

KAUNDA BHATTA ON THE MEANING OF SANSKRIT VERBS (2)*

An English Translation and Annotation
of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*,
Chapter 1 with the Introduction

Shivaram Dattatray JOSHI

PART II: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND ANNOTATION OF THE *VAIYĀKARAṆA- BHŪṢAṆASĀRA*, CHAPTER 1

The Prologue

Page 1, lines 1-2.

I pay homage to the exalted husband of the Goddess Lakṣmī [i.e. Viṣṇu], who has the form of the husband of Gaurī [i.e. Śiva] and the form of meaningful sound [*sphoṭa* = *brahman*], whence this whole universe evolves.

Notes. 1) *sphoṭarūpam* : - Kaunda Bhatta, who belongs to the school of vivartādvaita, holds that the universe is a *vivarta* [deformation] of Śiva and *Śabda-Brahma* = *sphoṭa*. He here equates Viṣṇu, Śiva and śabda-Brahma.

2) The commentators suggest an alternative analysis of *śrīlakṣmī-ramaṇa*, viz. 'the husband of Śrī (= Sarasvatī) and of Lakṣmī.' They suggest an alternative also in the second half verse, viz. to take *sphoṭarūpam* as an adjective modifying *jagat*: "whence this world, whose form is *sphoṭa*, evolves." Compare the 1st verse of the *Vākyapadīya*.

Page 1, lines 3-4.

I pray to [Viṣṇu], who bestows all rewards, who is a raft for the crossing of the ocean of worldly existence and who has the

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serpent Śeṣa for his ornament, that I may grasp the complete sense [of the *Mahābhāṣya* composed] by Śeṣa [i.e. by Patañjali].

Note. Tradition holds that Patañjali was an incarnation of the serpent Śeṣa. Rāmabhadra, in his *Patañjalīcarita* [*Kāvyamālā* 51] records the legend that Goṇikā, the daughter of a sage, made offerings to the sun god, praying for a son. Śeṣa, the wise lord of serpents, then appeared in her hands. The serpent child prayed to Śiva to enable him to write the *Bhāṣya* on the *Vārtikas* of Kātyāyana, which wish was granted.

Page 1, lines 5-6.

For success [in my undertaking] I pay homage to my paternal uncle Bhaṭṭojī Dikṣita, on the tip of whose tongue the goddess of the speech ever dances in joy.

Note. *Narīnarti* Intensive 3rd person singular of *nṛt*. This verse is not found in all published texts and may be a later addition.

Page 1, lines 7-8.

Having bowed down to the lotus-like feet of Gaṇeśa, to my teachers and to the goddess of learning, I, master Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa compose the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* [an ornament for grammarians].

Note. This verse is absent from many texts.

Page 1, line 9-12.

Having bowed down to the sages beginning with Pāṇini; to my father, Rangoji Bhaṭṭa, who assumed the nature of the goddess of learning in male form in order to remove the darkness of dualism; and to the lord Gaṇeśa; I set forth with reasoned arguments the doctrines [of grammar], which have been criticized by commentators of the *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā* schools, and in turn I criticize their criticism.

Page 1, lines 13-14.

[The author of the verse] having composed an auspicious verse, in which he calls to mind the serpent god, for the removal of obstacles in what he wishes to undertake, and having written it down in order to instruct his pupils [by furnishing them an example], now introduces the matter which he intends to undertake.

Page 1, lines 15-16; page 2, lines 1-2.

1. The *Śabdakaustubha* is drawn from the ocean of the *Bhāṣya* composed by the serpent god [i.e. by Patañjali]. The topics which have been thoroughly discussed there are here briefly recorded.

“Drawn out etc.”: Supply the words “by me.” “The *Śabda-kaustubha* is drawn from the ocean of the *Bhāṣya*”: This is to dispel the notion that the topics recorded in the *Śabdakaustubha* have been invented by men of the present day. Otherwise, this book [the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā*] being based on that [the *Śabdakaustubha*] would be merely an abridgement of inventions of men of the present day and accordingly would be unacceptable to the followers of the school of *Pāṇini*. “Which have been thoroughly discussed there”: This is to indicate that those who care to know more than what is furnished here should refer to the *Śabdakaustubha*.

Page 2, line 3.

Now [the author of the verse] proceeds to establish [what he declared in his opening statement].

Page 2, lines 4-5.

2. A verbal root is said to denote a result and an activity; *tiñ* to denote the substratum thereof. The activity is predominant [i.e. qualificand] with respect to the result. That which is denoted by *tiñ* stands as qualifier.

Notes. ‘A verbal root’ means *bhū* (be), *gam* (go), *pac* (cook) etc. These words denote a result and an activity. By this opening statement Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa puts forth a theory which is basic to his work and to that of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita and which was denied by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. Cf. Excursus 1. Result and activity are denoted separately, but in this denotation the activity predominates syntactically over the result. What is meant here by ‘predominates’ is syntactic predominance (*śābdaprādhānya*) and not physical predominance [*ārthaprādhānya*]. The difference may be shown by the sentence *rājapuruṣam ānaya* : ‘Bring the king’s man’. Positionally the king predominates over his officers and servants, but syntactically in the phrase *rājapuruṣam* the element ‘man’ predominates over the element ‘king’. It is the element ‘man’ with which the verb *ānaya* is construed. If the element ‘king’ were syntactically predominant the sentence would mean that the king was to be brought. Further, according to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa the relation between activity and result is a producer-produced relation (*janya-janaka-bhāva*), for the activity produces the result.

The term *tiñ* is a *pratyāhāra* or formula. It means all the symbols from *tip* to *mahiñ* (listed by *Pāṇ.* 3.4.78). These symbols in turn mean one of the personal endings of the finite verb. Hence, the statement ‘*tiñ* denotes the substratum’ means ‘the personal endings of a finite verb denote the substratum (of the activity or result denoted by the verbal

root).’ The substratum will be either the agent of the activity or the object in which the result appears. In the active the substratum will be the agent, in the passive the object. This is in accordance with *Pāṇ.* 3.4.39 and in opposition to the theories of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā; see Introduction. Thus, according to Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa *tiñ* denotes agent or object. It will be shown later that *tiñ* also denotes number and time. All these denotations of *tiñ* are qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) directly or indirectly of the activity and result denoted by the verbal root.

To make Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa’s meaning quite clear we give the semantic paraphrase of the sentence *Maitro grāmam gacchati* : ‘Maitra goes to the village’ according to Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa’s doctrine:

Ekatvāvacchinna-Maitrābhinna-kartṛko vartamānakāliko grāmābhinnakarmaniṣṭho yaḥ saṃyogas tad-anukūlo vyāpārah: “An activity of the present time, of which the agent is limited by singularity and is identical with Maitra, which activity is favourable to (a result, namely) a conjunction residing in an object which is identical with the village.”

The passive sentence *grāmo Maitreṇa gamyate*: “the village is gone to by Maitra,” according to Bhaṭṭoji and Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa would be given precisely the same semantic paraphrase as that above.

Excursus 1. Page 2, lines 4-5.

Nāgeśa does not agree with the theory put forth by Bhaṭṭoji and Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa according to which a single verbal root has two denotations, activity (*vyāpāra*) and result (*phala*), these denotations being presented separately. Nāgeśa argues in his *Laghumañjūṣā* (page 543) that if the meaning result and action were separately denoted by the root they would obtain separate semantic status, that is to say, it would be possible to express them in a subject-predicate relation (*uddeśya-vidheyabhāva*). This is not the case of the meaning result and action.

According to Nāgeśa a single verbal root has a single denotation at a time. Only at a different time, that is, in a different construction, may its denotation change. In an active construction the root denotes *phalāvacchinnavyāpārah*: “activity limited (i.e. considered insofar as it leads to) a result,” in the passive a root denotes *vyāpārāvacchinnaphalam*: “a result limited (i.e. considered insofar as it derives from) activity.” This theory of Nāgeśa presents action as predominant in the active and result as predominant in the passive. Nāgeśa probably borrowed the theory from the Nyāya as suggested in the section of Nyāya in the Introduction.

Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa are nearly in agreement when paraphrasing an active sentence. [Cf. notes on the 2nd verse.] But

in paraphrasing a passive sentence they differ. According to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa passive sentences may be paraphrased with precisely the same words as active. [Cf. notes on 2nd verse]. According to Nāgeśa the active and passive constructions give different paraphrases. This will be clear from the following example.

Maitro grāmaṃ gacchati: "Maitra goes to the village." Nāgeśa paraphrases: *Maitrakartṛko grāmaniṣṭhasaṃyogāvachchinno vyāpārah*: "an activity of which Maitra is the agent, limited by [=considered insofar as it leads to a result, viz.] conjunction [a quality] residing in the village."

Maitreṇa grāmo gamyate: "The village is gone to by Maitra." Nāgeśa paraphrases: *Maitrakartṛkavyāpārāvachchinno grāmaniṣṭhaḥ saṃyogaḥ*. "A conjunction (a result, quality) which resides in the village and is limited by [=considered insofar as it derives from] an activity of which Maitra is the agent."

According to Nāgeśa the difference of meaning between the passive and active is not dependent on syntax but is the result of morphology. To use in modern linguistic terminology each root constitutes two morphemes, each presenting its particular meaning in a particular environment. This goes against the modern method of linguistic analysis according to which the postulation of two morphemes is inappropriate when the difference in meaning can be accounted for by the difference of distributional environment.

According to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita a single verbal root has two separate denotations: activity and result. Of these, activity stands predominant in the passive as well as in the active. Nāgeśa feels it is absurd to accept two separate meanings because these meanings are always presented together and never the one without the other.

There is one advantage in accepting two separate denotations of the root. In such sentences as *stokaṃ pacati*: "He cooks a little bit," the meaning *stoka* must be construed with result, the intention being that the cook so acts as to produce a small amount of softening in the rice, not that the cook engaged in a small amount of activity. Now, if the root denotes any one meaning, viz. *phalāvachchinnavyāpārah*: 'activity limited by result,' it becomes impossible to construe the meaning *stoka* (a little bit) with the meaning result *viklitti*, because we have the semantic law that the meaning of one unit is construed with the whole meaning or predominant meaning denoted by another unit and not with the subordinate meaning.

Page 2, line 6.

Here the word *dhātuḥ* is to be construed with a word *smṛtaḥ* which is obtained by changing the plural *smṛtāḥ* to the singular.

Note. The literal form of the sentence was “verbal root [and] *tiṅ* suffixes are said [*smṛtāḥ*] to denote....” The logical resolution of this complex form is “verbal root is said [*smṛtaḥ*] to denote... and *tiṅ* suffixes are said (*smṛtāḥ*) to denote.”

Page 2, line 6.

The result is the becoming soft [of the food] etc.

Note. By this statement Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa indicates that he is using the word result (*phala*) in a technical sense. Of the two senses in which grammarians use the word *phala*, the ‘popular’ sense is ‘chief aim or purpose.’ Such a sense is implied by Pāṇini’s rule ‘*svaritañītaḥ kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale* [1.3.72]. Thus, when a man cooks, the *pradhānaphala* or chief aim is the ultimate appeasement of hunger. When he performs a sacrifice the chief aim is the attainment etc. The cook and priest may earn money by cooking and sacrificing respectively, but this is not the chief aim, in the popular sense, of the activities in which they engage. This popular sense of the word *phala* is defined by Bhartṛhari as follows.

Yasyārthasya prasidhyartham ārabhyante pacādayaḥ

tat pradhānam phalam teṣām na lābhādiprayojanam

“When [an action] such as cooking etc. is undertaken for the purpose of gaining a given goal, that goal and not the purpose of gaining money is the chief aim of that action.” If the *phala* of cooking is to be regarded not as the appeasement of hunger but as the becoming soft of the grains of rice etc., we cannot take *phala* in its ‘popular sense.’ Thus, by this statement Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa indicates that he is using *phala* in its technical sense.

Technically, the word *phala* means the single effect of an action (*kriyā*), produced by the various activities (*vyāpāra*) conveyed by the root. For example the root *pac* denotes any of the activities which go to make up the action of cooking, e.g. setting fire under the pot, fanning the fire, putting rice in the pot, etc. Here we see that all these activities result in a single effect. Although some of them are more removed than others, still, each is essential for the production of ultimate effect. Thus the word *phala* technically means the single effect of an action, produced by the various activities of which the action consists.

Page 2, lines 6-7.

Activity (*vyāpāra*) is that sort of action (*kriyā*), another name for which is productive operation (*bhāvanā*); which is called to be effected (*sādhya*).

Notes. Having described result (*phala*) in the previous line Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa now comes to the crucial and difficult problem of defining activity. "Activity (*vyāpāra*) is that sort of action (*kriyā*) which is called to be effected." The word *sādhya* means literally to be effected; *siddha* means effected. But Bhartṛhari used these words, as in the verse which Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa quotes below, without reference to distinction of past and future time. For Bhartṛhari *sādhya* meant durative action. It is by these terms that he distinguished verbs from nouns. *Pacati*, 'he cooks' gives us a notion of some thing in process, something that requires duration. The same is true of *apāksīt*, 'he cooked.' On the other hand, *pākaḥ*, 'a cooking' refers to a non-durative, frozen fact.

This distinction of Bhartṛhari's is either misunderstood or disapproved by Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa. To Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa the distinction between *pacati* and *pākaḥ* is that the first expression is complete in itself whereas the second contains as expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*) of something else. Hence, Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa is forced into the awkward step of saying that *sādhya* lit, 'to be effected action,' is action which is complete in itself whereas *siddha* lit, 'effected action,' is action which requires something further. Since the old terminology has become awkward he prefers the term *vyāpāra*. By *vyāpāra* (activity) he understands that which is complete in itself. See further, Introduction.

'Another name for which is productive operation (*bhāvanā*): Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa here equates activity with the Mīmāṃsā term *bhāvanā* (lit. 'a bringing into being'). This equation arises more easily from the fact that the causative of the root *bhū* (to become) is identical in meaning with the simplex [non-causative] of the root *kṛ* (to do, make). 'He brings the pot into being' (*ghaṭam bhāvayati*) and 'he makes the pot' (*ghaṭam karoti*) are synonymous statements.

The point of the equation will appear later in arguments with the Mīmāṃsakas. The Mīmāṃsakas claim that productive operation (*bhāvanā*) is denoted by the *tin* suffixes. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa, having laid the ground by showing that productive operation (*bhāvanā*) is identical with activity (*vyāpāra*) and that activity is denoted solely by the verbal root, will argue that productive operation (*bhāvanā*) cannot be denoted by the *tin* suffixes.

Page 2, lines 8-16.

And this is stated in the *Vākyapadīya*. Whether effected (i.e. past) or not effected (i.e. future) it is termed to-be-effected (i.e.

durative); (and) it is termed action (*kriyā*) insofar as it takes the forms of a series of constituent parts.

One cannot object that there is no evidence for calling [action] to be effected, for the evidence is at hand in such (pairs of words) as he cooks / cooking [*pacati* / *pākaḥ*], he makes / making [*karoti* / *kṛtiḥ*], where, although there is no distinction in our apprehension of the denotation of the verbal root we see that there is expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) of another action (in the latter of each pair) and no such expectancy of another action (in the former of each pair). And to be effected means having such a nature as in no case gives rise to expectancy of a further action. Having such a nature means being that which is not substantive. It is in this sense that one should interpret the following sentence of the *Vākyapadīya* : “[To-be-effected action is] that which is not a substance and that which is in process of happening; it is denoted by words [ending] in the *tiṇ* suffixes [i.e. by verbs].”

And this activity is denoted (by the verbal root *pac* ‘to cook’) in such forms as blowing (on the fire), setting (the fire) below the pot, effort [volition] etc., for it is obvious that when the verb *pacati* (he cooks) is used we experience a notion characterized in one or another of these ways.

Note. Notice the terminology. We may say that the knowledge or notion (*jñāna*, *bodha* etc.) ‘he cooks’ has as its qualifier (*prakāra*) its own content viz. the action of cooking, which may be understood as limited to any of the above forms.

Page 2, lines 16-17.

This does not imply that a verbal root has many meanings, for it is the particular intention (of the speaker) that determines what limits there are to the root’s area of denotation (in each instance); just as in the case of the pronoun *tad* etc.

Notes: The verbal root *pac* (to cook) does not have many denotations. According to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa it has only two denotations, which the hearer combines into a unitary compound, namely, ‘an activity favourable to the result, namely the becoming soft of food.’ However, there are many activities which fit this denotation; e.g. blowing the fire, fanning it, setting the fire under the pot, putting the rice in the pot etc. The characteristics peculiar to each of these activities, viz. the characteristic of blowing the fire [*phūtkāratva*, literally blowing-ness] etc. may be termed limiting properties [*avacchedaka-dharmāḥ*] of the denotedness [*śakyatā*], i.e. area of denotation, described by the root. [For the use of such abstracts and the manner in which they are said to be limited see Ingalls, *Material for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*,

page 44] In one instance the word *pacati* ['he or it cooks'] will refer to no other activity than the cook's blowing on the fire. In another instance it will refer to no other activity than the fuel's activity by combustion of heating the pot. Thus we may at one time say *paktā pacati*: 'the cook cooks,' and at another time say *kāṣṭhāni pacanti*: 'the fuel cooks.' The meaning of *pac* is not multiple, but its area of denotations is limited by different properties in different instances. The criterion for determining just which limiting properties are in play in a given instance is the speaker's intention. In one case he wishes to emphasize one sub-type of action, in another another. And context etc. enable the hearer to apprehend the limited action, that is, the specific activity which is intended.

Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa furnishes an analogy by saying "just as in the case of the pronouns *tad* etc." When one uses the pronoun *tad* ('it, that') one may be referring to anything in the world. But this does not mean that *tad* has an infinite number of denotations. It has only one denotation which may be limited in an infinite number of ways by the speaker's intention.

Page 2, lines 17-20.

And singleness of action is also maintained through the singleness of the particular intention of the speaker which limits [the area of denotation]. And it is said in the *Vākyapadīya*:

"A group, composed of subordinate parts [viz. activities] which come into being successively, when imagined by the mind as a unit, is termed an action."

Notes. According to Bhartṛhari the word *kriyā* [action] means a process of happening, composed of various activities which occur in succession. These activities are momentary in nature and cannot co-exist. Now, the question arises how these parts, the successive activities, can form an idea of a whole [i.e. a single action] when they do not co-exist. Bhartṛhari's answer is that parts occurring at different moments are mentally unified because they lead to a single effort. It is the group of these activities occurring in different moments when imagined by the mind as a unit that he terms an action. Thus, Bhartṛhari's phrase *buddhyā prakalpitābhedaḥ* means 'a unity imagined by the mind.'

On the other hand, what Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa means by his phrase *avacchedaka-buddhiviśeṣaika* something very different. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's understanding is that the root *pac* denotes in general any activity which leads to the result, namely, the becoming soft of food. In different instances the root *pac* refers to specific activities such as blowing, setting the fire etc. These specific activities are limited by various properties such that one may speak of them as *phūt-*

kāratvāvacchinnavyāpāra, *adhaḥsantāpanatvāvacchinnavyāpāra* etc. But this choice of properties is limited to a single property by the particular intention of the speaker (*avacchedakabuddhiviśeṣa*). In one instance, the root *pac* means blowing on the fire because that is what is intended by the speaker. In another instance the root *pac* denotes the activity of setting the fire under the pot, because that is what is intended in that particular instance by the speaker. Thus, what Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa conceives of is a singleness of denotation imposed by the speaker's intention, where Bhartṛhari had conceived of a unity superimposed by the imagination upon an actual multiplicity.

Page 2, lines 21-24.

Having expounded the meaning of verbal roots, the author takes up the meaning of *tiñ* suffixes. "*Tiñ* is said to denote the substratum etc.": The meaning is, the substratum of the result and the substratum of the activity. The substratum of the result is the object, the substratum of the activity is the agent. Since the result and activity are apprehensible from the verbal root, the *tiñ* suffixes have no denotative power in this area, [these meanings] being apprehensible from something else. The property which limits the denotedness [to a *tiñ* suffix, i.e. which limits the area of denotation of a *tiñ* suffix] is the property of being a substratum. That this property appears in specific forms as this or that [particular] property [e.g. objecthood, agenthood] will be explained in the section on the meaning of case terminations.

Notes. "For these meanings are obtainable from something else." This is the general statement of the reason after the particular statement *phalavyāpārayor dhātulabhyatvāt*, Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's phrase *anyalabhyatvāt* indicates his adherence to the Mīmāṃsā maxim *ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ* which states that the meaning of a word is exclusive, that is, is obtainable from nothing else.

For further explanation of this passage see Excursus 2 (page 2, lines 21-24).

Excursus 2. Page 2, lines 21-24.

"The property which limits etc." This passage is intended to forestall a Nyāya objection. According to the Nyāya the denotation of the *tiñ* suffixes is *kṛti* (exertion i.e. the acting of the agent). The nature of this exertion [acting] differs, of course, according to differences of agent and action, so for the sake of simplicity the Naiyāyikas have recourse to a limiting property of the denoted area of *tiñ*. This property is called *kṛtitvam* exertionhood (actingness), and this property is one, not multiple.

To put the matter in non-technical terms, the Naiyāyika says that a *tiñ* suffix has various specific denotations in the various specific instances of its use, but these meanings all fall within the limit of some sort of exertion [acting]. In technical terms the (indivisible abstract property) actingness (*kṛtītvam*) resides by *samavāya sambandha* (inherence) in every denotation (viz. *kṛti*: exertion, acting) of a *tiñ* suffix. So to a single type of morpheme (i.e. *tiñ* suffixes) the Nyāya attaches a single area of meaning. This is simple and neat.

Now, the grammarians may be supposed to proceed along the same lines. They claim that *tiñ* denotes agent (*kartā*) and object (*karma*). The limiting properties of the *śakyatā* of *tiñ* will therefore be agentness (*kartṛtvam*) and objectness (*karmatvam*). But *kartṛtvam* is a peculiar sort of abstract that leads to difficulties. If we analyze *kartṛtvam* logically, we find that it means 'the property which is present in all agents and present in no other entity.' This property is nothing else than the acting of the agent (*kṛti*). And as we have already said, there are many different actings depending on differences of agent etc. The use of *kartṛtvam* as *śakyatāvacchedaka*, unlike the use of *kṛtītvam*, accomplishes nothing, for it leaves us as far from unity as we were in the first place, that is, as we were when faced with the multiplicity of specific meanings.

One may note that this sort of objection is very common in Navya Nyāya. Abstracts in *tvam* and *tā* often denote indivisible properties (*jāti* or *akhaṇḍhopādhi*), but not always. When these abstract suffixes are appended to possessive suffixes (*-in* etc.) or to agent-suffixes (*-tr* etc.) the result never denotes an indivisible property. Cf. the objections to *daṇḍitvam*. *Sidh. Mukh.*, pp. 66-67 and *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, pp. 44-47.

It is to forestall this objection that Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa claims that the *śakyatāvacchedaka* of *tiñ* is the property of being a substratum (*aśrayatvam*). Such a property is indivisible and resides in all denotations of *tiñ* (object or agent) which vary the general area, just as the denotations of the verbal root 'to cook' vary within the general area of 'action favourable to the becoming soft of food.' Thus, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's theory is as simple and neat as the Naiyāyikas.

It is worth noting that Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (*Laghumañjūṣā*, pp. 730-731) rejects Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's theory, for the immediate denotation of *tiñ*, he says, is never substratum, but always agent or object. Nāgeśa takes the bold step of saying that simplicity is no virtue unless it accords with the facts.

Page 2, lines 24-25.

[Objection] But what proof is there that these [viz. agent and object] are the meaning of *tiñ*, for we can explain the apprehension [of agent and object] by indication (the secondary function of a word), by implication or from the word with nominative case-ending?

Notes. This is a Mīmāṃsā objection. No one denies that when we hear the sentence "Maitra walks to the village" we have an apprehension of agent. But this is not sufficient proof that agent is the denotation of the *tiñ* suffix. We could come by this apprehension in any of several other ways. We might suppose that *tiñ* indicates agent rather than denotes it. The secondary function (indicative) of a word comes into play when the primary function [*abhidhāśakti*] is obstructed [*bādhita*]. E.g. when we hear the phrase *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* --- a village on the Ganges, the primary function of the word *gaṅgā* by which this word gives us the notion of a particular holy river, is obstructed by consideration that if the village were actually on the Ganges the inhabitants would drown. Accordingly, the secondary function of the word Ganges comes into play, by which the word points to an object closely associated with the denoted meaning, in this case to the bank of the river. So also the Mīmāṃsaka argues, in the sentence *Maitro grāmam gacchati*, the *tiñ* suffix '*ti*' may indicate rather than denote agent, agent being a meaning closely associated with denoted meaning productive operation.

However it will be hard to show that the denotative function of *tiñ* is obstructed in this sentence, because we do not give up the primary meaning 'productive operation' as in the case of *gaṅgā*, so the Mīmāṃsaka adds other possibilities.

The Mīmāṃsaka now proposes that *tiñ* neither denotes nor indicates agent. It denotes only productive operation (*bhāvanā*). But since operation is inconceivable without an operator, we may say that agent is implied. Finally the Mīmāṃsaka suggests that the notion of agent can be furnished in this sentence not by the verb at all but by the word *Mitraḥ* which ends in the nominative suffix. To these objections the grammarian now replies.

Pages 3, lines 1-3.

To this we answer. Our proof lies in the sūtra *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ*. In this rule, on the basis of the [particle] *ca* (and), the word *kartari* is supplied from the preceding sūtra *kartari kṛt*.

Notes. *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ* (Pān. 3.4.69). "The *l*-suffixes are used in the sense of object and [agent and] after [the roots of] intransitive verbs in the sense of impersonal action and [agent]. In

both cases where 'agent' is placed within brackets it is supplied from Pāṇ 3.4.67: *kartari kṛt*: "a kṛt suffix is used in the sense of agent."

The term *l*-suffix (*l*) is a formula representing all the ten symbols *laṭ*, *liṭ*, *luṭ* etc. ... of these symbols each stands for the finite verb suffixes of one of the ten tenses and moods of Sanskrit; e.g. *laṭ* for present indicative suffixes, *liṭ* for perfect indicative suffixes etc.

The question now arises why a rule which concerns the sense of *l* suffixes should be proof of the denotation of *tiṅ* suffixes. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa explains as follows:

Page 3, lines 3-5.

The *l*-suffixes are prescribed by this *sūtra* in the sense of object and agent only on the assumption (*prakalpya*) that the denotative power of the suffixes *tiṅ* etc., which [power] takes the forms of denoting [agent and object], belongs to the *l*- suffixes which are invented [*kalpita*] as their prototypes (*sthānin*). In just the same way, [the prototypes] *śas* etc. are prescribed [in the sense of object, instrument etc.] by making use of the powers denotative of object, instrument etc., which actually reside in the substitute forms *-n* and *-h*.

Notes. In other words, the *sūtra* concerning *l*- suffixes is possible only because the denotations agent and object belong to the *tiṅ* suffixes. The denotation of an *l*-suffix is really a fiction. To explain when a man hears the sentence *grāmam gacchati* (he walks to the village) or *grāmān agacchat* (he walked to the village), the verbal suffix *ti* and *t* carry a real denotation, that is, they actually produce a certain apprehension in the hearer's mind. Now, grammarians find it convenient to give a single name to the finite verb suffixes of moods and tenses. Thus, all finite verb suffixes are symbolized by *l*. This symbol *l* is called a prototype (*sthānin*) and the actual finite verb suffixes *mi*, *si*, *ti*, etc. are called substitutes (*ādeśāḥ*) of the prototype. But one must remember that the prototype is a grammatical fiction. It is always replaced. It follows that it is also a fiction, though a very useful one, to say that the prototype has a denotation. This fiction which is found in works of grammar, is possible only because of the reality of denotative power in the substitute suffixes *mi*, *si*, *ti*, etc.

In the word *devān* (acc. pl. of *deva*) *-n* denotes the object, and in the word *devaiḥ* (instr. pl. of *deva*) *-h* denotes the instrument. But *śas* is the prototype of this *-n* and *bhis* is the prototype of this *-h*. Hence, the useful grammatical fiction that *śas* denotes object and *bhis* denotes agent.

deva + śas = deva + as = devās = devān

deva + bhis = deva + ais = devais = devaiḥ

Page 3, lines 5-7.

It cannot be argued that the words 'agent' and 'object' (in Pāṇini's sūtra 3.4.69) actually mean 'agent-ness' and 'object-ness', whereby the rule would mean that *l-* suffixes denote agent-ness (*kartṛtva*) that is to say, acting (*kṛti*, effort = volition, *bhāvanā*) and object-ness (*karmatva*), that is to say, result (*phala*). Because result and activity are apprehensible from the verbal root, and hence it is improper to assume a denotative power directed to the same and in the *l-* suffixes.

Notes. This refutes an objection raised by the Nyāya. Let us admit that Pāṇini is an authority, they may say, but he requires interpretation. What he really meant by *kartṛ* and *karma* was *kartṛtva* and *karmatva*. Now, *kartṛtva* = *kṛti* [for that which is common to all agents is their acting, see Excursus 2 on p. 10ff]. In the same way, the property that is common to all *karmanas*, one may argue, is result. Kaundā Bhaṭṭa answers this false interpretation by the maxim *ananyalabhyah śabdārthaḥ* (see notes on page 2, lines 21-24).

Page 3, lines 7-9.

But if it is said that according to another system [the Mīmāṃsā] activity is not denoted by the verbal root and may therefore very well be prescribed [as the meaning of the *tiṇ* suffixes], we reply that in that case the meanings of agent and object will not do for the *kṛt* - suffixes either.

Notes. E.g. the word *paktā*, which ends in the *kṛt* suffix *tṛc*, will have to mean the activity of cooking, whereas everyone knows that it means a cook.

Page 3, lines 9-10.

The rules *kartari kṛt* [3.4.67] and *laḥ karmaṇi ca* [3.4.69] are entirely parallel [as far as the denotation of the suffixes is concerned].

Notes. See notes on page 3, lines 1-3. If the unwritten word *kartari*, supplied in the rule *laḥ karmaṇi* [3.4.69], is to denote effort or activity, then the same word *kartari* expressly used in the rule *kartari kṛt* must bear the same denotation.

Page 3, lines 10-11.

Furthermore, let the Mīmāṃsakas allow [the *tiṇ* suffixes] to denote agent just like the *kṛt* suffixes, and let them not allow [the *tiṇ* suffixes] to denote productive operation. Since productive operation could be understood by implication just as the

Mīmāṃsakas claim it is from the *kṛt* suffixes, there is no need to have it directly denoted.

Notes. According to the Mīmāṃsakas the verbal root denotes only result, the *tiṇ* suffixes denote productive operation and imply agent, and the *kṛt* suffixes denote agent and imply productive operation. The grammarians object that it is wrong to have *x* imply *y* in one case and *y* imply *x* in the other. It is easier, they say, to have both *tiṇ* and *kṛt* suffixes denote agent, which in turn may imply productive operation.

Page 3, lines 11-13.

If the Mīmāṃsaka objects that at this rate there can be no predominance [of the meaning productive operation], he is wrong, for there could very well be [such predominance] just as there is predominance of the meaning 'individual' [over the meaning class character, even though it is only] implied, in such sentences as "Bring the pot."

Notes. By 'predominance' is here meant syntactic predominance [*śābda-prādhānya*]; (cf. notes on page 2, lines 4-5). According to the Mīmāṃsā system the chief qualificand in every sentence is productive operation (*bhāvanā*), for this is the fulcrum, so to speak, upon which all the other meanings, agent, result etc. bear. When the grammarian suggests that productive operation be merely implied, not directly denoted, by the *tiṇ* suffixes, the Mīmāṃsaka objects that in case productive operation would not be predominant. That which is implied (*ākṣiptārtha*) never predominates, never even enters into the semantic paraphrase [*śābdabodha*]. For example, the sentence "Fat Devadatta eats nothing by day," *pīno devadatto divā na bhunkte* implies that Devadatta eats at night, but this meaning is not syntactically predominant nor does it enter into the semantic paraphrase of the sentence.

The grammarian answers the objection of the Mīmāṃsā by pointing to a case where implied meaning does predominate even according to Mīmāṃsa theory. In the sentence, "Bring the pot," *ghaṭam ānaya*, the direct denotation of the word pot is the generic character common to all pots (*ghaṭatva*), not the individual pot. And yet the syntactically predominant element in the meaning of the word *ghaṭam* is the individual pot which is only implied, for it is only with the individual pot that the other meanings in the sentence can be connected. The sentence does not command the bringing of a generic character.

As to why the Mīmāṃsakas give the direct denotation of 'pot' as the generic character common to all pots, there are several answers. In the first place, according to Mīmāṃsā doctrine the meaning of a word is exclusive, is that which is obtainable from nothing else. Since the

meaning individual can be obtained by implication from the class character it cannot be the denoted meaning of a word. Furthermore, if the denotation were of the individual, the word 'pot' would have almost as many denotations as there are sentences in which it is used. This is a heavy postulate. Finally, if the word 'pot' denoted an individual pot which is created, altered and destroyed, it would be difficult to argue the permanence of the denoting word; and the permanence of words is a basic dogma of the Mīmāṃsā.

Page 3, lines 13-14.

If [the Mīmāṃsaka claims that] productive operation is the denoted meaning [of the *tiṅ* suffixes] because we see that this meaning is revealed in the semantic explanation of *pacati* by *pākaṃ karoti*, [we say that he is wrong] because what is there revealed is equally well the agent engaged in activity favourable to [the result denoted by] *pāka*.

Notes. 'Semantic explanation' (*vivṛti* or *vivarāṇa*) means the expression of the meaning of an utterance by another synonymous utterance; cf. *Siddhānta Muktvālī śabdakhaṇḍa*. p. 312.

The Mīmāṃsaka here argues that when we explain the verb *pacati* (he cooks) by another synonymous expression *pākaṃ karoti* 'he makes a cooking,' the meaning of the verbal root *pac* is revealed to be a result, *pākaṃ*, and the meaning of the suffix *ti* is revealed to be a productive operation (*karoti* = *bhāvayati*). The grammarian answers by saying that *karoti* in the explanatory expression does not reveal productive operation only, it also reveals agent. The grammarian would explain *karoti* as *ekakarṭṛkā pacikriyā* which would reveal denotations of agent, number and action. In general the grammarians feel that semantic explanations must be used with caution as proof of the denotations of words and suffixes, for a semantic explanation reveals much else, e.g. constructional meaning.

Page 3, lines 14-16.

[The Mīmāṃsaka may argue] that the revelation of agent is the revelation of a constructional meaning and so does not determine the denoted meaning, just as in [the explanatory expression] *pākaṃ karoti* there is revelation of the meaning 'object' which is [constructional and] not the denoted meaning of any word, and just as in [the explanatory analysis of] an *itaretaradvandva* compound there is revelation of the [unexpressed] element 'addition.' [But this argument] is wrong, for it would word equally against [taking] productive operation [to be the denoted meaning].

Notes. The Mīmāṃsaka is arguing according to the theory of *abhihitānvayavāda* (see Introduction,). According to this theory each sememe in a word or sentence has a single denotation. When sememes are joined together further meanings appear, which are called constructional meanings [*tātparyārtha*]. Thus in *pac + ti* *pac* denotes result, *ti* denotes productive operation, and from the joining of these sememes into *pacati* there results the additional constructional meanings of object and agent. Similarly, in the *itaretaradvandva* compound *hariharau*, *hari* denotes Viṣṇu and *hara* denotes Śiva, and from the joining of these, there results the constructional meaning of addition, revealed by *ca* in the explanatory analysis: *hariś ca haraś ca hariharau*.

The grammarian answers this argument by implying that the Mīmāṃsaka's assignment of denoted and constructional meanings is arbitrary. The argument that would make agent a constructional meaning in *karoti* (devadattaḥ) could be used equally well to make productive operation a constructional meaning.

Page 3, lines 16-17.

And further, [the *tiṃ* suffixes] must denote the agent because we see the syntactic agreement [between the noun 'Devadatta' and the verb 'cooks'] in the phrase "Devadatta cooks," just as we see it in the phrase 'Devadatta, a cook.'

Notes. The Sanskrit term for 'syntactic agreement' is *abhedānvayaḥ*, literally, 'an agreement or relation of non-difference.' What is literally meant by this can best be seen from the semantic paraphrases of a simple collocation. *Nīlo ghataḥ*: 'the blue pot,' is paraphrased as *nīlābhinno ghataḥ*, pot which is non-different from blue.' The paraphrase shows that both denotations are thought to bear upon the same object. The grammarian would go further and say that whenever there is syntactic agreement, whether this is expressed by similar case-ending, as in *nīlo ghataḥ*, or by other means, this is only possible by reason of the fact that both terms of the agreement bear upon, that is, by their whole or part (root, suffixes etc.) denote, the same object. The grammarian's paraphrase of *devadattaḥ pacati*: 'Devadatta cooks,' is *devadattābhinnakarṭrko viklittyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ* 'an activity favourable to the becoming soft [of food] whose agent is non-different from Devadatta.' The paraphrase is sufficient proof that the grammarians feel that *pacati* by one of its parts [the *tiṃ* suffix] denotes the same object, viz. agent, as was denoted by Devadatta. Were this not true, according to the grammarians, no syntactic agreement [*abhedānvaya*] would be possible between the noun and verb.

In regard to these matters the Mīmāṃsakas held different views. They admitted that in the phrase *devadattaḥ paktā* 'Devadatta, the cook' each word by its whole or part denoted the same object, for here both words are in the same [nominative] case. But they denied that the sentence *devadattaḥ pacati*, 'Devadatta cooks,' was amenable to the same analysis. It might contain syntactic agreement, but this agreement resulted, they said, not from the denotative power of the constituent elements, these elements being disparate: verb suffix and noun suffix, but from indicative power (*lakṣaṇā*). Accordingly, the Mīmāṃsakas did not consider the agreement of *devadattaḥ* with *pacati* as an argument for the denotation of agent by *tiṅ* suffixes. The objection of the Mīmāṃsakas will now be raised.

Page 3, lines 18-19.

It should not be argued that for the apprehension of syntactic agreement identical case endings are required and that such are not here found, because if this were so, syntactic agreement would not be recognized in the phrases 'one should perform a sacrifice with that which has *soma*,' 'he cooks a little bit,' 'a king's man.'

Notes. In each of the phrases adduced, the grammarians as well as the Mīmāṃsakas admit that there is syntactic agreement, but in none of them are two words followed by the same case-ending. In *somena yajeta* the Mīmāṃsakas say that the word *somena* by possessive indication (*matvarthalakṣaṇā*) means 'with that which possesses *soma*.' The semantic paraphrase, then, is *somavadabhinnena yāgena iṣṭam bhāvayet*: 'one should produce what he desires [heaven etc.] by a sacrifice which is non-different from that which possesses *soma*. [Here *somena* = *somavatā*; *yaj* = *yāgena*; *eta*, optative sign plus *tiṅ* suffix = *iṣṭam bhāvayet*; all this according to the Mīmāṃsā interpretation.] The paraphrase of *stokaṃ pacati* is *stokābhinnaviklittyanukūlā bhāvanā*; 'productive operation favourable to the softening of the food, which is not different from a small amount [viz. a small amount of softening]. In *rājapurusaḥ*, the word *rāja* indicates by implication (*lakṣaṇayā*) one who is dependent upon the king (*rājasambandhin*) and so can be construed by a relation of non-difference (*abhedānvaya*) with *puruṣa* although *rāja* is in the genitive case (the ending being dropped because it is in a compound) and *puruṣa* in the nominative.

Page 3, lines 19-21.

It should not be argued that reference to the same object [in such a sentence as *devadattaḥ pacati*] is made possible because the meaning agent is conveyed [by *-ti*] through indication, because in

that case the derivative words *piṅgākṣī* etc., also will not denote [but will merely indicate] the meaning substance. The same thing may be said of the word *vaiśvadevī* etc. ending in the secondary suffix (*taddhita*).

Notes. In the ritual texts we read the sentence *aruṇayā piṅgākṣyaika-hāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti*: “one buys *soma* by [paying for it with] a red, tawny-eyed, year old [heifer].” The Mīmāṃsā exemplifies several of its rules of exegesis by this sentence. As regards the bahuvrīhi compound *piṅgākṣyā*, ‘tawny-eyed,’ the Mīmāṃsā holds that it directly denotes the substance (*dravya*), viz. the heifer, which one pays for the *soma*. The grammarians’ opinion as Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa will point out, is that a bahuvrīhi directly denotes possession, not the substance which is possessor. The argument here is that if the Mīmāṃsaka explains reference to the same object in *devadattaḥ pacati* by indication (*lakṣaṇā*), to be consistent he should do the same in the case of the *piṅgākṣī* heifer and give up his peculiar doctrine that *piṅgākṣī* directly denotes the substance.

The word *Vaiśvadevī* in *Vaiśvadevī āmīkṣā*, ‘the curdled milk dedicated to the Viśvadeva deities’ gives rise to a similar disagreement of interpretation. Here too the Mīmāṃsaka takes the direct denotation to be to the substance. Here too according to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa the Mīmāṃsā is inconsistent.

Page 3, lines 21-23.

[Further evidence that such words do not denote but merely imply substance is furnished by the rules of Pāṇini]. By the rule *anekam anyapadārthe* (2.2.24) and *sāsyā devatā* (4.2.24) we see that *piṅgākṣī* and *Vaiśvadevī* are to be analyzed as ‘whose eyes are tawny’ and ‘whose presiding deities are the Viśvedevas.’ Accordingly [the forms such as *piṅgākṣī* are] obtained from the rules of grammar in a primary genitive sense.

Notes. *Pāṇ.* 2.2.24 is the basic rule for the meaning of bahuvrīhi compounds. “A collection of more than one [word may be compounded] to give a meaning other than that of the component words.” *Pāṇ.* 4.2.24 states that “[a suffix is appended to the name of a deity in the sense] ‘whose presiding deity [that is].’” The analyses required by these rules are such as *piṅge akṣiṇī yasyāḥ*, *viśve devā devatā asyāḥ*, where we see that the primary or denotative sense of *piṅgākṣī* and *vaiśvadevī* is possession, indicated by the genitive case of the relative pronoun in the paraphrase, and thus they can refer only in a secondary way, by indication, to the substance or things possessed.

Page 3, lines 23-26.

And thus the Aruṇā Chapter [of the Mīmāṃsā Darśana] will be destroyed. This chapter proposes that in the sentence: “One buys *soma* by paying for it with] a red (*aruṇayā*), tawny-eyed, year-old [heifer]” the word red, although it is not denotative of an individual [i.e. substance], is in syntactic agreement with the individual [i.e. the substance heifer] which appears with it in the same sentence. [The whole chapter will be useless] because the references of two words to the same object, which is the basic proof of the word *aruṇā*’s denoting an individual [i.e. a substance], can be explained in the above manner, [that is, the reference of one word may be by denotation and of the other by implication]. This has been discussed at great length in [my] *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa*.

Notes. The whole of the preceding paragraph has as its purpose to show that syntactic agreement cannot be established through indicated meaning. If the Mīmāṃsaka claims that it can be so established he will have to admit that one of the chapters of his textbook is useless. For the Aruṇā Chapter see Excursus 3.

Excursus 3. page 3, lines 23-26.

(A) In connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice we have the scriptural text *aruṇayā piṅgakayā ekahāyanyā somam krīṇāti*: “One buys *soma* by [paying for it with] a red, tawny-eyed year old [heifer].” In an argument on interpretation a *pūrvapakṣin* (straw man) says that the word *aruṇā* denotes the quality redness and not a substance while the other two words *ekahāyanyā* and *piṅgākṣyā* denote a substance. His argument runs as follows. The direct statement of the instrumental case in *aruṇayā* (*Tritīyāśruti aruṇayā*) seems to show that redness is an instrument of purchase. But redness, being immaterial, cannot be an instrument by which the act of purchasing is accomplished. Accordingly, we may not connect this with the verb *krīṇāti* but must connect it generally with the entire context. The context (*Prakaraṇapramāṇa*) connects redness with all substances that are used in the sacrifice, e.g. pots, ladles etc. It prescribes that all substances used in the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice must be red. On the other hand the words *piṅgākṣyā* and *ekahāyanyā*, being denotative of substance, may properly be connected directly with the act of purchasing. The interpretation of the sentence under debate, then, is: The word *aruṇayā* forms a sentence by itself and is connected generally with the entire chapter; the remainder forms a different sentence in which the words *ekahāyanyā* and *piṅgākṣyā* are construed with *krīṇāti*. To

this argument the *Siddhāntin* (approved interpreter) replies thus. All these words: *aruṇayā*, *ekahāyanyā* and *piṅgākṣyā*, being used in the same case, function in the same way, namely, as means to the act of purchasing. It is not proper to split these words into the sentence. As regards the distinction of substance and quality it comes to this, that the substance helps the act of purchasing directly whereas the quality helps the act indirectly. First the quality redness qualifies the substance heifer, then through this substance the quality is grammatically connected with the act of purchase. Thus it is established in the *aruṇādhikaraṇa* that the words *piṅgākṣyā* and *ekahāyanyā* are directly connected with the verb, but redness is connected with the verb through substance *ekahāyanyā*.

In the foregoing argument both *pūrvapakṣin* and *Mīmāṃsā siddhāntin* accept the view that the words *ekahāyanyā* and *piṅgākṣyā* denote a material substance which can be directly construed with the *krīṇāti*. But if one is to take the word *piṅgākṣyā* as denoting primarily the relation of possession (*piṅge aksinī yasyāḥ*) the foregoing view will be wrong.

(B) By a similar chain of reasoning the conclusion of the *Mīmāṃsaka's* *Balābalādhikaraṇa* will also be wrong. We have a scriptural text in connection with the *Vaiśvadeva* sacrifice: *tapte payasi dadhy ānayati sā vaiśvadevī āmiksā, vājibhyo vājinam*: "One puts curd into hot milk, which becoming curdled milk (*āmiksā*) is dedicated to the *viśvedevas* [and one dedicates] the liquid skimmed milk (*vājina*) to *vajins*." Here then arises a doubt whether the statement lays down two accessories (*guṇavidhi*) *āmiksā* (curdled milk) and *vājina* (skimmed milk) for the *Viśve devas* or whether it lays down *āmiksā* as accessory for the *Viśve devas* and *vājina* as accessory for the *vājins*. If we accept the second explanation there will be a splitting of the sentence. Accordingly, the *pūrvapakṣin* says that the word *vājinam* like the word *āmiksā*, stands for the sacrificial food and the word *vājibhyaḥ* stands for the *Viśve devas*. Two accessories, skimmed milk and curdled milk, are enjoyed with the reference to the same divinities. But the *Siddhāntin* refutes this argument. He says that the deific character of the *Viśve devas* is indicated by direct statement (*śrutipramāṇa*) and the deific character of *vājins* is indicated by the dative case, i.e. by syntactical connection (*vākyapramāṇa*). The *Viśve devas* are in syntactic agreement with *āmiksā*. Thus, by direct statement the accessory requirement of the *Viśve devas* is already fulfilled; hence, the *Viśve devas* have no requirement of other accessories such as *vājina* so *vājina* is not

related to the Viśve devas. In the foregoing argument the Mīmāṃsā *Siddhāntin* has held that the deific character of the Viśve devas is directly expressed by the *taddhita* suffix and that *vaiśvadevī* is therefore in syntactic agreement with *āmikṣā*. But if the word *vaiśvadevī* denotes merely relationship and not the thing related this view will be wrong.

Page 4, lines 1-2.

[Referring to verse 1.] “The *tiñ* suffixes etc. :-” This [particular term has been used] in order to show that denotative power belongs only to the *tiñ* suffixes [and not to the prototype 1-symbols].

Page 4, line 2.

Having described the meaning of [the component] words [or rather, morphemes, viz. roots and *tiñ* suffixes], the verse proceeds to describe the meaning of the sentences [composed of these elements] with the half verse beginning with *phale*.

Notes. The verse will show the interrelation of morphemes by pointing out which morpheme stands as a qualifier and which stands as qualificand.

Page 4, lines 2-4.

[The meaning is that activity is predominant or qualificand] with respect to the result, such as the becoming soft [of the food] etc. The *tiñ* suffixes denote agent, object, number and time [which act as qualifiers]. Of these the agent is a qualifier of the activity and the object is a qualifier of the result. Number is a qualifier of the agent, if an agential suffix [i.e. an active *tiñ* suffix] is used; it is a qualifier of the object if an objective suffix [i.e. a passive *tiñ* suffix] is used. This follows from the fact that these [meanings: on the one hand number and on the other hand agent or object] are denoted by a single suffix.

Notes. For ‘the agent,’ ‘the activity’ etc. in the above passage, a strictly logical statement would require ‘the meaning agent,’ ‘the meaning activity’ etc. The sense of the statement will be clear by the following examples.

1) *devadattaḥ taṇḍulaṃ pacati*: ‘Devadatta cooks rice.’ This is paraphrased as *devadattābhinnakartṛkas taṇḍulābhinnakarmavṛtti-viklittyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ*: “an activity of which there is a single agent not different from Devadatta, favourable to the becoming soft which occurs in an object which is not different from rice.” Here the fragment *devadattakartṛko vyāpāraḥ* shows that the meaning agent qualifies the

meaning activity. The fragment *taṇḍulābhinnakarmavṛttiviklitty-anukūlaḥ* shows that the meaning object (rice) is the qualifier of the meaning result. The phrase *ekakarṭṛkaḥ* shows that the meaning number qualifies the meaning agent. 2) The semantic paraphrase of the passive sentence *taṇḍulaḥ pacyate* 'rice is cooked' is *taṇḍulābhinnaika-karmavṛttiviklittyānukūlo vyāparaḥ* "an activity favourable to the becoming soft which occurs in a single object which is not different from rice." Here the expression *eka-karma* shows that the meaning number qualifies the meaning object (rice) because the meaning 'one' and the meaning 'object' are denoted by the single passive suffix *-te*.

Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's phrase *samānapratyayopāttatvāt* indicates his adherence to the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of *samānābhīdhānaśruti* which states that if [two meanings are directly denoted] by the same element [of a word, as here by the verbal ending *-te*] then they must be connected with each other.

Page 4, lines 4-5.

Thus, in order to have a verbal knowledge (*bodha*, also = 'semantic paraphrase') in which a number as denoted by a *tiṇ* suffix stands as qualifier, it is necessary to have a presentment [to the intellect of a notion] of agent or object derived from a *tiṇ* suffix standing as qualificand [to that number]. It is thus that the cause-effect relation [between the presentment of a specific meaning by a specific seme and the knowledge of number] can be successfully explained.

Notes. In the first compound the word number [*saṃkhyā*] is used to exclude time, which is also denoted by a *tiṇ* suffix, but which is a qualifier of the activity and not of the agent or object.

Again in the first compound, the word *ākhyātārtha* is used to exclude the number denoted by the *sup* suffixes [case endings].

In the second compound, the word *karṭṛkarma* is used to exclude time because time is also denoted by the *tiṇ* suffixes, but it is not construed with the number but with the activity. Again, in the second compound, the word *ākhyātajanya* is used to exclude the agent or the object denoted by the *kṛt* suffixes.

Page 4, lines 6-9.

According to the Naiyāyikas etc. the number denoted by a *tiṇ* suffix is construed with the meaning denoted by a word ending in the nominative case, so the statement of cause-effect relation [between presentment of specific meaning and the knowledge of number] will be as follows. In order to have a verbal knowledge, in which a number as denoted by a *tiṇ* suffix stands as qualifier, it

is necessary to have a presentment [to the intellect of a notion] of a meaning derived from a word ending in the nominative case [which meaning stands as qualificand to that number]. But [this statement must be further qualified by saying that] it [viz. the meaning denoted by the word ending in the nominative case] must not stand as a qualifier to something else [in the same paraphrase], because in such sentences as “her face looks like the moon” and “having eaten, Devadatta walks away” the meaning ‘moon’ and the meaning of the continuative are not construed with the meanings denoted by the *tiñ* suffixes. Hence [it is seen that the Naiyāyika’s] analysis is over-complex.

Notes. The Naiyāyikas claim that a number denoted by a *tiñ* suffix must be construed with the meaning denoted by a word ending in the nominative case. But this statement presents some difficulty, because in such sentences as *candra iva mukhaṃ dṛśyate* and *bhuktvā vrajati devadattaḥ* we have two words in each sentence ending in the nominative: *candraḥ* and *mukham* in the first sentence, *bhuktva* and *devadattaḥ* in the second sentence. Note that according to Indian grammatical theory the continuative suffix *-tvā* involves elision of the nominative case ending [cf. *Pāṇ.* 2.4.82] and therefore *bhuktvā* is considered to be *prathamānta* = nominative. In the adduced sentences, unless the Naiyāyika qualifies his rule, the number denoted by the verbs ‘looks’ (*dṛśyate*) and ‘goes’ (*vrajati*) will be construed with the meaning moon and with the meaning of the continuative. This is not desirable, because at this rate such sentences as *candra iva mukhe dṛśyate* and *caitramaitrau bhuktvā vrajati* would prove to be correct. Accordingly, to preclude such cases, the Naiyāyikas must insert into their statement of cause-effect relation the phrase *itarāviśeṣaṇatva-ghaṭita*, which specifies the condition that the meaning of the nominative must not stand as qualifier to something else. Now the meaning moon acts as a qualifier to the notion of similarity expressed by ‘like’ and the meaning of the continuative acts as a qualifier to the action expressed by the verb ‘walks’. Hence, they do not fit the amended statement. The meaning face and the meaning Devadatta on the other hand, do fit the amended statement. They are the chief qualificands according to the Naiyāyikas (see Intro.) and hence they are construed with the meaning number. The grammarian’s objection to this analysis is that it requires a complex and heavy statement. The grammarian’s statement on the other hand is simple, for the meaning moon and the meaning of the continuative do not function as agent or object denoted by the *tiñ* suffixes.

Page 4, line 9.

This also proves that agent and object are denoted by the *tin* suffixes, as is clearly explained in the *Bṛhadbhūṣana*.

Page 4, line 10.

Time [present etc.] is a qualifier of the activity.

Notes. The semantic paraphrase offered by the grammarians shows clearly how time is construed by such collocations as *vartamānakāliko vyāpāraḥ* 'an activity of present time' etc. This makes it clear that the notion of time is construed with that of the activity, as a qualifier of that activity.

Page 4, lines 10-12.

To explain more fully, in the rule *vartamāne laṭ* [Pāṇ. 3.2.123] the *adhikāra* rule *dhātoḥ* [Pāṇ. 3.1.91] is to be supplied. And that [word, *dhātoḥ*] inasmuch as it implies 'meaning of a root' comprehends chiefly activity. Accordingly, it is with activity that the meaning [time] is construed.

Notes. The interpretation here of Pāṇ. 3.2.123 is that of the *Kāśikā*. The word *vartamāne* is construed not with *laṭ* but with *dhātoḥ* : *vartamānārthe vartamānād dhātor laṭ pratyayo bhavati*. "The suffix *laṭ* is added to a root when the root is used in the sense of something occurring in present time." Thus, the word *dhātoḥ*, which is supplied from 3.1.91, is taken to mean not simply 'a root,' but 'a root which denotes by its predominant meaning an activity occurring in the present.' Hence, the supplied word *dhātoḥ*: 'to a root' implies, or literally, bespeaks activity; and since our interpretation of Pāṇini's *sūtra* takes *dhātoḥ* with *vartamāne* we may infer that the meaning time is to be construed with the meaning activity.

Page 4, lines 12-13.

It should not be argued that time like number should be construed with the agent or object, because in that case, if an agent [were to exist] after his activity had ceased, one might still say 'he cooks' and one could not say 'he cooked.' Similarly if an agent were to exist before his activity began one could not say 'he will cook.'

Notes. If time is construed with the agent or object, then the idea of past, present and future will depend upon the state of the agent or object. As long as the agent or object exists the usage will be 'he cooks,' even if the activity has ceased or has not yet begun.

Page 4, lines 14-15.

Neither is time to be construed with the result, because in that case if activity were to exist before the result appeared, one could not say 'he cooks,' but one would have to say 'he will cook.'

Page 4, lines 15-17.

It should not be argued [if time refers to activity with no reference to result] one might then say 'he is rising up' with reference to a man whose body is paralyzed by Āmavāta disease simply from the fact that he is exerting an effort favourable to rising. We reply that one would say no such thing, for one cannot cognize another man's effort [until one perceives the result in the form of motion]. But if one did cognize it by the slightest amount of motion one might say "He is rising up but from lack of power fails to make it." Such an expression accords with the general understanding of people and we have no objection to it.

Page 4, lines 17-18.

In this way the meaning denoted by the *tin* suffixes is shown always to be a qualifier and the meaning activity is primary.

Page 4, lines 18-20.

Though elsewhere it is observed that of the meanings denoted by a base form and suffix, the meaning denoted by the suffix is syntactically predominant [cf. previous notes], it is nevertheless concluded that the activity denoted by a root is syntactically predominant [over the meaning denoted by a *tin* suffix]. This is on the authority of the *Nirukta*, which states that a verb presents the meaning action as predominant and nouns present the meaning substance as predominant, also on the authority of the *Mahābhāṣya*, which, in connection with the rule *bhūvādayo* (1.3.1.) indicates that action is predominant.

Notes. The *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.3.1 is an important passage, for Patañjali there shows clearly his doctrine that one action can govern another action. He furnishes the examples *pacati bhavati* (literally, 'he cooks' comes into being). What is meant by this example, according to Patañjali, is that the action of cooking, of which 'he' is the agent, is an action which is coming into being. Thus he says *pacādayaḥ kriyā bhavatikriyāyāḥ kartryo bhavanti*. "The actions of cooking (in these examples) are themselves the agents of the actions of coming into being." It would be therefore wrong to interpret *pacati bhavati* as 'he who cooks comes into being,' taking the agent of the first action to be the agent of the second. This is why the sentence *pacasi bhavati* (you

cook comes into being) is correct according to Patañjali, for the agreement is not between the agents, which are accordingly expressed by the second person and the third person respectively but between the actions.

The pertinence of Patañjali's remarks to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's argument will now be clear. Such a sentence as *pacasi bhavati* shows that the activity denoted by the root *pac* must be predominant over the agent denoted by the *tiñ* suffix *-si*. Otherwise, *pacasi* could not be construed with *bhavati*.

The commentators quote the reading *pacasi bhavati* from the *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.3.1 but this reading does not occur in the published editions of the *Mahābhāṣya*. Instead of *pacasi bhavati* the published editions read '*bhavaty apākṣīt, bhavati pakṣyati*.'

Page 4, lines 20-21.

Moreover, if the meaning denoted by a *tiñ* suffix were taken as predominant, then the meaning denoted by a word ending in the nominative case would be predominant, since the meaning denoted by the *tiñ* suffix is in syntactic agreement with Devadatta etc. [which end in the nominative].

Notes. This, of course, is a conclusion which the Nyāya accepts (see Introduction). Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa now furnishes reasons for its rejection.

Notice that the word *ākhyāta*, which Yāska uses as a general term for 'verb' (cf. page 4, line 19 above), is here used by Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa as a specific term meaning *tiñ* suffix.

Page 4, lines 22-27.

And this being the case the sentence *paśya mrgo dhāvati*: "Look the deer runs," would not form one sentence, as it does on the authority of Mahābhāṣya. The word *mrgaḥ* (deer) ending in the nominative case, which is the qualificand of the action of running, would necessarily take the accusative case ending, since it would be the object of the action of seeing. It is no help to say that in that case [the *tiñ* suffix of *dhāvati*] would be changed to a participial suffix by *Pāṇ.* 2.3.124 (see note following), for it would still be impossible to get rid of the accusative, and the sentence *paśya mrgo dhāvati* would be impossible. And it should not be argued that the word *tam* (it) may be supplied as object of the verb *paśya* ('look at') for this would make two sentences out of one. Furthermore, the original sentence intends to express a specially vivid action of running as object of [the action of] seeing, for which, if one supplies [the pronoun] there will be no construction [between *paśya* and *mrgo dhāvati*].

Notes. *paśya mṛgo dhāvati* is another sentence like *bhavati pacati* (see notes above), easily explainable by the grammarians who allow one verb to govern another, but presenting difficulties to the Naiyāyikas. If the *tiñ* suffix is predominant then there should be construction between the agent of *dhāvati*, expressed by *mṛgaḥ*, and *paśya*. This construction would require *mṛgaḥ* to be in the accusative case. In this event Pāṇini's rule 3.2.124 would come into play. This rule states that when a verb is in syntactic agreement with a noun of other than nominative case (*aprathamā-sāmānādhikaraṇya*) one must substitute the participial suffixes *śatṛ* or *śānac* for the finite suffixes of the present (*laṭ*). Our example would accordingly become *paśya mṛgo dhāvantam*. But we must still change *mṛgo* to *mṛgam*: 'See the running deer.' On the other hand, if we supply an object for *mṛgo*, thus, *paśya tam mṛgo dhāvati*, we have split the sentence (*vākyabhedadoṣa*) and altered the meaning.

Page 4, lines 27-28; Page 5, line 1.

In this way the Naiyāyika's declaration that in order to have a verbal knowledge, in which an activity is a qualifier, the necessary cause is a presentment [to the intellect of a notion] derived from a word ending in the nominative case [as qualificand to the activity or the effort] is unworthy of acceptance. Rather, the correct view of the cause-effect relations is that in order to have a verbal knowledge in which the meaning agent denoted by a *tiñ* suffix stands as a qualifier, the necessary cause is a presentment [to the intellect of the notion activity] derived from a verbal root, this presentment subsisting [in its object, the activity] by a container relation which is limited by activityness.

Notes. For the explanation of this passage, see Excursus 4.

Excursus 4. Page 5, line 1

Bodha, upasthiti, kāraṇatāvaccchedakasambandha

Since a semantic paraphrase (*śābdabodha*) is a complex entity it will contain some meanings which are qualifiers and others which are qualificands. It is useful to establish rules assigning status as qualifier or qualificand to certain classes of constituents. This is done by statements of cause-effect relation. Suppose, for example, we have two classes of correlated meanings A and B denoted by two classes of constituents A₁ and B₁ where A class meaning is qualificand and B class meaning is qualifier. The neogrammarians will then make the statement that "in order to have a knowledge of B class meaning denoted by B₁ constituent the necessary cause is a presentment (*upasthiti*) to the intellect of A class meaning denoted by A₁ constituent."

Such cause-effect relations are of somewhat peculiar nature. One is not to think of the cause as necessarily preceding or producing the effect. Rather the cause is the simpler entity, and more basic in that the effect is inconceivable without it. The way in which the grammarians express this is to say that a given *upasthiti* (presentment to the intellect) e.g. the notion of agent, is the cause of or is necessary for a knowledge (*bodha*) which possesses a given qualifier (*prakāra*) e.g. singularity (*ekatva*). Note that a knowledge which possesses singularity as its qualifier can only be a knowledge of one.

From the sentence *pacati* : 'he cooks' the *bodha* (paraphrase or knowledge) will be *ekatvāvacchinnakartṛko viklittyanukūlo vartamānakāliko vyāpāraḥ* : "an activity of present time favorable to the becoming soft of food, of which activity the agent is qualified by oneness." Here the presentation to the intellect of the notion agent conveyed by the *tiñ* suffix is the necessary cause of the knowledge which possesses the qualifier oneness conveyed by the *tiñ* suffix: *ākhyātārthaikatvaparakārabodham prati tīnārthakartṛupasthitiḥ hetuḥ*.

To proceed further: Wherever we conceive of cause-effect relation, we imply two other relations, the relation by which the cause is connected with its substratum and the relation by which the effect is connected with its substratum. Regularly the second and third relation must be the same, or reciprocals of each other for cause and effect to appear. Thus, the Naiyāyikas say that the potter's moulding stick is a cause of the pot through a relation of contact (contact of stick with pot, contact of pot with stick, relation of cause-effect between stick and pot). Here contact is said to be the limiting relation of the causeness in stick and the effecthood in pot (*daṇḍaniṣṭhakāraṇatāvacchedakasambandhaḥ saṃyogaḥ* or *ghaṭaniṣṭhakāryatvāvacchedakasambandhaḥ saṃyogaḥ*).

For further examples see Ingalls, *Materials*, pp. 74-82. Similarly there will be a limiting relation of the causeness in the presentment with regard to a knowledge (*bodha*), that is, a relation by standing in which and in no other relation the presentment can be considered a cause of the knowledge.

To understand what this relation may be we must inquire how the presentment and its effect, the knowledge, stand in their substrata. This, however, depends on how we consider the knowledge, for a knowledge has two different aspects. On the one hand it is a concatenation of meanings related to objects in the world. On the other hand, it is a quality supposed to inhere in the

soul of the hearer. If we choose to consider the knowledge in its first aspect we may say that the presentment and the concatenation are copresent in [or co-related to] the world object (*viṣayaniṣṭhapratyāsattyā upasthitir bodhaś ca vartete*). This copresence in or co-relation to (*pratyāsatti*) the object will be by container-contained relation (*viṣayatā sambandha*)¹. Accordingly, the limiting relation (*avacchedakasambandha*) of the causeness (*kāranatā*) of the presentment (*upasthiti*), when it is a cause of the knowledge, will be container-contained relation.

On the other hand, if we consider the knowledge in its second aspect, as a quality inhering in the soul of the hearer, we may say that the presentment and the knowledge are co-present in the soul (*ātmaniṣṭhapratyāsattyā upasthitir bodhaś ca vartete*). This copresence in the soul will be by inherence (*samavāya*) and inherence will be the limiting relation of the causeness in the presentment, when it is a cause of the knowledge.

A further refinement may be noticed. It may happen that a cause-effect relation can be established between a given presentment and a knowledge with a given qualifier only when the presentment is taken in one of its two possible senses. Thus the presentment deriving from a verbal root, according to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, has both the sense of activity and result. It is only in the sense of activity that Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa will allow this presentment to be the cause of a knowledge of agent. His method of restricting the causal law is to say that such a presentment is a cause by a limiting container-contained relation which is limited by activity (*bhāvanātvāvacchinnatayā kāraṇam*). This turn of phrase is essentially the same as that noticed in Nyāya texts by Ingalls, *Materials*, pp. 52-53. It rests on a convenient technique of describing a relation as limited by the limitors of its terms. The *upasthiti* in the cause under discussion can serve as cause only when it is taken to mean activity (*bhāvanā*), in other words when it is limited by activity (*bhāvanātvā*). The double restriction is expressed by saying that the limiting relation of its causeness is limited by activity.

¹ See Ingalls, *Materials*, p. 80. Such relations are regularly named from the second term of the relation. Here the *upasthiti* (and the whole *śābdabodha* also) is *viṣayin*, the objects are *viṣayas*: the *upasthiti* occurs in the objects by *viṣayatāsambandha* (lit., by a connection of objecthood of objects to it).

Page 5, lines 2-3.

But in order to have a verbal knowledge, in which an activity stands as a qualifier, the necessary cause may be a presentment of the notion, in the form of an activity denoted by a verbal root [as a qualificand to the other activity] just as well as it may be a presentment of the notion [of the agent] derived from a *kṛt* suffix. This statement fits such examples of sentences as “see the deer runs,” and “he cooks comes into being.”

In simpler language an activity may qualify another activity just as it may qualify the notion of agent etc. In *paśya mṛgo dhāvati* the activity denoted by *paśya* qualifies the activity denoted by *dhāvati*, just as in *pakṛ* (a cook) the activity denoted by the root *pac* qualifies the agent denoted by the suffix *ṭṛc*.

Page 5, lines 3-5.

In this way from the [active] verb *pacati*, ‘he cooks,’ we understand the meaning ‘an activity, of which there is one substratum [viz. an agent], favourable to the becoming soft [of food],’ and from the [passive] verb *pacyate* ‘is cooked,’ we understand the meaning ‘an activity favourable to the becoming soft [of food] of which [becoming soft] there is one substratum [viz. the object, food]. If a word such as *devadatta* is used, its meaning will stand in a relation of non-difference [i.e. in syntactic agreement] with such a meaning as agent denoted by the *tiñ* suffix [of *pacati*].

Notes. Similarly, if the word *tandulaḥ* (rice) is used, its meaning will stand in syntactic agreement with the *tiñ* suffix of *pacyate*.

Page 5, lines 5-8.

Even in the sentence, ‘The pot perishes’ [the root refers to activity as well as a result, for] we understand the meaning to be an activity of which there is a substratum, non-different from the pot, favourable to the result destruction. And that activity is the combined presence (*samavadhāna*) of the total requisite causes of destruction with (*viśiṣṭa*) counterpositiveness [to the destruction of pot]. That is why when such [an activity] in being [we say] ‘it perishes,’ when it has ended, [we say] ‘it has perished,’ when it is yet to come into being [we say] ‘it will perish.’

Notes. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa here puts forward the claim that the semantic law ‘verbal roots denote activity and result’ holds good of intransitive verbs as well as transitive. From a common-sense point of view, such as that of the Nyāya, the claim is open to objection. A man raises a stick and with it smashes an earthen pot. We say *ghaṭo naśyati*, ‘the

pot perishes.' Surely the activity is in the stick or the man; what is in the pot is the result, destruction. Accordingly, the Naiyāyikas say that when analyzing intransitive verbs we must limit the meaning of the verbal root to the result. Not so the grammarians as represented by Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa. According to the grammarians, activity (*vyāpāra*) need not mean the initiating of movement by an agent; it can refer equally well to the undergoing of a process or the being in a certain state. The two conceptions are simply different ways of thinking of the same facts. We may think of the destruction of the pot as a process, a gradual dissolution of its component members (*kramikāvayava-viśaraṇa*) or we may think of it as a state of perishing. It is in accordance with the latter manner of thinking that Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa defines the activity expressed by the root *naś* as he does. The definition contains two parts. First there must be present the total requisite causes of destruction; otherwise the pot might survive. Without further specification the definition would be defective, for in a given case the total requisite causes of destruction might be present in the stick, which would allow us to say '*yaṣṭir naśyati*' with the meaning 'the pot perishes.' Accordingly, the second part of the definition adds that these causes must be in combined presence with *ghaṭa-nāśa-pratīyogitva*, a property that can reside nowhere but in a pot previous to its final destruction. To explain the name of this property: Where we speak of an absence, e.g. absence of fire, the counterpositive (*pratīyogin*) of this absence is fire. In fire there is said to reside the property counterpositiveness (*pratīyogitva*) to absence of fire (*vahnyabhāva-nirūpitapratīyogitva*). Destruction (*nāśa*) is equivalent to posterior absence (*dhvaṃsābhāva*). In any object about to be destroyed there resides counterpositiveness to that particular posterior absence. The combined presence of *ghaṭanāśa-sāmagri* and *ghaṭanāśanirūpita-pratīyogitva* can reside only in the pot about to be destroyed.

The activity in *ghaṭo naśyati* then, consists in the state above described, a state analyzable as the presence of two properties in combination. The state is subject to temporal distinction: it is about to occur, it occurs, it has occurred. By his phrase *ata eva*, 'that is why...', Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa hints that the Nyāya explanation would not allow of these distinctions. If in *ghaṭo naśyati* the root referred to a result only, then it would never be possible to speak of this result in past time. Destruction is for all time; it never ceases.

Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's view of intransitive verbs is the view generally accepted by the neogrammarians. Patañjali, on the other hand, occasionally speaks of the meaning of intransitive verbs as being *bhāva*, where the word *bhāva* is interpreted as result. At all events, no ancient grammarian states that the root is denotative of the meaning

result and activity. The old distinction between transitive and intransitive is shifted by the neogrammarians from the meaning of roots to the nature of syntax. A transitive construction, in the new theory, is one where activity and result reside in different substrata; an intransitive construction is one where both reside in the same substratum.

Page 5, lines 8-9.

In sentences such as 'Devadatta knows,' 'Devadatta wishes,' etc. we understand the meaning to be 'an activity of present time, of which the substratum is non-different from Devadatta, favourable to the result knowledge, desire etc.' And that activity is ultimately nothing but the state of being a substratum. [Other examples] should be understood in the above manner.

Notes. The commentator Bhairavamiśra states that the passage is directed against the Nyāya. The problem of the roots *jñā*, *iṣ* etc. is raised again, page 7, lines 4-6 below, where the commentators ascribe to the prācīna Nyāya the following theory. 'Most transitive roots denote both activity and result and all intransitive roots denote activity only. Exceptions to this rule are the roots *jñā*, *iṣ*, *kṛ* etc. These roots although they are transitive denote no result.' The same theory is ascribed by Gadādhara to the Prācīna Nyāya (*Vyutpattivāda*, pp. 207-210) by which he means Udayana and Gaṅgeśa as opposed to Raghunātha.

In the same way the Naiyayikas held that in general *tiñ* suffixes denote effort (*kṛtiḥ*). However, the *tiñ* suffixes used with *jñā*, *iṣ*, *kṛ* etc. do not denote effort but denote simply the state of being a substratum (*āśrayatva*). To use Nyāya terminology, in the case of these roots the primary meaning (*śakyārtha*) of a *tiñ* suffix is hindered (*bādhita*), being impossible, and we therefore understand the suffix in a secondary sense (*nirūḍhalakṣanā*), viz. as meaning *āśrayatva*.

Our commentators do not tell us why the old Nyāya treated these roots as exceptions. Two reasons, though, appear likely. Knowledge (*jñānam*), desire (*icchā*) and effort (*kṛti*) are among the special qualities inhering in the soul (*ātmasamavetaviśeṣaguṇāḥ*). The soul is not affected by these qualities as a pot is affected by heat etc. No observable physical result ensues from these activities. Second, the Nyāya regards effort (*kṛti*) as necessary to produce a result. But knowing cannot be preceded by effort; rather it precedes effort. I remember an old verse to this effect, the origin of which I have been unable to trace:

*jñānājanya bhaved icchā, icchājanya bhāved kṛtiḥ,
kṛtījanya bhavet ceṣṭā, ceṣṭājanya bhaved kriyā.*

Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa also treats the roots *jñā* and *is* (but not *kr*) in a special manner, which differs from the Nyāya theory more verbally than in content. The meaning activity denoted by these roots, according to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, is ultimately nothing more than *āśrayatva*. But Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa insists that this is still an activity. *Jānāti* refers to two notions, one of which is an activity, the other a result. The state of the soul as substratum of the quality knowledge is an activity. Knowledge (*jñāna*) is likewise a container, holding within itself by container-contained relation the true nature of objects which are its contents. Knowledge as containing its objects is a result. In simple words, by the soul's coming to possess knowledge, it gains as a result knowledge of objects.

It remains only to explain how the soul's coming to possess knowledge can be regarded as an activity. It may be regarded as an activity qua process. In analyzing the process the grammarians follow Nyāya epistemology. The process consists of contact of sense organ and object, contact of sense organ and mind, contact of mind and soul.

Page 5, lines 10-11.

[Introduction to Verse 3.] Now, it might be objected that if the *tiñ* suffixes are denotative of the meanings agent and object, then both meanings might be understood in the verb 'cooks,' [not at one time, of course, but] just as the single meaning object might be understood [the next time]. To meet this objection the author gives the semantic criteria [for judging which meaning is to be understood in each instance] in the following verse.

Notes. The phrase *ubhayabodhāpatti*: 'both meaning might be understood,' needs qualification. It would be impossible to understand both meanings at one time because of the rule *sakṛd uccāritaḥ śabdah sakṛd evārthaṃ gamayati* 'a word used once transmits but one meaning.' Accordingly, the qualification shows that both meanings could be understood in the course of two occurrences of the word.

Page 5, lines 10-11.

3. Of the meanings activity and result the suffixes *tañ*, *yak*, *ciñ*, etc. reveal the substratum to be construed with a result [i.e. these suffixes reveal the sense of object], and the suffixes *śap*, *śnam*, etc. reveal the substratum to be construed with an activity [i.e. these suffixes reveal the sense of agent].

Notes. Suffix *tañ*: the finite endings of the middle voice, from *ta* to *mahin*. Pāṇini assigns them the meanings *bhāva* and *karman*. 1.3.13.

Suffix *yak*: accented -ya, the suffix which forms the passive, assigned the meaning *bhāva* and *karman* by Pāṇ. 3.1.67.

Suffix *ciṇ*: The suffix *i* of the third person passive of the aorist, assigned the meanings *bhāva* and *karman* by *Pāṇ.* 3.1.66.

Suffix *śap*: The present stem formant, unaccented *a* in verbs of the first conjugation (*bhū* class). This is indirectly assigned the meaning agent by *Pāṇ.* 3.1.68.

Suffix *śnam*. The present stem formant. This takes the place of *śap* after roots of the seventh conjugation (*rudh* class), according to *Pāṇ.* 3.1.78. The other substitutes for *śap* could, of course, be added.

‘Reveal’ (*dyotayanti*): Suffixes such as *śap* and *yak* have no denotative force (*abhidhāśakti*). When *Pāṇini* says *kartari śap* (3.1.68) this is interpreted by the *Kāśikā* to mean ‘*śap* is to be suffixed to the root when the root is followed by a *sārvadhātuka* suffix denoting agent’ (*kartrvācini sārvadhātuke parataḥ dhātoḥ śap pratyayo bhavati*). What suffixes such as *śap* and *yak* do is to reveal the agency or objecthood which is denoted by the suffixes which follow them. Where an ultimate suffix bears more than one denotation, as for example *-te* which denotes agency in *bhāṣate* but objecthood in *hanyate*, the *śap* and *yak* suffixes reveal which of the two denotations is present.

Page 5, lines 14-16.

The *tan* suffixes etc. reveal the substratum to be construed with the result. The substratum when construed with a result is the object [of a verb], therefore revealing such (a substratum) means revealing the sense of object. The substratum of an activity is an agent, therefore, revealing such (a substratum) means revealing the sense of agent. This is the total meaning [of the verse]. ‘Reveal’ means ‘help us to judge the specific meaning.’

Page 5, lines 17-23.

[Introduction to Verse 4.] objection: the rule [that the *ciṇ* and *yak* suffixes reveal the sense of object] is violated by the following examples: *kramād amuṃ nārada ity abodhi saḥ*, ‘finally he knew him to be Nārada,’ and *pacyate odanaḥ svayam eva*, ‘the rice cooks of itself’ etc. [The second example violates the rule] because when it is intended to designate an object as an agent and when the personal endings therefore have an active sense, since the suffixes such as *yak*, middle endings, *ciṇ* suffix, *ciṇvat* operations, and augment *it* are transferred [from passive to active] by the rule implying this transfer, viz. ‘*karmavat karmaṇā tulyakriyāḥ*,’ even if the suffixes *yak* etc. are employed we [nevertheless] understand [from them] the meaning agent, whereby the substratum is construed with an activity. [The first example violates the rule] because *abodhi* is formed in the

following way. The active aorist [*luṇ*] is added to the root *budh* of the fourth conjugation, then [the sigmatic suffix *cli* is replaced by] the *cin* suffix according to *Pāṇ.* 3.1.61: *dīpajanabudha*. [The ending *ta* of the third person] is then elided by *Pāṇ.* 6.4.104: *ciṇo luk*. To meet these objections the author adds [the following verse].

Notes. The substance of the objection is that we sometimes find typically passive suffixes used when the sense is active. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa gives two examples.

The first example is taken from Māgha, *Śisupālavadha* 1.3. In it the verb *abodhi* is used. Usually forms with this suffix (-i, technically called *cin*) are aorist passive. However, Pāṇini allows the suffix optionally as an active aorist suffix after the six roots *dip*, *jan*, *budh*, *purī* (= *pūr* to fill), *tāy* (to stretch), *pyāy* (3.1.61). The form *abodhi* is thus an optional substitute for *abuddha* and when so used, *cin* reveals an agent and the substratum is connected with action.

The second objection arises from the reflexive-passive construction and this requires a longer explanation.

It will be remembered that the action of cooking is considered to consist of many different activities, e.g. setting fire under the pot, fanning the fire, putting the rice in the pot, taking down the pot etc. Many factors (*kāraḥ*) are engaged in one way or another with these activities: Devadatta, the rice, the fuel, the pot etc. The ways in which they are engaged are not only as agent (*kartā*) and object (*karma*) but as instrument (*karana*), locus (*adhikarana*) etc. All these *kāraḥ* help to bring about the final result, namely the softness of the food.

Among the factors the agent is distinguished by his independence. He acts independently and the rest of the factors depend upon him for their attainment of the result. Here independence is not to be taken as a designation of precisely definable fact, but as a designation of what seems to the speaker to be independent or important in a given context. Thus, while the primary agent in *pacati* is the human cook, a speaker may transfer the conception of agent to any one of the other factors when context or his desire for emphasis so demands. Thus, when he sees Devadatta pour water in the pot, the speaker will say 'Devadatta cooks,' but when he sees the fire burning brightly under the pot he may say 'the fire is cooking the rice.' Here agency has been transferred to what is primarily an instrument, and the construction is called *karana-kartari*, 'where the agent is what is primarily an instrument.' Similarly, when one says 'the pot is cooking,' the construction is called *adhikarana-kartari*, 'where the agent is what is primarily a locus.' Such constructions are used when one wishes to point out that one of the *kāraḥ* performs its activity, its part in

bringing about the final result, particularly well, so well that it seems to be acting independently. One should note that dative and ablative *kāraḥ* cannot enter such construction. Thus, we cannot express any aspect of what is referred to by 'he gets angry at Rāma,' *Rāmāya krudhyati*, by saying 'Rama gets angry,' *Ramaḥ krudhyati*; nor can we change mountain in 'He falls from the mountain' into an agent.

However, it is possible in connection with some verbal roots to transfer agency to the object. This is called the reflexive passive (*karmakartari*) construction. We may say 'the rice is cooking,' or 'the rice is cooking by itself' to express the fact that it is cooking easily, as though it were in no need of a human agent. This usage is permitted only in the case of those verbs which express an action which produces a visible result in its object. Thus, one cannot use it with such verbs as 'see' or 'know' etc.

The *karmakartari* (reflexive passive) construction differs grammatically from *karṇakartari* and *adhikarṇakartari*, where active suffixes are used, by the requirement of passive suffixes. Pāṇ. 3.1.87: *karmavat karṇāṇā tulyakriyāḥ* says, "[An agent] whose action is the same as [the action seen to occur in or to produce a result in] an object is [treated grammatically] like an object." When we say 'the rice cooks' the action of cooking is the same action that produces the transformation in the rice as an object. Hence, the agent here is treated like an object and takes a verb with passive endings. One says '*odanaḥ pacyate svayam eva*' not '*odanaḥ pacati svayam eva*.'

The above rule of Pāṇini is an *atideśa*, that is, a rule implying a number of other operations. If the reflexive agent is to be treated *karmavat* 'like an object,' all the operations that take place in the case of passive verbs will take place in the verb with which it is connected.

These operations are:

- i) *yak*: Pāṇ. 1.3.13; 3.1.67. See note on page 5, lines 12-13 above.
- ii) *cin*: Pāṇ. 3.1.66; 6.4.104. See note on page 5, lines 12-13 above.
- iii) *cinvat*: The modifications occasioned by the advent of suffix *cin*. These are such as *vṛddhi* of a root ending in a vowel (Pāṇ. 1.2.115) e.g. *anāyi*, and the insertion of *y* (*yuk*) after a root ending in *ā* (Pāṇ. 7.3.33), e.g. *adhāyi*.
- iv) *it*: Pāṇ. 6.4.62: The union vowel that is prefixed to the personal endings of the optional forms of middle and passive futures, aorists, etc. from roots ending in a vowel as well as from the roots *han*, *grah*, and *drś*, e.g. the second vowel in *grāhiṣyate* and the third vowel in *agrāhiṣātām*, alternative forms for *grāhiṣyate* and *agrāhiṣātām*.

All these elements: middle endings, *yak*, *cin*, *cinvat* and *it* which usually reveal a passive sense, reveal an active sense in the case of the

passive reflexive construction. Hence Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's rule is violated. He therefore amends it in the following verse.

Page 5, lines 24-25.

Verse 4. This is a general rule, because the reverse is seen in the case of the reflexive passive etc. Therefore what is revealed (by the suffixes) should be understood according to what is appropriate and according to [grammatical] rule.

Page 5, lines 26-28; page 6, lines 1-2.

"In the case of the reflexive passive" etc. e.g. in the case of such examples as 'the rice cooks of itself' etc. Here we understand the meaning to be 'an activity of which there is a single substratum non-different from rice, this activity being favourable to [the result] cooking.' The word *et cetera* (*ādi*) refers to such examples as "gradually he knew him to be Nārada." Here we understand the meaning to be 'an activity in the past, of which there is a substratum non-different from Kṛṣṇa, this activity being favourable to the [result] knowledge of which the object is a single person, Nārada, this activity being preceded by general and [then] by particular knowledge.' "According to what is appropriate" means that *cin*, *yak*, etc., reveal the meaning object when they are prescribed by rules that are common to the impersonal passive and are pronounced in juxtaposition with transitive verbs.

Notes. "Being preceded first by general and then by particular knowledge". The reason for this gloss on *kramāt* (gradually) will be clear from a reading of the whole verse (Śiśupālavadha 1.3) from which the example is taken.

*Cayas tviṣām ity avadhāritam purā
tataḥ śarīrīti vibhāvitākṛtim
vapur vibhaktāvayavam pumān iti
kramād amuṃ nārada ity abodhi saḥ*

Him, who was first grasped as a mass of light;

Who, when his shape was described, was known to be an embodied being;

Who, when the parts of his figure were distinguished, was known to be a man;

Him he [Kṛṣṇa] finally knew to be Nārada.

'The suffixes *cin yak* etc': Here the siddhāntin answers the objections of the pūrvapakṣin. The suffixes *cin* and *yak* are prescribed by many rules. The *cin* suffix in *abodhi* is pronounced in juxtaposition with a transitive root, but the rule which prescribes the suffix is not common to the impersonal passive, for *Pāṇ.* 3.1.61 *dīpajana* etc. prescribes the

suffix *ciṇ* specifically for the active. The *yak* suffix in *pacyate odanaḥ svayam eva* is prescribed by a rule which is common to the impersonal passive (by *Pāṇ.* 3.1.67). One may form either *pacyate odanaḥ* or *devadattena sthīyate*, but it is not pronounced in juxtaposition with a transitive root. In the reflexive passive roots become intransitive.

Page 6, lines 3-5.

[Introduction to Verse 5.] In this way having described the meaning of sentences [i.e. the interrelation of morphemes] with proper reasoning, in accordance with the maxim of the needle and the frying pan the author now establishes the thesis which he proposed in the opening verse, namely that a root denotes activity, in opposition to the followers of the Prabhākara school etc., who state that a root does not denote productive operation (i.e. action).

Notes. *Sūcīkāṭahanyāya*: The maxim refers to the doing of an easier task before a more difficult one, as when a blacksmith, being asked to make a needle and a frying pan, first makes the needle.

Laḍādyante: This is a bahuvrīhi compound, lit., 'that which possesses a *laṭ* suffix etc. for ending.' The meaning is simply 'verbal root,' for the bahuvrīhi is to be understood as an *atadguṇa-saṃvijñāna*. A *tadguṇasaṃvijñāna* bahuvrīhi is one where the expressed constituents of the bahuvrīhi must be present together with the object characterized thereby; e.g. when one says *sumukhīm ānaya*: 'bring her-of-the-beautiful-face;' the speaker here expects to see the beautiful face brought as well as the girl. An *atadguṇasaṃvijñāna* bahuvrīhi is one where this is not the case, e.g. when one says *citrāgum ānaya*: 'bring him-of-the-speckled-cattle;' the speaker here does not expect the speckled cattle to be brought with the owner. Thus, *laḍādyanta*, 'that which possesses a *laṭ* suffix etc. for ending' means the root alone and not the root plus the *laṭ* ending.

Page 6, lines 6-7.

Verse 5. Activity (*vyāpāra*) is a productive operation (*bhāvanā*): this is the same as a bringing into being (*utpādanā*) and is the same as action (*kriyā*); for the meaning effort [which stands for a result] will not do since [roots such as] *krñ* would be intransitive.

Notes. I supply the words in brackets to make the meaning of the verse accord with Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's first interpretation. This interpretation understands the whole verse to be directed against the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, which held that verbal roots denote only result.

The interpretation fits the first half of the verse well enough, but requires considerable supplementation for the second half. Kaunḍa

Bhaṭṭa's second interpretation, which is simpler, may be understood by dropping the words of translation included in brackets. In the second interpretation *krñ* is taken to mean simply the root *krñ*, not as indicating all roots, and *yatna* is not taken to represent result but an activity. The second interpretation considers the first half of the verse to be directed against the Prābhākara school, and the second half against those Naiyāyikas who claimed that all roots or at least some roots are denotative of action only. For the opinion that all roots denote action only cf. Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* page 830, where this opinion is ascribed to the *Ratnakośa*. That the roots *jñā*, *yat*, etc. denote action only and not result was the common opinion of the Nyāya prior to Raghunātha. Raghunātha agrees with the Grammarians' theory that roots are denotative of both result and activity [Raghunātha, *Ākhyātaśaktivāda* page 127].

Page 6, lines 8-9.

The sense is that since the verb 'cooks' may be explained by the phrase 'brings into being a [result, namely] cooking,' a productive operation favourable to cooking,' 'a bringing into being of cooking,' [the verb 'cooks'] which is hereby explained must have the denotation [of the words which explain it].

Notes. The argument shows the interchangeability of the terms 'productive operation,' 'bringing into being' etc. Note that all these terms are of wider extension than 'effort.' Effort can be predicted only of sentient beings. Accordingly, all cases of effort are cases of activity etc., but not vice versa. This is emphasized by Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa in what follows.

Page 6, lines 9-10.

The word activity is used [in the verse] to suggest the fact that such concepts as blowing, even when they are not efforts, have their denotedness limited by (the abstractions of these concepts, viz.) blowingness, etc.

Notes. The argument here raised is one that the grammarians usually carried on against the Nyāya. It is here raised against the Mīmāṃsā, several of whose teachers held that productive operation is equivalent to effort (*yatna*, *kr̥ti* etc.); cf. Maṇḍada Miśra, *Bhāvanāviveka* - p.167 ff. and Śomesvara on *Tantravārtikā* 2.1.1, pp. 576 ff. Others, like Pārthasārathi Miśra allowed *bhāvanā* to equal *vyāpāra*; cf. *Śaṣṭradīpikā* on *Jaimini* 2.1.1, p.102 f.

For the explanation 'denotedness limited by' see note on page 2 lines 21-24. In less technical words, if one calls blowing an effort rather than activity, the area of denotation within which the force of 'to

blow' must fall will be included in the area within which the word applies. The advantage here is that effort is considered by the Nyāya to be a quality, and accordingly effortness (*yatnatva*, *kṛtītva*) is a single generic character which may reside by inherence in many substrata. By using this as the limiter of the denotedness of all verbs (actually the Nyāya would say 'of the denotedness to *tiñ* suffixes connected with all verbs') one can give a unitary explanation of the meaning of verbs. The disadvantage, however, is great. Such a verb as 'to blow' can now be used in its full denotative sense only with subjects who are sentient beings. Efforts, according to the Nyāya, is a quality which resides in a soul. Apparently, then, a bellows cannot blow, at least not in the primary sense of the word. The grammarians, therefore, take a different view and choose a different limiter. They say that roots denote an activity (as well as result). But since activity is neither substance, quality, nor exactly motion, there can be no generic character activityness to inhere in many substrata nor to limit the denotedness to many verbal roots. Each verbal root, then, will have a different limiter of the denotedness it describes: 'to blow' will have blowingness, 'to cook' will have cookingness etc. As Kaunda Bhaṭṭa proceeds to say, this may be complicated but it is no worse than the theory it escapes from.

Page 6, lines 10-11.

And that is why when the verb '*pacati*' is used every one understands [an activity in one or another form] such as placing fire beneath [the pot], blowing [on the fire], placing the pot on the stove, effort etc.

Page 6, lines 11-14.

It should not be objected that it is complicated to assume such properties as limitors of the denotedness, and that one should accordingly take effortness as the limiter; [furthermore that] the Naiyāyika's method is quite proper according to which activityness is taken by implication to be the chief qualifier of the verbal knowledge in such (special) cases as 'a car goes', 'he knows' etc. Because the limiter of the denotedness may be a complex property just as well as the limiter of the implicatedness there is no basis for differentiating the two cases.

Notes. The Naiyāyika's object to setting up a separate limiter in the case of each verb. They resort to the notion of activity, substratum etc. instead of effort only when forced to do so; e.g. activity in explaining sentences with non-sentient subjects 'a car goes,' 'a bellows blows', substratum in explaining the verbs *jñā*, *iṣ*, *yat* etc. In these cases the

Naiyāyikas still preserve their unitary explanation of verbal meaning. The denotedness described by 'goes' is still limited by effortness. But in such a sentence as 'a car goes' the hearer passes over the denoted meaning as being impossible (*bādhita*) and understands by implication (*lakṣaṇayā*) a secondary meaning. It is only as limitors of implicatedness, not of denotedness that the Naiyāyika will make use of such multiple properties as blowingness, goingness etc. To this Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa replies that we may as well admit complexity at the outset, in setting up limitors of denotedness, as admit it later.

Page 6, lines 14-16.

It should not be argued that effort is the meaning (and is) denoted by the *tin* suffixes from the fact that 'cooks' is explained by 'makes a cooking' and effort is the meaning of 'makes' in the explanation. Because one cannot establish effort to be the meaning of the verb 'make' since we have such uses as 'a chariot makes a motion', a 'sprout is made by a seed etc.'

Page 6, lines 17-18.

Furthermore, if productive operation were not denoted (by a root), then in the sentence '*ghaṭo bhavati*,' 'the pot comes into being,' the accusative case ending would be (added to the word *ghaṭa*) as it is added in the sentence *ghaṭam bhāvayati*, 'he brings the pot into being.'

Notes. The argument here is against the Prābhākara view that the root denotes result. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa insists that it must denote productive operation (= activity, etc.) because the definition of object, by which the use of the accusative case is regulated, requires such a denotation. According to the grammarians the object of a verb (*Karma-Kāraka*) may be defined as 'x such that x is the substratum of a result and x is not the substratum of the activity which is denoted by the verbal root and which gives rise to this result': *phalajanakadhātvarthavyāpāra-vyadhikaraṇa-phalāśrayatva*. This definition applies to the word *ghaṭa* in the sentence *ghaṭam bhāvayati*, 'he brings the pot into being,' but not in the sentence *ghaṭo bhavati*: 'the pot comes into being.' In the latter case, pot is the substratum of the forbidden activity as well as the stipulated result. Now, if the Prābhākaras claim that verbal roots denote only result, the definition of the object of a verb will be merely 'that which is the substratum of the result denoted by the verbal root': *dhātvarthaphalāśrayatva*. The word *ghaṭa* in both the above sentences fits this definition.

Page 6, lines 18-21.

You cannot explain the failure to use the accusative case ending by saying that the pot is here an agent and that the designation agent prevails over the designation object. Because by your theory it is impossible to define the subsuming (universal, viz) agenthood and accordingly the pot cannot be called an agent. [If you define agenthood as] the substratum of effort or of the efficient force which stimulates the whole circle of *kāraṅkas*, then it will not be applicable to the pot etc. [If you define agenthood] as the substratum of activity favourable to the result denoted by the root then it will be too extensive and will apply to all the *kāraṅkas*.

Notes. The Mīmāṃsakas try to overcome their difficulty by declaring that although the pot would be an object in the sentence *ghaṭo bhavati* still the designation agent prevails over the designation object and hence *ghaṭa* is not used in the accusative. The grammarians, however, object to this by pointing out that the Mīmāṃsakas cannot define the term agent adequately. According to the grammarians 'agenthood' is defined as *dhātvarthavyāpārāśrayatva*: 'that which is the substratum of an activity denoted by a root.' In the sentence *devattaḥ kṣāṭhaiḥ sthālyāṃ odanaṃ pacati*: 'Devadatta cooks rice in the pot by means of fuel,' the root denotes the activity primarily belonging to the agent, and does not denote, although in another context it might do so, the activities belonging to the *kāraṅkas*. For the term *kāraṅka*, see note on page 5 lines 17-23. The Mīmāṃsakas cannot define the term agent in this way because according to them an activity is not denoted by a root. If they define agent as that which is the substratum of effort then it would be too narrow, since it would not be applicable to a non-sentient entity like a pot. If they define agent as that which stimulates the whole circle of *kāraṅkas* it will still be too narrow because non-sentient entities cannot stimulate the other *kāraṅkas*. If the Mīmāṃsakas define agent as that which is the substratum of an activity favourable to the production of a result denoted by a root (*dhātvarthānukūla-vyāpārāśrayatva*) then this would be too extensive, for it would be applicable to all the *kāraṅkas*. All the *kāraṅkas*, such as rice, fuel, pot, etc. possess activities which help in one way or another to bring out the final result.

Page 6, lines 21-24.

And further, if productive operation (activity) is not denoted [by a root] then the division of roots into transitive and intransitive would be destroyed. The definition of a transitive root is either 'x such that x denotes an activity which has a locus other than the locus of the result denoted by x' or 'x such that x denotes a result

which has a locus other than the locus of the activity denoted by x'. But such definitions are impossible unless a root denotes productive operation [=activity].

Page 6, lines 24-25.

It cannot be argued that being such [i.e. being a transitive root] means being any one [of the roots belonging to the list of transitive verbs] because one and the same root is seen to be both transitive and intransitive according to difference of its meaning.

Notes. The Mīmāṃsakas are willing to give up a semantic definition of the terms transitive and intransitive. The mere list of transitive roots may suffice to distinguish transitive from intransitive. The grammarians say that a semantic definition cannot be avoided, because one and the same root is seen to be both transitive and intransitive. The root *vah* when it means 'to carry or fetch' is transitive; e.g. *bhāraṃ skandhena vahati*: 'he carries the load on his shoulder.' But when the root *vah* means 'to blow,' it is intransitive, e.g. *māruto mandam vahati* 'the wind blows gently.' Now, if the root *vah* is listed in the group of transitive roots then it could not be intransitive when it means 'to blow.'

Page 6, lines 25-26; Page 7, lines 1-3.

It is with this in mind that [the author of the verse] says "*krñ* [would be intransitive]" etc. The idea is this: If it is assumed that an activity is not denoted by a root then it follows that a root denotes a result only.

In the same way, if one understands the meaning effort in such a sentence as 'he makes,' one must accept just that much [i.e. effort alone] as the denoted meaning of the root. Thus, there will be no difference in denotation between the effort which stands for result [in the root *krñ*] and the root *yat* [which is always intransitive], and thus it will be hard to deny that the root [*krñ*] is intransitive. Thus, where the verse says "for the meaning effort will not do," we are to understand "effort as standing for result." [Similarly] the mention of *krñ* is to be taken as standing for all roots. The idea is that either all roots would be transitive or all would be intransitive.

Notes. As regards the second half of the verse, the interpretation is open to various objections, which the commentators furnish in great detail. The most important is that the arguments against 'effort' as a verbal meaning are most naturally to be taken as directed against the Nyāya rather than against the Mīmāṃsā. But the foregoing interpretation carries no weight against the Nyāya, for the Nyāya does

not limit verbal meaning to result. Kaunda Bhatta now furnishes a second interpretation of the second half of the verse.

Page 7, lines 4-6.

Or [one may interpret the verse as follows]: Having proved in the first half of the verse that activity is denoted meaning (of verbal roots), the author goes on to prove the same of result. [In so doing] he criticizes the theory held by the Naiyāyikas that the denoted meanings of the roots *jñā* and *krñ* are action only in the form of knowledge and effort respectively.

Notes. *Phalāmśasya*: Lit, of the portion [of the double denotation, action and result, viz.] result. For the Nyāya theory here referred to see notes on page 5 line 9.

Page 7, lines 6-10.

The idea is this. If result is not part of the denoted meaning of the root, then activity alone would be the denoted meaning. Hereby its transitiveness would be destroyed, for this is definable as 'being an x such that x denotes an activity which has a locus other than the locus of the result denoted by x.' When the Naiyāyika says that the transitive use of *krñ* is by the secondary function of the word [i.e. by indication and not by denotation] he says wrong because if the use were by the secondary function it would be impossible to use the passive voice. [In the phrase 'a village on the Ganges'] we may admit that the Ganges is used in a secondary sense to mean the bank of the Ganges but this does not mean one can bathe in [the 'Ganges' taken in this sense]. Thus, according to this second interpretation of the verse], the phrase "effort will not do" refers to effort alone [i.e. the meaning effort as an action without any result].

Notes: - *Sakarmakatvavyavahāro bhāktah* See Raghunātha, *Ākyhāta-śaktivāda*, page 212.

Page 7, lines 11-13.

[Introduction to Verse 6.] Accordingly, [the author of the verse] says:

Verse 6. Rather, [the roots *krñ* etc. denote] a bringing into being and nothing less [than that i.e. not an activity alone nor a result alone]. It is therefore that the operations *yak* etc. [prescribed by the rule] *karmavat* (*Pāṇ.* 3.1.87) also [take place] in the reflexive passive construction. Otherwise they would not take place, as they do not in the case of the root *drś*.

Notes. "also" (*api*): as well as in the normal passive construction.

Page 7, lines 14-20.

“A bringing into being”: The sense is that the meaning of the root *krñ* is effort etc. combined with a result in the form of a coming into being. [The author of the verse now] furnishes one more reason to prove that result is a denoted meaning (of roots), saying “it is therefore etc.” He means “since effort alone will not do as a meaning of *krñ*, therefore etc.” The words *karmavat syāt* (in the verse) refer to the rule *karmvat karmaṇā tulyakriyāḥ* (3.1.87). The sense is as follows. Because the root *krñ* means a bringing into being, it follows that the suffixes *yak* etc. can be used in such sentences as *kriyate ghataḥ svayam eva*: ‘the pot makes itself,’ just as it can be in the sentence *pacyate odanaḥ svayam eva*: ‘the rice cooks by itself.’ Otherwise, [if *krñ* meant effort only and not an activity and a result] this would not be the case, for effort does not reside in the object, [and the case would be] like [that of the root] *drś*. Just as one cannot say the pot sees by itself since [neither the activity nor the result of] seeing occurs in the pot, just so [in the case of ‘the pot makes itself,’ since] effort [does not occur in the pot], such a usage would be impossible.

Notes. For the reflexive passive construction see notes on page 5 lines 17-23. This construction is permitted only with *karmasthabhāvaka* roots, that is, roots whose denoted results are visible in their objects. If we deny to root *krñ* the denotation of result it will be impossible to use it in such a construction.

Page 7, lines 21-23.

[Introduction to Verse 7.] Now an objection may be raised. Just as [a denotation of result is allowed to] *krñ*, a denotation of result, namely ‘the breaking of the veil which encompasses the object’ must be allowed to *jñā* ‘to know.’ Otherwise, it would not be a transitive root. And thus why can we not say ‘the pot knows by itself’ [i.e. ‘is known’] or ‘the village goes by itself’? Having this objection in mind [the author of the verse] says:

Page 7, lines 24-25.

Verse 7. We may say that the operations prescribed by the rule [*karmavat karmaṇā tulyakriyāḥ*, *Pāṇ.* 3.1.87, take place] when the object is producible or modifiable [by the action of agent] and not when the object is simply attainable. This is the established conclusion.

Notes. For the interpretation of *Pāṇ.* 3.1.87, see notes on page 5, lines 17-23. The specification ‘producible’ is taken by the commentators to

fit *asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda*. For the latter, 'producible' is to be understood as 'capable of being brought into manifestation.'

Page 7, lines 26-30.

An object which is chiefly sought [and therefore expressed by the accusative case, *Pāṇ.* 1.4.49; 2.3.2] is of three sorts: producible, modifiable and attainable. In the case of the first two operations prescribed by the rule '*karmavat karmaṇā tulyakriyāḥ*' take place and not in the case of the last. It will be mentioned in the chapter *Subarthanirṇaya* that attainability of an object means non-apprehensibility of a change brought about in the object by the action of the agent. By looking at an object [a pot or village] one cannot apprehend that "this pot has been seen by someone," "this village has been visited by someone." But in the case of a producible object, as where some one makes a pot, and in the case of a modifiable object, as where someone extracts *soma* juice, it is possible to know this. Thus, such objects are not attainable. And thus the pot etc. in respect to the action of seeing etc. are objects which are attainable only. So there is no fault, such as was suggested above, of unwarranted extension [of the operations prescribed by the *karmavat* rule *Pāṇ.* 3.1.87].

Page 8, lines 1-2.

If verbal roots did not denote result [as well as action] then the roots *gam* and *tyaj* would be synonymous, for they denote the very same action. Even if it be explained that the [particular] result is [a meaning] to be inferred [from the particular circumstances] one must say that the objection remains, for the very same action produces disjunction from the preceding place and conjunction with the following place.

Notes. This is directed against those Naiyāyikas who maintain that verbal roots denote activity only. Cf. Raghunātha, *Akhyātaśaktivāda* page 114.

According to the grammarians the distinction between *gam* (to go) and *tyaj* (to leave) lies only in their denoted results, not in their denoted activities. *Gam* means *uttaradeśasaṃyogānukūlaspaṇḍa-vyāpāraḥ*: 'an activity in the form of motion favourable to a conjunction with a consequent point', whereas *tyaj* means *pūrvadeśavibhāgānukūla-spandavyāpāraḥ*: 'an activity in the form of motion favourable to a disjunction from a precedent point.' It will be seen that the denoted activity is the same in both instances.

The Naiyāyikas who denied to verbal roots the denotation of result explained such cases as follows. While the root's denotation is activity only, they said, its meaning in the broadest sense may envisage result.

The result which is denoted by the accusative case ending conditions the meaning of the root, so that one may say that the meaning of *gam* when in juxtaposition with an accusative implies (*uplakṣayati*) a result different from the result implied under comparable circumstances by *tyaj*.

Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's objection to this argument is persuasive. The sentences 'Devadatta goes' and 'Devadatta leaves' will be synonymous. The meaning of these collocations can be distinguished only when an accusative is added. Thus, an identical action would lead to different results: in the one case to conjunction with a consequent point, in the other to disjunction from a precedent point.

Page 8, lines 3-5.

Therefore it is necessary to assume that the transitive roots denote result. In the case of intransitive roots the matter is beyond dispute. Further [evidence, if such were needed, is supplied by the *Dhātupāṭha* when we find] *bhū* (to be) listed in the sense of existence. This also is why the *Bhāṣya* is justified in stating that the root *pac* has two meanings.

Notes. "In the case of intransitive roots": Here the Naiyāyika explanation that a root may imply result, its meaning being conditioned by an accusative, obviously will not work. Intransitive roots take no accusative.

"By the *Dhātupāṭha*": The meanings assigned to roots by the *Dhātupāṭha* are regularly the result-denotations rather than activity-denotations. This is because a root may denote many different activities all of which lead to the same result; e.g. the root *pac* denotes the activities of putting the pot on the fire, blowing the fire, putting rice in the pot etc. It would be a practical impossibility to list all these activities. The result-denotations are not so numerous and so are chosen for listing. These lists, of course, could not have been made if verbal roots did not denote result.

"In saying that *pac* has two meanings": On the rule *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma* (*Pāṇ.* 1.4.49) Patañjali raises the question whether the usage *taṇḍulān odanaṃ pacati* or the usage *taṇḍulānām odanaṃ pacati* is correct. He decides that both usages are correct because the root *pac* has two meanings. In so saying Patañjali is not referring to the activities denoted by *pac*, which are not two but many. Rather he means that *pac* denotes two different sorts of result: One a modification, the other a production. Thus the sentence *taṇḍulān odanaṃ pacati* according to Patañjali means: "By softening the rice-grains he produces cooked-rice" (*taṇḍulān vikledayan odanaṃ nirvartayati*). Here the rice-grains are the substrata of the result,

softening, and one may say that rice-grains belong to the category of modifiable objects (*vikārya-karma*). On the other hand, cooked rice is the substratum of the result, production, and one may say that cooked-rice belongs to the category of producible objects. Hence the usage *taṇḍulān odanaṃ pacati* is justified by the two result-denotations of *pac*. Patañjali's justification would be impossible if the Naiyāyikas were correct in denying to verbal roots the denotation of result.

Page 8, lines 6-10.

[Introduction to Verse 8. Mīmāṃsaka objection]. "Granted that activity and result are denoted [by verbs], still, the meaning productive operation (= activity) is denoted by the *tiṇ* suffixes and not by the roots. To say that activity, which is apprehended as predominant is a meaning belonging to the root is to go against the maxim which says that of the two meanings, that of the stem and that of the suffix, the meaning of the suffix is (always) predominant. Furthermore it goes against the maxim which says "that is comprehended when that is used."

Accordingly, the following verse is in answer (to the arguments) of the conceited Mīmāṃsaka who would define a transitive root as 'x such that x denotes a result which has a locus other than the locus of activity denoted by a *tiṇ* suffix which is attached to x,' and would define agent as the substratum of the activity denoted by the *tiṇ* suffixes.

Notes. For the maxim that the meaning of a suffix predominates over the meaning of a stem see notes on page 9, lines 8-10. The grammarians admit that the maxim holds in instances other than that of verbal root and *tiṇ* suffix.

For the maxim "that is comprehended when that is used" cf. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 4.1.15. The maxim is used here for a different purpose than that which Jaimini aims at in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. There Jaimini is insisting that the syntactical meaning and therefore the Vedic injunction is affected by suffixes which are directly connected only with a single word. In *paśum ālabheta*: 'one should kill a beast' although the singularity is directly connected only with the beast, the whole sacrifice (which is not directly connected with any expression of singularity) will be in vain if one kills more than one beast. The purpose here is as follows. From the word *pacati*, ending in a *tiṇ* suffix the Mīmāṃsaka understands a productive operation; from the word *pakṛ* (a cook), lacking *tiṇ* suffix he does not. Accordingly, by the maxim "that is comprehended when that is used" he argues that productive operation is denoted by *tiṇ* suffixes.

Page 8, lines 11-12.

Verse 8. Therefore the root *kṛ* explains the sense of the root [e.g. *pac*] and not of the *tiñ* suffixes. The phrase *pakvavān* (having cooked) is explained as *pākam kṛtavān* (having done the cooking); and the phrase *kiñ kṛtam* (what has been done) is answered by *pakvam* (it has been cooked).

Notes. The natural meaning of the verse, which is simpler, is as follows. Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's explanation, as will be seen later, is more elaborate. Both the Mīmāṃsaka and the grammarian agree that *pacati* may be explained by *pākam karoti*. The Mīmāṃsaka claims that in this explanation the word *pākam*, denoting result, explains the meaning of the root *pac*, while the word *karoti*, denoting activity, explains the meaning of the *tiñ* suffix (the *-ti* of *pacati*). The grammarian opposes this by showing that *kṛñ* is used in explanation of other forms that contain no *tiñ* suffix. Thus *pakvavān* (root plus *kṛt* suffix) is explained by *pākam kṛtavān*.

The grammarian's assignment of meaning to root and suffix is based on the following analyses.

Forms	Meanings
1) <i>pacati</i> (<i>pac</i> + <i>tiñ</i> suffix)	result, activity, agent
2) <i>pakvavān</i> (<i>pac</i> + <i>kṛt</i> -suffix <i>tavān</i>)	result, activity, agent
3) <i>pakvam</i> (<i>pac</i> + <i>kṛt</i> -suffix <i>vam</i>)	result, activity, object

One morpheme and two meanings are constant in the three examples. Hence this morpheme (a root) has these two meanings (result and activity).

The Mīmāṃsaka employs the same analyses but differs in his assignment of meanings. Some of the meanings he takes to be denoted meanings (*vācyārtha*) and some to be implied meanings (*ākṣiptārtha*).

Thus:

Forms	Denoted Meaning	Implied Meaning
<i>pacati</i>	result, productive operation	agent
<i>pakvavān</i>	result, agent	productive operation
<i>pakvam</i>	result, object	productive operation

He assigns only the meaning result to the morpheme *pac*. The *tiñ* suffix denotes productive operation (= activity) and implies agent. The *kṛt* suffix *tavān* denotes agent and implies productive operation. The *kṛt* suffix *vam* denotes object and implies productive operation.

Against the Mīmāṃsaka analysis it may be said that they violate the principle that common meaning should correspond to common morpheme. Or to translate into terms of western descriptive linguistics one might say that the Mīmāṃsaka sets up a separate zero morpheme in each of the words *pacati*, *pakvavān*, and *pakvam* that are here analyzed.

Page 8, lines 13-15.

The word 'therefore' refers to the reason which is in the mind of the author. And that is this. If the root denotes the result alone, then we should have the notion 'the village has gone' (*grāmo gamanavān*) [where the fact is that he goes to the village], for the village is the substratum of [the result of going, namely] conjunction. Likewise, when the result [namely, the becoming soft of the rice] has not yet occurred although the activity [favourable to the becoming soft] is in progress, we could not say 'something is cooking' [*pāko bhavati*]; where on the other hand, the activity [favourable to the becoming soft] has ceased and the result is present, we would say 'there is something cooking' [*pāko vidyate*].

Notes. A more literal translation of *pāko bhavati* and *pāko vidyate* would be 'a cooking is coming into existence', and 'a cooking is found to exist.'

Page 8, lines 15-18.

It will not do [for the Mīmāṃsakas] to object that the suffixes *ghañ* etc. which are suffixes of activity [by Pāṇini's rule 3.3.18], may denote an activity favourable [to the result] and that there would therefore be no impropriety [such as we claimed in the examples *grāmo gamanavān*, *pāko bhavati* etc]. Because [one cannot take Pāṇini 3.3.18 to prescribe the meaning activity for *ghañ* if one has taken 3.4.69 to prescribe activity for *tiñ*, as the Mīmāṃsakas do]. The rule prescribing [*ghañ*] in the sense of activity would be superfluous because this prescription would be obtained from *kartari kṛt* (3.4.67) [where the Mīmāṃsakas must take *kartari* in the sense of *kartṛtva* = activity] just as they take *tiñ* to be prescribed in the sense of activity [by the word *kartari* to be supplied in 3.4.69]. Hence [Pāṇini 3.3.18 is in] contradiction of the [Mīmāṃsaka theory of meaning of *tiñ* suffixes].

Notes. The sūtras referred to are: 3.3.18 *bhāve*: [The suffix *ghañ*] is used in the sense of activity. 3.4.67 *kartari kṛt*: A *kṛt* suffix is used in the sense of agent.

3.4.69 *Laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyah*: Any *l* suffix (e.g. *tiñ*) is used [in the sense of agent] and in the sense of object and after intransitive roots in the sense of activity.

The peculiar tenet of the Mīmāṃsakas forces them to take the word *kartari*, which is to be supplied in 3.4.69 from 3.4.67, in the sense of *kartṛtve*, which they say means *bhāvanā* (productive activity). The grammarians insist that they must take it in the same sense in 3.4.67, and that if they do, 3.3.18 becomes superfluous.

Page 8, lines 18-21.

Now if it is admitted that also the meaning activity is denoted by the root, then, since all activity can be obtained from the root alone, it will be cumbrous to assume that the *tiñ* suffixes denote action separately. The word *karoti* in the phrase *pākam karoti*, 'he does a cooking,' which is used to explain the meaning of the verb *pacati*, 'he cooks,' explains, i.e. reveals, the sense of the root only. Accordingly, it cannot be used as evidence that the *tiñ* suffixes denote productive operation.

Page 8, lines 21-22.

By the word 'not etc.' the author of the verse removes the objection put forth by the Mīmāṃsakas and refutes their opinion. [The word *karoti*] is not an explanation of the *tiñ* suffixes because in that case there would be no relation [between the meaning denoted by the root *pac* and the meaning denoted by the suffix *ktavatu*] in the word *pakvavān*, 'having cooked' etc.

Notes. For the simple explanation of the verse see note above. Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's explanation is more subtle. If the Mīmāṃsaka insists that in *pākam karoti*, which glosses *pacati*, the word *karoti* glosses the *-ti* only of *pacati*, then there will be no syntactic connection between the *pak-*, which will denote result as object only, and *-vavān*, which will denote agent only, in the participial form *pakvavān*. The reason, as he proceeds to show, is that agent and object can be connected syntactically only through action and the Mīmāṃsaka theory leaves no place for the denotation of action in such a form as *pakvavān*.

Page 8, lines 22-25; Page 9, lines 1-2.

To explain more fully: - [We have the maxim that] base form and suffix denote meaning jointly [i.e. so that the meaning of the one is joined to the meaning of the other], and of their meanings that of the suffix is syntactically predominant. In such cases we may say that in order to have a verbal knowledge [semantic paraphrase] in which the meaning denoted by a base [i.e. root] stands as a qualifier the necessary cause is a presentment [of meaning to the intellect] derived from a suffix which stands as qualificand. Hereby the relation of cause and effect [between presentment and verbal knowledge] is fully explained. Now in the word *pakvavān* the meaning *pāka* [denoted by the base form] stands as object [*karma-kāraka*] and the meaning denoted by the suffix *ktavatu* stands as agent [*karṭṛ-kāraka*]. Between these two no construction is possible either by the method used in the Aruṇa Chapter of the Mīmāṃsa or by the method that we shall describe

later on. So, if there is no regular construction between the meanings of base form and suffix, how can there be any relation of cause and effect [between presentment and verbal knowledge] to inform us of the syntactic predominance [of the suffix meaning]?

Notes. "The meaning *pāka*": In *pakvavān* the root *pac* according to the Mīmāṃsā denotes *pāka*, the result or object of the action of softening.

In the Aruṇā Chapter the Mīmāṃsā concludes that the *aruṇayā* is to be connected with the acts of purchasing because all *kāraḥ* can be connected only with action. See Excursus 3 on Aruṇā (pp. 20-22). Similarly, Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa in the Subarthanirnaya Section will explain that the *kāraḥ* by definition are connected only with action. One is therefore left with no possibility of connecting the two parts of *pakvavān*. The Mīmāṃsakas obviate this difficulty by saying that the suffix *ktavatu* implies action. A construction can be formed through the implied meaning.

"To inform us of the syntactic predominance." This predominance is necessary in order to justify the Mīmāṃsā interpretation of *tin* as denoting action.

Page 9, lines 2-8.

Objection: The *kāraḥ* may be construed together by an unspecific relation after the manner stated by Bhaṭṭa pāda.

The [Vedic] word taken alone denotes the mere relation of root-meaning and productive operation. It lacks the function of conveying a particular aspect of that general relation.

Answer: We say this is wrong because of a lack of compatibility [between the meanings of the parts of the word]. Being compatible means being possessed of a nature which permits of construction. It will be stated later on that actionhood* alone is the limiter of the property of being construed with a *kāraḥ* [i.e. for all *x*, if *x* is construed with a *kāraḥ*, *x* must be an action]. In order to make clear [this incompatibility] the author of the verse shows by means of his explanation *ktavān pākam* [for *pakvavān*] that the meaning denoted by the root stands as object and the meaning denoted by the suffix stands as agent.

Notes. By Bhaṭṭa pāda is meant Kumārila. The verse is found in the *Tantravārtika* page 353. Kumārila holds that a verb form such as *yajeta*, 'one must sacrifice,' if taken by itself expresses a general relation between sacrifice and productive operation. One may conceive

* Some edition (e.g. Kāshī and Sri Harikṛṣṇa) read *kriyānvayitvam* for *kriyātvam*, giving a proper sense.

of this general relation as consisting of several parts or several segments, each of which is a particular or specific aspect of the general relation. What specific aspect is intended can be determined only by context. It may be the aspect action/means or action/end (object). If the sacrifice has already been enjoyed by another Vedic text the meaning sacrifice (*yāga*) will be construed as a means and the whole meaning of the verb form will be productive operation qualified by sacrifice as a means (*yāgakaraṇikā bhāvanā*). If the sacrifice has not previously been enjoined it will be construed as the end or object and the meaning of the verb form will be productive operation qualified by sacrifice as an object [*yāgakarmikā bhāvanā*]. On the analogy of such explanations the Mīmāṃsakas say that in the word *pakvavān* we can construe the meanings of root and suffix by a general or unspecific relation. The grammarians object that mere juxtaposition between root and suffix is not enough to relate them with each other even by unspecific relation. To form a construction the essential condition is *yogyatā* (compatibility). The components of a word or phrase are compatible only if they are grammatically capable of conveying the intended meaning of the speaker. The phrase *jalam ghaṭam siñcati*: “he sprinkles the pot water”, lacks compatibility because the word *jalam* is grammatically incapable of conveying the idea that water is the instrument of sprinkling because *jalam* is used in the accusative instead of the instrumental case. In the same way the constituent meanings ‘object’ and ‘agent’ denoted by the root and suffix respectively in the word *pakvavān* lack compatibility because the meanings object and agent have an expectancy [*ākāṅkṣā*] towards action and without action cannot be construed with each other even by general relationship.

Page 9, lines 8-11.

In reality [the maxim] that the meaning of the suffix stands as syntactically predominant does not mean that what is predominant is always the meaning of the suffix nor that the meaning of the suffix is always predominant. If it did, in such examples as *ajā*, *chāgī* (‘female goat’), *āśvā* (‘female horse’) the meaning female denoted by feminine suffix would be predominant and the sense goat etc. [denoted by the base forms] would not be predominant. Rather, this is a general maxim to which there are exceptions.

What one understands as qualificand depends on one's training.

Notes. The verbal knowledge or semantic explanation of the word *ajā*, according to the grammarians, is *strītvāvachinna-aja* ‘goat characterized by femininity not ‘a female characterized by goatness’. One can scarcely argue that they are wrong.

Page 9, lines 11-12.

This is why the Naiyāyikas understand as qualificand the word which ends in the nominative case. [Again] in [analyzing] a secondary meaning the rhetoricians say that the verbal understanding is qualified by the limiter of the denotedness, whereas the Naiyāyikas say not.

Notes. In the phrase *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, 'a village on the Ganges,' the primary meaning of the word *gaṅgā*, viz. a particular river, is obstructed, it being impossible for the village to be on (in) a river without its inhabitants drowning. Accordingly, we understand the word *gaṅgā* in a secondary or implied sense to mean 'the bank of a particular river'. Now, the Rhetoricians distinguish the two phrases *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* and *gaṅgātāṭe ghoṣaḥ* by saying that the former expresses of the bank a greater degree of coolness and holiness than the latter. In the latter expression the primary meaning bank is characterized by bankhood, while in the former expression the secondary meaning bank is characterized by streamhood [i.e. *gaṅgātva*]. In the first expression the meaning stream is *śakyārtha* [the denoted meaning] while the meaning bank is *lakṣyārtha* [the implied or secondary meaning]. The property which limits *śakyārtha* is called the limiter of denotedness [*śakyatāvacchedaka*] which is here *gaṅgātva*: streamhood. The property which limits *lakṣyārtha* is called the limiter of impliedness [*lakṣyatāvacchedaka*] which is here *taṭava*: bankhood. Accordingly, the Rhetoricians say that the verbal understanding (*bodha*) of an implied [*lakṣyārtha*] meaning is qualified by the limiter of the denotedness, not by the limiter of impliedness [*lakṣyatā*]. In other words in the expression *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* the word *gaṅgā* means *gaṅgātāvāvacchinnāḥ taṭaḥ* i.e. bank characterized by streamhood i.e. holiness and coolness, and not *taṭatāvāvacchinnāḥ taṭaḥ*: bank characterized by bankhood.

The Naiyāyikas disagree. They say that a secondary meaning is characterized by the properties which inhere in the secondary meaning. Thus, the expression *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* means *taṭatāvāvacchinnāḥ taṭaḥ* and not *gaṅgātāvāvacchinnāḥ taṭaḥ*. In support of their opinion the Naiyāyikas quote the line of poetry *kacataḥ trasyati vadanam*: 'her face is frightened of her hair'. The primary sense is inappropriate. But from the frequent poetic comparison of a woman's face to the moon we are reminded of the moon's fear of *Rāhu*, the demon who causes its eclipse. The attribution of a secondary sense 'Rāhu' to the word *kaca* furnishes an appropriate poetic sense. The face of the maiden is frightened as the beautiful moon is frightened before *Rāhu*. The connecting links between *Rāhu* and the woman's hair are black colour and the concealing of what is beautiful. Now, the Naiyāyikas say that

in its secondary sense as 'Rāhu' the word *kaca* must be characterized by Rāhuneess in order to preserve the poetic charm and not by *kacatva* : hairness. The verbal understanding of the word is qualified by *lakṣyatāvacchedaka*, not by *śakṣyatāvacchedaka*.

Page 9, lines 12-14.

For the modern Naiyāyikas who are trained in perverse as well as normal speech, there is verbal understanding from [such unconnected words as] "jar, objecthood, bringing, effort;" but there is no understanding for those who are so trained. For [such] others these words lack expectancy.

Notes. In the sentence *ghaṭam ānaya*: "bring the pot", the words *ghaṭam* and *ānaya* are mutually expectant, because the expectancy created by the one is fulfilled by the other. But in every day language unconnected words like *ghaṭaḥ*, *karmatvam*, *ānayanam*, *kṛtiḥ* etc. do not fulfill any mutual expectancy. Now the accumulated meanings of the sentence *ghaṭam ānaya* as represented by each part of each word are practically the same as those furnished by the unconnected words *ghaṭaḥ*, *karmatvam*, *ānayanam*, *kṛtiḥ*, but the former expression gives a coherent idea, because its words are organized according to everyday rules.

But words are after all nothing but symbols adopted for communication and if someone invents new symbols for old or new arrangements of symbols for the old arrangements, he can still communicate with others provided that he first teaches them. In fact in India the modern Naiyāyikas and the grammarians while discussing philosophical problems communicate with each other in a peculiar language which the layman cannot understand. If we examine the language of the modern school of Naiyāyikas we readily see how that language differs from ordinary speech. Verbs are not used, compounds are substituted for clauses, etc. Thus Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa says, perhaps facetiously, that from isolated words like *ghaṭaḥ*, *karmatvam*, *ānayanam*, *kṛtiḥ*, though the layman cannot derive any sense the modern Naiyāyikas can.

Page 9, lines 14-17.

Hence the venerable Pāṇini says "the predominance of the meaning of the suffix [need not be taught] because the meaning is established by other criteria".

The meaning of this [statement] is as follows. The rule that the meaning of the suffix is predominant should not be prescribed, the word 'not' being supplied from a previous sūtra, because the meaning, that is, the proper comprehension [of the suffix as

predominant, as subordinate] depends on the convention to which one is trained.

Notes. This rule is not explained by *Patañjali* and seems to be a later addition [cf. Boethlingk's *Pāṇini* 1.2.53]. In the explanation of this rule the *kāśikā* and Bhaṭṭoji differ. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa follows Bhaṭṭoji's explanation.

Page 9, lines 17-18.

This being the case, if one seeks a criterion [for the meaning of roots] let the statement [of the *Nirukta*] be taken, which says "the root denotes chiefly action [in process]." This is how the wise should interpret the question.

Notes. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa is certainly wrong in quoting Yāska that the root is denotative of action, because Yāska *Nirukta* 1.1 does not mean 'root' by the word *ākhyāta* here. Here Yāska distinguishes verb from noun by saying that nouns chiefly denote action in the form of substance while verbs denote chiefly action in process. Yāska does not mean that activity is a peculiar denotation of roots nor does he mean that action stands as predominant with respect to other meanings.

Page 9, lines 18-20.

The author now shows that [the *Mīmāṃsā*] maxim "that is understood when that is used" is too wide, as is also their explanation [of the suffix-meaning by *kṛñ*], "what has been done? Cooking has been done": The sense here is that the explanation [of the verbal form] by *kṛñ* and the notion [of activity] are found also in *pakvam* as well as in *pacati*. Accordingly [just as they assigned the meaning activity to the suffix *-ti* in *pacati*, the *Mīmāṃsā* must hold that] activity is denoted here also [by the suffix *-vam* of *pakvam*].

Notes. Since the conclusion is not accepted by the *Mīmāṃsā*, which claims that a *kṛt* suffix, such as the *-vam* of *pakvam*, implies but does not denote activity, the premise of the *Mīmāṃsā* must be too wide.

Page 9, lines 20-22.

By the word 'also' the author of the verse answers [a fanciful] objection that activity might be the denotation of *kṛt* suffixes as well as of *tiñ* suffixes. His meaning is that since activity is common to both cases [*pacati* and *pakvam*], the root which is the common element in both must be denotative of that sense. Furthermore, according to your method [viz., the method of the fanciful objector who takes *kṛt* suffixes to denote activity], activity would stand predominant because it is denoted by the suffix.

Notes. In *pakvam* every one admits that predominant sense is object.

Page 9, lines 23-25.

[Introduction to verse 9.] [The author of the verse] gives another proof for activity's being denoted by the root.

Verse 9. [Activity is denoted by the root] because it is seen in words ending in *kṛt* suffixes also, for [the question] *kiṃ kāryam* ('what is to be done?') is answered by *pacanīyam* ('the cooking should be done') etc. Furthermore there can be no such thing as a root without denotation of activity.

Notes. If the Mīmāṃsakas claim that the root *krñ* explains the sense of action denoted by the *tiñ* suffixes because *kiṃ karoti* ('what does he do') is answered by *pacati* ('he cooks' - *pākaṃ karoti*) then they will have to accept also that the very same root *krñ* explains the sense of nouns derived from the *kṛt* suffixes. For instance, *kiṃ kāryam* ('what is to be done?') is answered by *pacanīyam* ('cooking should be done'). The argument is simply a repetition of that used in the previous verse, only the example being different.

Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, however, explains the first half of this verse differently in order to avoid the repetition of the argument. He says that if the meaning action is not denoted by the words ending in the *kṛt* suffixes, the suffixes *nyat* and *anīyar* could not be appended to the roots *krñ* and *pac* in the words *kārya* and *pacanīya*. The reason for this impossibility will appear from his explanation.

Page 9, lines 26-27; Page 10, lines 1-2.

In the word *kārya* the suffix *nyat* [is appended to the root *krñ*] in the sense of object [i.e. in the passive sense] as prescribed by the rule *ṛhalor nyat*. In the word *pacanīya* the suffix *anīyar* [is appended to the root *pac*]. The word 'etc.' [in the verse includes such further examples as] *jyotiṣṭomayājīn* [who has sacrificed with a Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice] etc., where the suffix *nini* [is appended to the root *yaj*] in the sense of agent, the word preceding *yaj* in the compound being used in an instrumental sense. These suffixes, since they cannot be used if [the meanings denoted by them i.e. object or agent etc. are] not connected with action, show us that activity must be denoted [by the root]. It is impossible to call something a *kāraka*, if it is not related to the notion of action. It is accordingly impossible to use a suffix denoting a *kāraka* [in the absence of a connection with the notion of action].

Notes. *ṛhalor nyat*: [Pāṇ. 3.1.124]. "The suffix *nyat* [is appended] to a root which ends in *ṛ* or a consonant [to denote an object of the action]".

tavyattavyānīyarah [Pāṇ. 3.1.96]: “The suffixes *tavyat*, *tavya* and *anīyar* [are appended to a root to furnish the sense of object].

Karaṇe yajāḥ [Pāṇ. 3.2.85]: [The suffix *nini* in the sense of agent] is added to the root *yaj* [if that root denotes the sense of past time, when the root is preceded by a word used] in the instrumental sense. [*jyotiṣṭomena iṣṭavān* = *jyotiṣṭomayājī*, where *yājī* = *yaj* + *nini*].

Page 10, lines 2-7.

The method of the followers of Kumārila is wrong whereby one understands an action by implication and then construes the *kāraka* with this [implied action]; because the same [construction with an implied action could be argued] in the case of verbs ending in *tiṇ* suffixes also, and thus [these followers of Kumārila] could not establish that *tiṇ* suffixes actually denote activity. If you say that the denotation of agent [by the *kṛt* suffixes] is necessary in order to establish the connection [of the agent] with number and gender, and then by that [denotation of the agent] the sense of action can be understood by implication; we say this is wrong, because the denotation of the agent by *tiṇ* suffixes would be equally necessary in order to establish the connection [of the agent] with number. Furthermore, in words like *pakvavān*, the denotation of action is just as necessary in order to establish the connection [of the action] with the notion of time and *kāraka*.

Notes. If one understands the meaning action by implication rather than by denotation in *pacanīyam* etc. One might do the same in *pacati*. So there would be no necessity to take *tiṇ* to denote activity as the Mīmāṃsaka answers that in *pancanīyam* the denotation of agent is necessary; otherwise one could not construe number and gender; and that it is only through this designated agent that activity can be implied. But practically the same rationale will hold of *pacati*, where agent must be denoted to furnish a construction for number. Finally, action is necessary not only in order to form a construction for agent (a *kāraka*) but to form a construction for time, even the case of the words ending in *kṛt* suffixes.

The semantic laws on which the above argument is based are

- 1) The meaning number can be construed only with the meaning *kāraka*,
- 2) The meaning *kāraka* can be construed only with the meaning activity,
- 3) The meaning time can be construed only with the meaning activity.

Page 10, lines 7-9.

The word 'also' [in the verse] adds other examples. For instance the compounds *nakhabhinnaḥ* [which is analyzed as] 'broken by the finger-nail' and *haritrātaḥ* [which is analyzed as] 'protected by Hari', formed by the rule *karṭṛkaraṇe kṛtā bahulam* [2.1.32], would not be possible owing to the absence of coordination between the constituents of the compound], just as [it is not possible to form a compound *rājabhāryā* from the uncoordinate phrases] *puruṣo rājñāḥ* and *bhāryā Devadattasya*.

Notes. Kaunda Bhaṭṭa takes the word *api* not to modify the preceding word [viz., "in *kṛt* suffixes also"] but to imply a new clause which is unexpressed, viz. "also, there are other reasons."

karṭṛkaraṇe kṛtā bahulam: "A word which is used to denote agent or instrument may be combined variously with a word ending in a *kṛt* suffix."

Now, it is an axiom that none of Pāṇini's rule for compound formation can be applied to words unless they are co-ordinate (*samartha*). The axiom is furnished by *Pāṇ. 2.1.1 samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*. In regard to compounds co-ordination (*sāmarthyā*) is said to mean *ekārthībhāva*: 'a nature such that they may express a single idea.' [Co-ordination has a different meaning in regard to the syntax of sentences, which need not concern us here.]

The question arises as to how two different words may possess a nature such that they may express a single idea. The answer may be seen from the examples *nakhabhinna* and *haritrāta*. In *nakhabhinna*, 'broken by the finger-nail,' a word ending in the suffix *kṛtā* and denoting an object recipient of action and a word denoting an instrument come to be coordinate and capable of expressing a single object by the action which binds them, viz. breaking. Without this action they would be uncoordinate. Similarly, in *haritrātaḥ*, *hari* is coordinate with *trāta* by the action of protecting which here links agent and object. Where there is no link of action, as between the *rājā* of *puruṣo rājñāḥ* and the *bhāryā* of *bhāryā devadattasya*, no compound can be formed by *Pāṇ. 2.1.32*.

The concatenating function of action is clearly revealed by the syntactic analysis of such a compound as *nakha-karaṇaka-vyāpāra-janya-vidāraṇāśryaḥ*: 'substratum of the separation brought about by an activity of which the finger-nail was the instrument.'

Thus, in many compounds, viz. those formed by *Pāṇ. 2.1.32* activity must be denoted by the root.

Page 10, lines 9-14.

It should not be urged that coordination can be maintained by supplying a word denoting the sense action, as in the compound *dadhyodanaḥ*: 'rice seasoned with curd' and *guḍadhānāḥ* 'grain mixed with molasses', that otherwise in these cases too no compound could be formed by the rules *annena vyañjanam* (2.1.34) and *bhakṣyeṇa miśṛikaraṇam* (2.1.37). For although we admit [coordination by supplying a word in these cases since [otherwise] the rules [2.1.34 and 2.1.37] would be useless and accordingly there is no alternative, still in such a compound as *haritrātaḥ* where the rule *kartṛkarane kṛtā bahulam* (2.1.1) can be applied by maintaining a direct coordination with the sense, [viz. activity] of a root, it would be wrong to apply the rule through an indirect connection.

Notes. *Annena vyañjanam* (2.1.34): "[A word in the instrumental sense, denoting] a condiment [is compounded] with [a following word denoting] food." E.g. *dadhyodanaḥ*: 'rice [seasoned with] curd.'

Bhakṣyeṇa miśṛikaraṇam (2.1.35): "[A word in the instrumental sense, denoting] that which is mixed in, [is compounded] with [a following word denoting] an edible." E.g. *guḍadhānāḥ* 'grain [mixed with] molasses.'

These rules are given by Pāṇini as exceptions to 2.1.32 *kartṛkarane kṛtā bahulam* [see above], to cover special cases. Naturally the grammarian has to supply a verb to connect the two parts of the compounds formed under these rules. Thus, *dadhyodanaḥ* = *dadhnā upasikta odanaḥ*. Without supplying a verb the parts of the compound would be uncoordinate and the two rules would be useless. But when the Mīmāṃsaka suggests that we take such compounds as an analogy and similarly supply a word denoting action to link the parts of compounds like *haritrātaḥ* and *harikṛtaḥ* the grammarian says no. There is no need to supply a word when the word (or rather the verbal root) is already there. It is wrong to regard compounds like *haritrātaḥ* as exceptions when they fall under the general rule.

Page 10, lines 14-17.

It should not be objected that coordination means nothing more than being connected with one and the same action [rather than being connected through action with each other]. Because then the compound *asūryampaśyāḥ* ['those who never see the sun, viz. the king's harem.'] would not be an uncoordinated compound. If this is what you wish, then you will be faced with the difficulty that a compound such as *kṛtasarvamṛttikaḥ* could be formed out of the words *kṛtaḥ sarvo mṛttikayā* [wholly made of earth]. If you argue

that there is no rule to prescribe such a compound, we may contradict you by [pointing to] the existence of the rule *saha supā* [2.1.4] otherwise [viz. if this rule is not accepted as a general rule], no uncoordinated compound could be formed for want of a prescribing rule.

Notes. The Mīmāṃsaka furnishes a new definition of co-ordination. The example which is usually given to justify the definition is the dvandva compound. In the sentence *Caitramaitrau gacchataḥ*: "Caitra and Maitra go," Caitra and Mitra, it is said, are not directly connected with each other, but are both connected with the same action of going, which is expressed outside the compound. If one can bring in from the outside the sense of action in these cases to connect the members of a compound, why not bring in the sense of action by supplying it from outside in a compound like *haritrātaḥ*?

Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa does not here explain the case of dvandvas, but the grammarian's explanation is that the parts of a dvandva are co-ordinate by conjunction and not by action. What Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa does is to point out the impossibilities to which the new definition of the Mīmāṃsaka would lead. *Asūryampaśyāḥ* which is traditionally regarded as an irregular compound, would become regular, for the two members, *nañ* (the negative prefix) and *sūrya* ('sun') are both connected with the same action of seeing. One could form such a compound as *kṛtasarvamṛttikaḥ*, for both *sarva* and *mṛttikā* are connected with the action of making.

Of course, to form a compound it is necessary not only that the parts be co-ordinate but that there be a rule to prescribe the formation. However, if the Mīmāṃsaka objects that there is no rule to prescribe *kṛtasarvamṛttikaḥ*, one may furnish the favorite catchall *saha supā* (2.1.4). This means "[A noun ending in a *sup* suffix may be compounded] with a noun ending in a *sup* suffix." This is the rule which governs all irregular compounds.

In other words, what prevents the formation of *kṛtasarvamṛttikaḥ* is not lack of prescriptive rule, but lack of co-ordination among the components.

Page 10, lines 17-24.

Furthermore, if productive operation were taken as the denotation of the *tiñ* suffixes then we would have the usage *ghaṭam bhavati* ('the pot [accusative] comes into being') just as we have the usage *ghaṭam bhāvayati* ('he brings the pot into being'), since [in both cases] the pot [by the Mīmāṃsā definition] must be the object, as being the substratum of the result denoted by the root. You cannot explain the failure to use the accusative

case ending [in *ghaṭo bhavati*] by saying that the pot is here an agent as being the substratum of the activity denoted by the *tiñ* suffix and the office of object is ruled out by the office of agent, because if you define agenthood as 'being the substratum of the activity denoted by a *tiñ* suffix,' then, in the sentence *pācayati devadatto viṣṇumitreṇa* ('Devadatta makes Viṣṇumitra cook') the instrumental case ending would not be appended to the word *viṣṇumitra*, since Viṣṇumitra will not be the agent. Again, in the sentence *grāmam gamayati devadatto viṣṇumitram* (Devadatta makes Viṣṇumitra go to the village') *grāmam* (village) would not be the object of the action of going, since Viṣṇumitra would not be the agent. Similarly the usage *grāmāya gamayati devadatto viṣṇumitram* ('Devadatta makes Viṣṇumitra go to the village') would not be correct because the rule *gatyarthakarmani dviṭīyācaturthyau ceṣṭāyām anadhvani* (Pāṇ. 2.3.12) prescribes the dative for the object of the verb.

Notes. Cf. notes on page 6, lines 17-21 for the explanation of the first four lines.

The grammarians raise the difficulty against the Mīmāṃsakas that they cannot define agenthood in such a way as to be applicable to all agents. If the Mīmāṃsakas define the term agent as *ākhyātārthavyāpārāśraya*: 'the substratum of an activity denoted by a *tiñ* suffix,' their definition will fail to apply to the instigated agent (*prayojyakartṛ*) in a causative sentence. The Mīmāṃsakas will have to admit that in causative sentences the *tiñ* suffixes denote the activity belonging to the instigator agent (*prayojakakartṛ*) and not to the instigated agent because the number denoted by the *tiñ* suffix in the causative agrees with the instigator agent, and the Mīmāṃsakas admit that the meanings number and productive operation denoted by the *tiñ* suffixes are construed with one and the same meaning, viz. agent. Thus, if the number in the causative agrees with instigator agent, then the activity denoted by the *tiñ* suffix must be construed with the instigator agent. Now, if the *tiñ* suffixes denote the activity belonging to the instigator agent then the definition *ākhyātārthavyāpārāśraya* will fail to apply to the instigated agent. Thus, in the causative sentence, the instigated Viṣṇumitra cannot be considered as agent and consequently the word *viṣṇumitra* cannot be used in the instrumental case, since this is prescribed only for the meanings agent and instrument by the rule *kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā* [2.3.18].

With the grammarians the above difficulty does not arise, for they define agenthood as *dhātvarthavyāpārāśraya* ('being the substratum of an activity denoted by the verbal root'). The grammarians say that the causative root denotes two activities, that of which the instigator is the

agent and that of which the instigated is the agent. The causative sentence *pācayati devadatto viṣṇumitreṇa* is analyzed as *viklitty-anukūlavyāpārānukūlavyāpārāḥ*: ‘an activity favourable to the activity which is in turn favourable to the [result, viz.] the becoming soft of food.’ Here the causative root *pāci* denotes both activities. The instigator agent Devadatta is the substratum of the second activity as expressed in the Sanskrit analysis and the instigated Viṣṇumitra is the substratum of the first. The Mīmāṃsakas cannot define agenthood in this way, for they do not admit activity to be denoted by the verbal root.

The grammarians put forth another difficulty: that in the sentence *grāmāya gamayati devadatto viṣṇumītram* (‘Devadatta makes Viṣṇumitra go to the village’) according to the Mīmāṃsaka theory the village cannot be an object, because object (*karmakāraka*) is defined by Pāṇini as that which is most desired to be obtained by the agent through his action (*kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*, 1.4.49). Thus, the office of object is dependent upon the office of agent. As shown above, the person instigated, viz. Viṣṇumitra, according to the Mīmāṃsaka cannot be the object. Granted that Devadatta is an agent, still the village cannot be called an object by the reference to the agenthood of Devadatta, for the village is the substratum of a result produced by an activity residing in *Viṣṇumitra*.

A similar objection to the Mīmāṃsaka's theory arises from consideration of the sentence *grāmāya gamayati devadatto viṣṇumītram*, where the meaning is the same as before: “Devadatta makes Viṣṇumitra go to the village.” Here the dative form *grāmāya* would be impossible by the Mīmāṃsaka theory. The rule *gatyarthakarmani dvitīyācaturthyau ceṣṭāyām anadhvani* (2.3.12) states that the object of a root denoting the sense of going may be put in either the dative or the accusative when the action of going is physical and the object is not a road. This rule allows the dative to be used for the object of the action of going. But *grāma* (village) in the test sentence cannot be placed in the dative by the Mīmāṃsakas since, for the reasons stated above, it cannot be called an object.

Page 10, lines 24-25.

By this the theory is ruled out that in the causative verb both [actions, viz. the action residing in the instigator and that residing in the instigated] are denoted by the *tiṃ* suffix and that therefore both Devadatta and Yajñadatta are agents, being substrata of [activities denoted by] this [*tiṃ* suffix].

Notes. It is not clear what is meant by *etena* (‘by this’). One suspects that a sentence has fallen out, for neither the preceding nor the

following argument can be understood, without forcing, to rule out the suggested theory.

The simplest argument to rule out the theory would be one based on the argument of number. In the sentence *devadattaḥ putrān grāmam gamayati*: “Devadatta causes his sons to go to the village,” it would seem impossible to have the sons, who are plural, substrata of activity denoted by a singular suffix.

The commentators suggest other arguments. The *Darpaṇa*, using the sentence *devadatto viṣṇumitraḥ grāmam gamayati* argues that if the *tiṇ* suffix denotes the activity of Viṣṇumitra as well as of Devadatta *viṣṇumitra* would be used in the nominative as *devadatta* is. Harirāma Kāle in his *Kāśika* seeks to justify the use of *etena* by offering an argument which can be attached to the preceding sentence. In *grāmāya gamayati devadatto viṣṇumitraḥ*, under the suggested theory, *grāma* could not be used in the dative. The reason is that Viṣṇumitra is now the substratum of an activity denoted by a *tiṇ* suffix which is appended to a causal stem *gamaya* whereas the dative is prescribed by Pāṇini 2.3.12 for the object most desired by the agent of the (non-causative) action of going. In other words the dative suffix can be appended only to a *gacchatikarma* not to a *gamayatikarma*.

Page 10, lines 25-27.

Furthermore, to his definition “[action] denoted by a *tiṇ* suffix” the Mīmāṃsaka must add “which [action] is [denoted] in that [particular sentence].” Accordingly, in such sentence as *devadattaḥ paktā* (‘Devadatta [is] one who cooks’), since there is no *tiṇ* suffix, Devadatta could not be an agent.

Notes. The necessity for the Mīmāṃsaka addition arises as follows. In the sentence *devadatto ghaṭam karoti* (‘Devadatta makes a pot’), if agent is defined as *ākhyātārthavyāpārāśraya* (see above), the pot will become an agent, for the pot is a substratum of activity denoted by a *tiṇ* suffix in other sentences, e.g. *ghaṭo vidyate* (‘a pot exists’). The addition *tasmin prayoge*: “which action is denoted in that particular sentence” removes this difficulty but leads to another. In *devadattaḥ paktā* there would be no agent, for a *tiṇ* suffix is not used in that particular sentence. If the Mīmāṃsaka supplies the verb *astī* in order to make Devadatta an agent, this will make Devadatta an agent of the action of being, not an agent of the action of cooking.

Page 10, lines 27-30; Page 11, lines 1-3.

By the words ‘furthermore’ etc. [the author of the verse] denies that the above discussed theory [that the root denotes activity] is a fancy invented by himself, by showing as its proof of validity that

a rule [of Pāṇini's] would be impossible [without it]. The rule *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ*: [1.3.1] defines the term [and establishes the office of] verbal roots. In the rule the portion *bhūvā* is a copulative compound to be analyzed as *bhū* (to become) and *vā* (to blow). [The part] *ādī* [in the compound *bhūvādayaḥ*] is an *ekasēṣa* [a word formed from two similar words of which one is retained and the other dropped] formed from the two words, *ādī* denoting the sense 'terminus' and *ādī* denoting the sense 'type'. From these [parts is formed] a bahuvrīhi compound meaning 'those [verbal entities] of which *bhū* is the terminus and *vā* is the type. Thus, the rule means: "everything beginning with *bhū* etc. and similar to *vā* are verbal roots." And that [viz. similarity] is [to be understood as] in respect to the property of denoting action. Accordingly, the full meaning is: "that which is denotative of action and is included in the traditional list (*Dhātupāṭha*) that begins with *blū*, is verbal root." [The rule is so phrased, for if only [one condition, namely,] being denotative of action were mentioned, the definition [of roots] would be so wide as to apply to [the indeclinables] *hiruk*, *nānā* etc. which are denotative of the action exclusion (*varjana*). That is why [another condition is mentioned, namely,] inclusion in the traditional list beginning with *bhū*.

Notes. Doubtless the original meaning of Pāṇini's sūtra was much simpler, namely, "*bhū* etc. [viz. the morphemes listed in the *Dhātupāṭha*] are roots." But Kātyāyana felt this to be insufficient and tried to supply its deficiencies. Then Patañjali undertook to defend Pāṇini by a reinterpretation of the rule. This reinterpretation, which is very skillful, is that given by Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa above.

(to be continued)

Professor Emeritus of the University of Poona
and General Editor of Sanskrit Dictionary Project
Deccan College Postgraduate & Research Institute
Poona