

# Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha on Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa of *vyāpti* (4)

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## INTRODUCTION

The present article is a continuation of section IV of a previous article<sup>1</sup> by the same title. This section contains a translation and analysis of the Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa chapter of Mathurānātha's *Tattvacintāmaṇi-rahasya*, which is a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. The content of the other sections is as follows: In section I<sup>2</sup> I explained the relation among 'definition' (*lakṣaṇa*), 'definiendum' (*lakṣya*), and invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) to such an extent that readers can understand the discussions presented in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and the *Tattvacintāmaṇi-rahasya*. Section II demonstrates the use of diagrams to illustrate the structure of the definitions of invariable concomitance.<sup>3</sup> Section III provides a translation and analysis of the Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa chapter of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. The following is a summary of the texts included in section III (a single text), section IV (texts 1 through 11),<sup>4</sup> and the present article, which deals with texts 12 through 15.

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1 Wada [1995b]. Other articles to be included in section IV are Wada [1997; 1998a].

2 The introduction preceding section I in Wada [1995b] presents a brief history of the research on the Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa chapter of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and the *Tattvacintāmaṇi-rahasya*, and an explanation of the editions of these two texts and their commentaries and the method of editing the two texts.

3 Wada [1995a] presents a more detailed history and discussion of the diagrams used to illustrate the logical forms of the definitions than section II of Wada [1995b]. Wada [1995a] was published before Wada [1995b], but the manuscript of the latter had been prepared and submitted to press earlier than that of the former.

4 Texts 1 through 3 are dealt with in Wada [1995b], texts 4 through 6 in Wada [1997], and texts 7 through 11 in Wada [1998a].

*Tattvacintāmaṇi:*

Text: Lion's definition of invariable concomitance is that state [possessed by a probans] of not being the locus of the property of having no common locus with a probandum, and Tiger's definition is that state [possessed by a probans] of not being the locus of the property of having a locus different from that of a probandum. These two definitions are reduced to the 'state possessed by a probans' of not having for a locus a non-locus of a probandum. Gaṅgeśa gives two reasons why this reduced definition is not satisfactory.

*Tattvacintāmaṇirahasya:*

Text 1: Mathurānātha begins to clarify 'the property of having no common locus with a probandum' in Lion's definition either as an absence of the occurrence in the locus of a probandum or as the occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum. He then rejects both clarifications.

Text 2: Mathurānātha arrives at a revised version of Lion's definition: the state [possessed by a probans] of being different from an occurrent in the locus of an absence of the property of being the locus of a probandum.

Text 3: The purpose of the expression 'the property of being a locus' in the definition arrived at in text 2 is clarified.

Text 4: The probandum should be qualified by the delimitor of probandumness, and the probandum should exist in its locus through the delimiting relation of probandumness.

Text 5: Two reasons are provided why the two conditions given in text 4 can remove the defect of narrow-application.

Text 6: The occurrence [of the occurrent referred to in the definition] should be delimited by the delimiting relation of probansness.

Text 7: Someone may object that the occurrence delimited by the delimiting relation of probansness is not real, in which case the definition will suffer from the defect of narrow-application.

Text 8: To remove the above defect, the definition should be rewritten as 'the state of being the delimitor of counterpositiveness to a mutual absence, which is the pervader of an absence of the property of being a locus of a probandum, and so on'.

Text 9: The purpose of the word 'pervader' used in the definition is clarified.

- Text 10: The state of being the delimiter of counterpositiveness should be delimited by the delimiting relation of probansness and the delimiter of probansness.
- Text 11: To preserve the validity of the definition, a mutual absence of the possessor of an incomplete occurrent should be interpreted as a complete occurrent.
- Text 12: Mathurānātha begins his discussion of Tiger's definition. He clarifies 'the property of having a locus different from that of a probandum' in the definition as the occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum.
- Text 13: A mutual absence of the possessor of an incomplete occurrent should not be regarded as an incomplete occurrent, as in the case of Lion's definition.
- Text 14: The difference between Tiger's definition incorporating the clarification given in text 12 and the fifth definition of the Five Definitions (*vyāptipañcāpa*) lies in that the former includes 'the state of being a locus' (locusness) in its final part.
- Text 15: 'The state of being different from the locus of a probandum' in the definition should be understood as a difference describing (*nirūpaka*) the state of being the delimiter of counterpositiveness delimited by the delimiting relation of probandumness. And that state should reside in that which is qualified by the delimiter of probandumness.

A TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE  
SĪMHAVYĀGHRALAKṢAṆA CHAPTER OF THE  
*TATTVACINTĀMANIRAHASYA*

TEXT 12: *sādhyā*-(<sup>1</sup>*vaiyadhikaranyam iti.*<sup>1</sup>) *sādhyavaiyadhikaranyam sādhyavadbhinnavṛttitvam, sādhyavadavṛttitvaparatve dravyam sat-tvād ityādāv ativyāptih.*

VARIANT: (1) BI, *-vaiyadhikaranyeti.*

TRANSLATION: [Now begins the discussion of the expression] 'the property of having a locus different from that of a probandum' [in Gaṅgeśa's text]. The property of having a locus different from that of a probandum is [equivalent to] the occurrence in what is different from

the locus of a probandum. If [that expression] means the non-occurrence in the locus of a probandum, [the definition will suffer from] the defect of over-application in the case of the inference “[this] is a substance because [it possesses] existence”, and so on.

NOTES: Mathurānātha begins to discuss the definition of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) formulated by the person called Tiger (*vyāghra*). The definition as found in Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi* runs as follows: the state [possessed by a probans] of not being the locus of the property of having a locus different from that of a probandum (*sādhyavaiyadhikaraṇyānadhikaraṇatvam*).<sup>5</sup> Mathurānātha first of all clarifies ‘the property of having a locus different from that of a probandum’ (*sādhyavaiyadhikaraṇya*) in the definition. He offers two possible clarifications, and shows that the second causes a problem, while the first avoids the problem. Let us first examine the second.

The second clarification is that the property of having a locus different from that of a probandum is equivalent to the non-occurrence in the locus of a probandum (*sādhyavadavṛttitva*). In addition, text 14 purports that Mathurānātha interprets ‘the state of not being a locus’ (*anadhikaraṇatva*) in Gaṅgeśa’s definition as ‘the absence of the state of being a locus’ (*adhikaraṇatvābhāva*)<sup>6</sup> and not as ‘the state of being different from a locus’ (*adhikaraṇabhinnatva*) or ‘the difference from a locus’ (*adhikaraṇabheda*). As a result, if the second clarification is incorporated into the definition, it will run as follows: invariable concomitance is an absence [possessed by a probans] of the state of being the locus of the non-occurrence (an absence of occurrence) in the locus of a probandum (*sādhyavadavṛttitvānadhikaraṇatvam*). We can illustrate the structure of this definition in Figure 37.

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<sup>5</sup> For this definition, see Wada [1995b: 279].

<sup>6</sup> Text 14 compares the fifth definition of the Five Definitions (*vyāptipañcaka*) with the present definition. The fifth one is formulated as the non-occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum (*sādhyavadanyāvṛttitva*). Mathurānātha interprets it as an absence of the occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum (*sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvābhāva*). On this point, see Ingalls [1951: 148, text 100.1-7]. Text 14 says that the difference between this definition and the present definition is that the latter includes ‘the state of being a locus’ (*adhikaraṇatva*). This means that Mathurānātha takes the meaning of the present definition as ‘an absence of the state of being the locus of the non-occurrence in the locus of a probandum’ (*sādhyavadavṛttitvādhikaraṇatvābhāva*).




Figure 37

According to Mathurānātha, this definition will apply to the invalid probans of the inference “this is a substance, because [it possesses] existence” (*dravyam sattvāt*)<sup>7</sup>, and thus suffer from the defect of over-application. The following is the test of the application to the invalid probans. (1) The probandum is substanceness (*dravyatva*).<sup>8</sup> (2) The locus of the probandum is a pot (*ghaṭa*). (3) Since a pot is a substance, existence (*sattva, sattā*) resides in a pot.<sup>9</sup> (4) Hence, existence does not possess the non-occurrence in a pot. In other words, existence possesses an absence of the state of being the locus of such a non-occurrence (of an absence of occurrence). (5) The probans is existence and possesses the same absence. Thus, all the conditions stated in the definition are satisfied, and so the definition applies to the invalid probans. We can illustrate the connection among the entities referred to above in Figure 38.

If the first clarification is adopted, the definition will not apply to the invalid probans and will be free from the defect of over-application. The first clarification is that the property of having a locus different from that of a probandum (*sādhyavaiyadhikaranyā*) is

<sup>7</sup> On why this inference is invalid, see Wada [1995b: 284].

<sup>8</sup> On why the probandum is substanceness and not a substance, see Wada [1998a: 157, fn.15].

<sup>9</sup> Existence resides in a substance (*dravya*), a quality (*guṇa*), and an action (*karman*). On this point, see Wada [1997: 389-390, fn.7].

equivalent to the occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum (*sādhyaavabhinnavṛttitva*). The definition incorporating this clarification will run as follows: invariable concomitance is an absence [possessed by a probans] of the state of being the locus of the occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum (*sādhyaavabhinnavṛttivānadhikaranatvam*). The structure of this definition can be illustrated in Figure 39.




Figure 38




Figure 39

Let us see why this definition does not apply in the case of the invalid inference: “this is a substance, because [it possesses] existence”. Steps (1) and (2) are the same as before. (3) What is different from the locus of the probandum, i.e., a pot, can be cloth (*paṭa*). (4) In cloth, existence resides, because cloth is a substance. (5) Hence, existence, i.e., the probans, is the locus of the occurrence in cloth. It follows that the probans does not possess an absence of the state of being the locus of the occurrence. This outcome does not satisfy the condition stated in the definition that the probans should possess such an absence. Consequently, the definition does not apply to the invalid probans, and thus it does not suffer from the defect of over-application. We can illustrate the connection among the entities referred to in the above process in Figure 40.




Figure 40

TEXT 13: *avyāpyavṛttimato 'nyonyābhāvas tu nāvyāpyavṛttir ity avyāpyavṛttisādhyakasaddhetau nāvyāptih.*

TRANSLATION: And since a mutual absence of the possessor of an incomplete occurrent is not an incomplete occurrent, [the definition does not suffer from] the defect of narrow-application to a valid probans whose probandum is an incomplete occurrent.

NOTES: Mathurānātha argues that the definition arrived at in text 12 will succeed in applying to a valid probans whose probandum is an incomplete occurrent (*avyāpyavṛtti*). A condition for this successful application is that a mutual absence of the possessor of an incomplete occurrent should be interpreted as a complete occurrent (*vyāpyavṛtti*). This condition was set forth in the notes to text 11.

We will see how the definition applies to such a probans under the above condition. An example of a valid inference which includes such a probans is “[this tree] possesses contact with a monkey, because [it possesses] this-tree-ness” (*kapisamyogī etadvṛkṣatvāt*).<sup>10</sup> (1) The probandum is contact with a monkey. (2) The locus of the probandum can be a tree whose branch has a monkey. Suppose this tree is also called ‘this tree’. (3) What is different from this locus cannot be another tree whose branch also has a monkey.<sup>11</sup> The contact with a monkey occurs only in the branch and is an incomplete occurrent in its locus. A difference (mutual absence) from the possessor of an incomplete occurrent is a complete occurrent according to the condition stated in text 13. Hence, a difference from the possessor of ‘contact with a monkey’ (which is an incomplete occurrent) should occur throughout its locus. This difference as a complete occurrence cannot be regarded as existing in that other tree, as a difference from the possessor of the contact is generally an incomplete occurrent and occurs, for instance, in the underground root-part of the same tree and not in the branch.

On the other hand, we can take a quality (*guṇa*) as what is different from the locus of the probandum. Since a quality cannot have another quality such as contact,<sup>12</sup> it cannot possess contact. A quality is that which is different from the possessor of contact with a monkey. Moreover, because a difference from the possessor of the contact occurs throughout a quality, this difference is a complete occurrent. Nothing prevents us from taking a quality as what is different from the locus of the probandum.

<sup>10</sup> For the validity of this inference, see Wada [1995b: 287; 1989: 24].

<sup>11</sup> If we can take this other tree as what is different from the locus of the probandum, the definition fails to apply to the present valid probans. This case will be explained after the present application ends.

<sup>12</sup> An action (*karman*) and a quality do not possess a quality: *aguṇavato dravyārambhāt karmaguṇā aguṇāḥ. Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 7.1.12.

(4) This-tree-ness can occur only in a tree and never in a quality, and so it is not an occurrent (the locus of occurrence) in a quality. This means that this-tree-ness possesses an absence of the state of being the locus of the occurrence in a quality. (5) The probans is this-tree-ness, and hence it possesses such an absence. This outcome fulfills all the conditions stated in the definition, and thus the definition applies to the valid probans. We can illustrate the connection among the entities in the above process in Figure 41.<sup>13</sup>




Figure 41

To understand the purpose of the condition stated in text 13, we have to ascertain what will happen if the condition is not met. In step (3) of the above application, we could not take a tree called 'this tree' as what is different from the locus of the probandum. However, if the condition is omitted, we can take such a tree as what is different from the locus. Then, the probans (this-tree-ness) can occur in the tree, and the probans cannot possess an absence of the state of being the locus of the occurrence in the tree (i.e., what is different from the locus of the probandum). This result prevents us from applying the definition to the

<sup>13</sup> In the figure, contact with a monkey is represented as a single entity for convenience sake. More precisely, it consists of three entities: contact, a monkey, and the relation between them (i.e., inheritance).

present valid probans. Thus, the condition stated in text 13 saves the definition from the defect of narrow-application. We can illustrate the connection among the entities in this case in Figure 42.




Figure 42

TEXT 14: *anadhikaraṇatvam ity atrādhikaraṇatvāṁśasyādhikasya<sup>1</sup> praveśān na sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvam ity anena yathāśrutasya paunar-uktyam. akhaṇḍābhāvaghatakatayā cādhikaraṇatvāṁśasya na vai-yarthyam.*

VARIANT: BI omits *adhikasya*.

TRANSLATION: Since the additional part 'the state of being a locus' (locusness) is included in 'the state of not being a locus', what has been stated by this [fifth definition, namely, by] the non-occurrence [possessed by a probans] in what is different from the locus of a probandum is not a repetition [here]. And the part 'the state of being a locus' (locusness) is not useless, since it forms a different absence.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> A very similar sentence appears in the *Tattvaintāmaṇirahasya*, in which the third definition of the Five Definitions (*vyāptipāñcaka*) is analyzed: *akhaṇḍābhāvaghatakatayā cānādhikaraṇatvāṁśasya vaiyartham iti na ko 'pi doṣa iti dik* (Ingalls [1951: 136, text 94.10-95.2]). Ingalls translates it as "The portion 'which is a locus' is not useless, for it goes to make up an indivisible absence. This much as a general indication". Since he gives no exposition on

NOTES: Mathurānātha mentions the difference between the fifth definition of the Five Definitions (*vyāptipañcaka*) and the definition arrived at in text 12. The fifth definition (D5) reads as follows: invariable concomitance is the non-occurrence [possessed by a probans] in what is different from the locus of a probandum (*sādhyavad-anyāvṛttitvam*). This is paraphrased by Mathurānātha as an absence of the occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum (*sādhyavadanyāvṛttivābhāvaḥ*: D5-1).<sup>15</sup> The definition under discussion, on the other hand, will run as follows: invariable concomitance is the state [possessed by a probans] of being the non-locus of the occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum (*sādhyavadbhinnavṛttivānadhikaraṇatvam*: D7-1). This can be paraphrased as an absence [possessed by a probans] of the state of being the locus of the occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum (*sādhyavadbhinnavṛttivādhikaraṇatvābhāvaḥ*: D7-2)<sup>16</sup>. The difference between D5-1 and D7-2 lies in that D7-2 includes the expression ‘the state of being the locus’ (*adhikaraṇatva*). This is pointed out in text 14.

Even if D7-2 lacks that portion, it will function as D5-1 does. Hence, the expression appears superfluous and useless. However, text 14 affirms that it is not useless and that it serves to indicate that the absence in D7-2 has the state of being a locus for the counterpositive. On the other hand, the absence in D5-1 has occurrence for the

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the text and his translation, the meaning of *akhaṇḍābhāva* ‘invisible absence’ is not clear, either. The *Candrikā* (p. 36,19) says “*akhaṇḍābhāvety asyātiriktābhāvety arthaḥ*” (This [part] *akhaṇḍābhāva* means ‘a different absence’). The *Vyākhyā* (p.31,19-22) says “*akhāṇḍeti. sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvam ity atra vṛttitvapadārthasya pratiyogītāsambandhenābhāve ’nvayaḥ atra tu niṣṭhatvasambandhena tasyādheyatāyām anvayaḥ ādheyatāyās cādihikaraṇatāyām anvayaḥ tasyās\* ca pratiyogītāsambandhenābhāve ’nvayaḥ idam evānāyor vailakṣanyam.*” (The meaning of the word ‘occurrence’ (*vṛttitva*) is associated with absence through the relation of counterpositiveness in the case of [the fifth definition] ‘the non-occurrence [possessed by a probans] in what is different from the locus of a probandum’. On the other hand, in the present case [of Tiger’s definition] that [meaning] is associated with superstratumness [to the locus of the occurrence] through the relation of residing. Superstratumness is associated with the locusness [of the locus of the occurrence]. That [locusness] is associated with absence through the relation of counterpositiveness. This is the difference between these two [definitions]. (I read *tasyās* for *tasya* which I marked by an asterisk.)) On the word *akhaṇḍa*, the *Vyākhyā* (p. 21,21-22) says “*akhaṇḍapadam na khaṇḍam akhaṇḍam iti yaugikam na; api tu pāribhāṣikam.*” (The word *akhaṇḍa* does not derive from ‘*na khaṇḍam*’ with the meaning ‘indivisible’ but is a technical term.)

15 See Ingalls [1951: 148, text 100.1-7].

16 For this paraphrasing, see the notes to text 12.

counterpositive. Thus, the expression indicates that the counterpositives differ in the absences in the two definitions.

TEXT 15: *sādhyavadbhinnatvaṃ ca sādhyatāvacchedakasambandhāv-  
acchinnaśādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnapratiyogitāvacchedakatākaṃ<sup>1</sup>  
bodhyam. tena vahnimān dhūmād ityādau dhūmasya samavāyena  
vahnimato bhinne yatkiñcitsādhyavadvyaktibhinne ca parvatādau  
vṛttitve 'pi na kṣatih.*

VARIANT: (1) BI, *-tākabhedavattvaṃ.*

TRANSLATION: The state of being different from the locus of a probandum should be understood as [a difference] describing<sup>17</sup> the state of being the delimiter of counterpositiveness delimited by the delimiting relation of probandumness, which (state) resides in that which is qualified by the delimiter of probandumness. Therefore, [the definition will] not [suffer from] the defect [of narrow-application] in the case of the inferences “[the mountain] possesses fire, because [it possesses] smoke”, and so on, even though smoke occurs through inherence in what is different from the possessor of fire or in the mountain, etc., which are different from some individual possessor of the probandum.

NOTES: Here Mathurānātha provides one clarification to the definition in order to remove the defect of narrow-application in two cases. Let us first try to understand how the definition arrived at in text 12 fails to apply in the two cases, and that the definition incorporating the above clarification removes the defect. These two cases concern the single valid inference “the mountain possesses fire, because it possesses smoke”. The definition without the clarification, whose structure is illustrated in Figure 39, runs as follows: invariable concomitance is an absence [possessed by a probans] of the state of being the locus of the occurrence in what is different from the locus of a probandum (*sādhyavadbhinnavṛttivānadhikaranatvaṃ*). A test of the definition will start in the following manner.

<sup>17</sup> This word is a translation of the suffix ‘-ka’, which means ‘*nirūpaka*’ (describer) in some cases. Ingalls [1951: 83] states that “This suffix may do duty for ‘*nirūpaka*’ as in the examples, but it may indicate a relation less specific than this”. For the concept of describer, see Wada [1990: 66-80].

Case (A): (1) The probandum of the inference is fire. (2) The locus of the probandum can be a part of fire, since the whole body of fire is regarded as an occurrent in its parts through inherence.<sup>18</sup> (3) What is different from this locus is an 'upper part of smoke' which has no contact with fire. (4) In this part the whole body of smoke resides, since the whole can reside in its parts through inherence. This means that smoke possesses the occurrence in that part. In other words, smoke possesses the state of being the locus of the occurrence. (5) Since the probans is smoke, it possesses such a state. This result does not satisfy the condition stated in the definition that the probans should possess an absence of the state of being the locus of the occurrence. Consequently, the definition fails to apply to the valid probans. We can illustrate the connection among the entities referred to above in Figure 43.




Figure 43

Case (B): (1) The probandum is fire. (2) The locus of the probandum can be a kitchen. (3) What is different from this locus can be a mountain where smoke arises. (4) Smoke possesses the occurrence on the mountain but not an absence of the occurrence. In other words, smoke possesses the state of being the locus of the

<sup>18</sup> On this point, see Wada [1997: 390, fn.12; 1995b: 291, n.14].

occurrence. (5) The probans is smoke, and hence it possesses no absence of such a state. This result does not satisfy the condition stated in the definition that the probans should possess an absence of the state of being the locus of the occurrence. Consequently, the definition fails to apply to the valid probans. We can illustrate the connection among the entities referred to above in Figure 44.




Figure 44

Mathurānātha's clarification consists of two parts, which respectively remove the defect of narrow-application in the foregoing two cases. One part is 'counterpositiveness delimited by the delimiting relation of probandumness' (*sādhyatāvacchedakasambandhāvacchinnaṣṭiyogitā*), and the other part is '[a difference] describing the "state of being the delimiter of counterpositiveness" [which resides] in that which is qualified by the delimiter of probandumness' (*sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnaṣṭiyogitāvacchedakatāka*). Let us examine how the first part of his clarification removes the defect in case (A).

The definition incorporating this part will run as follows: invariable concomitance is an absence [possessed by a probans] of the state of being the locus of the occurrence in that which possesses a difference describing counterpositiveness delimited by the delimiting relation of probandumness (*sādhyatāvacchedakasambandhāvacchinnaṣṭiyogi-*

*tākabhedavadvyṛttivānadhikaraṇatvam*).<sup>19</sup> We can illustrate the structure of this definition in Figure 45.




Figure 45

The following is the test of the application to the valid probans of the inference “the mountain possesses fire, because it possesses smoke”. (1) The probandum of the inference is fire. (2) The previous application allowed us to take a part of fire as the locus of the probandum due to inherence, as shown by Figure 43. But now the clarification demands that we ascertain what the delimiting relation of probandumness (*sādhya-tāvachedakasambandha*) is. This relation functions as the ground for probandumness existing in fire (the probandum) according to Navya-nyāya and is nothing but the relation between fire and its locus. This relation is supposed to confine probandumness to fire, and so the relation between fire and its locus is

<sup>19</sup> Mathurānātha employs ‘counterpositiveness’ (*pratiyogitā*) in his clarification, and Navya-nyāya considers absence to be the describer (*nirūpaka*) of counterpositiveness. On this point, see Wada [1990: 291ff. fn. 25]. The absence involved in the clarification is difference (*bheda*), or mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*). Although the original definition contains the expression ‘what is different’ (*bhinna*), I have used instead the expression ‘that which possesses a difference’ (*bhedavat*). In the present definition I have inserted ‘describing’, which is the meaning of the suffix *-ka*, to connect the difference with counterpositiveness. On the meaning of this suffix, see Ingalls [1951: 83].



Let us see how the definition remove the defect of narrow-application in case (B) by incorporating the second part of Mathurānātha's clarification. The definition in question will run as follows: invariable concomitance is an absence [possessed by a probans] of the state of being the locus of the occurrence in that which possesses a difference describing the 'state of being the delimiter of counterpositiveness', [which (state) resides] in that which is qualified by the delimiter of probandumness (*sādhyatāvachhedakāvachchinnapratiyogitāvachhedakatāka-bhedavadvṛttivānadhikaraṇatvam*). We can illustrate the structure of this definition in Figure 47.




Figure 47

The test of the application to the valid probans will proceed in the following manner. If we substitute a kitchen for an altar in steps (1) through (3), these steps are valid here. As a result, the locus of the probandum is, for example, a kitchen, and the counterpositiveness residing in a kitchen is delimited by the delimiting relation of the probandumness, i.e., contact. (4) When we sought what is different from the locus of the probandum, we took for the locus another mountain which is not the subject (*pakṣa*). However, the present clarification does not allow us to take this mountain for the locus.

The clarification prescribes (i) that the probandum should be qualified by the delimitor of the probandumness, and (ii) that the difference should describe (*nirūpaka*) the 'state of being the delimitor of counterpositiveness' residing in the probandum. Since the probandum is fire in the present case, Navya-nyāya takes the view that fireness (*vahnitva*) in fire circumscribes probandumness to fire. Hence, fireness is the delimitor of probandumness. It is certain that the probandum (fire) is qualified by this delimitor, which satisfies condition (i).

Let us consider why condition (ii) is required. Fire is also the delimitor of counterpositiveness described by a difference existing in some thing, because the locus of fire can be regarded as the counterpositive of this difference. To put it another way, fire is supposed to confine counterpositiveness to the locus of the probandum (fire). However, to say that fire is the delimitor of counterpositiveness means that a particular fire is the delimitor, and therefore the locus of such a delimitor also becomes a particular instance, for example, a kitchen. That which possesses a difference from this locus of the probandum can again be another mountain. We cannot rule out this mountain from that which possesses the difference.

If, on the other hand, we take all fires as the delimitor of counterpositiveness, we can include that mountain in the locus of the probandum (fire). To make all fires the counterpositive of the difference, we have to delineate this difference as describing a property common to all fires. Since fire is the delimitor of counterpositiveness, such a property can be the state of being such a delimitor (*pratiyogitāvachchedakatā*). To say that a difference describes this state means that the difference has the locus of this state, i.e., all fires, or the probandum, for its counterpositive. That mountain is also involved in the locus of that state, and so the difference cannot exist in the mountain. Consequently, we cannot take the mountain as the locus of the difference.

If we take a lake as the locus of the difference, the difference is delineated as describing the state of being the delimitor of counterpositiveness and as a result as having all fires for its counterpositive. Thus, condition (ii) is fulfilled.

(5) In a lake there occurs no smoke, which means that smoke possesses no occurrence in a lake. In other words, smoke does not possess the state of being the locus of the occurrence. Hence, smoke

possesses an absence of this state. (6) Since the probans is smoke, it also possesses such an absence. This outcome fulfills all the conditions stated in the new definition, and the definition succeeds in applying to the present valid probans. We can illustrate the connection among the entities referred to above in Figure 48.




Figure 48




Figure 49

Thus, the definition incorporating the clarification avoids the defect of narrow-application in the two cases. It will run as follows: invariable concomitance is an absence [possessed by a probans] of the state of being the locus of the occurrence in that which possesses a difference describing the 'state of being the delimitor of counterpositiveness delimited by the delimiting relation of probandumness', which (state) resides in that which is qualified by the delimitor of probandumness (*sādhyatāvachedakasambandhāvacchinna-sādhyatāvachedakāvaccinna-pratīyogitāvachedakatākabhedavad-vṛttivānadhikaraṇatvam*). We can illustrate the structure of this definition in Figure 49.

(to be continued)

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