.D.1600) there is no book in the school of grammar which deals specifically with the philosophy of language. One should note, however, that Kaiyaṭa (11th century A.D.) adds here and there some worthwhile remarks on the philosophy of grammar. Kaiyaṭa

commented on Patañjali, but there is a gap of nearly 1200 years between him and the older author during which period the chief grammarians were Buddhist³⁷ or at least opposed to Patañjali.³⁸ Kaiyaṭa remarks at the beginning of his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* that he has composed his work on the model of Bhartr̥hari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, and he refers occasionally to that commentary in what follows.

Long after Kaiyaṭa, Bhaṭṭoji wrote his *Śabdakaustubha*, a voluminous commentary on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī and Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, which latter is supplanted in many parts of India. Bhaṭṭoji enters into controversy concerning the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar and presents the grammarian's view very thoroughly. Especially the *Śabdakaustubha* reforms the interpretation of Pāṇini and Patañjali and criticizes the views of ancient grammarians like Jayāditya, Vāmana, Haradatta, Nyāsa and the author of the *Prakriyākaumudī*. After completion of the *Śabdakaustubha* Bhaṭṭoji wrote the *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana*. In the Introductory verse of the *Vaiyākaraṇa-matonmajjana* he tells us that topics which have been thoroughly discussed in the *Śabdakaustubha* are briefly mentioned here. Bhaṭṭoji's *Vaiyākaraṇa-matonmajjana* furnishes a summary of the research of the Pāṇiniyan school on semantics.

As I have already said Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa composed two commentaries on the Kārikās of Bhaṭṭoji: the *Bhūṣaṇa* and its abridged version the *Sāra*. The *Sāra* gives all the essential principles of semantics and the philosophy of language. What it omits are the detailed arguments against the opposing views of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā.

Both the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* and the *Sāra* are divided into fourteen chapters. 1) Analysis of the meaning of the verbal roots. 2) On the meaning of tense suffixes. 3) On the meaning of case endings. 4) On the meaning of nouns. 5) On the denotative power of compounds. 6) On the denotative power in general. 7) On the meaning of negation. 8) On the meaning of prepositions and particles. 9) On the meaning of abstract nouns. 10) On the meaning of suffixes appended to the names of deities. 11) On the non-denotation of number by the subordinate constituent of a *vṛtti*. 12) On the meaning of the *kṛt* suffixes *ktvā* etc. 13) On the intended and unintended denotation of number. 14) On *sphoṭa*.

Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (A.D. 1670-1750) was the last great original scholar of the Pāṇiniyan school. His *Laghumañjūṣā* is a masterly treatise in which he elucidates the principles of semantics. It furnishes an ample store of arguments and refutes the view of ancient writers. The general plan of the *Laghumañjūṣā* is the same as that of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* with

37. E.g. Chandragomin, Jayāditya, Vāmana etc.

38. *Vāk.* the last 7 verses of second Kāṇḍa.

this difference that where Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa put the chapter on *sphoṭa* at the end Nageśa Bhaṭṭa begins with it.

The term neogrammarian has been applied to the school to which Bhaṭṭoji, Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa belonged. What is 'new' in the work of these men as opposed to that of Bharṭhari is a number of techniques which give their analysis and arguments great precision. Most important among these techniques is the *śābdabodha*. The term means literally 'verbal cognition,' i.e. what the hearer actually understands from the spoken phrase or sentence. By extension the term is then applied to a paraphrase of a given expression, a paraphrase in which the denotation of each element and the relations between these elements are rendered explicit. Many of these *śābdabodhas* will be found in the text and notes which follow. A single example will suffice here. Of the sentence 'Devadatta cooks' (*devadattah pacati*) Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's *śābdabodha* would be as follows. *Ekatvāvaccinnadevadattakarṭrko Vartamānakāliko Viklity-anukūlo vyāpārah*: "An activity of which the agent Devadatta is limited by singularity, belonging to present time, and favourable to the [result, namely] the becoming soft [of the rice grains]."

The neogrammarians like the Navyanaiyāyikas were careful to define their terms. They furnish precise definitions of agenthood, objecthood, root, compound, activity, result etc. They give great attention to the manner in which the elements of meaning are combined. Many of their arguments concern the question of predominance. Thus, they assign the denotation of the verbal root predominance over the denotation of finite verbal suffixes, whereas in the case of nouns the suffix is predominant. When the argument concerns syntax one might apply the terms nucleus and satellites to their categories.

Thus, the history of semantics in India falls into four stages. 1) The prescientific state. Here belong the mystical and magical speculations on speech and sound in the Rigveda and the Upanishads. 2) The Pāṇinian School. The central interest of this school is descriptive linguistics, but numerous questions of semantics are treated incidentally by Patañjali. 3) Bharṭhari and his commentators. Bharṭhari's interest lay in semantics and metaphysics. He himself considered metaphysics as more important but his influence on later ages was far greater in semantics. 4) The neogrammarians. This stage begins with Bhaṭṭoji's *Śabdakaustubha*. One might call it a school of descriptive semantics.

In what precedes I have limited my remarks to authors who fall under the general category of grammarians. Philosophers of other schools also wrote on semantics and the history of their speculations parallels that which I have outlined. Thus, parallel to Bharṭhari we have the metaphysical semantics of the Mīmāṃsā as preserved in Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika* and Vācaspati's *Tattvabindu*. Parallel to the neogrammarians

we have the descriptive semantics of the Mīmāṃsaka Khaṇḍadeva Miśra (A.D. 1596-1666) in his Bhāṭṭarahasya and the numerous studies of semantics by the Navyanaiyāyikas: Raghunātha's *Ākhyātavāda*, Jagadīśa's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* and Gadādhara's *Vyutpattivāda*.

6. Contents of the Dhātvarthanirṇaya

The opening chapter of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* is called Dhātvarthanirṇaya, 'Analysis of the Meaning of Verbal Roots.' According to the grammarians the basic element of the sentence is the verb. In this they disagree with the Naiyāyikas who take the noun as basic. Again, of the verb the basic element to the grammarians is the root. In this they differ from the Mīmāṃsakas, who take the personal ending of the verb as basic. Thus, the traditional views of the school make it natural for a grammarian to begin a treatise on semantics with an analysis of the meaning of roots.

According to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa a verbal root (such as *bhū*, *gam*, *pac*) denotes (*abhidhatte*) both activity (*vyāpāra*) and result (*phala*); it denotes them separately. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, as we shall see, disagrees to this extent that he claims the two denotations are not separate but are combined in such fashion that the one predominates over the other. Which denotation predominates depends on whether the verb is active or passive.

Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa teaches that the *tiṅ* suffix, that is, the personal ending of the verb, denotes a substratum. In an active verb-form the *tiṅ* suffix denotes the substratum of activity, that is, the agent; in a passive verb-form *tiṅ* denotes the substratum of result, that is, the object. *Tiṅ* suffixes also denote number and time. The relations between these numerous denotations is as follows. The agent is a qualifier of the activity, the object is a qualifier of the result, number is a qualifier of the agent when *tiṅ* denotes an agent and a qualifier of the object when *tiṅ* denotes an object, time is a qualifier of the activity.

These relations are made explicit by semantic paraphrases (*śābdabodha*). Thus, the semantic paraphrase of the sentence *caitras taṇḍulān pacati*: "Caitra cooks the rice grains," is as follows. *Ekavācchinnacaitrābhinnakarṭko vartamānakālikas taṇḍulābhinnakarmaniṣṭhaviklityanukūlah phūtkārādirūpavyāpārah*: "An activity in the form of blowing [on the fire] etc., of which the agent is limited by singularity and nondifferent from Caitra, belonging to the present time, and favorable to the [result, namely] the becoming soft [of the rice grains] which [result] resides in an object non-different from rice grains."

1) Here the fragment *caitrābhinnakarṭko vyāpārah* shows that the meaning agent qualifies the meaning activity.

- 2) The fragment *taṇḍulābhinnakarmaniṣṭhaviklityanukūlaḥ* shows that the object, rice grains, qualifies the meaning result.
- 3) The fragment *ekatvāvaccinnacaitra* shows that the meaning number denoted by the *tiñ* suffix qualifies the agent.
- 4) The fragment *vartamānakāliko vyāpāraḥ* shows that the meaning time qualifies the meaning activity.

According to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa, who here follows the ancient grammarians, the passive sentence *caitreṇa taṇḍulāḥ pacyante*; ‘The ricegrains are cooked by Caitra,’ may be paraphrased in the same way with the sole difference that the number denoted by the *tiñ* suffix qualifies the meaning object whereas in the active it qualifies the meaning agent. Thus, *caitrābhinnakartrko vartamānakāliko bahutvāvaccinnataṇḍulābhinnakarmaniṣṭhaviklityanukūlaḥ phūtkārādirūpo vyāpāraḥ*. It will be seen that according to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa the passive differs from the active syntactically but semantically it is almost identical.

Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa is of a different opinion. He finds that the passive differs semantically from the active by the fact that in the passive the result predominates over the activity. The root *pac* in *pacati*: ‘he cooks,’ denotes activity leading to action, whereas the same root *pac* in *pacyante*: ‘are cooked,’ denotes a result produced by an activity. His semantic paraphrase of the sentence *caitreṇa taṇḍulāḥ pacyante* is as follows. *Caitrābhinnakartrkavartamānakālikavyāpārajanyā bahutvāvaccinnataṇḍulābhinnakarmikā viklittiḥ*: “A becoming soft, of which the object is non-different from rice-grain[s] limited by plurality, arising from an activity of the present time, of which [activity] the agent is non-different from Caitra.” The fragment *vyāpārajanyā ... viklittiḥ* shows that the activity qualifies the result.

7. Vyāpāra (activity)

The word *vyāpāra* means literally busying oneself (*vyāpriyata iti vyāpāraḥ*), or an activity. In certain contexts it may be used synonymously³⁹ with *kriyā* (action), *bhāvanā* (productive operation) or *kṛti* (effort). However, these four words are not true synonyms; there are many contexts where one may not be exchanged with another.

The primary use of *vyāpāra* by Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa⁴⁰ and the grammarians of his age is to refer to a denotation of a verbal root. A root such as *pac*: ‘to cook’ may denote any of numerous activities. When we say *Devadattaḥ pacati*: ‘Devadatta cooks’ we may mean that Devadatta is

39. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, verse 5, page 5.

40. *Ibid.*, verse 2, page 2.

putting the pot on the fire, that he is putting rice in the pot, that he is blowing on the fire etc. Only context can determine which or how many of these activities (*vyāpārāḥ*) we intend.

The same root *pac* may be used with a non-sentient subject. Thus, we may say *sthāly odanam pacati*: 'the pot cooks the rice,' or *Kāṣṭhāny odanam pacanti*: 'the sticks of wood cook the rice.' Here the activity of the pot in the first instance and of the sticks of wood in the second may be called *vyāpāra*. These instances reveal a distinction between *vyāpāra* and *ḥṛti* (effort). *Ḥṛti* can be used to refer only to activities of sentient beings.

Although the root *pac* may refer in different contexts to different *vyāpāras*, within a single sentence it refers to the *vyāpāra* of the agent only. Thus, in the sentence *Devadattaḥ kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyām odanam pacati*: 'Devadatta cooks rice in the pot by means of sticks of wood,' the root *pac* denotes the activities of Devadatta but not the activities of the pot and sticks of wood.

8. *Kriyā* (action)

'*Kriyā*' has been variously defined, but through all the definitions there runs a thread of similarity. *Kriyā* is a complex entity, a process which has parts. Extended and secondary usages sometimes permit '*kriyā*' and '*vyāpāra*' to be interchanged, but basically *kriyā* is complex whereas *vyāpāra* is simple. The *kriyā* of cooking includes setting the pot on the fire, putting the rice in the pot, blowing on the fire etc., whereas a *vyāpāra* of cooking is any one of these but only one, the particular one being determined by context. With so much by way of preface we may examine the historical definitions.

Yāska, using the word *bhāva* rather than *kriyā*, says at the beginning of his *Nirukta*: "Action, which consists of preceding and succeeding [parts], is expressed by the verb."⁴¹

Patañjali, using the word *kriyā*, remarks that action, since it consists of successive parts, in a strict sense is invisible.⁴² We can only see the component parts. However, by our identifying the part with the whole we speak metaphorically of seeing action.

Bhartrhari considered the nature of action more deeply. To him the difference between *kriyā* and *vyāpāra* is one of degree rather than basic nature. Even the component activity (*vyāpāra*), if analyzed, turns out to be a process consisting of consecutive parts.⁴³ Thus, the single activity of

41. *pūrvāparibhūtam bhāvam ākhyatenācaṣṭe. Nirukta* 1.1.

42. Patañjali on *Pāṇ.* 1.3.1.

43. *Vāk.* III, p. 609.

pouring water into the rice pot may be broken down into stretching out one's hands, grasping the vessel, tipping it etc. To Bhartṛhari the world of reality is very like that of the Buddhists: a succession of infinitely numerous, infinitely brief, quanta of occurrences. All his categories fall under this metaphysics. Action (*kriyā*) and activity (*vyāpāra*) are simply different calibrations that we make on the underlying reality. The difference between them is a difference of viewpoint, subjective not objective in nature. Accordingly, as our viewpoint changes so will our selection of terms. Thus, if we think of the pouring of water into the rice pot as part of a larger process we term it an activity (*vyāpāra*). If we think of it as a whole composed of parts we term it an action (*kriyā*).

Our use of tense, on Bhartṛhari's showing, is equally subjective. Properly the idea of tense goes with an idea as a whole. But if that which has elsewhere been conceived as a part is in a given context conceived as a whole⁴⁴ it will draw to it the idea of tense. If the speaker considers the first activity of cooking, such as setting the fire, to be the main part and if he thus identifies this one activity with the whole, he may use a tense with reference to this one activity, saying, for example, *apāksīt* 'he has cooked' when only the first activity is completed. On the other hand, from a different point of view he may say with reference to the same external facts: *pacati*, "he is cooking."

Some of Bhartṛhari's remarks concerning action are very subtle. Thus, an opponent argues that at least one portion of action must be visible, namely the final portion. After all, actions are not endless, so every action must have a final portion which itself is partless. Bhartṛhari replies⁴⁵ that if something is partless it cannot be action.

The grammarians were early bothered by the peculiarity of those actions denoted by such verbs as *as* (to be), *bhū* (to come into existence), *jñā* (to know). That what is here denoted is action (*kriyā*) as indicated by the distinctions of tense. If what was denoted was result only, the present tense would be used so long as the result continued, and we should say *ghaṭo bhavati*: "the pot comes into existence" for years after it had been made.

The key to a solution was found by Vārṣyāyāni, whose work is lost but who is quoted by Yāska as listing six stages⁴⁶ of which all activities are composed: *jāyate*, *asti*, *vipariṇamate*, *vardhate*, *apakṣiyate*, *naśyati*: "it is born, is, alters, grows, decays, perishes." Bhartṛhari⁴⁷ takes these stages as six aspects of *bhāva*.

44. *Vākyapadīya*, 3, *Kriyāsam.* p. 307.

45. *Vākyapadīya*, 3, *Kriyāsam.*, p. 610

46. *Nirukta* 1.1.

47. *Vākyapadīya*, 3, *Kriyāsam.*, p. 311, 322.

Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa in his *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* says that the roots as etc. also denote action in process but this action is not clearly cognized because in the case of intransitive verbs the actor (agent) and that which is acted upon (object) are not two different entities. For further explanation see notes on page 11, lines 27-30. Nāgeśa, as usual, is more precise. He says that one uses *asti* of that action whose agent is undergoing neither production nor alteration. *Asti* refers to the process⁴⁸ between these two processes.

9. *Bhāva*

As I have indicated above, the word *bhāva* was used by Yāska to mean action: *pūrvāparībhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenācaṣṭe*. However, the word has many other senses and was felt to be so ambiguous by the neogrammarians that they generally avoided it. Even Patañjali substituted *kriyā* in his dictum *kriyāpradhānam ākhyātam*⁴⁹ where Yāska had said *bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam*.⁵⁰

Pāṇini used the word *bhāva* in three senses. 1) Action in general as denoted by a verbal root. So Pāṇ 2.3.37. This is Yāska's sense. 2) Impersonal action, e.g. the action denoted by the verb *sthīyate*, which does not indicate whether the agent is first, second or third person. So Pāṇ 1.3.13. 3) Frozen action such as that denoted by nouns ending in the suffix *ghañ*. So Pāṇ 3.1.11.

The unhappy results of this ambiguity may be seen in such example as Durgācārya's comment on Yāska's old dictum *bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam*. First he tries to read into *bhāva* Pāṇini's third sense. *Bhāva*, he says, means frozen action such as is denoted by resultative nouns (*nāmapadavācyā-rthāśrayavyaṅgyo bhāvah*). Examples of such nouns would be *pāka* (a cooking), *lābha* (an obtaining) etc. Now, when Yāska says that the verb denotes this sense predominantly we are to understand predominance, says Durgācārya, not as linguistic but as physical or teleological predominance. From a teleological point of view the result is more important than the action which brings about the result. The main thing which the verb points to, then, if we overlook its strict linguistic denotation is result.

This may be thought a skilful interpretation, but it is a wrong one as one may see by reference to Yāska's qualifying phrase *pūrvāparībhūtam*. A result is not a process consisting of successive parts. So Durgācārya gives

48. *Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 556.

49. *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇ. 5.3.66.

50. *Nir.* 1.1.9.

a second interpretation, this time the right one: *bhāvaḥ karma kriyā dhātvartha ity anarthāntaram*; “*bhāva, karma, kriyā* are not different in meaning i.e., are synonyms.”

The neogrammarians usually avoid the term *bhāva*, but since they strove for precise definitions they did find such definitions for *bhāva*. Nāgeśa says:⁵¹ *Saparispandanāparispandanāsādhanaśādhya dhātvartho bhāvaḥ, saparispandanāsādhanaśādhya dhātvarthah kriyā*: “*Bhāva* is the root meaning representing that which is brought about by *kāraḥ* (*sādhana*) whether these have motion or not; *kriyā* is the root meaning representing that which is brought about by those *kāraḥ* only which have motion.” Thus, according to Nāgeśa *bhāva* is of wider extension than *kriyā*. Both *pacati* and *asti* denote *bhāva*; only *pacati* denotes *kriyā*. But not everyone agrees with Nāgeśa. According to the *Tattvabodhinī*⁵² *bhāva* does not include *kriyā*; rather, each term refers to a separate type of root meaning: *bhāva* to a meaning that does not involve motion, *kriyā* to a meaning that does. According to this definition *pacati* denotes *kriyā*, *asti* denotes *bhāva*.

10. Ākhyāta

Yāska’s predecessors used the word *ākhyāta* in the sense of verbal root, e.g. *nāmāni ākhyātajāni iti Śākaṭāyanaḥ*: “*Śākaṭāyana*⁵³ holds the view that nouns are derived from verbal roots.” Yāska used the word *ākhyāta* in the sense of (finite) verb,⁵⁴ e.g. *catvāri padajātāni namākhyāto-pasarganipātāḥ*: “There are four parts of speech: nouns, verbs, prepositions and particles.”

Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Bhartr̥hari used the word *ākhyāta* in the sense of finite verb. See *Gaṇasūtra* ‘*ākhyātam ākhyātena kriyā-sātatyē*,’ *Siddhāntakaumudī*, page 173; *Vārtika* 9 on *Pāṇ* 2.1.1.; *Vākyapadīya* 2.1-2, page 63 and 3.8, page 331.

The same usage of *ākhyāta* to mean finite verb is found in the older Mīmāṃsā text, e.g. *Jaimini-Sūtra* 2.1.3; Śābara on 6.3.24; 6.2.13.

However, the later Mīmāṃsā texts use the word *ākhyāta* in the sense of *tiṅ* suffixes. See *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*: ‘*yajeta*’*ty atrā*’*sty aṃśadvayaṃ, yajidhātuḥ pratyayaś ca. Tatra pratyaye*’*py asty aṃśadvayaṃ, ākhyāta-tvaṃ liṅtvaṃ ca. Ākhyātatvaṃ ca daśasu lakāreṣu vidyate*.’ In the word *yajeta*, “he shall sacrifice,” there are three elements, the root *yaj*,

51. Uddyota on *Mahābhāṣya* 1.3.1.

52. page 409.

53. *Nirukta* 1.12.

54. *Ibid.*, 1.1.

“sacrifice” and ending *-ta*. The ending also consists of two parts, characterized by *ākhyāta* (*tiñ* suffixes) and optative sign.⁵⁵

The usage of the neogrammarians is not consistent. In most cases Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa uses *ākhyāta* in the late Mīmāṃsā sense to mean verb ending (*tiñ* suffix). So page 3, line 10; page 4, line 4; page 4, line 28; page 5, line 5; page 10, lines 19-20. Occasionally, though, he reverts to the usage of classical grammarians, using *ākhyāta* in the sense of finite verb. So page 10, line 3; page 38, line 4. The archaic use: *ākhyāta* = verbal root, is not found in Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.

11. Three Types of Action

Patañjali on Pāṇini 3.3.18 says that the roots *kṛ* (do), *bhū* (come into being) and *as* (be, exist) denote action in general whereas roots like *pac* (cook) denote particular actions.⁵⁶ What Patañjali means by this is that all roots can be classified into three types: *kṛ* type, *bhū* type, *as* type. Later grammarians⁵⁷ kept this natural semantic classification, giving the following designations and descriptions to each type.

1) *Kartṛsthakriyaka* (Patañjali’s *bhū* type): where the observable activity denoted by the root resides in the agent. To this class besides ‘comes into being’ belong ‘grows’ ‘perishes’ and all intransitive verbs except those contained in class 3.

2) *Karmasthabhāvaka* (Patañjali’s *kṛ* type): where the activity denoted by the root is manifested in the object, that is to say, produces an observable result on the object. Where we say “The ax splits the tree” we observe the result to be manifested in the tree not the ax. To this class belong *kṛ*, *bhid* and all transitive verbs except those contained in class 3.

3) *Kartṛsthabhāvaka* (Patañjali’s *as* type): where the activity denoted by the root is manifested in the agent (but is not observable). It is inobservability of the action that really characterizes this type. Some of its members are transitive, e.g. *vid*, *jñā* (to know), some intransitive, e.g. *as* (to be), *sthā* (stand), *ās* (sit). As regards the last two examples, while it is true that we can observe a man standing or sitting we cannot observe any *activity* of standing or sitting.

55. Edgerton, *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, p. 193, and translation, p. 39.

56. *Kṛbhvastayaḥ kriyāsāmānyavācīnaḥ kriyāviśeṣavācīnaḥ pacādayaḥ*.

57. Bhoja’s *Śrīgāraprakāśa*, p. 126.

12. Verbs and Nouns

The structure of Sanskrit as of all the older Indo-European languages reveals a clear distinction between verbs and nouns. However, it is much more difficult to define these categories semantically than morphologically. In Sanskrit a verb is *tiñanta*, that is, ends in a *tiñ* suffix, whereas a noun is *subanta*, ends in a *sup* suffix. By the compilation of lists of suffixes and by use of the fiction of omitted suffixes it was possible to construct criteria for assigning all verbs and nouns to their proper group. But what is of the distinction of meaning?

Yāska was first to handle the problem. He tells us⁵⁸ that a verb denotes *bhāva*, by which he means action, and he defines this *bhāva* as a process of happening, which consists of a definite sequence of beginning, middle and end. Nouns, on the other hand, do not denote a process. Patañjali, commenting on Pāṇini 5.4.19, notes that nominalized action, that is, action denoted by the *kṛt* suffixes, appears as a substance (*dravya*).

Patañjali notes several other distinctions of verb from noun which are as much semantic as morphological. Commenting on Pāṇini 3.1.67 he notices the fact, which had been pointed out in Greece by Aristotle, that action denoted by a verb has a temporal character whereas the action denoted by nouns does not indicate time. Commenting on Pāṇini 1.2.64 he says that the denotation of a verb is single (*eka* or *nivṛttabhedā*). His meaning is that the verb does not directly denote number. The verb *pacanti*: (they cook) does not denote a plurality of actions. At most it indicates a plurality of agents. On the other hand, a noun like *ghaṭa* when the plurality suffix *as* is added to it marks the plurality of the objects directly denoted.

But it is Bhartṛhari who considered the semantic distinctions of verbs from nouns most carefully. He speaks of verbs as denoting *sādhya-kriyā*, literally, action to-be-effected as opposed to nouns which denote *siddha*, that which is effected. The intended distinction is a valuable one but the choice of terms was unfortunate. Even in Bhartṛhari's time it led to misunderstanding, for one naturally understands *sādhya* to refer to future time and *siddha* to past. This was not Bhartṛhari's intention, as he tells us explicitly in *Vākyapadīya*, page 298.⁵⁹ To him *apāksīt*: 'he cooked' denoted something that was *sādhya* just as much as *pakṣyati*: 'he will cook.' What Bhartṛhari meant by *sādhya* in this context was process action, durative action as opposed to frozen action for which he used the term *siddha*. His distinction raises an interesting question as to the nature

58. *Nirukta* 1.1.

59. The passage is quoted (and misunderstood) by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa page 2, lines 8-16 of the text which is translated below, see with notes thereon.

of the Sanskrit verb in classical times. It would seem that Bhartrhari felt verbs to be of continuative action type rather than point action type. His understanding of *apāksīt* may have been closer to our 'he was cooking' than to 'he cooked.' But this is not certain.

The neogrammarians either misunderstood Bhartrhari's distinction of verbs from nouns or disapproved of it. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa returned to a formal distinction. See notes on page 2 lines 6-7 of text below.

13. Verb Governing Verb: The Argument with the Nyāya

In distinguishing verbs from nouns in the course of his comment on Pāṇini 3.1.67 Patañjali remarks that while a substance is linked with an action (*dravyam kriyayā samavāyam gacchati*) an action is not linked with a second action in the same way. His words are open to misunderstanding and so are rendered more precise by Kaiyaṭa. Kaiyaṭa says that what is meant is that an action is never connected with another action by any of the relations of the oblique cases. One action can be connected with another action, however, as its agent or object; thus, *bhavati pacati*, which Kaiyaṭa takes to mean "that he cooks [i.e. the action represented in the phrase 'he cooks'] comes into being."

The example is an old one, being used elsewhere though with different word order by Patañjali himself. In it the grammarians insist that the agent of the one action is not the agent of the second; rather, the one action itself is the agent of the second. Thus, they construct the further example *pacasi bhavati*: 'that you cook comes into being,' which would be ungrammatical if the agents were the same; one would then require *pacati* in place of *pacasi*.

Another anointed example of this sort of construction is *paśya mṛgo dhāvati*: 'See, the deer runs.' To the grammarians this is a single sentence, the object of 'see' being the action of running of which the deer is the agent. If the object of 'see' were the running deer the example would be ungrammatical; one would then require *mṛgam* in place of *mṛgo* and a participle in place of the finite verb *dhāvati*.

With the interpretation and analysis of these examples the Naiyāyikas disagree. The basic cause of disagreement is that they regard the primary designation of a verb form like *pacati* to be the agent of action rather than the action itself. Accordingly, in the sentence *pacati bhavati* it is the primary designate, the agents, which govern one another, not the actions. The sentence, according to the Nyāya, means 'he who cooks comes into being.' The sentence *pacati bhavati* in the sense claimed by the grammarians is wrong.

If the agent is to be the primary designation of the verb the sentence *paśya mṛgo dhāvati* must be reinterpreted. According to the Nyāya this is really two sentences with a pronoun omitted: *paśya (tam) mṛgo dhāvati*: “See him! The deer runs.” The grammarians object that such an interpretation loses sight of the speaker’s intention, which is to call attention more vividly to the running of the deer. But the Naiyāyikas use a further example to strengthen their case. Take the words *rājā gacchati namaskuru*: “The king comes! Pay honor!” Even a grammarian must admit that this is two sentences with a pronoun omitted: *rājā gacchati (tam) namaskuru*: “The king comes! Pay him honor!” Why, then, should one refuse to supply the pronoun *tam* in one case when one is willing to do so in another?

14. *Phala*

The grammarians use the word *phala* in two senses, which one may distinguish as a popular sense and a technical sense. In the popular sense *phala* means the ultimate aim of an action. Such a sense is implied by Pāṇini’s Sūtra 1.3.72 *svaritañiṭaḥ kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale*: “when the benefit of the action accrues to the agent the roots with indicatory svarita vowel and ñ, take middle endings.” Thus, when a man cooks, the *pradhānam phalam*, the chief or ultimate aim or benefit of his action is the appeasement of hunger. When he performs a sacrifice the ultimate aim is the attainment of heaven etc. The cook and the priest may earn money by cooking or sacrificing, but this is not the ultimate aim of actions in which they engage.

This popular sense of *phala* is defined by Bhartrhari as follows.

*yasyārthasya prasiddhyartham ārabhyante pacādayaḥ
tat pradhānam phalam teṣām na lābhādiprayojanam*

“when [an action] such as cooking etc. is undertaken for the purpose of gaining a given goal, that goal and not the purpose of gaining money is the chief aim of that action.

In the technical sense *phala* means something quite different, viz., the single effect of an action (*kriyā*) as produced by the various activities (*vyāpāra*) of which the action is composed and which are denotable by the verbal root. For example, the root *pac* denotes any of the activities which go to make up the action of cooking, e.g. setting fire under the pot, blowing on the fire, putting rice in the pot etc. Here we see that all sense activities result in a single effect, namely, the becoming soft of the grains of rice. This single effect is the *phala*, in the technical sense of the action of cooking. In general it is in the technical sense that Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa uses the word *phala*. The sense may be defined more precisely as

taddhātvarthajanyatve sati taddhātvartha-tvam: “that which is produced by the activity denoted by a verbal root, being itself denoted by the verbal root.” Between the activity and result denoted by a root there subsists a producer-produced relation. Result is produced and activity is the producer.

In the semantic paraphrase result is expressed by a noun ending in a *kṛt* suffix, e.g. *viklitti*, *saṃyoga*, *utpatti* etc. Thus, *pacati* is rendered by *viklittyanukūlo vyāpārah*: “an activity favourable to the becoming soft of the rice grains;” *gacchati* (he goes) is rendered by *uttaradeśasaṃyogānukūlo vyāpārah*: “an activity favourable to the result conjunction with a consequent point. *Karoti* (he does) is rendered by *utpattyanukūlo vyāpārah*: “an activity favourable to production.” Thus, in the semantic paraphrases the result is expressed by nouns such as *viklitti*, *utpatti*, *saṃyoga*, *vibhāga*, *tyāga*, *pāka* etc. These verbal nouns are resultative nouns which denote frozen action. Thus, result is nothing but frozen action.

The old theory propounded by Yāska and Bhartrhari was that the verb denotes action in process (*sādhyakriyā*) whereas frozen action (*siddhakriyā*) is denoted by nouns. It will be seen from the foregoing that this old theory was revised by the neogrammarians. According to them both these aspects of action are denoted by the verbal root. When they paraphrase *pacati* (‘he cooks’) by *viklittyanukūlo vyāpārah*, the process aspect of the action is expressed by *vyāpārah*, the frozen aspect by *viklitti*. The two aspects are related to one another as producer and produced.

In some cases this producer-produced relation is said to be superimposed (*āropita*). An example is furnished by the analysis of the verb *as*, ‘to exist.’ *Asti* (‘he exists’) is paraphrased as *sattānukūlo vyāpārah*: “an activity favourable to existence.” Here the activity is not really different from the existence. Both activity and result reside in the same entity. To use technical language, the agent of the verb *asti* has two properties *vyāpārāśrayatva* and *phalāśrayatva*. Since this is so and since activity is not cognized in this case as separate from result the relation between the two is said to be superimposed (*āropita*), e.g. fictional, imagined.

15. Transitive and Intransitive

The last paragraph above will serve to explain the distinction which the neogrammarians make between transitive and intransitive verbs.

With the older grammarians the distinction of transitive from intransitive was purely formal. To them a verb was transitive when it took a

direct object in the accusative, intransitive when it took no direct object. Thus, if the object was in the dative the root was intransitive.

For the formal distinction the neogrammarians substitute a semantic one. Transitive roots, they say, are those where the activity and the result denoted by the root reside in different entities. Thus, in *pacati* ('he cooks') the activity resides in the cook, the result in the rice. Intransitive roots are those where the activity and result denoted by the root reside in the same entity.

16. The Double Designation of Roots

The translation which follows is chiefly concerned with proof of the double designation of roots. To repeat all the arguments here would be wasteful of space. I limit myself therefore to the most salient points.

Activity. No one except the Mīmāṃsakas ever argued that activity was not a denotation of roots. The reason for the Mīmāṃsakas' peculiarity is that they assigned activity to the verb ending; the root, then, must denote result. The most trenchant argument against them and in favor of the common sense view is based on the maxim that common meaning should correspond to common morpheme. We have the forms

<i>pacati</i>	he cooks
<i>pakvavān</i>	he has cooked
<i>pakvam</i>	it is cooked

Common to each of these is the activity of cooking. There is only one common morpheme to which this can correspond, namely, the root *pac*.

Result. We have shown how the neogrammarians revised the older theory in such fashion as to include result in the denotation of the root. Their favourite argument in favour of this innovation is that without it the roots *gam* (to go) and *tyaj* (to leave) would be synonymous, for according to the grammarians the distinction between *gam* and *tyaj* lies only in their denoted results, not in their denoted activities. *Gam* means *uttaradeśa-samyogānukūlaspaṇḍavyāpārah*: "an activity in the form of motion favourable to a conjunction with a consequent point," whereas *tyaj* means *pūrvadeśavibhāgānukūlaspaṇḍavyāpārah*: "an activity in the form of motion favourable to disjunction from a preceding point. It will be seen that denoted activity is the same in both instances.

The ancient Naiyāyikas who denied the verbal roots the denotation of result explained such cases as follows. While the root's denotation is activity only, they said, its meaning in the broadest sense may envisage result. The general idea of result which is denoted by the accusative case ending conditions the meaning of the root, so that one may say that the meaning of *gam* when it is in juxtaposition with an accusative implies

(*upalakṣayati*) a result defferent from the result implied under comparable circumstances by *tyaj*.

The ancient Naiyāyikas, then, distinguish *gam* from *tyaj* by a syntactic criterion whereas the neogrammarians insist on the morphological criterion. Such arguments are frequent in modern Western linguistics also. In favour of the grammarians is the fact that no one feels that *gacchati* and *tyajati* mean the same thing even when they are used without accusatives.

17. The Nyāya Theory of the Denotation of Root and Verb Ending

The Naiyāyikas⁶⁰ say that the *tiñ* suffixes denote *kṛti* (= *yatna*: exertion, the acting of an intelligent being). This theory is based on the same principle by which the Nyāya proves the existence of God. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika there can be no effect without a cause and every effect is produced ultimately by the exertion of an intelligent being. Unintelligent things produce effects only when they are impelled by that which is intelligent. Thus, such a result as the becoming soft of food cannot be produced unless an intelligent agent exerts himself to this end.

Such words as *kartā*: 'maker,' *kṛtam*: 'made,' *karoti*: 'makes' can be applied, according to the Nyāya,⁶¹ only to intelligent or conscious exertion. In such a sentence as *ghaṭaḥ kṛtaḥ*: "the pot is made," we understand the maker as an intelligent agent and not an unintelligent one such as a wheel etc. When the root *kṛñ* is used with reference to unintelligent things it is used metaphorically. Such metaphorical use is seen in the sentences *cakraṃ ghaṭam karoti*: "The wheel makes the pot," *ratho gacchati*.⁶² "The chariot moves," *tantavaḥ paṭam kurvanti*: "The threads make the cloth." According to Nyāya, wheel, chariot and threads, being non-sentient, cannot be called agents (*kartāraḥ*) in the strict sense.

The Nyāya paraphrases the verb *pacati*, 'he cooks' by *pākaṃ karoti*: 'he makes a cooking.' From the paraphrase they understand that the meaning of the suffix *-ti* is revealed by the gloss *karoti*. They take the meaning of *karoti* to be 'he makes an effort or exertion' and refuse the use of this verb in the strict sense to non-intelligent beings. Hence the paraphrase substantiates the Nyāya thesis that the *tiñ* suffixes denote exertion.

60. *Kusumāñjali*, p. 52.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

62. *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 820.

According to the Nyāya⁶³ the agent is not simply a substratum of activity (*vyāpārāśraya*) as the grammarians would have it, because then every *kāraka* would be an agent. According to the Nyāya the agent is distinguished from the other *kāra*kas by its independence. Only the agent can act independently and this independence on the part of the agent is nothing other than exertion. In such a sentence as *ratho gacchati*: “The chariot moves” we see that the grammatical agent is the chariot but this agenthood on the part of the chariot is not actual but metaphorical.⁶⁴

Against the grammarians the Nyāya argues that if the *tiñ* suffix were to denote agent instead of exertion then the limiting property of the denotation would be agentness (*kartr̥tva*). Since agentness is nothing more nor less than the property which characterizes all agents it is equivalent to *kr̥ti* (exertion, the acting of an agent), and will differ from verb to verb. [For the difficulties to which one is led by lack of a unitary limiting property of denotation see Excursus 2 (on text page 2, lines 21-24, addition by the editors).]

Concerning the designation of verbal roots Nyāya opinion passed through several stages. The old Nyāya⁶⁵ held that the root denoted activity only. Thus, it was held that *pacati* meant *phūtkārādivyāpārānukūlakṛtimān*: “one possessed of exertion favourable to the activities of blowing on the fire etc.” Gaṅgeśa then invented the doctrine that the root denotes ‘an activity favourable to a result’ (*phalānukūlavvyāpāra*),⁶⁶ and it is likely that the neogrammarians owe this important doctrine ultimately to Gaṅgeśa. Thus, according to Gaṅgeśa *pacati* means *viklīṭṭyanukūlavvyāpārānukūlakṛtimān*: ‘one possessed of exertion favourable to an activity which is in turn favourable to [the result] the becoming soft [of the rice grains].’ The final stage of Nyāya doctrine is achieved by the Navya Nyāya. Raghunātha⁶⁷ says that the root denotes *phalāvachchinnavyāpāra*: ‘an activity as limited by a result.’ This refinement obviates the old Nyāya difficulty with the roots *gam* and *tyaj*. *Gam* (to go) denotes the activity of motion as limited by the result conjunction with a succeeding point; *tyaj* (to leave) denotes the activity of motion as limited by the result disjunction from a preceding point.

According to the Naiyāyikas⁶⁸ the *tiñ* suffixes do not directly denote agent or object. It is true that when we have the sentence *grāmam gacchati*: “He walks to the village,” we have an apprehension of agent.

63. *Lakārārthavicāra*, p. 35.

64. *Lakārārthavicāra*, p. 28.

65. *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 206.

66. *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 849.

67. *Ākhyātaśaktivāda*, p. 115.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

But this is not sufficient proof that agent is denoted by the *tiñ* suffix. The Naiyāyikas argue that the number denoted by the *tiñ* suffix implies the idea of agent, because plurality etc. denoted by the verb does not mean many actions but means many agents; therefore we may say that since the denotation of number is inconceivable without an agent the meaning agent is implied by number. Finally, the Naiyāyikas say that the notion of agent or object is directly denoted only by a word ending in the nominative case, as by *Maitro* in *Maitro grāmam gacchati*.

The Naiyāyikas assign central status to the meaning denoted by the word ending in the nominative. Next in importance comes the verb, which consists of two portions, the root and the *tiñ* suffix. It is possible of course for a single meaning denoted by one constituent of a sentence to be predominant with respect to *x* and subordinate with respect to *y*. For example, in the active the meaning exertion denoted by a *tiñ* suffix is predominant with respect to activity and present time but subordinate with respect to the meaning denoted by the nominative. One should note further in the passive exertion is subordinate to the activity denoted by the root. Again in the active activity stands predominant with respect to result but in the passive result stands predominant with respect to activity.

The *tiñ* suffixes denote number and time also. In the active the meaning number is construed with the meaning agent, which is either implied by *tiñ* or denoted by the word ending in the nominative. In the passive the meaning number is construed with the meaning object which is either implied by *tiñ* or denoted by the word ending in the nominative.

To make these relations clear I present the semantic paraphrase of the sentence *Caitras taṇḍulān pacati*: “Caitra cooks the rice grains,” according to Nyāya theory. *Bahutvāvachchinnataṇḍulaniṣṭhaviklityanukūlavyāpāra-nukūlavartamānakālikakṛtyāśraya ekatvāvachchinnah Caitraḥ*: “Caitra limited by singularity and exertion in present time favorable to an activity which in turn is favorable to [the result] the becoming soft which resides in the rice which is limited by plurality.” In this sentence the stem *taṇḍulān* is connected with the suffix *-ān* which denotes that *taṇḍula* (rice) as limited by plurality is a substratum of the result i.e. an object. The suffix *-ān* is then connected with the meaning result denoted by the root by a substratum-supersubstratum relation. The meaning result which is a part meaning of the root is connected with the other part meaning, activity (*viklityanukūlavyāpāra*). The meaning activity is connected with the meaning exertion denoted by the *tiñ* suffix by a producer-produced relation. The meaning present time denoted by *tiñ* suffix is related to the meaning exertion denoted by the same suffix by a substratum-supersubstratum relation. The meaning exertion is connected with the meaning agent denoted by the word in the nominative. Similarly the

notion of number denoted by the *tiñ* suffix is connected with the meaning denoted by the word in the nominative.

According to the Naiyāyikas the semantic paraphrase of the passive sentence *Caitreṇa taṇḍulāḥ pacyante*: “The rice grains are cooked by Caitra,” is as follows: *Ekatvāśrayacaitravṛttivartamānakālikakṛtijanya-vyāpārajanyaviklittimān bahutvāśrayas taṇḍulaḥ*: “The rice grains possessed of plurality and softening which is produced by the activity which is in turn produced by exertion in present time residing in the agent Caitra possessed of singularity.” The relation in the passive sentence differs in only a few particulars from those in the active. Caitra is connected with the instrumental suffix *ina* which denotes substratumhood (of exertion) and singularity. The instrumental suffix is connected with the meaning exertion denoted by the *tiñ* suffix. The meaning exertion is connected with the meaning activity denoted by the root by producer-produced relation. The notion of present time denoted by the *tiñ* suffix is connected with the meaning exertion denoted by the *tiñ* suffix. The meaning activity denoted by the root is connected with the meaning result denoted by the middle ending by producer-produced relation. The meaning number denoted by the *tiñ* suffix is connected with the meaning denoted by the word ending in the nominative. The meaning result denoted by the middle ending is connected with the meaning denoted by the word ending in the nominative which stands predominant.

Thus, we see a shift of certain elements from principal to subordinate status as we pass from active to passive construction. The same number of meanings is conveyed but the status of certain elements changes.

18. The Mīmāṃsā Theories of Verbal Denotation

The Mīmāṃsakas or Ritualists, like the grammarians, hold that the verb is the central element in the sentence. But they differ from the grammarians in their assignment of meanings and status to the component parts of the verb.

A verb consists of root (*dhātu*) and suffixes (*ākhyāta*). Of these the suffixes, according to the Mīmāṃsā, predominate semantically over the root. In justification of this view the Mīmāṃsakas quote the maxim *prakṛtipratyayau saḥārtham brūtaḥ tayor madhye pratyayārthasya prādhānyam*: “Base form and suffix denote meaning jointly [i.e. so that the meaning of the one is joined to the meaning of the other] and of these two meanings that of the suffix is syntactically predominant.” The maxim has obvious validity in many cases. In the patronymic *Dāśarathi* [= Daśaratha plus patronymic suffix *iñ*] it is the suffix which predominates syntactically and its meaning which is therefore construed with the rest of

the sentence: *Dāśarathī Rāvaṇam avadhīt* means that the son of Daśaratha, not Daśaratha himself, slew Rāvaṇa. Similarly, say the Mīmāṃsakas, in *pacati* ('he cooks') the suffix *-ti* predominates syntactically over *pac* and is the construction bearer with other sentence elements. The grammarians avoid this conclusion by saying that the maxim concerning base form and suffix is a general maxim to which there are exceptions.

Verb suffixes, according to the Mīmāṃsā, denote *bhāvanā*. The word is derived from the causal root of *bhū* (to come into being) and means literally that which brings something into being. Āpadeva in the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (page 193) defines *bhāvanā* as *bhavitur bhavanā-nukūlo bhāvakavyāpāraviśeṣaḥ*: "the particular operation belonging to the operator which is conducive to the production of the result."

Bhāvanā is further said to be of two kinds: *śabdabhāvanā* (verbal production operation) and *arthabhāvanā* (material productive operation). Verbal production operation is the injunction of scripture which induces the hearer to take a particular action. It is denoted by the optative suffix *liṅ* and is discussed by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa in the second chapter of his book. Here we are concerned only with *arthabhāvanā*, which is denoted by the *tiṅ* suffixes. It is the material exertion or activity of an agent leading to a result.

Such, at least, is the general Mīmāṃsā understanding of *bhāvanā*. But within the Mīmāṃsā school there have been many divergent views on this subject.

For example, Someśvara,⁶⁹ a commentator on the *Tantravārtika* holds that *bhāvanā* is simply exertion (*kṛti* or *prayatna*). According to him the root denotes activity of frozen nature (*siddhavyāpāra*) and the *tiṅ* suffix denotes *prayatna* or *kṛti*. He says that the verb *pacati* is paraphrased by *pākam karoti*: "He makes a cooking," where *karoti* explains the sense of the *tiṅ* suffix. In the paraphrase the word *karoti* is synonymous with *bhāvayati*, which conveys the sense of *bhāvanā*. Thus, Someśvara agrees with the Naiyāyikas in saying that the *tiṅ* suffixes denote *kṛti*. This *bhāvanā*, he says, is a quality which resides in a soul. Accordingly, sentences like *ratho gacchati*: "the chariot goes," cannot be used in the primary sense. Rather the hearer passes over the denoted meaning as being impossible (*bādhita*) and understands by implication (*lakṣanayā*) a secondary meaning *āśrayatva* 'the state of being a substratum (of the result denoted by the root).' The followers of Someśvara agree further with the Nyāya, at least with the Navya Nyāya, in holding that the roots *jñā* (to know), *iṣ* (to desire), *naś* (to perish) etc. also form exceptions to the general rule. Here too the *tiṅ* suffixes do not denote *kṛti* (*bhāvanā*) but

⁶⁹. *Nyāyasudhā* on Śabara 2.1.1., pp. 576 ff.

the state of being a substratum (*āśrayatva*). In other words in the case of these roots the primary meaning of the *tiñ* suffixes is hindered (*bādhita*), being impossible, and we must take them in a secondary sense (*nirūḍhā lakṣanā*). For the rationale of this argument see Translation and notes, page 5, lines 8-9.

Pārthasārathi⁷⁰ Miśra and his followers hold that the *tiñ* suffixes denote activity in general. Thus, according to the followers of Pārthasārathi Miśra the term *bhāvanā* means any action whether belonging to a sentient or a non-sentient agent. The term *bhāvanā* is therefore of wider extension than the term *kṛti* and is synonymous with the grammarian's term *kriyā* or *sādhyavyāpāra*. Thus, this school holds that the sentence *ratho gacchati* can be taken in the primary sense.

Maṇḍana Miśra⁷¹ in his *Bhāvanāviveka* defines the word *bhāvanā* as *audāsīnyavicchittisāmānyarūpā*: 'total absence of inactivity.' According to him in the case of inanimate objects *bhāvanā* means activity residing in the non-sentient object but originating from the association of that object with the exertion of an intelligent being.

All Mīmāṃsakas hold that the meaning agent is implied by the productive operation denoted by the *tiñ* suffixes, because productive operation is inconceivable without an operator. Thus, the meaning agent is implied rather than denoted. The Ākrtyadhikaraṇa of the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* states the principle that a word always denoted primarily a qualifier (i.e. attribute=*viśeṣaṇa*) whereas the meaning qualificand (*viśeṣya*) is indicated by a secondary function (*lakṣaṇayā*) of the word. For example, the word 'cow' primarily denotes the qualifier cowness (*gotva*, the generic character). The individual cow (the *viśeṣya*) is indicated by *lakṣaṇā*. Similarly the word *kartā* (doer, agent=*kṛtyāśraya*, substratum of exertion, or *kṛtimān*, possessor of exertion) primarily denotes the qualifier 'exertion' (*kṛti*). Therefore the *tiñ* suffixes primarily denote *kṛti* and the meaning *kartā*, i.e. *āśraya* is implied. The meanings *kṛti* and *āśraya* cannot both be denoted because of the Mīmāṃsā rule *ananyalabhyah śabdārthah*: "The meaning of a word is always exclusive, i.e. cannot be obtained elsewhere." Since the meaning *āśraya* can be obtained either by implication (*ākṣepa*) or by indication (*lakṣaṇā*) it cannot be a denoted meaning of the *tiñ* suffixes.

Kumārila⁷² classifies activity into two categories, activity belonging to the instigated (*prayojavyāpāra*) and activity belonging to the instigator (*prayojakavyāpāra*). The *tiñ* suffixes in connection with the root *as*, *bhū*, *vid* etc. denote activity belonging to the instigated whereas in connection

70. *Śāstradīpikā* on Jaimini 2.1.1, p. 102.

71. *Bhāvanāviveka*, pp. 167 ff.

72. *Tantravārtika* on Śābara 2.1.1.

with the root *kr* they denote activity belonging to the instigator. The relation between the activity of being (as with *as*, *bhū*) and the activity of doing (as with *kr*) is such that the agent of the action of being is regularly the object of the action of doing. Thus, *ghaṭo bhavati*: “the pot comes into being;” *devadattaḥ ghaṭam karoti*: “Devadatta makes the pot.” Here Devadatta is the agent of the action of doing and is the instigator of the action of being; the pot is the agent of the action of being and is instigated by the agent of the action of doing. In any simple sentence either the action of the instigated or the action of the instigator is directly expressed while the other is left to be understood (implied). Only in a compound sentence such as *devadatto ghaṭam karoti, sa ca bhavati*: “Devadatta makes the pot and it comes into being,” are both actions, that belonging to the instigator and to the instigated directly denoted.

Thus, the roots *bhū* and *kr* denote only one type of action each. Neither root reveals the full sense of the *tiñ* suffixes. It is only the causal root *bhāvi* that reveals this full sense, for the simplex *bhū*, which is contains, reveals the activity of the instigated while the causal *bhāvi* [*bhū* + *nic* = *bhū* + *i* = *bhau* + *i* = *bhāv* + *i*] reveals the activity of the instigator. It is said to be on this account that the word *bhāvanā* is chosen by the Mīmāṃsaka in preference to *kṛti* and *vyāpāra*.

Kumārila insists that even in connection with verbs like *asti* the *tiñ* suffixes imply (although they do not denote) the action of the instigator. The sentence *ghaṭo bhavati*: “The pot comes into being,” implies *ghaṭa ātmānam bhāvayati*: “The pot brings itself into being.” The implication is explained by saying that when the agent is not already an accomplished entity (i.e. is *asiddha*) the action of the instigator denoted by the *tiñ* suffixes is one which accomplishes (*sādhayati*) the agent itself. On the other hand when the agent is already an accomplished or established entity with respect to the productive operation denoted by the *tiñ* suffixes, the productive operation denoted by the *tiñ* suffixes brings about the accomplishment of something else other than the agent. For instance, *Kumbhakāraḥ ghaṭam karoti*: “The potter makes a pot.” Here actor (instigator = potter) and acted upon (instigated = pot) are two different things and the nature of *bhāvanā* is clearly cognized. But in the case of the verb *asti* where the agent is not an accomplished entity, the action denoted by the *tiñ* suffix functions towards the accomplishment of the agent itself. In this case actor and acted upon are not two different things but one and the same. In this case distinction between instigator and instigated is not clearly visible and accordingly the nature of *bhāvanā* is not clearly cognized. Even in such sentences, however, the *tiñ* suffixes furnish (by implication) the sense of activity belonging to the instigator. Thus, the action revealed by the *tiñ* suffixes always operates toward bringing something into being.

One may state the foregoing in another way by saying that every *bhāvanā* must have an object, an end, a result. Kumārila calls this object or end *sādhyā* (that which is to be accomplished, to be distinguished from the sense of *sādhyā* in *sādhyakriyā* for which see below). He paraphrases such intransitive verbs as *śete* (lies down) and *āste* (sits) by *śayanam bhāvayati* and *āsanam bhāvayati*.

The Mīmāṃsā agrees with the grammarians in distinguishing action in process (*sādhyakriyā*) from frozen action (*siddhakriyā*). But it disagrees by assigning the denotation of action in process to the *tiṅ* suffixes and the denotation of frozen action to the root. The Mīmāṃsā like the Nyāya uses the gloss *pākam karoti* of *pacati* as justification for its assignment of meanings. In the gloss the noun *pākam* is said to represent the frozen action of the root whereas *karoti* represents the action in process of the suffix *-ti*. Thus, Maṇḍana Mīśra⁷³ says that verbal roots denote result and the *tiṅ* suffixes denote action in process.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas the semantic paraphrase of the sentence *Caitro grāmam gacchati* will be as follows. *Ekatvāvacchinnacaitrakarṭṛkā ekatvāvacchinnagrāmanīṣṭhasamyogānukūlā vartamānakālikī bhāvanā*: “A productive operation of present time favourable to [the result] conjunction (a quality) residing in the object village which is limited by singularity, of which (productive operation) Caitra limited by singularity is the agent. The passive sentence according to the Mīmāṃsaka would be analyzed precisely with the same paraphrase.

19. Note on the Translation

The text of the *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana* with the commentary *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa has been repeatedly printed in India with and without commentaries. I have had access to seven different editions.

- 1) Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, vol. 43, Poona, 1901.
- 2) Bombay Sanskrit and Prākṛt Series, vol. LXX, with the commentary *Kāśikā* by Harirāma Kāle, Bombay, 1915.
- 3) Kashi Sanskrit Series, vol. 3, with the commentary *Darpaṇa* by Harivallabha, Benares, 1939.
- 4) Kashi Sanskrit Series, vol. 133, with the commentaries *Darpaṇa* by Harivallabha, *Parīkṣā* by Bhairava Mīśra and *Bhūṣaṇavyākhyā* by Kṛṣṇamitra, Benares, 1939.

⁷³. *Bhāvanāviveka*, pp. 167 ff.

- 5) Ādarśagranthamālā, vol. 4, with the commentary *Prabhā* by Pāñcoli and *Darpaṇa* by Harivallabha, Benares, 1947.
- 6) Śrīharikṛṣṇanibandhamālā, vol. 7, with the commentary *Saralā* by Gopālaśāstrī Nene, Benares, 1952.
- 7) Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, vol. 135, with the commentary *Śāṃkarī* by Śaṃkara Shastri Marulkar, Poona, 1957.

I have mainly followed the first Ānandāśrama Sanskrit edition of 1901 for my translation and have used its pagination when referring to the text. I have done this not only because the edition is accurate but because it is available to students in many libraries.

All the editions of the work agree except in small points. If we ignore obvious misprints, the variant readings are very few. Accordingly, it is only seldom that they will be found recorded in my notes.

In writing the notes I have made use of all the available commentaries, but have relied more particularly on the excellent *Darpaṇa* of Harivallabha and the *Kāśikā* of Harirāma Kāle. In a few cases, when the published explanation seemed to me oversubtle or too far removed from the natural meaning of the text I have ventured on my own authority to give what seemed to me a stricter and more straightforward interpretation. I have tried throughout to make my translation as accurate as possible. Accordingly, I have preferred literal renderings when these could be given without cost to intelligibility.

(to be continued)

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*Professor Emeritus of the University of Poona
and General Editor of Sanskrit Dictionary Project
Deccan College Postgraduate & Research Institute
Poona*