

A STUDY ON SANSKRIT SYNTAX (1): ŚABDAKAUSTUBHA ON P.1.4.23

Sanskrit Text and Annotated Translation

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (1575-1640) was one of the great grammarians who furnished the later period of the history of the Sanskrit grammar. He is said to have written more than one hundred works in his life. Among those, although some of them were not done by his own hands, only four works are concerned with the Sanskrit grammar. The *Siddhāntakaumudī* and its commentary, the *Praudamanoramā*, are newly systematized texts of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and the *Śabdakaustubha* and the *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana* are collections of the philosophical and grammatical issues not only from the earlier texts of Pāṇinīyas but also from those of the other philosophical systems. The latter is a summary of the former as stated in the *maṅgala* verse of it. Bhaṭṭoji says:

*phaṇibhāṣitabhāṣyābdheḥ śabdakaustubha uddhṛtaḥ.
tatra nirṇīta evārthaḥ saṃkṣepeṇa kathyate.*

“From the ocean [called] *Mahābhāṣya* narrated by Phaṇi [Holy snake, i.e., Patañjali], *Śabdakaustubha* (Jewel of the Word) is brought out [by me]. The topic treated there is going to be explained concisely here.”

However, the *Śabdakaustubha* has not been studied as *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana* has. The *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana* along with the commentaries written by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa called the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* and its abridged form the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, has been studied and translated several times.

The *Śabdakaustubha* is a commentary in *vṛtti*-style, mainly based on the *Mahābhāṣya*. It bears several philosophical and grammatical speculations which greatly influenced later grammarians, specially Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. It is not an overstatement that despite its importance the *Śabdakaustubha* is one of undeservedly forgotten texts in the study of Sanskrit grammar, due to both facts, that the *Śabdakaustubha* is an incomplete text and that its editions do not stand for the critical demand of the modern scholars. In face of such situation, a revised text of *kākarāhnikā* with an attemptative translation is presented in this paper. This is a first part of ongoing translation.

Sanskrit Text

This text has been printed several times so far. According to *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, volume 5 [The Philosophy of the Grammarians], it was first published at Varanasi, 1876. The subsequent edition is from Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 2, 1898-1917 [second edition, 1991]. It comes next that is included as an appendix of the *Vaiyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*, edited by Guru Prasad Shastri [see MBh(b)]. This edition has only the first nine *āhnikas* of the *Śabdakaustubha*. Furthermore, Kunnjuni Raja used the edition of the Asiatic Society of Bengal [date not given] as base for his very small summary of this text in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, volume 5. Among these editions, only *ChSS* edition gives us the whole text, which now consists of three parts. Unfortunately this edition has a lot of misprints and misreadings which are easily noticeable. In this translation, this *ChSS* edition is referred to as the main text.

Commentaries

T. Aufrecht mentioned six commentaries. In his *Catalogus Catalogorum*, part 1, p. 500, the following is listed:

1. *Viśamapadī* of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa [1714],
2. *Prabhā* of Vidyānātha Pāyagūḍa [1740],
3. *Udyota* of Vidyānātha Śukla [date unknown],
4. *Prabhā* of Satārā-Rāghavendrācārya [Gajendragadkar] [1840],
5. *Bhāvapradīpa* of Kṛṣṇamitra[-miśra, Durbalācārya] [1800],
6. *Dūṣaṇa* of Bhāskara Dīkṣita [date unknown].

Of those, 1, 2, and 5 are available in manuscript form according to various catalogues. Remainings are not reported to be extant.

Besides, two commentaries are added to above list.

7. *Guṇa* of Indradatta Upādhyāya [1800].

This title is referred in the colophon of the manuscript of his *Samvādacintāmaṇi* deposited at Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute [No. 669 of 1891-95, folio 7 Ob, *Descriptive Catalogue of Government Collection of Manuscripts deposited at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, compiled by Shripad Krishna BELVALKAR, vol. II Grammar: Part 1 (Vedic & Pāṇiniya), Poona: BORI, 1938, pp. 269-270]. It runs as follows:

vistasaras tv asmatkṛtakaustubhaguṇād avaseyaḥ. iti śrīmad upādhyāyasuku(?)lālamaṇiśarmasūnunā vaiyākaraṇakesarīmṇdradatto-pādhyāyena kṛte samvādacintāmaṇau dhātvarthavādaḥ samāptah.

8. *Ṭippanī* [Author unknown].

This commentary is mentioned in the *Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Manuscripts Library*, Madras. Three manuscripts which have the same title are preserved. Among these, one is also called

Marīci. At present it is under the speculation whether they are same work or not.

Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja Tailaṅga [1650], a well-known poet, is said to have written a work which is an opposition to Bhaṭṭoji, called *Śabdakaustubha-Kaṇḍana* <lost>. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka quoted a passage from Jagannātha's *Manoramā-Kuca-Mardana* in his *Itihāsa*, vol. 1, p. 499. (See Bali [1976, p. 12]).

ittham ca aut sūtrāt kaustubhagranthaḥ sarvo 'py asaṃgata iti dheyam. adhikaṃ ca Śabdakaustubhakaṇḍanād avadheyam.

All the commentaries on the *Śabdakaustubha*, from what is known to date, only covers the first nine *āhnikas*. It is not known whether the remaining portion of the text was ever commented upon or not. At least, as far as *kāra-kāhnikā* is concerned, no commentary is available to the present writer.

Manuscripts

There are a considerable number of manuscripts of this text. However, most of them contain only the commentary of the first nine *āhnikas* which cover the rules from the Śivasūtra to 1.1.75 of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The manuscripts which have the *kāra-kāhnikā* are very few compared to those of *navāhnikas*. The present writer was able to consult only one manuscript up to date for this translation. The manuscript referred to here is deposited at Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, MS. No. 655 of 1891-95, folios 48, lines 11, letters 42, Devānāgarī, Paper, Samvat 1847 [= 1789/90 CE]. This manuscript is supposed to have 121 folios but the first 73 folios are missing. In this extent manuscript, the *kāra-kāhnikā* is included.

Remarks on Sanskrit Text and Translation

The Sanskrit text of ŚK is transliterated from the *ChSS* edition. The page numbers of it are placed in the braces. The text is divided in sections in order to clarify the argumentation of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. In this romanized text, obvious mistypos and inconsistencies of the external *sandhi* are revised and corrected, however without note, according to the rules of Classical Sanskrit. The double quotation marks are used for the examples and the *sūtras* discussed by Bhaṭṭoji. The *sūtra* number of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is put in the square brackets in the text. Otherwise, the text itself is transliterated as it is without corrections.

Alternative (or more acceptable) readings, mainly based on the above-mentioned manuscript, are given under the text portion, noted with asterisk. Square brackets in the translation are supplied to give a comprehensial understanding of the text. More elaborated explanations are provided in the Notes.

As this revised text presented here has no pretention to be critical (in the real sense of the word) due to the lack of more materials to constitute a critical edition, the readings will eventually be treated for revision as other manuscripts or newly found commentaries become available.

**PART II:
SANSKRIT TEXT, TRANSLATION AND NOTES**

1. *kārake* [P.1.4.23: *Siddhāntakaumudī*. no. 534]

1.0 Nature of *sūtra*

{p. 112, 1.26} *kārake* [P.1.4.23]. *adhikāro 'yam. vyatyayena prathamārthe saptamī*.

Translation: This is an '*adhikāra*: governing rule' [which is effective up to P.1.4.55]. By the interchange of case ending, a locative case ending is meant for the meaning of first case ending [i.e., to introduce a '*saṃjñā*: a technical term' in the Pāṇinian system].

Notes: There have been discussions among grammarians on the nature of P.1.4.23. The principles which are to be concerned here are as follows: (1) This rule is included in the *ekasaṃjñā* section which introduces a technical term and (2) in case that the technical term is introduced, it is usual for Pāṇini to put it in a nominative case.

When P.1.4.23 is regarded as an *adhikārasūtra*, as Patañjali states, the problem is which type of *adhikāra* it is. There are six types of the *adhikāra* rule, namely *saṃjñā*, *viśeṣaṇa*, *sthānin*, *prakṛti*, *nimitta*, and *ādeśa*. Patañjali states that this rule is an *adhikāra* which introduces the technical term *kāraka*. However, he does not provide any apparent explanation on why this technical term *kāraka* is put in a locative case. Kaiyaṭa, commenting on Patañjali's statement, says that "*saṃjñānirdeśa iti. 'sUPām sUPo bhavanti'ti prathamāyāḥ sthāne saptamī kṛteti bhāvah.*"¹ [*Pradīpa* on P.1.4.23, II,344.]

Then another difficulty arises. If we admit this rule as *saṃjñā-dhikāra*, P.1.4.1 would prevent the application of this term against the following terms. For example, P.1.4.24 introduces the technical term *apādāna*. If *kāraka* is a technical term, two designations would be at the same time applied to one single item. Such a conflict is prohibited and the following rule sets aside the previous one. However, this is not desirable and both designations should be applied here. The possible solutions in this case are two, i.e., a co-application (*samāveśa*) or an application in turn (*pariyāya*). They are discussed in the next passage.

¹ "*sUPām sUPo bhavanti*" is a bhāṣyavārttika on P.7.1.39: *supāṃ sulukpūrvasavarṇāc cheyāḍādyāyājālah.* [III.256,13].

1.1. Co-application of rules (*samāveśa*)

tathā ca “dhruvam [apāye ’pādānam: P.1.4.24]” ityādaṁ prati sūtram vākyam bhittvā kārakasamjñā vidhīyate. tathā hy apāye dhruvam kārakasamjñā syāt. tato ’pādānam. uktam kārakam apādānasamjñām syāt. punaḥ kārakaśabdānuvṛttisāmarthyād viśeṣasamjñābhiḥ saha samāveśo, na tu paryāyaḥ. anuvṛttim vināpi prathamavākyamātrāt tatsiddheḥ.

Translation: Therefore, after dividing every *sūtra* [which introduces *samjñā*] like “*dhruvam (apāye ’pādānam)*” into [two forms of] sentence, this term *kāraka* is prescribed to each of them. Namely, (1) when some item is a point of separation, that [fixed] point is called *kāraka* (*dhruvam apāye kārakasamjñā syāt*). Then, the term *apādāna* is introduced [in the second sentence]. [Namely,] (2) the *kāraka* is [also] called *apādāna* ([*ayam*] *kārakam apādāna-samjñā syāt*). Since the word *kāraka* appears twice on the strength of *anuvṛtti*, it can be co-applied with a particular *samjñā*, but it does not work in turn (*paryāya*). Even without the *anuvṛtti*, it [= *samāveśa*] can be established because only the first sentence [of rule splitted] is enough for it [= application].

Notes: In order to resolve the conflict of two designations, though Patañjali keeps silent, Kaiyaṭa resorts to ‘*yogavibhāga*: a splitting of the rule.’ He says: “*dhruvam apāya*” *iti yogavibhāgena kāraka iti samjñā kriyate. tato ’pādānam ity atra kārakagrahaṇam anuvartate, “dhruvam apāya” iti ca tena kārakam sad apādānasamjñam ity evaṁ samāveśaḥ sidhyatīti. antareṇāpy anuvṛttim vacanasāmārthyāt paryāye siddhe samāveśārthānuvṛttir vijñāyate* [II, 345].

Thus, P.1.4.24: *dhruvam apāye ’pādānam* is splitted as (1) “*dhruvam apāye kāraka[samjñam] syāt*” and (2) “[*ayam kārakam*] *apādāna [samjñam] syāt.*” Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita bases his argument on the above passage of Kaiyaṭa which is again based on Patañjali’s view that P.1.4.23 is *samjñādhikāra*.

The *Kāśikāvṛtti* brings different views. It says: *kārake iti viśeṣaṇam apādānādisamjñāviśayam adhikriyate. kārake ity adhikāro veditavyaḥ. yad ita ūrdhvam anukramiṣyāmaḥ kārake ity evaṁ tad veditavyam. kārakaśabdaś ca nimittaparyāyaḥ. kārakam hetur ity anarthāntaram kasya hetuḥ? kriyāyaḥ. ... kārakasamśabdaneṣu cānena eva viśeṣaṇena vyavahāro vijñāyate* [on P.1.4.23, I,530-534].

According to the first view, P.1.4.23 serves as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) to the term *apādāna*, etc. and P.1.4.24 will be read as “the term *apādāna* [will apply to] the one which is a fixed point (*dhruvam*) when the act of moving away is taking place.” In this case, we need not to have the interchange of case. Another view is that P.1.4.23 introduces a condition for the application (*niṁitta*). (For details about the nature of this rule, see Joshi and Roodbergen [1975, pp. 3-26] and Sharma [1987, pp. 141-7; 1990, pp. 229-234]).

1.2. Necessity of *samāveśa*

tena "stamberamah" ityādāv adhikaranatvāt saptamī, kārakatvāt "gatikārapapadāt kṛt" [P.3.2.139] iti prakṛtisvaraś ca siddhaḥ. thāthādisvaras tu na bhavati, apā sāhacaryād "er aca" [P.3.3.56] {p. 113} eva tatra grahaṇāt.

Translation: Accordingly, in case of 'stamberamah: delighting in bunches of grass [= name of elephant],' at first we can have a locative case ending in *stambe* because the grass stands for *adhikaraṇa*. Then, (since *adhikaraṇa* is) *kāraka*, the original accent of [a final member ending in *kṛt* suffix preceded by *kāraka*] is established by P.6.2.139. In this case, the accent prescribed in P.6.2.144 does not arise, because the *kṛt* suffix *aC* in P.6.2.144 is the one which is mentioned in the rule near to the rule prescribing *aP*, i.e., P.3.3.56².

Notes: The compound *stamberamah* is derived by P.3.2.13: *stambe-karṇayoḥ ramijapoḥ*. The derivational procedure is now presented in simple form.

stambe ramate > *stambe* + *ram-* + *aC* > *stambe-ramah*.

P.3.2.9: *harater anudyamane 'C*. [*aC* introduced].

P.6.3.9: *haLaDantāt saptamyāḥ samjñāyām*. [*aluk* for the locative ending of *stambe*].

P.6.2.139: *gatikārapapadāt kṛt*. [an accentuation on *-ramā*].

Now, the problem is how we can have the accent as *stamberamáḥ*. This compound retains its original accent by P.6.2.139 because the first member of it is *kāraka*. Since the first member has the locative ending, if it is *kāraka* as well, then two designations, i.e., *kāraka* and *adhikaraṇa*, are to be co-applied. As for the application of P.6.2.139, two difficulties are brought about. One is treated in this passage and the other is in the next.

One difficulty is whether this accentuation is taken place by P.6.2.144, or by P.6.2.139. For P.6.2.144, which is prescribed after P.6.2.139, sets aside P.6.2.139.

P.6.2.144: *thāthaGHaŃKtāJaBitrakāṇām*.

The answer is that the suffix *aC* introduced here is not the one prescribed in P.6.2.144. In P.6.2.144, the suffix *aC* is followed by suffix *aP*. According to the interpreting principle of grammar³, this suffix *aC* is the one which is prescribed in P.3.3.56: *er aC*, for suffix *aP* is introduced in the next rule P.3.3.57: *ṛdor aP*. However, the suffix *aC* to be introduced here is the one which is prescribed in P.3.2.9, not in P.3.3.56. Therefore, P.6.2.144 is not applicable.

² This view is supported by Nāgeśa. *prakṛtisvara iti. thāthādisvaras tu na, apā sāhacaryād er aCa eva tatra grahaṇāt.* (*Uddyota* on P.1.4.23, II,240r).

³ The principles on how to interpret the grammatical rules are the same as those of sentence-interpretation. They are mentioned in VP.II,315:

saṃsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā.

arthah prakaraṇaṃ liṅgaṃ śabdasyānyasya saṃnidhiḥ.

1.3. Alternative

na copapadatvād eva kṛduttarapadaprakṛtisvaro 'stv iti vācyam, "stambakarmayoḥ" [P.3.2.13] iti nirdeśāt prātipadikayos tathātvē 'pi saptamīviśiṣṭayor atathātvāt. na hi saptamīviśiṣṭam saptamyā nirdiṣṭam, yenopapadasamjñāṃ labheteti dik.

Translation: It should not be argued that since [the form *stambe* is called] *upapada*, the original accent [of the final member] ending in *kṛt* suffix would be retained [by the rule P.6.2.144]. Because of the rule P.3.2.13, even if those two nominals [*stamba* and *karma*] are called *upapada*, what is qualified by the locative case should not be so, i.e., the declensional form *stambe* [or *karme*] has no *upapada*-status. For what is qualified by the locative is not taught by the locative form again. Thus by which rule can this *upapada*-status be obtained?⁴

Notes: Another difficulty is that the first member is not *kāraka* and for this reason the co-application is not allowed. However, the word *stambe* is called as *upapada* by P.3.1.92. Then P.6.2.139 becomes applicable simply because of its *upapada*-status, not of the *kāraka*-status.

The answer is as follows: The form *stambe* is not a *upapada*. P.3.1.92 defines the *upapada* as being prescribed in the locative case in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Since the word *stamba-* is mentioned in P.6.2.139 in the form of *stambakarmayoḥ*, i.e., in the locative form, the word *stamba-* is called *upapada*. But in this compounding the declensional form *stambe* is required (by the strength of *anuvṛtti*, P.3.2.4: *suPi*). This form *stambe* is not called *upapada*. If one wishes to have the word *stambe* called *upapada*, the word *stambe* is to be again prescribed in the locative case. Therefore the word *stambe* is *kāraka*, not *upapada* and by this reason the co-application is justified.

2.1. Definition of *kāraka* 1

anvarthā ceyam samjñā karotīti kārakam iti. tena kriyānavayino na bhavati. "brāhmaṇasya putram panthānam pṛcchati" iti. iha hi brāhmaṇaḥ putraviśeṣaṇam na tu kriyānvayī.

Translation: This is the technical term with an etymological sense, i.e., "*karoti iti kārakam*: One who acts is *kāraka*." Thus, it is not applied to what is not related to the action. For example, "*brāhmaṇasya putram panthānam pṛcchati*: he asks a way to a son of a brahmin." In this case, brahmin is a qualifier to son, but not a relatum of the act of asking.

⁴ Nāgeśa opposes to this solution. He thinks that the example *stamberamaḥ* for justifying the co-application is not right. He says: *stamberama iti. cintyam idam. upapadatvād eva gatikārako-papadāt kṛd iti svarasya siddheḥ. na ca stambaśabda upapadam, na tu stambeśabda iti vācyam. subantasyaivopapadatāyā upapada-samjñāsūtre bhāṣye vakṣyamānatvāt. tasmād grāmevasa iti udāhāryam* (Uddyota on P.1.4.23, II,243r).

Notes: The first definition is based on an etymological explanation. This is introduced by Patañjali [*MBh* ad. P.1.4.23, I,324,9-10]. Another definition of *kāraka* by him is as follows: *sādhakaṃ nirvartakaṃ kārakasaṃjñāṃ bhavatīti vaktavyam* (It should be noted that an accomplisher, or a completer, is given the technical name *kāraka*) [*Ibid.*, I,323,8-9]. For details, see the articles listed in Secondary Sources.

2.2.1. Objection

nanu putro 'pi katham kārakam? praśno hi jijñāsā. tatra praṣṭuḥ kārakatve 'pi yaṃ prati praśnas tasya janakatvāyogād iti cet?

Translation: How is it possible for the son to be *kāraka*? Because the act of asking is the act of wishing to know something. In this case, even if the person who asks is the *kāraka*, the person to whom one asks the question has no role as producer [and, therefore, the son cannot be *kāraka*].

Notes: If we accept the etymological definition, we come to face the objection. The word *kāraka* is derived from the verbal root *kr-* and paraphrased into “*kriyāṃ janayati*: one produces an action.” This means that what is called *kāraka* is the producer (*janaka*) of the action. If this is the case, one who asks the question can be called *kāraka* because he produces the act of asking. However, the son who is asked cannot be *kāraka* simply because he does not produce that action. Therefore, in case of the act of asking, the son has no *kāraka*-status.

2.2.2. Reply [Second def. of *kāraka* introduced]

satyam, māstu janakatā. kriyānvayamātram iha vivakṣitam. tac cāsty eva. etena sampradānasya kārakatvaṃ vyākhyātam.

Translation: Correct. He would not have a producer-ness (*janakatā*). Here [in this definition] everything whatever related to action is intended and it [= that relation] is definitely existing in the son. In this way, the *kāraka*-ness of *sampradāna* (a recipient) is explained.

Notes: Bhaṭṭoji admits the above objection. He casts away the notion of producer-ness (*janakatva*). Instead, he explains *kāraka* in much boarder sense, namely that the relation to the action alone (*kriyānvayamātra*) is enough to be *kāraka*. The son is not related as the producer of that action, but he is certainly related to the act of asking. In the same manner, the *sampradāna* (a recipient) can be called *kāraka*. Because in case of the act of giving, though a person who is given something is not the producer of that action, he is related to it.

2.3. Third def. of *kāraka* introduced

yadvā sampradānāder api prathamam buddhyārohāt kārakatā. evaṃ jñāyate karotītyādau kartṛkarmanor api bodhyam.

Translation: Or rather, it could be said that *sampradāna* etc. has *kāra*ka-ness since it is first conceived [as something which is related to the action] in mind. Similarly, [the *kāra*ka-ness] of the agent or of the object in cases such as *jñāyate* or *karoti* respectively should be understood.

Notes: This is a modified definition of the second one. This definition “*buddhyāropakriyānvayatvam*” is already implied by Bhartṛhari. He says: *sādhana*vyavahāraś ca buddhyavasthānibandhanah (The usage of *sādhana* is based on how it is conceived by the mind) [VP.III.7.3.ab]. The relation to the action is not necessary to be seen externally. When the speaker conceives such a relation in his mind, he imposes the *kāra*ka-status on the item which is regarded to have the relation. Let us see the following examples.

ghataḥ devadattena jñāyate: A pot is known by Devadatta.

Here, Devadatta is an agent of the act of knowing. How do we know the act of knowing which is existing in Devadatta? The agency is imposed to Devadatta only through the mind.

kaṭam karoti: He makes a mat.

In the course of making the mat, the mat is not completed. However, we use such a sentence and admit it as correct. In this case, something being made is regarded as the object of that action.

The object of the meanings of the verbal roots like *jñā-*, *iṣ-*, *kṛ-* (or *yam-*) are not seen. How can they be a *sādhana* (namely, *kāra*ka)? In the verse which enumerates a classification of the objects, Bhartṛhari says: *nirvartyo vā vikāryo vā prāpyo vā sādhanāśrayaḥ. kriyāṇām eva sādhyatvāt siddharūpo 'bhidhīyate* ([Whether an object is considered as] something to be made or something to be modified or something to be reached, since the action alone is to be done, it [= the object] is represented as an accomplished) [VP.III.7.79]. Therefore, the one which is yet to be accomplished can be *karman* only because it is aimed by that action. Furthermore, an action itself can work as *kāra*ka. Bhartṛhari says about how a previous action becomes *sādhana* for the following action that “*saṃdarśanam prārthanāyā vyavasāye tv anantarā. vyavasāyas tathārambhe sādhanatvāya kalpate*” (The act of seeing is regarded as *sādhana* for desire, the latter [= the desire] for a decision to act and that decision to act is *sādhana* when it begins.) [ibid., 16].

As for the sentence “*ghataḥ kriyate*”, Helārāja says in his commentary on VP.III.8.1:

ghataḥ kriyata iti ca ghata ity evaṃ buddhyā gṛhyamāno yo 'rthaḥ sa nirvartyata ity evaṃ padasamanvayaḥ [Prakāśa, p. 5, ll.18-19].

“In the sentence ‘*ghataḥ kriyate*,’ the thing such as pot which is conceived by the mind [now] is being made. Thus, as such the word is used.”

2.3.1. Objection 1 and Reply

*kāryavyavahitapūrvakṣaṇāvṛttinām**¹ *katham kāraṇateti cet?*
yathā yāgasyety avehi.

*1. Read *kāryavyavahitapūrvakṣaṇāvṛttinām*. This reading is found in MS.folio 88R5.

Translation: [Objection 1:] How is it possible that they can have a cause-ness (*kāraṇatā*) which does not exist in the previous moment adjoined to the result?

[Answer:] It should be noted as akin to the case of sacrifice.

[Because the sacrifice which is a cause of a result has already vanished when the result comes arise.]

Notes: From this passage onwards, three objection are brought into consideration. These objections are based on the question on how the *kāraka* can be a cause of action.

First objection is concerned about the temporal relationship between the action and its result. If we admit *kāraka* as the means of action, it should be regarded as the cause of action. However, if there is a time gap between the action and its result, how can the *kāraka* be the cause since it does not exist when the result appears? The answer is that there is an example where the result comes arise even after the cause has disappeared such as in a sacrifice (*yāga*). In case of the sacrifice, it is the cause and the result is, say, rebirth in heaven. Here, the sacrifice does not exist just in the previous moment which is followed by the result.

2.3.2. Objection 2 and Reply

tatra vyāpāro 'stīti cet.
na, tāvatāpi yāgasya pūrvavartitānupapādanāt.

Translation: [Objection:] Is there any activity [that precedes its result]?

[Answer:] No. As far as [the activity is concerned], the previously-existing-ness of sacrifice [to the result] is not justified.

Notes: Even though the sacrifice itself does not exist just in the previous moment of the result, the result in the form of "rebirth in heaven" is expected. In this case, it is believed to be something which connect both of them. It is 'vyāpāra: a causal activity.' This *vyāpāra* becomes a direct cause of the result and the sacrifice is an indirect cause. Through this intermediate one the result is produced from the sacrifice. Such an intermediate activity is nothing but 'apūrva.' However, this intervene of the *vyāpāra* does not ascertain that an existence of a cause like the sacrifice at immediately previous moment of the result is justified. The notion of *apūrva* is not consistently held by all the Mīmāṃsakas (See Gune [1978, pp. 25-31]). In this connection, it seems to be enough to point out that in the causal relationship the cause is regarded either as being existing in the immediately previous moment or as having the intermediate like *vyāpāra* which maintains until the result will occur.

The theory of *apūrva* is advocated by Śabara in his commentary on JS.2.1.5: *codanā punar ārambhaḥ*. Śabara says: *apūrvam punar asti, yata ārambhaḥ śiṣyate "svargakāmo yajete"ti. itarathā hi vidhānam anarthakam syāt. bhaṅgitvād yāgasya* [II.358,16-359,1]. Kumārila explains this *apūrva* as follows [*Tantravārttika*, on JS.2.1.5. *Apūrvādhikaraṇa*, II.364,7-8]:

*karmabhyaḥ prāgayogyasya karmanāḥ puruṣasya vā.
yogyatā śāstrāvagamya yā parā sāpūrvam iṣyate.*

“[The notion of] *apūrva* is admitted as a possibility (*yogyatā*) either of the rite which is not able to [cause a result] before the rites or of a person [who is not able to have that result], which is understood from the text and [existing in the] later.”

This existence of *apūrva* between the sacrifice and the result is necessary for the Mīmāṃsakas because otherwise they cannot establish the authority of the Vedas and the Vedic injunctions. Moreover, if it does not last until the time of the appearance of the result, the sacrifice cannot serve as the means to obtain the result. Therefore, a contiguity of *apūrva* should be assumed. Kumārila says [*ibid.*, 365,22-366,2; 366,10-14]:

yāgād eva taddhi śaktidvāreṇa sidhyati.

sūkṣmaśaktyātmakam vā tatphalam evopajāyate.

*yadi hy asaṃbandhinā kenacit phalam sādhyeta tato doṣaḥ syāt.
yāgāhitayā tu śaktyā sādhyamānam yāgenaiva sādhitam bhavati.
sarvasādhanānām iṣṭaphalapravṛttāv āntarālikavyāpārāvaśyam-
bhāvitvāt.*

vināśitvena vijñātam sādhanam lokavedayoḥ.

asaṃbhāvitasāmarthyasthāyitvam codyate katham.

*nūnam vinaṣṭasyāpy etasya sāmartyam phalanivṛttikālāvadhim
yāvad āsta iti hi yāvan nāvadhāryate tāvad vināśinī kriyā
codayitum evāśakyā. tasmāt saṃbhāvanāvadhāraṇā ca
prathamam eva siddheti.*

“That [= the result] is established only by the sacrifice with the intermediate of the power (*śakti*). Or, that result is produced as the one which has a minute power as its nature.

If something which is not related to [the sacrifice] accomplishes the result, it would lead to a fault. However, anything which is accomplished by the power left behind by the sacrifice is the one which is accomplished by the sacrifice itself. Because all the means inevitably require the intermediate activity (*vyāpāra*) in order to produce the result desired.

The means either of the ordinary world or of Veda is known to be destructive. Then, how is it possible to presupposedly prescribe the contiguity of the potentiality?

Unless the potentiality of the one which is already vanished can continue till the occurrence of the result, it would not be able to

prescribe the transitory action. Thus, the contiguity [of such a potentiality] is proved at first.”

2.3.3. Objection 3 and Reply

avyavahitapūrvavartisvasvavyāpārānyatarakatvaṃ kāraṇatvam iti cet ?

na, vyāpārasya kāraṇatvagarbhatayā ātmāśrayāpatteḥ, svavyāpārasyeva svajñānasyāpi praveśasambhavāc ca.

Translation: [Objection:] The cause-ness is the state of being a possessor of either oneself or one's activity which exists in a previous [moment] contiguous [to the result].

[Answer:] No. Because, if so, the activity-ness would lead to mutual dependence, for it is itself included in the cause-ness [to the result]. Moreover, if *svavyāpāra* is admitted as the cause, then *svajñāna* would be [wrongly] admitted as the cause.

Notes: Here, a definition of the cause-ness is introduced alternatively. According to this definition, the cause in case of the sacrifice is either the sacrifice or its *vyāpāra*. The activity (*vyāpāra*) is defined as “*taj janyatve sati tajjanyaṅako vyāpārah*: when it is produced [by a cause], the producer [of an effect], which is produced, is the activity” according to Naiyāyikas. Thus, the *vyāpāra* itself is the one which is produced by the cause, i.e. the sacrifice, and becomes the cause to the result.⁵

2.3.4. Naiyāyikas' opinion

ata eva jñāyamānaṃ liṅgaṃ padañ cānumitiśabdajñānayoḥ kāraṇam iti jarannaiyāyikāḥ.

Translation: Therefore, according to the old Naiyāyikas, the cause of inference and knowledge of word is the sign and the word respectively, which is to be known at present.

Notes: As for an inference (*anumāna*), Naiyāyikas hold that in the inference a mark (*liṅga*) is a cause of it. Vātsyāyana says in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5:

tatpūrvakam ity anena liṅgaliṅgināḥ. sambandhadarśanam liṅga-darśanam cābhisambadhyate. liṅgaliṅgināḥ sambandhadvayor darśanena liṅgasmṛtir abhisambadhyate smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena cāpratyakṣo 'rtho 'numīyate. [pp. 142, 146].

⁵ Navya-Naiyāyikas discuss the notion of *apūrva*. For example, *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara has a section named 'Apūrvavāda.' “*etad api nāsti, kāraṇatvasya kāryavyavahitapūrvasamaya-vartitvatatpūrvasamayavartivyāpāravattvānyatararūpaniyatatvād iti sañkṣepah*.: It is not correct. Because the cause-ness is either the state of being existing in the previous [moment] to the result or the state of having the *vyāpāra* which is existing in the previous [moment to the result]” [p.90, ll.26-28] Gaṅgeśa also has Apūrvavāda-section in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabdakaṇḍa. “*nanu nirupadhīpūrvavartitā kāraṇatā sā vyāpāreṇa nirvāhyata ity atra ko 'rthah, kiṃ kriyate, uta jñāpyate. nānyaḥ, uttaravartitvena vyāpārasya tatrāsāmarthyāt. netarah, liṅgaiva tadbodhanāt ciradhvas taṃ kāraṇam vyāpāreṇa vyāptam iti cet*” [vol.4, part 2, p. 412,1.3-p. 413,1.2].

And in case of a verbal knowledge, it is a word (*pada*) which causes it. See the *Tarkasamgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa [p. 50, 54]:

śaktam padam. asmāt padād ayam artho boddhavya itīśvara-samketah śaktih. ... vākyārthajñānam śābdajñānam, tat karaṇam śabdah.

“The word (*pada*) has a power [to convey a meaning]. This is a convention of Īśvara that from this word this meaning is to be understood. ... The knowledge of a sentence is the knowledge obtained through the language. The language is the cause of it.”

However, Navya-Naiyāyikas oppose to the view of old Naiyāyikas. For example, the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* of Viśvanāthapañcānana (fl. ca. 17th CE), which is a commentary of the *Bhāṣapariccheda*, discussed it.

“padajñānam tu karaṇam, dvāram tatra padārthāḥ. śābdabodhaḥ phalam, tatra śaktidhīḥ sahakāriṇī [k. 81]. śābdabodhaprakāram darśayati -- padajñānam tv iti. na tu jñāyamānam padam karaṇam, padābhāve 'pi maunīślokādaḥ śābdabodhāt.”

Here, his reason why the word to be known at present is not a cause of verbal knowledge is that even if no word is uttered, for instance, when someone reads a *śloka* in his mind, he realizes the meaning of that *śloka*. Therefore, a *pada*, not a *pada* to be known at present, is the cause of knowledge.

2.3.5.1. Mīmāṃsaka' opinion 1

jñāyamānāḥ padārthāḥ karaṇam iti ca mīmāṃsakāḥ.

Translation: According to the Mīmāṃsakas, it is the meaning of word to be known that causes the knowledge.

Notes: Śabara says in his commentary on *JS*. 1.1.25 that “*padāni hi svam svam padārtham abhidhyāya nivṛttavyāpārāni, athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham gamayati*: In fact, [every] words, after expressing [their] meanings, stop their activity [of expressing]. Then, when the meanings of the words are realized, [the words] make the meaning of sentence realize as well”. [vol. 1, p. 116, 115-6] Among the Mīmāṃsakas after Śabara, there are two theories about sentence-meaning, i.e., *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhidhānavāda*. Bhāṭṭa school takes a position of the former, and Prābhākaras of the latter. Both theories have their root in the above passage of Śabara.

It is the Bhāṭṭa school who holds the view that a knowledge of word is the cause of verbal knowledge. Kumārila states that “*atrābhidhīyate yady apy asti mūlāntaram na naḥ. padārthānām tu mūlatvam dṛṣṭam tadbhāvabhāvataḥ*: Even though we have no other base [for understanding of the meaning of the sentence], the meanings of the words serve as such bases since that [the knowledge of the sentence-meaning] comes [when] there is that [the knowledge of the word-meanings]” [*ŚV*, *Vākyādhikaraṇam*, 110cd-111ab].

On the other hand, Śālikānatha Mīśra, a Prābhākara, says:

padebhya eva vākyārthapratyayo jāyate yathā. tathā vayam nibadhnīmaḥ prabhākaraguror matam. [Vākyārthamātrkā, k.1] padebhya eva, na vākyāt. nāpy antyavarnāt. nāpi padārthebhya ity arthaḥ" [p. 1].

"As the notion of sentence-meaning comes arise from the words themselves, so we realize the view of Prabhākara teacher. [Com.] This means that [sentence-meaning arises] from the words themselves, not from the sentence itself. Neither from the last phoneme, nor form the meaning of the words."

2.3.5.2. Mīmāṃsakas' opinion 2

ata eva rathantarasāmāder aindravāyavāgratvādau^{*1} *nimittatety udghoṣo mīmāṃsakānām.*

*1. Read *aindravāyavāgratvādau* (MS88R9). See Notes.

Translation: Therefore, it is a popular claim of Mīmāṃsakas that the *sāman* like *rathantara*, etc. is the cause of the precedence of *aindravāyava*.

Notes: This refers to the precedence of 'rathantarasāman' in the case of Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. For the details, see the discussions of Śabara and Kumārila on JS. 2.3.1.1. rathanarādhikaraṇam [vol.3, pp. 141-147]. The *sāman* in question is "yadī rathantarasāmā somaḥ syāt, aindravāyavāgrān grahān gṛhṇīyāt: If the soma is connected with the *Rathantarasāma*, precedence should be given to the holding of the vessels dedicated to Indra and Vāyu" [tr. by Ganganath Jha, p.805]. The following is quoted from *Tantravārttika* of Kumārila, which is only the portion related to this ŚK's passage.

"na ca nimittam naimittikasya rūpasamnidhānenopakaroti. katham tarhi ? jñāyamānatvena. tasmād aprayuktam api samkalpitatvād rathantaram nimittam. yadā tv ekadeśasthenāpi tena viśeṣitaḥ kratur nimittam, tadāsau vartata evety avirodhaḥ. [vol. 3, p. 150,9-12]

"Then again, as a matter of fact, the Condition helps the Conditioned not by its actual material presence, but simply by being fully known; and hence even though the *Rathantara* may not have been actually sung in the morning, yet, inasmuch as it has been determined upon (in the very act of determining the performance of the sacrifice), and is fully known as such, it could very well serve as the condition (for the particular order of precedence in the holding of the vessels in the morning). And when it is the sacrifice, as qualified by the *Rathantara*, even though existing in only one part of it, that is the condition of the precedence -- then, inasmuch as the sacrifice is present in the morning also, there would be no incongruity in this" [Jha, pp. 814-815].

2.4. Fourth def. of *kāraka* introduced

athavopasarjanasamjñā, yathā “rājñah kumāryāḥ; rājakumāryāḥ” ityādau yathāsambhavam anvarthāpi, “arddhapippalī” ityādau vacanād bhavati. tathā kārakasamjñāpi prati sūtram vidhīyamānāvacanāt sampradānādau bhavati. pradeśeṣu tu samjñāprakāraka eva bodhaḥ. tattadrūpaprakārako veti anyad etad.

Translation: Or, the technical term *kāraka* as one [prescribed in a *vidhi sūtra*], not as the *anvarthasamjñā*, can continue to the following rules which prescribe *sampradāna*, etc. as in case of the technical term *upasarjana*. Namely, in case of compound *rājakumāryāḥ*, this *upasarjana* is interpreted as the one which follows its etymological meaning and, on the other hand, in case of compound *arddhapippalī*, it is interpreted in the formal sense. However, in the domain of the grammar, what is understood [from the rule] is that which has a technical term as its subject or that which has an individual form as its subject.

Notes: The compound *rājakumāri* is a *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa* by P.2.2.8. Its elemental string is as follows:

[(*rājan* + *Nas*) + (*kumārī* + *Nas*) +] *svam* + *sU*.

In this string there are two words ending in *ṣaṣṭhī*. If we accept the literal interpretation of P.1.2.43, i.e., “that which is mentioned by *prathamā* in the compounding is called *upasarjana*,” both of them would be so because the rule in question is prescribed in the first case (*ṣaṣṭhī*). Then a difficulty arises. Which constituent should be placed first in compound by P.2.2.30?

In order to resolve this difficulty, an etymological consideration of the term is introduced here. Namely, one constituent is termed *upasarjana* in relation to the other. Thus, one derivational unit [*rājan* + *Nas*] is regarded as *upasarjana* to the other unit [*kumārī* + *Nas*] and the latter is *upasarjana* to [*svam* + *sU*]. (After compounding, the shortening of final vowel in a word termed *upasarjana* which ends in a feminine affix is taken place by P.1.2.48. *rājakumārī* → *rājakumāri*.) In this way, a technical term which is interpreted on the basis of etymological consideration can resolve the difficulty.

The compound *arddhapippalī* is a *Tp.* by P.2.2.2: *ardham napuṣsakam*. Since the word *ardha* is mentioned in *prathamā* in the present rule, it is termed *upasarjana* and placed first in the compound. Here, term *upasarjana* is interpreted formally. (In details, see Sharma [1990, pp.111-112]).

Likewise, the term *kāraka* is interpreted as *anvarthasamjñā* in certain case and as *vidhisūtra* in the other. Such different interpretation are really seen as is in case of *upasarjana*. Above argument is based on *Nyāsa* on P.1.2.48, I. p. 333:

iha ca rājñah kumāryāḥ svam rājakumārīsvam iti dvayor api ṣaṣṭhyantayoḥ samāsaśāstre prathamānirdiṣṭād ubhayor apy upasarjanasamjñāyām satyām tad eva doṣadvayam prāpnoti?

naiṣa doṣaḥ. yasmād upasarjanam iti mahatyāḥ samjñāyāḥ karānasyaitad eva prayojanam — anvarthasamjñā yathā vijñā-yeteti. apradhānam upasarjanam, pradhānam upasarjanam iti. apradhānañ ca tat prati tad upasarjanam iti. ... rājñāḥ kumāryāḥ svam rājakumārīsvam ity atrāpi eṣa pariḥārah. atrāpi kumārī-śabdāḥ apekṣya rājaśabdasyāprādhānyam, na tu rājaśabdāḥ apekṣya kumārīśabdasya. tasmād rājaśabdasyopasarjanasamjñā, na tu kumārīśabdasya.

2.5. Objection by Pracīnavaiyākaraṇas

syād etad. “vrkṣasya paṇam patati” ityādaḥ paṇaviśeṣaṇasyāpi vrkṣasya kārakatāpatih, “vrkṣāt patati” iti prayogānurodhāt. tarhi asmadiyaśabdaprayogavilakṣaṇyamātreṇa ekasyaiva jana-katvājanakatve vyavatiṣṭhete iti cet.

Translation: It may be so. In the expression “*vrkṣasya paṇam patati*: a leaf of tree is falling down,” the word *vrkṣa* which is a qualifier to the word *paṇa* can be the *kāra* because there is an usage like “*vrkṣāt (paṇam) patati*” in which *vrkṣa* is the *kāra*. Thus, contrary to our usage, it would lead to establish two properties, i.e., producer-ness (*janakatā*) and non-producer-ness (*ajanakatā*), to only one item.

Notes: Let us see the following sentences.

vrkṣasya paṇam patati: A leaf of a tree is falling down.

vrkṣāt paṇam patati: A leaf is falling down from a tree.

In the above sentences, the word *vrkṣa* is used. In the first sentence, since this word is a qualifier to the word *paṇa*, it has *ajanakatā*. On the other hand, in the latter, since it is regarded as the point of separation, it is called *apādāna* and thus has *janakatā* (i.e., *kāratā*). Such different usages regarding to one and the same word would imply that two properties which are contradictory to each other do exist in one entity. This is indicated by the interpretation of the term *upasarjana*.

However, this objection is an argument just for the sake of argument. If *kāra* is considered as an exclusive notion, once any entity is called, say, *apādāna*, it would be so elsewhere. The different attribution of six *kāras* which is represented in the sentences are neither exclusive nor factual. It is a linguistic difference which enables the entity to perform such a role. When, in the outside world, the entity is witnessed as a point of a separation, it is called *apādāna* and takes an ablative case. When the same entity is witnessed as an object and the speaker wants to express it so, then it is called *karman*. The notion of *kāra* is thus relative and every entity is eligible for all types of *kāra* in the verbal communication. This is a position of Pracīnavaiyākaraṇas.

2.6. Siddhānta

atredam siddhāntarahasyam.

Translation: Now, this is the secret of final view.

2.6.1. By Pracīna.

kāraakatvaṃ tadvyāpyakarṭṛtvādiṣatkañ ca vastuviśeṣe 'navasthitam. viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyavat tarhi gauḥ sarvaṃ prati gaur eva, na tu kañcit praty agaur itivad viśeṣaṇam viśeṣaṇam eveti suvacam. tathā ca kiṃ kārakam, kaḥ karttā, kiṃ karmetyādipraśne sarvaṃ ity uttaram.

Translation: The *kāra*-ness, which has six varieties like agency (*karṭṛ*), etc. prevailed by it, is not fixed in a particular object. Like the relation of qualifier and qualificand, namely, the word *go* can be used for every cow but not for anything which is not a cow. [In the same manner,] a qualifier is nothing but a qualifier [so it does not serve as the *kāra* in the above example]. Therefore, when the question arises “What is *kāra*?”, “Who is the agent?”, or “What is the object?”, etc., it is the answer that “everything [can be eligible for it].”

Notes: This view is borrowed from Bhartṛhari. According to him, everything can become all types of *kāra* because it has *śakti* which enables itself to do so. He says [VP.III.7.1]:

svāśraye samavetānāṃ tadvad evāśrayāntare.

kriyānām abhiniṣpattaṃ sāmārthyam sādhanam viduḥ.

“The one which resides in its substratum, or in a substratum of the other, is called ‘a capability (*sāmārthya*)’ which is a means (*sādhana*) to accomplish actions.”

This capability is nothing but a power (*śakti*). Such a power is inevitably inherent in the substance and when the action takes place this power functions as the means of that action (*sarvatra sahaṃ śaktir yāvad dravyam avasthitā. kriyakāle tv abhivyakter āśrayād upakāriṇī* [ibid., 28]). When the action is not yet started, the *śakti* is not differentiated. However, once the action starts, something functions as the agent and something as the instrument, etc. A speaker, witnessing a series of the action and the different roles performed by different substances, attributes the grammatical designations such as *karṭṛ* and *karāṇa*, etc. to the substances. This attribution of the grammatical role is based on the roles of which the substance plays in that action and, therefore, the substance whose *śakti* is not exclusively restricted to one role can be given different designations according to the aspects of the action.

2.6.2. By Navya

vakṣyamānakarṭṛtvakarmatvāder acetaneṣu ānādiṣu ca nirbādhatvāt kayā pacidhātuvyaktiyā upasthāpīte 'rthe kiṃ karṭṛdikam itī praśne tu prakṛtapacivvyaktyupāttavyāpārāśrayaḥ kartā. vyāpāryadhikaraṇaphalāśrayaḥ karma. {p.114} yad vyāpārottara-

*bhāvitvaṃ kriyāyā vivakṣyate tat karaṇam. karṭṛkarmanor āśrayo
'dhikaraṇam ityādikrameṇottaram.*

Translation: However, since the agency or the object-ness, etc. which is to be expressed is not assumed to be inanimate and infinite [like space or time], the question should be “Who is the agent in which his action is represented by a particular verbal root like *pac-*?” In this case, the answer is as follows: the agent is the substratum of the activity obtained by the individual verbal root *pac-* in context, that the object is the substratum of the result which is residing in a different locus from that of the activity, that the instrument is that which is intended to express the production of action subsequent to the activity, and that the locus is the substratum of either the agent or the object.

Notes: Here, Bhaṭṭoji turns his position. His statement declares that everything cannot become all types of *kāraṇa*. Because, in case of *acetana* or *anādi* things, although we have the expressions such as “*ākāśam pravartate*: the sky expands,” or “*ratho gacchati*: a cart is going,” it does not mean that we accept the *acetana* or *anādi* things as being the agent of those actions independently. Since we have such usages and they are desired, in order to derive them we have to postulate the agency, etc., in them. This agency (*karṭṛtva*) is not the power of them but the grammatical expression. This postulation is based on the extremely linguistic treatment of the term *kāraṇa*. The term *karṭṛ* or *karman* is a grammatical designation insomuch as that action denoted by the verbal root in context is concerned. (In detail, see Kudo [1995]).

2.7. Example of verbal root *pac-*

viklityanukūlavvyāpāro hi pacyarthah. vyāpāraś cānekadhā.

Translation: [Let us consider the example of *pac-*.] The meaning of verbal root *pac-* is an activity conducive to softening. And [this] activity has several stages [in it].

Notes: In this section onwards (2.7), how the sentences differ due to the different aspects of the action and its substratum. This difference is based on the notion that the verbal root denotes a series of several activities. Action consists of several activities. For example, the verbal root *pac-* denotes the act of cooking. This act of cooking is regarded as a collection of sub-actions. Basing on each sub-action, the agent as the substratum of that sub-action differs and consequently the sentence differs as well. These are illustrated. (For the discussions about the meaning of verbal root, and theory of *kriyā*, etc., that is to say, Pāṇinian theory of action, is not treated here due to the limit of space.)

2.7.1.1. Different agent due to the different aspects of cooking

*tatra pacer adhiśrayanataṇḍulāvapanaidhopakarsaṇāpakarsaṇa-
phūtkārādītātparyakatve tadāśrayo devadattaḥ kartā.*

Translation: When the speaker wants to express the activity like putting [a pot] on [the fire], putting the rice grains into [the pot], supplying and pulling out the fuel, and blowing [the fire], the agent is Devadatta who is the substratum of those activities [and the sentence might be “*devadattaḥ pacati*”].

Notes: cf. Vt VIII on P.1.4.23, I,324,17-18. *adhiśrayaṇodakāsecana-taṇḍulāvapanaidhopakarsaṇakriyāḥ pradhānasya kartuḥ pākaḥ*: The act of cooking performed by the main agent consists of ‘putting [a pot] on [a stove]’ (*adhiśrayaṇa*), ‘pouring water’ (*udakāsecana*), ‘putting the rice grains in [the pot]’ (*taṇḍulāvapana*), and ‘supplying [= dragging and pulling out] the fuel’ (*edhopakarsaṇa*).

2.7.1.2. The agent turned from the instrument

jvalanatātparyakatve tv edhāḥ kartāraḥ.

Translation: When the act of heating is intended, the agent is the fuel [and the sentence should be “*edhāḥ pacanti*”].

Notes: cf. Vt X on do., I,325,1. *edhāḥ pakṣyanty ā viklitter jvaliṣyantīti jvalanakriyā karaṇasya pākaḥ*: The act of cooking by the instrument is ‘heating’ (*jvalana*) such as “*edhāḥ pakṣyanti*: the fuels will cook,” namely “[they] will heat until [the rice grains] become soft” (*ā viklitter jvaliṣyanti*).

2.7.1.3. The agent turned from the locus

taṇḍuladhāraṇādiparatve sthālī kartrī.

Translation: When the act of holding the rice grains is [intended], the agent is the pot [and the sentence is “*sthālī pacati*”].

Notes: cf. Vt IX on do., I,324,21-22. *droṇaṃ pacaty ādhakaṃ pacati-ti sambhavanakriyā dhāraṇakriyā cādhikaraṇasya pākaḥ*: The act of cooking by the locus consists of ‘taking in’ (*sambhavana*) and ‘holding in’ (*dhāraṇa*) as in “*droṇaṃ pacati*: it [= the pot] cooks as much as *droṇa*,” and “*ādhakaṃ pacati*: it cooks as much as *ādhaka*.”

2.7.1.4. The agent turned from the object

avayavavibhāgādiparatve taṇḍulāḥ kartāraḥ. ata eva karmakartā karaṇakartetyādi vyavahāraḥ.

Translation: When the separation into small pieces is [intended], the agent are the rice grains [and the sentence is “**taṇḍulāḥ pacanti*” or “*taṇḍulāḥ pacyante svayam eva*”].

Therefore, we have the [linguistic] usages like ‘*karmakartr*: objective agent’ and ‘*karaṇakartr*: instrumental agent,’ etc.

Notes: An object, when it is regarded as an agent, is treated as the agent. In this case, the action which is performed by itself is directed to itself. This is so-called reflexive construction prescribed by P.3.1.87: *karmavat karmaṇā tulyakriyāḥ*. The oft-quoted example is “*odanaḥ svayam eva pacyate*: rice cooks itself.” Here, rice is a substratum of the act of cooking and at the same time a substratum of the result, i.e., a

softening. Although rice is the object of the act of cooking in the active, when the speaker wants to express the act of cooking restrictedly as softening, the *karman* which is the substratum of the result becomes the agent because the *karman* is independent as far as its activity is concerned. This is the *karmakartr* (the object-turned-agent). The verbal understanding from this sentence is, according to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, “*ekodaṇābhinnāśrayakaḥ pākānukūlo vyāpāraḥ*: the activity conducive to the act of cooking in which the substratum of it is identical with rice” [VBS. dhātvarthanirṇaya, p. 75]. (As for the reflexive construction, see Kudo [1993] and also other articles listed in it. This is also to be referred, Iwasaki [1993]).

2.7.2.

evam “sthālyā pacati” ity atra tṛtīyopāttavyāpārāśrayo ’pi sthālī karaṇam eva, na tu tadā kartrī. devadattādivyāpārasyaiva tatra dhātūpāttatvāt.

Translation: In this way, in case of “*sthālyā pacati*” the pot is nothing but the instrument even though it is a substratum of the activity represented by the third case. It is not always an agent because the activity of Devadatta, etc. is represented by the verbal root.

Notes: According to the grammarians, a verbal ending indicates either the agent or the object. P.3.4.69: *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarma-kebhyaḥ* (I-members are introduced [after a verbal stem] to denote [the agent] as well as the object and [after] intransitive to denote the abstract action in addition to [the agent]).

Bhaṭṭoji clearly states this in his VMM. k.3:

*phalavyārārayos tatra phale tanyakcīṇādayaḥ.
vyāpāre śapsnamādayas tu dyotayanty āśrayānvayam.*

“Among the activity and the result [which are the meanings of verbal root], *ātmanepada* ending *-taṆ*, passive *vikaraṇa -yaK*, and aorist marker *-CiṆ*, etc., indicate the relation to the substratum of the result, and the present verbal stem formants such as *ŚaP*, *ŚnaM*, etc., indicate the relation to the substratum of the agent.”⁶

Therefore, in the verbal form *pacati* whose grammatical formation is [*pac-* + *ŚaP* + *tīP*], the verbal ending *tīP* shows the relation to the agent. In “*sthālyā pacati*,” since the agent of the act of cooking is already represented in the verbal ending *tīP*, the pot does not serve as the agent.

⁶ Suffix *taṆ* is a term for nine personal ending of *ātmanepada* [P.1.4.100]. The affix *yaK* is the marker of passive [P.3.1.67: *sarvadhātuke yaK*]. *CiṆ* is the aorist maker [P.3.1.66: *CiṆ bhāvakarmaṇoḥ*]. *ŚaP* is the *sārvadhātuka* marker *-a* which is introduced after verbal roots in active voice. [P.3.1.68: *kartari ŚaP*]. *ŚnaM* is the affix introduced after verbal roots which belong to the seventh class [P.3.1.78: *rudhādibhyaḥ ŚnaM*].

2.7.3. Another example

*tathādikhādibhyām upātte 'rthe batuḥ kartā. tasminn evārthe bhakṣayatinopātte 'rthe ādhārah^{*1} karma. adhipūrvaiḥ sīNsthāprabhṛtibhir upātte 'rtha ādhārah karma. tatraiva kevalair upātte 'dhikaraṇam ityādi.*

*1. Read *batuḥ*. (MS 89R2).

Translation: When the act of eating is denoted by a verbal root like *ad-* or *khād-*, a boy (*batu*) is the agent [and the sentence is “*batuḥ attī*” or “*batuḥ khādati*”]. [But,] when such a meaning, i.e., the act of eating is denoted in the causative construction like *bhakṣayati*, the boy [being the substratum of that activity] is called *karman* [by P.1.4.52 and takes the accusative case by P.2.3.2]. [Thus, the sentence would be “*(*devadattaḥ*) *batum ādayati ; khādayati*”.]⁷

When the verbal roots like *sī-*, *sthā-* [and *ās-*] are prefixed with *adhi-*, the locus is regarded as *karman*. [However,] when [those verbal roots] are used without prefix, [the substratum] is called *adhikaraṇa* [by P.1.4.45 and takes the locative case by P.2.2.36].

Notes: P.1.4.52: *gatibuddhipratyavasāyārthaśabdakarmākarmakāṇām aNikartā sa Nau*. This rule teaches that an agent in non-causative construction is regarded as an object in the causative when the verbal root listed in this rule is used. For example:

[aNiC] *gacchati māṇavako grāmam*: A boy goes to a village.

[NiC] *gamayati māṇavakaṃ grāmam*: [He] lets a boy to go to a village.

However, the application of this rule is restricted. The prohibition is given in *Vt V*: *adikhādinivahinām pratiśedhaḥ* [MBh ad P.1.4.52, I.337,14]. By P.1.4.52, the agent of a verbal root denoting the meaning of ‘eating’ (*pratyavasānārtha*) in the non-causative construction becomes the *karman* in the causative construction. In case of the verbal roots like *ad-* or *khād-*, however, the agent in *aNiC* is prohibited to become the *karman* in *NiC* construction by the present *Vt V*. For example,

[aNiC] *batuḥ annam attī khādati*: A boy eats the food.

[NiC] *batunā annam ādayati khādayati*: (He) makes a boy eat the food.

In this passage of ŚK, Bhaṭṭoji seems to forget this prohibition of *Vt V*, for his statement says that “*tasminn evārthe bhakṣayatinopātte 'rthe batuḥ karma*.” If the boy is called *karman*, the word *batu* should take the accusative, but it is not desired. It is strange that Bhaṭṭoji, here, ignores the prohibition of *Vt V* even though he himself admits this

⁷ In MBh. ad P.1.4.52, the causative form of *ad-* is given as *ādayate*. The prohibition of *Vt V* is not only restricted to P.1.4.52, but also to P.1.3.87 which prescribes to add the *parasmaipada* endings. Due to this view held by another grammarian, the verbal root does not take the *parasmaipada* but the *ātmanepada* in the causative [I.337,14-19]. In details, see Joshi and Roodbergen [1975, pp. 245-246, Note (170)].

prohibition and quotes the example mentioned above in his *Siddhānta-kaumudī* no. 540.

P.1.4.46: *adhiṣīNsthāsām karma*.

When the verbal roots such as *śī-*, *sthā-*, *ās-* are prefixed by *adhi-*, the locus (*ādhāra*) where that action is taken place is regarded as *karman*. Since it is called *karman*, it takes accusative case by P.2.3.2. For example:

vaikuṇṭhe śete; tiṣṭhati; āste → *vaikuṇṭham adhiṣete; adhiṭiṣṭhati; adhyāste*.

2.8.1. Objection.

nanv evam ananugama iti cet?

Translation: This leads to an inconsistency.

Notes: The inconsistency referred here is as follows: the agent in the active voice (in this case, the non-causative construction) is called *karman* in the causative. However, this general exchange has an exception stated in *Vt V* on P.1.4.52. Thus, the agent in the active is called *karman* in certain cases of verbal roots and takes the accusative in the causative and, on the other hand, it is called not *karman* but *kartr*, and takes the instrumental.

2.8.2. Reply

satyam, kasya kaḥ pitā ko bhrāta ity atrevānanugatasyaiva lakṣyatvāt. ata eva prayogānām sādhasādhitā vyavatiṣṭhate. anyathā kvacit kartuḥ sarvatra karṭṭāpattau sakalaprayogāḥ saṅkīryeran.

Translation: True. As is in case of the question like “Who is whose father?”, “Who is a brother of whom?”, this inconsistency is implied.

Therefore, the correctness or incorrectness of the usages is decided case-by-case. Otherwise, in certain cases where [someone] is the agent, he should be so elsewhere and it would lead to the confusion of all the usages.

Notes: The answer is very simple to say that the *kāraka* is a relative notion such as the relation of father-son. Someone is called father of X and at the same time he is a son of Y.

2.8.3.

uktaṃ ca Hariṇā [VP.III.7.91]

*vastutas tadanirddeśyam na hi vastu vyavasthitam .
sthālyā pacyata ity eṣā vyavasthā dṛśyate yataḥ.⁸ iti.*

Translation: Thus, it was said by Bharṭhari:

⁸ VP.III.7.91. The word *vyavasthā* in *d pāda* is *vivakṣā* in the editions of Abhyankar-Limaye, Iyer, and Rau.

In reality, nothing can be indicated as it [= *karana*] since [the role of] things is different in each case. This is known from the usage “*sthālyā pacyate*” in which the speaker wants to say so.

2.8.4. Causative construction

ata eva prayojakavyāpārvyāpyatvāviśeṣe 'pi pacyādīdhātuṣu prayojyo na karma, gamyādiṣv eva tu karma.

Translation: Therefore, even if there is no difference in the state of being pervaded by the activity of a prompter, the prompted [agent in NiC construction] in case of a verbal root *pac-*, etc. does not become *karman*. However, in case of a verbal root *gam-* [i.e., the verbal root which has a meaning of the movement (*gatyārtha*)] it becomes *karman*.

Notes: See also 2.7.3. Let us see the following examples again.

Ex. [aNiC] *devadattaḥ gacchati* → [NiC] (*yajñadattaḥ*) *devadattaṃ gamayati.*

[aNiC] *devadattaḥ pacati* → [NiC] (*yajñadattaḥ*) *devadattena pācayati.*

In both of the causative constructions, Devadatta is ‘*prayojyakarṭr*: an agent whose action is prompted by someone (*prayojakakarṭr*)’. Now, an underlying role of each item is presented on the right shoulder in a small letters.

devadattaḥ gacchati

= *devadatta*^{karṭr} + *gam-ŚaP-tiP*^{karṭr}.

devadattaṃ gamayati

= *devadatta*^{prayojyakarṭr} + *gam-NiC-ŚaP-tiP*^{prayojakakarṭr}.

In this case, Devadatta is the *prayojyakarṭr*. According to the Vt V on P.1.4.52, since the verbal root *gam-* has the meaning of movement, this *prayojyakarṭr* is called *karman* and thus takes the accusative [P.2.3.3] in the causative.

devadattaḥ pacati

= *devadatta*^{karṭr} + *pac-ŚaP-tiP*^{karṭr}.

devadattena pācayati

= *devadatta*^{prayojyakarṭr} + *pac-NiC-ŚaP-tiP*^{prayojakakarṭr}.

Here, Devadatta is also the *prayojyakarṭr*. However, since the verbal root *pac-* is not included in the list of P.1.4.52, this *prayojyakarṭr* remains as *karṭr*. Being the *karṭr*, it takes the instrumental [P.2.3.18] in the causative.

2.8.5.

tathā “paurāṇikāc chṛṇoti,” “naṭasya śṛṇoti” ity atra paurāṇiko-pādānaṃ kārakañ ca, naṭas tu nobhayam ityādi vakṣyamānaṃ saṅgacchate.

Translation: Then, in cases of “*paurāṇikāc chṛṇoti*: he listens to [a story] from a story-teller” or “*naṭasya śṛṇoti* : he listens to [a song] of a

singer,” the story-teller is *apādāna* as well as *kāraka*. But the actor is neither *apādāna* nor *kāraka*. Thus should be noted.

Notes: P.1.4.29: *ākhyātopayoge*: A person who provides information, [if [that information] is useful, [is called *apādāna*].

Ex. *naṭasya śṛṇoti*.

MBh ad. P.1.4.29 discusses this example [I.329.6-11]:

upayoga ity ucyamāne 'py atra prāpnoti, eṣo 'pi hy upayogaḥ. ātaś copayogo yad ārambhakā raṅgaṃ gacchati naṭsya śroṣyāmo, granthikasya śroṣyāma iti. evaṃ tarhy upayoga ity ucyate sarvaś copayogas tatra prakarṣgatir vijñāsyate. sādhiyo ya upayoga iti. kaś ca sādhiyaḥ. yo granthārthayoḥ. athavopayogaḥ ko bhavitum arhati. yo niyamapūrvakaḥ. tadyathā upayuktā māṇavakā ity ucyante ya ete niyamapūrvakam adhītavanto bhavanti.

To hear an actor has no usefulness because it does have neither high utility nor disciplined conduct, even though people have an enjoyment from him (**naṭac chṛṇoti*)⁹. Since the actor is not covered by this rule, it is not *apādāna*. Then, how about the *kāraka*-status? If it is regarded as *kāraka*, since it is not *apādāna*, it would be covered by P.1.4.51 (*akathitaṃ ca*). This rule gives the term *karman* to which is not covered by any one of the previous rules. If it is the case, the actor is called *karman* and takes the accusative case by P.2.3.2. However, it is not desired. Therefore, the actor is out of *kāraka*-range and is included in *śeṣa*. By P.2.3.50, it takes a genitive case.

2.9.1. Objection

nanv evaṃ “laḥ karmaṇi (ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ)” [P.3.4.69] ityādi vidhiṣu kiṃ karma grāhyam iti cet?

Translation: In the rules like “*laḥ karmaṇi (ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ)*” [P.3.4.69], what kind of *karman* is to be known?

Notes: In grammar, the *karman* is classified into three (P.1.4.49-51: *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma; tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam; akathitaṃ ca.*). Once any item is called *karman*, there is no difference for the application of the rules. (For the types of *karman*, i.e., the difference of its content, see VP.III.7.79 quoted in the Notes of 2.3.)

2.9.2. Reply

vinīgamakābhāvāt sarvam ity avehi. yathā bhasyety atra sarvaṃ bham.

⁹ Nāgeśa admits this sentence “*naṭac chṛṇoti*” as correct only in case that people go to the theatre in order to get information from the actor as their teacher [Uddyota, II.253: *yadā tu naṭādibhyo 'pi tathādhyayanaṃ tadā naṭac chṛṇotīti bhavaty eveti bodhyam*].

Translation: Since there is no deciding factor between the alternatives, everything can be realized as *karman*. In case of “*BHAsya*” [P.6.4.129], this rule means every item which is termed *BHA*.¹⁰

2.9.3. Objection

tarhi tighubhādivat pārībhāṣikam eva kārakatvakarmatvādikaṃ syād iti cet?

Translation: [Objection:] If so, like *ṬI*, *GHU*, and *BHA*, etc. [which are an artificial technical term (*kr̥trimā samjñā*)], the term *kāraka* and *karman*, etc., are [to be known] as being technical.¹¹

2.9.4. Reply

ko vā brūte neti. etāvān eva paraṃ bhedaḥ tighubhādīnām śabdasaṃjñātvam, itaresān tv arthasaṃjñātvam iti.

Translation: [Answer:] No one can refute this. Only this difference is [to be known], namely, *ṬI*, etc., is the technical term of the word and, on the other hand, *kāraka*, etc., is the technical term of the meaning.

Notes: The word *śabdasaṃjñā* is related to the rule for a phonetic unit (*varṇavidhī*) and, on the other hand, the word *arthasaṃjñā* is to the rule for a meaning prescription (*arthavidhī*).

2.9.5.1. Reason for accepting *karman* as a technical term

evañ ca “karmaṇi dvitīyā” [P.2.3.2] ity anena yathāyatham ādhārādāv api dvitīyā vidhīyate iti phalitam.

Translation: In this way, the second case ending is introduced even after an item which denotes the locus, etc., by P.2.3.2.

Notes: So-called *ādhāra-karman* is prescribed in P.1.4.46-48. (*adhīṣṭiṅsthāsām karma; abhinivīśās ca; upānavadhyāṅvasaḥ*). This attribution of term *karma* to the item which is in fact the locus is technically (or grammatically) decided.

2.9.5.2. Refutation of the view of Naiyāyikas

“rathena gamyate,” “ratho gacchati” ityādāv api kartr̥vibhaktir utsargeṇaiva siddhetī, na tatra lakṣaṇāśrayaṇīyety avadheyam.

Translation: It should moreover be noted that the case ending which is introduced after the item which denotes the agent is generally established by P.2.3.18, but it is not necessary to resort to the

¹⁰ P.6.4.129: *BHAsya*. This technical term is applied to the pre-affixial stem which is prescribed by P.1.4.18-19, i.e. “*yaCi BHAm: BHA* denotes an item before an affix with initial semivowel or any vowel” and “*tasau matVarthe: [BHA]* denotes an item (ending in) the phonemes (-t, -s) before an affix having the meaning of affix *matUP* (P.5.2.94)” (See Katre [1987]).

¹¹ P.1.1.64: *aCo 'ntyādi ṬI*. *ṬI* denotes a syllable which begins with the last vowel of a given unit. P.1.1.20: *dādhā GHVadāP*. *GHU* denotes the verbal roots of the form *dā* or *dhā* except those which have the shape of *dāP* (See Katre [1987]).

secondary function of the word-meaning [in order to introduce that ending] in case of sentences like “*rathena gamyate*” or “*ratho gacchatī*” [in which an inanimate thing is the agent].

Notes: This is a refutation to the view of Naiyāyikas. According to them, since the verbal ending denotes the effort (*kṛti*, *yatna*), an animate thing cannot be the agent of action. In order to explain how the expression like “*rathena gamyate*” or “*ratho gacchatī*” is to be formed, they have to resort to the secondary function of the word (*lakṣaṇā*). For the grammarians, the attribution of term *karṭr* in case of the inanimate thing is decided by the grammatical rules, and thus they need not resort to *lakṣaṇā*, which is redundant (see also 2.6.2).

2.10.

vibhaktīnām vācyāṃśāniṣkarsas *1 *tu kariṣyate*

*1. Read *vācyāṃśāniṣkarsas*. (MS. 90R11).

Translation: The odd part of the denoted meaning of case endings is dealt with [as follows].

Notes: From this passage, the discussion is directed to the problem whether the case endings represent either the *kāraka* or the meaning of the *kāraka*.

2.10.1. Against Naiyāyikas 1

etena jñānasya svaprakāśatve karṭrkarmavirodham udbhāvayantaḥ parāstāḥ, śabdaviśeṣopādhikasya karṭṛtvādeḥ pratyakṣādāv uktisambhavāt.

Translation: Here, even if the knowledge illuminates itself, those who raise the contradiction of agent and object are defeated. Because it is valid to make a statement about a direct perception¹², etc., like “*devadattaḥ ghaṭaṃ paśyati*”, since the agency, etc., is the distinctive feature of a particular word.

Notes: In the direct perception, a knower (*pramāṭr*) perceives a knowable (*prameya*). If the perception reveals the form of the object, is it the object itself or the reflection of the form of the object? If a knowledge comes arise with the form of the object, it means that the knowledge knows the knowledge. In this case, the agent of the cognition and the object of it are not differentiated. For the grammarians, however, the notion of the agent or the object is highly

¹² The notions of *karṭr* and *karman* discussed in relation to a direct perception are, for example, found in the *Tattvacinātmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa, *pratyakṣakhaṇḍa*, *Anuvyavasāyavāda*, vol.1, p. 765ff: *api ca kriyāyāḥ kṛter vā samvāyitvaṃ karṭṛtvaṃ, parasamavetakriyāphalaśālitvaṃ karaṇavyāpāra- viṣayatvaṃ vā karmmatvaṃ, dhātvarthatvaṃ anyad vā kriyātvaṃ idam ahaṃ jānāmīti vyavasāye na bhāsate tadbodhakendriyasannikarṣābhāvāt kin tv idam viṣayakajñānatvaviśiṣṭasya jñānasya vaiśiṣṭyam ātmani bhāsate. na ca svaprakāśe vyavasāye tādrśaṃ svasya vaiśiṣṭyaṃ bhāsitum arhati, pūrvaṃ viśeṣanasya tasyājānāt. tasmād idam ahaṃ jānāmīti na vyavasāyaḥ kintv anuvyavasāyaḥ. syād etat. karṭṛtvādiññānavaiśiṣṭyam ātmani mā jñāyi vyavahārasya svaviśayakajñānasādhyatvasiddhau tad eva jñānaṃ svaviśayakaṃ kalpyate lāghavāt. ...'*

linguistical so that the agency, etc., is the distinctive features of the word not the external reality of the object. Thus, the linguistic behavior becomes possible.

2.10.2. Against Naiyāyikas 2

etena parasamavetakriyāphalaśālitvaṃ karmatvaṃ ced apādāne 'tivyāptir ity āśaṅkya dhātvarthatāvacchedakaphalaśālitvaṃ tad iti pariṣkurvanto 'pi parāstāh.

Translation: Then, if you suspect that in case that the object-ness is [defined as] the state of being an abode of the result of action which is residing in other(s), it would be too broad to apply to an *apādāna* item; hence, it is well defined that it is the state of being an abode of the result which is the delimitor of the meaning-ness of the verbal root. [It is not correct, thus] those who claim so are also defeated.

Notes: In this passage, two definitions of *karmatva* are mentioned. First definition is “*parasamavetakriyāphalaśālitvaṃ.*” Let us consider an example “*devadatto grāmaṃ gacchati,*” and the meaning of verbal root *gam-*.

The meaning of the verbal root *gam-* is “*pūrvadeśavibhāgajanyo-ttaradeśasaṃyogānukūlavyāpāra:* an activity conducive to the contact with another place produced by a separation from a previous point.” Here, the contact (*saṃyoga*) is the result of the action. Thus, its substratum, i.e., *grāma* (a village) is called *karman* and takes the accusative case. However, since the separation resides in the one which is other than the agent and this meaning is regarded as that which leads to the result its substratum would be called *karman*. In this case, the substratum of the separation, which is to be *apādāna*, would be wrongly covered by the first definition of *karmatva*. Therefore, this definition should be rejected.

Second definition is “*dhātvarthatāvacchedakaphalaśālitvaṃ.*” In this case, the separation is not the delimitor of *dhātvarthatā*. Therefore, this definition would not overapply to its substratum which is *apādāna*.

The definition of the word *karman* in Nyāya is first appeared in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana (350-450 CE)¹³ on *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.16 [pp. 438-9]. Namely, “*kriyayā vyāptum iṣyamānatamaṃ karma:* it is an object which is most desired to be pervaded by an action.” Uddyotakara (500-600 CE) comments on this passage [*ibid.*, p. 437]: *karmani kaḥ kārakārthaḥ? kriyāviṣayatvaṃ* (What is a meaning as *kāraka* in the object? It is a state of being a object of the action). Furthermore, Vācaspati Miśra I (10 c. CE) says in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā* [p. 437] that “*anātmamasamavetakriyāphalaśālitvaṃ kriyāviṣayatvaṃ karmatvaṃ:* the state of being an object is the state of being an abode of a

¹³ All dates of the Naiyāyikas' are given from Matilal [1977].

result [produced by] the action which is not in oneself or the state of being a content of the action.” He exemplifies a sentence “*devadattaḥ vṛkṣam paśyati*: Devadatta is seeing a tree” and explains its sentence-meaning as follows:

devadattasamavetayā hi kriyayā darśanalakṣaṇayā vṛkṣaviṣayo 'nubhavo janyate [*Ibid.*].

“A perception in which the tree is a content is produced by the action in the form of seeing which is residing in Devadatta.”

Vācaspati's definition is borrowed by the later Naiyāyikas (namely, Navya-Naiyāyikas). However, it is quoted as a *pūrvapakṣa*. For example, in the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*, Śāśadhara (ca. 12c. CE) says “*na cānyasamavetakriyāphalabhāgitvaṃ karmatvam*” [p. 25, ll.5-6]. The *Kārakacakra* of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa (ca. 1570 CE), perhaps the first independent work on *kāra* in the history of Navya-Nyāya, discusses the notion of *karman*, first refuting the definition of Pracīna-Naiyāyikas:¹⁴

nāpi parasamavetakriyājanyaphalaśālitvam gamipatyoh pūrvasmin deśe, tyajeś cottarasmin deśe, spandeh pūrvāparayoś ca karmatva-prasaṅgāt. [p. 19] ... *tathā ca tattaddhātvarthatāvacchedakaphalaśālitvam tattaddhātvarthakarmatvam.* [p. 20]

“Nor is it defined as the state of being an abode of the result produced by the action inherent in the other(s). Because [in that case] the object-ness would be incorrectly supposed to ‘a previous point (*pūrvadeśa*)’ in cases of verbal roots such as *gam-* and *pat-*, and to ‘a subsequent point [of moving] (*uttaradeśa*)’ in case of *tyaj-*, and to ‘both [i.e., here and there] points [of moving]’ in case of *spand-*. ... Thus, the state of being the object of the meaning of each verbal root is the state of being the abode of result which is a delimiter of the *dhātvarthatā*.”

Above mentioned passage of ŚK is apparently parallel to this argument of Bhavānanda.

2.11.1. Against Naiyāyikas 3

“*grāmaṃ gamayati devadattam*” {p.115} *ityādaḥ gantry avyāpteḥ. tvaṃmate gamanasya prakṛtyarthatve 'pi tathātvānavacchedakatvāt.*

Translation: Because that definition is too narrow to apply for one who goes in case of “*grāmaṃ gamayati devadattam*: [Someone] lets Devadatta to go to a village.”

In your view, the act of going has no delimiter-ness as such, even if it is included in the meaning of *gam-*.

¹⁴ Nāgeśa also refutes the definition of Pracīna-Naiyāyikas in the very same manner as Bhavānanda does [*PLM*, pp. 175-176]. Almost all the passage of *PLM* which is directed to Naiyāyikas are complete parallel to *Kārakacakra*. The authenticity of *PLM* is doubtful, as already pointed out by Kapila Deva Shastri [1974].

Notes: In this passage, non-causative and causative constructions are discussed.

[aNiC] *devadatto grāmaṃ gacchati.*

[NiC] *devadattaṃ grāmaṃ gamayati.*

The verbal root *gam-* denotes the activity in the form of going which is conducive to the contact (*saṃyogānukūlagamanarūpavyāpāra*). The contact resides in two substrata, namely the place to be reached, a village, and the goer, Devadatta. At the same time, the goer is the substratum of the act of going. Thus, he is *kartr*. The village is *karman* because it is the substratum of the result produced by the activity which is not resided in the village.

In the causative construction, what is understood is the activity in the form of the instigation and as the result Devadatta's act of going begins. In this case, Devadatta as the substratum of the act of going is still the agent (*prayojoyakartr*) and he cannot be regarded as the *karman* if we follow the Naiyāyikas' definition. Hence, the word *devadatta* cannot take the accusative case.

We find the parallel discussion in VB. subarthanirṇaya [p. 99]:

nanu — 'grāmaṃ gamayati devadatto yajñadattam' ity atra prayojoyakartary avyāptiḥ, uttaradeśasaṃyogarūpaphalasya prayojoyakriyāphalatvābhāvāt, tadanukūlakriyāyāḥ phalatve 'pi avacchedakatvābhāvāt.

“Objection arises. In the sentence ‘*grāmaṃ gamayati devadatto yajñadattam*: Devadatta lets Yajñadatta to go to a village,’ [the definition would] be too narrow to apply to the prompted agent. Because the result in the form of the contact with the latter place does not serve as the result of the action performed by the prompter. And because the activity conducive to that [result] has no property of being the delimitor to the result.”

2.11.2.

tattve vā pācayatyādiprayojoyakartary ativyāpteh.

Translation: Or, that definition would overapply to the agent which is prompted by (someone) in the case of *pācayati*.

Notes: VB. says [p. 100, ll. 1-7]:

nanu — śuddhagamadhātvarthe 'vacchedakatvavirahe 'pi, sanādyantadhātvarthaprayojoyakavyāpāraṃ prati phalatvam avacchedakatvañ ca prayojoyavyāpārasya akṣatam eva iti cet? tarhi 'pācayati devadatto viṣnumitreṇa' ity atrāpi prayojoyakartuḥ karmatāpattau dvitīyāpatteḥ iti cet. maivam, dhātvarthaphalaśālitvam iti svīkartṛñam vaiyākaraṇānām apy etad doṣasya duṣpariharatvāt. 'gatibuddhipratyavasānārtha---' iti sūtreṇa gatyādyarthānām eva iti niyamād, nānyeṣāṃ prayojoyavyāpāravattvena karmatvam iti cet, tarhi samaṃ mamāpi iti dheyam.

“Objection arises. In the meaning of the verbal root of *gam-*, even though there is no delimitor-ness, the state of being the result or

the delimitor-ness does not crush the activity of the prompted agent as far as the activity of the prompter [which is the agent of] the verbal root conjugated with suffix *saN*, etc.¹⁵ is concerned. If so, in the expression ‘*pācayati devadatto viṣṇumitreṇa*: Devadatta makes Viṣṇumitra cook,’ the prompted agent is called *karman* and thus takes the accusative case.

Answer: It should not be argued. For the grammarians who admit the *karmatva* as ‘*dhatvarthaphalaśālitvam*’, such a difficulty is hard to overcome. This is [overcome] by the separate rule like ‘*gatibuddhipratyavasānārtha---*’ [P.1.4.52]. If you claim that others holds the *karmatva* as having the activity of the prompted, it is to be noted as we do¹⁶.”

2.12.1. Objection

tatra pāribhāṣikam anuśāsanopayogikarmatvaṃ vacanabalād vyavasthitam iti cet?

Translation: In that case, it might be claimed that the object-ness suitable for the grammar, i.e., technical [object-ness] is decided by grammatical rules.

Notes: Against the statements of 2.11.1 and 2.11.2 in which the accusative form is based on the definition of *karmatva*, the grammarians reply that the accusative case of the word *devadattam* in “*devadattaṃ grāmaṃ gamayati*” and the instrumental case of the word *devadattena* in “*devadattena odanaṃ pācayati*” are explained by the separate rules, i.e., the accusative by P.1.4.52 and the instrumental by P.2.3.18, respectively. Since those case endings are introduced by separate rules, there is no harm in defining the *karmatva* as *dhātv-arthatāphalaśālitvam*. This is an objection from Naiyāyikas.

2.12.2. Reply.

apādāne 'pi tarhi tan nāstīty avehi, ekasaṃjñādhikāre 'navakāśayā *1 *bādhāt. ata eva “ātmanam ātmā hanti” ityādau parayā karmasaṃjñāyā* *2 *karmasaṃjñābādham āśaṅkyāhaṅkāradiviśīṣṭātmabhedam āśrītya tatra tatra bhāṣye samāhitam iti dik.*

*1. Add *sāvakāśayā*. *2. Read *karṭṛsaṃjñāyā*. These follows the MS. readings (MS.90Ob6-8): *ekasaṃjñādhikāre* (')*navakāśayā sāvakāśayā bādhāt. ata evātmānam ātmā ha(n)tītyādau parayā karṭṛsaṃjñ(ay)ā*

¹⁵ The word *sanādyanta* appears in P.3.1.32: *sanādyantā dhātavaḥ*. They are listed in the third *adhyāya*, first *pāda* and introduced after the verbal root followed by the active marker *ŚaP*, again followed by *lakāra* of the Present (*sārvadhatuka*). Among them, the causative marker *ṆiC* (prescribed in P.3.1.21,25,26) is included.

¹⁶ Cf. Nāgeśa gives the definition of *karmatva* in case of the causative construction. “*ṆiJarthavyāpārājanayataddhātvarthavyāpārāśrayatvam*: the state of being a substratum of an activity denoted by the contextual verbal root, which is produced by the activity being the meaning of suffix *ṆiC*.” [VSM. p. 127].

karmasaṃjñābādham āsaṃkyāhaṃkāradivīṣiṣṭātmabhedam āsṛitya tatra tatra bhāṣye samāhitam iti dik.

Translation: It should be noted that there is no such entity in *apādāna*. In the section of *ekasaṃjñā*, since [*apādāna*], as the technical term which has no scope for application [comparing to other *kāraṅkas*], sets aside the technical term which has the scope [like *karman*]. Thus, in the case of “*ātmānam ātmā hanti*,” etc., the technical term *karṭṛ* would set aside the term *karman*. [Hence, such an usage is not correct.] If you suspect [the validity of those usages], it is granted in *Bhāṣya* and elsewhere that these are confirmed by depending on the difference of *ātman* which is restricted by the self-consciousness, etc.

Notes: In the *kāraṅkāhnikā*, six *kāraṅkas* are enumerated in the order of *apādāna*, *saṃpradāna*, *kaṛaṇa*, *adhikaraṇa*, *karman*, and *karṭṛ*. Since no two technical terms can work at the same time to the same single item, only one term should be applied. According to the *paratva*-principle, when a conflict between two rules happens, the term which is prescribed in the subsequent rule always prevails over the previous one. This conflict arises where two terms have the same scope of application (*sāvakāśa*).

Six *kāraṅkas* have their own scope for application. For example, the term *apādāna* is applied to the one which is regarded as a point of separation (*dhruvam*) when a separation is taken place (*apāye*) [P.1.4.24]. P.1.4.27 prescribes the term *apādāna* for the item which is desired by the agent in case of action having the meaning of blocking (*vāraṇārtha*). The term *karman* is applied to the one which is most desired by an agent (*īpsitatamam*) [P.1.4.49]. Let us consider an example “*agner māṇavakam vārayati*: He keeps a boy away from the fire.” Here, if a suffix *-tama* is not added to the definition of *karman*, P.1.4.27 and 49 connote the same meaning. The word *māṇavaka* would be called either *apādāna* or *karman*. In this case, since both terms are equally applied (*apādāna* by P.1.4.27 and *karman* by P.1.4.49), the *paratva*-principle is introduced and the latter designation is applied. Then, how about the word *agni*? That is to say, the fire is desired because he wants to keep the fire untouched and the boy is also desired because he wants the boy not to be fired. In this case, two terms can be also applied. When the *paratva*-principle is introduced and the *karman* which is prescribed in the subsequent rule prevails, P.1.4.27 has no scope for application (*niravakāśa*). In order to give it scope, this rule should be applied, and the word *agni* is called *apādāna*; thus, it takes the ablative case.

However, the suffix *-tama* is really added to the definition, such a conflict does not happen. P.1.4.49 is applied to the word *māṇavaka* and P.1.4.27 to the word *agni*. (See *MBh* ad P.1.4.49, I.332, 10-13; Joshi and Roodbergen [1975, pp. 150-154]).

For the expression “*ātmānam ātmā hanti*”, see, for example, the following:

ātmanah karmatve pratiṣedhaḥ [Vt VIII]. *ātmanah karmatve pratiṣedho vaktavyaḥ. hanti ātmānam. ghātayaty ātmeti. sa tarhi vaktavyaḥ.*

na vā nyante 'nyasya kartrtvāt. [Vt IX]. *na vā vaktavyaḥ. kiṃ kāraṇam.nyante 'nyasya kartrtvāt. anyadatrānyante karmānyo nyantasya kartā. katham. dvāv ātmānāv antarātmā śarīrātmā ca. antarātmā tat karma karoti yena śarīrātmā sukhaduḥkhe anubhavati. śarīrātmā tat karma karoti yenāntarātmā sukhaduḥkhe anubhavatīti.* [MBh ad P.1.3.67, I.292, 9-16].

“Vt VIII. The prohibition should be made in case where *ātman* is the object. <Bh: Explanation> The prohibition should be made in case where *ātman* is the object. For example, “*hanti ātmānam*: he kills himself.” When this sentence is converted in causative construction, [the prohibition is necessary to secure *ghātayati*] in “*ghātayaty ātmā*: he allows to be killed.” Thus it should be noted.

Vt.IX. No. [It need not.] Because in the verbal form ending in *ṆiC*, it is the agent which is other than [the object in non-*ṆiC*.] <Bh.: Explanation> [The prohibition] is not necessary. Why? Because in the verbal form ending in *ṆiC* what is represented is the agent which is other than [the object in non-*ṆiC*.] That is to say, the object in the non-*ṆiC* is different from the agent in the *ṆiC*. How? In this case, two *ātmans* are considered, namely the *ātman* inside (*antarātmā*) and the physical body (*śarīrātmā*). When the *ātman* inside is doing that action, the physical body experiences a pleasure or a pain; when the physical body is doing that action, the *ātman* inside feels a pleasure or a pain.”

The same discussion is also found in MBh ad P.3.1.87. [II.67, 18-22].

2.13.1. Objection

nanv evaṃ karaṇam kārakam iti sāmānādhikarānyam katham?, asvātantryeṇa ṇvulpratyayāyogāt. anyathā karṭṣamjñāpattau karaṇasamjñāyāḥ paryāyāpatter iti cet ?

Translation: How is it possible to make an appositional statement like “*karaṇam kārakam*”? [It is impossible] because *kr̥t* suffix *ṆvuL* should not be attached to an item which is not independent. Otherwise, whenever the technical term *karṭṣ* is applied, the term *karaṇa* should be applied in turn.

Notes: Both words *karaṇa* and *kāraṇa* are derived from the verbal root *kr̥-*.

kāraṇa : *kr̥-* + *ṆvuL* [*karṭṣ kr̥t*, P.3.1.133; -*vu-* → -*aka*P.7.1.1]

karaṇa: *kr̥-* + *LyuT* [*karaṇa kr̥t*, P.3.3.115,117; -*yu-* → -*ana*P.7.1.1]

P.3.1.133: *ṆvuL-tr̥Jau*. prescribes the introduction of the *kr̥t* suffixes *ṆvuL* and *tr̥C* after the verbal root. These suffixes denote the agent

(by P.3.4.67). Therefore, the word *kāraka* means the agent of the act of doing something. P.3.3.115: *Lyuṭ ca*. prescribes the *kṛt* suffix to form a neuter action noun. This suffix is also introduced to denote an instrument or a locus. The word *karāṇa* derived from *kr-* plus suffix *Lyuṭ* means the instrument or the locus of the act of doing. Hence, *karāṇa* has no independence. If something which is not independent [i.e., *karāṇa*] is equivalent to the one which is independent [i.e., *karṭṛ*], the former would be regarded as independent and, thus, the instrument would be always the agent.

2.13.2. Reply

ucyate, adhikārasāmarthyāt kārakaśabdopanītaṃ svātantryam avasthāntaragataṃ vijñāyate. avasthāntare yat svatantraṃ tat "sādhakatamaṃ karāṇam" [P.1.4.42] iti. yathā "kurukṣetrastāḥ kāśyāṃ vasanti" ityādau. kartus tu sāmpratikaṃ svātantryam. tac ca kartṛsamjñāyām upayujyata iti.

Translation: Since [the technical term *kāraka*] serves as *adhikāra*, the word *kāraka* is applied to that which has independence by itself in the another situation. What is most effective is called *karāṇa*, which is independent in certain situations. For example, "kurukṣetrastāḥ kāśyāṃ vasanti: people of Kurukṣetra are now living in Kāśī." On the other hand, the agent has prior independence [at any stage]. And it is employed in the designation of *karṭṛ*.

Notes: As we have seen, the instrument and the object, etc. are regarded as the agent when the activity of their own is emphasized [see, 2.7.]. The change of a role is easily understood. In the above example, it is intended that people of Kurukṣetra can live in other places such as Kāśī, etc. Likewise, the instrument in a certain case can function as the agent in another case. However, the agent is always independent. *MBh.* ad P.1.4.23 says "yat sarveṣu sādhanēṣu samnīhiteṣu kartā pravartayitā bhavati: when all means are present, the agent is the prompter of them" [I.326,10].

This ŚK's answer is quoted from *PM* on P.1.4.23, II,532.

yady evam, kārakavyapadeśo 'pi karāṇādyavasthāyām na syāt? karāṇam kārakam iti adhikārasāmarthyāt. kārakaśabdopanītasvātantryam avasthāntaragataṃ vijñāsyate avasthāntare yat svatantraṃ tat sādhakatamaṃ karāṇam iti kartur eva tv ekasya sāmpratikaṃ svātantryam, tac ca kartṛsamjñāngatayā coditam.

2.14. Fifth def. of *kāraka* introduced

yadvā kārakaśabdaḥ kriyāparaḥ, karoti kartṛkarmādivyapadeśān iti vyutpatteh. tathā cāpādānādisamjñāvidhau kriyāyām ity asyopasthityā kriyānvayinām eva tattatsamjñāḥ syuḥ. "kārakāddattaśrutayoh" [P.6.2.148] ityādau tu kārakaśabdaḥ svaryate. tenaitad adhikāroktam karṭṛādiṣatkam eva gṛhyata iti.

Translation: Or rather, the word *kāraka* amounts to saying *kriyā* because of the etymology the one which introduces the designation like *karṭr*, *karman*, etc. Therefore, in the rule which prescribes the technical term *apādāna*, etc., firstly [the condition] “*kriyāyām*: in relation to action” is assumed and then each designation would be applied to that which is connected with that action. However, in the rule “*kārakāddattaśrutayor eva āśiṣi*” [P.6.2.148], the word *kāraka* is marked with *svarita* accent. Thus, it includes the six varieties like *karṭr*, etc., which have been mentioned under this section-heading.

Notes: This paraphrase is also found in *MBh* ad P.1.4.23 (*athavā yāvad brūyāt kriyāyām iti tāvat kāraka iti. evaṃ ca kṛtvā nirdeśa upapanno bhavati kāraka iti. itarathā hi kārakeṣv iti brūyāt* [I,326,16-17]). If we take the meaning *kāraka* in a literal sense, the word *kāraka* is equivalent to say *kriyā*. Commentators such as Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa understand this passage as such. This *ŚK* passage is as same as that of Kaiyaṭa[*Pradīpa*. II,246r]:

atha veti. kriyātra sūtre kārakaśabdenocyate. sā hi karṭrādīni viśiṣṭavyapadeśayuktāni karoti. viṣayatvena cāyam adhikāraḥ. kriyāyām viṣaye tad dhruvam ityādi vastu sampadyate. evaṃ ca kṛtveti. nirdhāraṇasaptamyām hi kārakeṣv iti vācyam. nirdhāraṇasyā'nekāśrayatvāt. “kārakāddattaśrutayor” ityādaḥ tu kārakaśabdasya svaritatvāt tadadhikāropāttānām apādānādīnām grahaṇam.

According to Kaiyaṭa, the word *kāraka* has *svarita* accent. The word which has *svarita* accent indicates additional results [*MBh* ad. P.1.3.11, I.273,14]. Kaiyaṭa interpretes this *bhāṣya* that this additional results mean six types of *kāraka*. See Joshi and Roodbergen [1975, p. 48 and footnote (164)].

(to be continued)

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* I wish to thank Dr. Saroja Bhate, Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages, University of Poona, who kindly gave me the opportunity of discussing about many of the problems of this text and provided valuable suggestions for the readings during my stay in Poona, 1990-1993.

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