

# A SYNTHETIC ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS ON *BRAHMASŪTRAS* 2.2.42-45

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The four *Brahmasūtras*, viz. *Utpattayasambhavāt; na ca Kartuh Karaṇam; Vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratishedhaḥ*; and *Vipratisheddhācca* (2.2.42-45), are regarded by all the commentators as one *adhikaraṇa* (section), called the '*Utpattayasambhavādhikaraṇa*', but there has been considerable difference of opinion among them about the doctrine referred to in these *sūtras*. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Śrikanṭha, Śrīpati, Vallabha and Vijñānabhikṣu take this *adhikaraṇa* as concerned with the refutation of the *Pañcarātra*<sup>1</sup> system. Rāmānuja also takes this *adhikaraṇa* as dealing with the *Pañcarātra* or *Bhāgavata* doctrine, but not refuting, but establishing. Nimbārka agreeing neither with Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja regards the *adhikaraṇa* as a refutation of the *Śakti*<sup>2</sup> doctrine. It is very curious that Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa, a Nimbārkaist, in his *Vedāntakaustubha-prabhā*, a Commentary of Śrīnivāsa's *Vedāntakaustubha*, a commentary of the *Vadāntapārijātasaurabha* of Nimbārka, begins with a lengthy explanation, word for word identical with that in the Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja, and in the end very briefly observes that, really speaking, this *adhikaraṇa* should be a refutation of the *Śakti* doctrine, and then gives a short explanation, exactly following Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa<sup>3</sup>. Madhva,

1. It is worth nothing, in passing, that the term *Pañcarātra*, a number of explanations have been offered by various *Samhitās*. We are not, at present concerned with all these different definitions. This much is certain, however, that the original significance and connotation of the term *Pañcarātra* came to be lost in the course of many centuries, which left room for a variety of explanations. The most authoritative and perhaps the genuine definition is as follows:

"*tatparavyūhavibhavasvabhāvādinirūpaṇam*  
*pāñcarātrāhvayaṃ tantram mokṣaikaphalalakṣaṇam*"  
(*Ahīrbudhnyā Samhitā*, XI, 63b-64a)

This indicates that this system has developed the name *Pañcarātra* since it deals with the five-fold manifestation of Lord Vāsudeva, viz. *para*, *vyūha*, *vibhava*, *arcā* and *antaryāmin*.

2. The Śāktas hold that *Śakti* alone is the cause of the world, she is possessed with the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and the rest. No agent can accomplish any thing without energy or *Śakti*. The effect must, therefore, be attributed not to the apparent agent. A red-hot iron has the power of burning, but effect of burning should be properly attributed to the fire, and not to the iron through which the fire manifests itself. It is the eternal energy, working through the Lord, that creates the world, and the Lord without the energy has no creative power. Thus *Śakti* is the real creator.

3. *Vedāntakaustubha-prabhā*, 2.2.42-45, pp. 271-81.

and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa also follow Nimbārka. Now two questions are raised: (1) Whether the *adhikaraṇa* deals with the *Pañcarātra* doctrine or the *Śakti* doctrine? And (2) whether the *adhikaraṇa* is only a refutation of the *Bhāgavata* doctrine or whether it aims at establishing it? It is proposed in this paper to seek an answer to these questions.

To start with, I would like to examine in detail the *Sūtras* and their interpretations by all the commentators.

(1) *Utpattayasambhavāt* (2.2.42)

According to Śaṅkara<sup>4</sup>, Bhāskara<sup>5</sup>, Śrīkaṇṭha<sup>6</sup>, Śrīpati<sup>7</sup>, Vallabha<sup>8</sup> and Vijñānabhikṣu<sup>9</sup> this *sūtra* means: On account of impossibility of origin. That is, the *Pañcarātra* doctrine holds that Saṃkarṣaṇa (the individual soul) springs from Vāsudeva (the Highest Self), Pradyumna (the mind) from Saṃkarṣaṇa and Aniruddha (the principle of egoity) from Pradyumna is not tenable, for the individual soul, which is eternal, cannot spring from the Highest Soul. Śaṅkara remarks that the *Pañcarātra* doctrine deserves our acceptance, so far as it holds that *Īśvara* is both the efficient and material cause of the universe. So also when it says that the one Vāsudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and that he, dividing himself in four parts, appears in four forms as Vāsudeva etc., We have nothing to object. But when it further adds that Saṃkarṣaṇa (the individual soul) springs from Vāsudeva (the Highest Self), Pradyumna from Saṃkarṣaṇa and Aniruddha from Pradyumna, we must take exception to it. For it is impossible that the individual soul would spring from the Highest self, which would make the former non-eternal<sup>10</sup>. Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha, Śrīpati, Vallabha and Vijñānabhikṣu also follow Śaṅkara.

Rāmānuja takes this and next *sūtra* (2.2.42-43) as laying down the *prima facie* view, the next (2.2-44-45) the correct conclusion like Yāmuna<sup>11</sup>. He, however, translates or interprets this *sūtra* like Śaṅkara and the rest<sup>12</sup>.

Nimbārka explains this *sūtra* thus: 'The *Śakti* doctrine holds that *Śakti* alone is the producer of the world is not tenable, because the origin of the

4. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.2.42, pp. 525-526.

5. *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, 2.2.41, p. 128.

6. *Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya*, 2.2.39, p. 115, parts 7 and 8.

7. *Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya*, 2.2.42, pp. 57-78, part 2.

8. *Aṇubhāṣya*, 2.2.42, p. 231.

9. *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya*, 2.2.42, p. 174.

10. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.2.42, pp. 525-526.

11. *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, p. 117.

12. *Śrībhāṣya*, 2.2.39, p. 808.

world from *Śakti* without any connection with *Puruṣa* is impossible<sup>13</sup>. Or else, because the origin of the world is impossible, it being eternal, *Śakti* cannot be its cause there being no proof that the world is something produced<sup>14</sup>. Madhva<sup>15</sup> and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa<sup>16</sup> exactly follow Nimbārka.

It makes clear that this *sūtra* refutes any one particular doctrine like the preceding *sūtras*, viz. '*naikasminnasambhavāt*' (2.2.33) and '*patyurasāmañjasyāt*' (2.2.37). But this *sūtra* reads only '*Utpatty-asambhavāt*'; and repeats the word '*na*' from the preceding *sūtra* '*naikasminnasambhavāt*' (2.2.33) which refutes the Jain doctrine. And thus this *sūtra* reads '*notpattayasambhavāt*' like the *sūtra* '*patyurasāmañjasyāt*' (2.2.37) = '*na patyurasāmañjasyāt*, i.e. 'the view of *Pāśupata* is not justifiable, on account of inconsistency'. And then the word '*na*' points out the refutation of any one doctrine, but not of any one *particular* doctrine. Here the problem is: In preceding *sūtras*, the *Sūtrakāra* Bādarāyaṇa has clearly given the technical words relating to the doctrines, but in this *sūtra* Bādarāyaṇa has not clearly given the word from which we could know the *particular* doctrine. So the commentators has proposed two different doctrines, viz. the *Pañcarātra* doctrine and the *Śakti* doctrine in this *Sūtra*. Now the question is: whether this *sūtra* refutes the *Pañcarātra* doctrine or the *Śakti* doctrine. To this, the answer is as follows: In this *sūtra* the *Pañcarātra* doctrine is more appropriate than the *Śakti* doctrine, because the word *Śakti* is totally excluded from the *sūtra*. On the other hand, '*Samkarṣaṇo nāma jīvo jāyate*' = 'Samkarṣaṇa (the individual soul) springs,'- this doctrine of the *Pañcarātra* system is issuing from the *sūtra*, '*utpattayasambhavāt*' (2.242) like the *sūtra* '*Naikasminn-asambhavāt*' (2.2.33) from which the '*Anekāntavāda*' is arising. So, in this *sūtra*, the *Pañcarātra* doctrine is refuted, but not the *Śakti* doctrine.

(2) '*na ca Kartuh Karanam*' (2.2.43)

Śaṅkara explains this *sūtra* thus: '(There can be) no (origin) of the organ (viz. the mind) from the agent (viz-the individual soul)<sup>17</sup>. That is, the *Pañcarātra* doctrine holds that Pradyumna (the mind) springs from Samkarṣaṇa (the individual soul) is not justifiable, because the organ or the instrument (the mind) cannot spring from the agent (the individual soul) i.e. the agent (individual soul) cannot be the material cause of the

13. *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*, 2.2.42, p. 210.

14. *Vedānta-kaustubha*, 2.2.42, p. 210.

15. *Brahmasūtramadhvabhāṣya*, 2.2.42, p. 122.

16. *Govindabhāṣya*, 2.2.42, p. 140.

17. *Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.2.43, pp. 527.

organ or the instrument<sup>18</sup>. Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha, Śrīpati, Vallabha and Vijñānabhikṣu exactly follow śaṅkara.

As pointed out above, Rāmānuja takes this *sūtra* as lying down a *prima facie* view against the Pañcarātra doctrine. He interprets this *sūtra* like Śaṅkara and others<sup>19</sup>. This *sūtra* is explained by Yāmuna, Rāmānuja's grand teacher, as speaking of the revealed character (*apauruṣeyatva*) of the *Vedas*. This *sūtra* means, says Yāmuna, that the *Vedas* are not (*na ca*) the work (*Karaṇam*) of *Īśvara* (*Kartuḥ*)<sup>20</sup>. Here, Rāmānuja differs from his teacher, Yāmuna.

Nimbārka explains this *sūtra* thus: If Śākta thinks that there is a *Puruṣa* (creator) helping *Śakti* and she creates the world through her connection with him, still there is no instrument on the part of *Puruṣa* (creator) because all instruments are produced only after the creation has begun<sup>21</sup>. If, however, it is assumed that he has sense instruments, then he would be subject to pleasure and pain. Thus he will be no creator at all<sup>22</sup>. Or else, if Śākta says that the fact, the world is something produced, too, is inferred on the analogy of what is directly perceived, then we reply: since there is no similarity of the ether and the rest with pots and so on, the fact that the world is something produced like the pots and so on is by no means established<sup>23</sup>. In this *sūtra*, the word '*ca*' implies that if there be *Puruṣa* as the creator, *Śakti* is no longer the cause of the world<sup>24</sup>. Madhva and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa also follow Nimbārka.

As pointed out above, the refutation of the *Śakti* doctrine is not appropriate to this *adhikaraṇa*, yet if it be admitted that the preceding *sūtra* (2.2.42) refutes the *Śakti* doctrine, then the meaning of this *sūtra* as given by Nimbārka, Madhva and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa does not seem to be conformable to this *sūtra* itself as well as to the preceding and following reference. Nimbārka and the rest, in the preceding *sūtra* (2.2.42), defend their view with this reason that *Śakti* is a woman, so she can not produce the world without any connection with *Puruṣa*; and with same reference they explain this *sūtra* thus: There is no sense instruments on the part of *Puruṣa*, so He cannot help her. Here the question is; when the above-mentioned reason is not stated in the preceding *sūtra*, how can the above-said subject-matter of this *sūtra* be admitted with reference to the preceding *sūtra*? The preceding *sūtra* says thus: The *Śakti* is not the

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18. *Ibid.*

19. *Śrībhāṣya*, 2.2.40, p. 809.

20. *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, p. 122.

21. *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*, 2.2.43, p. 211.

22. *Vedānta-Kaustubha*, 2.2.43, p. 211.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

cause of the world, because from Śakti the origin of the world is impossible. Why is it impossible? To this the preceding sūtra does not reply. This sūtra also reads only 'na ca Kartuh Karaṇam', there is no insertion of the word 'Puruṣa', how can the meaning of this sūtra that 'there is no instrument on the part of Puruṣa, so He cannot help the 'Śakti' be possible? The meaning of the word 'Kartā'='agent' of this sūtra should be Śakti', but not Puruṣa, because Nimbārka and the rest accept Śakti' as the Kartā 'creator' or 'producer' of the world in the preceding sūtra. If they like to accept the meaning of the world 'Kartā' as 'Puruṣa' helping Śakti, they should refute Puruṣa, as the cause of the world in the preceding sūtra. It proves that there is no consistency in the interpretations of these two sūtras (2.2.42-43) as presented by Nimbārka and others.

On the other hand, 'Saṃkarṣaṇāt jīvāt pradyumnaṣaṃjñāṃ mano jāyate'-'Pradyumna (the mind) springs from Saṃkarṣaṇa (the individual)'- this doctrine of the Pañcarātra system is following the sūtra 'na ca Kartuh Karaṇam' (2.2.43). The Pañcarātra doctrine is: The mind, i.e. instrument springs from the individual soul, i.e. Jīva; and the Sūtrakāra refutes this doctrine thus: The origin of the mind from Jīva is not justifiable, because the instrument (the mind) cannot spring from the agent (the individual soul). This interpretation conciliates the prior reference also. In the preceding sūtra (2.2.42) the first thought, 'Saṃkarṣaṇa (the Jīva) springs', of the Pañcarātra system is refuted; and now with reference to the preceding sūtra the second thought, viz. 'the instrument (the mind) springs from the Jīva', is refuted. It makes clear that the present interpretation as given by Śaṅkara and the rest is conformable to this sūtra as well as to the prior reference. Accordingly, the fitness of the words 'na ca' of this sūtra is also maintained thus: 'na jīvotpattirupapannā, na ca jīvāt kartuh manasaḥ karaṇasyotpattir upapannā' = 'The origin of the Jīva is not appropriate, and the origin of the instrument (the mind) from the agent (the Jīva) is not appropriate'.

### (3) Vijñānādibhāve Vā tadapratishedhaḥ (2.2.44)

According to Śaṅkara this sūtra means: 'Or, even if there be the existence of knowledge, there is no setting aside of that, (viz. of the above objection).' That is, or, even if it be said that Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest are not the individual soul and so on, but divine beings endowed with supreme knowledge and the rest, still then the objection stated before, viz. the impossibility of origination, remains in force<sup>25</sup>. Bhāskara, Śrīpati and Vijñānabhikṣu also follow Śaṅkara. Vallabha follows Śaṅkara except this, where 'tadapratishedhāt' is explained by him to mean 'Īśvarānāma-

25. Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya, 2.2.44, pp. 527-528.

*pratiśedhāt*, i.e. because of the plurality of lords-which is unreasonable-remaining uncontradicted<sup>26</sup>.

According to Rāmānuja this *sūtra* and the next set forth the correct conclusion against the above *prima facie* view, and defend the *Pañcarātra* doctrine. Thus, It means: 'Or if (Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest be) of the nature of knowledge and so on (i.e. of the Highest Lord) there is no contradiction of that (i.e. the *Bhāgavata* doctrine)<sup>27</sup>. That is, the *Pañcarātra* doctrine is not that individual soul arises from the Lord, the mind from the individual soul and so on, but simply that the Highest Lord, viz. Vāsudeva, out of Kindness for people, abides in a four-fold form, so that He may be easily accessible to His devotees. Here the word 'vā' precludes the *prima facie* view<sup>28</sup>.

Nimbārka explains this *sūtra* thus: Or, if there be the existence, i.e. admission of intelligence and so on, there is no denial of that<sup>29</sup>. That is, if there be the existence, i.e. admission of natural intelligence and so on, on the part of Śakti, what contradiction, can there be in its being the cause of the world? The doctrine of Śakti is set aside by itself through the admission of Brahman<sup>30</sup>. In the *sūtra* 'sarvopetā ca,' 'And endowed with all (attributes)' (2.1.29), there is designated a Deity, Knowledge through all the Vedāntas, and it is He that is admitted by you. He is not the power (Śakti) of any one, He is the Highest Deity, denoted by the word 'Brahman' and so on. Here the word 'Vā' has the meaning 'tu'=but<sup>31</sup>. Madhva exactly follows Nimbārka.

Śrikanṭha takes this *sūtra* to be a *prima facie view*, viz. "If there is the assumption of intelligence and so on (i.e. of the forms of the individual soul and so on), there is no contradiction of that". That is, the opponents point out that they do not hold that there is the origin of the individual soul and the rest, but simply that Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest assume the forms of the individual soul etc., i.e. rule them. Hence the above objection cannot be raised<sup>32</sup>.

Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa differently interprets this *sūtra*: 'If (the body of the Lord be of the) nature of intelligence and the rest, there is no contradiction of that. That is, if the *prima facie* objector points out that although the Lord cannot have a material body, yet He may have a non-material body composed of knowledge and so on, then we reply that if

26. Aṇubhāṣya, 2.2.44, p. 232.

27. Śrībhāṣya, 2.2.41, p. 809.

28. Ibid, pp. 809-811.

29. Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 2.2.44, p. 211.

30. Ibid.

31. Vedānta-Kaustubha, 2.2.44, p. 211.

32. Śrikanṭha-bhāṣya, 2.2.41, p. 116, parts 7 and 8.

the Lord of the Śāktas be possessed of such a body, then we have no objection to their view, since it becomes identical with our doctrine of *Brahman*<sup>33</sup>.

The interpretation of this *sūtra* as presented by Nimbārka, Madhva and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa does not seem to be agreeable to the *Sūtrakāra* Bādarāyaṇa. For, any doctrine, only due to this that it accepts the creator of the world admitted by itself as endowed with intelligence and so on, cannot be the *Brahman* doctrine on the purview of the *Sūtrakāra*. If it be so admitted, then the *Pāśupata* doctrine should also be accepted the *Brahman* doctrine, because the *Pāśupatas* admit the *Paśupati*, the creator of the world, as endowed with intelligence and so on<sup>34</sup>. But the *Pāśupata* doctrine is also refuted by the *Sūtrakāra* in the preceding *sūtras* (2.2.37-41). Thus, this *sūtra* also is not appropriate to the refutation of the *Śakti* doctrine.

As pointed out above, according to Rāmānuja, this *sūtra* sets forth the correct conclusion and defends the *Pañcarātra* doctrine, so Rāmānuja explains this *sūtra* thus: *Vijñānaṃ cādi ceti parabrahma* ‘Vijñānādi,’ i.e. ‘Vijñānādi’ means the Supreme *Brahman*. Hence, if Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest be of the nature of *Vijñānādi*, i.e. the Supreme *Brahman*, there is no contradiction of the *Bhāgavata* doctrine. But, here, the meaning of the word ‘Vijñānādi’ the Supreme *Brahman* seems to be faded-forming as well as this meaning is not agreeable to the *Sūtrakāra*. *Sūtrakāra* did not use the word ‘vijñana’ in the sense of *Brahman* anywhere in the *Brahmasūtras*, but he used this word in the sense of ‘*manas*’ = this mind<sup>35</sup>. If it be said that here *Sūtrakāra* has used the word ‘Vijñānādi’ in the sense of *Brahman* as the technical word of the *Pañcarātra* doctrine, then the question is: Why did Rāmānuja not give the reference of the *Pañcarātra* literature, in which the Supreme *Brahman* or *Vāsudeva* is known by the word ‘Vijñānādi’. Thus, the present meaning of the word ‘Vijñānādi’, as given by Rāmānuja seems to be inappropriate. Similarly, Vallabha’s interpretation of the word ‘Vijñānādi’ also seems to be inappropriate, because he explained ‘Vijñānādi’ to mean ‘*Īśvara* endowed with knowledge and so on,’ which is similar to the interpretation as given by Rāmānuja.

As Śrīkaṇṭha takes this *sūtra* to be a *prima facie* view, this also is not conformable to the *Sūtrakāra*, because criticism of the *Pañcarātra* doctrine is continued in this *sūtra*.

Śaṅkara interprets this *sūtra* with an alternative explanation on the part of the *Pañcarātra* doctrine thus: “ Even if it be said that Saṃkarṣaṇa and

33. *Govindabhāṣya*, 2.2.44, p. 141.

34. *Pāśupatasūtra-pañcārtha-bhāṣya*, 1.1.21-25 etc.

35. *antarā vijñānamanasī Krameṇa talliṅgāditi cennāviśeṣāt - Brahmasūtra*, 2.3.15.

the rest are not the *Jīva* and so on, but divine beings, endowed with knowledge and the rest, still then the objection raised above remains uncontradicted.” Perhaps the word ‘*Vā*’ in the *sūtra* goes well with Śaṅkara’s way of interpreting.

(4) *Vipratishedhācca* (2.2.45)

According to Śaṅkara the criticism of the *Pañcarātra* doctrine is concluded here. He explains this *sūtra* thus. “And moreover, the *Pañcarātra* doctrine cannot be accepted owing to there being many contradictions is the doctrine itself and owing to its containing many passages contradictory of the *Vedas* (i.e. not having found the highest bliss in the *Vedas* ‘Śaṅḍilya studied this *śāstra*’<sup>36</sup>. This *sūtra* is not found in the *Bhāskarabhāṣya*. Śrīpati, Vallabha and Vijñānabhikṣu follow Śaṅkara.

According to Rāmānuja, right conclusion, in defence of the *Pañcarātra* doctrine, ends here: “(The above objection be raised) on account of the contradiction (i.e. because the *Pañcarātra* doctrine itself controverts that the individual soul has an origin<sup>37</sup>)”. Rāmānuja, in defence of the *Pañcarātra* system, quotes passage from *Paramasamhitā*, -*acetanā parārthā ca nityā satata vikrayā, triguṇā karminām Kṣetram prakṛte rūpamucyate/ Vyāptirūpeṇa sambandhastasyaśca puruṣasya ca, sa hi anādiranantaśca paramārthena niścitaḥ*”<sup>38</sup>, -which controverts that the *Jīva* has an origin. Again, he remarks that it is not possible to image Bādarāyaṇa refuting the *Pañcarātra* doctrine in his *Brahmasūtra*, which he himself commends in glowing terms in his *Mahābhārata*, as the very essence of the four *Vedas* and so on. He quotes many passages from the *Mahābhārata* in support his view<sup>39</sup>.

Nimbārka explains this *sūtra* thus: “And on account of contradiction”. That is, And on account of being opposed to Scripture and *Smṛti*, the doctrine of Śakti is unauthoritative<sup>40</sup>. Madhva and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa exactly follow Nimbārka.

Śrīkaṇṭha explains this *sūtra* thus: (In reply to the above *prima facie* view, we point out although the contradiction with regard to the origin of the individual soul and the rest set aside by the above view, yet the *Pañcarātra* doctrine is not to be accounted) on account of its opposition to Scripture<sup>41</sup>.

36. *Brahmasūtra-śaṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.2.45, p. 529.

37. *Śrībhāṣya*, 2.2.42, p. 811.

38. *Parama-samhitā* quoted in *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 811.

39. *Śrībhāṣya*, 2.2.42, pp. 814-815.

40. *Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*, 2.2.45, p. 211.

41. *Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya*, p. 116-119, parts 7 and 8.

In the interpretation of this *sūtra* as presented by Nimbārka, Madhva and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa the Criticism of the *Śakti* doctrine is simply concluded, which is not conformable to the *sūtra*. Because, the *adhikaraṇa* is not concerned with the refutation of the *Śakti* doctrine as pointed out above. As a matter of fact, this *utpattyādhikaraṇa* is concerned with the refutation of the *Pañcarātra* doctrine.

Rāmānuja's interpretation of this *sūtra* (2.2.45),—"The *Pañcarātra* literature itself controverts (*pratiṣedha*) that the *Jīva* has an origin, hence the criticism of the *Pañcarātra* doctrine, as presented above, is not proper",- is inappropriate because there is no word '*pratiṣedhācca*', but is '*vipratiṣedhācca*' in the *sūtra*. The word '*vipratiṣedha*' means 'internal contradiction', which is accepted by Rāmānuja himself in the preceding *sūtra* (2.2.9). Hence, the meaning of this *sūtra* may be presented thus: 'The *Pañcarātra* doctrine is inconsistent, because of the internal contradiction, i.e. because of the contradiction between its prior and subsequent statements'. Again, the sentence refuting the origin of the *Jīva*, quoted by Rāmānuja, is of which *Samhitā*, i.e. *Paramasamhitā*, in that *Samhitā* the sentence '*Vāsudevāt samkarṣaṇo nāma jīvo jāyate*' etc. is not found. If both the above mentioned sentences were of only one *Samhitā*, then it was possible to say that Sūtrakāra is not refuting the doctrine of *Pañcarātra* on the basis of the sentence propounding the origin of the *Jīva*. But the sentence propounding the origin of the individual soule is not found in the *Samhitā* refuting the origin of the *Jīva*. It makes clear that the *Paramasamhitā* refuting the origin of the *Jīva*, which is available today, was not present during the period of Sūtrakāra. In his time *Prācīna-Samhitā*, an ancient *Samhitā* was available in which the above-mentioned sentence propounding the origin of the *Jīva* was stated<sup>42</sup>. Hence, Sūtrakāra is refuting the *Bhāgavata* doctrine. Finally, Rāmānuja, in defence of the *Bhāgavata* doctrine, presents this reason that Sūtrakāra who commends the *Pañcarātra* doctrine in glowing terms in his *Mahābhārata*, how can he himself refute the *Pañcarātra* doctrine? This reason does not seem to be agreeable, because the identity between Bādarāyaṇa and Vyāsa is not authoritative, on the contrary, Vyāsa and Bādarāyaṇa were different persons<sup>43</sup>. Thus Sūtrakāra refutes the *Pañcarātra* doctrine, but not establishes.

The meaning of this *sūtra* as given by Śāṅkara, Vallabha and the rest, seems to be more reasonable, because they refute the *Pañcarātra* doctrine on account of the internal contradiction. But their second interpretation on

42. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 56; and *Brahmasūtra-śāṅkarabhāṣya*, -bhūmikā, p. 69.

43. For detail, see "The traditional author of the *Vedāntasūtras*-Bādarāyaṇa or Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana" PAIOC 2, 1923, pp. 463-470; and "Is Vyāsa the same as Bādarāyaṇa?" JSVRI, 7.2, 1946, pp. 361-369.

the word 'vipratishedha' as 'Vedavirodha' = 'Opposition to Vedas', does not seem to be correct one, because 'Vedavirodha' is not direct meaning of the word 'Vipratishedha', as mentioned above.

Having thus examined the *Brahmasūtras* 2.2.42-43 and 2.2.45 in detail it cannot assume that Sūtrakāra is defending the *Pañcarātra* doctrine; as well as, owing to there being use of the words 'vā' and 'apratishedha' in the *sūtra* (2.2.44) after the refutation of 'origin' in the preceding *sūtras* (2.2.42-43), it also does not seem to be possible that any thought of the *Pañcarātra* system is refuted. Here, it just seems that Sūtrakāra has presented an alternative regarding the Thought of the *Pañcarātra* doctrine to be refuted. That alternative may be presented thus: "If it be said by the *Pañcarātra* doctrine that 'the origin of the mind from the *Jīva*' means that "vijñāna" intended by the word 'manas,' i.e. 'dharmabhūtajñāna' = knowledge as an essential attribute of the *Jīva*' arises from the *Jīva*, then that i.e. the *Bhāgavata* doctrine is uncontradicted." But as well as the word 'vā' of the *sūtra* (2.2.44) suggests that if the *Pañcarātra* doctrine, here, accepts the mind (*manas*) as a different real entity, then this system also is contradicted, because the *Jīva* is not material cause of other real entity and the origin of the *Jīva* is certainly and entirely contradicted. The conclusion arrived at, therefore, is that in these *Brahmasūtras* 2.2.42-45 the *Pañcarātra* doctrine is refuted only by the Sūtrakāra Bādarāyaṇa. The fact that the *Pañcarātra* doctrine is refuted last of all in the *Tarkapāda* of *Brahmasūtra*, can be explained by the circumstance that it is the most allied to *Vedānta* doctrine in which the *Brahman* doctrine is established, and Śaṅkara has admitted this fact at the beginning of this *adhikaraṇa*, as remarked above.

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