A STUDY ON SANSKRIT SYNTAX (2):*
ŚABDAKAUSTUBHA ON P.1.4.24 [Apādāna (1)]

Sanskrit Text and Annotated Translation

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Introductory Remark

A relationship between an action and a thing which is related to that action is expressed differently according to how to recognize an aspect of that action. This relationship is, when we cognize the action, realized on an ontological and epistemological scheme. The action itself is regarded as having several aspects that consist of it and something is realized as the one which is undertaking some role and supporting that aspect in the course of accomplishing the action. Pāṇini seems to use a term *kāraka* to represent such relationship in his grammar. The term *kāraka* is thus based on a sort of extra-linguistic scheme. However, since it is the term which is set forth in sentence composition, it is purely grammatical, i.e., syntactic and semantical. In verbalizing the action, some item is at first perceived as the one having a relation to that action. Depending on the relation to the action, its role is classified into one of *kāraka*-categories. A word denoting that item is provided a suffix which represents the notion of one *kāraka*. In this derivational course, we have different levels of procedure. The presumptions based on epistemological and ontological dimensions are included in this very grammatical notion of *kāraka*. Kiparsky and Staal [1968] is one of the attempts to extract such a different stages in Pāṇini's derivational procedure, and recently Deshpande [1991(b)] reconsiders this *kāraka* system by introducing the idea of "prototype."

   The notion *kāraka* has six categories which are differently related to actions: *apādāna, sampradāna, karaṇa, adhikaraṇa, karman,* and *kartṛ*. (All these are prescribed in the *kāraka* section, namely, in the rules of P.1.4.24-55). Each of these categories is operated under the condition of P.1.4.23: *kārake* (when it is [directly] related to the action) and unless they are not perceived to be related to the action they cannot be established.

P.1.4.24 (*dhruvam apāye 'pādānam*) introduces a designation of "*apādāna*: an ablation." In this *Śabdakaustubha*, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita discusses following subjects: the meaning of the word *dhruva*, the relation of *apādāna* to a verb (in this discussion a basic notion of sentence, i.e., *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* [a relation of qualifier and qualificand] in *śābdabodha* or a verbal understanding, is reviewed in detail), types of *apādāna* and the validity of this rule.

Sanskrit Text, Translation and Notes

2. *dhruvam apāye 'pādānam.* [P.1.4.24: *SK*.586]
2.1. The meaning of the word *dhruva* { 115,18-20 }
Text: *apāyo viśleṣo, vibhāgas taddhetutvopahito gativiśeṣaś ceha vivakṣitas tasmin sādhye 'vadhibhūtam apādānasaṃjñaṃ syāt. "vṛkṣāt patati."*
Translation: [An act of] "moving away" (*apāya*) means a disjunction (*viśleṣa*). Here, a separation (*vibhāga*) or a particular movement which is represented as its cause is intended. When it [= that movement] is to be accomplished, what is a fixed point is termed "*apādāna*." For example, "*vṛkṣāt patati*: it is falling from a tree."
Notes: This interpretation of P.1.4.24 is based on the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, more precisely on the *Padamañjarī*. *KV* on P.1.4.24 [I,535] says: *dhruvaṃ yad apāyayuktam apāye sādhye yad avadhibhūtaṃ tat kārakam apādānasaṃjñaṃ bhavati.* (When a separation has taken place, the one which is related to the separation as the fixed point serves as *kāraka* and is given a designation *apādāna*.)
PM on do. [I,535,7-10]:

apāyaḥ viśleṣaḥ, vibhāgas taddhetubhūtaś ca gativiśeṣo 'vadhisāpekṣaḥ, tatra vibhāgasya dviṣṭhatvāt na kevalam apayann eva tena yuktaḥ, kiṃ karhi ? yato 'paiti so 'pi yukta evety āha -- 'dhruvaṃ yad apāyayuktam' iti. kathaṃ punaḥ saptamīnirdeśe 'py apāyayuktam iti pratipadyemahīty atrāha -- 'apāye sādhya' iti.

Tr.: The act of moving away [means] a disjunction. Such a separation or a particular movement which becomes a cause of it depends on a fixed point. In this case, since the separation resides in two entities, it is not proper to say that only one entity is separating. Why ? The one from which something is moving is properly [called *dhruva*]. Thus said, "*dhruvaṃ yad apāyayuktam*." How do we realize the one which is related to the act of moving away, though it is mentioned in the locative case [such as "*apāye*"]? Thus explained, "*apāye sādhye.*"

2.1.1. The formation of the word *dhruva* <first alternative> {115,20-21}

Text: *"dhruvam" ity atra "dhru gatisthairyayoḥ* [1400; *Dhātupāṭha.* VI.107]*" ity asmāt kuṭādeḥ pacādy aC.*

Translation: The word "*dhruva*" is derived from a verbal root √*dhru-* (its meaning is both movement and stability) adding the agentive *kṛt* suffix -*aC* [by P.3.1.134]. [The root √*dhru-* belongs to *kuṭādi* class.] Thus, this √*dhru-* is within the scope of P.3.1.134 prescribing *paca-*, etc.

Notes: This and the following passages deal with the formation of the word *dhruva*. Two alternatives are discussed. In the first alternative, the word *dhruva* is analyzed as a derivation from a verbal root √*dhru-*, a member of sixth class of *dhātus*. The root √*dhru-* is sub-classed in the heading of *kuṭādi* [*Gaṇapāṭha* 54; *Dhp.* VI,107]. The *kṛt* suffix -*aC* is added to the stems beginning with √*pac-* by P.3.1.134 (*nandi-grahipacādybhyo LyuṆiny aCaḥ*).

√*dhru-* + *aC* > *dhru-* + *a°* > *dhr-uv-a* [P.6.4.77]

Actually, the heading *pacādi* does not refer to the class of verbal roots but the nominal forms (*pacādi* is listed in *Gaṇapāṭha* 133 and is said as *ākṛtigaṇa*). Then, how we can introduce the suffix -*aC* after the verbal root √*dhru-*. *SK.*2896 on P.3.1.134 says [IV, p. 35]:

pacādir ākṛtigaṇaḥ. 'śivaśamariṣṭasya kare' [SK.3489; P.4.4. 143], 'karmaṇi ghaṭo 'ṭhaC' [SK.1836; P.5.2.35] iti sūtrayoḥ karoter ghaṭeś cāCprayogāt. aCpratyaye pare yaÑlugvidhānāc ca.

Tr.: The heading *pacādi* is an open list. In the *sūtras* such as P.4.4.143 and 5.2.35, the forms *kara-* and *ghaṭa-* are mentioned, which are derived from √*kṛ-* and √*ghaṭ-* respectively with the suffix -*aC*. [Although those verbal roots are not included in the list of *pacādi*, such examples are admitted as correct. Therefore, we have to conclude that the suffix -*aC* can be introduced to every verbal root.] Furthermore, [in P.2.4.74,] it is prescribed that zero suffix replaces the affix -*yaÑ* (Intensive marker by P.3.1.22) before the suffix -*aC*.

As is clear from this statement, the suffix -*aC* is not explicitly prescribed to be added after √*pac-* but, by the analogical interpretation, the scope of this suffix is extended. This indicates that the suffix -*aC* is introduced after the stem of Intensive. Since the conjugation of Intensive is not listed in the *pacādi*, we have to conclude again that the suffix -*aC* is affixed after every root.

2.1.2. <Second alternative> {115,21-23}

Text: *ye tu "dhru*[*1] *sthairye [Dhp.* I.990]*" iti paṭhanti. teṣām igup-adhalakṣaṇaḥ kapratyayaḥ. dhruvatīti dhruvaṃ sthiram. eka-rūpam iti yāvat. "dhruvam asya śīlam" iti yathā.*

    *1. Read *dhruva* instead of *dhru* (MS. 90R5), based on *PM* reading.

Translation: Some hold that [the word *dhruva* is derived from] a verbal root √*dhruvA*- denoting a stability. To those verbal roots such as having a penultimate vowel ["*iK-upapada*: having *iK* (=i,u,r,l) as penultimate vowel"], an agentive suffix -*Ka* is introduced [to denote the agent].

   [The form "*dhruvati*" means that] something is stable. Therefore, it keeps one and the same form (*ekarūpa*). For example, "*dhruvam asya śīlam*: his conduct is stable."

Notes: Here is explained the second derivation of the word *dhruva*. In this opinion, the word *dhruva*- is derived from the verbal root √*dhruvA*- with *kṛt* suffix -*Ka* which is prescribed in P.3.1.135: *iGupadhajñāprīkiraḥ Kaḥ*.

   √*dhruva*- + -*Ka* > *dhruv*- + °*a* > *dhruv-a*

As regards to the derivation, commentators have already discussed on it. *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,535,5-7] says:

   "*dhruvam*" *iti*. "*dhru gatisthairyayoḥ*" [*Dhp*. 1400] *ity asmāt kuṭādeh pacādy aCi rūpam. ye tu* "*dhruva gatisthairyayoḥ*" [*Dhp*. 1400 pā.] *iti paṭhanti, teṣām iGupadhalakṣaṇaḥ Kaḥ pratyayaḥ.*

   Tr.: On the word *dhruva*. Since it [= √*dhru*-] is included in the *kuṭādi* class [sixth class of *Dhp*.], a suffix -*aC*, prescribed to *pacādi*, is applied. Others, however, list the root in the form of √*dhruvA*-. To such verbal roots, a suffix -*Ka* is introduced because it has a penultimate vowel -*u*.

This passage is quoted by Sāyaṇa (or Mādhava, 14 c. CE) in his *Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti* on √*dhru*- [p. 479]:

   dhru gatisthairyayoḥ. (dhruvati) ityādi guvativat. (dhruvaḥ) pacādy aC. atra Svāmyādayo[1] *dhruva iti vakārāntaṃ dhātuṃ paṭhanti. uktañ ca* "*dhruvam apāye*" *ity atra Haradattena -- dhru gatisthairyayor ity asmāt pacādy aC, ye dhruva gatisthairyayor iti paṭhanti, teṣām iGupadhalakṣaṇaḥ Kapratyaya iti.*

Also, he says [on √*dhru*- (*Dhp*. I.990), p. 263]: *dhru sthairye. dhruvaḥ -- iti bāhulakāt Kaḥ. yadvā 'dhruvam apāye' iti nirdeśāt sādhuḥ. ayaṃ tudādau gatyarthaś ca. tasmād vā aCi dhruvaḥ. sa hi kuṭādiḥ.*

   From the first alternative, the word *dhruva* has two meanings, the movement and the stability. It seems to imply that the notion of *dhruva* would contain some sort of motion. On the other hand, the second alternative gives the meaning, stability, and this seems to exclude the item having the motion from the range of *dhruva*.

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[1] Sāyaṇa specifies "others" as "*Svāmyādayaḥ* (Kṣīrasvāmin, etc.)." However, in the *Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī* of Kṣīrasvāmin, the root √*dhruvA*- is not listed (See Liebich [1930, p. 151]). In this connection, Kṣīrasvāmin says [p. 86]: *dhru sthairye. dhravati, bāhulakāt* [P.3.3.1], *Kaḥ* [Uṇ. II.61]: *dhruvaḥ. tudādau* [*Dhp*. VI.107] *dhruvat* [I.990].

According to Palsule [1955], some *Dhātupāṭha*s give different list of √*dhru-*.

	B	Kṣ	M	S	Śa	C	J	Kk	Kt	Śā	H	V
√*dhru-*	VI107a	119	126	116	x	x	135	108	x	116	114	P
√*dhruv-*	VI107b	x	x	116	81	93	x	x	107	x	x	x

(As for the abbreviations of *Dhātupāṭha*s, see Palsule [1955]).

2.2. Nature of the word *dhruva* {115,23-29}

Text: *tathā cāpāye sādhye yad ekarūpam ity ukte prakṛtadhātūpātta-gatyanāviṣṭatve sati tadupayogīti labhyate. tac*[*1] *cārthād avadhibhūtam eva paryavasyati. tena "dhāvato 'śvāt patati" ityādau kriyā*[*2] *viśiṣṭasyāpy aśvasya prakṛta*[*3]*dhātūpātta-kriyāṃ praty avadhitvaṃ na virudhyate. tathā "parasparasmān meṣāv apasarataḥ" ity atra sṛdhātunā gatidvayasyāpy apādānād ekameṣaniṣṭhāṅ gatiṃ praty aparasyāpādānatvaṃ sidhyati.*

> *1. MS90R7. *yac* for *tac*. *2. Read "*kriyā-*" instead of "*kriyāyāḥ*."[2] cf. MS. 90R8. *kriyāvi(śi)ṣṭasya*. *3. ad. -*pati-* (MS. 90R8).

Translation: Accordingly, when [*dhruva* is said as] "the one which remains the same where the moving is to be done," it [= *dhruva*] is realized as the one which helps the movement if it itself is not involved in that movement denoted by the contextual verbal root. And on the basis of this meaning it leads to [the notion of] "the one which is a limit (*avadhibhūta*)." Therefore, in case of "*dhāvato 'śvāt patati*: he is falling from a running horse," even though a horse is qualified by one action [i.e., running], it does not make a contradiction to become a limiting point in relation to the other action [= the act of falling] obtained by the contextual verbal root √*pat-*. Similarly, in case of "*parasparasmān meṣāv apasarataḥ*: two rams back away from each other," even though two movements are obtained by root √*sṛ-*, in regard to the movement existing in one ram, the other [ram] functions as *apādāna*.

Notes: The word *dhruva* means "a fixed point" or "something stable" (as is stated in 2.1.2). If this literal interpretation alone is admissible, a thing which is itself moving is not elligible to become *dhruva*. In the example quoted in this passage, '*aśva*' would not be considered as the fixed point because it is running. This kind of objection is already discussed in *Vt* II on P.1.4.24 [I,327,9]: *gatiyukteṣv apādānasaṃjñā nopapadyate 'dhruvatvāt* (It is not justified to give a designation *apādāna* to the things related to the action, because they are not fixed point). This *Vt* is, however, immediately refuted by *Vt* III: *na vādhrauvyasyāvivakṣitatvāt* (Or, it is not the case because *adhrauvya* [instability] is not intended here).

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[2] Cf. *Tattvobodhinī* on *SK* No.586 [I, p. 657]: *iha dhāvanakriyāviśiṣṭasyāpy aśvasya prakṛta-dhātūpāttakriyāṃ praty avadhitvaṃ na virudhyate.*

The point of this discussion is how to interpret the *dhruva*. Does this allow us to make an extension of the meaning? The stability referred to in this is not an absolute notion. Even though a horse is running, this act of running is not of the agent who is falling. In the verbal understanding, the main denotation is the act of falling and with regard to this falling the *apādāna* is decided because the horse is not involved in the act of falling. The notion of the *dhruva* is thus relative. Kaiyata clearly says about this relativeness of the notion of *dhruva* [on P.1.4.24, II,249l] that "*na tv anavacchinnam. tato 'pāye yad anā-viṣṭam tad apāye dhruvam ucyate*: But it is not a restricted meaning. Thus, something which does not enter into [the act of] moving away, that is called *dhruva*."[3]

2.2.2. Proof by Bhartṛhari {115,29-116,3}
Text: *uktañ ca hariṇā prakīrṇakāṇḍe*
> *apāye yad udāsīnam calam vā yadi vācalam.*
> *dhruvam evātadāveśāt tadapādānam ucyate.*
> *patato dhruva evāśvo yasmād aśvāt pataty asau.*
> *tasyāpy aśvasya patane kuḍyādir dhruvam iṣyate.*
> {116}*meṣāntarakriyāpekṣam avadhitvam pṛthak pṛthak.* [*VP.* III,7. 141]
> *meṣayoḥ svakriyāpekṣam kartṛtvañ ca pṛthak pṛthak. iti.*
> *atadāveśād ity apāyānāveśād ity arthaḥ.*

Translation: Thus said by Bhartṛhari in his *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa* [*VP* III.7.141]:
> "When the moving away has taken place, the one which is indifferent to the movement or does not move is the fixed point because of not being involved in it [= moving away]. It is called *apādāna*. In case where someone is falling from a horse which is itself falling from the fixed point, the wall, etc. is desired as the fixed point with regard to the falling of that horse. [In case where two rams are separating,] the limiting point [of the act of separating of one ram] is decided with reference to the act of the other ram, and in each case the agency is decided with regard to each rams' own action."

Here, "*atadāveśāt*" [in c *pāda* of first *kārikā*] means "because it does not enter into the act of moving away."

Notes: First two *kārikā*s are not found in the present *Vākyapadīya*. Both are quoted by Haradatta in *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,536,5-6; 8-9]. The *pāda* a-c of the former *kārikā* is quoted by Nāgeśa, attributing this to

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[3] Cf. *Uddyota* on P.1.4.24 [II,249l]: *apāye yad anāviṣṭam iti. apāye sati prakṛtadhātūpāttayā kriyayā yad anāviṣṭam ity arthaḥ. evam ca prakṛtadhātūpāttagatyanāviṣṭatvam eva dhruvatvam iti tātparyam.* Also *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,535,12] says: *iha tad apāyena viśeṣyate -- apāye yad dhruvam iti, na tu sārvatrikam.* (Here, [To express the notion that] it is specified by the separation, it is said "*apāye yad dhruvam.*" However, it does not mean the absolute [stability].)

Bhartṛhari, in his *Uddyota* on P.1.4.24 (II, 2491: *harir apy āha* ...).
Cf. See the remarks by Abhyankar and Limaye in their edition of *VP*,
the Appendix IV, no. 2 (pp. 358-9) and no. 14 (pp. 363-4).

VP III.7.140 says: *ubhāv apy adhruvau meṣau yady apy ubhaya-
karmaje. vibhāge pravibhakte tu kriye tatra vivakṣite* (Even though
two rams are not stable in the act [of separating] performed by both,
two actions are intended to be different [from the other]).

2.2.3. In sum {116,4-8}
Text: *gatir vinā tv avadhinā nāpāya iti kathyate*[*1]. *iti* [*VP*.III,7.143ab]
   *tatraivokter avadhinirapekṣasya calanasyāpāyatvābhāvād iti
   bhāvaḥ. "parvatāt patato 'śvāt patati" ity atra tu parvatā-
   vadhikapatanāśrayo yo 'śvas tad avadhikaṃ devadattāśrayaṃ
   patanam arthaḥ.*
      *1. In the Iyer's edition of *VP*, *gamyate* instead of *kathyate*.
Translation: "It is said that there cannot be any act of moving away
   without the limiting point."
      Here it is implied that the motion which is not related to the
   fixed point is not [called] "moving away." However, in case of
   "*parvatāt patato 'śvāt patati*: he is falling from a horse which is
   falling from the mountain," the verbal understanding is the act of
   falling down in which Devadatta is its substratum and has the
   fixed point, i.e., the horse which is the substratum of the act of
   falling down having the mountain as its fixed point.
Notes: When mere separation is intended, that is to say, a separation of
one thing into two or more is expressed, if those two or more have no
movement, we cannot speak of the separation (*apāya*). For example,
cutting a tree into pieces. In the course of cutting, we realize that the
separation in the form of the tree divided into pieces has happened.
Since the pieces are not moving (*acala*), we cannot say that "pieces
are separating from the tree." We cannot admit the tree as the fixed
point.
   When the movement is witnessed and it is a sort of separation from a
certain point, this is called *apāya*. In this action, there are both the
agent and the fixed point. If the horse is falling down from the
mountain and a person is falling down from that horse, both person
and horse are in motion. In this case, two movements are involved,
i.e., horse's and person's falling down. Here, two actions are as
realized to be distinct. Each act has its own agent and fixed point. That
is, horse is the agent of its falling and has the mountain as the fixed
point. The person is the agent of his movement and has the fixed point,
horse. Therefore, even though two movements are involved, there is no
confusion in usage. We have such usages quoted in this passage and
admit them as correct.

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2.3. Relation of *apādāna* to *kriyā* {116,8-10}

Text: *pañcamī tv avadhau śaktā. tatrābhedena saṃsargeṇa prakṛty-artho viśeṣaṇam. pratyayārthas tu kriyāyāṃ viśeṣaṇam. kāra-kāṇāṃ kriyayaiva sambandhāt. anyathāsādhutvāt. kriyānvaye saty eva hi kārakasaṃjñā, tatpūrvikā viśeṣasaṃjñāś ca sthitāḥ.*

Translation: The fifth case ending (*pañcamī*) denotes the fixed point. In that case, the meaning of the nominal stem is a qualifier [to case ending] through the relation of identity (*abheda*). And the meaning of the suffix serves as the qualifier to the action because *kāraka* is the one which is related to the action. Otherwise any expression would be wrong. Thus, when something is related to the action, it is called *kāraka*. And as it being *kāraka*, a particular designation is applied to it.

Notes: This passage refers to the maxim "*prakṛtipratyayārthayoḥ pratyayārthaḥ prādhānyaḥ*: among the meanings of the nominal stem and the suffix the meaning of the suffix is predominant." This is based on Patañjali, *MBh* ad P.3.1.67 [II, 58,11-12]: *prakṛtipratyayau pratyayārthaṃ saha brūta iti* (the nominal stem and the suffix are conveying the meaning of the suffix conjointly).

According to the grammarians, the nominal stem is related to the suffix through the relation of identity (*abheda*) because the substratum denoted by the elements are identical. In the example "*vṛkṣāt (parṇaṃ) patati*," the nominal stem *vṛkṣa* expresses the meaning "tree" and suffix -*Ṅas* expresses the meaning "the starting-point." Tree is the substratum of this starting-point-ness, which is denoted by the suffix. Therefore, both are connected by the relation of identity. The *kāraka, apādāna* in this case, is related to the verb. The suffix added after the nominal stem expresses the starting-point and this meaning together with the meaning of the nominal stem delimits the meaning of the verbal root. This relation is not of identity but of non-identity (*bheda*), simply because their substrata are different.

2.3.1. Relations between two words in sentence {116,11-18}

Text: *ata evāhuḥ - [Tantravārttika* on *Jaiminīya Sūtra* 2.2.9.23]
       nāmno dvidhaiva sambandhaḥ sarvavākyeṣv avasthitaḥ.
       sāmānādhikaraṇyena ṣaṣṭhyā vāpi kvacid bhavet.
"sāmānādhikaraṇyena" iti "nīlo ghaṭaḥ" ityādy abhiprāyam. "nīlaṃ ghaṭam ānaya" ityādāv apy antaraṅgakriyānvayā-nantaram ekakriyāvaśīkṛtānāṃ pārṣṇikyabodhābhiprāyañ ca. "ṣaṣṭhyā" ity akārakavibhakter upalakṣaṇam, "haraye namaḥ" iti yathā. "kvacid" ity akārakavibhakter api, "naṭasya śṛṇoti" ityādau kriyānvayadarśanād iti bhāvaḥ.

Translation: It is said: "It is established that the relation of two nominals in every sentence is of two kinds. Namely, through the appositional relation and through [the meaning of] the sixth case ending in certain cases."

The appositional relation (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) [is the relation realized in the phrase], for example, "*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*: a blue pot." And in case of "*nīlaṃ ghaṭam ānaya*: bring the pot which is blue," immediately after the relation to the action is understood, the integrated cognition of which is subdued to one action is realized. The word "*ṣaṣṭhyā*" is an indication of the case endings which represent the non-*kāraka* relation. For example, "*haraye namaḥ*: salute to Hari."

The word "*kvacit*" means the case wherein the case endings do not represent the *kāraka* relation. By this, it is implied that *naṭa* in case of "*naṭasya śṛṇoti*," [although it does not represent any *kāraka* relation,] does relate to the action.

Notes: The verse qouted here is taken from *Tantravārttika* of Kumārila on *JS*. 2.2.9.23 [III,97]. In d *pāda* text runs as "*vā pratipādyate*." The context is how the relation between the two words in the sentence "*vājibhyo vājinam*" is established without the verb.

> *nāmnāṃ dvidhaiva sambandhaḥ sarvavākyeṣv avasthitaḥ.*
>
> *sāmānādhikaraṇyena ṣaṣṭhyā vā pratipādyate .*
>
> *na cātra sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ṣaṣṭhīṃ vā paśyāmaḥ. na ca vājibhya iti kārakavibhaktiḥ kriyāpadād anyena sambadhyate. na ceha tadupāttam. tatrādhyāhārakālpanād eko viprakarṣaḥ. tripadasambandhagauravād aparaḥ.* "

Tr.: It is established that the relation of two nominals in every sentence is of two kinds. [It is expressed either through the appositional relation or through [the meaning of] the sixth case ending.

Here, we have neither the appositional relation nor [the relation expressed by] the genitive case. [The case ending of] the word *vājibhyaḥ* is not expressive of *kāraka* and it is not related to any word other than the verb. Here, there is nothing which represents it [i.e., the verb]. This is a sort of remoteness because some supplementary [word] (*adhyāhāra*)[4] is supposed. The other point is that it is cumbersome to establish the relation among three words [*vājibhyaḥ, vājinam,* and *dadyāt*].

The word *antaraṅgakriyānvaya* referred to in this passage means a relation that an action, a meaning denoted by a verbal form, is a core of sentence meaning and others such as the meanings of nominal forms are joined to the action. In the example quoted in this passage, "*nīlaṃ ghaṭam ānaya*," we have two (preliminary) relations, i.e., between the word *nīlam* and *ānaya*, and between the word *ghaṭam* and *ānaya*. Both have same relatum, i.e., *ānaya*, and through this word two words *nīlam* and *ghaṭam* are combined. Consequently, we get a knowledge of "bring a blue pot." This interpretation of a sentence is apparently

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[4] See Notes on 2.5.

held by the Mīmāṃsakas.[5] They claim that a meaning of verbal suffix is main qualificand of verbal understanding if we say in the later terminology. The verbal suffix denotes '*bhāvanā*: productivity.' Other meanings denoted by the nominal words in the sentence are integrated to the meaning of verbal suffix.[6] This position is already maintained by old Mīmāṃsakas. Kumārila says in his *Tantravārttika* on *JS* 1.2.4.32 [II,52]: *kārakānāṃ kriyāparihāreṇānyonyasambandhābhāvāt. tena vākyam api kriyayaiva sambadhnīyāt* (It is because the *kārakas* have no mutual relation except [the relation to] the action. Thus, a sentence is tied to the action).[7]

There are two relationships between two nominal words. One is *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (an appositional relation) or *abheda* (identity) and the other is *bheda* (difference or non-identity). The relation of identity is, roughly speaking, expressed by the words having the same case ending and that of non-identity is by the genitive case.

The example "*haraye namaḥ*: salute to Hari" is justified by P.2.3.16 (*namaḥsvastsvāhasvadhākamvasaḍyogāc ca*). As for the sentence "*naṭasya śṛṇoti,,*" see Kudo [1996], pp. 49-50.

2.3.2. The relation of non-identity <Against Naiyāyikas> {116,18-21}

Text: *etena "bhūtale ghaṭo na" ity atra "bhūtalādheyatvābhāvo" ghaṭe, "bhūtalādheyatvaṃ" vā ghaṭābhāve viśeṣaṇam iti dvedhā vyācakṣāṇā Naiyāyikāḥ parāstāḥ, ubhayathāpi kriyānvaye kārakavibhakter asādhutvāt, arthābhāve 'vyayībhāvāpatteś ca. tasya nityasamāsatvāt.*

Translation: In this way, in regard to "*bhūtale ghaṭo na*" Naiyāyikas explain its *śābdabodha* in two ways, namely, that the absence of the superstratumness on the ground is a qualifier to the pot [that is to say, pot has an absence of the superstratumness on the ground], or that the superstratumness on the ground is qualifier to the absence of the pot [the ground has the absence of the pot]. Their position is not acceptable because in both the *kārakavibhakti* is wrongly used in spite of non-connection to the action. And if there is no meaning [of *kāraka* which is to be related to the action], there must be *avyayībhāva* since it is permanent compound which is not affected by the relation to the action.

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[5] To this interpretation, Navyanaiyāyikas, for example Gadādhara, criticize [*Vyutpattivāda*, p. 31]: *atha nīlaṃ ghaṭam ānayetyādau nīlāder ghaṭādāv anvayopagame nīlādipadottaravibhakty-arthakarmatvādeḥ kutrānvaya iti cen na kutrāpi. vibhaktipadaṃ sādhutvārtham eva prayujyate* (Then, even if we admit that a word *nīlam* is related to a word *ghaṭa*, which is an object-ness expressed by case ending added after the word *nīla* related to? [Answer]: It is related to nothing. The case ending [attached to the word *nīla*] is only used for the grammatical correct-ness).

[6] As for the verbal understanding of the Mīmāṃsakas', see Rao [1969], pp. 24-34, especially p. 28.

[7] This is discussed by Bhide [1980], p. 138.

Notes: Next discussion is concerned with the verbal cognition based on the relation of non-identity, especially on how the negative particle *naÑ* is construed in the sentence composition. Here is referred to the Naiyāyikas. Bhaṭṭoji refutes them by saying that in the sentence "*bhūtale na ghaṭaḥ*" we have no verbal form, so the negative particle is not construed with either *bhūtale* or *ghaṭaḥ*. As is stated in this passage, if we want to construe the negative particle with *ghaṭa*, these two words do not stand separately in the sentence but form a compound. According to P.2.1.6 (*avyayaṃ vibhakti-samīpa-samṛddhi-vyṛddhi–arthābhāvātyaya– asamprati– śabda– prādurbhāva– paścād-yathānupūrvya-yaugapadya-sādṛśya-sampattisākalyāntavacaneṣu*), an *avyayībhāva* compound is formed from *avyaya* and a nominal stem if it is used to connotate an absence of the object (*arthābhāva*). This is an obligatory compound. Thus, *avyayībhāva* which connotes the absence of a pot is '*nirghaṭam,*' derived from the underlying sentence "*abhāvo ghaṭasya.*" Therefore, since the negative particle cannot relate exclusively to the meaning of one word in the sentence, the above discussion itself is impossible.

The proposition "*bhūtale ghaṭo na*" referred in this *ŚK* is oft-quoted statement in the Navya-Nyāya literature to illustrate the relation of qualifier-qualificand (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*). For the Naiyāyikas the absence (*abhāva*) is admitted as a real entity. It is to be understood as "absence of something" and at the same time recognized "on/in something." This relation is also called *ādhārādheyabhāva* wherein the absence of pot is *ādheya* (superstratum) and a piece of the ground is *ādhāra* (substratum). Something of which the absence is known is called *pratiyogin* and something wherein the absence exists is *anuyogin*. In the case of the above statement a piece of the ground is *anuyogin* and the absence of the pot is *pratiyogin*.

Here we realize a certain kind of relation in the form that one restricts the other between the absence of the pot and the piece of the ground. Wada [1990] classifies the cases of this relation, *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*, into two, viz., (1) direct and (2) indirect, and further gives sub-classes as follows [pp. 55-56]:

        (1) direct: *viśeṣaṇa* is (a) the superstratum of *viśeṣya*
                                   (b) the substratum of *viśeṣya*
                                   (c) neither the superstratum nor the sub-stratum of *viśeṣya*.

When the absence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva)* distinguishes the piece of the ground *(bhūtala)* from the other piece of it, *ghaṭābhāva* is *viśeṣaṇa* and *bhūtala* is *viśeṣya*. In this case, the knowledge from that statement is "The piece of the ground has the absence of the pot." This is the case of (1-a). Contrary, when the ground distincts the absence of the pot from the absence of something other than the pot, *bhūtala* is *viśeṣaṇa* and *ghaṭābhāva* is *viśeṣya,* and the knowledge is "There is no

pot on the ground" or "The absence of the pot is on the ground." This is the case of (1-b).

However, we have another interpretation, i.e., "The pot has the absence of the occurrence on the ground." This third interpretation is treated in this *ŚK* passage. The relation of qualifier-qualificand is considered between two relata but as regards these two we have different interpretations about two relata as: (i) the pot and the absence of the occurrence on the ground or (ii) the absence of the pot and the occurrence on the ground. Such consideration is found in *Nañvāda* of Raghunātha Śiromani (1510 CE) [in the edition of the *Tattvacintāmani*, part IV (śabdakhanda), vol.2, pp. 1039-1042].

> *yatra cādhārādheyabhāvo na samsargamāryyādayā labhyas tatrānuyogipade saptamyapekṣā yathā bhūtale ghaṭo na ghaṭa ity atra tātparyyavaśāt kadācid bhūtalādau ghaṭābhāvaḥ kadācid dhaṭādau bhūtalavṛttitvābhāvaḥ pratīyate, ata eva pṛthivyāṃ gandho na jale ityādau pratīter ekaviśeṣyakatvā-nubhavaḥ.*[8]

Tr.: Where a superstratum-substratum relation cannot be other-wise obtained as the [intended] 'relational seem' (*samsarga-māryādā*), the locative case ending becomes necessary in the word expressing the subjunct (*anuyogin*), e.g., "There is a pot on the ground" and "There is no pot on the ground." Here, depending on the intention of the speaker, one (the hearer) may understand an absence of pot [to occur] on the ground or an absence of occurrence-on-the-ground [to occur] in the pot. It is because of this [second alternative] that the cognition "There is smell in earth and not in water" is felt to have only one qualificand [*viśeṣya*, i.e., smell and two qualifier, viz., occurrence-in-earth and absence-of-occurrence-in water]. (Tr. by Matilal [1968], p.152.)

Raghunātha thinks that the second interpretation [= (ii)] is preferable (see Matilal, op.cit., p.153). On this passage, Gadādhara (1700 CE) gives following commentary [in op.cit, p. 1042]:

> *tathā ca bhūtale ghaṭa ity ato ghaṭe bhūtalavṛttitvasya viśeṣaṇatayā bodhanāt, bhūtale na ghaṭa ity ato 'pi ghaṭe bhūtalavṛttitvābhāva eva viśeṣaṇatayā pratīyate, na tu ghaṭā-bhāve bhūtalavṛttitvam. ekākāravākyasya dvividhabodha-janakatopagame naÑpade saptamyantabhūtalādisamabhiyā-hārajñānasya dvividhakāraṇatvakalpanāpatteḥ.*

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[8] Parallel passage is found in *VSM* of Nāgeśa [nipātārthanirṇaya, p. 48]: *etena – 'bhūtale na gahṭaḥ' ityādau tātparyavaśāt bhūtalādau ghaṭādyabhāvaḥ, kadācic ca ghaṭādau bhūtala-vṛttitvābhāvaḥ pratīyate – ity āpastam, atyantabhāvārthakanaÑaḥ pratiyogibhūtakriyā-nvayitvaniyamāt, kārakānāṃ kriyānvayitvaniyamāc ca. kiñcaivam avyayībhāvasya nityasamāsatvād vākyasyaiva durlabhatvāpattiḥ. na caivam "pṛthivyāṃ gandhaḥ, na jale" ityādau pratīter ekaviśeṣyakatvānubhavo na syāt, iti vācyam. iṣṭāpatteḥ, tathā-nubhavasyaivābhāvāt.*

Tr.: As in case of "*bhūtale gaṭhaḥ*" we realize the relation of which the occurrence on the ground is *viśeṣaṇa* for the pot, so in case of its negative statement "*bhūtale na ghaṭaḥ*" we know that the absence of the occurrence on the ground is a qualifier to the pot, [namely "The pot has the absence of the occurrence on the ground"]. However, it [should] not be [considered that] the occurrence on the ground is a qualifier to the absence of the pot because, for one and the same sentence, twofold cause-ness of the knowledge which is produced from the word ending in a locative case such as *bhūtale*, etc. would be [wrongly] assumed to the negative particle *naÑ* which has the producer-ness of twofold cognition.

2.4. Correctness / incorrectness of the cognition {116,21-26}

Text: *nanv asmad ukto 'pi bodho 'smaddarśanavyutpannānām anu-bhavasākṣika iti cet ?*

   satyam, na hi vayaṃ bodha eva nodetīti brūmaḥ. sarve sarvārthabodhanasamarthā ity abhyupagamāt, kintu tasminn arthe 'sādhutām. tathā ca "siddhe śabdārthasambandhe" iti vārttikaṃ vyācakṣāṇā Bhāṣyakārā āhuḥ -- "samānāyām arthā-vagatau sādhubhiś cāsādhubhiś ca gamyāgamyetivan niyamaḥ kriyate" iti.

Translation: [Objection]: The cognition we claimed is also observed in the experience of the understanding of our philosophy.

   [Reply:] [If Naiyāyikas say as such,] it is true. We do not say that the cognition does not arise in that case because it is accepted that every [word] is capable of conveying its meaning. However, even if such a meaning is [obtained], incorrectness [of the usage] is inevitable. Thus, in the course of explaining *Vārttika* "*siddhe śabdārthasambandhe*," Bhāṣyakāra said that even though the meaning is understood equally both from the correct word and from the wrong word, a restriction like meaningful (*gamya*) or non-meaningful (*agamya*) is still effective.

Notes: Every word has its meaning and from this meaning we come to have a knowledge, but the correctness of the knowledge is not determined by mere acquisition of the meaning. Every school has its own epistemological scheme. The correct cognition for one school is not so for other schools. From the grammarians' point of view, the analysis of sentence into words, again into the meaningful elements, the relation of word-meaning, the faculty of the word, and the epistemological and ontological considerations based on aforesaid analysis held by other schools are not acceptable because they have their own criteria. This passage simply clarifies their standpoint.

The statement "*sarve sarvārthabodhanasamarthāḥ*"[9] is exhibited differently. In the *MBh,* it is said [*MBh* ad P.1.1.20, I,75,13-14; ad 7.1.27,III,251,12-13]:

> *sarve sarvapadādeśo dākṣīputrasya pāṇineḥ / ekadeśavikāre hi nityatvaṃ nopapadyate* ([This is an opinion] of Pāṇini, the son of Dākṣī, that all are the substitutes (*ādeśa*) of the rest, because the permanency of them would be not damaged even if there are changes [of the words]).;

or [ad P.5.1.119, II,367,26-27],

> *yadvā sarve śabdāḥ svenārthena bhavati sa teṣām artha iti tadabhidhāne vā tvataLau bhavata it vaktavyam* (Or rather, every word has its meaning. When it is said that it is their meaning, the suffix -*tva* or -*taL* are possible. Thus to be stated).

Also *PM* on P.1.1.1 [I, p. 60] says "*ataḥ sarve śabdāḥ saṃjñārūpeṇa sarvān arthān pratipādayitum samarthaḥ* (Therefore, every word has a capacity to express own meaning in the form of the technical term).

In the discussion of the relation of the word and its meaning, Navya-Naiyāyikas hold that it depends on the will of God (*Īśvarecchā*), see the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* [p. 293]: *sā cāsmāt padād ayam artho boddhavya itīśvarecchārūpā.*

The phrase "*siddhe śabdārthasambandhe*" is first part of *vārttika* I[10] in the paspaśāhnika (I,6,16), but not of Kātyāyana. This aims at establishing a permanent relation of a word to its meaning. The quotation from *MBh* is taken from the *bhāṣya* on the second part of *Vt* I [I,8,20-22], stating that the grammar gives us criteria to make a distinction of correct words and incorrect words and consequently leads to the ultimate happiness:

> *evam ihāpi samānāyām arthagatau śabdena cāpaśabdena ca dharmaniyamaḥ kriyate śabdenaivārtho 'bhidheyo nāpaśabdene- ti. evaṃ kriyamāṇam abhyudayakāri bhavatīti.*

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[9] Nāgeśa sometimes quotes this statement. In *PLM* [pp. 62,63] it reads "*sati tātparye sarve sarvārthavācakā iti bhāṣyāl lakṣaṇāyā abhāvāt, vṛttidvayāvacchedakadvayakalpane gauravāt.* (Even if there is an intention of speaker, a secondary function of the word is not possible on the basis of the *bhāṣya*, namely "*sarve sarvārthavācakāḥ*: every [words] can denote the their meanings." Because it is redundant to postulate two delimitor for two imports). In this, Nāgeśa refers to *Bhāṣya*, probably the portions qouted in the Notes.

[10] In the Kielhorn ed. this *Vt* I is divided into three parts, namely, "*siddhe śabdārthasam-bandhe," "lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ," and "yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu.*" However, Joshi and Roodgergen propose different division and numbering of this first *vārttika*. They consider the opening statement of *MBh*, "*atha śabdānuśāsanam*" [I,1,1], as first *vt* and "*rakṣohāgamaladhvasaṃdehāḥ prayojanam*" [line 14], which is included in the *bhāṣya*-portion in Kielhorn ed., as second. Subsequently, *vt* III is "*siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokataḥ,*" IV is "*arthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ,*" and V "*yathā laukikavaidikeṣu.*" For the reasons why they give different readings, see Joshi and Roodgergen [1986], Introduction p. ix, Note (2) [pp. 7-8] and fn.331 [p. 90].

Tr.: Likewise, when a meaning can be obtained equally from correct words and incorrect words, a restriction for *dharma*[11] is made that the meaning is to be made explicit only by the correct word not by incorrect word. If it is managed as such, the [words] used become a navigator to *abhyudaya* (welfare).

2.4.1. Proof {116,26-28}

Text: *uktañ ca* - [*VMM. kārikā* 21]

> *bhedābhedakasambandhopādhibhedaniyantritam.*
> *sādhutvaṃ tadabhāve 'pi bodho neha nivāryate. iti.*

Translation: It is said: "The correctness [of the word form] depends on the distinction conditioned by the relation of difference and identity. Even if there is no [correct-ness], the [verbal] cognition is not denied [by grammarians]."

Notes: This is *kārikā* 21 of *VMM*. Its a-b *pāda* is "*bhedyabhedaka-sambandhopādhibhedanibandhanam.*" Nāgeśa attributes this *kārikā* to Bhartṛhari in his *VSLM* (p. 746 and p. 799), but it is not found in the present *VP*. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa comments on it [*VBh*, Dhātvarthanirṇaya, p. 65]:

> *bhedyam = viśeṣyam, bhedakam = viśeṣaṇam, tayor yaḥ*
> *sambandhaḥ, tasya yo bhedaḥ, tan nibandhanaṃ sādhutvam ity*
> *arthaḥ. ayam bhāvaḥ -- yasmin viśeṣye yādṛśaviśeṣaṇānvite*
> *yādṛgānupūrvyāḥ sūtravārtikabhāṣyakārādyanyatamena sādhu-*
> *tvam uktam, sa śabdaḥ tatra sādhuḥ, anyatrāsādur eva.*

> Tr.: The word *bhedya* means a qualificand and the word *bhedaka* a qualifier. [The compound in a-b *pāda*] means that the correct-ness is a juxtaposition such as the difference of the relation between two. What is meant is: When certain qualifier is related to some qualificand, such a particular order is said to be the correct-ness of the words. It is provoked by Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali. [Thus,] one word is correct in a certain case but not in another case.

On this line, it is also remembered that Bhartṛhari says [*VP*. I, 133 (142)[12]] that the tradition of grammar has the knowledge of correctness as its subject (*sādhutvajñānaviṣayā seyaṃ vyākaraṇa-smṛtiḥ*).

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[11] For the compound *dharmaniyama*, Patañjali discusses its formation [I,8,4-7]: [under the partial *Vt* I (*lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ*)] *lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ kriyate. kim idaṃ dharmaniyama iti. dharmāya niyamo dharmaniyamaḥ. dharmārtho vā niyamo dharmaniyamaḥ. dharmaprayojano vā niyamo dharma-niyamaḥ.*

[12] This numbering is given in Iyer's edition. In Rau [1977], it is numbered as 158.

2.4.2. The verbal cognition and the [in-]correct sentence {116,29-33}

Text: *evañ ca kasmād vākyāt kīdṛgbodha iti praśne yo yathā vyutpannas tasya tādṛg eveti sthitiḥ. kīdṛśe bodhe sādhutvaṃ kutra neti paraṃ vicāraviṣaya iti tattvam. etena "ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ" ityādīnāṃ svarūpāyogyateti parāstam, tathā vyutpannasya bodhānubhavāt. anyathā vyutpannasya vyutpattirūpasahakārivirahāt kāryānudaye 'pi svarūpayogyatānapāyāt.*

Translation: Similarly, in regard to the question that what kind of cognition arises from which kind of sentence, it is already established that one who is trained as such gets such a kind of knowledge. In fact, it is another subject of consideration as to whether the correctness exists in the knowledge or not. Accordingly, it is rejected that there is no compatibility of its own form [= sentence form] in case of the expression like *"ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ*: a pot, the object-ness, the act of bringing, [and] an effort." Because it is experientially known that those who are trained in that way get a cognition from it. Otherwise, since one has no helping factor for language training in particular way, even if the result [= the *śābdabodha*] does not arise, it would have nothing to do with the issue of the compatibility of its own form.

Notes: In this passage, the correct-ness of the sentence and the validity of the cognition are sorted out as different issues. Even though the sentence is grammatically correct, not all sentences would give a valid knowledge. Roughly speaking, the process of acquisition of the verbal knowledge is firstly to hear the utterance of word-elements, i.e., sentence form or word form, to recollect the meanings of those elements and to reach the integrated meaning. This meaning obtained at the last stage is called *śābdabodha* (a verbal knowledge). However, it is not enough to have the meanings of the uttered elements. For the Naiyāyikas, there must be several factors to enable us to reach the "correct" knowledge or verbal cognition and it is said that there are four causes, i.e., *yogyatā* (semantic compatibility), *āsatti* (contiguity), *ākāṅkṣā* (syntactic expectancy) and *tātparya* (intention of speaker). Naiyāyikas often quote above the string "*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ*" to illustrate how four causes are necessary. For example, the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, on *kārikā* 84, says [pp. 348-350]:

> *yat padena vinā yasyānanubhāvakatā bhavet. ākāṅkṣā.* [k.84 a-c]

> *ākāṅkṣāṃ nirvakti -- yat padeneti. yena padena vinā yat padasyānvayānanubhāvakatvam tena padena saha tasyākāṅkṣety arthaḥ. kriyāpadaṃ vinā kārakapadaṃ nānvayabodhaṃ janayatīti tena tasyākāṅkṣā, vastutas tu kriyākārakapadānāṃ sannidhānam āsattyā caritārtham. parantu ghaṭakarmatābodhaṃ*

*prati ghaṭapadottaradvitīyārūpākāṅkṣājñānaṃ kāraṇam, tena
ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtir ityādau na śābdabodhaḥ.*
Tr.: "That one word cannot convey a complete meaning without
some word, it is called *ākāṅkṣā* (syntactic expectancy)."
Here the expectancy is now going to be explained, so said "*yat
padena.*" The word X has a syntactic expectancy to the word Y
when X without Y cannot convey any syntactic relation [between
the two]. Any nominal word [ending in certain case suffix which
represents] *kāraka* does not produce relational knowledge without
a verb. Thus it has an expectancy to [the verb]. However,
truthfully speaking, the juxtaposition (*sannidhāna*) of the verbs
and nominal words is fulfilled by the contiguity (*āsatti*). On the
contrary, as for the cognition of a pot being an object [of some
action], the knowledge of expectancy in the form that an
accusative case ending follows the stem *ghaṭa* is a cause [of
verbal cognition]. Therefore, the sequence "*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam
ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ*" cannot produce any verbal cognition.

Here, Viśvanātha at first gives the definition of *ākāṅkṣā* that it is an
expectancy of the one word to another. After saying so, he
immediately redefines that it is required between, for instance, the
stem and the case ending.[13]

Let us examine the sentence "*ghaṭam ānaya.*" The relation of
juxtaposition (*sannidhāna*) is realized because those two words
(*ghaṭam*[kārakapada] and *ānaya*[kriyāpada]) are placed contiguously. In order
to get the cognition "bring a pot," it is sufficient to have this contiguity
for the verbal cognition. Even if we divide one word into its elements,
e.x., *ghaṭam* into *ghaṭa*- and -*am*, we find another contiguity between
them.

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[13] Cf. *Kiraṇāvalī* on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, k. 84 [p. 349]: *nanv evaṃ sati vyabhicārād
ākāṅkṣājñānasya śābdasāmānye kāraṇatvā'nupapattir ity ata āha – paran tv iti. 'ghaṭam' ity
atra ādheyatāsambandhena ghaṭaprakārakakarmatāviśeṣyakaghaṭaniṣṭhakarmatvam iti bodhaṃ
prati, ghaṭapadottaradvitīyārūpākāṅkṣājñānam = avyavahitottaratvasambandhena ampade
ghaṭapadavattvaṃ ghaṭapade vā'vyavahitapūrvatvasambandhenā'mpadavattvam evākāṅkṣa
tajjñānaṃ = smaraṇam kāraṇam ity arthaḥ. evaṃ 'naya' ity atrāpi nayanaprakārakakṛtiviśeṣyaka
'nayanānukūlakṛtimān' iti śābdabodhaṃ prati avyavahitottaratvasambandhena loṭpade
niṅpadavattvaṃ niṅpade 'vyavahitapūrvatvasambandhena vā loṭpadavattvam ākāṅkṣa tajjñānaṃ
kāraṇam iti bodhyam. tathā ca ghaṭakarmakanayanānukūlakṛtimān iti śābdatvavyāpakaṃ yad
ghaṭaniṣṭhakarmatāviśeṣyakaśābdatvaṃ nayanānukūlakṛtiviśeṣyakaśābdatvaṃ ca tad
avacchinnaṃ prati ākāṅkṣājñānasya kāraṇatvena, ākāṅkṣājñānaśūnyakāle tu tādṛśavyāpaka-
dharmāvacchinnabodhā'nutpattyā viśiṣṭaśābdatvātmakavyāpyadharmāvacchinnasyā'py anutpādāt
vyabhicārā'prasakteḥ ākāṅkṣājñānsya vyāpakadharmāvacchinnotpādakasāmagrīrūpasya
vyāpyadharmāvacchinnaṃ prati niyatapūrvavṛttitvasya (kāraṇatāyāḥ) nirābādhatvāt. kintu
prayojanā'bhāvād vyāpyadharmāvacchinnaṃ prati ākāṅkṣājñānasya kāraṇatvaṃ pṛthaktvena
nāṅgīkriyate eveti bhāvaḥ. nanu tattadvyāpakadharmāvacchinnaṃ praty api āsattyā
caritārthatvāt ākāṅkṣājñānasya kāraṇatvaṃ nirarthakam ity āśaṅkāṃ pariharati – teneti.
tattadvyāpakadharmāvacchinnaṃ prati ākāṅkṣājñānasya hetutvenety arthaḥ.*

Following is the elements divided from the sentence "*ghaṭam ānaya*," according to the Naiyāyikas.

word:	*ghaṭam*		*ānaya*	
element:	*ghaṭa*	*-am*	*ā-√nī*	*-hi*
meaning:	*ghaṭa*	*karmatva*	*ānayana*	*kṛti*
	\<pot\>	\<objectness\>	\<an act of bringing\>	\<volition\>

Now, an expectancy comes from the verb *ānaya* in the form of "what is to be brought?" The word *ghaṭam* also has an expectancy to the verb because otherwise the case ending which denotes the object would not be justified. Therefore, those two have mutual expectancy. However, in the verbal understanding, when these are uttered contiguously, *āsatti* (contiguity) is perceived and their meanings are matched to each other (*yogyatā*). On the basis of *āsatti* and *yogyatā* the cognition is achieved without *ākāṅkṣā*. Does it mean that for the verbal cognition *ākāṅkṣā* is not required ?

The answer is no. The expectancy is required between the elements consisting of the word. When the word *ghaṭam* is uttered, there is *āsatti* between the stem *ghaṭa-* and the case ending *-am*. We can indubitably say that there is *āsatti* between *-am* and *ghaṭa-* even in this order. By the reverse order, however, no cognition arises. That is why we need *ākāṅkṣā* between the elements. The order, first *ghaṭa-* comes and next *-am*, is desired and only this combination of the elements produces the knowledge such as "a pot being the object." Therefore, *ākāṅkṣā* is the syntactic expectancy not only between the words in the sentence but also between the elements of one word.

When the meanings of the elements are phrased in the sentence in the form of independent words, for example, in "*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ*," it is possible to say that there are *āsatti* and *yogyatā* between the *meanings*. But this string does not have any syntactic expectancy and thus it does not produce the cognition. In this way, the syntactic expectancy between the elements consisting of the word is required in addition to *āsatti* and *yogyatā*.

Generally, the syntactic expectancy is of two types - *utthitākāṅkṣā* (an expectancy arisen [naturally]) and *utthāpyākāṅkṣā* (an expectancy to be arisen).[14] *VSLM* says [I, p. 505]:

> *utthāpakatāviṣayatā 'nyatarasambandhenobhayasambandhena*
> *vā jijñāsāviśiṣṭaḥ sākāṅkṣā ity ucyate. tatrāntyaṃ – pacati taṇ-*
> *dulam devadatta iti. kriyākārakayor dvayor api parasparaṃ*
> *tadutthāpakatvāt tadviṣayatvāc ca. ādyaṃ paśya mṛgo dhāvatīti.*
> *atra paśyārthasya kārakadhāvanā''kāṅkṣotthāpakatvaṃ dhāva-*
> *naṃ tu tadviṣaya eva.*

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[14] Raja [1966 (1977), p. 159] gives the translations of these two term as "natural expectancy" for *utthitākāṅkṣā* and "potential expectancy" for *utthāpyākāṅkṣā*.

Tr.: The expectancy is particular intention to know(*jijñāsā*) through the relation of either the property of bringing about (*utthāpakatāsambandha*) or the property of being a content (*viṣayatāsambandha*), or the relation of both. An example for the latter is "*pacati taṇḍulaṃ devadattaḥ*: Devadatta is cooking rice." In this case between the verb *pacati* and the nominal words such as *taṇḍulam* and *devadattaḥ* there are both the relation of the property of bringing about and the relation of being a content [of that action]. Next is an example for the former, "*paśya, mṛgo dhāvati*: See, a deer is running." Here the meaning of "the act of seeing" brings about the expectancy to the act of running which is a *kāraka*. [Namely,] the act of running is just an object of seeing.

The *utthitākāṅkṣā* has the relation of being either its content or its producer. In the example "*paśya, mṛgo dhāvati,*"[15] the act of seeing needs something to be seen, i.e., the running of a deer, as its content. Here, *viṣayatāsambandha* exists. However, in this case the act of running of a deer expressed in the sentence functions as *kāraka* and so it has an expectancy to the act of seeing. This is *utthāpakatā-sambandha*. These two relation cannot stand simultaneously, because the phrase "*mṛgo dhāvati*" is possible without another verb *paśya* and only when the phrase as a whole functions as *kāraka* it has an expectancy to *paśya*. Therefore, in this *utthitākāṅkṣā* the relation is always one-sided.

The *utthāpyākāṅkṣā* is realized between *kriyā* and *kāraka*. The verb that represents the action expects some word which represents its content. In the example quoted in *VSLM*, the act of cooking needs something to be cooked, e.g. rice, as its object. This relation is *viṣayatāsambandha*. At the same time, the rice needs some action which causes it to be cooked. This relation is *utthāpakatāsambandha*. Since these two relations interactively exist between these two words, this *utthāpyākāṅkṣā* is mutual expectancy.

2.4.3. Conclusion from the grammarians {116,33-117,6}

Text: *etena pra*{117}*kṛtyarthaprakārako bodho yatra viśeṣyatayā tatra viṣayatayā pratyayajanya ityādi kāryakāraṇabhāvaṃ kalpayanto 'py apāstāḥ, viparītavyutpādite vyabhicārasyodbhavāt.*

　　siddhānte tu "ghaṭaḥ karmatvam" ityādy asādhv eva. tathā hi "abhihite prathamā" iti Vārttikam [Vt IV on P.2.3.1], tat kathaṃ "ghaṭaḥ karmatvam" iti prathamā? ghaṭānayanayor ānayanakṛtī prati karmatayā "kartṛkarmaṇoḥ [kṛtiḥ]" [P.2.3.65] iti ṣaṣṭhīprasaṅgāc ceti dik.

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[15] For the Pāṇinian notion of the sentence and, particurly, the discussion to this sentence "*paśya, mṛgo dhāvati*" which seems to have two finite verbs in one sentence, see especially Deshpande [1991(a)] and Dikshit [1980].

Translation: There are some who assume the cause-effect relation [in the verbal cognition] in the form that wherever the cognition having the meaning of the nominal stem as its subject through the [relation of] qualificand-ness appears [the remembrance of the knowledge] produced by the suffix is the cause for [that result = that verbal knowledge] through the [relation of] content-ness. [Such an opinion] should be set aside because, if [the elements] are placed in the reverse order, a deviation of knowledge would happen.

However, as the *siddhānta*, the string "*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ*" is not correct. As for it, *Vt* says that when it is already expressed the first case is introduced.

Then, why is the first case introduced after the elements in the string "*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ*"? The reason is that since both the pot and the act of bringing are related to the act of bringing and the effort respectively as the object [and this object-ness is not specified otherwise], the sixth case should be introduced according to P.2.3.65. It is enough to say so to refute their view.

Notes: The verbal cognition obtained from the sentence "*ghaṭam ānaya*" is, according to the Naiyāyikas, "*ghaṭavṛttikarmatānirūpitā-nayanānukūlakṛtimān tvam:* You having an effort conducive to the act of bringing which is described by the object-ness existing in pot." The verbal suffix *-hi*, which denotes the volition (*kṛti*), qualifies the agent (= you) and the volition is qualified by the act of bringing though the relation of conduciveness, while the act of bringing is qualified by the pot through the relation of objectness. When this cognition is again verbalized into the string such as "*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ,*" we have to add some relations that combine the elements because the sentence meaning is nothing but the relation of qualifier-qualificand. In that string, there is no *ākāṅkṣā*. Although this is seemingly correct, we cannot have knowledge of "bring the pot." Nor have we the *śābdabodha* proclaimed by Naiyāyikas "*ghaṭa-vṛtti-karmatā-nirūpita-ānayana-anukūla-kṛtimān tvam*" from that string.

Then, even if we accept that string as meaningful and those who are trained by the Naiyāyikas' way of thinking are able to have that cognition, the string has no grammatical correct-ness. In the cognition tentatively accepted, the pot is an object of the act of bringing and the act of bringing is also an object of the volition. These object-ness are not specified otherwise in that string and according to P.2.3.65 (*kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti*) the elements are to be put in the genitive case, resulting in "**ghaṭasya ānayanam, ānayanasya kṛtiḥ.*" The use of the nominative case endings after the elements is not justified by grammar. In grammar, the nominative case is introduced after the stem to express mere meaning of the stem, etc., (P.2.3.46: *prāti-padikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā*) if the notion of the

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object, etc. which is attributed to that meaning of the stem is already expressed (*Vt* I). The nominative case does not convey the notion of the objectness here.

Therefore, Bhaṭṭoji concludes that the string "*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ*" does not produce the cognition and that it is not grammatically correct and thus meaningless. Nāgeśa says about the correct-ness of the cognition in his *VSLM* [I, pp. 501-2]:

> *ata eva ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtir ity ato viparīta-vyutpannasya bodhaḥ. sadvyutpannasya cābodha upapadyate. sadvyutpannatvaṃ ca vyākaraṇaśāstroktaprakṛtipratyayavibhā-gatattadarthavibhāgatattadanvayabodhaviṣayajñānavattvam.*[16]

> Tr.: Therefore, in the string "*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ*" [incorrect] knowledge [obtained from the reverse order of the elements] comes arise. [That is to say,] a right cognition cannot occur. To be right cognition is to have the knowledge of following contents such as the divisions of stem and suffix, each meanings of them and the relational knowledge of them which are prescribed in the grammar.

This criticism against Naiyāyikas is, of course, an arbitrary one imposed on them by the grammarians. "From the Nyāya point of view," as is stated by Matilal [1968, p. 20], "it will not be improper to say that examples like (11) [that is, above string. Noted by N.K.] lack the syntactic property *ākāṅkṣā* and hence do not generate any cognitive meaning."

In this connection, the *Kiraṇāvalī*, a commentary on the *Nyāya-siddhāntamuktāvalī*, gives Naiyāyikas' explanation [p. 349]:

> *'ghaṭam ānaya' itivākyasthāne prayuktāt 'ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtir' itivākyāt 'ādheyatāsambandhena ghaṭapra-kārakakarmatāviśeṣyakaḥ anukūlatāsambandhena ca ānayana-prakārakakṛtiviśeṣyakaḥ śābdabodho na jāyate, ... 'ghaṭam' itisthāne prayukte 'ghaṭaḥ karmatvam' ity atra 'karmatvaṃ ghaṭa' ity api vaktuṃ śakyatvāt tatra aviparīte viparīte vā prayoge āsattiyogyatāsattve 'pi aviparīto viparīto vā śabda-bodho na bhavati, ākāṅkṣā'bhāvāt, yatas tatra 'karmatvaṃ ghaṭa' ity atra ākāṅkṣā nāsty eva, ampade ghaṭapadottara-tvasyaivā''kāṅkṣātvāt, anyathā 'aṃ ghaṭa' ity api prayogaḥ śuddha āpadyeteti vyāpakadharmāvacchinne khaṇḍabodhe ākāṅkṣājñānasya kāraṇatvaṃ sārthakam eveti bhāvaḥ.*

> Tr.: In the case of the sentence "*ghaṭam ānaya*," since its divided string is already shown, the verbal knowledge which has a pot as a qualifier and an objectness as its qualificand through the relation

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[16] Bālam Bhaṭṭa says in his *Kalā*, a commentary on *VSLM* [in *VSLM*, p. 504]: *yady api tattat-samabhivyāhāre tattadbodhājanakatvaniścayaḥ pratibandhaka iti. tad api na. ghaṭam ānayety-ādau tattatpade ghaṭāmpadādau pratyekaṃ gṛhītaśaktikasya tādṛśānupūrvījñānavato 'kāraṇatva-niścayābhāvavato viparītavyutpannasya tato bodhāpatter gauravāc ca.*

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of superstratumness and which has the act of bringing as a qualifier and the volition as its qualificand through the relation of conduciveness would not arise from the string "*ghaṭaḥ karma-tvam ānayanaṃ kṛtiḥ.*" ...

In the case of the word "*ghaṭam,*" even though it is shown in the form of "*ghaṭaḥ karmatvam,*" it is possible to say "*karmatvaṃ ghaṭaḥ.*" Here, even though there are *āsatti* and *yogyatā* between two elements, neither right nor incorrect verbal cognition would occur because there is no *ākāṅkṣā.* That is to say, *ākāṅkṣā* does not exist between *karmatvam* and *ghaṭaḥ* in this order. The element *-am* has *ākāṅkṣā* when it is placed only after the element *ghaṭa.* Otherwise, it would be claimed that the expression "*am ghaṭa*" is correct usage. In the cognition obtained from the divided sentence which is delimited by the pervader-ness, the knowledge of *ākāṅkṣā* is the cause.

2.5. Types of *apādāna* {117,7-16}

Text: *nirdiṣṭaviṣayaṃ kiñcid upāttaviṣayaṃ tathā.*
     apekṣitakriyañ ceti tridhāpādānam ucyate. [*VP* III.7.136].
    yatra sākṣād dhātunā gatir nirddiśyate tan nirdiṣṭaviṣayam. "*aśvāt patati*" *yathā.*
    yatra tu dhātvantarārthāṅgaṃ svārthaṃ dhātur āha tad upāttaviṣayam. yathā "*balāhakād vidyotate*" *iti. niḥsaraṇāṅge vidyotane dyutir vartate. yathā vā* "*kusūlāt pacati*" *iti. ādānāṅge pāke 'tra pacir vartate.*
    apekṣitakriyaṃ tu tat, yatra pratyakṣasiddham āgamanam manasi nidhāya pṛcchati "*kuto bhavān*" *iti,* "*pāṭaliputrād*" *iti cottarayati, arthādhyāhārasya nyāyyatāyā uktatvāt.*

Translation: [Bhartṛhari says (*VP* III.7.136)]: "The *apādāna* is said to be of three types. That where [*apāya*] is directly mentioned, that where [*apāya*] is included, and that where [*apāya*] is implied."

In case where the movement is directly expressed, it is *nirdiṣṭaviṣaya.* An example is, "*aśvāt patati*: he is falling from a horse."

Where the verbal root denotes a meaning which becomes a part of the meaning of another verbal root, it is said "*upāttaviṣaya.*" An example of it, "*balāhakād vidyotate*: it is lightening from the cloud." Here, a verbal root √*dyut-* is used in the sense of "*udyotana*: lightening" in which [the act of] "*niḥsaraṇa*: going forth" is included. [Thus, that expression is same as saying "*balāhakān niḥsṛtya vidyud vidyotate*"]. Or, another example for it, "*kusūlāt pacati*: he cooks out of granary." Here, a verbal root √*pac-* is used in the sense of [cooking] in which the act of "*ādāna*: taking out" is included. [Thus, it is literally equivalent to say "*kusūlāt taṇḍulān ādaya pacati*"].

The third one, "*apekṣitakriya*" is one where, having someone's approach obtained by the direct perception, a person asks "From where, sir?" And the other who is coming replies "From Pāṭaliputra." It is already stated that the supplement of the meaning [in sentence] (*arthādhyāhāra*) is [one of] proper way [of understanding].

Notes: Bhartṛhari summarizes types of *apādana* as three. His classification is followed by almost all grammarians after him. Above *ŚK*'s passage is based on *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,537,6-12]: *yatra dhātunā 'pāyalakṣaṇaḥ saṃjñāviṣayo nirdiśyate, yathā — grāmād āgacchatīti, tan nirdiṣṭaviṣayam. yatra dhātur dhātvantarā 'rthāṅgaṃ svārtham āha, yathā balāhakād vidyotate vidyud iti. atra hi niḥsaraṇāṅga-vidyotane vidyutir vartate — balāhakān niḥsṛtya vidyotata ity eva. kusūlāt pacatīty atrādānāṅge pāke pacir vartate. kusūlād ādāya pacatīti, tadupāttaviṣayam. apekṣitakriyaṃ tu — yatra kriyā na śrūyate, pramāṇāntareṇa tu pratīyate, yathā — āgacchantaṃ puruṣaṃ pratyakṣeṇa paśyann āha — kuto bhavān iti, so 'pi tad eva pratyakṣasiddham āgamanam upajīvann āha — pāṭaliputrād iti.*[17]

Helārāja, commenting on above *kārikā*s of Bhartṛhari, explains the meaning-implication by the phrase "*guṇabhāvena pradhānabhāvena vā*: through a secondary function or a basic function [of meaning]."[18]

Patañjali realizes the mental acquistion of the action for applying the designation *apādana*. P.1.4.25-31 prescribe the application of *apādana* to the items which represent "a source of fear," etc., but Patañjali thinks that those rules are redundant because the application of *apādana* is justified solely by P.1.4.24 in terms of taking the mental stages into consideration. For example, he says [ad. P.1.4.25, I,327,24-328,1]:

> *iha tāvad vṛkebhyo bibheti, dasyubhyo bibhetīti ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakārī bhavati sa paśyati yadi māṃ vṛkāḥ*

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[17] Parallel passage is found in *Pradīpa* on P.1.4.24 [II,248r]: *tatra nirdiṣṭaviṣayam, — yatra dhātunā'pāyalakṣaṇo viṣayo nirdiṣṭaḥ. yathā grāmād āgacchatīti. upāttaviṣayam — yatra dhātur dhātvantarārthāṅgaṃ svārtham āha. yathā ca balāhakād vidyotata iti. niḥsaraṇāṅge dyotane 'tra dyutir vartate. — yathā vā kusūlāt pacatītyādau. ādānāṅge pāke pacir vartate. apekṣitakriyam — yatra kriyāvāci padaṃ na śrūyate, kevalaṃ kriyā pratīyate. yathā saṅkāśyakebhyaḥ pāṭaliputrakā abhirūpatarā iti.*

[18] Helārāja on *VP* III.7.136 [p. 338]: *upāttaḥ kriyāntarasya guṇabhāvena pradhānabhāvena vā yatrāpāyalakṣaṇo viṣayas tad anyadupāttaviṣayam apādānam. tadyathā 'balāhakād vidyotate,' 'kusūlāt pacati,' 'brāhmaṇāc chaṃsīti.' atra hi niḥsaraṇāṅge vidyotane vidyotanāṅge vā niḥsaraṇe vidyutir vartate iti niḥsaraṇalakṣaṇo 'pāyo vidyotanasya guṇapradhānabhāvenopāttaḥ. balāhakān niḥsṛtya jyotir vidyotate, balāhakād vā vidyotamānaṃ niḥsaratīty arthaḥ. kusūlād ādāya pacatīty ādānāṅge pāke pacir vartate. brāhmaṇād gṛhītvā śaṃsatīti grahaṇāṅge śaṃsane śaṃsir vartate.*

paśyanti dhruvo me mṛtyur iti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nivartate.
tatra dhruvam apāye 'pādānam [P.1.4.24] *ity eva siddham.*[19]
Kaiyaṭa further says that such mental consideration belongs to the type
of *upāttaviṣaya* in his commentary on *MBh* ad P.1.4.25 [II,250r]
(*prekṣāpūrvakārīti. buddhivyavasthāpito trāpāyo 'stīti bhāvaḥ. tatra
nivṛttyaṅge bhaye bibhetyādayo vartanta ity upāttaviṣayam etad
apādānam.*)

For the technique of *adhyāhāra* (supplement), Pāṇini uses the word
vākyādhyāhāra in his P.6.1.139 (*upāt pratiyatnavaikṛtavākyādhyā-
hāreṣu ca*). Bhaṭṭoji comments on this word as "*vākyasyādhyāhāraḥ
ākāṅkṣitaikadeśapūraṇam*: The supplement of the sentence means to
fulfill the part [of the sentence] which is expected." [*SK.*2552 on
P.6.1.139, III. p. 375] Patañjali uses the word "*vākyādhyāhāra*" in
commenting on the word *vyākhyāna* two times (strictly speaking, the
passages are the same) [*MBh*, paspaśāhnika, I,11,23; 12,25-26]: *udā-
haraṇam pratyudāharaṇam vākyādhyāhāra ity etat samuditam
vyākhyānaṃ bhavati* (Explanation consists of *udāharaṇa* or example,
pratyudāharaṇa or counterexample and *vākyādhyāhāra* or supplement
to the sentence). In this connection, Patañjali also states about "the
natural ellipsis" (Deshpande [1985, p. 57]) [*MBh* ad P.1.1.45, I,111,22-
24]:

> *athavā dṛśyante hi vākyeṣu vākyaikadeśān prayuñjānāḥ padeṣu
> ca padaikadeśān. vākyeṣu tāvad vākyaikadeśān. praviśa piṇḍīm
> praviśa tarpaṇam. padeṣu padaikadeśān. devadatto dattaḥ
> satyabhāmā bhāmeti.*
>
> Tr.: Or rather, it is seen that people use a part of sentence instead
> of [whole] sentence and a part of word instead of [whole] word.
> Examples of the sentence, "*praviśa piṇḍīm*" for "*praviśa gṛhaṃ
> bhakṣaya piṇḍīm*: Come in the house, eat food" and "*praviśa
> tarpaṇam*" for "*praviśa gṛhaṃ kuru tarpaṇam*: Come in the
> house, make a refreshing." Examples of the word, "*dattaḥ*" for
> "*Devadattaḥ*" and "*bhāmā*" for "*Satyabhāmā.*"

Bhartṛhari discusses such ellipses in detail in his *VP* II after he
mentions the ways of deciding the meaning. See *VP* II.315-316
onward. The technique *arthādhyāhāra* is held by Prabhākara
Mīmāṃsā (See Raja [1963, p. 170]). They assert that what is to be
supplied is not the word but the meaning. On the other hand, Bhāṭṭa
Mīmāṃsā holds *padādhyāhāra*-view. For details, see Raja [1963], pp.
169-176.

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[19] This type of statement is repeatedly found in *bhāṣya* on all the remaining rules which describe
the termed.

2.6. On the sentence "*sārthād dhīyate*"

2.6.1. Objection 1 {117,17-20}

Text: *iha "sārthād dhīyate" ity api nirdiṣṭaviṣayasyodāharaṇam. syād etat. paratvāt sārthasya kartṛsaṃjñā prāpnoti. uktaṃ hi "apādānam uttarāṇi" iti. kiñ ca sārthasya kartṛtvābhāve tyajyamānasya karmasaṃjñā na syāt, kartṛvyāpāravyāpyatvābhāvāt. tataś ca "hīyate ; hīnaḥ" iti karmaṇi lakāro niṣṭhā ca na syāt.*

Translation: There is another example for the first type of *apādāna*, i.e., "*sārthād dhīyate*: he is excluded from a caravan." So be it. According to the *paratva*-principle, the caravan would get the *kartṛ* designation because of the *paribhāṣā* "*apādāna* is set aside by the latter designations." Or, when the caravan has no agency, the one which is to be excluded would not get the *karman* designation because it is not pervaded by the activity of the agent. Therefore, in the expression like "*hīyate*" or "*hīnaḥ*," the formation of passive voice and the use of past passive participle (*niṣṭhā*)[20] respectively are not justified.

Notes: Passages 2.6.1-4 deal with how to justify the passive construction "*sārthād dhīyate*." Active construction probably supposed to this passive might be either "*sārtho devadattaṃ jahāti*: a caravan banishes Devadatta" [alternative A] or "*devadattaḥ (svayam eva) sārthād jahāti (= apagacchati)*: Devadatta leaves a caravan by himself" [alternative B].

At first, in this passage, the ablative case put after the word *sārtha* is discussed. Pūrvapakṣin criticizes the ablative case after *sārtha* as being incorrect if we suppose the passive construction having alternative A as its underlying sentence. In this underlying sentence, Devadatta is *karman* and the caravan is *kartṛ*. The *l*-ending, here substituted by *ātmanepada* ending *-te*, expresses the notion of *karman* (P.3.4.79). The notion of *karman* is already expressed by the verbal ending and thus the word which expresses the object of the action, i.e., Devadatta, takes nominative case in the passive. On the other hand, the agent, the caravan, is not expressed in this passive construction and so it should take instrumental case by P.2.3.18 (resulting in "[*devadattaṃ*] *sārthena hīyate*"). At the same time, if a speaker wants to express it as the fixed point from where Devadatta is banished, the caravan would be designated as *apādāna*. Consequently, two designations are attributed to one and the same item, so according to the principle for the conflict, namely "*apādānasaṃjñām uttarāṇi kārakāṇi bādhante*: the designa-tion *apādāna* is prevailed by other *kārakas* [which are prescribed] after [it in grammar]" (*MBh* ad. P.1.4.1 [I,302,13]), the latter designation prevails. Therefore, the caravan would be regarded

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[20] P.1.1.26: *KtaKtavatŪ niṣṭhā*. The suffix *-Kta* is prescribed in P.3.4.70 (*tayor eva kṛtyaKta-KHaLarthāḥ*).

as *kartṛ* and the passive would be "*sārthena [devadattaḥ] hīyate*: Devadatta is banished by the caravan," which is not the case here.

If the caravan is not admitted as the agent, in this case since there is no agent, no *karman* is possible. The object is the one which is pervaded by the activity of the agent. Hence, Devadatta cannot be *karman*, and neither passive construction nor the use of the past passive participle is justified.

See *PM* on P.5.4.45 [IV, 357,10-14]:

> "*sārthād dhīyate*" *iti.* "*OhāK tyāge*" [*Dhp.* 1090] *karmaṇy ātmanepadam, yaK, GHUmāsthā sūtreṇe* [P.6.4.66][21]*tvam. kathaṃ punaḥ karmasaṃjñā, yāvatā* "*kartur ipsitatamaṃ karma*" [P.1.4.49]?, *na cātra sārthaḥ kartṛsaṃjñakaḥ, kintu dhruvatvena vivakṣitatvād apādānasaṃjñakaḥ. mā bhūt kartṛsaṃjñā, jahāti tāvat sārtho devadattaṃ yadi na jahyād apāya eva na saṃvarteta.*

> Tr.: About "*sārthād dhīyate*." The verbal root √*hā*- means the act of banishing and the *ātmanepada* ending is meant to the object and before passive marker *yaK* the last phoneme -*ā* of the root is substituted to -*ī* by P.6.4.66. [Thus, the form *hī-ya-te* is derived.] Then, [if the caravan is not admitted as the agent,] how does one apply the designation *karman* [for Devadatta]? It is said in P.1.4.49 that *karman* is most desired by the agent. [Reply:] The caravan is not deserved as the agent. Since it is intended as to be a fixed point, it has the designation *apādāna*. Nor should be called it as the agent. Because, as for the sentence "*jahāti sārtho devadattam*," if the caravan does not banish Devadatta, there would be no separation. [That is to say, there would be no fixed point and no agent because the act of banishing is not done yet.]

2.6.2. Objection 2 {117,20-28}

Text: *na ca karmakartary ayaṃ lakāra iti vācyam, jahāteḥ kartṛstha-kriyatvāt karmaṇy evāyaṃ lakāra iti Indunoktatvāt.*

Translation: It should not be argued that this is *l*-suffix which is introduced to form a reflexive construction (*karmakartari*). It is said by Indumitra that it is *l*-suffix which denotes the object alone, i.e., passive voice since √*hā*- is the verbal root whose action is observable in the agent.

Notes: In the previous passage, the agency is not admitted to the caravan. If so, the passive construction is not justified. Then, pūrva-pakṣin asserts that the sentence "*sārthād [devadattaḥ] dhīyate*" is a reflexive construction (*karmakartari*).

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[21] P.6.4.66: *GHUmāsthāgāpājahātisāṃ haLi.* The substitute phoneme -*ī* is by previous rule P.6.4.65.

If we admit this objection, the result is that Devadatta is the agent turned from the object, namely Devadatta is the object of the act of banishing and the agent of that action as well. In other words, Devadatta leaves the caravan by his own intention. The sentence is meant to "Devadatta excludes himself from the caravan."

However, this objection is refuted simply because the verbal root √hā- is *kartṛsthakriyaka*. This type of verbal root is not allowed to form the *karmakartari* construction. Thus, the form *hīyate* is the passive form not the reflexive. Bhaṭṭoji refers to Indumitra's statement. It is likely that it is quoted from the *Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti* [p. 275]: *Indur api svayam eva hīyata iti pratīteḥ karmakartari lakāro 'stv ity āśaṅkya jahāteḥ kartṛsthakriyatvāt karmaṇy eva lakāra iti.* (For the whole passage that treats with this discussion, see Notes on 2.6.4). Indumitra (1070?) is said to write the *Anunyāsa*, a commentary on the *Nyāsa*, but it is not available at present. See *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. 1, p. 154; vol. 2, p. 248.

Patañjali classifies the verbal roots into four.

1) *kartṛsthakriyaka:* [a verbal root] whose action is observable in the agent.
2) *kartṛsthabhāvaka:* [a verbal root] whose static action resides in the agent.
3) *karmasthakriyaka:* [a verbal root] whose action is observable in the object.
4) *karmasthabhāvaka:* [a verbal root] whose static action resides in the object.

Among these, only the verbal roots belonging to last two classes are allowed to form the *karmakartari* because this reflexive construction is based on the attribution of the agency to the object of the action in the active voice. When some changes are seen in the object, it can be said from a certain point of view that the changes are made by that object itself. By this attribution, the object in the active voice is treated as the agent in the reflexive. However, if the result of action is not seen on the side of the object, since there is no changes in the object which enable us to regard them as being made by the object itself, such attribution is not possible. The verbal root √hā- is *kartṛsthakriyaka* and this action does not produce any visible change on the object. Therefore, the object "Devadatta" in the active voice cannot be regarded as the agent. (See also 2.7.1.4 [pp. 45-46] of part (1) of this study. In the Notes and Bibliography of part (1), the paper referred to as Kudo [1993] is a misprint and please refer to it as Kudo [1994].)

2.6.3. Objection 3 {117,21-28}

Text: *yat tu "apādāne cāhīyaruhoḥ"*[P.5.4.45] *iti sūtre Nyāsakāreṇa sampradānasūtre Kaiyaṭena coktaṃ karmasaṃjñāyāṃ kartṛ-grahaṇaṃ svātantryopalakṣaṇam. ato hānakriyāyāṃ sva-tantreṇāpādānenepsyamānasyeha karmateti.*

tac cintyam, "māṣeṣv aśvaṃ badhnāti" ity atra karmaṇo 'py aśvasya vastuto bhakṣaṇe yat svātantryaṃ tad āśrayakarma-saṃjñāpatteḥ. ata eva karmasaṃjñāvidhāyakasūtraśeṣe Kaiya-ṭenoktam — prayojakavyāpārasyāśabdārthatvāt tadapekṣaṃ karmatvam ayuktam iti.

Translation: However, the others say that as Jinendrabuddhi and Kaiyaṭa say in their commentaries respectively on P.5.4.45 and P.1.4.32, the mention of the word *kartṛ* implies the independency in the rule prescribing the designation *karman*. As far as the act of leaving is concerned, since the caravan does act independently, although it is designated as *apādāna*, the caravan is regarded as the agent [even if it is not represented as such]. Thus, it is possible to apply the designation *karman* to [Devadatta].

This is questionable. [Then, consider this example] "*māṣeṣv aśvaṃ badhnāti*: he ties a horse in the bean field." Here, although horse is the object [of the act of tying], it is independent as far as the act of eating is concerned. As a result, the designation *karman* would be [wrongly] applied to the substratum [i.e., the bean field] because they are directly reached by the horse. Therefore, it is said by Kaiyaṭa in his commentary on P.1.4.49 that since the activity of the prompting agent is not expressed in [the collection of] the meaning of the words [in above expression], it is improper to apply the designation *karman* to that which depends on it [= *prayojakakartṛ*].

Notes: This objection is that even though the agency of the act of banishing is not attributed to the caravan and this agency is not expressed explicitly in the sentence, the caravan is independent as far as that action (*hānakriyā*) is concerned and by this independency it is regarded as the agent. When the speaker wants to express it as the fixed point, its *apādāna*-ness is intact by its independence because the independency (*svātantrya*) is larger notion than *apādāna*-ness. At this stage, we can have a potential agent of that action, i.e., a prompting agent or instigator (*prayojakakartṛ*), inspite of the fact that it and its agency are not expressed in the actual sentence. Presupposition that when some X has a desire to exclude other Y, this desire is directed to Y allows us to regard Y as the most desirable object of that agent. By P.1.4.49, this most desirable thing (*īpsitatama*) is called *karman* and that is why the objectness for Y is justified and the passive expression is derived. Pūrvapakṣin quotes Kaiyaṭa as his support. For the sources referred in *ŚK*, see the *Pradīpa* on P.1.4.32, [II,256l-r]: *nanu śiṣyasya kartṛtvābhāve kathaṃ goḥ karmasaṃjñā? naiṣa doṣaḥ. karma-saṃjñāyāṃ svātantryasya kartṛgrahaṇenopalakṣaṇāt. tathā ca 'sārthād dhīyata' ity atra karmaṇi lakārotpattiḥ;* and the *Nyāsa* on P.5.4.45 [IV,357]: *sārthād dhīyata iti. "OhāK tyāge" laḥ karmaṇy ātmanepadam. "dhumāsthā" ityādisūtreṇettvam. nanu cākartṛkaṃ karma nāsti, "kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma" iti vacanāt, sārthaś cātra*

na karma[22]*, kiṃ tarhi? apādānam? naiṣa doṣaḥ; karmasaṃjñāyāṃ hi kartṛgrahaṇaṃ svātantryopalakṣaṇam.*

To this argument, Bhaṭṭoji replies that it leads to a wrong sequence. For example, "*māṣeṣv aśvaṃ badhnāti*: he ties an horse in the bean field." In this sentence, *māṣa* would be *karman* if we accept the above reasoning. Someone wants the horse to eat the bean and for that purpose ties it in the bean field. As for the horse, it is independent with respect to its eating of the bean. Since above reasoning allows this independency, even though it is not directly expressed in the sentence, the horse as the agent of the act of eating wants the bean as the most desirable. Then, the bean field regarded as the most desirable is called *karman* and takes the accusative case instead of the locative case (**māṣān aśvaṃ badhnāti*). However, this string is clearly incorrect. As is stated by Kaiyaṭa, the presupposition of the independency which is not expressed in the sentence and the attribution of the object-ness based on such presupposition should not be accepted. *Pradīpa* on P.1.4.49 [II,262l-263r]: *anye tu prayojakakartrapekṣayā prayojyasya karttur anīpsitam api karmety ācakṣate. tat tu prayojakavyāpāra-syāśabdatvāt pūrvoktodāharaṇe 'yuktam iti nyāyavido manyate.* (Tr.: Others say that the one which is not desired by the instigated agent would be *karman* by presupposing the role of the instigator [who instigates the latter to do so]. But this is not correct. Since the activity of the prompting agent is not expressed in the sentence, [to suppose his role and assign the objectness] in the above example [i.e, *nāhaṃ kaṭaṃ kariṣyāmi*] are improper).

See also *PM* on P.5.4.45 [IV,357,14-18]: *svātantryopalakṣaṇaṃ ca karmasaṃjñāyāṃ kartṛgrahaṇam, kartṛsaṃjñā bhavatu, mā vā bhūt. evaṃ cāpādānasyāpi sataḥ sārthasya hāne yat svātantryaṃ vāstavam, tadāśrayā karmasaṃjñā bhavati. yady evam, māṣeṣv aśvaṃ badhnātī-ty atra karmaṇo 'py aśvasya vastuto yad bhakṣaṇe svātantryaṃ tad āśrayā māṣānāṃ karmasaṃjñā prāpnoti, tasmāt karmakartary atra lakāraḥ.*

2.6.4. Conclusion {117,29-32}

Text: *atrāhuḥ -- "sārthād dhīyate" ity atra karmakartari lakāraḥ. tathā hi, apagamanā jahāter arthaḥ. sā ca kṣudupaghātādinā devadattasyāpagamate*[*1] *tatsamarthācaraṇam.*

yadā tu kṣudupaghātādinā svayam evāpagacchati tadā karma-kartṛtvam. sphuṭañ cedaṃ HaradattaMādhavagranthayoḥ.

　　*1. Read *-gamane.* (See the quotations from *PM* and *MDhV* below).

Translation: Here is said. In the example "*sārthād dhīyate*," *l-* suffix is used as *karmakartari*. Namely √*hā-* means "going away

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22 Joshi and Roodbergen [1975] reads *kartā* instead of *karma* [p. 115, fn.335]. As they note, *PM* reads: *na cātra sārthaḥ kartṛsaṃjñakaḥ.* (Quoted in Notes on 2.6.1.)

(*apagamanā*)." When [√*hā*- is used to mean] the departure of Devadatta by reasons of hunger or disease, etc. [which is instigated by the caravan], it leads to special kind of meaning.

However, in case where he himself goes away by suffering from hunger or disease, there is the object-turned agency [in Devadatta]. This is clearly stated in the *PM* of Haradatta and the *Dhātuvṛtti* of Mādhava.

Notes: Here, the alternative B (see 2.6.1) is dealt with. At first, the meaning of the verbal root √*hā*- is understood as "going away (*apagamana*)," not as "throwing away (*tyāga*)." The sentence "*sārtho devadattaṃ jahāti*" is paraphrased into "*sārtho devadattam*[23] *apagamayati:* the caravan lets Devadatta go away." Here, we realize the meaning of the causative, *apagamayati*, as indicated in *PM*. This meaning modification is expressed by the word *samarthācaraṇa*. In the background of this paraphrase, the commentator seems to take into consideration that the act of going away of the caravan is transferred to the act of departure of Devadatta by particular reasons. The departure of Devadatta is at least caused by two situations. One is direct or indirect instigation by the caravan. For instance, by not being given food, Devadatta feels hunger and as a result he departs from the caravan. In this case, though the caravan does not seem to act as an agent of excluding, he is the agent of this instigation.

Active [sentence describing the simple fact]
  [sārthād] devadatto 'pagacchati (Devadatta departs from the caravan).

Causative [sentence considered with the particular situation]
  sārthaḥ [sārthād] devadattam apagamayati (The caravan lets Devadatta leave off [from the caravan]).

Passive
  [sārthena] sārthād [devadatto] apagamyate [→ sārthād dhīyate].

The other situation is that if Devadatta himself decides to depart from the caravan for reasons of hunger or disease, etc., he is the agent of the departure and the object as well. Thus, the status of agent turned from the object is admitted to Devadatta and the reflexive construction is justified.

References in *ŚK* are as follows:

PM on P.5.4.45 [IV,357,18-22]: *katham iha jahātir apagamanāyāṃ vartate? devadattaṃ sārtho jahāti, apagamayatīty arthaḥ. eṣaiva ca sārthasyāpagamanā yat kṣudupaghātādinā devadattasyāpagamane tat samarthācaraṇam, yadā tu kṣudhādinā svayam evāpagacchati tadā*

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[23] P.1.4.52 (*gatibuddhipratyavasānārthaśabdakarmākarmakāṇām aṆikartā sa Ṇau*) prescribes that the agent in the active voice is regarded as *karman* in the causative (and takes accusative case) when the verb denotes the movement.

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*karmakartṛtvam, tataś ca hīyata iti. ko 'rthaḥ? svayam evāpa-
gacchatīty arthaḥ. punaḥ "kuto hīyate?" -- ity apekṣāyāṃ sārthena
sambandhaḥ.*

MDhV on the verbal root *OhāK* [p.275]: *sārthād dhīyate devadattaḥ,
hīna ityādau lakārādau vivadante. tatra 'apādāne cāhīyaruhoḥ'*
[P.5.4.45] *ity atra Nyāse devadattasya kartur īpsitatamatvābhāve 'pi
karmasaṃjñāyāṃ kartṛgrahaṇasya svātantryopalakṣaṇārthatvād
hānakriyāyāṃ svatantrasya apādānasyepsitatamatvāt karmaṇi lakārā-
daya iti prapañcena samarthitam. sampradānasūtre Kaiyaṭe 'py evam
uktam. Indur api svayam eva hīyata iti pratīteḥ karmakartari lakāro
'stv ity āśaṅkya jahāteḥ kartṛsthakriyatvāt karmaṇy eva lakāra iti.
Haradattas tu Nyāsamatam uktvā, yady evam, māṣeṣv aśvaṃ
badhnātīty atra karmaṇo'py aśvasya vastuto yad bhakṣaṇe svā-
tantryaṃ tad āśrayā [māṣāṇāṃ] karmasaṃjñā prāpnoti, tasmāt
karmakartary atra lakāra iti. upapāditaṃ ca "iha jahātir apa-
gamanārthaḥ, sā ca kṣudupaghātādinā devadattasyāpa[gama]ne tat
samarthācaraṇam. yadā tu kṣudhādinā svayam evāpagacchati tadā
karmakartṛtvam" iti. punaḥ kuta ity apekṣāyāṃ paścāt svārthe
sambandhaḥ.*

2.7. On the purpose of the word *dhruva*

2.7.1. Reason 1 for necessity and its rejection {117,33-118,1-3}

Text: *syād etat. dhruvagrahaṇaṃ kim artham ?*

>   *na ca "grāmād āgacchati śakaṭena" ity atra {118} śakaṭe
>   'tivyāptivāraṇāya tad iti vācyam, paratvāt tatra karaṇa-
>   saṃjñāpravṛtteḥ. yathā "dhanuṣā vidhyati" ity atra. iha hi
>   saraṇiḥsaraṇaṃ praty avadhibhāvopagamenaiva vyadhane
>   karaṇatety ubhayaprasaṅgaḥ.*

Translation: May it be so. Here is a question. What is the purpose for
mentioning "*dhruvam*" ?

>   It should not be argued that in order to prevent the
>   overapplication to "*śakaṭa*" in "*grāmād āgacchati śakaṭena*: he is
>   coming from a village by cart" [the word *dhruva* is mentioned],
>   because the designation *karaṇa* will set it aside by the *paratva*-
>   principle. For example, "*dhanuṣā vidhyati*: he pierces with a
>   bow." In this case, since a bow is considered as the fixed point in
>   regard to the act of shooting of an arrow, it is the instrument in
>   regard to the act of piercing. Therefore, both designations
>   *apādāna* and *karaṇa* become applicable [but according to the
>   *paratva*-principle the latter prevails].

Notes: If the word *dhruva* is not mentioned in P.1.4.24, whatever
relates to the separation (*apāya*) would be called *apādāna*. Ex.
grāmād āgacchati śakaṭena. Here, someone is coming from the village
and we realize that a separation occurs. The cart (*śakaṭa*) is apparently
related to this separation and thus called *apādāna*, which is not the

case here. Therefore, in order to prevent such wrong application we need the word *dhruva* in P.1.4.24. This is first *pūrvapakṣa*.

The answer to this objection is that the wrong application is prevented by another grammatical device, i.e., the *paratva*-principle. Since the cart is the most effective instrument for coming, it is called *karaṇa*. The designation *karaṇa* appears later than the designation *apādāna* and term *karaṇa* prevails over *apādāna* by P.1.4.1. Therefore, even if there is no word *dhruva* in P.1.4.24, we can produce desirable composition. This argument is based on *MBh* ad P.1.4.24 [I,326,19-20]: *dhruvam iti kim artham. grāmād āgacchati śakaṭena. naitad asti. karaṇasaṃjñātra bādhikā bhaviṣyati.*[24]

See *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,537,13-17]:

> *dhruvagrahaṇaṃ kim? grāmād āgacchati śakaṭena -- atra śakaṭasya mā bhūt. atha kriyāmāṇe 'pi dhruvagrahaṇa iha kasmān na bhavati -- dhanuṣā vidhyatīti, atra hi śarāṇām apāyaṃ prati avadhibhāvenaiva dhanuṣaḥ sādhakatamatvam? satyam; ubhayaprasaṅge paratvāt karaṇasaṃjñā bhaviṣyati. nanv evam akriyamāṇe 'pi śakaṭasya naiva bhaviṣyati, evaṃ saṃjñāntaraviṣaye sarvatra.*

> Tr.: What is a purpose of mentioning the word *dhruva*? [In order to prevent an application of the designation *apādāna* to the cart.] For example, "*grāmād āgaccahti śakaṭena*." Here, [the designation *apādāna*] should not be applied to the cart. Then, why should such an application is not to be done even though the word *dhruva* is mentioned in this rule? It is because, in case of "*dhanuṣā vidhyati*," the bow is the most effective means of action functioning as the fixed point from where an arrow is shot. [That is why the designation *karaṇa* is applied to]. It is true. When two designations become conflict, the latter prevails because of the *paratva*-principle. If it is questioned that even though [the word *dhruva*] is not mentioned, [the designation *apādāna*] is not applied to the word *śakaṭa*, it is true because term *apādāna* is always [set aside when it collides] against the scopes of the other designations.

2.7.2. Reason 2 and its rejection {118,3-4}

Text: *"vṛkṣasya parṇaṃ patati" ityādau tu vṛkṣaḥ parṇaviśeṣaṇam, na tv apāyena yujyate.*

Translation: In case of "*vṛkṣasya parṇaṃ patati*: a leaf of tree is falling," the word *vṛkṣa* is a qualifier to the word *parṇa* and is not related to *apāya*.

Notes: If the word *dhruva* is not mentioned in P.1.4.24, every item which is related to the separation is called *apādāna*. In the previous

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[24] Cf. *Pradīpa* on P.1.4.24 [II,247l]: *śakaṭeneti. apāye śakaṭasyāpi sādhanatvād apādānasaṃ-jñā prāpnoti. karaṇasaṃjñeti. yathā dhanuṣā vidhyatīti kriyāmāṇepi dhruvagrahaṇe paratvāt karaṇasaṃjñā bhavati. evam akriyamāṇe 'pi śakaṭasya bhaviṣyatīty arthaḥ.*

passage, this type of wrong application is avoided by the *paratva*-principle. However, this principle is operative among the rules that have same applicability. Then, how about the word *vṛkṣasya* in "*vṛkṣasya parṇaṃ patati*"? In case of the separation, the tree is apparently related to it and it is possible to apply the designation *apādāna* to the tree. The sentence "*vṛkṣāt parṇaṃ patati*" would be meant for "a leaf of tree is falling." Even though the speaker does not want the tree to be the fixed point of the separation, since the tree is related to this separation, it would be wrongly called *apādāna*. Consequently, we have only one sentence to express the same connotations ("*vṛkṣāt parṇaṃ patati*" means "a leaf of tree is falling down" and "a leaf is falling down from the tree" as well). In order to prevent such an application, we need *dhruva* in P.1.4.24.

Keeping this objection in mind, this passage simply refutes it by stating that the tree is represented as having the relation to the leaf and, thus, it does not serve as the means for the separation. Since it does not represent the *kāraka* relation, it is in the scope of *śeṣe* (P.2.3.50). Therefore, even though there would be no word *dhruva* in P.1.4.24, the wrong application of *apādāna* to the tree would not happen.

Patañjali already discussed this problem in his *MBh* ad P.1.4.23 [I.324,1-4]: *na vāpāyasyāvivakṣitatvāt. [Vt V] na vaiṣa doṣaḥ. kiṃ kāraṇam. apāyasyāvivakṣitatvāt. nātrāpāyo vivakṣitaḥ. kiṃ tarhi. saṃbandhaḥ. yadā cāpāyo vivakṣito bhavati bhavati tadāpādāna-saṃjñā. tadyathā, vṛkṣāt parṇaṃ patatīti. saṃbandhas tu tadā na vivakṣito bhavati.* He also gives the sentence "*vṛkṣasya ...*" as the counter-example against the unnecessity of the word *dhruva* in *MBh* ad P.1.4.24 [I,326,2122] and this seems that Patañjali considers the word *dhruva* as necessary despite the fact that he does not explicitly state it.

Kaiyaṭa says [*Pradīpa* on P.1.4.24, II, 247r]:

> *vṛkṣasyeti. asty atrāpāya iti bhāvaḥ. nanv atra kārakatvābhāvāt saṃjñā na bhaviṣyati, apāyābhāvāc ca. saty eva hy avadhāv apāyo bhavatīti pūrvasūtre uktatvāt.*

> Tr.: On the example *vṛkṣasya*. It implies that when there is a separation, [the designation would be applied. But this is not the case.] [Objection:] Since [in the examples quoted the tree and the wall] has no *kāraka*-status, the designation would not be applied. Moreover, there is no separation. As is stated in the discussion of the previous rule, only in the case that the fixed point is available *apāya* is to be considered.

Kaiyaṭa seems to have an opinion that the word *dhruva* is superfluous. Counter-examples are all managed by other rules if we have no word *dhruva*.

2.7.3. Reason 3 and its rejection {118,4-5}

Text: *na ca saṃjñinirdeśārtham dhruvagrahaṇam, apāye kriyāyāṃ
yad anvetīty asyākṣiptasya saṃjñisamarthakatvāt.*

Translation: It is not the purpose of the word *"dhruvam"* in P.1.4.24 to
prescribe the termed (*saṃjñin*) because [by resorting to supplying
the phrase] *"kriyāyāṃ yad anveti"* in the rule *"apāye
[apādānam]"* this implied meaning [namely, P.1.4.24 means that
when the moving away has taken place, the one which is related
to that action is termed as *apādāna*] is capable to [specify] the
termed.

Notes: Third argument for the necessity of the word *dhruva*. In the
rule that prescribes the technical term, there should be at least *saṃjñā*
(the term) and *saṃjñin* (the termed). P.1.4.24 has *saṃjñā* and we
need the word *dhruva* as *saṃjñin*. This is a purpose of mentioning
dhruva.

This is refuted. Kaiyaṭa refers to some grammarians [*Pradīpa* on
P.1.4.24, II,247r]: *tatra kecid āhuḥ — sujñānatvāt pūrvasūtre
uktatvāc ca bhāṣyakāreṇāyam artho noktaḥ* (Some hold that since
such a notion is easily understood and really argued in [the discussion
on] the previous rule, Patañjali has no intention to speak of it.)
Kaiyaṭa's reference is not clear but according to Nāgeśa it describes the
unnecessity of the word *dhruva* [*Uddyota*, ibid.]: *sujñānatvād iti. evaṃ
ca saṃjñinirdeśasya kārakākṣiptena siddhatvād dhruvagrahaṇam
cintyaprayojanam iti bhāvaḥ* (What is the meaning of *sujñānatvāt* ?
Because the listing of the termed is established by its close relation to
the *kāraka*, it is implied that the mention of the word *dhruva* is not
necessary).

By the implication (*ākṣepa*), the termed is understood. Even if we
have no *saṃjñin* in P.1.4.24, since the condition for application, i.e.,
apāye (when the separation is taken place) is given, what is called
apādāna (a relatum to the separation) is easily obtained. All items that
relate to the separation (in those the fixed point is of course included)
are able to be called *apādāna* but when this designation is in conflict
with other designations, it is always set aside. In this way, we can
apply the designation *apādāna* without having the word *dhruva*.

2.7.4. Conclusion {118,5-7}

Text: *yadvā, "kārake"* [P.1.4.23] *iti nirdhāraṇasaptamyāśrayaṇāt
kārakam iti labhyate. pūrvatrāpi prathamārthe saptamīty
uktatvāc ca. tasmād dhruvagrahaṇaṃ cintyaprayojanam.*

Translation: Or rather, [the phrase *"kārake(ṣu) madhe yad apāye
dhruvaṃ] kārakam"* is obtained in terms of the locative case,
kārake [P.1.4.23], which means the selection of one from the
whole. And it is already stated that the locative case is meant for
the nominative case. Therefore, the mentioning of the word
dhruva in P.1.4.24 is purposeless.

Notes: The translation of the phrase "... *kārakam iti labhyate*" is based on the *PM* [on P.1.4.23, I,531] which reads "*viśeṣaṇādhikāre tu – kārakeṣu madhye yad apāye dhruvaṃ kārakam ity artho labhyate* (However, in the interpretation of P.1.4.23 as the qualifier as well as the governing rule, it is obtained that among the *kāraka*s one *kāraka* being the fixed point is [called *apādāna*] when the separation has taken place)."

The interpretation of P.1.4.23 is again introduced here. According to this passage (as seen below, it is based on the *PM*), the locative case is understood to express the specification (*nirdhāraṇa*). Given all the six varieties of *kāraka*, we select one, e.g., *apādāna*, out of among them. In selecting it, if the word *dhruva* is not mentioned, the sole condition would be whether it is related to the separation or not. This condition inevitably facilitates the wrong nomination that the one which is not the fixed point and which is to be designated as another *kāraka* can be termed *apādāna*. However, such wrong nomination is avoided as we have seen in the previous passages 2.7.1-3. Accordingly, we do not need the word *dhruva*.

Sharma [1990, pp. 232-233] considers this "*nirdhāraṇa* interpretation" acceptable. He considers this view as having advantages because "it does not propose to interpret locative as nominative, nor does it resort to rule-splitting (*yogavibhāga*)" and "... would block the assignment of a *kāraka* term to something which is not a *kāraka*." See also *PM* on P.1.4.24 [I,537]:

> *saṃjñinirdeśārthaṃ tu na hi "kārake" iti saptamyantena śakyaḥ saṃjñī nirdeṣṭum, siddhaṃ tu nirddhāryamāṇasya saṃjñitvād apāyaviṣayeṣu kārakeṣu madhye yat kārakaṃ saṃjñāntarasyā-viṣayas tad apādānam iti, tad evaṃ dhruvagrahaṇaṃ cintya-prayojanam.*

> Tr.: Regarding to the purpose as the prescription of the *saṃjñin*. It is not possible to describe *saṃjñin* by the word ending in the locative case (i.e., *kārake*). [To describe *saṃjñin*] is to be done as follows: since what is to be specified is *saṃjñin*, *apādāna* as one class of *kāraka* is the one which is not covered by other *saṃjñā*s when there are the *kāraka*s associated with the separation. In this way, the word *dhruva* is redundant.

2.8. On the necessity of *Vārttika* I

2.8.1. *Vt* I on P.1.4.24 {118,8-12}

Text: "*jugpsāvirāmapramādārthānām upasaṅkhyānam*" [*Vt* I].

> "*adharmāj jugupsate; viramati; pramādyati vā.*" *saṃśleṣa-pūrvako viśleṣo vibhāgaḥ. sa ceha nāsti. buddhikalpitas tu gauṇatvān na gṛhyata iti Vārttikārambhaḥ.*

> *Bhāṣyakāras tu jugupsādayo 'tra jugupsādipūrvikāyāṃ ni-vṛttau vartanta ity upāttaviṣayam etat.*

Translation: It is said by Kātyāyana that an addition of [the verbal roots] denoting "*jugupsā*: disgust," "*virāma*: cessation," and "*pramāda*: neglect" should be made. For examples, "*adharmāj jugpsate; viramati; pramādyati*: he is disgusted with; ceases to practise; neglects *adharma*." [*Apāya*] means "*viśleṣa*: separation" or "*vibhāga*: disjunction" which is preceded by [physical or actual] conjunction (*saṃśleṣa*). [However,] that is not seen in these examples. Thus, since [the notion of separation] mentally pictured is secondary, that meaning [= imagined separation] is not realized from this rule [directly]. Thus said in *Vt*.

On the other hand, since Patañjali said that the word *jugupsā*, etc. are used when "*nivṛtti*: desisting from" preceded by disgust, etc. happens, this is [the *apādāna* of] "*upāttaviṣaya*."

Notes: This section 2.8 deals with the meaning of the word *apāya*. In the previous passages, we have treated the case that is the separation from a certain point, in other words, the act of moving away which is actually/physically perceived. When this physical separation alone is meant by the word *apāya*, mental separation such as disgust, neglect, etc. would not be covered by P.1.4.24. Therefore, as given by Kātyāyana, an addition is required (i.e., *Vt* I on P.1.4.24).

Patañjali, however, does not admit the necessity of this additional statement, instead he says that all the examples are within the scope of P.1.4.24 by extending the notion of *apāya*. *MBh* ad P.1.4.24 [I,327, 2-4] says:

> *iha tāvad adharmāj jugupsate adharmād bībhatsata iti, ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakārī bhavati, sa paśyati duḥkho 'dharmo nānena kṛtyam astīti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nivartate. tatra dhruvam apāye 'pādānam ity eva siddham.*
>
> Tr.: Here, it is shown that the association of two (or more) is at first formed in the mind and later the separation of one from the other(s), i.e., the desist (*nivṛtti*), is taken place. These two phases ongoing in the mind is regarded as the separation inspite of it being psychological, although it not being physical. By this extentional meaning of *apāya*, the addition by Kātyāyana and P.1.4.25-31 as well are considered as dispensable.

For this extentional interpretation of P.1.4.24, see also 2.5.

2.8.2. First reason for rejecting *Vt* I {118,12-13}

Text: *kārakaprakaraṇe ca gauṇasyāpi grahaṇam. "sādhakatamaṃ [karaṇam]"* [P.1.4.42] *iti tamagrahaṇāl liṅgāt.*

Translation: Even in the section where *kāraka*s are prescribed this secondary meaning is understood. It is because the use of suffix -*tama* after the word *sādhaka*- in P.1.4.42 indicates that the secondary meaning is to be considered.

Notes: In 2.8.1, it is said that Patañjali extends the meaning of *apāya* as the separation both in a physical and psychological sense. This

extentional meaning is not directly understood from the word *apāya*.
As is stated by Kaiyaṭa (on P.1.4.24, [I,248]: *buddhikalpitas tu gauṇa
iti bhāvaḥ*), it is a secondary meaning *(gauṇa)*. In order to know that
this secondary meaning is intended here, we need clues in grammar.
Two are given.

First clue is the use of the suffix *-tamaP* in *sādhakatama* of
P.1.4.42. Patañjali discusses the purpose of this suffix [ad P.1.4.42,
I,331,20-21]:

> *evaṃ tarhi siddhe sati yat tamagrahaṇaṃ karoti taj jñāpayaty
> ācāryaḥ kārakasaṃjñāyāṃ taratamayogo na bhavatīti.*
>
> Tr.: Even though it is well-managed [by reading the word
> *sādhakatama* in the sense of simply 'accomplisher *(sādhaka)*'],
> since the teacher [Pāṇini] uses the suffix *-tama*, he lets us know
> that in [the section prescribing] the *kāraka*-designations [the words]
> are not used to express the relative or superlative sense."

By this statement, it is turned out that the words used in defining the
kāraka-designations do not express their full meanings. In other words,
there is room to interpret them in the secondary sense. For the purpose
of this indication, the suffix is added. Accordingly, the word *apāya* is
read not only in its literal sense but in secondary sense. Patañjali says
[ibid., 22-24]:

> *apādānam ācāryaḥ nyāyyaṃ manyate, yatra samprāpya nivṛttiḥ.
> tenehaiva syāt grāmād āgacchati nagarād āgacchatīti. sām-
> kāśyakebhyaḥ pāṭaliputrakā abhirūpatarā ity atra na syāt.
> kārakasaṃjñāyāṃ taratamayogo na bhavatīty atrāpi siddhaṃ
> bhavati.*
>
> Tr.: What does Ācārya consider to be adequate for *apādāna*? [It is
> the case] where having reached then [someone] stops. [If we take
> *apāya* in literal meaning, we can derive the sentences] "*grāmād
> āgacchati*: He is coming from the village" and "*nagarād
> āgacchati*: He is coming from the city," but not the sentences
> such as "*sāṃkāśyakebhyaḥ pāṭaliputrakā abhirūpatarāḥ*: People
> of Pāṭaliputra are more praiseworthy than those of Sāṃkāśya."
> Depending on the clue that in [the section prescribing] the *kāraka*-
> designations [the words] are not used to express the relative or
> superlative sense, we can derive the latter sentence.

2.8.3. Second reason for rejecting *Vt*I {118,13-17}

Text: *apāyādipadānāṃ svaritatvād vā "svaritenādhikāraḥ"* [P.1.3.11]
> *gauṇo 'py artho gṛhyata iti vyavasthāpanāt. tena buddhi-
> kalpitasyāpy apāyasya sattvāt siddham. pūrvaṃ hi buddhy-
> ādharmaṃ samprāpya tato doṣadarśanān nivartata ity asty
> apāyaḥ. evam uttarasūtreṣv api prapañcatvaṃ bodhyam iti dik.*

Translation: Or, it is established that since the word *apāya*, etc. is
> marked with *svarita* accent and whatever marked with *svarita*
> accent is regarded as an *adhikāra* rule by P.1.3.11 [and *adhikāra*

means that which achieves something extra], the secondary meaning would be realized from it. Therefore, the separation taken place in the mind is covered [by the word *apāya*]. Namely, precedingly having [formed] a connection with *adharma*, he [then] leaves it off. Here, the separation is taken place.

In this way, in the following rules [upto 32] this explanation is to be considered.

Notes: Second clue is based on an etymology of the word *adhikāra*. According to P.1.3.11: *svaritenādhikāraḥ*, whatever has the *svarita* accent is regarded as *adhikāra* (a governing rule). The word *adhikāra* paraphrased as "*adhikaṃ kāryam*" means "something extra is to be done." Here, the word *apāya* has *svarita* accent so it is regarded as *adhikāra*. Since it is *adhikāra*, it has to express extra meaning. This extra meaning is nothing but the secondary sense, the psychologically supposed separation. See *MBh* ad P.1.3.11 [I,273,12-14]: *adhikaṃ kāryam. apādānam ācāryaḥ kiṃ nyāyyaṃ manyate, yatra prāpya nivṛttiḥ. tenehaiva syāt grāmād āgacchati nagarād āgacchati. saṃkāśyakebhyaḥ pāṭaliputrakā abhirūpatarā ity atra na syāt. svaritenādhikaṃ kāryaṃ bhavatīty atrāpi siddhaṃ bhavati.[25]*

(to be continued)

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[25] *Pradīpa* on *MBh* ad P.1.3.11 [II,1471]: *saṃkāśyakebhya iti. buddhyā samīhitaikatvāḥ prakarṣāśrayeṇa pāṭaliputrakā vibhajyante iti mukhyāpāyābhāvād apādānasaṃjñā na syāt. "dhruvam apāye" ity atra tu svaritatve pratijñāte sati buddhiparikalpitāpāyāśrayaṇenāpi bhavati.*

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