THE CONCEPT OF *SAÑJÑĀ* ACCORDING TO THE EARLY VAIŚEṢIKAS

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The word '*sañjñā*' is a highly technical term. But it is used in different senses among various systems of philosophy. For example, it is used in the sense of 'representation as the first step for the verbalization of a cognition' by Vasubandhu a Buddhist, who in his *Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya* defines the collection of components (*skandha*) called '*sañjñā*' as follows:

> "<The essence of *sañjñā* is apprehension of images.> (1.14c'd) Apprehension of all possible images such as 'blue,' 'yellow,' 'long,' 'short,' 'female,' 'male,' 'friend,' 'enemy' 'pleasure,' 'pain' and so on is the collection of components called *sañjñā*."[1]

But, for the early Vaiyākaraṇas it is in the primary sense 'a technical or proper name' for describing their system of grammar.[2] On the other hand, according to the *Nyāsa* on the *Kāśikāvṛtti* on *Pāṇinisūtra* V.1.119, the ground for the application of a word (*śabdānāṃ pravṛttinimittam*) is of four types: *jāti*, *guṇa*, *kriyā* and *sañjñā* (or *yadṛcchā*). The term '*sañjñā*' of this type means 'the ground for the use of a conventional, technical or proper name.'[3]

The usage of the term '*sañjñā*'' by the Vaiśeṣikas is considerably different from that of the Vaiyākaraṇas. For example, as is shown clearly by Vātsyāyana a Naiyāyika,[4] the term '*sañjñā*' means '(any)

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[1] <*sañjñā nimittodgrahaṇātmikā*> (1.14c'd) *yāvan nīlapītadīrghahrasvastrīpuruṣamitrāmitra-sukhaduḥkhādinimittodgrahaṇam asau sañjñāskandhaḥ.*

[2] Cf. S.M. Katre, *Dictionary of Pāṇini* (Pune: Deccan College, 1968-69): 1. a nomen proprium, 2. a technical or conventional term. Cf. also K.V.Abhyankar, *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar* (Baroda: Oriental Institute,1986): (1) a technical term; a short wording to convey ample sense; a term to know the general nature of things; convention. (2) knowledge.

[3] The remaining three, namely, *jāti*, *guṇa* and *kriyā* are the grounds for the use of a noun, an adjective and a verb respectively. Cf. K.V. Abhyankar, *ibid.*, "*saṃjñāśabda* (i) one of the four divisions of words, *jātiśabda*, *guṇaśabda*, *kriyāśabda* and *saṃjñāśabda*. The *saṃjñāśabda* is also called *yadṛcchāśabda* a word forming the name of a thing by virtue of a convention ⋯ (ii) Technical terms in a Śāstra ⋯."

[4] *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.6: *asya gavayaśabdaḥ sañjñeti sañjñāsañjñisambandhaṃ pratipadyata iti.* Cf. *Tarkasaṅgraha* [58] : *sañjñāsañjñisambandhajñānam upamitiḥ.*

word' or '(any) name' for the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. But it does not so for the early Vaiyākaraṇas.

The present paper intends to clarify the usage of the term '*sañjñā*' by the *Daśapadārthī* of Candramati and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* of Praśastapāda, and show the difference between the two usages. I stand on the hypothesis that Candramati flourished much before Praśastapāda and a little later or around Vātsyāyana's time, and that Praśastapāda floulished after Bhartṛhari while Candramati flourished before Bhartṛhari.[5]

1. Candramati on *sañjñā*s of ether, space and time

The term '*sañjñā*' appears only once in the *Daśapadārthī*. It runs as follows:

"*viśeṣo dravyeṣu vartamāna ekadravyāśrito 'nyavyāvṛttibuddhihetur etadvyaktibuddhihetur ākāśadikkāleṣu vartamāna ākāśādisañjñāhetur nityo 'kāryo nirguṇo niṣkriyo nirbhāgo 'nyatra sattāśaktyaśakti-sāmānyaviśeṣaviśeṣebhyaḥ samaveto 'nekaḥ.* [238]"[6]

It can be translated as follows:

"A particular exists in [eternal] substances, has one [eternal] substance as its locus, is the cause of the cognition, namely, '[This is] exluded from any other [substance],' is as well the cause of cognition, namely, 'This is represented as it is,' is the cause of the names 'ether' and so on being present in ether, space and time, is eternal, is a non-product, is without quality, action and part, inheres in those [categories of entities] whose exceptions are the highest universal, potentialities, non-potentialities, particular universals and particulars, and is plural."

Earth, water, fire, air, soul and mind have particular universals (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*), namely, earthness, waterness, fireness, airness, soulness and mindness respectively. On the other hand, ether, space and time do not have particular universals because they are single.

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[5] Cf. my forthcomming book (its temporary title is *The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Early Vaiśeṣikas*).

[6] See the Appendix (*The Daśapadārthī* of Candramati -- A translation with a reconstructed Sanskrit text, notes and a critical edition of the Chinese version) of *ibid.*. The translation of this passage and a note thereon by Dr. H. Ui (H. Ui, ed. by F.W. Thomas, *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārtha-śāstra, Chinese text with introduction, translation and notes.* 2nd Ed. Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1962 [1st Ed., 1917]) are the product of misunderstanding.

That is to say, there dose not exist etherness (*ākāśatva*), spaceness (*diktva*) or timeness (*kālatva*) as a universal. As can be seen below, Praśastapāda asserts that the names for six kinds of substances are prompted by their own lower universals. Even the term '*ākāśa*' is prompted by an attribute called '*ākāśatva.*' However, the attributes like *ākāśatva* are not genera (*jāti*), but mere individual attributes (*upādhi*).

Names play a role to distinguish one thing from the others and at the same time to identify the thing for which it stands. Particularity of Candramati lies in the fact that he prepares a list of terms related to the categories, defines them and uses them as per those definitions unlike Praśastapāda who many times uses undefined terms. For Candramati, the cause of congnition which distinguishes the locus of something from others is nothing but a particular. His another definition of the category of particular is as follows:

> "*ko viśeṣapadārthaḥ? yo nityo dravyeṣu vartamāna ekadrvyāśritas tadvyāvṛttibuddhihetur etadvyaktibuddhihetuś ca sa eva viśeṣapadārtha ity ucyate.*"[68] (What is the category of particular? That which is eternal, exists in [eternal] substances, has one substance as its locus, is the cause of the cognition, namely, '[This is] excluded from that (any other thing)' and is as well the cause of the cognition, namely, 'This is represented as it is' is called the category of particular.)[7]

In other words, Candramati thought that ether, space and time are named after particulars which exist in them. Thus, particulars of ether, space and time are the prompting factors of the terms '*ākāśa*,' '*diś*' and '*kāla.*'

However, here arises a serious question as to why the names for the other substances are not prompted by their particulars. A particular exists in every eternal substance. How is it that ether, space and time belong to one group and the rest to another group? What could be the criterion to distinguish one group from the other? Praśastapāda's explanation, which we shall see in the next section, can be considered to be the answer to this question.

2. Praśastapāda on *sañjñā*s of ether, space and time

The *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (*Ākāśa-nirūpaṇa*) states thus:

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[7] Cf. K. Miyamoto, *op. cit.*

"Ether, time and space, as they are single, do not have lower universals. Thereupon, three technical names, namely, 'ether,' 'time,' and 'space,' are [given to them]." (*ākāśakāladiśām ekaikatvād aparajātyabhāve pāribhāṣikyas tisraḥ sañjñā bhavanti. ākāśaḥ kālo dig iti.*)

According to Śrīdhara, while names denote their referents through the convention (*saṅketa*), they are of two kinds: technical names (*pāribhāṣikī sañjñā*) like a proper name such as 'He is Devadatta' and names which are prompted by respective grounds (*naimittikī sañjñā*).[8] That the prompting factors of the names for substances such as earth, water, fire, air, soul and mind are the lower universals existing in them is evident from Praśastapāda's following statements:

"*pṛthivītvābhisambandhāt pṛthivī.*"(*Pṛthivī-nirūpaṇa*)[9]
"*aptvābhisambandhād āpaḥ.*" (*Jala-nirūpaṇa*)
"*tejastvābhisambandhāt tejaḥ*"(*Tejo-nirūpaṇa*)
"*vāyutvābhisambandhād vāyuḥ.*"(*Vāyu-nirūpaṇa*)
"*ātmatvābhisambandhād ātmā.*"(*Ātma-nirūpaṇa*)
"*manastvayogān manaḥ*"(*Mano-nirūpaṇa*)

Udayana is not eager about this problem. But Vyomaśiva presents an interesting interpretation. It is as follows:

"Then, why are they technical? It is because [ether, time and space] do not have their own grounds such as substance, quality or action.[10]
[Opposition:] Aren't there grounds such as etherness and so on which have the feature of universals?
[Answer:] Therefore, [Praśastapāda] mentioned "[they] do not have lower universals." Since etherness, timeness and spaceness have singular loci and since they do not exist in more than one locus, they cannot be treated as lower universals compared to substanceness ….

Therefore, the name 'ether,' which has been handed down to us through the stream of the beginningless time, is not possible [to be applied] to anything else. This is characteristic [of the name 'ether'] because it is uncommon [to others]. This is obtained to be a qualifier by implication. Thus, ether is differentiated from others because it is the referent of the word 'ether' which has been handed down to us through the stream of the beginningless time. However, those such as

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8 *ākāśasya kālasya diśaś caikaikatvād aparajātir nāsti tasya vyaktibhedādhiṣṭhānāt. aparajātyabhāve cākāśa iti kāla iti dig iti tisraḥ sañjñāḥ pāribhāṣikyo na pṛthivyādisañjñāvad aparajātinaimittikya ity arthaḥ. sañjñaiṣām itaravaidharmyaṃ yasyāḥ sañjñayā vinā nimittena śṛṅgagrāhikatayā saṅketaḥ sā pāribhāṣikī yathāyaṃ devadatta iti. yasyāḥ punar nimittam upādāya saṅketaḥ sā naimittikīti vivekaḥ.*

9 *Vyomavatī* lacks this sentence.`

10 The word 'universal' should be added to here according to the argument below.

earth and so on which are not differentiated from others, namely, from those other than ether and so on are not so. But ether, unlike them, is differentiated from others.

[Objection:] [It is] not possible at all [to say that the name 'ether,' 'time' or 'space' is] a technical name. Because the very absence of four kinds of grounds [for the application of names] is the ground. Suppose where any ground such as substance, quality, action or universal is not possible for some [name for something], there alone the absence of those grounds can be the ground for the application of such a name, but not in other cases.

[Answer:] You are not right. Because what is intended here is the ground such as of the cognition of associatedness with such a name. As there is an expression like '[He] has a stick' ('He is associated with a stick') which is associated with substance, quality or universal, such is not the case of the expression 'This is ether' and so on. As it cannot be said to be associated with the absence of them, the names ['ether,' 'time' and 'space'] are technical."[11]

This argument of Vyomaśiva makes us aware of two points. First, Vyomaśiva presents an interesting information about the ground for the application of a name. He enumerates four kinds of ground (*nimittacatuṣṭaya*). They are as follows: substance, quality, action and universal. Such a way of enumeration reminds us of that of the Vaiyākaraṇas on the grounds for the application of a word referred to above.

Now, let's turn our eyes to his illustration of the expression 'He is associated with a stick.' The original Sanskrit text runs '(*ayaṃ puruṣo*) *daṇḍī*,' of which literal transration is 'This man is stick-possessing.' Vyomaśiva says that such an expression is associated with substance, quality or universal. This is also the illustration of the cognition of the qualified (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) as given by the Vaiśeṣikas around the time of Vyomaśiva.[12] That is to say, the cognition 'This man has a stick' is not

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[11] *atha kasmād imāḥ pāribhāṣikyaḥ? dravyaguṇakarmātmakasya nimittasyābhāvāt. athākāśatvādi sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ nimittaṃ bhaviṣyatīty āha aparajātyabhāva iti. aparā hi jātiḥ dravyatvā-pekṣayākāśatvakālatvadiktvarūpā. sā tu na sambhavaty eva, ākāśāder ekatvāt sāmānyasya ca nānādhiṣṭhānād iti ⋯ tathā cākāśam iti sañjñā anādikālapravāhāyattā nānyatra sambhavatīty asādhāraṇatvāl lakṣaṇam. etac ca viśeṣaṇam arthāl labhyate. tathā hy ākāśam itarasmād bhidyate anādikālapravāhāyātākāśaśabdavācyatvāt, yas tv itarasmād anākāśāder na bhidyate, na cāsāv evam, yathā kṣityādi, na ca tathākāśas tasmād bhidyate iti. nanu pāribhāṣikyaḥ sañjñāḥ na sambhavanty eva nimittacatuṣṭayābhāvasyaiva nimittatvād iti cet. tathā hi -- yatra dravyaguṇakarma-sāmānyātmakaṃ nimitaṃ na sambhavati tatraiva pravartate nānyatreti tadabhāvo nimittam. naitad evam. svānuraktapratyayahetor nimittasyātra vivakṣitatvāt. yathā hi dravyaguṇasāmānyānurakto daṇḍītyādivyavahāraḥ tathā ca nāyam ākāśādivyavahāras tadabhāvānurakta iti pāribhāṣikya iti.*

[12] For example, *Nyāyakandalī* (on *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa*): *viśiṣṭatā ca svarūpātiriktāṇy eva yā daṇḍīti jñāne pratibhāsate na khalu tatra puruṣamātrasya pratītir nāpi daṇḍasaṃyogamātrasya tathā ca*

a cognition of a mere qualificand (*viśeṣya*), namely, a man, but is that of a man who is qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), namely, a stick.

In addition, Vyomaśiva says, "This is obtained to be a qualifier by implication (*etac ca viśeṣaṇam arthāl labhyate*)." The word 'this' means that the name 'ether' invariably denotes the substance called 'ether.' Therefore, in the case of the expression and cognition 'This is ether,' 'etherness'(*ākāśatva*) ought to be the qualifier. But etherness is not a universal because ether is single. This case is quite different from that of 'He has a stick.' That is to say, the expression and cognition 'This is erther,' "is associated with the absence of them," especially with the absence of a universal. To be associated with the absence of a universal is nothing but to be devoid of a universal. Therefore, the names 'ether,' 'time' and 'space' are technical ones. This must be the Vyomaśiva's way of argument on technical names.

Second, Vyomaśiva emphasizes the differentiating function of the names 'ether,' 'time' and 'space.' He says, "Namely, ether is differentiated from others (*itarasmād bhidyate*), because it is a referent of the word 'ether' which has been handed down to us through the stream of the beginningless time." Furthermore, he says that earth and so on are not so, or, that earth and so on are not differentiated from others even though they are the referents of the words 'earth' and so on. Vyomaśiva's intention is probably to maintain that the word 'earth,' for example, denotes those individuals which belong to the class of earth, and that it may denotes this or that pot, that stone, this cow and so on. In this case, 'earth as this pot' is not differentiated from others, namely, from 'earth as that pot' and so on. Thus, we can conclude that, according to Vyomaśiva, the name 'ether' denotes its referent *exclusively by the differentiating function.* 'Differentiation' (*bheda*) resembles 'particular.'

Thus, Vyomaśiva's notion of '*pāribhāṣikī sañjñā*' is not different from Candramati's assertion that an ultimate particular is the ground for the use of the name 'ether' and so on. In other words, Candramati seems to have understood the central point in the context.

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daṇḍīti pratītāv itaravilakṣaṇa eva puruṣaḥ saṃvedyate vailakṣaṇyaṃ cāsya daṇḍopasarjanatvam eva. ata eva viśeṣaṇaṃ vyavacchedakam iti gīyate. daṇḍo hi svopasarjanatāpratipattiṃ puruṣe kurvan puruṣam itarasmād vyavacchinatti. Cf. ibid., loc. cit.: viśeṣaṇaṃ viśeṣyasya svarūpam viśeṣyānurañjakaṃ viśeṣye svopasarjanatāpratītihetur iti yāvat. na cāvidyamānasyānurañjakatvaṃ svopasarjanatāpratītihetutvaṃ yuktam ato na viśeṣyajñānaṃ viśeṣaṇasambandham antareṇa bhavitum arhati viśeṣyajñānaṃ sādṛśyād viśeṣaṇānuraktatvād viśeṣaṇasambandham antareṇa bhavitum arhati.

3. The term *sañjñā* according to the early Vaiśeṣikas

The term '*sañjñā*' appears four times in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. But we cannot deduce from them any definite theoretical viewpoint. On the other hand, the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, I think, presents us a useful information.

Firstly, this term is found in the beginning part of *Uddeśaprakaraṇa* which runs as follows: *tatra dravyāṇi pṛthivyaptejovāyvākāśakāla-digātmamanāṃsi sāmānyaviśeṣasañjñayoktāni navaiveti. tadvyatireke-nānyasya sañjñānabhidhānāt.* In this passage '*sañjñās*' are those which the *Sūtrakāra* used to enumerate his categories of entities. According to the commentaries *sāmānyasañjñā* is the name for 'substance,' while *viśeṣasañjñā* is the name for 'earth' and so on.

Secondly, the term is found in *Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa* which runs as follow: *rūpādīnāṃ sarveṣāṃ guṇānāṃ pratyekam aparasāmānyasambandhād rūpādisañjñā bhavanti.* They are also directly related to the categories.

Similarly, the term is used in *Karmagranthe gamana-nirūpaṇa* which runs as follows: *yatas tūtkṣepaṇādivad viśeṣasañjñayābhihitaṃ tasmād aparaṃ sāmānyaṃ syād iti · · · atha viśeṣasañjñayā kim arthaṃ gamana-grahaṇaṃ kṛtam iti · · · anyathā hi yāny eva catvāri viśeṣasañjñayoktāni tāny eva sāmānyaviśeṣasañjñāviṣayāṇi prasajyerann iti.* Here '*sañjñās*' are also directly related to the categories.

Besides, other names are expressed also by the term '*sañjñā*.' The examples are as follows:

Example 1: *trividhaṃ cāsyāḥ kāryam. śarīrendriyaviṣayasañjñakam.* (*Pṛthivī-nirūpaṇa*; almost the same phrases are found in *Ap*- and *Tejo-nirūpaṇas*.)

Example 2: *kriyābhedād apānādisañjñāṃ labhate.* (*Vāyu-nirūpaṇa*)

Example 3: *śrotraṃ punaḥ śravaṇavivarasañjñako nabhodeśaḥ.* (*Ākāśa-nirūpaṇa*)

Example 4: *digliṅgāviśeṣād añjasaikatve 'pi diśaḥ paramamaha-rṣibhiḥ śrutismṛtilokasaṃvyavahārārthaṃ meruṃ pradakṣiṇam āvartamānasya bhagavataḥ savitur ye saṃyogaviśeṣāḥ lokapāla-parigṛhītadikpradeśānām anvarthāḥ prācyādibhedena daśavidhāḥ sañjñāḥ kṛtāḥ ato bhaktyā daśa diśaḥ siddhāḥ. tāsām eva devatāparigrahāt punar daśa sañjñā bhavanti. māhendrī vaiśvānarī yāmyā nairṛtī vāruṇī vāyavyā kauberī aiśānī brāhmī nāgī ceti.* (*Diṅ-nirūpaṇa*)

Example 5: *panasatvam api panaseṣv anuvṛttam āmrādibhyo vyāvṛttaṃ pratyakṣam eva kevalaṃ tūpadeśābhāvād viśeṣasañjñā-pratipattir na bhavati.* (*Buddhyadhikāre 'nadhyavasāya-nirūpaṇa*)

Example 6: *bhāvanāsañjñakas tv ātmaguṇaḥ.* (*Saṃskāra-nirūpaṇa*)

Among these examples, it is only the name '*panasa* tree' in example 5 that is prompted by a universal and at the same time is that of a *natural* thing. It is to be noted that Praśastapāda had a tendency to denote the technical names by the term '*saṃjñā*.' Such a tendency seems to be reflected in the division of denoting function of a word (*vṛtti*) by the later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. According to them, it is divided into *saṅketa* and *lakṣaṇā* (a secondary denoting function), and the former is subdivided into an eternal function called '*śakti*' and a non-eternal function called '*paribhāṣā*.'[13]

4. Conclusion

Candramati tried to explain the ground for the use of names within his system of philosophy. On the other hand, Praśastapāda, unlike Candramati, adopted another criterion which resembles more Pāṇinian tradition of terminology than that of the Vaiśeṣikas. It may be that Praśastapāda followed such a way because he flourished after a great philosophical grammarian, Bhartṛhari, and that Candramati was satisfied with his own explanation because he flourished before Bhartṛhari. The post-Praśastapāda Vaiśeṣikas and Niyāyikas developed their own way of explanations about linguistic problems. Their explanations, though based on Praśastapāda, kept on becoming different in course of time.

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[13] Cf. Satischandra Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1965, pp. 324-25.

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