KAUṆḌA BHAṬṬA ON THE MEANING
OF SANSKRIT VERBS (3)*

An English Translation and Annotation
of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra,*
Chapter 1 with the Introduction

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Page 11, line 4.

[Introduction to Verse 10. What would result] if one were to define [a root] simply [as what is listed in the *Dhātupāṭha*] is stated [as follows]:

Page 11, lines 5-6.

Verse 10. It will not do [to define root] simply as what is listed, for this would involve [regarding as roots] the pronoun *yā* etc., and the indeclinables *vā* etc. This is established in the *Mahābhāṣya.*

Page 11, lines 7-8.

If one defined [root] simply as what is listed [in the *Dhātupāṭha*], the pronoun *yā* would become a root. And thus, in the sentence *yāḥ paśyasi* ('those [feminine] whom you see') the phoneme *ā* [of the pronoun *yā*] would be elided by the rule *āto dhātoḥ* (6.4.140).

Notes. In the *Dhātupāṭha* the phonemic sequences *yā* and *vā* are listed without reference to their meanings. Thus, under the shorter definition there would be nothing to prevent one's regarding any *yā* and *vā* as roots. Now, if the pronoun *yā* were regarded as a root, its accusative plural would become *yaḥ* after the type of *viśvapaḥ* instead of *yāḥ*. The rule *āto dhātoḥ* (6.4.140) says that the final *ā* of a root stem elides before bha endings [weak-endings], for example *viśvapaḥ* [*viśva + pa + as - viśvap + as = viśvapaḥ*], where *pā* is the root. But if the condition *kriyāvācitva* is added then the pronoun *yā* and the

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indeclinable *vā* will be ruled out since they are not denotative of action.

Page 11, lines 8-10.

But it might be objected that of two [homophonous] words, one of which is the result of applying a grammatical rule and the other of which is original, one must select that which is original, and that therefore the pronominal [form *yā*] could not be taken [as a root] since this form results from the application of grammatical rules. In view of this [possible objection] the author adds [another instance, namely] *vā*.

Notes. An application of the *paribhāṣā* here referred to is furnished by *Pāṇ.* 2.4.77: *gāti-sthā-ghu-pā-bhūbhyaḥ sicaḥ parasmaipadeṣu:* "When active endings follow the roots *gā*, *sthā*, the *ghu* roots, *pā*, and *bhū*, [there is elision] of the sibilant of the aorist." Here, the question arises what is meant by the root *pā*, that of *pibati* 'he drinks,' or that of *pāyati* 'he dries.' The answer is that *pā* 'to drink' is intended because this is *pā* in its original form. The original form (the form found in the *Dhātupāṭha*) of the root 'to dry' is *pai*, which only becomes *pā* in certain instances, viz. these covered by *Pāṇ.* 6.1.45 *ād eca upadeśe'* (*avagraha*) *śiti:* "*Ā* shall be substituted for the final diphthong in [a root] as listed [in the *Dhātupāṭha*] when a suffix follows which does not bear an indicatory *ś*." By the same principle, of the words *yā* (original root) and *yā* (the feminine pronoun which results from *yad* by the grammatical rules:

yad + *śas* = *ya* + *as* = *ya* + *tāp* + *as* = *ya* + *ā* + *as* = *yās*), only the first could be intended in the rule defining roots. Hence, the author adds another example.

Page 11, lines 10-13.

To the indeclinable *vā* there would be unwarranted application [of the term root] because it is listed in the *Dhātupāṭha* simply as this [viz. as the phonemes *v* + *ā* with no meaning attached], and so there could be no criterion [for choosing one *vā* rather than another]. Thus, one might use *vāti* in place of *vā* [as an indeclinable] in the sense of alternative. It will not do to say that the statement [in the *Dhātupāṭha*] of the senses 'motion' and 'bearing scent' may furnish a criterion; because reference to the *Bhāṣya*, which says that the roots are not specified [as to meaning], shows that this specification is a modern addition.

Page 11, lines 14-15.

[Introduction to Verse 11.] Now an objection may be raised, that a root may well be defined as that which is denotative of action and at the same time that which is listed in the *Dhātupāṭha*. But, here the word action (*kriyā*) means nothing more than the root

meaning [i.e. result] and does not mean activity. To meet this objection the author of the verse says:

Notes. The Mīmāmsaka now argues to admit the definitions of Pāṇini and Patañjali but differs from the grammarian as to the interpretation of the word action (*kriyā*).

Page 11, lines 16-17.

Verse 11. That an action should be that which is denoted by a root and that a root should be that which denotes an action is clearly a case of mutual dependence. Therefore, it [the word *kriyā*] should be taken as defined in the *Ākara* [Patañjali's *Bhāṣya*].

Page 11, lines 18-21.

If action is that which is denoted by a root and that only, then an understanding (*graha*) of action, which is defined as the denotation of a root, will presuppose an understanding of what a root is; and an understanding of what root is, since a root is defined as composed of denotativeness of action limited by actionness [i.e. is defined as that which denotes an *x* such that *x* is an action] will presuppose an understanding of what an action is. [The text of the verse] should be explained thus by supplying the word 'understanding.' If it is taken simply as it is then it would be inappropriate, for mutual dependence is admitted to be opposed to reason only in regard to origination and understanding.

Notes. Mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) is one of the five types of hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) recognized by the Navya Nyāya as useful for attaining truth by the indirect method of invalidating a judgment. However, not all cases of mutual dependence invalidate a judgment. When I press my hands together the left hand rests on the right and the right hand on the left. This is a case of mutual dependence in position (*sthitau*) and is acceptable. Only where the mutual dependence is in regard to origination (*utpattau*), e.g. 'A alone causes B and B alone causes A,' or in regard to acknowledge or understanding [*jñāptau*], e.g. 'A alone gives rise to a knowledge of B and B alone gives rise to a knowledge of A,' does the mutual dependence invalidate the judgment. Hence, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, logician that he is, is not satisfied with the general statement of mutual dependence in the verse, but supplies the word 'understanding' to show that the case in question is of an invalidating type of mutual dependence.

Page 11, lines 21-22.

It cannot be argued that being a root means being any one [of the phonemic sequences listed in the *Dhātupāṭha*] because then the rule *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ* would be meaningless. Having this

in mind the author of the verse says 'It should be taken etc.'
[Therefore action should be understood] as a continuum of
activities and the term root is to be defined as denotative of action
and at the same time listed in the *Dhātupāṭha*.

Page 11, lines 23-26.

Objection: - Let us define a root as that which is mentioned in
the *Dhātupāṭha* and the same time which is denotative of any one
of several result portions [of the total verbal denotations], as for
example, existence [*sattā*] etc. Since [these specific results] are
denoted by roots it would be quite appropriate that it is they which
are referred to by the word *kriyā* (action) in the *Bhāṣya*.

Answer: This is wrong, because among the specific results it
will be necessary to include 'alternative' (*vikalpa*) since we have
the usage *vikalpayati* ('He offers a choice'), and then the
definition will be too wide in the manner shown above because it
will be applicable to the indeclinable *va* which denotes that sense
[viz. alternative] and at the same time is mentioned in the
Dhātupāṭha.

Notes. In the pūrvapakṣin's statement, the word portion (*aṃśa*) in the
phrase *phalāṃśa* is misleading because, according to the Mīmāṃsakas,
the root denotes a result alone and not activity and thus result cannot
be a portion of the root meaning. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa in his
Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra does not use the word. He says:
*sarvaphalāny anyatamatvena dṛṣṭvā tadvācakatve sati gaṇapaṭhita-
tvam eva sūtrārthaḥ kalpyatām iti parāstam.*

The Mīmāṃsaka argues that if it is required that the term root be
defined semantically it can still be defined as a word listed in the
Dhātupāṭha which is at the same time denotative of result. The
Mīmāṃsakas mean to say that they will enumerate all the words
which are intended to be called roots and enumerate all the results and
they will define the term root in the above manner.

They further claim that not only they but also Patañjali refers to the
result *sattā* by the word action (*kriyā,* cf. Patañjali under *Pāṇ.* 1.3.1).

The grammarians object to this definition because it will be still
applicable to the indeclinable *vā*.

It is worth nothing that in his *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, Kauṇḍa
Bhaṭṭa offers an alternative explanation of this verse. In his second
interpretation, he takes the first part of it as a Mīmāṃsā objection.
Thus: The grammarians' definition of *kriyātva* as *dhātvarthatva* and
dhātutva as *kriyārthatā* is mutually dependent. Accordingly, the
Mīmāṃsā doctrine is better, viz. that action is denoted by the *tiṅ*
suffix. To this, the grammarian says: no; better leave *kriyā* as it is
defined by Patañjali.

Page 11, lines 27-30.

[Introduction to Verse 12.] Now one might raise the objection that if the root is supposed to denote action then roots like *as* (to be) etc. which are not denotative of action would not be termed roots, since when we say *asti* (he is), the meaning action [i.e. process composed of activities] is not cognized. To meet this objection the author of the verse says:

Verse 12. Even in the case of the root *as* etc. where a part of the agent is [intended to be understood as] to be accomplished there is certainly present a productive operation (*bhāvanā*); but this [operation] does not reveal itself in the same way [i.e. it is not readily apparent as in the case of transitive roots] because it is not subservient to anything elsewhere [i.e. it dose not appear in a relation of subserviency to anything other than the agent.]

Notes. All roots, transitive and intransitive, denote action, but whereas in intransitive roots the object of the productive operation (*bhāvanā*) is different from the agent, in intransitive roots it is the same. Hence, the statement that in the roots *as* etc. the productive operation is not subservient to anything else than the agent itself. In such cases, the real nature of *bhāvanā* (productive operation) is obscured.

In general, in connection with verbs, the actor is an accomplished entity while that which is acted upon is unaccomplished. There, thus arises a difficulty of explaining intransitive constructions, where agent and object are one. How can the same entity be both accomplished and unaccomplished? The answer furnished by the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas is that one may conceive of an intransitive agent as composed of various parts or aspects, some of which are accomplished while others are not. Such an agent has not yet attained its full form and is undergoing a process of which there are three stages: beginning, maintenance and completion. The parts which are so far accomplished stand as agent while the unaccomplished parts stand as object to the productive operation. The distinction is a subtle one and not immediately apparent.

Anyatrāśeṣabhāvāt: - *Śeṣabhāva* is a technical term in Mīmāṃsā denoting the relation between subsidiary part (*śeṣa = aṅga = parārtha*), that which is subservient to something else) and that which possesses the subsidiary part (*śeṣin = pradhāna*). Since an agent performs own action in order to bring about a desired result, the action may be termed subsidiary (*śeṣa*) to both agent and object. In the case of intransitive roots, since agent and object are the same, the action is not subservient to any other entity than the agent.

Page 12, lines 1-2.

'In the case of the root *as* etc.': in the case of *as*, *bhū* etc.
'When a part of the agent': When a portion of of agent. 'To be

accomplished:' intended to be understood as to be accomplished. 'Is certainly present': is certainly cognized.

Page 12, lines 2-4.
Furthermore, we do cognize an action favourable to the result 'existence' from such a usage as where to the question "Has he moved away or not?", one is answered "He remains with great effort." Action is still more clearly cognized when we [use the root *as* to] to transmit a meaning of 'was produced': for example, "Rohita was from [i.e. was produced from] Lohita and his son was Dhundhu."

Notes. An answer should be appropriate to its question. If a question investigates an activity on the part of that agent, its answer must refer to some particular activity on the part of that agent. Thus, according to Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa the above answer 'he remains' (*tiṣṭhati*) refers to an action.

Page 12, lines 4-6.
And further, if an action were not [denoted by roots like *as*] then there would be no specification [of action] by the suffixes *laṭ* etc. [i.e. action would not be specified as past, present, and future], because the suffixes *laṭ* etc. are prescribed when it is action that is intended to be specified as present etc. This we get from the *Vākyapadīya** also

Time distinguishes action and number distinguishes all [viz. both nominal and verbal meanings].

Page 12, lines 6-12.
Now one might question why action is not clearly cognized from the verb *asti*. To meet this question the author of the verse says: 'anything elsewhere etc.' 'Because it does not appear subservient to anything else' means because the action has the same substratum as the result. And the sameness of substratum of an action with its result is an obstacle to the clarity of the action. One might object that at this rate [i.e. if the verb *asti* really denotes an action], just as to the question "What is he doing" one may answer "He is cooking", just so one might answer "He is." But we welcome the conclusion suppose a man on the verge of death and with reference to him some one asks "What is he doing?" The answer "He is [he exists]" would be approved [as meaningful] by everyone. In other contexts when it is certain that a man is in good health, the question "What is he doing?" will refer only to

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* This verse is not found in the present available edition of the *Vākyapadīya*.

some specific action like cooking, and from this limitation of context the answer "He is" will not be used.

Page 12, lines 13-16.

[Introduction to Verse 13.] Now one might object that a productive operation invariably has some result and that which is the substratum of a result is called an object [*karma*]. Accordingly, if all roots denote an action, then all roots must be transitive. To meet this objection the following verse is given.

Verse 13. When its activity and result reside in the same substratum a root is intransitive, when they reside in different substrata it is called transitive.

Notes. The result and activity are *dharmas* [properties] and the substrata of these properties are called *dharmins* [property - possessors] i.e. either agents or objects. Thus, the word *dharmi-bhede* means when the substrata of the result and activity are different.

Page 12, lines 17-19.

[The phrase] 'in the same substratum' means 'in the same substratum and there only,' that is to say, when they [viz. an activity and a result] do not reside in different substrata. Therefore, in the case of the root *gam* etc., although the result [as well as the activity] resides in the agent still our definition [of intransitive] is not so wide [as to apply the root *gam*]. 'Intransitive': for example, *bhū* etc. The meaning is that when they [viz. an activity and a result] have different substrata the root is transitive.

Notes. The Indian grammarians regard verbs of motion like *gam* as transitive verbs. The word *mātra* must therefore be inserted in the definition of intransitive roots; otherwise the definition would apply to verbs like *gam*. To explain: - In the sentence *maitro grāmaṃ gacchati* ('Maitra goes to the village') Maitra is the substratum of activity, while the result namely the conjunction of Maitra with the village, has two substrata, Maitra and the village. The quality (*guṇa*) conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is peculiar in this respect that it always resides in a pair of substances. Thus, in the sentence *maitro grāmaṃ gacchati* both activity and result reside in a single substratum, maitra. But the result does not reside there and there only. It resides also in the village. Hence, the insertion of the word *mātra* ('and there only') makes the definition of intransitive roots inapplicable to verbs of motion like *gam*.

Page 12, lines 20-22.

And this is stated in the *Vākyapadīya*: He who maintains the self by means of the self is said to exist. The root *as* is not transitive by [its having] an object [viz. the self], because the object is included [in the meaning of the root].

See *Vāk.* III. page 120.

Notes. It is clear from Bhartṛhari's verse that he considered the root *as* to denote action, viz. *svadhāraṇānukūlavyāparaḥ*, an activity favourable to one's maintaining oneself, where the part *svadhāraṇa* (one's maintaining oneself) is the result. Thus, the root *as* denotes the same meaning as the root *bhṛ* with one difference, that the root *as* includes its object (self) in its meaning, which makes it intransitive, whereas the root *bhṛ* does not. In other words, the root *as* means *svadhāraṇānukūlavyāparaḥ*, whereas the root *bhṛ* means *dhāraṇā-nukūlavyāpāraḥ*. In the case of the root *as* the 'maintaining' must not be of something other than the agent, while in the case of the root *bhṛ* the 'maintaining' or 'holding' may be of the agent or of the object; e.g. *ātmā ātmānaṃ bibharti* or *maitro vastraṃ bibharti*.

Page 12, lines 23-28.

'He who maintains etc': By this the intention is [to show] that here also [in the case of *asti* as well as in the case of transitive verbs] an activity is apprehended, [namely, an activity] favourable to the maintenance of oneself. But by its [having an] object [viz. the self] the root *as* does not become transitive, because [the object] is included in the meaning of the root; that is to say, because the activity has the same substratum as does that part of the meaning [of *as*] which is the result. In such a case 'he knows the self,' 'he desires the self' etc. we have two different selves, the bodily self and the inner self or soul.' One should explain the transitive use of the roots [*jñā, iṣ* etc.] in such cases by reference to different substrata [of the activity and result] after the manner stated by the *Bhāṣya* on the rule *karmavat karmaṇā* [*Pāṇ.* 3.1.87] viz. that the inner self does those acts by which the bodily self experiences happiness and suffering.

Notes. The pūrvapakṣin raises the difficulty that the transitive use of the root *jñā* etc. in such a sentence as *ātmā ātmānaṃ jānāti* ('the self knows the self') would be incorrect according to the definition, because the action which produces the result knowledge and the result knowledge, have one and the same substratum viz. the self (*ātmā*).

The siddhāntin answers that the self which is the agent is different from the self which is the object owing to differences of limitation (*upādhi*). The self limited by the adjunct body is the object and it is the substratum of the result knowledge, while the self limited by the adjunct innerness is the agent and is the substratum of the activity. Thus, the activity and the result have different substrata.

Page 13, lines 1-2.

[Introduction to Verse 14.] Objection: - If an action, which is not a substance, were to be the denotation of a root, then the same meaning would be cognised from a word like *pāka* [which is

formed by adding a *kṛt* suffix to the root *pac*]. It will not do to answer that this is a desirable conclusion, because it is in contradiction to the *Bhāṣya*, which says that an action denoted by a *kṛt* suffix appears like a substance. To meet this objection the following verse is given.

Notes. "Non-substantial (*asatvabhūta*) action" means action in process or durative action [see explanation given in following section of quotes] which lacks gender and number. Substance (*satva*) is defined as *liṅgasaṃkhyānvitam*, 'that which has gender and number.' Compare *Vākyapadīya**

> *Kriyā na yujyate liṅgakriyānādhārakārakaiḥ /*
> *asatvarūpatā tasyā dvayam evāvadhāryatām //*

An action is not construed with the meaning gender and it is not construed [as a *kāraka*] with *kārakas* other than those which are substrata of action. Its being non-substantial may be specified as this pair of features. *Kriyādhāra = phalāśraya* or *vyāpārāśraya = kartṛ* or *karma*. Therefore, *kriyādhārakāraka = kartṛkarmakāraka* and *kriyā-nādhārakāraka* = other than *kartṛkarmakāraka*.

Page 13, lines 3-4.

Verse 14 [Original sense.] As in the case of a word which is a finite verb there is, by means of its two constituents, a meaning pattern of *sādhya* [denoted by the base form] and *sādhana* [denoted by the suffix, assumed] in the science [of grammatical description], just so a similar succession [of meanings, i.e. *sādhya* by the base form and *sādhana* by the suffix] is to be assumed also in the case of a word ending in [a *kṛt* suffix such as] *ghañ*.

Notes. The verse is taken from Bhartṛhari [*Vāk*. III. *kriyāsamuddeśa*, p. 331]. I have translated it according to Helārāja, a commentator on the *Vākyapadīya*, whom Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa refers to as Vivaraṇakāra. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's explanation, as will be seen below, is more elaborate and misrepresents the original intention. Bhartṛhari means to say that in the verb *pacati* the root morpheme denotes *sādhya* action, i.e. action in process or durative, and the suffix *tiṅ* denotes *sādhana* i.e. that which is not in process and can act as a setter-in-motion of process. In *pacati*, of course, *tiṅ* denotes an agent. By the latter half of the verse, he means that, in a word like *pāka*, which ends in the *kṛt* suffix *ghañ*, the root morpheme denotes action in process and the suffix *ghañ* denotes that which is not in process and can act as a *sādhana*. In *dṛṣṭānta* and *dārṣṭāntika* the point is the same: that the root denotes action in process and the suffix denotes *sādhana*.

If he had not been drawing an analogy, Bhartṛhari might have used the word *siddha* with reference to *ghañ*. *Siddha* action is action in

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* This verse, according to the comm., is quoted from the *Vākyapadīya* but not found in the present available texts of the *Vākyapadīya*.

which the process is already accomplished or frozen. In some passages Bhartṛhari contrasts *sādhya* with *siddha* and in others he contrasts *sādhya with sādhana*. The difference between the two contrasts in less than may appear. He defines the word *sādhana* as *kriyāṇām abhiniṣpattau sāmarthyaṃ sādhanaṃ viduh* (*Vāk*. III, sādhanasamu. p. 173: *Sādhana* is that which is capable of bringing the action into being.) But only well-established accomplished entities are capable of serving as a *sādhana* or instrument. On the other hand, that which is *siddha* or accomplished action has the characteristics of *sādhana* because accomplished action is a substance and is thus always capable of being used as an instrument of action in process, e.g. *pākena kṣudhāṃ śamayati*. So much for the original meaning of the verse.

Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa explains the verse quite differently: He begins by comparing this verse of the *Vākyapadīya* with fourth verse that follows in the same text.

Mṛgo dhāvati paśyeti sādhyasādhanarūpatā /
tathā viṣayabhedena saraṇasyopapadyate //

In the first half of this verse, Bhartṛhari used the word *sādhya* and *sādhana* with reference to the two verbs *paśya* and *dhāvati*, for *dhāvati* has assumed the form of a *kāraka*, namely the object of the action *paśya* which is in process.

Returning now to the verse *Ākhyātaśabde* etc, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa proceeds to interpret the word *ākhyātaśabda* not as a *karmadhāraya* compound: *ākhyātaḥ śabdaḥ ākhyātaśabdaḥ,* but as a *bahuvrīhi* compound *ākhyāte śabdau yasmin*. Thus, the word means a sentence in which two verbs are used. Next, the word *bhāgabhyām,* says Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, does not mean the two parts of a verb but two verbs which form parts of a sentence; e.g. a sentence like *paśya mṛgo dhāvati*. Thus, the translation of the verse *Ākhyātaśabde* etc. according to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa will be as follows.

Verse 14. [According to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa]. Just as in a sentence having two verbs there is, by means of these two parts, a meaning pattern of *sādhya* [denoted by the one verb] and *sādhana* [i.e. *siddha* action denoted by the other verb, assumed] in the science [of grammatical description], just so, a similar succession [of meanings i.e. *sādhya* by the base form and *sādhana* by the suffix] is to be assumed also in the case of words ending in [*kṛt*] suffixes such as *ghañ*.

According to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, in the sentence *paśya mṛgo dhāvati,* the action of seeing is action in process (*sādhya*) because it is construed as a *kāraka* with another word. [cf. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, page 59]. The action of running is *sādhana* because it is not construed as the object (*karma-kāraka* cf. on p. 4, lines 22-27 notes) with the verb *paśya*. Similarly, in the word *pāka,* which ends in the suffix *ghañ,* the root *pac* denotes *sādhya* action because it is not construed as a *kāraka* with another word, and the suffix *ghañ* denotes *sādhana* i.e. *siddha* action because it is construed as a *kāraka* with another word; e.g. *pāko*

bhavati, where the action denoted by the suffix *ghañ* stands as the agent of action of becoming.

Kaunda Bhatta rejects the Vivaranakāra's explanation on the ground that the *drstānta* does not there tally with *dārstāntika*. According to the Vivaranakāra, in the *drstānta* we have *sādhya-sādhanabhāva* between the action and the *kāraka* while in the *dārstāntika* we have *sādhyasādhanabhāva* between two actions. Thus, in the *drstānta* the word *sādhana* means *kāraka* while in the *dārstāntika* it means *siddha* action. Therefore, the *drstānta* does not fit the *dārstāntika*.

But, I think Kaunda Bhatta has done wrong to refute the Vivaranakāra's explanation. There is no invariable rule that all the points observed in a *drstānta* must tally exactly with those of the *dārstāntika*. Moreover, Kaunda Bhatta's explanation of the words *ākhyātasabda and bhāgābhyām* is fantastic.

Page 13, lines 5-8.

"In a [sentence] having two verbs": in such a sentence as *pasya mrgo dhāvati.* "By means of the two parts": by means of the two verbs. The explanation of the phrase given by the Vivaranakāra, viz., 'by means of the base form and the suffix' is a wrong explanation since in the verb *pacati* etc. also we have two parts [but we do not there have an action serving as *sādhana*]. "Meaning pattern of *sādhya and sādhana*": this is to be understood in the order expressed [i.e. the meaning *sādhya* as applying to the base form and the meaning *sādhana* as applying to the suffix]. Action in process (*sādhyatvam*) means having a nature which in no case gives rise to expectation of further action [cf. notes on page 2, lines 12-14]. Being a *sādhya* means being construed as a *kāraka* with another word.

Page 13, lines 8-11.

"Just so in the case of a word ending in the suffix": The stage of action in process is denoted by the base form [i.e. root]. The stage of *sādhana* is denoted by the suffix [*ghañ* etc.]. The difference [between the *siddha* action denoted by the suffix *ghañ* etc. and that denoted by a verb like *dhāvati* in the sentence *pasya mrgo dhāvati* etc.] is only this. The [*siddha*] action presented by the suffixes *ghañ* etc. is construed with gender and number [for instance the word *pākah*] and is construed as a *kāraka* with another word [for instance, *pāko bhavati* where the *siddha* action denoted by the suffix *ghañ* is the agent of the action of becoming.] But the [*siddha*] action denoted by a verb [like *dhāvati* in the sentence *pasya mrgo dhāvati* etc.] is not like this [viz., it has no gender and number but it is construed as a *kāraka* with another word]. Thus, [although the analogy does not tally completely owing to the difference above mentioned,] still, it

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should be considered that the resemblance between illustration [*drstanta*] and that for which illustration is adduced [*dārstāntika*] is effected by just [the common characteristic, namely,] the capability of being construed as a *kāraka* with another word.

Page 13, lines 11-17.

It should not be argued that there is no evidence for root's denoting durative action (*tathā = sādhyatvena*) when it is followed by *ghañ*. This is the proof: that the object *odana* is put in the genitive case in the phrase *odanasya pākaḥ* [the cooking of rice]. It will not do to say that the genitive case is construed with a finite verb *bhavati* which is to be supplied, because the genitive case is prescribed [to the object] by the rule *kartṛkarmaṇoh kṛti Pāṇ.* 2.3.65] only if it [the object] is construed with a verb ending in a *kṛt* suffix. And further, the rule *na lokāvyayaniṣṭhākhal-arthatṛnām* [2.3.69] prohibits the use of the genitive when [the object stands] in construction with a substitute of *la* [e.g. with a *tiṅ* suffix]. In like manner, the usage *kāṣṭhaiḥ pākaḥ* ['cooking by means of fagots'] is justified and is acceptable. So also the portion [of meaning which denotes] result is something which has not reached the state of substance and is denoted by the root. This is how one may use the phrase *stokaṃ pākaḥ* ['cooking a little bit'] just as one uses the phrase *stokaṃ pacati* [he cooks a little bit].

Notes. If it is assumed that the root does not denote *sādhya* action apart from the frozen (*siddha*) action denoted by the suffix *ghañ,* then the genitive case after the word *odana* [in the phrase *odanasya pākaḥ*], which shows that the rice is the object, cannot be justified. A *kāraka* is instrumental in bringing about only durative action (*sādhya*), not frozen action (*siddha*). Therefore, to justify the *kāraka* relation denoted by the genitive in the phrase '*odanasya pākaḥ*' we have to admit that the action denoted by the root is durative.

Kartṛkarmaṇoh kṛti, Pāṇ. 2.3.65: "[The genitive case-ending is appended] to [a word denoting] an object or agent [when such a word is construed] with a word ending in a *kṛt* suffix." e.g. *kṛṣṇasya kṛtiḥ,* 'Kṛṣṇa's doing' (where Kṛṣṇa is the agent of the doing), *jagataḥ kartā kṛṣṇaḥ,* 'Kṛṣṇa, creator of the world' (where world is the object of creation).

Na lokāvyayaniṣṭhākhalarthatṛnām, Pāṇ. 2.3.69: "[The genitive case-ending is] not [appended to a word denoting an object or agent when such a word is construed] with *la* [i.e. a verb or verbal participle], the suffix *uka,* an indeclinable, the suffixes *kta* and *ktavatu,* the *khalartha* suffixes and the suffix *tṛn.*" Thus, the usage *odanasya pacati* is wrong. *Stokaṃ pākaḥ:* - In the phrase *stokaṃ pākaḥ* (cooking a little bit, i.e. to a small extent) the word *stokam* is used in the accusative, which shows that it is the object [*karmakāraka*], and it is connected with the becoming soft [*viklitti*] of the food as is

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shown by the semantic analysis: *stokābhinna-viklity-anukūlo vyāpāraḥ*. But, if the result denoted by the root were frozen action (*siddha*) and not durative then the object *stoka* would not be connected with the result, for the rule is that the *kārakas* can be connected only with that which is cognized as durative.

Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* [III. *Kriyāsamu.* pp. 330-332] asks how one and the same action [e.g. as denoted by the root *pac* and the suffix *ghañ*] can be termed both *sādhya* and *siddha*. He answers that one and the same action may appear in different forms by its relation to other entities. When the action is connected with the *kārakas* it appears as *sādhya*, when it is connected with another action or when it functions itself as a *kāraka*, it appears as *siddha*. Thus, one and the same action cannot be called *sādhya* and *siddha* with reference to the same entity, but may be *sādhya* and *siddha* with reference to different entities.

Page 13, line 18.
    [Introduction to Verse 15.] In the following verse [the author] clarifies the same point.

Page 13, lines 19-20.
    Verse 15. There [viz. in a noun ending in the suffixes *ghañ* etc.] activity in its durative aspect is associated with the root portion, while its frozen aspect is associated with the suffixes *ghañ* etc.
Notes. 1) *Sādhyatvena = sādhyasvarūpiṇī,*
2) *dhāturūpanibandhanā - dhāturūpaṃ nibandhanaṃ pratipādakaṃ yasyāḥ sā dhāturūpanibandhanā kriyā.*

Page 13, lines 21-22.
    It should not be objected that there is no evidence that the suffixes *ghañ* etc. denote activity in its frozen aspect, for this is the evidence: that upon *pākaḥ* ['cooking'] being spoken we see that there arises an expectancy [of another word such as] 'comes into being', 'arises', '[is] destroyed.' We have already stated that this expectancy of another activity does not arise in the case of that [aspect of activity] presented by a verbal root.
Notes. For Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's definition of *siddhatva* (frozen aspect) in terms of expectancy see notes on page 2, lines 12-14.

Page 13, lines 22-25.
    And further, such a construction as *stokaḥ pākaḥ* [a small amount of activity favourable to the becoming soft of food] would be wrong [unless it is admitted that the suffixes *ghañ* etc. denote frozen action]. This is why words like *stoka* take the accusative case when they are construed with the meaning of a verbal root, but take the nominative case and masculine gender when they are

construed with the meaning of [suffixes such as] *ghañ*. Thus, to justify this [construction, viz. *stokaḥ pākaḥ* one must admit a function denotative [of action in its frozen aspect] as belonging to the suffixes *ghañ* etc. Hereby the view of the modern Naiyāyikas is refuted that suffixes such as *ghañ* etc. [have no semantic function but] are used merely for constructional purposes [since grammar does not sanction the independent usage of a stem.]

Notes. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa makes a semantic distinction between the construction *stokaḥ pākaḥ*, "a small amount of cooking," and *stokaṃ pākaḥ*, 'cooking to a small extent.' In the first case, *stoka* is syntactically connected with the suffix *ghañ*, which denotes activity in its frozen aspect; in the second case with the root *pac*, which denotes durative activity. Durative activity is *asatvabhūta:* void of number and gender. Therefore, when *stoka* is construed with *pac* it takes no specific gender or number. Its ending *-am* here is not to be regarded as denoting neuter gender and singular number, but is simply a formal or constructional appendage made necessary by the rule that a substantive cannot be used without suffix. On the other hand, frozen activity (*siddhakriyā*) is *satvabhūta*, i.e. possesses number and gender. Hence, when *stoka* is construed with the suffix *ghañ* it takes masculine gender and whatever number is appropriate: *stokaḥ pākaḥ, stokau pākau* etc.

The above goes to show that contrary to the Navyanyāya opinion [cf. *Ākhyātaśaktivāda*, p. 70.] the suffixes such as *ghañ* have a semantic function and what they denote is frozen activity.

Page 13, lines 25-26; Page 14, lines 1-2.

One should not argue that the usage *stokaḥ pākaḥ* takes place when [the word *stoka* is] in construction with that which is presented by the denotative function which belongs to the [whole] word ending in the suffix *ghañ*. For it is cumbrous to suppose that the denotative function is bound to the whole sequence [of the base form plus suffix] of the word ending in the suffix *ghañ* and furthermore our assumption of the above-mentioned denotative function of the suffixes *ghañ* etc. is based on the authority of [Pāṇini's] rules. Likewise, when the *Bhāṣya* says that [activity] denoted by the suffix *kṛt* [appears as substance] it is with the thought in mind that the [above-mentioned] denotative function belongs to the suffix *ghañ* [and not to a whole word]. Hence, the *Bhāṣya* is not contradictory to our theory.

Notes. According to the *Darpaṇa*, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa here refutes the view of the author of the *Kātantrapariśiṣṭa*. That author holds the view that the root portion, in the words *pākaḥ* etc. is denotative of durative action while the *ghañanta* word taken as a whole is denotative of frozen action. The view is cumbrous because it is simpler to assign the denotative function to the suffix *ghañ* which is a simple entity and

common to the words *pāka, yāga* etc. rather than to the whole words, which are complex and mutually different units.

Ato na tad virodhah: - This is meant to refute the contradiction pointed out by the objector in the introductory remarks to the previous verse.

Page 14, lines 3-4.

[Introduction to Verses 17-18.] Now, only if there is a rule that the *kārakas* must be construed with productive operation (= durative activity) can one establish the fact that in *pāka* as well [as in a finite verb like *pacati*] there is a denotation of productive operation compatible with [its taking] an objective genitive [such as *odanasya pākah:* 'the cooking of rice']. But where is that rule? The author of the verses now answers this doubt.

Page 14, lines 5-6; Page 15, lines 5-6.

Verse 16. 1) A word ending in the vocative case, 2) suffixes having the sense of the suffix *krtvas*, 3) the *kārakas*, 4) the first suffix *Vati*, 5) a word put together [with a suffix] that falls under the governing rule *dhātusambandhe pratyayāh*, 6) uncompounded *nañ*.

Verse 17. (7) [the locative absolute] prescribed by the rule *yasya ca bhāvena and* (8) [the genitive of contempt] prescribed by the rule of *sasthī ca*: Proper construction of these eight types is specified as only with [durative] activity.

Page 14, lines 7-11.

A word ending in the vocative is construed with [a word denotative of] activity, for this accords with the loss of *uddātta* accent in such sentences as *tvam brūhi devadatta* ['tell it, Oh Devadatta'], this loss being prescribed by [the *Vārtika*] *samānavākye nighāta-yusmadasmadādeśāh* [to such vocatives] only [as fall] in the same sentence [with a preceding word]. And this is stated in the *Vākyapadīya* also, [cf. II p. 69]:

"Every vocative is a qualifier of an activity, for only thus can there be loss of accent in the sentence *vrajāni Devadatta* ['Oh Devadatta, I will go']."

Notes. Two rules of Pānini, verbally identical but differing in meaning, apply to the Vedic accent of vocatives. *Pān.* 6.1.198 *āmantritasya ca* means "[the first syllable] of a vocative also [takes *udātta* accent]." *Pān.* 8.1.19 *āmantritasya ca* means "also [there is no *udātta* accent] of a vocative [when it follows another word and does not stand first in a verse]." To the second rule, the *Vārtika* adds the proviso *samānavākye* etc: "it should be stated that loss of accent and the substitution for *yusmad* and *asmad* occcur [only when the word to be altered stands] in the same sentence [with a preceding word]." Thus, in the following:

odanaṃ paca, tava bhaviṣyati: "cook the rice; it will be for you," one cannot substitute *te* for *tava* (a form of *yuṣmad*), it not being in the same sentence with the word that precedes it. By the same *Vārtika* we can infer from *tvaṃ brūhi devadatta,* if *devadatta* is accentless, that *bhūhi* forms part of one sentence with it. This in turn implies that *devedatta* is to be construed with *brūhi* since a sentence demands construction and there is nothing else to construe it with.

According to Bhartṛhari, vocatives belong to the category of adverbs. And Puṇyarāja, commentator on the *Vākyapadīya* divides adverbs into two kinds: Those that are in syntactical agreement with a word of activity and those that are not. To the first kind belongs *stokam* etc. in such phrases as *stokaṃ pacati.* It is used in the neuter accusative singular. To the other kind belong the vocatives. In the phrase *devadatta vrajāni:* "Oh Devadatta, I will go," *devaddata* is not in syntactic agreement with the verb *vrajāni.* Its relation is shown by the syntactic analysis *devadattā mantraṇaviśeṣitā vrajanakriyā:* an activity of going, qualified by [the activity of] addressing Devadatta. Cf. Puṇyarāja on *Vāk.* II p. 69.

Other explanations have been given of the relation between vocative and verb. In this *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* (P. 64) Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa remarks that some people consider it a subject-predicate relation (*uddeśya-vidheyabhāva*). In such a sentence as *devadatta vrajāni,* Nāgeśa and his followers supply the verb *jānīhi* "know!"

Page 14, lines 12-16.

> Now, in such an expression as "[that] he cooks comes into being, Oh Devadatta!" loss of accent still takes place, since this forms a single sentence according to the method of both *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya.* By forming the *Sūtra, tiṅṅatiṅaḥ* [8.1.28] Pāṇini recognizes that a single sentence may contain more than one finite verb. On the other hand, [loss of accent in such an expression does] not [take place] in the opinion of the author of the *Vārtika,* who says that a sentence can contain only one finite verb. Actually however, as has been shown by Helārāja in his comment [on the *Vākyapadīya*] and by me in my *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa,* the meaning of the *Vārtika* is that a sentence contains only one qualificand or predominant verb. Accordingly, it should be understood that even in the opinion of *Vārtika* loss of accent takes place in such an expression as the above,

Notes. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's argument here is singularly inept, for loss of accent on *devadatta* must take place whether *pacati bhavati devadatta* be regarded as one sentence or two. All that the *Vārtika* on *Pāṇ.* 8.1.19 requires is that the de-accent vocative occur in one sentence with the word that precedes it. Even regarding *pacati bhavati devadatta* as two sentences devadatta must occur in the same

sentence with *bhavati* since the grammarians do not recognize the possibility of a vocative forming a sentence by itself.

Tiṅṅatiṅaḥ: "A finite verb [loses its accent] when it follows a word which is not a finite verb." Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa infers from this that according to Pāṇini a finite verb may also follow a verb within a single sentence.

Page 14, lines 16-18.

"suffixes having the sense of the suffix *kṛtvas*": because by the rule *kriyābhyāvṛttigaṇane kṛtvasuc* it is stated that such words are correctly employed [only] if construed with [a word denoting] activity. In the rule, the word *abhyāvṛtti* means 'recurrence'; when such is to be indicated the suffix is used.

Notes. *Saṃkhyāyāḥ kriyābhyāvṛttigaṇane kṛtvasuc, Pāṇ.* 5.4.17: "After a numeral which is employed to count the recurrences of an activity [one employs] the suffix *kṛtvasuc*." For example, *pañcakṛtvo bhuṅkte.*

Page 14, lines 18-21.

"The *kārakas* etc.": Because the prescriptions concerning *kārakas* fall under the *adhikāra sūtra* 1.4.23 'kārake'. [In that *sūtra*] the word *kāraka* means activity (*kriyā*) because of its etymology, viz. 'that which makes (or is responsible for) the function (or office of) agent, object etc.' Thus, in the rules which follow and which prescribe the function ablation etc., since it is necessary [in each case] to repeat the word *kāraka* which means activity, each function (*saṃjñā*) can belong only to that which is construed with activity. This is clearly stated in the *Bhāṣya.*

Notes. The word *kāraka* has a conventional technical sense and also an etymological sense. The conventional sense is 'one of the six relational descriptions listed as *kartā, karma, karaṇa, sampradāna, apādāna, adhikaraṇa,* which are instrumental in bringing about an activity. Pāṇini does not define the word in this sense. He simply lists the relations involved viz., object, agent etc. under the heading *kārake* (1.4.23). This word *kārake* is an *adhikārasūtra,* an aphorism which is to be repeatedly understood with the rules which follow. Now, the word *kārake* in the *adhikārasūtra* bears not the conventional sense but the etymological sense, viz. 'that which makes (or is responsible for) the function (*saṃjñā*) of object, agent etc.' (*yat karoti kartṛkarmādi-vyapadeśan tat kārakam*). In this etymological sense *kāraka* is synonymous with *kriyā* (activity). That is used in 1.4.23 in its etymological sense is shown by its being used in the locative absolute. Thus, to take a rule which falls under this *adhikāra,* we must interpret 1.4.49 [*kārake*] *kartur īpsitatimaṃ karma* to mean "[when there is activity] that which is chiefly sought by the agent is 'the object.'" i.e. that which is chiefly sought by the agent and is in construction with a

word denoting activity is 'the object.' Had the word *kāraka* in 1.4.23 borne the conventional rather than the etymological sense, it would have been used in the nominative and would have resulted in *kārakam īpsitatamaṃ karma*: "'The object' is a *kāraka*" in 1.4.49.

Such is Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's interpretation, which differs from that of the *Kāśikā* and of Bhaṭṭoji Dīksita. They interpret *kārake* in the conventional sense and therefore transpose the locative to nominative.

This *sūtra* (1.4.23) is Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's authority for stating that a *kāraka* (in the conventional technical sense) must be construed with an activity.

Page 14, lines 21-23.

> "The first *vati* suffix": [this is] prescribed by the rule *tena tulyam kriyā ced vatiḥ*: [It is here listed] because the rule which prescribes it states [that the suffix is to be employed only] if what is similar is an activity.

Notes. *Tena tulyam kriyā ced vatiḥ* (*Pāṇ.* 5.1.115) "The suffix *vati* [is appended to a noun] in the sense of 'similarly thereto' if [that which is similar is] an activity." Thus, *brāhmaṇavat adhīte*, 'he learns like a Brahmin,' or, to make the construction explicit, 'He learns in a manner similar to the manner in which a Brahmin learns.' This suffix may not be appended when that which is similar is a quality. In place of *putreṇa saha sthūlaḥ* 'as fat as the son', one may not say '*putravat sthūlaḥ*'.

This suffix is called first *vati* to distinguish it from the second *vati* prescribed by the rule *tatra tasyeva* (*Pāṇ.* 5.1.116): "[The suffix *vat* in the sense of] 'like' [is appended] to [a noun conveying a] locative or genitive sense." *Mathurāvat srughne prākāraḥ:* 'a wall at srughna like [the wall] at Mathurā.' The second *vati* is not construed with activity.

Page 14, lines 23-24.

> "Under the governing rule *dhātu sambandhe*": [here listed] because there suffixes] are prescribed by the governing rule *dhātu sambandhe pratyayāḥ*.

Notes. *Dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ* (*Pāṇ.* 3.4.1): "suffixes where a relation is to be expressed between [meanings of] roots." This is an aphorism which is repeatedly understood in the *sūtras* which follow. Among the suffixes prescribed in the following sūtras are *śatṛ* (present participle), *ktvā*, (continuative or so-called gerund etc.) For example, in *Mathurāyāṃ vasan kṛṣṇaṃ dadarśa:* "living in Mathura he saw kṛṣṇa," the participial suffix shows a relation of contemporaneity between the activity of living and that of seeing. In *bhuktvā svapiti:* "having eaten he sleeps," the continuative suffix shows a relation of succession in the time between the activities of eating and speaking. All such suffixes, by the very terms of the *adhikāra sūtra* 3.4.1 must be construed with a verbal root, i.e. with an activity.

Page 14, lines 24-25.

"Uncompounded particle of negation": what is meant is the uncompoundable or verbal particle of negation. The expression ['uncompounded] cannot be taken literally, because [a nominal particle of negation] while it may be construed with the following member of a compound may also be uncompounded since the forming of compounds is optional.

Notes. The technical term *nañ* refers to all forms, *na-*, *a-*, and *an-*. These particles are regarded not as three separate morphemes but as one morpheme with its three allomorphs. This word is sometimes a verbal negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedhīya nañ*), in which case only the form *na* is used; and sometimes a nominal negation (*paryudāsa nañ*), in which case all three forms -*na* -*an* -*a* may be used.

The use of the terms for the different types of negation goes back to Mīmāmsā exegesis. A *prasajya* negation is literally the negation of something that would otherwise 'be implied', e.g. *na kalañjam bhakṣayet.* 'one may not eat *kalañja.'*

In such a negation the particle is always construed with the verb. A *paryudāsa* negation is one which 'rules out' one object, quality etc. in favour of another, e.g. *na Brāhmaṇaḥ, kiṃtu kṣatriyaḥ.* In such a negation the particle is not construed with a verb. In both types of negation the particle may be uncompounded, but in verbal negation it cannot be compounded; it is here not simply *asamasta* (uncompounded) but *samāsāyogya* (uncompoundable). To avoid misunderstanding of the *kārikā*, Kaunda Bhatta substitutes the more specific epithet.

Page 14, lines 25-27; Page 15, lines 1-3.

One cannot argue that there is no evidence that the uncompounded particle of negation is construed with an activity. For it is negation of the activity that we apprehend in such sentences as 'you do not cook,' 'you two do not cook,' 'Caitra does not cook,' 'the pot does not come into origination.' For this very reason, even in the presence of the pot, one can speak thus [viz. 'the pot does not come into origination']. Similarly, in the sentence 'pot does not exist,' it is the negation of existence that is conveyed. There is no difference between the expression 'the pot does not come into origination' and 'the pot does not exist' except the difference in the root meanings. And thus, in the expression 'on the ground no pot' the verb *asti* 'exists' should be supplied.

Notes. The commentators show the point of these examples. If the negation were to be construed with other than the activity in these sentences, then it must furnish a negation of 'you,' 'you two,' etc. Thus, the agent of the activity would be a negation, as in the expression *ghaṭābhāvo 'sti* ('the negation of the pot exists'). And since a negation cannot be specified as of first or second person, the verb

would take the third person singular and the usage *na tvam pacasi* etc. would be wrong.

Kaunda Bhatta gives a further reason to prove that *prasajya-pratisedhīya nañ* must be construed with an activity. If the particle were construed with a noun then the expression *ghato na jāyate* would mean 'the negation of the pot comes into existence,' which is absurd in the condition of the presence of the pot. But, if we construe the negation with activity, then even in the condition of the existence of the pot we can say the pot does not come into origination, for it already exists.

Page 15, lines 3-4.

> The reason for the above is that in order to have a verbal knowledge in which negation stands as qualificand it stands established that the necessary cause is a presentment [to the intellect of a notion] of activity deriving from a verbal root and standing in a relation of qualifier. The remaining [discussion of this problem] will be furnished in the chapter on negation.

Page 15, lines 7-9.

> ["The locative absolute": -] because one can find a correct construction [for the locative case ending only] when it is construed with that which in Pāṇini's *sūtra* - *yasya ca bhāvena bhāvalakṣaṇam* is referred to by the word *bhāva*, which word has the sense of *bhāvanā* (productive operation, activity). And in the next following *sūtra* [concerning the genitive of disrespect, viz.,] *ṣaṣṭhī cānādare [Pāṇ. 2.3.38]* the expression *yasya ca bhāvena* is continued implicitly by force of the particle *ca*. [Accordingly, the genitive of disrespect also must be construed with an activity].

Notes. *Yasya ca bhāvena bhāvalakṣaṇam (Pāṇ. 2.3.37):* "[the locative case ending is appended to a participle or noun] when its activity (*bhāva*) serves to characterize [another] activity." Thus, *gosu duhyamānāsu gataḥ:* "[while] the cows [were] being milked he left." The activity here possessed by the cows is their being milked and this activity serves to characterize, by setting its time, the activity of leaving. Hence, the noun *gauḥ* and the participle *duhyamānā* are given the locative ending. This case-ending can be construed only with the activity of being milked.

Ṣaṣṭhī cānādare (Pāṇ .2.3.38): "And [to a participle or noun when its activity serves to characterize another activity] if [this other activity is treated] with disrespect the genitive case-ending [may be used optionally instead of the locative]." Thus, *rudataḥ prāvrājīt:* "despite his weeping [the other] one became a monk." Here again, the case-ending can be construed only with an activity.

Page 15, lines 9-10.

>   As regards "correct construction," its nature will be discussed later on.

Page 15, lines 10-13.

>   "With an activity". The meaning is as follows. In such [contexts] as [Patañjali's comment on] the rule *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ* (1.3.1) etc. the word *kriyā* generally has the meaning 'activity.' Accordingly, it is to this [meaning] that its denotative function points. Granted that there is occasional use of the word *kriyā* in the meaning 'result,' viz., 'that which is done,' this being the etymological meaning [of the word *kriyā*], still, a word in its conventional sense presents a meaning without further requirements and so is stronger [than when used in an etymological sense]. Accordingly, we must conclude that a proper construction [of the foregoing eight grammatical types] subsists with activity only.

Notes. An objector might agree that roots are denotative of *kriyā* but insist that the word *kriyā* here means result, not activity. There is no denying the fact that the word *kriyā* may mean result. The suffix *śa* (=*a*) is added to *kṛ* in the passive sense (*Pāṇ.* 3.3.100). Thus, the word *kriyā* means that which is produced, i.e. result.

To this objection, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa replies that when in doubt we must take the conventional sense to predominate over etymological senses, for the latter require a knowledge of the component parts and of the rules of grammar; they also require time for the mind to apply this knowledge. The conventional sense, on the other hand, presents itself to the mind immediately, making no requirements: *rūḍhir yogam apaharati*. Thus, *kriyā* here is to be taken as activity and it is with activity that the eight grammatical types listed in the *kārikā* are to be construed.

Page 15, lines 13-14.

>   It is for this reason, namely, the predominance of conventional meaning, that it is concluded in the ninth chapter of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā [*Jaimini* 9.11.23] that the *Rathantara* chant must be sung to the verses which are in the *Uttarā* section of the Sāmaveda and not to the verses which next follow (i.e. which are *uttarāḥ*) in the Vedic text.

Notes. In connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, we have the scripture *rathantaram uttarayoḥ gāyati:* 'one sings the *Rathantara* chant to the two *uttarā* verses'. The question arises what the word *uttarayoḥ* means. Does it mean that the *Rathantara* chant should be sung to the two verses which next follow? In this case the word *uttarā* would be taken in its etymological sense of 'later' or 'next,' or does it mean that the *Rathantara* chant should be sung to the verses that are

read in the Uttarā, that is, the second section of the *Sāmaveda*? In this case, the word *uttarā* would be taken in its conventional or technical sense.

The Mīmāṃsā decides in favour of the conventional sense. The etymological sense, they say, requires the contrasting term 'former' (*pūrva*) in order to be selected. The conventional sense makes no requirements but is clear by itself alone.

Page 15, lines 14-18.

> Moreover [in a verbal root] the partial [meaning] result is a qualifier of [the meaning] activity, just as the *kārakas* are in certain cases. There is a maxim that "qualities [subordinate entities] can never be related to each other, for they are dependent on something [i.e. a primary entity], and are thus in parallel position" (Jaimini 3.1.22). Accordingly, [result and *kārakas*] have no relation to each other but both follow after the activity, as all the servants follow after the king. Again, there is a maxim "a beggar shall not beg alms of another beggar, if there is one [to beg from] who is not a beggar."

> In accordance with this, even the Mīmāṃsakas realize that the *kārakas* have no connection with result but follow after the productive operation (= activity).

Page 15, lines 18-21.

> And thus, the following cause-effect relation is established. In order to have a verbal knowledge in which a *kāraka* stands as qualifier, the necessary cause is a presentment [to the intellect of a notion] of activity in a relation of qualificand, deriving from a verbal root. And hence, even where an activity stands as qualifier, e.g. in *paktā* (a cook) and *pācakaḥ* (a cook), in that case also, in accordance with the established cause-effect relation the *kārakas* are construed with the activity. This is explained in detail in the *Bhūṣaṇa*.

Notes. In the case of the verb, where activity stands as qualificand the *kārakas* are no doubt construed with activity. But what is the case when the activity stands as qualifier to something else? The *kārakas* are still construed with the activity. Take the examples *odanasya paktā* and *odanasya pācakaḥ*: 'a cook of rice.' Here, the nouns *paktā* and *pācakaḥ* are formed from the root *pac* by adding the *kṛt* suffixes *tṛ* and *aka*. These words are paraphrased as *pākakriyāśrayaḥ:* 'a substratum [i.e. agent] of the activity of cooking,' where the meaning activity denoted by the root *pac* stands as qualifier and the meaning agent denoted by the suffixes stands as qualificand. In the phrase *odanasya pācakaḥ*, the object denoted by the genitive case is still construed with the activity of cooking although the activity stands as subordinate to the agent denoted by the *kṛt* suffix.

Page 15, lines 21-23.

Some hold the view that such phrases as 'the jar on the ground', 'Devadatta, the jar,' etc. are not correct, since we do not find any construction [between the constituents] nor do we find that the expectancy created [by the constituents of the phrase] is satisfied [and the phrases cannot be correct] without these.

Notes. Some grammarians hold the view that isolated words or constituents of a phrase cannot form a syntactic unity without a verb to unite these constituents. Thus, the phrase *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ* requires the verb *asti* and the phrase *devadatto ghaṭam* requires some such verb as *karoti*. The phrase 'some hold ' [*kecit tu*] suggests that Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa disagrees with this view. According to him the verbs need not be present for the phrases to be correct. They may be implied, and so supplied.

Page 15, line 24-26.

[Introduction to Verse 18. The author of the verse now] presents his own argument [to establish the theory set forth in the last two verses].

Verse 18. If you say that the meaning denoted by the suffix *vati* may also be construed with the minor term [of a syllogism] and that a *kāraka* may be construed with the negative particle etc. then you should give up the supplying of the verb *spṛh* with the dative [*puṣpebhyaḥ*].

Notes. The verse is directed against the Naiyāyikas. They held the view that the first *vati* suffix [*Pāṇ.* 5.1.115] and some *kārakas* need not be construed with an action. They used such examples as *parvato vahnimān mahānasavat*; 'the mountain [is] possessed of fire like a kitchen hearth.' Here, according to the Nyāya, the meaning similarly denoted by the suffix *vati* is construed with the meaning denoted by 'kitchen hearth' and not with an activity. Similarly, in the phrase *bhūtale na ghaṭaḥ* 'no jar on the ground,' the *kāraka* denoting locus is construed with negation and not with an action. According to the Nyāya, the phrase *bhūtale na ghaṭaḥ* means *bhūtalādhikaraṇa-nirūpitādheyatvābhāvavān ghaṭaḥ:* 'a jar, [is] possessed of an absence of superstratumness described by the locus ground.'

However, the author of the verse objects to this view on the ground that the Naiyāyikas are not consistent. In some cases they hold that a *kāraka* can stand without a verb being supplied, while in other cases they say that a *kāraka* does not form a syntactically complete idea unless a verb is supplied. They say that the phrase *puṣpebhyaḥ:* '[he has a desire] for flowers' is an elliptical one. The verb *spṛhayati* must be supplied to make the idea syntactically complete. According to the Naiyāyikas, it is not an omitted meaning [*arthādhyāhāra*] nor some verb synonymous with *spṛhayati* [viz. a *śabdādhyāhāra*] which is to be supplied, but the actual verb *spṛhayati*, for Pāṇini's rule (1.4.26)

prescribes the dative after a noun referring to that which is desired when the specific root *sprh* is used to denote desire. Now, the grammarians say that if you go against one rule, namely, that *kārakas* can be construed with action alone, why not go against another rule and agree that *puṣpebhyaḥ* used alone is correct when the omitted meaning, not the actual word *sprhayati* is supplied.

Page 15, line 27; Page 16, lines 1-2.
        If such phrases as 'the mountain [is] possessed of fire because [it possesses] smoke like a kitchen hearth,' 'a pot [is] not on the ground,' and from the word 'et cetera' [of the verse one may add] 'a pot [is] on the ground,' are admitted to be correct and to have a construction [without supplying a verb], even when this goes against a rule of grammar, then you should give up the supplying of the verb *sprh* with a dative [like 'for flowers']. When there is no difference in regard to obeying a rule, it is senseless to make a [half girl] half old woman [by accepting a rule in one case and rejecting a rule in another].

Page 16, lines 3-5.
        [Introduction to Verse 19. The author of the verse says] that in the same manner suffixes such as *ini* etc., prescribed [by Pāṇini 5.2.87] in such senses as agent etc., are construed only with an action.
        Verse 19. Just as the inseparable (*avigrahā*) action [denoted by the root *gam*] in the word *gata* is construed with the object *grāmam* [in the phrase *grāmaṃ gataḥ*], just so the activity [denoted by the root *kṛ*] in the phrase *kṛtapūrvī* [*kaṭam*: 'one who has made a mat before'] is connected [with the object *kaṭam*].
Notes. The three words *ādi*, which I have left untranslated to avoid confusion, merely indicate that other cases could be cited, e.g., for *gam*, *tyaj*; for *gata*, *tyakta*; for *grāmam*, *nagaram* etc.
    The effect of the verse is to extend the scope of a doctrine which Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa has already mentioned: that even when the activity denoted by a root is subordinate to the agent, object, etc. denoted by a suffix, a *kāraka*, denoted by a separate word with oblique case ending, is still construed with the action, not with the denotandum of the suffix. This holds true not only in cases like *grāmaṃ gataḥ*: 'he has gone to the village,' where the *kāraka*, *grāmam*, is construed with *gam* rather than with the suffix *kta*, but also in cases arising from Pāṇini 5.2.87.
    Pāṇini 5.2.87 says *sapūrvāc ca*: "and [the suffix *ini* (-*in*)] is appended to the word [*pūrva* when it occurs in a compound] with a word preceding." The suffix *ini* here has the sense of agent. Thus, *kṛtapūrvī kaṭam*: 'he who has made a mat before,' *bhuktapūrvī odanam*: 'he who has already eaten rice.'

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The construction of the two examples can be best shown by semantic paraphrase, thus, *grāmaṃ gataḥ = grāmakarmaka-gamanāśrayaḥ*: 'a substratum (viz., agent) of an activity of going of which a village is the object.' *ʳrtapūrvī kaṭam = kaṭaniṣṭhotpatty-anukūlavyāpārāśrayaḥ*: 'a substraṭṭ / /viz., agent) of an activity favourable to a production which resides in a mat.'

The use of the word *avigraha*, 'inseparable,' and its rendering by Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa in what follows as *guṇībhūta*, 'subordinate,' is in accordance with the *Vārtika* and *Bhāṣya* on Pāṇini 2.1.1. The underlying theories are important and may best be explained here.

Pāṇini's rule 2.1.1 *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ* says simply that any word formation (*padavidhiḥ*) prescribed by grammar must be applied to words which are co-ordinate (*samartha*). Among these formations are compounds. Now, when a compound is prescribed, e.g. a genitive *tatpuruṣa*, this means that such a compound as *rājapuruṣa* is to be made, but that where no co-ordination or link exists between the two elements, e.g., as between the *rājan* of *puruṣo rājñaḥ* and the *bhāryā* of *bhāryā devadattasya*, no compound can be formed.

The question thus arises as to what co-ordination is. Among other pronouncements the *Vārtika* states that if a compound contains a member that is dependent (*sāpekṣa*) on something outside the compound, the compound lacks co-ordination. (*sāpekṣam asamartha-vat*). Thus, where we mean to say 'the man of the rich king' we cannot form a compound and say *ṛddhasya rājapuruṣaḥ*, for the element *rājan* of the compound would be dependent on *ṛddhasya*. A compound or any other *vṛtti*, according to the grammarians expresses a single complex meaning (*ekārthībhāva*). Any word that modifies the compound must modify the whole, not a part of it. The parts of a compound, being inseparable (*avigraha*) from the whole, cannot have modifiers outside the compound.

Patañjali qualifies these statements in several ways to make them accord with usage, everyone admits that *sundaro rājapuruṣaḥ*: 'a handsome king's man' is good usage. One could, of course, argue that the adjective *sundara* modifies the single idea expressed by the compound, but our natural feeling is that *sundara* modifies *puruṣa*, 'a handsome man of the king.' Thus, Patañjali allows a word outside the compound to modify one member of the compound if that is the predominant (*pradhāna*) member. In *tatpuruṣa* compounds the final member is regarded predominant.

The old rule that a word outside cannot modify an inseparable (*avigraha*) member of a word formation noun becomes a rule that it cannot modify a subordinate (*guṇībhūta*) member. Hence, the gross of *avigraha* by *guṇībhūta*.

However, our difficulties are not done. In a number of formation such as *grāmaṃ gataḥ*, *kṛtapūrvī kaṭam*, *devadattasya gurukulam*, a

word outside the formation is indeed construed with the subordinate member. These cases too are allowed. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa now tells us why.

Page 16, lines 6-8.
    Avigrahā means that of which the *graha*, i.e., cognition, is not received separately, in other words, subordinate. And just as in the phrase *grāmaṃ gataḥ*, the action [denoted by the root *gam*], although it is subordinate to the meaning [agent] of the suffix *kta*, is construed with the object *grāma*, so also the action [denoted by the root kṛ] in the phrase *kṛtapūrvī* [*kaṭam*] which action is subordinate to the meaning denoted by the suffix *ini* etc., [is construed with the object *kaṭa*].
Notes. In line 7, for *Ktaprakṛtyarthā* read *Ktapratyayārthagu* etc.

Page 16, lines 8-11.
    It should not be argued that in the case of *vṛttis* it will be later established that the denotative function belongs to the whole, that the meaning action, being comprised within the whole, forms only a part of the whole meaning, and that there can therefore be no construction [of something outside the compound] with this [part]; because such construction is allowable in cases where [the subordinate member stands in] a constant relation of expectancy [to the outside word] e.g. *devadattasya gurukulam*: 'Devadatta's teacher's family' and *caitrasya naptā*: 'caitra's son's son.' The examples *bhoktuṃ pākaḥ:* 'a cooking for eating' and *bhuktvā pākaḥ:* 'a cooking on having eaten' should be explained in the same way.
Notes. The permission for such construction is given by Patañjali on Pāṇini 2.1.1. In the case of *devadattasya gurukulam* the mention of a teacher always gives rise to the expectation of a pupil, for there cannot be a teacher without pupil. Hence, a relation of *nityasāpekṣatva* subsists between *devadatta* and the portion *guru* of the compound. *Caitrasya naptā* falls under the same category. *Naptā*, 'grandson,' is defined as *putrasya putraḥ*, so the phrase is equivalent to *Caitrasya putraputraḥ*, where *Caitra* is construed with the first word '*putra.*'
   One may remark that it requires a broad interpretation of Patañjali's permission to justify *bhuktvā pākaḥ*. But the permission is often more grossly abused than this. In classical poetry, whenever a subordinate member of a compound is construed with a word outside the compound the commentators invariably say *sāpekṣatve 'pi gamakatvāt samāsaḥ*, whether this relation of mutual expectancy is constant or not.

Page 16, lines 12-14.
    [Introduction to Verse 20.] Fearing that this [permission] may lead too far, [the author of the verses] removes the difficulty [as follows]:

Verse 20. If you object that [the suffixes] denoting the sense of the suffix *krtvas* would be employed like the suffixes *tvā* and *tumun*, we reply that they are so employed in some cases. [The difficulty of] unwarranted license should not be raised because usage is the final resort.

Notes. Patañjali's permission to construe the subordinate element of a complex form (*vrtti*) with a word outside has been extended to such phrases as *bhuktvā pākah* and *bhoktum pākah*. Why should we not also allow *dvih pākah:* 'a twice cooking?' The suffix of *dvih* is *suc*, one of the suffixes with the meaning of the suffix *krtvas*; see Verse 16 and notes.

The Siddhāntin answers that forms with *krtvortha* suffixes are occasionally so construed. Thus, Pāṇini and Patañjali use the phrases *dvir vacanam:* 'use of word twice,' *dvih prayoga:* 'twice an utterance.' The fact remains that Sanskrit idiom approves *dvau pākau:* 'two cookings' and not *dvih pākah:* 'twice cooking.' The number is construed with the action in frozen form (*siddharūpa*) denoted by the suffix *ghañ* of *pāka* rather than with the activity in durative form (*sādhyarūpa*) denoted by the root *pac*.

The Siddhāntin refuses to face this difficulty and revise the rules of Pāṇini to accord more perfectly with the idiom of the language. He simply says that usage (*abhidhāna*) is the final criterion. The old rules, literally interpreted, allow many forms and constructions which are never found. This is not unwarranted license (*atiprasaṅga*), because usage is enough to prevent our employing such forms.

Page 16, lines 15-18.

[The following objection may be made]. In the phrases *bhoktum pākah*, *bhuktvā pākah* etc. the suffixes *tumun*, *tvā* etc., are prescribed by *Pāṇ*. 3.3.10: *tumunnvulau kriyāyām kriyārthāyām* and *Pāṇ*. 3.4.21: *samānakartrkayoh pūrvakāle*, [that is to say, are prescribed] for instances where there is an accompanying word denotative of action at a time prior [in the case of *tumun*] or posterior [in the case of *tvā*] to the two actions [in questions]. Accordingly, *tumun* and *tvā* come into being in dependence upon this [prior or posterior action,] which is subordinate. [e.g. -*tum* in *bhoktum pākah* comes into being because of the prior action denoted by the element *pac* in *pākah*.]

Notes. *Pāṇ*. 3.3.10: *tumunnvulau kriyāyām kriyārthāyām* "The suffixes *tumun* (-*tum*) and *nvul* (-*aka*) [are appended to a verbal root in the sense of futurity] when there is an [accompanying word expressive of] action which has as its purpose the action [denoted by the aforesaid verbal root]." e.g. *bhoktum vrajati, bhojako vrajati:* 'he goes away to eat.'

Pāṇ. 3.4.21 *samānakartrkayoh pūrvakāle* "[the suffix *ktvā* (-*tvā*)] is appended to [a verbal root which expresses] the prior time of two

[verbal roots] which have the same agent." E.g. *bhuktvā vrajati*;
having eaten, he goes away.'

Page 16, lines 18-21.

In just the same way the suffixes with the meaning of *kṛtvas*
would come into being [in dependence on a subsidiary element
denoting *sādhya* action]. Thus, for *ekaḥ pākaḥ* one would apply
Pāṇ. 5.4.19 *ekasya sakṛc ca*; for *dvau pākau* or *trayaḥ* or
catvāraḥ [*pākaḥ*] one would apply *Pāṇ*. 5.4.18 *dvitricaturbhyaḥ
suc* and in the case of five cookings one would use the suffix
kṛtvas. The result would be the phrases *sakṛt pākaḥ, dviḥ, triḥ,
catuḥ pākāḥ* [*and pañcakṛtvaḥ pākāḥ*]

But the implication of this argument is one that we welcome,
for we see [that the masters have used] such expressions as *dvir
vacanam* 'use of a word twice.'

Notes. *Pāṇ*. 5.4.19: *ekasya sakṛc ca*: "[In the counting of actions] *sakṛt*
is substituted for the word *eka* and [the suffix *suc* is appended, but
drops by 8.2.23]." *Pāṇ*. 5.4.18 *dvitricaturbhyaḥ suc*: "[In counting the
recurrences of an action,] after the numerals *dvi, tri,* and *catur* the
suffix *suc* [is appended]."

Suffix *kṛtvas*: see *Pāṇ*. 5.4.17.

Page 16, lines 21-22.

By [the latter half of the verse] 'unwarranted license' etc. the
author states that [Patañjali's permission does] not lead too far
because such forms are not used. [In other words] the objection is
answered by the principle which a competent [Sanskritist] uses
when he says "the root *vac* is not used in the 3rd person plural."

Notes. The rules of grammar exhibit nothing to prevent our using
vacanti for 'they say' just as we use *vadanti*. But a competent
Sanskritist does not use *vacanti*. In the way he will not use *sakṛt pākaḥ*
etc.

An interesting book could be written on forms and constructions
which are not forbidden by the grammarians but are not used.

Anabhidhānāt: 'because such forms are not used': literally,
'because such forms do not [in actual fact] transmit the [intended]
meanings.'

Page 16, lines 23-27.

Some people [solve the difficulty as follows. They] hold that the
word *kriyā* (action) in *Pāṇ*. 5.4.17 *kriyābhyāvṛttigaṇane* is [prima
facie] useless, for it is only an action that can be recurrent and one
could understand 'action' [by implication] from that [viz. from the
word *abhyāvṛtti:* 'recurrence']. Accordingly, that [word 'action'
must be used in 5.4.17 for an ulterior purpose, and this] is to give
us to understand [a special kind of action, namely,] an action

whose nature is limited to the durative aspect. And we do not cognize such a kind of action [i.e. *sādhya* action] from the word *pāka*, [its suffix *ghañ* giving us rather a cognition of frozen activity]. Hence, there is no unwarranted license [for the usage *sakṛt pākaḥ*]. [Those who follow this explanation take *dvirvacana* as an exception.] They say that *dvirvacana* is to be justified by [reference to the passage where] its etymology [is given by Patañjali; viz.,] *dviḥ prayogo dvirvacanam* or by [the occurrence of *dvirvacana* in *Pāṇ.* 1.1.59] *dvirvacane 'ci* which implies that the phrase, although irregular, is correct.

Page 16, lines 28-29.
    [Introduction to Verse 21.] Objection: - In conclusion, it is necessary [to admit] that the denotative function [of the *tiṅ* suffixes] conveys the meaning [productive operation] because those [the Mīmāṃsakas] who have taken the denotative function of the *tiṅ* suffixes [to convey the meaning productive operation so] understand [them]. How, then, can one conclude that the root alone denotes action and not the *tiṅ* suffixes? To meet this objection the following verse is given.
Notes. The final criterion of what a word or word element means is simply what people understand when they hear it. If a child understands that he is being called when his father says 'come, Rāma,' the meaning of the 'Rāma' in this sentence is the child and not a divine hero. Similarly, it may be argued, that if there are persons who understand productive operation on hearing the *-ti* of *pacati*, that is what this suffix must mean.

Page 17, lines 1-2.
    Verse 21. The correctness [of forms] is dependent upon differences in discriminative feature (*upādhi*) which [in turn] are relations between distinguisher (i.e. qualifier) and that to be distinguished (i.e. qualificand). And even in absence of that [correct form] the verbal knowledge [of action from the *tiṅ* suffixes] is not denied here [in the grammatical system] or The correctness of [forms] is dependent upon the particularity of distinctive feature.
Notes. According to Nageśa [cf. *Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 746], this verse is from the *Vākyapadīya*. It is not found in the present editions of that work.
    The word *bhedya* literally means to be distinguished i.e. *viśeṣya* (qualificand) and the word *bhedaka* means distinguisher i.e. *viśeṣaṇa* i.e. qualifier. Thus, the word *bhedyabhedakasambandha* stands for *viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇasambandha*: a relation between qualifier and qualificand. The word *upādhi* means a property which serves to distinguish one thing from other. Now *viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇasambandha* is a

kind of *upādhi* which serves to distinguish a correct form from an incorrect form.

An example will clarify the meaning of these terms. From a knowledge and the words by which it is represented *ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭa-ghaṭa*, 'pot as distinguished by potness' we may elicit by analysis the following entities.

1) a substance, pot
2) a generic character 'potness'
3) a relation by which entity 2) resides in entity 1)
4) a word '*ghaṭa*'
5) a generic character '*ghaṭa*'-ness
6) a relation by which 5) inheres in 4).

Now, of the above entities 2) serves to distinguish 1) from a cloth etc.; 5) serves to distinguish the phonemic sequence *gh-a-ṭ-a* from such phonemic sequences as *p-a-ṭ-a*. It is only by the fact 1) and 4) are so distinguished that we can say that word *ghaṭa* is correctly used of a pot and incorrectly used of a cloth. In other words, it is 3) and 6) that act as the distinctive features of our correctness of speech in representing the aforesaid knowledge.

This correctness, according to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa has no invariable connection with communication. Two persons may communicate by solicisms if their errors happen to agree.

Page 17, lines 3-7.

> 'To be distinguished': qualificand. 'Distinguisher': qualifier. The correctness [of forms] is dependent upon the particularity of the relation between these two. To explain more fully: the traditional science of grammar has as its aim [the forming of] correct words. But, for the Mīmāṃsakas, who say that denotative power is a property assumed [to belong to words] only insofar as it limits [their meaning] when they are correctly formed, being meaningful is the same as being correct, and if we are to argue along these lines, it is only a decision as to correctness that can be called a decision as to denotative power. [On the other hand] if it is argued that denotative power is different [from correctness], then too it would certainly be incorrect to use the *tiṅ* suffix in the sense of action.

Notes. If the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the denotative power belongs only to those words that are authorized by grammar and maintain that the denotativeness of the words depends upon the correctness then they will have to admit that the *tiṅ* suffixes have no denotation of action because in that sense *tiṅ* suffixes are not authorized by grammar. On the other hand, if the Mīmāṃsakas argue that denotativeness or non-denotativeness has nothing to do with correctness, the grammarians are ready to admit that the *tiṅ* suffixes are denotative of productive

operation, but they will further add that the use of the *tiṅ* suffixes in this sense is incorrect.

Page 17, lines 7-9.

     And thus, just as if the instrumental were used in the sense of the dative, if the *tiṅ* suffixes are used to denote action which is [in fact] denoted by the root, then those who are proficient in other systems [i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas] will have to perform penance prescribed for transgressing the prohibition 'one must not speak falsely', for they will have used incorrect words in a sacrificial act.

Notes. The man who uses incorrect words in a sacrificial act commits a sin and must perform a rite of expiation.

Page 17, lines 9-12.

     Objection: -According to you, the prohibition 'one must not speak falsely' will not apply specifically to the sacrificial act but will apply to a man [in general] by force of direct statement; since the agent is [directly] denoted by the *tiṅ* suffix. [It is true that] from context [the prohibition] would apply to the sacrificial act but the [context] is ruled out being at variance with the direct statement.

     Answer: -the objection is already removed by the declaration that "the meaning denoted by the *tiṅ* suffixes functions as qualifier." For the meaning agent, being subordinate is not competent to take the meaning prohibition [or negation] as subsidiary to itself. On the other hand, the meaning action, being predominant is competent and therefore by force of context [the prohibition] applies to the sacrificial act.

Notes. In the chapter Darśapūrṇamāsa of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, we have a scriptural text *nānṛtaṃ vadet*: 'one must not speak falsely.' In regard to this text, the question arises whether the prohibition applies to the context, i.e. to the sacrifice, or to a man in general.

On this question the Pūrvapakṣin, according to the Śabara's commentary says that the prohibition is *puruṣārtha*, applicable to a man in general. His argument is that while the context suggests that the prohibition applies to the sacrificial act laid down in the Darśapūrṇa-māsa chapter, the direct statement (*śruti*) tells us that the prohibition is applicable to a man in general because the verb *vadet* directly denotes the meaning agent. Direct statement is more powerful than context. Therefore, the prohibition is *puruṣārtha*.

In reply, the Mīmāṃsā siddhāntin points out that the *tiṅ* suffixes directly denote the meaning productive operation and not the meaning agent or object. The meaning agent is only implied, not denoted, and what is understood through implication cannot be regarded as directly stated. Therefore, direct assertion (*śruti-pramāṇa*) has no place here

and context comes into play which tells us that the prohibition is *kratvartha*, applicable to the sacrificial act.

Now the theory of the grammarians will go against the above conclusion because according to the grammarians in the verb *vadet* the *tiṅ* suffix directly denotes the meaning agent, and thus by force of direct statement (*śruti*) the prohibition will apply to a man in general.

To this, subtlety Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa answers that he has already shown that the meaning denoted by the *tiṅ* suffixes functions as a qualifier. The meaning of the *tiṅ* suffixes is presented as dependent on the meaning action denoted by the root. The semantic paraphrase of the verb *vadet* will be *ekakartṛka-preraṇā-viṣayībhūtā vadanakriyā:* 'an action of speaking which is an object of injunction and of which there is a single agent.' We see here that the meaning agent is a qualifier of the meaning action and hence subordinate to that meaning.

Now the prohibition or negation can be construed with the meaning action which stands as syntactically predominant but not with the meaning agent which is subordinate to action. If the subordinate meaning could be construed with other meanings then the sentence *rājapuruṣamānaya*, 'bring the king's man,' would mean 'bring the king'. The negation is not directly construed with the agent. So, it cannot be said that by force of direct statement the prohibition applies to a man in general. Rather, by force of context the prohibition applies to the acts described in the Darśapūrṇamāsa chapter and since *tiṅ* suffixes are employed in that act, the Mīmāṃsaka who misuses them is liable to penance.

Page 17, lines 13-15.

> Or let it be incumbent on a man as connected with the sacrifice because so far as the performance of the sacrifice is concerned there is no difference, just as the injunction laid down by the *Mantra* in the sentence 'yawning, one should recite the words *'Mayi dakṣakratū'*. Other instances are explained at length in my *Bhūṣaṇa.*

Notes. In connection with Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice, there is a scriptural text 'yawning one should recite the words *'Mayi dakṣakratū.'* In regard to this, there arises the question whether what is enjoined here applies to the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice or to a man in general.

On this question the Mīmāṃsā Pūrvapakṣin says: the injunction applies to a man in general because the agent is directly denoted by the *śānac* suffix which is added to the frequentative root *jañjabhya*, while the sacrifice is indicated only indirectly by context. Direct assertion is more powerful than context. Therefore, the injunction applies to a man in general.

Siddhāntin answers that the recitation of the words *'Mayi dakṣakratū'* should not be divorced from the context. Rather, the

injunction applies to a yawning man in general in connection with the sacrifice. The siddhāntin grants that when the direct assertion comes into conflict with context, it prevails over context, but when these two are not in contradiction they are both applicable and come into play jointly. Here, there is no contradiction because the injunction will apply to a man by force of direct statement and it will apply to the sacrifice by force of context. If we apply both direct statement and context we find that the injunction applies to a man connected with sacrifice, and not to a man in general.

In the same way, Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa argues that the prohibition 'one should not speak falsely' may apply to a man as connected with a sacrificial act and not to a man in general. And thus, this prohibition does not stand against the grammarian's theory that the *tiṅ* suffixes denote agent.

Page 17, lines 15-18.

> Now, it may be objected that if the *tiṅ* suffixes are incorrect in denoting productive operation, one would not understand the meaning action from them since verbal knowledge of word denotation presupposes the knowledge of correctness [of the words]. It is to meet this objection [that the author of the verse] says 'the verbal knowledge etc.'. There may be a verbal knowledge even where a word is incorrect, from its being mistaken for what is correct as in case of corrupt [or dialect] words. However, [the corrupt form which gives rise to the knowledge] will still be incorrect. This is the meaning of the passage. In reality, knowledge of correctness is not the cause of denotativeness nor is the decision that [a form is] different from the correct one a preventative [of denotativeness in words]. We shall discuss this further under the verse *asādhur anumānena* [verse 37 in *Śaktinirṇaya*].

Notes. The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that whatever is denotative is correct. Corrupt words are not denotative; therefore, they are incorrect. The Naiyāyikas add further corrupt words like *gāvī* etc. appear to be denotative of the meaning cow because they remind us of correct words like *go* etc. The grammarians refute this view as follows. If the corrupt words have no denotative function they would convey no meaning. It does not help to say that they remind us of correct words and through those they are denotative, because ignorant persons who do not know the correct words understand the meaning from incorrect ones. According to the grammarians, the correct word '*go*' and the corrupt word '*gāvī*' both are denotative of the meaning cow. The only difference is that the use of corrupt words leads to the religious demerit, whereas the use of correct word leads to merit.

Page 17, lines 19-20.

Here ends the chapter of the *Bhūṣaṇasāra* on the denotation of the *tiṅ* suffixes and roots composed by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa the son of Rangoji Bhaṭṭa.

(the end)

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