

ON THE NATURE OF *PRAMĀṆA*: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN JAYANTABHAṬṬA AND THE VAIBHĀṢIKAS AND YOGĀCĀRINS

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0.0 INTRODUCTION

Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* opined under *Nyāya-sūtra* (= NS) 1.1.1 that the true nature of a thing is decided on the basis of the four components of the act of knowing, namely, the knower, the knowable, the process of knowing and the resultant knowledge (*cataṣṣu evaṁ vidhāsu arthatattvam parisamāpyate*). In my opinion, these are the four components of philosophizing. Ancient Indian philosophers had to pay, naturally therefore, a lot of attention to the discussion on the process of knowing (*pramāṇa*).

The structural depth of ancient Indian analytical thinking was acquired through a dialogue in which the participants were the orthodox philosophers and logicians like the Naiyāyikas on the one side and the Buddhist philosophers and logicians on the other. The result is the illustrious tradition of analytic philosophy and logic called *Prācīna Nyāya*. Had the Buddhist logicians not participated in this dialogue, *Prācīna Nyāya* which includes *Bauddha Nyāya*, would not have acquired such depth. Although this has been accepted beyond doubt and some scholars have been engaged in highlighting this fact, still a lot remains to be done. What is required is a very close study and analysis of the texts of these traditions with an aim to identify the issues which prompted the dialogue so that we have a clear picture of the development of philosophical thinking in ancient India during the period called golden period of Indian philosophy.

In this paper an attempt is made to present the central issues which led the dialogue on the nature of *pramāṇa*. The text taken for the purpose is a portion of the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa.

Jayantabhaṭṭa is a logician of the 9th century A.D. from Kashmir. Although his *Nyāyamañjarī* is called a *vṛtti* on the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama, still it is not a usual commentary on each and every *sūtra* of Gautama. What he has done is that he has selected some *sūtras* only in accordance with the issues in his mind and has presented encyclopaedic discussions on them. Thus, the *Nyāyamañjarī* does not present the view of only one system but it takes into account all the existing view of his time on those particular issues and presents his

own views in conclusion. Thus, it has not remained a text on Nyāya, but has become an encyclopaedia of Indian philosophy.

Here, in this paper, I am going to present Jayanta's definition of *pramāṇa* along with the two views of the two schools of Buddhist philosophy and logic namely, the Vaibhāṣikas and Yogācārins, as presented by Jayanta. The text is being presented here with my own English Translation and Notes.

But before we present the text, let us identify the issues involved behind the notion of *pramāṇa*.

0.1 The Issues

The main issues behind the concept of *pramāṇa* are the following:

- (a) Whether a *pramāṇa* is the producer of *pramā* (a true cognition) or not.
- (b) Whether a producer (*karāṇa*) is different from its result (*phala*) or not.
- (c) The basis of distinguishing the knowledge of *x* from the knowledge of *y*.
- (d) Whether *jñāna* is *sākāra* or not.

The settlement of issues (a) is necessary in order to distinguish a true cognition from a false cognition. The answer to the issue (b) is essential for knowing the process of a true cognition and a false cognition.

We behave with the world around us. For a consistent behaviour it is necessary to acquire discrete knowledge of each object of our behaviour. How to distinguish each cognition? This is what is required to be settled in (c). The solution to this problem is provided by the answers to (d).

In this dialogue, the Buddhists have taken the stand that the nature of *pramāṇa* is *jñāna* or *bodha* knowledge or cognition. This has provoked Jayanta to raise the issue whether a *karāṇa* has to be different from *phala*. If a *jñāna* is the result of a process, the process (*pramāṇa*) has to be different from the result. The Buddhist maintain this by introducing the idea of various aspects of one and the same *jñāna*. The participating Buddhists here are the Vaibhāṣikas and the Yogācārins. The Yogācārins are the *vijñāna-vādins* (Idealists) who think that no knowledge can arise without a form and the form is in the knowledge itself and not outside and hence a knowledge is always *sākāra*. Not only that, it is because the knowledge is *sākāra* one can distinguish one knowledge from the other and one can say that this is the knowledge of *x* and not of *y*. If knowledge is taken as *nirākāra* as the Naiyāyikas (Realists) take, such a distinction cannot be made.

Thus, it can be seen that ultimately the dialogues aims at settling the most important issue whether the world of our behaviour is real or not.

Jayanta, first of all, presents his novel idea of a *pramāṇa*. According to him, a cognition of factors and no factor in isolation can claim to be the most effective means of a valid cognition. It is, therefore, the assemblage or collection of factors of knowledge (*sāmagrī*) which is fit to be called a *pramāṇa*. To him *pramāṇa* is basically a *karāṇa* and since it produces *pramā*, the *pramā* is *phala* and a *karāṇa* and *pramāṇa* have to be different and since *pramā* is knowledge, its producer (*karāṇa*) must be different from it.

In this context Jayanta brings views of other systems of Indian philosophy like, *Mīmāṃsā*, *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism.

Since the *Vijñānavādin*s are the idealists, they have to maintain that the nature of a *pramāṇa* and, that of the *pramā* are *jñāna* itself, although different aspects of knowledge.

We have, therefore, to look at the entire dialogue with these issues in mind. Let us have now a close look at the texts.

1.0 JAYANTA'S TEXT, ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

The English translation is of the *Nyāyamañjarī* (Āhnika I), Mysore edition, 1969, pp. 31-42. The page numbers and the line numbers put in the brackets in each text refer to those of this edition.

1.1 Jayanta's Theory of *pramāṇa*

Text 1 (p. 31, 1-3): *pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇavibhāgasūtram tv avasara-prāptatvād idānīm eva vivriyate --*

pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni //1.1.3//

Translation 1: Since it is order, the *sūtra* which deals with the general definition of *pramāṇa* and its division is being explained now. Perception, Inference, Analogy and Words are the *pramāṇas* i.e. the means of valid knowledge.

Note 1: In the *Nyāyasūtra* (NS) of Gautama there are certain *sūtras* which present the list of items. The listing or mentioning the items is called *uddeśa* (*nāmnā padārthasaṃkīrtanam uddeśaḥ*). And the *sūtras* which do such listing are called *uddeśa-sūtra*. There are some other *sūtras* which are called *lakṣaṇa-sūtras* since they contain definitions of the items given in the *uddeśa-sūtras*. These definitions are of two kinds: (1) general definition (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) and (2) particular definition (*viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa*).

There has to be a sequence between a *uddeśa-sūtra* and *lakṣaṇa-sūtras*. An *uddeśa-sūtra* precedes a *lakṣaṇa-sūtra*. Similarly, there has to be a sequence between a *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sūtra* and *viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa-sūtra*. The *viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa-sūtra* must follow a *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sūtra*.

In other words, the general definition must precede a particular definition.

There are, similarly, some *sūtras* which are called *vibhāga-sūtras* containing division of a particular item.

Thus, for instance, the item *pramāna* 'means of valid cognition' is mentioned in the *uddeśa-sūtra* (NS 1.1.1) and the division of this item is presented in NS 1.1.3.

Similarly, there is another category of *sūtras* in the NS, which is called *parīkṣā-sūtra* 'an examining rule'. A *parīkṣā-sūtra* examines whether a definition presented by a *lakṣaṇa-sūtra* is actually applicable to an item or thing defined or not.

In the preceding section Jayantabhaṭṭa has already explained the meaning of NS 1.1.1 and he has said that he is going to concentrate on the *lakṣaṇa-sūtras*. The first item of the NS 1.1.1 is *pramāna*. So he wants to discuss the general definition of *pramāna* and its subdivisions such as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, and *śabda* and their particular definitions. Therefore, he thinks that the discussions on the general definition of *pramāna* and its divisions is quite in order. In other words, this is the proper occasion to discuss the general definition of *pramāna* which forms the first item in the *uddeśa-sūtra* (NS1.1.1).

Text 2 (p. 31,5-6): *atredaṃ tāvad vicāryate -- kiṃ pramāṇam nāma? kim asya svarūpam? kiṃ vā lakṣaṇam iti? tataḥ sūtram yojayisyate.*

Translation 2: Here, let us discuss the following questions: What is a means of valid knowledge? What is its nature? What is its definition? And then will follow explanation of the *sūtra*.

Note 2: The NS 1.1.3 is *vibhāgasūtra* which divides *pramāna* into four. But there is no *sūtra* which provides the general definition of *pramāna*, which was expected. What is necessary is one should first of all know the general definition of an item and then one can follow its division. Without providing a general definition of a *pramāna* the NS 1.1.3 straight way provides the division of it as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*.

In order to know the general notion of *pramāna*, Jayanta formulates three questions. These three questions aim at knowing the general definition of *pramāna*, which should reflect upon two aspects: (1) the nature of *pramāna* and (2) distinguishing features of *pramāna* which characterize and distinguish it from what is not *pramāna*. The word *lakṣaṇa* has two aspects: (a) *surūpa* i.e. form and (b) *vyāvartakatva* 'distinguishing aspect'. Therefore, a *pramānalakṣaṇa* should throw light on these two aspects.

Text 3 (p. 31,8-11): *tad ucyate -- avyabhicāriṇim asandigdham arthopalabdhiṃ vidadhatī bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam. bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī hi tasya svarūpam. avyabhicārādiviśeṣaṇārthopalabdhisādhanatvaṃ lakṣaṇam.*

Translation 3: The questions raised above can be answered as follows :

A *pramāṇa* is an assemblage of factors which are of the nature of both knowledge and non-knowledge which produce infallible or non-illusive and undoubtful knowledge of things. An assemblage which is of the nature of knowledge and non-knowledge, is the nature of *pramāṇa*. Being the means of infallible and undoubtful knowledge of things is its definition-(part).

Note 3: The nature of *pramāṇa* is such that it consists of knowledge and non-knowledge. In other words, since the collection or assemblage of factors is *pramāṇa*, some of its factors are of the nature of a cognition or knowledge and some others of the nature of non-knowledge. Let us look at the epistemology of a perceptual cognition. As Vātsyāyana, the Bhāṣyakāra of the NS, puts it under NS 1.1.4: *ātmā manasā saṃ-yujyate, manah indriyeṇa, indriyam arthena, tataḥ pratyakṣam.*

When the soul (the cognizer) comes in contact with the mind (the internal sense-organ), and when the mind comes in contact with the external sense-organ (eyes etc.) and when the external sense-organ comes in contact with the object, there arises a perceptual cognition.

In this process of perceiving (say, a pot), before the resultant cognition namely, 'This is a pot' arises, the perceiver must have the knowledge of the qualifier namely 'the potness' before the resultant knowledge. Because without the knowledge of the qualifier the knowledge of the qualified cannot arise. Thus, this knowledge of the qualifier is also a factor for producing the resultant perception. This factor is of the nature of knowledge. Whereas the soul, mind, sense-organ and pot and their contact, all are of the nature of non-knowledge. This is why, Jayanta says that a *pramāṇa* is a collection of factors some of which may be of the nature of knowledge and some others may be of the nature of non-knowledge.

Cakradhara, the author of the commentary called *Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga* (Edited by Nagin J. Shah, L.D. Institute, Ahmedabad, 1972) comments on the word *bodhābodhasvabhāva* (of the definition of *pramāṇa*) as follows:

bodhābodheti. viśeṣaṇa-jñānāder bodhasvabhāsyā tatra anupraveśāt bodhābodhasvabhāvēty uktam (page 6), since the knowledge of qualifier is of the factors in the collection of factors and since it is of the nature of knowledge, the definition reads as 'the collection of factors which consists of knowledge and non-knowledge'.

This is the form of *pramāṇa* and the distinguishing feature of *pramāṇa* is this that it produces a true cognition. That which produces a false cognition is, therefore, not *pramāṇa*, but a *pramāṇābhāsa*. This is the implication of adjectives 'non-illusive' and 'undoubtful' of the knowledge. Thus, *pramāṇa* is the means of a valid cognition.

Text 4 (p. 31,13-17): *nanu ca pramīyate yena, tat pramāṇam iti karaṇa-sādhanō 'yaṃ pramāṇaśabdah. karaṇam ca sādhatatamam. tamab-arthas cātīśayah. sa cāpekṣikah. sādhakāntarasambhave hi tadapekṣayā'tiśayayogāt kiñcit sādhatatamam ucyate. sāmagrayās caikatvāt tadatiriktasādhakāntarānupalambhāt kim apekṣam asyā atiśayam brūmah.*

Translation 4: Well, the word *pramāṇa* is derived as 'that by which something is known.' Thus it has an instrumental derivative structure underlying. The instrumental case is, again, defined as *sādhatatama* (i.e., that which is the most required in producing the result) and the suffix *tama* means 'most', 'excellence.' This 'excellence' is, again, relative. If there are other cases (*kāraṇas*) in addition to this then alone it can be taken as 'the most helpful' since in that case it can have 'excellence' in comparison to those other cases. But as 'assemblage' is singular in number and- as no other productive factor i.e. additional *kāraṇa* is found, in comparison to what its excellence is to be established?

Note 4: The word *pramāṇa* is derived by adding the suffix *-ana* (*lyuṭ*) to the root *pra-√mā* 'to measure, to know' in the sense of an instrument. Thus, the underlying derivative structure of the word *pramāṇa* is *pramīyate anena* 'by which one knows'. Thus, the sense there is instrumental. And the notion of instrumentality is provided by Pāṇini by defining the instrumental case which runs as *sādhatatamam karaṇam* 'the instrument is that which is the most effective means'. Here the superlative suffix *-tamaP* is meaningful only when there are more than two entities. But if an assemblage or collection of factors or *kāraṇas* is considered to be an instrument, then since the collection is only one, how can the meaning of the superlative suffix be applicable there? So, in comparison to what the collection will be called the most excellent factor or *kāraṇa* and hence the instrument and hence *pramāṇa* ?

The concept of *pramāṇa* as proposed here does not fit into either the common sense view or into the technical notion of an instrumental case of Pāṇini. This is the idea behind the opponent's view.

Text 5 (p. 32,1-4): *api ca kasmin viśaye sāmagryāḥ pramāṇatvam? pramīyamāṇo hi karmabhūto viśayah sāmagrayantarbhūtatvāt sāmagryeveti karaṇatām eva yāyāt. nirālambanās cedānīm sarvapramitayo bhaveyuh, ālambanakāraṇasya cakṣurādivat pramāṇāntahpātivāt.*

Translation 5: Moreover, with respect to what object 'assemblage is to be taken as a means? That which is to be known itself becomes 'assemblage' because it is also included in the 'assemblage.' Thus, object becomes an instrument. In that case every knowledge will be turned objectless, because the object is included in the *pramāṇa* itself like eye etc.

Note 5: After having raised the objection that since nothing is left out of a collection in comparison of which one may call the collection 'most excellent means', the opponent is now showing one by one how the accusative case (*karmakāraka*) is also included in the body of the *karaṇakāraka*. Here, *ālambana* means a *karmakāraka*. In this way nothing is left to be known. As Varadācārya puts it in his commentary on the *Nyāyamañjarī* called *Nyāyasaurabha* (edited by K.S. Varadacharya, Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, 1969): *nirālambanā iti - karmakārakasyāpi sāmāgrīgoṣṭhīniṣṭatvena sāmāgrīyāḥ karaṇatve karmaṇo 'pi karaṇatva-prāptyā katham jñānam karaṇa-ṣayakam syāt iti jñānam nirālambanaṁ prasajyeta ityārthaḥ*. i.e. if the accusative case also is included in the collection of *kārakas*, and if the collection (*sāmāgrī*) is treated as an instrument, the accusative case also becomes an instrumental case, how can there be a cognition in which an instrumental case is an objective case? And since it is not possible, a cognition will have no content and as result a cognition will become contentless or objectless.

The term *ālambana* is a Buddhist term.

Text 6 (p. 32,5): *kaś ca sāmāgrayā prameyam pramimīte? pramātā 'pi tasyām eva līnaḥ*.

Translation 6: Who will cognize the object through assemblage? Even the knower is included in that (assemblage).

Note 6: Here it is shown that if the concept of *pramāṇa* is the collection of all *kārakas*, then even the knower is included in the *pramāṇa* and in that case who remains to know? Text 5 said that there would be no *karma-kārakas* and this text says that likewise there will be no *karṭṭ-kāraka* (agent) also, since everything is included in the assemblage itself. As Varadācārya puts it: *Tathā ca pramātuḥ api karaṇatvam eva, na karṭṭtvam iti bhāvahaḥ* 'thus, a knower too will become an instrument, he will no longer remain as an agent'.

Text 7 (p. 32,6-7): *evaṁ ca yad ucyate 'pramātā pramāṇam prameyam pramītiḥ iti catasṛṣu vidhāsu tattvam parisamāpyate' iti, tad vyāhanyate*.

Translation 7: Thus, the statement (of Vātsyāyana) that "the real nature of things is concluded on the basis of the four components such as the knower, the instrument of knowing, the object (which is to be cognized) and the cognition" is hereby contradicted.

Note 7: This text has a direct reference to the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana. Although it is not a quotation verbatim, still in essence it is a quotation.

The *Bhāṣya* actually read as follows:

Arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā prameyam pramītiḥ ity arthavanti bhavanti. kasmāt? anyatamāpāye arthasya anupapatteḥ. tatra yasya ipsājihāsāprayuktasya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā. sa yena artham pramīnoti tat pramāṇam. yo 'rthaḥ pramīyatīti tat prameyam. yad arthavijñānam

sā pramitiḥ. catasṛṣu evaṁ vidhāsu arthatattvam parisamāpyati. kim punaḥ tattvam? sataḥ ca sad-bhāvaḥ asatś ca asadbhāvaḥ. sad iti gṛhyamānam yathābhūtam aviparītam tattvam bhavanti. asacca asad iti gṛhyamānam yathābhūtam aviparītam tattvam bhavanti (Gaṅgānātha Jha Edn., Chowkhamba Series, 1925, pp.8-11).

That is, once the *pramāṇa* gets associated with the object, the other elements like, the knower, the knowable, and the knowledge also get associated with the object. How? Because in the absence of the most prominent the object cannot be explained. There, one who acts being prompted by the desire to get something or by the desire to get rid of something is called the knower; by what he measures or knows is the instrument of knowing; that which is known is called object of knowledge and the resultant cognition of the knowable is called the knowledge. In this way, the real nature of a thing is decided on the basis of these four components. What is the real nature of a thing? Being positive of what is positive and being negative of what is negative. When a positive is known as positive not otherwise (i.e. not as negative) it is called real and when a negative is known as negative not otherwise (i.e. not as positive) it is called real.

This text provides a frame-work to know something and also decide whether what is known is real or not.

The *Granthibhaṅga* interprets the text of Jayanta as follows: *catasṛṣu vidhāsu iti - tattvam parisamāpyate arthaḥ parisamāpto bhavanti, nādhikāpekṣā upayujyate*, i.e. *tattvam parisamāpyate* means '(the knowing the real nature of) a thing is completed and nothing additional is required'.

In the act of knowing these are the only four components and the act of knowing is complete once the reality of a positive and negative entities is known or arrived at. As a matter of fact, these may be considered as the four components of philosophizing.

Thus, if all the components are reduced to only one i.e. to *pramāṇa*, it will go against the above frame-work suggested by Vātsyāyana. This is the tone of text 7.

Text 8 (p. 32,7-10): *na ca loko 'pi sāmāgrayāḥ karaṇabhāvam anu-manyate tasyāṁ karaṇavibhaktim aprayuñjānaḥ. na hy evaṁ vaktāro bhavanti laukikāḥ, sāmāgrayā paśyāma iti; kin tu dīpena paśyāmaḥ cakṣuṣā nirīkṣāmaha ity ācakṣate.*

Translation 8: Nor do the people approve the instrumentality of 'assemblage,' without the instrumental case-ending added to it. Nor do we meet ordinary people saying we see with 'assemblage,' on the contrary they say 'we see with a lamp,' 'we see with eyes.'

Note 8: After having shown that if *sāmāgrī* is treated as *pramāṇa*, all *kāraka* s will become *karaṇakāraka* and not only that there will be no knowledge and thereby the reality can also not be decided, the

opponent shows in the present text that even the language of common people do not support this view of Jayanta. Had *samagrī* been *pramāṇa*, the word *sāmagrī* would have been treated as *karaṇakāraka* and people would have used it in instrumental form like *sāmagryā*. But no one uses it like this. On the other hand, they use instrumental case-ending after a word denoting single factor and not the collection of factors. Thus, the common men's notion also does not support Jayanta.

Text 9 (p. 32,10-11): *tasmān na sāmagrī karaṇam, akaraṇatvāc ca na pramāṇam iti nedam sādhu pramāṇasvarūpam.*

Translation 9: Therefore, 'assemblage' is not the instrument and since it is not the instrument it cannot be the means of a valid knowledge and thus it is not the actual nature of the means of valid knowledge.

Note 9: This is the conclusion of the *pūrvapakṣa*. The notion of *pramāṇa* involved the notion of instrument and the notion of an instrument cannot be a collection of factors, but only one factor out of many, which may be the most effective means. Therefore, since Jayanta's notion of *karaṇa* is not acceptable, his notion of *pramāṇa* is also not acceptable. His notion is also against all authorities like Pāṇini, Vātsyāyana and common usage. This is what the opponent concluded.

Text 10 (pp. 32,13-33,3): *atrocyate -- yata eva sādhatamam karaṇam, karaṇasādhanaś ca pramāṇasabdah, tata eva sāmagrayāḥ pramāṇatvam yuktaḥ; tadvyatirekeṇa kārakāntare kvacid api tamabarthasamsparsānupapatteḥ. anekakārakasannidhāne kāryam ghatamānam anyataravyapagame ca vighaṭamānam kasmai atīśayam prayacchet? na cātīśayaḥ kāryajanmani kasyacid avadhāryate, sarveṣāṃ tatra vyāpriyamānatvāt.*

Translation 10: We meet the above objections as follows : Because of the very fact that an instrumental case is defined as 'the most helpful case in producing the result' and because of the fact that the word *pramāṇa* is of instrumental derivation, it is but proper to take 'assemblage' alone as the means of valid knowledge. In no other case excepting that (= assemblage) there is any possibility of fitting in of the meaning of the suffix *tamap*. Moreover, when this is the situation that if all the cases are present the result occurs, but the result does not occur even if only one of them is removed to which excellence' can be given? The 'excellence' cannot be given to one when all are equally engaged in producing the result.

Note 10: Here Jayanta begins replying the objections raised in the *pūrvapakṣa*. Text 10 is a reply to the text 4. Jayanta says that his notion of *karaṇa* is in conforming with that of Pāṇini. He suggests the interpretation of the rule *sādhatamam karaṇam* in the light of his notion of *karaṇa* as *sāmagrī*. He wants to show that 'that' after which a

result follows and in the absence of 'that' the result does not follow is a *karaṇakāraka*. And it is everybody's experience that a result follows only when all the factors required for that result are present and such a result does not follow even if one of those factors is absent. Therefore, the collection of factors alone can be the *karaṇa* to produce that result. No one factor can be singled out to attribute 'excellence' which is the meaning of the superlative suffix *-tama(p)*. Therefore, Pāṇini rule *sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam* will make sense only if the meaning of the superlative suffix *-tama(s)* is attributed to the collection of *kāraka*s and not to any single *kāraka*. Thus, Jayanta's notion is not against the notion of Pāṇini.

Varadācārya also rightly says: *Pratyekam kārakāṇi karaṇāṇi, tat-smudāyaś ca karaṇam iti tu sāram*, i.e. each *kāraka* is merely a factor and the collection of all factors is indeed the *karaṇakāraka*. This is the gist of the argument (of Jayanta).

Text 11 (p. 33,4): *sannipattyajanakatvam atīśaya iti cet?*

Translation 11: One may hold the view that being the product (or a result) being very close to it (i.e., directly without any intervention) is what is called *atīśaya* 'excellence'.

Note 11: The *Granthibhaṅga* paraphrases the text as follows: *anya-kāravavyāpārāvvyavadhīyamānavyāpāratvam sannipatyājanakatvam* (p. 7) 'being the producer (of a result) being very close to it' means 'being the function which is not being intervened by the function of any other *kāraka*'.

But unless the causal complex acquires the nature of being invariably related to the production of the result how can it be called a producer. This nature is obtained only through the collection of factors and not by any one particular factor. This is what Cakradhara says: *phalotpādā-vinābhāvisvabhāvo yāvan na bhavati tāvat katham avaśyatayā kārya-janako bhavet? tadrūpaṁ ca sāmāgrito nānyasya iti*.

Text 12 (p. 33,4-6): *na -- ārād upakārakāṇām api kāratvānapāyāt. jñāne ca janye kim asannipatyajanakam? sarveṣām indriyamano'rthā-dīnām itaretarasamsarge sati jñānanīṣpatteḥ.*

Translation 12: No. He is mistaken; because those which help the bringing out of the result remaining indirectly connected with the object do remain cases (*kāraka*). Moreover, in generating knowledge, being away from the result which can be a productive factor without being connected (i.e. not being closely connected) because knowledge is produced at the mutual contact of all, the sense-organ, the mind, the object etc.

Note 12: It is not the case that every factor directly produces a result. Some may be directly doing so, some other many be indirectly doing so. In the case of, for example, the perception of a jar, the soul is at a distance in comparison to the sense-object contact, still soul is a

necessary factor and hence a *kāra*. The main point, therefore, is this that when all the necessary factors assemble together the result comes into existence and hence the assemblage is the only thing that can be called *pramāṇa*.

Text 13 (p. 33,7): *atha sahasaiva kāryajanam atīśayaḥ*;

Translation 13: Now, if producing the result all at once is taken as 'the excellence.'

Note 13: This refers to the factor at the final stage of a process after which all at once the result emerges. That final factor may be said to possess 'excellence'. For example, suppose, the person is there in the room, he has good eyes, the book is also there, but the room is dark and so after one puts the light one can see the book. In this case, the putting on the light is the final stage of the result of seeing and hence the light may be said to have the 'excellence' and in this situation one may say, *dīpena paśyāmi* 'I see with the light'.

Text 14 (p. 33,7-13): *so 'pi kasyāñcid avasthāyām karaṇasyeva karmaṇo 'pi śakyate vaktum -- yathā aviralajaladhārādhārāprabandhavaddhāndhakāranivahe bahulaniśīthe sahasaiva sphuratā vidyullatā-lokena kāmīñjñānam ādadhānena taj janmani sātīśayatvam avāpyate, evam itarakārakakadambasannidhāne saty api sīmantiṇim antareṇa taddarśanam na saṃpadyate, āgatamātrāyām eva tasyām bhavatīti tad api karmakārakam atīśayayogitvāt karaṇam syāt.*

Translation 14: The same can be attributed like Instrumental to objective case also. Thus, the sudden flash of the lightning in the night of *amāvāsyā* having huge darkness due to the layers of series of dense clouds produces the knowledge of a beautiful woman (i.e. makes her visible) and thereby gets 'the excellence' in producing such a knowledge; but to see her is not possible if the woman is not there even though all other *kāra*s are present there. If she comes then alone seeing (her) is possible. In this way the object (= the woman) will become the instrumental since it possesses 'the excellence.'

Note 14: So all the factors or *kāra*s are equally important. An accusative case also is as important as what is normally known as an instrumental case.

Text 15 (p. 34,1-4): *tasmāt phalotpādāvinābhāvisvabhāvatvam avaśyayatayā kāryajanakatvam atīśayaḥ. sa ca sāmagrayantargatasya na kasyacid ekasya kārakasya kathayitum pāryate. sāmagryās tu so 'tīśayaḥ suvacah. sannihitā cet sāmagrī saṃpannam eva phalam iti saivātīśyavatī.*

Translation 15: Therefore, excellence is that which invariably produces the result and which is of the nature of that without which the result cannot be produced. One of the *kāra*s constituting the assemblage cannot be said to have that excellence. But this

excellence can be easily attributed to 'the assemblage.' In other words, if the assemblage is present the result is as good as accomplished. Therefore, that (assemblage) alone has the excellence.

Note 15: Therefore, excellence has to be seen in terms of production of the result. And a result is never produced by a single *kāraka*. Therefore, the producer of the result is always a collection of factors and hence the collection alone can have the excellence, and not any single *kāraka* in isolation.

Text 16 (p. 34,6-7): *nanu mukhyayoḥ pramāṭṛprameyayor api tadavinābhāvitvam atīśayo 'sty eva.*

Translation 16: Well, the main factors like the knower and knowable too have the excellence of being that without which the result (*pramiti*) cannot be produced.

Note 16: Therefore, the agent and the object will become the instrument if *atīśaya* is defined as *phalotpādāvinābhāvisvabhāvatvam*. This is the implication of the objection.

Text 17 (p. 34,7): *pramitisambandham antareṇa tayos tathātvābhāvāt.*

Translation 17: But without the association with the resultant knowledge they (the agent and the object) cannot be called important or prominent.

Note 17: So, first knowledge should arise and then the role of agent and object may be decided, not before that.

Text 18 (p. 34,7-8): *pramīṇotīti pramātā bhavati, pramīyata iti ca prameyam*

Translation 18: (But the derivative meaning of) the word *pramātā* is one who knows and what is known is called *prameya*.

Note 18: So, before the knowledge arises he is called the knower and the object is called knowable. Thus they are prominent and hence an instrument only.

Text 19 (p. 34,8-13): *satyam etat kintu sākalyaprasādalabdhapramiti-sambandhanibandhanaḥ pramāṭṛprameyayor mukhyasvarūpalābhaḥ. sākalyāpacaye pramityabhāvāt gauṇe pramāṭṛprameye sampadyete. evañ ca sākalyam antareṇa yadi pramītir avakalpeta bhaved vyabhicārah:, na tv asau tathā dṛśyate iti pramityavyabhicārāt sākalyam eva sātīśayam iti tamabarthayogāt tad eva karaṇam.*

Translation 19 (Reply): What you say is true. But the knower and the knowable get prominence when they are related to *pramiti* got through assemblage, and if the assemblage is not there, there is no *pramiti* and therefore, the knower and the knowable become secondary. Thus, without assemblage if *pramiti* were there, your objection would have held water, but such is not the case.

Therefore, since the assemblage is invariably related with the *pramiti*, it alone has excellence and so assemblage alone can be *karāṇa* since it alone has excellence.

Note 19: Here, there is no over-application of the definition of *atiśaya*.

The prominence or subordinateness of a factor should be decide by observing whether the factor is actually involved in producing the knowledge or not. The *Granthibhaṅga* puts it as follows: *tat-kālam pramām akurvannapi योग्यतया यद्द प्रामाता इति भण्यते सा गाुणः, यस्तु तत-कालम एवप्रामा-जानमनि व्यप्रीयते सा मुख्यः. एवम प्रमेयम अपि.*

Text 20 (p. 35,2-4): *yat tu kim apekṣam sāmāgrayāḥ karaṇatvam iti tat antargatakāra-kāpekṣam iti brūmah. kārakāṇām dharmah sāmagrī na svarūpahānāya teṣām kalpate; sākalyadaśāyām api tatsvarūpa-pratyabhijñānāt.*

Translation 20: To the objection that with reference to what 'assemblage' is an instrument, our answer would be: with reference to all *kāraka* cases included in the assemblage. Assemblage is a property of cases. It never destroys their (= of the cases) casehood because even at the time of assemblage we recognize their nature (of being a *kāraka*).

Note 20: This is the answer to text 4. A collection is a property of the collected and at the same time it does not replace the collected.

Text 21 (p. 35,6-8): *nanu samagrebhyaḥ sāmagrī bhinnā cet katham pṛthānopalabhyate? abhede tu sarvakārakāni karaṇibhūtāny eveti karṭrkarmavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgaḥ*

Translation 21: Well, if this assemblage is different from all the cases how is it that it is not cognized separately? And if it is identical with the cases, there is then the contingency of putting an end to the usage of nominative, accusative etc. because, in that case, all the cases would become Instrumental case only.

Note 21: If the collection is a property of the cases as held in text No.20, then one should know whether it is a different from the cases or identical with them. If different, then why should it not be cognized differently? And if identical then all cases turn to be Instrumental cases only, which is an absurdity. This is the purpose of the objection.

Text 22 (pp. 35,8-36,7): *maivam samagrasannidhānākhyadharmasya pratyakṣam upalambhāt. pṛthag avasthiteṣu hi sthālījalajvalana-taṇḍulādiṣu na samagratāpratyayaḥ; samudīteṣu tu bhavātīty atah tantupaṭālaparighaṭitapaṭādyavayavivat kārakakalāpaniṣpādyadravyāntarābhāve 'pi samudāyātmikā sāmagrī vidyata eveti samudāyy-apekṣayā karaṇatām pratipadyate. tasmān na paricodanīyam idaṃ kasmin karmaṇi sāmagrī karaṇam iti. samudāyīṇām sāmagryava-*

sthāyām api svarūpānapāyāt samudāyiviśeṣe karmaṇi sāmagrī karaṇam. ata eva pramiter na nirālambanatvam.

Translation 22: What you have said is not true because the property such as closeness of all the participating cases (i.e. the assemblage) is directly cognized. If the cooking pot, water, fuel, rice etc. are kept in different places hardly one can have the knowledge of assemblage, but one can certainly have that when they (i.e. pot, water, etc.) are assembled together. Therefore, although the assemblage does not produce any other result than the result produced by the group of cases as the threads produce a cloth, still there is certainly the assemblage which is of the nature of collection or group, or totality. Hence it (= assemblage) has the instrumentality in comparison to the cases. Therefore, there is no point in asking with reference to what (*prameya*) assemblage is the instrument. Since the cases involved do not lose their forms even at the time of assemblage, the assemblage is the instrument with reference to a particular object which is one amongst the cases. Therefore, the *pramiti* (valid knowledge) is not without an object.

Note 22: The property of being together is *sāmagrī* which is experienced by all when the cases come together. Thus, *sāmagrī* is not a fictitious thing. Nor is it identical with the cases. Therefore, all the usages of all cases will continue.

Text 23 (p. 35,8-9): *etena pramātrādiḥ pṛthg upadarśita iti vidhācatuṣṭayam api samāhitam.*

Translation 23: In this way, the knower etc. are shown separately. Thus, all the four aspects are hereby maintained.

Note 23: Thus, the basic frame-work of philosophizing is not disturbed.

Text 24 (p. 35,10-12): *yat tv abhyadhāyi sāmagraḥ karaṇavibhaktinirdeśo na dṛśyate iti tatrocya - sāmagrī hi saṃhatih. sā hi saṃhanyamānavyatirekeṇa na vyavahārapadavīm avatarati tena sāmagraḥ paśyāmīti na vyapadeśah.*

Translation 24: To the objection that none uses instrumental case-ending with *sāmagrī* (assemblage), the following is the answer: The word *rī sāmagrī* means collection or assemblage. That (assemblage) never becomes the object of usage without those cases which are being assembled. Therefore, no such usage such as *sāmagraḥ paśyāmi* (I see with the assemblage) is found.

Note 24: This is an answer to text 8.

Text 25 (p. 36,2-3): *yas tu dīpendiyānām tṛtīyānirdeśah, sa phalopajananāvinābhāvisvabhāvatvākhyasāmagrīsarūpasamāropanibandhanaḥ. anyatrāpi ca tadrūpasamāropeṇa sthālyā pacatīti vyapadeśo dṛśyate*

eva. *tasmād antargatakāarakāpekṣayā labdhakaraṇabhāvā sāmāgrī pramāṇam.*

Translation 25: But that we find instrumental case-ending added to *dīpa* (lamp), sense-organ (eye etc.) is due to the imposition of the nature of the assemblage namely the nature of being invariably productive of the result. Similarly, in other cases (i.e. in the case of Locative) by the imposition of its nature to the assemblage) we get the usage *sthālyā pacati* (he cooks by the pot). Therefore, in comparison to the participating cases the assemblage becomes the Instrument and it is the means of valid knowledge.

Note 25: The usage of language is prompted by the intention of a speaker. It is as per that intention a particular role is assigned to an entity. Thus, the role of instrument is assigned to *sthāli* which is in reality a locative case.

Here this has happened due to the superimposition of the notion of instrumentality on a locative. This is a universal phenomenon in language.

After this Jayantabhaṭṭa discusses some other view according to which a *kāraka* other than nominative and accusative which produce the knowledge of a thin, which is neither doubtful nor erroneous is called *karaṇa-kāraka*. But we are not going to discuss it here. Because our aim is to present the Nyāya-Buddhist-controversy on the nature of a *pramāṇa*. Therefore, I present the following texts which present two stand-points of the Buddhist logicians and which have been taken for examination by Jayanta.

1.2 Buddhist Views and Their Refutation

Text 26 (pp. 38,13-39,6): *ye tu bodhasyaiva pramāṇatvam ācakṣate - na sūkṣmadarśinas te. bodhaḥ khalu pramāṇasya phalam, na sāksāt-pramāṇam. karaṇārthābhidhāno hi pramāṇaśabdaḥ, pramīyate aneneti pramāṇam. pramīyata iti ko 'rthaḥ? pramā janyata iti. pramāṇād avagacchāma iti vadanto laukikāḥ karaṇasyaiva pramāṇyam anumanyate. yas tu pramā pramāṇam iti pramāṇaśabdaḥ, sa pramāṇaphale draṣṭavyaḥ. tathā ca saṁśayaviparyayātmakaṁ apramāṇaphalam api jñānam ātmamano 'numāne tad viśeṣaṇārthaparicchede vā viśiṣṭapramājananāt pramāṇatām pratipadyate. avyabhicārādiviśeṣeṇopapannam api jñānam aphalajanakam apramāṇam eva. kevalapramāsvabhāvam pramāṇād vibhinnaṁ phalam iti pratyakṣalakṣaṇe vakṣyāmaḥ.*

Translation 26: Those who take knowledge itself as the means of valid knowledge do not have a critical mind or outlook. Knowledge, in fact, is the result of the means of valid knowledge and not the means itself. The word *pramāṇa* means instrument since it is derived as *pramīyate anena iti* 'by which something is known'. *Pramīyate*, again, means 'knowledge is produced'. Moreover,

people do use such sentences as *pramāṇād avagacchāmaḥ* 'we know by the means of valid knowledge'. Thus, they too accept instrument only as *pramāṇa*. When, however, the word *pramā* (knowledge) is paraphrased as *pramāṇa*, it (i.e. the word *pramāṇa*) means 'the result of *pramāṇa* (i.e. the means of valid knowledge)'. Moreover, even the knowledge which is the result of defective means and even which is the nature of doubt or misapprehension does become the means of valid knowledge with reference to inferring the soul and mind or with reference to determining the qualification of the soul because it produces the knowledge of the qualified object. On the other hand, if a knowledge, which is, although an invariable (i.e. undoubtful) knowledge, does not produce any result, it never becomes the means (of valid knowledge). That the result is different from the means and that it can be of the nature of a valid knowledge also, will be explained when we will discuss the definition of perception.

Note 26: The main issue is this that a valid cognition is produced by a means of valid cognition. In this process, the process or *pramāṇa* has to be different from the result (*phala*) namely, the valid cognition. This is the view of Jayanta. The Buddhists, however, argue that the result itself is *pramāṇa*.

Cakradhara puts it as follows: *yadā karaṇasādhanena pramāṇa-śabdena loke vyavahārah, evaṁ sati phalasya pramārūpasya aprāmāṇyam sidhyati. phala-pramāṇa-pakṣe punaḥ saṁśaya-jñānasya pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa-virahāt yat kvacit siddham prāmāṇyam saṁśayito 'yam arthaḥ. ityādaḥ viśeṣaṇatvena tad hīyate. phalāntarā-janakatvena ca yad aprāmāṇyam akāraḥ phalasya tadapi na parigrhītam bhavati iti tātparyam.*

In other words, we can distinguish a true or a false cognition, if the instrument is treated as different from the result. For the Buddhists' view cf. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (1.8) and the *Vṛtti* thereon, *Nyāyapraveśa* 7 (Baroda edn.) p. 7; *Nyāyabindu* 1.18.21.

Text 27 (p. 39,7): *atha vyatiriktaphalajanakam api bodharūpam eva pramāṇam ucyate*

Translation 27: Even if it is accepted that a means must produce a result which should be different from the means, still *pramāṇa* remains 'of the nature of knowledge' only.

Notes 27: Let the nature of *pramāṇa* remain of the nature of knowledge still one can show the difference by pointing at different aspects of knowledge. Thus, the aspect of revealing the *ākāra* of *jñāna* may be called *phala* and the act of revealing that *ākāra* by the same knowledge may be called *pramāṇa*. Thus, it is said under the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (kārikā 1344): *jñānasya adhigatirūpatvāt sādhyatva-*

pratītir iti phala-tvam upa-caryate. tasyaiva ca viṣayākāra-parigraha-karmaṇā vyāpāreṇa ca saha pratītir iti pramāṇatvam upacaryate.

Text 28 (p. 39,8-9): *tad ayuktam - sakalajagadviditabodhetarasvabhāvaśabdaliṅgadīpendriyādīparihāraprasaṅgāt.*

Translation 28: This is incorrect. If this nature (i.e. the nature of knowledge alone) of *prāmāṇa* is accepted, there would arise a contingency of rejecting the (Instrumentality of) words, probans, lamp, sense-organs etc. which are of the nature of non-knowledge and which are known as Instruments by the whole world.

Note 28: This text presents contradiction of the Buddhist concept of *pramāṇa* with that of common people.

Text 29 (pp.39,9-40,2): *tasmāt sāmāgryanupraviṣṭobodhaḥ viśeṣaṇa-jñānam iva kvacit pratyakṣe, liṅgajñānam iva liṅgīpramitau, sārūpya-darśanam ivopamāne, śabdaśravaṇam iva tadarthajñāne pramāṇatām pratipadyate. ata eva bodhābodhasvabhāvāsāmāgrī pramāṇam ity uktam.*

Translation 29: Therefore, a knowledge when included in the assemblage does become a *pramāṇa* as the knowledge of adjunct in the case of the perception of some possessed of that adjunct, as the knowledge of probans in the case of inferring the probandum, as the observing (knowledge) of similarity in the case of analogy, as the hearing (knowledge) of words in the case of knowing the meaning of those words. That is why, we have said that *pramāṇa* is the assemblage which consists of knowledge and non-knowledge.

Note 29: In all the four processes of knowing some factors involved are of the nature of knowledge and some others of the nature of non-knowledge. For instance, in the process of perception of pot the *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* preceding the *savikalpaka-jñāna* of pot is a factor which is of the nature of knowledge.

Similarly, the process of inferring starts from the knowledge of probans (*hetu*) and so this factor is of the nature of knowledge.

Likewise, the analogical cognition of the relationship between the word *gavaya* and the animal *gavaya* results from the knowledge of similarity and so the factor may be of the nature of knowledge.

Similarly, in the process of verbal understanding the starting point is the perception of a linguistic expression and it is no doubt of the nature of knowledge.

But all the factors involved in the process of knowing are not knowledge. Hence the nature of *pramāṇa* cannot be of the nature of knowledge only. This is the view of Jayantabhatta.

Text 30 (p. 40,4-10): *anye tulyasāmāgrayadhīnayoḥ jñānārthayoḥ grāhyagāhakabhāvam vadantaḥ bodham pramāṇam abhyupāgaman*

kṣaṇabhaṅgiṣu padārtheṣu sahakāryupādānakāraṇāpekṣakṣaṇāntara-santatijananena ca lokayātrām udvahatsu jñānajanmani jñānam upādānakāraṇam, arthaḥ sahakārikāraṇam; arthajanmani ca arthaḥ upādānakāraṇam, jñānam ca sahakārikāraṇam iti - jñānam ca jñānārthajanyam, arthaś ca arthajñānajanyo bhavatīty evam ekasāmagraya-dhīnatayā tam artham avyabharato jñānasya tatra prāmānyam iti.

Translation 30: Some others, again, accept that knowledge and object which depend upon the same assemblage, (means) are mutually related as *grāhya* (which is to be known, the object) and *grāhaka* (which is the means of knowledge) and therefore, knowledge itself is the means (of valid knowledge). (They further elaborate this as follows) .

Objects are momentary. They help the activities of this world by producing a chain of momentary (objects and knowledge) depending on material cause as well as the auxiliary cause. When knowledge is produced, knowledge is the material cause and the object is the auxiliary cause; when object is produced (in the next moment) object is the material cause, knowledge is the auxiliary one. Knowledge is produced by both knowledge as well as object. Similarly, object is produced by both object as well as knowledge. Therefore, knowledge alone is *pramāṇa* there because it is always with the object since it depends on the same assemblage (i.e. means such as knowledge and object).

Note 30: According to Cakradhara, this view refers to the Vaibhāsika school of Buddhist philosophy. According to the Vaibhāsikas a knowledge is without any form (*nirākāra*). As Cakradhara puts it: *ajanako 'pi arthaḥ sahabhāvi-jñānena grhyate iti nirākāra-jñānāvādinām vaibhāsikāṇām darśanam* (p.8) i.e. 'Although an object is not the direct producer of its knowledge, it is cognized by the knowledge which arises along with it - this is the view of the *Vaibhāsika*-philosophy which holds that knowledge is without a form'.

Now the question arises, if a knowledge has no form and if it is also not caused by its object, then how to decide that this is the knowledge of *x* and not of *y*? In order to account for this difficulty, they hold that both, the knowledge and its object depend on both of the previous moment. Since *x* has taken part in the production of its knowledge of the subsequent moment, one can say this is the knowledge of *x* . In the words of Cakradhara, *eka-sāmagry-upannatvena tasyaiva tad grāhakaṃ nānyasya* (p.8).

Similarly, since *y* has not played any part with regard to the production of the knowledge in the subsequent moment, this knowledge cannot be the knowledge of *y*. As the *Granthibhaṅga* puts it: *yathā etad-grahāṇe tulya-sāmagry-adhīnatvam tasya niyāmakam asti, tathā anya-grahāṇe na kiñcit asti* (p.8).

Cakradhara defines the term *upādāna-kāraṇa* as follows: *pūrvabhāvī svasantānagatasadrśakṣaṇaḥ upādānakāraṇam* (p.8) i.e. 'the moment-

entity which precedes the effect and which is a moment-entity similar to the moment-entity of its series is a material cause’.

In support of this definition he quotes *Abhidharmakośa* 2.52ab. Then he defines *sahakāri-kāraṇa* as *tad-anyah sahakāri-kāraṇam* ‘Other than the *upādāna-kāraṇa* is an auxiliary cause’. In support of this he further quotes *Abhidharmakośa* 2.50. [P. Pradān’s edition reads *svato ’nye ...* in the place of *tato ’nye ...*]

Cakradhara also reads another definition of *upādānakāraṇa* of the same school which runs as under: *yad-utpattau yat-santāna-nivṛtṭiḥ tat tasya upādānakāraṇam* i.e. ‘if after the production of *y* the series of *x* has terminated, then *x* is the material cause of *y*.’

But this definition does not work in the present cases because here what is explained is the next member of the same series i.e. the series of knowledge and the series of objects. Thus, the second definition of material cause refers to the case where the effect belongs to the series of another class. Therefore, Cakradhara comments: *tad visadṛśotpādābhiprāyam*, and gives an example to illustrate the point: *tathā hi - ghaṭotpatau mṛt-piṇḍa-santāna-nivṛtṭiḥ, anutpanne hi ghaṭe mṛt-piṇḍa-kṣaṇā eva santānena utpadyante, ghaṭe tu utpanne ghaṭa-kṣaṇā iti*.

In this context one may also compare the *Pramānavārttika* of Dharmakīrti. Jñānaśrīmitra points out: *ekasāmagrījanyatve tu jaḍānubhavayoḥ pratiniyatam vedyatvam vedakatvaṃ ca syāt. tatpratibandhāt ca nātiprasaṅgaḥ* (p.421) ‘i.e. if both are produced by both, then they will be always i.e. at every moment ‘a revealer and revealed’. Since difference is introduced in the material and auxiliary causes, such a contingency will not arise’.

Text 31 (p. 40,11-12): *tad idam anupapannam - aphaḷajanakasya pramānatvānupapatter ity uktatvāt.*

Translation 31: What you say is uncogent, because (if your view that knowledge alone is the means is accepted then) there will arise a contingency of taking even that knowledge as *pramāna* which does not produce any result. We have already pointed out this before.

Note 31: Jayanta points to his argument in text No.26.

Text 32 (p. 40,12-16): *api ca karmaṇi jñānaṃ pramāṇam iṣyate. yathoktam - ’savyāpāram ivābhāti vyāpāreṇa svakarmaṇi’ iti. sa cāyam arthakṣaṇo jñānasamakālaḥ tataḥ pūrvābhyāṃ jñānārthakṣaṇābhyāṃ upajanita iti tatkarimatāṃ pratipadyatām, na punaḥ svasamānakālaprasūtajñānakṣaṇakarmatām iti.*

Translation 32: Moreover, with reference to an object you want to take (mere) knowledge is the means, as you, yourself, have said in the *Pramānavārttika* that knowledge (which is of the form of reflection of an object) by intermediate course (i.e. by invariably revealing the objects) appears to be as if it has function with

reference to its own object. Therefore, as this (second) momentary object which is the first knowledge is produced by the immediately preceding momentary knowledge and object, but it (the second *arthakṣaṇa*) be the object of the first momentary knowledge and not (of that which has come into existence simultaneously with it).

Note 32: Jayanta points out that if the Buddhist view is accepted then the *viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva* between an object and its knowledge is difficult to be shown. Every thing is momentary so if a thing has to be object of a cognition it requires at least two moments: coming into existence in the first moment and then becoming the object in the second moments. How can it be accepted by the *kṣaṇabhāṅgavādin* ?

The *Granthibhaṅga* points out another difficulty. It says that the question by Jayanta is from the *Pramāṇavārttika* in the context of arguing in favour of *sākāra-jñāna* and hence it may not apply to them. To this Cakradhara thinks that even the *nirākāra-jñānavādin* Vaibhāṣika will have to accept that there is *grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva* relation between an object and its cognition. If they do not accept this position, they will have to give up their own theory *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda* and will have to adopt the *yogācāra*-position of *sākārajñānavāda*. In the words of Cakra-dhara, *evam ca vaibhāṣika-mata idaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ kathaṃ saṅgacchate? satyam kintu svasmin viṣaye jñānasya prāmāṇyam tair api iṣyate, ata eva tan-mata-saṃvādīna eva ślokākārasya upanyāsaḥ kṛtaḥ. athavā vaibhāṣikair anīṣyāmāṇam api balād etad aṅgikāryam, anyathā nir-viṣatve jñānasya yogācāra-darśanāpatti-prasaṅgāt.* (p. 9)

Text 33 (p. 40,17-18): *nanu ca tulyasāmagrayadhīnastayā samāna-kālatayā ca tadavyabhicārasiddhau satyāṃ kva karmatvam upayujyate?*

Translation 33: Well, where does the question of its (= of the second momentary object) objectness come when it is invariably associated with the knowledge by their being simultaneously produced and by their being produced, by the same causes?

Note 33: Even if *grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva* is not there, still the one-is to-one relationship is maintained because both the cognition and its objects are producing each simultaneously?

Text 34 (p. 40,18-19): *hanta tarhi sahotpannayoḥ samānasāmagrikayoḥ grāhyagrāhakaniyamah kiṃ kṛta iti vaktavyam?*

Translation 34: Funny indeed is your view! Then you should tell me what is the cause of the rule regarding the revealable and the revealer of two things having the same causes for their production and which have come into existence simultaneously?

Note 34: If two things x and y are produced by the same causal complex how is it that one of these is called a revealer and the other the revealed?

Text 35 (p. 41,1-2): *jñānaṃ svaprakāśasvabhāvam iti grāhakam, artho jadātmeti grāhyam - iti cet*

Translation 35: Knowledge is of the nature of illumination and therefore, it is *grāhaka* whereas object is of the form of inanimate things and therefore, it is *grāhya*.

Note 35: Thus, *svabhāva* of knowledge and that of knowable are such that there subsists the relationship of *grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva*.

Text 36 (p. 41,2): *ayam api viśeṣas tulyakālayoḥ kutastyaḥ?*

Translation 36: Wherefrom do they (knowledge and object) get their distinctness (i.e. one is *prakāśasvabhāva* and the other is *jada-svabhāva*) when both have the same causes?

Note 36: What is source of the respective *svabhāva* of things? When the causes remain the same and they occur at one and the same time how to distinguish them?

Text 37 (p. 41,2-3): *upādānasahakāśrikāraṇabhedād iti cet,*

Translation 37: Since there is a difference in the material cause and the auxiliary cause (they acquire *svabhāvas*).

Note 37: See text 30.

Text 38 (p. 41,3-4): *na - tasya kṣaṇabhaṅgabhaṅge nirākāriṣyamāṇa-tvāt.*

Translation 38: No. That will be refuted in the *kṣaṇabhṅga-bhaṅga*-section.

Note 38: The refutation of the theory of momentariness of things is presented by Jayanta in the seventh *Āhnika* of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

Text 39 (p.41,6-11): *ye 'pi nirākārasya bodhasvarūpasya nilapītādy-
anekaviśayasādhāraṇatvāt, janakatvasya ca cakṣurādāv api bhāvenāti-
prasaṅgāt, tadākāratvakṛtam eva jñānakarmaniyamam avagacchantāḥ
sākāraṃ jñānaṃ pramānaṃ iti pratipedire te 'pi vijñānādvaitasiṣādhā-
yīṣayaivam abhidadhānāḥ tannirāsaprasaṅga eva nirasiṣyante. na hy
ekam eva sākāraṃ jñānaṃ grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ ca bhabitum arhatīti
vaksyate.*

Translation 39: Those (Yogācāras) who took knowledge of the form of the object to be the *pramāna* (means of valid knowledge) think that the invariable association between knowledge and the object is feasible only when the knowledge (i.e. the *pramāna*) has in it a reflection of that (object) . Because, if the nature of knowledge is taken as having no particular form then-since it (*nirākārajñāna*) is common to all sorts of knowledge such as that of a blue thing or

of a yellow thing etc. and since productive nature is also there in eyes etc.-there is the contingency of its over-application.

They (Yogācāras) being desirous of establishing identity with the knowledge speak in the above manner. They too will be refuted when we will be refuting their *Vijñānādvaita*-theory. It will also be shown later that knowledge of form of the object cannot be both *grāhya* (revealed) and *grāhaka* (revealer).

Note 39: This text presents the view of the Yogācāra-school. According to this school of thought the knowledge is always *sākāra*. Since the *ākāra* is in the knowledge, there is no *ākāra* (thing of this world) outside. What appears as being outside is mere projection of one's mind.

Text 40 (p. 41,12-15): *arthas tu sākārajñānavādino na samasty eva. sa hy anumeyo vā syāt? pratyakṣo vā? nānumeyah; sambandhagrahaṇā-bhāvāt.*

*arthe hi sati sākāraṃ nirākāraṃ tadatyaye /
nityānumeyavāhyārthavādī jñānaṃ kva dr̥ṣṭavān. //38//*

Translation 40: Moreover, for these Buddhists who are the propagators of knowledge having a particular form of object as the means) the object itself does not probably exist If it is positive it should be either inferred or perceived?

(We say:) it cannot be inferred because there is no invariable concomitance between the object which is outside and the *sākāra*-knowledge which is inside the mind.

(We ask:) Where did the Buddhists for whom the wordly objects are always inferable and never perceivable) see or realize the knowledge of invariable concomitance such as if there is an object there is the knowledge of the form of that object and if that object is removed the knowledge has no form?

Note 40: If an existence of a thing is to be established it should be by some *pramāṇa*. The Buddhists accept only two *pramāṇa* s: *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. First, Jayanta shows that inference is not capable of establishing the existence of an object of knowledge.

Text 41 (p. 42,1-4): *nāpi pratyakṣo 'rthaḥ ākāradvayānupalambhāt. abhyupagame cānavasthāprasaṅgāt. arthākāro hi nirākārajñānagamyo na bhavatīti jñānenākāravatā gr̥hyate; so 'yam idānīm jñānākāro 'pi grāhyatvāt anyenākāravatā gr̥hyate, so 'py anyeneti.*

Translation 41: Nor, the objects can be perceived according to their theory because no body realizes two forms at a time (one of the *sākāra* knowledge which is the means and the other of the object). If it (i.e. realization of two forms of knowledge) is accepted there would arise the contingency of the fallacy known as *anavasthā*. Thus, since the form of an object cannot be realized by the knowledge (the means) which has no form or reflection of

that object) , it (the object) is realized by the knowledge having the form or reflected of that object. Now, that form of knowledge (of that object) also becomes an object of some other knowledge and as such it is to be realized by some other knowledge having the form of reflection of that, earlier knowledge. This knowledge of the earlier knowledge also requires some other knowledge having a particular form for its realization or knowledge, and so on and so forth. Thus, the fault of the *anavasthā*.

Note 41: Once one accepts the view that an object is to be revealed by only that knowledge which has the form of that object, this fault of *anavasthā* is unavoidable. So, one can never perceive the object if it is of the form of *jñānākāra* only.

Text 42 (p. 42,5-9): *atha vā artho nirākārajñānagrāhyatām nopayātīti svagrāhake jñānātmani samarpitātmā bhavatīti sākāraṃ jñānam evedam sampannam iti punar artho 'nyaḥ kalpanīyaḥ, so 'pi grāhyatvāt svagrāhakasya sākāratvasiddhaye tatraiva liyata iti sākāraṃ jñānam evāvaśīsyata iti punar anyo 'rtha iti ittham anavasthā.*

Translation 42: The *anavasthā* can be shown in another way also. As an object cannot be realized by a knowledge having no form, it (the object) offers itself to the knowledge which will reveal it and thereby becomes one with knowledge. (In that case there is no object left outside.) Therefore, another object is to be postulated or inferred. That too, being an object, becomes one with the means (knowledge) in order to make it (knowledge) *sākāra*. Therefore, what remains even at this step is simply a knowledge having a particular form. It again requires an object and therefore another object is to be inferred and so on and so forth. Thus the fault of *anāvasthā*.

Note 42: There is a step-by-step explanation of the fault of *anavasthā* presented by the *Granthibhaṅga*(p.10). Since the *artha* has to be only one, since without the *arthākāra*, the knowledge cannot be the revealer *pramāṇa*, the *arthākāra* will keep on making the *pramāṇa sākārā* and it will never stop. The result is this that one can never know the object.

Thus, if one holds the Yogācāra-view, one cannot establish the existence of an object of knowledge.

Text 43 (p. 42,9-13): *pratikarmavyavasthā tu janakatvanibandhanā bhaviṣyati, vastusvabhāvasyāparyanuyojoyatvāt. sākārapakṣe 'pi paryanuyogasāmyamityādi sarvaṃ upariṣṭāt savistaram abhidhāsyate. sākārapakṣe 'pi ca na pramāṇāt vyatiriktaṃ phalam upadarśitam ity asatpakṣa evāyam.*

Translation 43: The settlement namely, this is the knowledge of x and this is the knowledge of y is possible (according to our doctrine) because the object is considered as the producer of the knowledge.

[On this you argued that as object is a *janaka*, eyes etc. are also *janakas* and therefore, they (eyes etc.) should also be revealed by the knowledge.] To this we say it is the nature of the knowledge which reveals only the object and not the *karāṇa* (i.e. eyes etc.).

We can as well ask you on this point that even in your case of *sākāra* knowledge how is it that the knowledge gets the form of the object and not of the eyes etc. which are auxiliary means according to you? Therefore, your objection and your own position both are similar. All this will be discussed in detail later.

As in the theory of *sākāra*-knowledge also a *pramāṇa* is not different from the result, it is not a good theory.

Note 43: The *Granthibhaṅga* clarifies *vastu-svabhāvasya aparyan-jojyatvāt* as follows: - *yadi brūyāt - tulye kārakatve katham arthasyaiva pratibhāsyatvam na cakṣurāder iti? tatra uttaramvastusvabhāvo 'yam iti tathā ca bhavadbhir api paryanuyuktaiḥ 'tulye janakatve katham arthasyaiva ākāragrāhi jñānam na akṣāṇām' iti vastusvabhāva-patha ity eva uttaram deyam.* (p.10)

2.0 CONCLUSION

Following conclusions emerge from the understanding of the above dialogue:

(1) It is the basic philosophical frame-works of both, the Indian Realists and the Indian Idealists, which prompt their respective arguments. In Indian Idealism of the type of the *Vijñānavāda*, since a thing can exist only in the form of a cognition, how can they accept non-knowledge as the nature of *pramāṇa*? Similarly, according to the Indian Realism of the type of *nirākara-jñāna-vāda* of the Naiyayikas, when the thing has a separate existence independent of its cognition what is the necessity to disturb the common-sense view of a process and its result?

(2) While the Indian Realists base these argument on the basis of producer and produced - *pramāṇa*, the producer and *pramā*, the produced - the Indian Idealists depend on the notion of revealer and revealed, *pramāṇa* being 'the revealer' and the *pramā*, being 'the revealed'. It is this reason that Jayantabhaṭṭa's concept of *pramāṇa* was criticized by the Jaina logician Prabhācandra Sūri (11th Century A.D.) in his *Prameyakamalamārtanda* (Edited by Pdt Mahendrakumar Shastri, Nirmaya Sagar Press, 1941, pp.7-13).

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