

THE MIND (*CITTA*): ITS NATURE, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING IN CLASSICAL YOGA (2)*

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INTRODUCTION TO YOGA EPISTEMOLOGY

One of the special features of Patañjali's Yoga system is that it elaborates a primary response to the epistemological problem of the subject-object relation — an issue that is fundamental to any metaphysical system and is especially crucial for any philosophy that purports to explain the state of spiritual enlightenment. In the *YS*, liberation (*apavarga*) or “aloneness” (*kaivalya*) implies a complete sundering of the subject-object or self-world relation as it is ordinarily known, i.e., as a fragmentation or bifurcation within *prakṛti* existence. Our normal experience and everyday relations function as a polarization within *prakṛti*: the self as subject or experiencer which as an empirical identity lays claim to experience; and the objective world as it is perceived and experienced through the “eyes” of this empirical self. The conjunction (*saṃyoga*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* gives birth to phenomenal (empirical) selfhood or identity and its content of consciousness. However, this process which is largely enmeshed in ignorance (*avidyā*) and egoity (*asmitā*) or affliction actually entails utterly mistaken notions of who we are as our authentic being. What is needed, according to Yoga, is a total purification of the subject-object relation so that the spiritual nature of selfhood can be fully disclosed and the Self (*puruṣa*), established in its true form and identity, is no longer mistaken for *prakṛti* existence. Yet despite an overwhelming adherence to what normally amounts to being a mental array of confused human identity and its concomitant “suffering” (*duḥkha*),

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Yoga philosophy tells us that *puruṣa*, our true identity, is necessarily “present” to ordinary human experience in that without *puruṣa* all experience and knowledge would not be possible.¹²⁷ Based on this perspective — that *puruṣa* is simultaneously transcendent and immanent — Patañjali formulated a practical and transformative “path” of Yoga in which knowledge (*jñāna*), as an integral aspect of Yoga theory and practice, can have profound implications for human life in this world.

Despite Sāṃkhya’s unique distinction between pure consciousness and human awareness which allowed it to preserve its fundamental dualism in the face of monistic arguments — and thereby avoid the metaphysical problems attending monistic views — it could not avoid one fundamental philosophical question: What is it to say that *prakṛti* is dynamic because of the presence of *puruṣa*? To say that *prakṛti* reflects the presence of *puruṣa*, or that *puruṣa* is reflected in *prakṛti* preserves a rigid distinction between the two for neither an object reflected in a mirror nor the mirror is affected by one another. In Sāṃkhya, liberation is the result of discernment (*viveka*), the highest knowledge. The process of attaining it suggests either an intention on the part of *puruṣa* — which, some would argue, is impossible considering that *puruṣa*, as pure consciousness, is content-less and nonintentional — or a response on the part of *prakṛti*, if not both. How then can *puruṣa* be said to have no relation, including no passive relation to *prakṛti*? Even Īśvara Kṛṣṇa’s enchanting metaphor (*SK* 59) of the dancer before the host of spectators does not answer the question, for there is a significant relationship between performer and audience. In an effort to elucidate a proper response to the above questions from the perspective of Yoga, the remaining sections of this study will address among other related topics: (1) how cognition and knowledge take place in Patañjali’s system; and (2) how cognition and knowledge inform our understanding of the relationship between *puruṣa* — the pure seer or knower, and *prakṛti* — the seeable or knowable.

In order to grasp how Yoga philosophy can be lived on a practical level, one must: (1) understand how *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* “relate” to oneself and in pragmatic terms, and (2) see that these two principles — “spirit” and “matter” — are not merely understood in the abstract thereby overemphasizing the metaphysical and the impersonal

¹²⁷ Refer to notes 14 and 16 (and text) in part one on *YS* IV, 19 and IV, 22 respectively.

dimension of their existence. With the above consideration held in mind, Patañjali translated what appears to be a universal macrocosmic philosophy — heralding some of the main ideas of Sāṃkhya — into microcosmic, subject-oriented, and practical terms which apply to human life, such as, for example: perception, cognition and ethical sensibilities. The necessity of *puruṣa*'s presence to human experience notwithstanding (see above), it must also be emphasized that without the manifestation of psycho-physical being which includes our personhood — the material source and cause of which in Classical Sāṃkhya is said to be *prakṛti* — liberation would not “take place” in Yoga. Without *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* could not awaken to its true identity, could not “become” liberated. As *YS* II,23 spells out, it is by virtue of the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* that the essential nature of the “seer” (*puruṣa*) and the “seeable” (*prakṛtic* identity) can eventually be grasped.¹²⁸

Throughout the *YS*, Patañjali's main contention is that *puruṣa* — pure, immortal consciousness — is our true nature and being and therefore the real foundation or ground of authentic identity and livelihood. However, due to spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) human awareness mistakes the Self or “seer” (*puruṣa*) for the “seeable.” In this state of misplaced identity brought about by the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, and defined by Patañjali (*YS* I, 2) as the misidentification with the modifications of the mind, the cognitive error of mistaking intrinsic (spiritual) identity for extrinsic (material) identity is continually reinforced. With the above “teaching” having been properly considered and through an appropriate form of pedagogy, Yoga seeks to establish our identity as the seer, and in the process to “dismantle” the mechanism of misidentification (*sārūpya*, *YS* I,4) due to which we remain deluded, confused, and dissatisfied.

VR̥TTI

One of the most important terms used in the *YS* is *vr̥tti*. The word *vr̥tti* stems from the root *vr̥t*: “to turn, revolve, roll, proceed.”¹²⁹ *Vr̥tti* can mean: “mode of life or conduct,” “behaviour (esp.) moral conduct,” “mode of being,” “disposition,” “activity,” “function,” “livelihood,”

¹²⁸ See n. 117 above.

¹²⁹ See Monier-Williams (1899: 1009).

“mood (of the mind),” “nature,” “character,” “addition to” and “occupation with.”¹³⁰ In the context of *YS* I,2 (*yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ*) *vṛtti* has been translated as: “fluctuations,”¹³¹ “modifications,”¹³² “‘acts’ and ‘functions’,”¹³³ “Bewegungen,”¹³⁴ “activities,”¹³⁵ “processes,”¹³⁶ “transformations”¹³⁷ and “mode.”¹³⁸ I have adopted the general term “modification” for *vṛtti*. The functioning of the mind takes place through various modifications (*vṛttis*) which give form to our perceptions, thoughts, emotions and so forth.

Like all other aspects of “insentient” *prakṛti*, the mind undergoes continual change, and from the viewpoint of Yoga its most noteworthy modifications are of five kinds outlined by Patañjali as follows: the means of knowing or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), error (*viparyaya*), conceptualization (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidrā*) and memory (*smṛti*).¹³⁹ These *vṛttis* must be clearly understood and witnessed in order for finer states of awareness to arise. The five kinds of modifications listed above are described in the first chapter of the *YS*.¹⁴⁰ The first, the means of knowing or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), allows for the understanding of something that is fully manifested and is verified through one of the three avenues: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and valid testimony (*āgama*).¹⁴¹ The experience of objects such as: people, animals, plants, buildings and so forth, whether by direct perception, inference or reliable testimony belongs to the modification called *pramāṇa*. I will be saying more on *pramāṇa*

130 *Ibid*, p. 1010.

131 See Woods (1914: 8), Koelman (1970: 86), Feuerstein (1979a: 26), Chapple and Kelly (1990: 33); see also Halbfass (1991). *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*. (Albany: State University of New York Press), p. 227.

132 See Taimni (1961: 6), Āraṇya (1963: 7) and Prasāda (1912: 5).

133 See Müller (1899: 337).

134 See Hauer (1958: 240).

135 See Purohit Swami (1973: 25).

136 See Tola and Dragonetti (1987: 3).

137 See Larson (1993: 377). Larson also suggests (*ibid.*) “functions” as an appropriate translation for *vṛtti*.

138 See Hiriyanna (1949).

139 *YS* I, 6 (p. 10): *pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtayah*.

140 *YS* I, 7-11 (pp. 10-16).

141 *YS* I, 7 (p. 10): *pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni*.

especially in its form of perception (*pratyakṣa*) in the last section of this study.

The remaining four types of *vṛttis* explain other ways in which the mind operates. The second is "error" (*viparyaya*), i.e. when one's understanding or a thought does not correspond with reality¹⁴² and one apprehends something as other than what it is. Vyāsa (*YB* I,8) treats *viparyaya* as a synonym for the term *avidyā* (ignorance), *avidyā* being the principal among the five afflictions (*kleśa*).¹⁴³ The *vṛtti* of *viparyaya* is the fundamental error due to which we misinterpret or misconceive existence itself! Vyāsa writes of *viparyaya*:

Why is this not valid cognition? Because it is sublated by valid cognition. The object of valid cognition is a thing as it is, and the fact of not being valid cognition is shown by the fact that valid cognition cancels it. For example, seeing the moon as double is refuted by seeing that it is in fact a single moon. This ignorance is fivefold, namely the afflictions (*kleśa*): ignorance, I-am-ness, attachment, aversion, desire for continuity. These very five bear their technical names: darkness (*tamas*), delusion (*moha*), extreme delusion (*mahā-moha*), gloom (*tāmisra*) and utter darkness (*andhatā-misra*).¹⁴⁴

For Patañjali the conjunction (*samyoga*) of the seer and the seeable, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, is the cause of all suffering and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*)¹⁴⁵ because it gives rise to the incorrect understanding that one's identity is defined within the limits of the individuated psychophysical being or personality-complex and not according to the unbounded nature of the *puruṣa* or spiritual Self. The conjunction is caused by spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*)¹⁴⁶, the primary affliction which

142 *YS* I, 8 (p. 12): *viparyayo mithyājñānam atadrūpapratīṣṭham*. "Error is incorrect knowledge not based on the [actual] form [of an object]."

143 See n. 62 above.

144 *YB* I, 8 (p. 13): *sa kasmān na pramāṇam. yataḥ pramāṇena bādhyate. bhūtārtha viṣayatvāt pramāṇasya. tatra pramāṇena bādhanam apramāṇasya dṛṣṭam. tad yathā dvicandra darśanam sadviṣayenaikacandradarśanena bādhyata iti. seyaṃ pañcaparvā bhavaty avidyā, avidyāsmītā-rāgadveṣābhiniवेश kleśā iti. eta eva svasamjñābhis tamo moho mahāmohas tāmisro 'ndhatāmisra.*

145 *YS* II, 17.

146 *YS* II, 24 (p. 94): *tasya hetur avidyā*. "The cause of this [conjunction] is ignorance."

is the origin¹⁴⁷ of all other afflictions including our mistaken identity as a finite, egoic self or "I-am-ness" (*asmitā*). *Asmitā* constitutes the major affliction which permeates the principle of individuation thus leading to the ongoing misidentification of selfhood with the modifications of the mind. Ignorance is also at the root of three other afflictions: attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and the desire for continuity or the instinctive fear of death (*abhiniveśa*).¹⁴⁸ In attachment and aversion the emotive core of the concept of affliction (*kleśa*) comes into play thereby signifying an obvious affective dimension to *vṛtti*. The impressions (*saṃskāras*) centered around the experiences of pleasure are operative in and supportive of *rāga* or attachment/attraction. The modifications are said to take the form of *gardha*, *trṣṇa*, and *lobha*, which may be translated as longing, thirst, and greed respectively.¹⁴⁹ Metaphorically speaking, the seeds (*bīja*) of *sukha-saṃskāras* or impressions of pleasurable experiences germinate and will give rise to a state of attachment leading to effort directed toward the attainment of the object of pleasure or desire. In a seeming opposition to attachment, the emotive core of the phenomenon of aversion (*dveṣa*) is provoked by the seed recollection of pain. The states that arise are said to be those of retaliation (*pratigha*), malice (*manya*), revenge (*jighāṃsā*) and anger (*krodha*).¹⁵⁰ Thus, attachment and aversion dwell upon the *saṃskāras* of pleasure and pain. In general terms the mind is not repelled by that which is pleasurable, nor does it desire that which is painful.

The description by Vyāsa that the *kleśas* are prime examples of erroneous cognitions is especially noteworthy as it cuts through the stereotyped opposition between the emotive/affective and the rational/cognitive. This brings forth an integral view of the mind (*citta*). It is in this frame in which a picture emerges that saṃsāric identity and its reified notions of self and world (i.e., worldly existence) is not possible without I-am-ness, attachment, aversion, and the desire for continuity or fear of extinction, and that these afflictions govern the mind of the individual and perpetuate the wheel of

¹⁴⁷ *YS II, 4* (p. 59) states: *avidyā kṣetram uttaraśāṃ prasuptatanuvicchinmodārāṇām*. "Ignorance is the origin of the others (afflictions), which may be dormant, attenuated, intercepted, or fully active."

¹⁴⁸ See n. 62 above.

¹⁴⁹ See n. 168 below.

¹⁵⁰ See n. 169 below.

samsāra. The compulsive forces of attachment, aversion, and desire or fear cannot be uprooted and discarded unless *asmitā* is subdued, weakened. Thus the attenuation and ultimate transcendence of all the afflictions is the objective of Yoga praxis. The importance of the theory of the five afflictions has been emphasized by I.K. Taimni, who correctly notes that this theory is the foundation of the system of Yoga outlined by Patañjali.¹⁵¹

The function of Yoga is to oblige *puruṣa* to “awaken” to its true status through progressive stages of removing any misidentification with the forms of *prakṛti*, of uprooting and eradicating ignorance (*avidyā*), the primary affliction defined in *YS* II,5. Here, Patañjali states: “Ignorance is seeing the noneternal as eternal, the impure as pure, dissatisfaction as happiness, and the nonself as self.”¹⁵² Interestingly, Patañjali seems to be admitting in the above that there is a special kind of happiness (*sukha*) that is intrinsic to freedom (“aloneness”) in Yoga and that, far from resulting in a lonely or aloof nature or association with the world, implies that one of the fruits of Yoga can be experienced as an exalted sense of well-being that embraces our emotional/affective as well as our cognitive dimension.

Vyāsa correlates the five afflictions outlined by Patañjali (see n. 144 above) with the five categories of fundamental misconception or error (*viparyaya*) of Classical Sāṃkhya.¹⁵³ The correlation of the five *viparyayas* with the five *kleśas* of Yoga is also made by Vācaspati Miśra¹⁵⁴ and Vijñāna Bhikṣu.¹⁵⁵ Ignorance is said to fall within the category of *viparyaya* and is a factor common to all the afflictions. Therefore the other four afflictions are considered its segments.¹⁵⁶ Vijñāna Bhikṣu calls the *vyṛtti* normally termed “error” (the fivefold *avidyā*) the seed of the calamity called *samsāra*; it is a special kind of misapprehension in which there is a superimposition of cognition in the

151 I.K. Taimni (1961: 130).

152 *YS* II, 5 (p. 61): *anityāśuciduḥkhānātmasu nityāśucisukhātma khyātir avidyā*.

153 Text taken from Larson (1969); *SK* 47 (p. 275): *pañca viparyayabhedā bhavanty ...*; *SK* 48 (p. 275): *bhedas tamaso 'ṣṭavidho mohasya ca daśavidho mahāmohaḥ. tāmisro 'ṣṭādaśadhā tathā bhavaty andhatāmisraḥ*.

154 *TV* I, 8.

155 *YV* I, 8 and II, 5.

156 *TV* I, 8 (p. 13): *avidyā sāmānyam avidyāsmitādiṣu pañcasu parvasv ity arthah*.

object. Doubt (*saṃśaya*) is also included under this *vṛtti*.¹⁵⁷ It is, thus, the *kleśas* manifesting in the form of the *vṛtti* of error or misconception (*viparyaya*) which control the network or web of *saṃsāric* existence. Vyāsa describes the domination of the *kleśas* over empirical identity: “The word ‘afflictions’ means the five errors (*viparyaya*). When active they confirm the involvement with the *guṇas*, impose change, bring about the flow or current in the body and senses by mutually reinforcing each other, and bring on fruition of *karma*.”¹⁵⁸ The divisions of ignorance (*avidyā*) — which Vyāsa equates with the *vṛtti* of error (*viparyaya*) — can be explained¹⁵⁹ as follows:

- (i) *Avidyā* (YS II, 5) means spiritual ignorance itself, sometimes called *tamas* (“darkness”), and is described as being eightfold: the error of mistaking as Self or *puruṣa* (*ātman*) the eight *tattvas* that are: (1) *avyakta*: unmanifest *prakṛti*, (2) *mahat* or *buddhi* (intellect), (3) *ahaṃkāra*: sense of self, (4-8) the *tanmātras*: the five subtle senses. Spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) is sometimes defined as “darkness” in that it veils liberating knowledge (*jñāna*). It includes the error of misidentifying the physical body and psyche with *puruṣa* because body, etc., are the products of the eight *tattvas* listed above. *Viparyayas* — such as mistaking a seashell for silver — are not included in this category. SK 44 says that bondage (*bandha*) is caused by *viparyaya*. Hence *avidyā*, the major cause of bondage, is included here and not the other four “delusions.”¹⁶⁰
- (ii) *Asmitā* means I-am-ness/egoity (YS II, 6) or “delusion” (*moha*) and is eightfold: the error of considering the eight

¹⁵⁷ YV I, 8 (p. 73): *pañcaparvā yā vidyā saṃsārānarthabijam sā, iyam eva = mithyājñānarūpa vṛttir eva, etad viśeṣa eveti yāvat.* YV I, 8 (p. 71): *bhramas thale jñānākārasyaiva viśaye samāropa iti bhāvah. saṃśayasyāpy atraivāntarbhāvah.*

¹⁵⁸ YB II, 3 (p. 59): *kleśā iti pañca viparyayā ity arthah. te spandamānā guṇādhikāraṃ dradhayanti, parināmam avasthā payanti, kāryakāraṇa srota unnamayanti, parasparānugrahatantrī bhūtvā karmavipākam cābhinirharantīti.* The term *spanda* (“quiver,” “vibration”), used by Vyāsa in the above description refers not to activity or movement as ordinarily understood but rather to the first “movement” of (mis)identification with *guṇas*.

¹⁵⁹ I am following the explanations provided by Vijñāna Bhikṣu (YVI, 8) and/or Vācaspati Mīśra (TV 1, 8) after having consulted U. Arya (1986: 168-170). For explanations of the *viparyayas* in Sāṃkhya, see Larson (1987: 57-58).

¹⁶⁰ YV I, 8 (p. 74): *avyaktamahadahānkāra pañcatanmātreṣv anātmav aṣṭasvātmabuddhir avidyā = aṣṭavidham tamaḥ, jñānāvaraka tvād. etās veva dehādyaṭma buddhinam antarbhāvah, dehādīnam etad aṣṭakārya tvāt. śūktirāga tādi viparyayānām tu saṃsārāhetu tayā nātra gaṇanā, viparyayā diṣyate bandha iti pūrva kārikayā bandha hetu viparyayasyaiva prakṛta tvād iti.*

powers or accomplishments (*siddhis*, *YS* III,45) as though they were some-thing benevolent and belonging to, or an essential property of, the Self (*ātmīya*).¹⁶¹ This preoccupation with one's prakṛtic identity occurs when finite beings seek to overcome their limitations by pursuing the eight well known omnipotent or supernatural powers. According to Vyāsa these powers include: *animā*, the power of becoming minute; *laghimā*, the power to become light; *mahimā*, the power to become enlarged; *prāpti*, the power to reach or touch the most distant things (e.g. the moon); *prākāmya*, the power of an irresistible will to accomplish its tasks; *vaśitva*, mastery over all elements and elementals (their nature) not impeded by any; *īśitṛtva*, sovereignty, the ability to will the production, absorption, and disposition of the elements and the elementals; *kāmāvasāyitva*, implying that what-ever one's purposive idea is becomes true for that person.¹⁶² I-am-ness/egoity and self-possession are synonomous¹⁶³ and therefore the above divisions apply; the *siddhis*, misunderstood as an end in themselves, are a form of possessive or obsessive power in that the attachment to their pursuit only furthers egoic states (i.e., pride, greed, fear, etc.).

- (iii) *Rāga* means attachment (*YS* II, 7) or "extreme delusion" (*mahā-moha*) and is classified as being tenfold: one becomes attached to the five subtle elements (e.g. sound, sight) and the five gross elements. The attraction is for the attainment of the eightfold *siddhis* through Yoga, thereby becoming a powerful or "perfected" being (*siddha*) and gaining sovereignty over

161 Ibid.: *aśtasvaṇimādyaiśvareṣvan ātmasvātmīyabuddhir asmitā*.

162 *YS* III, 45 (p. 164): *tato 'nimādiprādurbhāvaḥ kāyasampattaddharmānabighātaś ca*. "Hence [from the conquest of the elements] arise the manifestation [of eight powers], such as becoming minute and so forth, perfection of the body, and unassailability of its [bodily] attributes." *YB* III, 45 (pp. 164-165): *tatrānimā bhavaty aṇuḥ. laghimā laghur bhavati. mahimā mahān bhavati. prāptir aṅguly agreṇāpi sprśati candra masam. prakāmyamicchān abhighātaḥ. bhūmāvunmajjati nimajjati yathodake. vaśitvaṃ bhūta bhautikeṣu vaśibhavaty avaśyaś cānyeṣām. īśitṛtvaṃ teṣām prabhavāpyayavyūhānāmiṣṭe. yatra kāmāvasāyitvaṃ satya samkalpatā yathā samkalpas tathā bhūtaprakṛtīnām avasthānaṃ*.

163 *YV* I, 8 (p. 74): *svatvāsmīyatoḥ paryāya tvāt*, i.e., *asmitā* is derived from *asmi* (I am). The beingness of "I" in this context means the same as belonging to "I" or ego-possession/attachment.

nature. Thus it is thought that the *yogin* will enjoy the objects of the ten senses.¹⁶⁴

(iv) *Dveṣa* means aversion (*YS* II, 8) or “gloom” (*tāmisra*) and is said to be eighteenfold: when one is fixed upon the above pursuits [i.e. in (ii) and (iii)] and some impediment prevents the attainment of *asmitā* (the eight *siddhis*) and *rāga* (the ten enjoyments of the senses), then the anger arising with regard to that failure and towards its cause is gloom (*tāmisra*) or aversion (*dveṣa*).¹⁶⁵

(v) *Abhiniveśa* means desire for continuity (*YS* II, 9), a mode of clinging-to-life or instinctive fear of death. This state is referred to as “utter darkness” (*andhatāmisra*) and is eighteenfold: *asmitā* and *rāga* have been attained, yet there comes the realization that this attainment will one day perish as, for example, at the end of a cycle of creation (*kalpa*). This fear is said to be the fear of death or “utter darkness” and the “darkness” or “night” refers to the period of dissolution in a single cycle of creation.¹⁶⁶

In the above order of five, each succeeding affliction (*kleśa*) is considered from the perspective of Yoga pedagogy to be more undesirable and of an inferior “grade” than its predecessor, indicating progressively deluded or impure levels of attainment. It is interesting to note that the above definitions seem to be of concern only to the so-called advancing *yogin* whose attainment of powers, ironically, can equally result in an inflated sense of ego rather than liberation from the ego. The general definitions of the afflictions as provided under *YS* II, 5-9 are wider and are applicable to the worldly-minded who are living more conventional states of awareness. U. Arya¹⁶⁷ has conceived the following scheme (see below), which shows *viparyaya* from (a) the “common view” or ordinary (worldly) person’s viewpoint as compared with (b) the novice and “imperfect” *yogin*’s viewpoint.

¹⁶⁴ *YV* I, 8 (pp. 74-75): *tathā drṣṭānuśravika bhedena daśasu śabdādi viṣayeṣu rāgo daśavidho mahāmohaḥ. TV* I, 8 (p. 13): *tathā yogenāṣṭastavidham aiśvaryamupādāya siddho drṣṭānuśravikañ śabdādīndaśa viṣayān bhokṣya ity evam ātmikā pratipattir mahāmoho rāgaḥ.*

¹⁶⁵ *YV* I, 8 (p. 75): *tathāṣṭaiśvaryaśya viṣayadaśakasya ca paripanthinidveṣo ’ṣṭādaśadhā tāmisraḥ.*

¹⁶⁶ *TV* I, 8 (p. 13): *evam aṇimādi guṇa sampattau drṣṭānuśravikaviṣayapratyupasthāne ca kalpānte sarvam etannaṅkṣyatīti yastrāsaḥ so ’bhiniveśo ’ndhatāmisraḥ.*

¹⁶⁷ See Arya (1986: 170).

While the *yogin's* consciousness is said to be more refined and subtle, it is clear from the scheme outlined below that the *yogin*, not yet having reached the fully liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*), can still be prone to a selfish mentality where attachment to the attainment of power diverts the *yogin* off the true spiritual "path" of Yoga:

<i>Kleśa</i>	Common View	Imperfect Yogin's View
<i>avidyā</i>	I am the body, male or female, with resultant pleasures and attachments.	I am <i>prakṛti</i> and its evolutes.
<i>asmitā</i>	I have an identity dependent on possessing the objects of experience. I desire worldly success, power and wealth.	I desire powers (<i>siddhis</i>).
<i>rāga</i> ¹⁶⁸	I desire the objects of my immediate pleasure.	I will appropriate my power to obtain refined pleasures.
<i>dveṣa</i> ¹⁶⁹	I have an aversion to specific objects, persons or situations that have caused me pain.	I am angry at causes, persons or situations that have prevented my fulfillment of <i>siddhis</i> and resulting enjoyment.
<i>abhiniveśa</i> ¹⁷⁰	I fear my death, that is the death of this body that I am.	I fear that all my powers and resulting pleasures and enjoyments of <i>prakṛti</i> will cease.

The above scale may be understood as constituting the range of misidentifications in the context of phenomenal selfhood. Under the dominating and delusive power of *viparyaya*, the *yogin* is in need of

168 YB II, 7 (p. 65): *sukhābhijñāsyā sukhānumṛti pūrvah sukhe tatsādhane vā yo gardhas tṛṣṇā lobhaḥ sa rāga iti*. "When one familiar with a pleasure now has a memory of it, one's eagerness for the pleasure or for the means to it, that thirst or greed, is [called] attachment." See also n. 94 above on YS II, 7.

169 YB II, 8 (p. 65): *duḥkhābhijñāsyā duḥkhanumṛti pūrvā duḥkhe tatsādhane vā yaḥ pratigho manyurjighāmsā krodhoḥ sa dveṣaḥ*. "When one familiar with a pain now has a memory of it, that aversion toward the pain or what causes it, the desire for retaliation, malice, revenge and anger, is [called] aversion." See n. 95 above on YS II, 8.

170 YS II, 9 (p. 65): *svarasavāhī viduṣo 'pi tathā rūdho 'bhiniveśaḥ*. "Desire for continuity, arising even in the wise (sages), is sustained by its own inclination." Vyāsa seems to take the primary meaning of *abhiniveśa* to be fear of death (annihilation): *maranātrāsa ucchedadr̥ṣṭāmaka* (YB II, 9) p. 65. Unlike *rāga* and *dveṣa*, and their resultant pleasure-pain impressions of which examples are easily found in this life itself, the *saṃskāra* of fear and anxiety involving death cannot be so easily accounted for, there being no such definitive experiences in this life. Thus, for Vyāsa, the idea of a previous death and the experience of former lives is confirmed. *Abhiniveśa* arises naturally and spontaneously from the habit patterns (*vāsanās*) of the past experiences of death pangs (YB II, 9; pp. 65-66).

the guidance of a spiritual preceptor or *guru*: one who has transcended the compulsive need to identify with prakṛtic existence. In the *guru*, or “accomplished one,” has awakened the “knowledge born of discernment” (*vivekajam jñāna*) that, endowed with the power of liberating (*tāraka*),¹⁷¹ enables one to “cross over” the limitations of saṃsāric identity. As the *yogin* progresses on the journey towards authentic identity, the influence of the afflictions progressively lessens. Vyāsa makes it clear that it is the *vṛtti* of misconception or error (*viparyaya*) that underlies our mistaken notions of selfhood and their attendant dissatisfactions and sorrows (*duḥkha*). According to Vyāsa (*YB* I, 8), *viparyaya* encompasses the source-affliction (*avidyā*) in which the karmic residue (*karmāśaya*) of *saṃskāras* and *vāsanās*, and the resultant fruition (*vipāka*) of afflicted action, are generated and sustained. In short, our afflicted identity rooted in spiritual ignorance functions through *viparyaya*. Curiously, this important insight, which can be attributed to Vyāsa, has not been clearly noted by scholars.¹⁷²

The Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems hold divergent views on the nature of *avidyā*. The Sāṃkhya system proper uses the term *a-viveka*, “an absence of discerning knowledge” of the nature of *puruṣa*, which the teachers of formal logic place under the category of “non-apprehension” (*a-khyāti*). It appears that the Yoga system differs in this regard. Yoga considers ignorance to be a misapprehension (*anyathā-khyāti*),¹⁷³ the definition of ignorance being: mistaking the non-eternal and the “non-self” for the eternal and the Self, etc., as in *YS* II, 5.¹⁷⁴ Vyāsa states that although *avidyā* is a negative compound it should be known as a positive existent, like the compound *amitra*, which signifies not the absence of a friend (*mitra*) but the contrary of friend, namely an enemy. Likewise, *avidyā* is neither valid cognition nor the absence of valid cognition, but is a cognition of a different

171 *YS* III, 54 (p. 174).

172 Cf. for example, Koelman (1970: 183-184), and Feuerstein (1979a: 32); both appear to overlook this key insight into Yoga epistemology and its implications for understanding the meaning of Patañjali’s whole system. For more on this issue see the discussion on *nirodha* in I. Whicher (1995), “Cessation and Integration in Classical Yoga,” *Asian Philosophy* Vol. 5:1, pp. 47-58, and I. Whicher (1997), “Nirodha, Yoga Praxis and the Transformation of the Mind,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* Vol. 25, No. 1: 1-67.

173 See *YV* I, 8 (p. 71): *atra ca śāstre 'nyathākhyātiḥ siddhānto na tu sāmkyavad aviveka-mātram.*

174 See n. 152 above.

kind, contrary to both of them.¹⁷⁵ In Yoga, therefore, *avidyā* is not *akhyāti*, that is, the non-apprehension of the nature of *puruṣa* as in Sāṃkhya, but *anyathākhyāti*, that is, a particular kind of cognition which mistakes *puruṣa* for prakṛtic existence. As the Sāṃkhyas (*SK* 44) hold that bondage is due to “the opposite of *jñāna*” (*viparyaya*), liberation occurs through the central expedient of discriminating knowledge (referred to in *SK* 2 as *vijñāna*). In the philosophy of Classical Yoga, *avidyā* is a type of cognition, however invalid, that can be remedied by various methods in Yoga such as the cultivation of faith (*śraddhā*), energy (*vīrya*), memory (*smṛti*), cognitive *samādhi* and clear insight (*prajñā*) — all outlined in *YS* I, 20 — or devotion to the Lord (*īśvara-praṇidhāna*, *YS* I, 23). *Avidyā* can be completely overcome only in the culminating realization of *puruṣa* “attained” through the high-level state of *samādhi* termed *asamprajñāta* (*YB* I, 18).

The third type of *vṛtti*, conceptualization (*vikalpa*), is defined by Patañjali (*YS* I,9) as the apprehensions arising out of verbal knowledge only but whose referents are words and ideas but not things.¹⁷⁶ *Vikalpa* involves a notion, not necessarily an error, that does not correspond to an object or thing, but that may in fact serve as a useful function as in a metaphor or simile. A *vikalpa* can be an imaginary cognition. The term *vikalpa* has been understood in the sense of “fancy”¹⁷⁷ or “hallucination,”¹⁷⁸ but these are insufficient meanings. In states of meditation, the engagement of *vikalpa* is considered important in strengthening and focusing the mind.

Vikalpa is that modification (*vṛtti*) of the mind which follows language, knowledge of words and the knowledge provided by words, and is productive of the same where no actual thing is its referent. Yet, being verbal knowledge, why could it not be included under valid testimony (*āgama pramāṇa*, *YS* I,7)? According to Vyāsa (*YB* I,7), there has to be an actual object (*artha*) that is corroborated by an accomplished teacher (*āpta*) in order to qualify under *āgama*.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ *YB* II, 5 (p. 63): *yathā nāmītro mitrābhāvo na mitramātram kiṃ tu tadviruddhaḥ sapatanah ..., evam avidyā na pramāṇam na pramāṇābhavaḥ kim tu vidyāvīparītam jñānāntaram avidyeti.*

¹⁷⁶ *YS* I, 9 (p. 13): *śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpah.*

¹⁷⁷ See I.K. Taimni's (1961) usage.

¹⁷⁸ See R.S. Mishra's (1972) usage.

¹⁷⁹ *YB* I, 7 (p. 12): *āptena dṛṣṭo 'numīto vārthah paratra svabodhasamkrāntaye śabdēno-padiśyate, śabdāt tadartha viśayā vṛtīḥ śrotur āgamah.*

Vikalpa relates to no “objects” as such. Nor is the *vṛtti* of conceptualization formally included under error (*viparyaya*) because in the latter (YS I,8) there is an “object” which is at first wrongly cognized, but when the error is corrected, the true form of the “object” — such as the moon, to use Vyāsa’s example — is seen clearly. There is no succession of error and refutation, and one word does not replace another (e.g. the word “seashell” replacing “silver” in the case of an oyster). In *vikalpa* there is no real external object at all, the referent being language itself rather than things.

Paraphrasing Vyāsa, conceptualization does not amount to valid cognition or to error. As there can exist a certain satisfaction or sense of exaltation about the use of language and knowledge of words, people bring words into usage even when there is no actual substance or object signified or designated by the words and their definitions. For example, the statement, “Consciousness (*caitanya*) is the nature of *puruṣa*,” is ultimately meaningless or fallacious. When the actual position of Yoga philosophy is that consciousness itself *is* the *puruṣa*, what consciousness, other than the very *puruṣa*, could be designated as the nature of that *puruṣa*? Otherwise, as Vyāsa tells us, it is as though one were talking of a cow belonging to a person called Caitra, who — as the owner — is other than his possession. Similarly, to assert that, “*Puruṣa* being inactive is a denial that it has the attribute of a thing,” is making no positive statement about any object. Only the the attributes of *prakṛti* as pertaining to *puruṣa* are denied.¹⁸⁰ The adjective “inactive” (*niṣkriya*), denying any possible activity in the case of *puruṣa*, expresses no qualification. The negative (psuedo) adjective is false, has no substance and is a mere verbal expression of the *vṛtti* called *vikalpa*. It is an absence, conceptualized as though a positive state, then attached to *puruṣa* as though it is its attribute, yet it expresses no attribute of *puruṣa*. However, the modification of *vikalpa* is by no means worthless and can serve a practical and pedagogical purpose. *Vikalpa* has, for example, a greater practical value than has *viparyaya*: “For unless we have a concept of a ‘higher Self’ or a ‘path’, we cannot exercise our will to overcome the limitations of

¹⁸⁰ YB I, 9 (pp. 13-14): *sa na pramāṇopārohī na viparyayopārohī ca. vastuśūnyatve 'pi śabda-jñāna mātmya nibandhano vyavahāro drśyate. tadyathā caitanyaṃ puruṣasya svarūpam iti. yadā citir eva puruṣas tadā kim atra kena vyapadiśyate. bhavati ca vyapadeśe vṛtīḥ. yathā caitrasya gaur iti. tathā pratiśiddhavastudharmo niṣkriyaḥ puruṣaḥ.*

conceptual thinking and to break through to the level of the ... Self.”¹⁸¹

The fourth modification or *vṛtti* is sleep (*nidrā*) and is defined as: “... the modification based upon the apprehension of non-becoming/absence.”¹⁸² It is a kind of rudimentary awareness, the awareness of “absence” (*abhāva*). That sleep is not simply the “absence” of experience, cognition or apprehension is, according to Vyāsa, demonstrated by the fact that when one wakes up one can recollect that one has slept well or badly.¹⁸³ The *YS* (I, 38) also states that attending to the knowledge derived from sleep (or dreams) can help to bring about clarification of the mind.¹⁸⁴

The last modification is memory (*smṛti*) defined thus: “Memory is the recollection of contents (conditions/objects) experienced.”¹⁸⁵ Memory operates exclusively on the level of the inner organ (*antahkaraṇa*), wherein the contents of a previous experience are returned to consciousness (i.e., remembered) via thought, although there are no longer any corresponding objects (on the gross level). Although not a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in Yoga, memory nevertheless does play an important role in cognition and in determining the nature and range of cognition. Regarding *smṛti*, Vyāsa asks: “Does the mind remember the process of apprehension of an object (e.g., a vessel) or, rather, the form of the object experienced?”¹⁸⁶ To which he then replies: “The cognition, coloured by the experience of the object known, shines forth in the forms both of the knowledge (or content or the object) and the cognition itself, and generates a latent impression that conforms to the above process.”¹⁸⁷ A cognition (*pratyaya*) is “coloured” (*uparakta*¹⁸⁸) or influenced by the object experienced. Therefore a cognition carries the form (*rūpa*)

181 Feuerstein (1979a: 32).

182 *YS* I, 10 (p. 15): *abhāvapratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā*.

183 *YB* I, 10 (p. 15): *sā ca saṃprabodhe pratyavamarśāt pratyayaviśeṣaḥ. katham, sukham ahamasvāpsam*.

184 *YS* I, 38 (p. 41): *svapnanidrājñānālambanaṃ vā*. “Or resting on the knowledge [derived] from dreams or sleep [the mind is made clear].”

185 *YS* I, 11 (p. 16): *anubhūtaviśayāsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ*.

186 *YB* I, 11 (p. 16): *kiṃ pratyayasya cittam smarati āhosvid viśayasyeti*.

187 *Ibid*: *grāhyoparaktaḥ pratyayo grāhyagrahaṇobhayākāranirbhāsas tajjātyakam saṃskāram ārabhate*.

188 See n. 187 above.

or representation of the object as well as the representation of the process or the fact of that apprehension. It contains both the representations of the *grāhya* (the object of experience) and the form or representation of the *grahana* (the instrument and the process and the fact of the experience), that is, it resembles the various features and natures of both of these and manifests them.

The cognition then generates a *samskāra* in which both features are represented: (1) the fact that the person cognizes the content or object, has gained experience through the process of apprehension of the object, and (2) the content or object as it actually is. Memory does not arise by itself. An experience first becomes a *samskāra*, an impression in the stored karmic stock (*āśaya*) in the mind. From the impression the memory arises again as a mental function or modification (*vyrtti*). The object itself therefore ceases to be present, but the impression produces the memory. Vyāsa further states, "That impression, being activated when similar or cognate cognitions occur, brings forth the memory experience. This memory also consists of the representation of the content or of the process of cognition."¹⁸⁹ The cause of the *samskāra*'s activation is the original cognition. When it reproduces the experience in the form of memory, the memory also is "identical" to: (a) the *samskāra*, as it manifests, shows itself to be "identical" with the original experience, and (b) the experience itself that was the manifesting cause of the *samskāra* (although the memory has now been triggered by some other manifesting cause, such as a similar cognition or an appropriate time).¹⁹⁰ The memory, just like the original cognition and the *samskāra* it had formed, consists both of the representation of the object apprehended and the knowing experience or process of cognition. The chain of causation is as follows: (a) the experience, from which is produced (b) the *samskāra*, which generates (c) the memory, each with the twofold process: (1) the process of cognition which makes possible the awareness that "I know the object," and (2) the cognition of the nature of the object itself. Obviously, unless the mind "knows that it knows," it cannot reproduce as memory the experience of the original object. In this process the faculty of determination or ascertainment (*buddhi*) plays its part. Vyāsa tells us that the representation of the process of cognition relates primarily to the

¹⁸⁹ YB I, 11 (p. 16): *sa samskārah svavyaṅjakāñjanas tadākārām eva grāhyagrahaṇobhayātmikām smṛtiṃ janayati.*

¹⁹⁰ See YV I, 11 (p. 88).

buddhi.¹⁹¹ The expression “I know the vessel” is a particular type of apprehension (*anuvyavasāya*¹⁹²): the awareness the intellect (*buddhi*) has that it cognizes or experiences. It is an important part of the process of memory, in which the other part of the cognition is the object, the vessel. However, when one sees the vessel a second time and says, “This is that vessel,” this is not, in Yoga, technically included under the *vṛtti* of memory. In the cognition “I know the vessel,” one apprehension — of “the vessel” — is the subject matter (*viśaya*) of the other apprehension — “I know.” “Knowing,” here, is the primary feature. Vyāsa adds: “Memory has primarily the representation of the content or object known.”¹⁹³ Even though the type of apprehension termed *anuvyavasāya* is an important part of the process of memory, the memory proper is a single apprehension: “the vessel.” Here, the awareness “I know” is secondary.

In the list of five *vṛttis* (*YS* I, 7-11), memory has been placed last because, in Vyāsa’s words, “All those memories arise from the experiences or apprehensions that come forth from [the other *vṛttis* of the mind, i.e.] the means of knowing, error, conceptualization, sleep, or of other memories.”¹⁹⁴ “Experience” in the above refers to the *buddhi*’s (*citta*’s) first ascertainment of or involvement with the remembered object;¹⁹⁵ thereafter it becomes the awareness of the cognition that *buddhi* has (*anuvyavasāya*) as explained earlier. It is also clear from Vyāsa’s passage that a memory may be remembered, as the first-time experience of that memory. Thus there may occur the memory of a memory. As cognition (in the process of apprehension) generates impressions (*samskāras*), so do the impressions serve to activate the memory experience assisting the process of knowing and provide the content of the memory experience.¹⁹⁶ Insofar as the

191 *YB* I, 11 (p. 16): *tatra grahaṇākārapūrvā buddhiḥ*.

192 See *YV* I, 11 (p. 88): *vyākhyāyānuvyavasāya ...*

193 *YB* I, 11 (p. 16): *grāhyākārapūrvā smṛtiḥ*.

194 *YB* I, 11 (p. 17): *sarvāḥ smṛtayaḥ pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtīnām anubhavāt prabhavanti*.

195 See *TV* I, 11 (p. 16).

196 Without explaining himself further, Bhoja (*RM* I, 11) asserts that of the five types of *vṛttis*, the means of knowledge or valid cognition, error, and conceptualization occur in the wakeful state (*jāgrat*). The experience of these three combined, masquerading as direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), becomes the dream state (*svapna*). Sleep is a unique state in that it is marked by the absence of other *vṛttis* even though it is in itself a *vṛtti*. Memory is the effect of any or all of these *vṛttis*. *RM* I, 11 (p. (4) states: *tatra pramāṇaviparyayavikalpā jāgrad avasthā. ta eva tadanubhava balāt*

samskāras and resulting memories are said to ensue under the influence of the afflictions, an afflicted latent deposit or karmic residue is formed and becomes operative. Thus the link between the *vṛttis*, *karma*, and *samsāric* identity is established.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu informs us that *buddhi* is the “raw material” from which all *vṛttis* are shaped, as images are shaped from gold. The *vṛttis* are the specific transformations (*pariṇāmas*) arising from the intellect or *buddhi*,¹⁹⁷ which, as we have seen, is located in the mind (*citta*). Because *buddhi* is a form of *prakṛti*, which consists of the three *guṇas*, Vyāsa says: “Also, all these modifications (*vṛttis*) are characterized by pleasure, dissatisfaction (pain) and delusion and are to be understood as being under the sway of the afflictions.”¹⁹⁸ The afflictions which correlate with pleasure, dissatisfaction (pain) and delusion are attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and ignorance (*avidyā*) respectively.¹⁹⁹

Obviously, the above five categories of *vṛtti* do not offer a comprehensive list of all psychomental states. By classifying the *vṛttis* into five categories, the totality of innumerable modifications that can actually take place can be seen generally as derivatives of these five. However, in the context of yogic praxis the five types of *vṛttis* are all significant in that they contribute to the mechanism of our karmic identity and its “entanglement” within *prakṛti* and, as we will soon see, our spiritual liberation as well. It is therefore quite natural that those modifications which keep the *yogin* bound in misidentification and are of an afflicted (*kliṣṭa*) nature, and those modifications that are conducive to liberation and are of a nonafflicted (*akliṣṭa*) nature,²⁰⁰ should be a topic of great concern in Yoga. We must keep in mind that according to Yoga, “knowledge” is not simply the ratiocinative process or reasoning, but correlates with the all-pervasive principle of *mahat* (*liṅga-mātra*) — the first principle of manifestation in *prakṛti* out of which everything else manifests and is activated.

prakṣīyamāṇāḥ svapnāḥ. nidrā tu asaṃvedyamānaviṣayā. smṛtiś ca pramāṇaviparyayavikalpa” nidrānimittā.

197 YV I, 11 (p. 90): *etāḥ sarvāḥ pramāṇādi vṛttayo buddhi dravyasya suvarṇasy eva pratimā-”divad viṣayākārā dravyarūpāḥ pariṇāmah ...*

198 YB I, 11 (p. 17): *sarvāś caitā vṛttayah sukhaduḥkhamohātмикāḥ. sukhaduḥkhamohāś ca kleśeṣu vyākhyeyāḥ.*

199 YB I, 11 (p. 17): *sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ, duḥkhānuśayī dveṣaḥ, mohāḥ punar avidyeti.*

200 YS I, 5 (p. 9): *vṛttayah pañcatayyah kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ.* “The modifications are fivefold; afflicted or nonafflicted.”

The five types of *vr̥tti* comprise the normal range of human functioning, encompassing three modes of everyday transactions, including things (as registered in *pramāna*), mental content or objects whether remembered (*smṛti*), conceptualized (*vikalpa*) or erroneous (*viparyaya*), and sleep (*nidrā*). Each of these states is related directly to a sense of self or subject who appropriates and lays claim to the experience. The experiences of discrete objects or mental content or thought are filtered through and referenced to an afflicted identity of self that permeates the mind. When this happens, *puruṣa*, the pure witness or knower of *vr̥tti*, is forgotten or veiled/concealed; the ego-sense possesses the experience, thinking it to be its own. *Puruṣa* (seemingly) becomes as if reduced to the finite realm, of limitation, of the “me” and “mine” of worldly, empirical existence. As described by Patañjali (*YS II, 6*), the unseen seer (*puruṣa*) becomes as if “mixed” with the seeable (*dr̥śya*) in the process of *saṃyoga*, the congenital conflation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The result of this “mixture” or “conjunction” of “spirit” and “matter” is the emergence of reified notions of the world and self (egoity) rooted in ignorance, attachment, aversion, and fear and functioning in the mind in the form of *vr̥tti* (i.e., *cittavr̥tti*).

The *vr̥ttis* may be described as being cognitive, conative, and affective considering the nature that Patañjali and Vyāsa attribute to them. As its general translation of “modification” indicates, *vr̥tti* incorporates both a mental content as well as an activity, a function, an act of mind. Vijñāna Bhikṣu provides a helpful definition of *vr̥tti*: “A *vr̥tti* of the intellect, like the flame of a candle, is the foremost point of the mind whereby the mind’s one-pointedness is experienced. This foremost point, contacting external objects through the senses, is transformed into replicas of objects like melted copper in a crucible.”²⁰¹ The author of the *Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-Sūtra* (V, 107) states: “The *vr̥tti* is a principle different from a member or a quality; it reaches out to make a connection and glides forth [among objects, senses and the mind].”²⁰² In his commentary on the above text,

201 YSS in G. Jha (1894:3): *buddhivr̥ttis ca pradīpasya śikhāvad buddher agrabhāgo yena cittasyaikāgratāvyaṅghāro bhavati. sa eva ca bhāga indriyadvāra bāhyārthe saṃyujya arthākareṇa parināmate.*

202 *Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-Sūtra* V, 107 (p. 488): *bhāgagunābhyām tattvāntaram vr̥ttih sambandhārthaṃ sarpatī iti.* Sanskrit text from N. Sinha, trans. (1915), *The Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, in *The Sacred Books of the Hindus*, Vol. 11.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu explains that the mind naturally forms *vṛttis* that are real “psychic” transformations taking place through mental processes.²⁰³ *Vṛtti* is not specifically defined by Vyāsa. Vācaspati Miśra understands the five modifications as “change into the form of an object.”²⁰⁴ Bhoja Rāja states: “The *vṛttis* are forms of modification which are parts of the whole [the mind];²⁰⁵ and elsewhere he says, “the *vṛttis* are particular modifications of the mind.”²⁰⁶ Even the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyāti*)²⁰⁷ that takes place in the *sattva* of the mind, as well as the five afflictions — understood as parts of the *vṛtti* of error (*viparyaya*)²⁰⁸ — can all be classified under the category of *vṛtti*. *Vṛtti* is employed by Patañjali in a more general sense as “function” or “movement” or “mode of being,”²⁰⁹ and as a technical term implying any mental content which falls into the five categories of *vṛttis* (i.e., *YS* I, 5; II, 11; IV, 18). In the latter sense it is often used in the plural.

By rendering *vṛtti* as “modifications,” our study means to include the cognitive conditions, mental, emotive, and affective content, processes and activities, in fact any act or content of consciousness, self-identity, or mode of consciousness operating in the mind itself. Unlike the term *pariṇāma* (transformation, development), which implies serial change (of *prakṛti*), *vṛtti* in Yoga is an “occurrence,” which implies a more local human (temporal) activity inextricably linked to self-identity.²¹⁰ A secondary meaning of *vṛtti* is “means of livelihood,” as in “*vṛttis* are the means for the mind (empirical selfhood) to attain its livelihood.” As appropriated by limited self-consciousness, the *vṛttis* are like individuated “whirlpools” metaphorically signifying “whirls” of consciousness or an existence that appears separate from the water (but

²⁰³ In R. Garbe, ed. (1943), *Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya or Commentary on the Exposition of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy by Vijñānabhikṣu*, Vol. II. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press); see *SPB* V, 107 (p. 140).

²⁰⁴ *TV* III, 47 (p. 166): *vṛttir ālocanam viśayākāra pariṇatir iti yāvat*.

²⁰⁵ *RM* I, 2 (p. 2): *vṛttayo 'ngāṅgībhāvapariṇāmarūpās tāsām ...*

²⁰⁶ *RM* I, 5 (p. 3): *vṛttayaś cittasya pariṇāmaviśeṣāḥ*.

²⁰⁷ *TV* I, 2 (p. 6): *yadā ca vivekakhyātir api heyā tadā kaiva kathā vṛttyantarānām doṣa-bahulānām iti bhāvah*.

²⁰⁸ *YB* I: 5, 8, 11 and II, 11.

²⁰⁹ See, for example, *YS* II, 15: *guṇa-vṛtti*; see also *YS* II, 50 and III, 43.

²¹⁰ Cf. Koelman (1970: 86), who appears to equate the term *vṛtti* with *pariṇāma*.

is not really); the *puruṣa* “as if” conforms to an identity extrinsic to itself and takes on the appearance of a changing, finite, psychophysical being, rather than abiding in its true nature as pure consciousness.

We have seen that in the realm of empirical selfhood the law of *karma* operates if and only if the modifications of the mind are rooted in afflictions (*YS* II, 12). Vyāsa (*YB* IV, 11) likens this bound state of affairs to the wheel of *saṃsāra*, which turns due to the power of ignorance with its six spokes, namely, virtue (*dharma*) and nonvirtue (*adharma*), pleasure (*sukha*) and pain/dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*), as well as attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*).²¹¹ The five afflictions (*kleśas*) provide the dynamic framework through which mistaken identity of Self is maintained urging the psychophysical organism to emerge into activity, to feel, to think, to desire, etc. As the basic emotional and motivational forces, they lie at the root of all delusion, dissatisfaction, or pain. In Yoga, misidentification *is* suffering. As long as we live out of a deluded understanding of authentic identity, we remain subject to sorrow and conflict. Hence, Vyāsa labels the afflictions as “errors” or “misconceptions” (*viparyaya*). Thus the normal human situation can be characterized as the product of a cognitive error, a positive misconstruction of reality and an apparent loss or concealment of intrinsic identity. The correction of this error or misunderstanding of the world and the true nature of selfhood is contingent upon the full recovery or realization of *puruṣa*. What role, if any, does *vṛtti* actually play in the “recovery” process through which the disclosure of our authentic identity as *puruṣa*, the seer, takes place?

KLIṢṬA- AND AKLIṢṬA-VṚTTI

Patañjali understands the five types of *vṛttis* as being either “afflicted” (*kliṣṭa*) or “nonafflicted” (*akliṣṭa*).²¹² Vyāsa explains:

The afflicted [*vṛttis*] are caused by the five afflictions and are causes of the afflictions (*kleśa-hetuka*); they become the seed-bed for the growth of the accumulated residue of

²¹¹ See *YB* IV, 11 (p. 195).

²¹² See n. 200 above.

karma. The others [nonafflicted] have discernment (*khyāti*) as their object and oppose the sway of the *guṇas*.²¹³

The compound word *kleśa-hetuka* used in the above by Vyāsa to explain *kliṣṭa* may be translated as “caused by the *kleśas*” and “causes of the *kleśas*.” Vācaspati states that the *kleśas* such as *asmitā* (egoity) are the causes that bring about the advent of (afflicted) *vṛttis*. Or, as Vācaspati adds, it may be said that as *prakṛti* serves *puruṣa*, only its rajasic and tamasic *vṛttis* are the cause of *kleśa*.²¹⁴ According to Vijñāna Bhikṣu, the word *hetu* (cause) can also mean a purpose as well as referring to the effects of the *vṛttis*. Bhikṣu states that *kleśa* should be taken mainly to mean suffering/dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*), which is the effect (e.g., greed) produced by the *vṛttis* that take the form of objects experienced; hence it is said to be *kliṣṭa* (“afflicted”).²¹⁵

Feuerstein understands Vyāsa’s explanation (see above) of *kliṣṭa* as making little sense in that “*akliṣṭa* would consequently have to be understood as ‘not caused by the *kleśas*’, which is absurd, since all mental activity is *ex hypothesi* engendered by the *kleśas*.”²¹⁶ Feuerstein’s claim in the above amounts to a tautological and reductionistic explanation of *all* mental activity as being engendered by the afflictions; it fails to take into account the soteriological purpose of *vṛtti* in the form of subtler mental processes leading to liberating knowledge (*jñāna*, *YS* II,28) or what I will refer to as the “sattvification” of the mind and its *vṛtti*-processes. The process of sattvification takes place in the *sattva* of consciousness, the most refined aspect of the mind (*citta*), and its effect is such that it opposes the afflictions by purifying and illuminating the *yogin*’s consciousness thereby dissolving the barriers to spiritual liberation.

Bhikṣu interprets Vyāsa’s exposition on *akliṣṭa* by paraphrasing it thus, “resulting in *akleśa*,”²¹⁷ meaning that *akliṣṭa-vṛttis* do not result in afflictions. Through cognitive error or misconception, the *kleśas* both

213 *YB* I, 5 (p. 9): *kleśahetukāḥ karmāsayapracaye kṣetrībhūtāḥ kliṣṭāḥ. khyātiviṣayā guṇādhikāra virodhinyo ’kliṣṭāḥ.*

214 *TV* I, 5 (p. 9): *kleśā asmitādayo hetavaḥ pravṛttikāraṇām yāsām vṛttinām tās tathoktāḥ. yad vā puruṣārthapradhānasya rajastamomayinām hi vṛttinām kleśakāraṇatvena kleśayaiva pravṛttih.*

215 *YV* I, 5 (p. 57): *atra ca hetuḥ prayojanam. kleśas cātra mukhya eva grāhyo duḥkhākhyah. tathā ca kleśahetukāḥ duḥkhaphalikaḥ viṣayākāravṛttaya ity arthaḥ.*

216 G. Feuerstein (1980: 66).

217 *YV* I, 5 (p. 57): *akliṣṭa akleśaphalikāḥ.*

generate and arise from the activity and changes of the *guṇas* in the *samsāric* condition of self-identity, a condition that continues up to the discernment (*khyāti*) of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.²¹⁸ According to Vācaspati Miśra, *khyāti* (used by Vyāsa in the sense of discriminative discernment or *viveka-khyāti*) means “clarity of insight” (*prajñā-prasāda*) and occurs when the *sattvic* component of *buddhi* (intellect), having been cleansed of the impurities of *rajas* and *tamas*, flows tranquilly.²¹⁹ Any yogic “methods” that lead to the discernment of *puruṣa* and the mind (*sattva*) can be included under the clause “have discernment as their object.”²²⁰ Soteriologically, the unafflicted *vṛttis* are helpful in bringing about discernment and reducing the power of the *guṇas* over the *yogin* until the *guṇas* (the seeable) have finally fulfilled their dual purpose of experience (*bhoga*) and liberation (*apavarga*). They do so by opposing or blocking the activation of ignorance, its resulting desire and attendant actions (*karma*).²²¹ In his commentary on Vyāsa (*Maṇi-Prabhā*), Rāmānanda Yati (sixteenth century CE) states that the result of *kliṣṭa-vṛttis* is bondage (*bandha-phala*) whereas the result of *akliṣṭa-vṛttis* is liberation (*mukti-phala*)²²²; but this is technically incorrect. *Akliṣṭa-vṛttis* only lead up to and include discernment (a quality of the *sattva* of the mind) which in turn must be transcended in higher *samādhi* (*asamprajñāta*)²²³. Only then can final liberation (*kaivalya*) from misidentification with *all vṛttis* and their effects/affects take place.

Bhoja Rāja interprets *kliṣṭa* and *akliṣṭa* as “with *kleśas*” (in the technical sense: ignorance, etc.) and “without *kleśas*” (in the technical sense), or as “affected by *kleśas*” and “nonaffected by *kleśas*” (both in

218 Cf. Āraṇya (1963: 18).

219 TV I, 5 (p. 9): *vidhūtarajastamaso buddhisattvasya praśāntavāhinaḥ prajñāprasādaḥ khyātiḥ tayā viṣayinyā*.

220 YV I, 5 (p. 57): *khyātiśādhanasyāpi saṁgrahāya viṣaya padam iti*.

221 YV I, 5 (p. 57): *tās ca guṇādhikāravirodhinyah, guṇānām sattvādīnām adhikārah kāryā-rambhaṇam tadvirodhinyo 'vidyākāmākarmādirūpakāraṇaśakatvāt. khyātiḥviṣayā vivekakhyāti sambaddhā ity arthah*.

222 Rāmānanda Yati, (1903). *Pātañjaladarśanam* with a gloss called *Maṇi-prabhā*. (Benares, Vidya Vilas Press, Benares Sanskrit Series No. 75) p. 4.

223 See YS I, 18 and YB I, 18; YS III, 50 states that the *yogin* must develop dispassion/detachment even toward discriminative discernment and its effects, i.e., omniscience and sovereignty over *prakṛti*.

the above technical sense).²²⁴ Hauer²²⁵ agrees with Bhoja's interpretation. Many scholars understand *kliṣṭa* as "with *kleśas*" (in the general sense) — as in "painful," and *akliṣṭa* as "without *kleśas*" (in the general sense) as in "not painful."²²⁶ *YS* I, 5 also appears in the *Sāṃkhya-Sūtras* (II, 33) attributed to Kapila. In his commentary *Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya ad locum*, Vijñāna Bhikṣu interprets *kliṣṭa* as the *vṛttis* which are proper of saṃsāric existence and produce suffering, and *akliṣṭa* as the *vṛttis* which arise through the practice of Yoga and are contrary to the *kliṣṭa-vṛttis*.²²⁷ In his commentary on the same work, Aniruddha (fifteenth century CE) explains *kliṣṭa* as being united to the *kleśas* and composed of *rajas* and *tamas*, and *akliṣṭa* as being made of *sattva* wherein the *kleśas* have been discarded.²²⁸

Based on the above analysis, and for the sake of clarification, it can be concluded that *kliṣṭa-vṛtti* refers to mental activity that helps to maintain the power and influence of the *kleśas*; and *akliṣṭa* refers to mental activity that facilitates the process of the dissolution of the *kleśas*. The "afflicted" modes of the mind refer to the ordinary intentional consciousness of everyday life. Referring earlier to Bhikṣu's (*YV* I, 5) understanding of *akliṣṭa* as "resulting in *akleśa*," it does not seem inappropriate to designate *akleśa* as that condition in which the grip of the afflictions on the mind is partially or completely checked. Evidently, according to the commentators (and to counter Feuerstein), not "all mental activity is ... engendered by the *kleśas*." *Kliṣṭa-vṛttis* are brought about by the afflictions, but this is not necessarily the case for the *akliṣṭa-vṛttis*. By reducing all mental activity to being a product of the *kleśas*, Feuerstein has failed to differentiate between two radically different causes in Yoga: (1) *avidyā*, which is responsible for the misidentification of self or egoity (*asmitā*) leading to further affliction, and (2) the purposefulness of *puruṣa*, which is the final cause of the three differentiated states of *prakṛti*²²⁹ and for which the

²²⁴ *RM* I, 5 (p. 3): *kleśair vaksyamāṇalakṣaṇair ākrāntāḥ kliṣṭāḥ. tadviparītā akliṣṭāḥ.*

²²⁵ See Hauer (1958: 243).

²²⁶ See, for example, the writings of Taimni, Vivekananda, Bangali Baba, Rāma Prasāda, Ballentyne, Max Müller (1899: 337). Purohit (1973) uses "painful" and "pleasurable."

²²⁷ See *SPB* II, 33 (p. 266) in N. Sinha, trans. (1915), *The Sāṃkhya Philosophy*.

²²⁸ See Aniruddha's commentary on the *Sāṃkhya-Sūtras* (p. 1104) in R. Garbe, ed. (1987), *Sāṃkhya Sūtra and Sāṃkhya System*.

²²⁹ *YB* II, 19.

mind ultimately serves the purpose of liberation.²³⁰ *Vṛttis* of the nonafflicted (*akliṣṭa*) variety are engendered by the purposefulness of *puruṣa* and cannot be reduced to being a product of the *kleśas*.

The task of the *yogin* lies in the gradual overcoming of the impressions (*saṃskāras*) of “emergence” (*vyutthāna*) that generate an extrinsic self-identity or the externalization of selfhood in its worldly attached modes “away” from the *puruṣa*, and the simultaneous cultivation of the impressions of “cessation” (*nirodha*)²³¹ and the eventual establishment of selfhood in its intrinsic spiritual nature. Based on our discussion of *saṃskāra* and *vṛtti*, it can be inferred that: (1) From *saṃskāras* of a *vyutthāna*-nature arise *vyutthāna-vṛttis*, afflicted *vṛttis* that generate or support a deluded understanding of reality. (2) From *saṃskāras* of a *nirodha*-nature arise *vṛttis* that are conducive to the process of “cessation” (*nirodha*) and that being of the *akliṣṭa* type, aid in removing the *kleśas* and their effects thus leading to an enlightened understanding of self and world. These two “directions,” which imply radically different understandings of selfhood based on *saṃskāra* and *vṛtti*, can be correlated to the mind’s *guṇic* dispositions as the following statement by Vyāsa makes clear:

The mind always tends towards three dispositions: illumination, activity or stasis, which leads to the inference that the mind is constituted of the three *guṇas*. The nature of mind-*sattva* is illumination. Mingled with *rajas* and *tamas* the mind is drawn toward power and possessions. The same mind, when pervaded by *tamas* becomes subject to non-virtue, ignorance, attachment and impotence. Again, when the covering of delusion (*moha*) [correlated with *tamas*] has diminished from the mind, it [the mind] shines in its fullness; when this is pervaded by a measure of *rajas*, it turns toward virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power. When the last vestige of the impurity of *rajas* has been eliminated, the mind is established in its own nature, becoming simply the discernment (*khyāti*) of the distinction of the *sattva* and the *puruṣa* ...²³²

²³⁰ See, for example, YS II: 18, 21 and IV, 24.

²³¹ YS III, 9; see n. 88 above.

²³² YB I, 2 (pp. 4-5): *cittaṃ hi prakhyāpravr̥ttisthitiśīlatvāt triguṇaṃ prakhyārūpaṃ hi citta-sattvaṃ rajastamobhyāṃ saṃsṛṣṭaṃ aiśvaryaṃ viśayaṃ priyaṃ bhavati. tad eva tamaśānuviddham adharmājñānāvairāgyānāiśvaryaṃ bhavati. tad eva prakṣiṇamohāvaraṇaṃ sarvataḥ pra-*

The presence of *sattva*, the purest *guna*, draws one toward *dharma* (merit, virtue), *jñāna* (knowledge that arises from Yoga), *vairāgya*²³³ (dispassion/detachment), and *aiśvarya* (supremacy, possession of power, sovereignty).²³⁴ These four qualities, according to *SK* 23,²³⁵ are the natural aspects of a sattvic “mind,” i.e., intellect or *buddhi*. For example, sovereignty implies an unthwarted sense of will power or determination whereas the loss of sovereignty denotes that one’s will is weakened or thwarted by many impediments. The word *aiśvarya* is an abstract noun formed from *īśvara* (“master,” “lord”), used here not in the sense of God, but rather as an exalted human sense of power, of lordship, a commanding presence, the ability to be effective, to be “in control.” According to Yoga philosophy, one cannot be “in control of things” or in harmony with one’s objective world without first being in control of one’s mental faculties or “subjective world,” personality traits, etc. The word *īśvara* is derived from the root *īś*, meaning “to command, rule, reign,”²³⁶ “to be the master of.” The presence of *sattva* gives one the clear-sightedness so as to exercise such autonomy and effectiveness in a morally responsible way. One in whom *sattva* is predominant can easily become engaged in Yoga and lead a purified, increasingly virtuous, and cognitively illuminated existence with a preponderance of *akliṣṭa-vṛttis*.

The “absence” of *sattva* and dominance of *tamas* robs the mind of clarity and, consequently, effectiveness in wielding power in a morally responsible way is lost. This does not mean that one who wields power in a manipulative egoic fashion, or in a non-discerning way, is also endowed with *sattva*. Nonvirtue, ignorance, and attachment are all symptoms of the predominance of *tamas* whereas only “meritorious” effectiveness in wielding power would mark the presence of *sattva*. When *sattva* is eclipsed by *tamas* one becomes weakened, overly dependent, no longer a “sovereign” person. One in whom *tamas* predominates misidentifies with *kliṣṭa-vṛttis* and is ensnared in the network of afflicted consciousness and identity.

dyotamānam anuviddham rajoleśamalāpetam svarūpapraṭiṣṭham sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti-mātram ...

²³³ See *YS* I, 15-16 and the discussion on *vairāgya* in I. Whicher (1997), “Nirodha, Yoga Praxis and the Transformation of the Mind,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* Vol. 25, No.1: 1-67.

²³⁴ See Monier-Williams (1899: 234).

²³⁵ See Larson (1969: 266).

²³⁶ Monier-Williams (1899: 170).

In Vyāsa's statement that "the mind always tends to illumination (*sattva*), activity (*rajas*) or inertia (*tamas*)" as a result of the presence of the three *guṇas*, it must be understood that the above list of qualities of the *guṇas* is far from being an exhaustive one. *Sattva* in its form of moral and mental activity implies other luminous qualities such as clarity of mind, serenity, insight, kindness and compassion, benevolence, forgiveness, pleasantness of character, etc. In the case of rajasic qualities, not only energy and will (volition leading to action), but passionate moral and mental activity, anguish, anger, and pleasure and pain of different kinds (joy, anxiety, dissatisfaction, conflict) are to be understood. The word "inertia" (*sthiti*) or "stasis," used to express the attribute of *tamas*, means both "stability" and "stagnation," and refers as well to other tamasic qualities such as dullness, confusion, stupidity, indolence, dejection, heaviness, sloth, etc. All forms of *prakṛti* carry within themselves all three *guṇas*,²³⁷ and nothing within *prakṛti* exists that does not include all the three *guṇas* together. Variances in the nature of all phenomena, entities, attributes, self-identifications, tendencies and inclinations, personalities, choices, relationships, and acts depend on the dominance and preponderance of the *guṇas*. In fact, the *guṇas* are used to characterize almost all aspects of life including the nature of faith, knowledge, action, agency, intellect, and foodstuffs.²³⁸

Upon further analysis of the *guṇas* it would appear to be the case that the mind can undertake an initiative only because of *rajas*. Through *tamas* it can be drawn to "negative" or irresponsible states such as malevolence toward others. *Sattva* brings to the mind serenity, clarity, pleasantness, and lucidity. What impels the mind to move in the direction of virtue? It is the presence of *rajas*. The mind, being a composition of the tripartite process, can never be without *rajas* and *tamas*. It is not, therefore, that in Yoga *rajas* and *tamas* are to be negated or abolished; rather, they are to be purified so that their presence as well as their effects (and affects) no longer obstruct the natural illuminating power intrinsic to *sattva*. In their natural state, *rajas* and *tamas* are essential and their measure is ideally sufficient to

²³⁷ On the physical side, *sattva* gives rise to lightness, brightness, and other related material properties and is associated with the colour white; *rajas* is responsible for mobility of various kinds and is associated with the colour red; *tamas* produces darkness, inertia, decay, and related phenomenon and is associated with the colour black.

²³⁸ See chapters seventeen and eighteen in the *BG*.

fulfil the purpose of *sattva*. When present within the limit of this measure, *rajas* initiates virtue, etc., and *tamas* imparts stability. What is initially intended by the discipline of Yoga is simply purification of body and mind so that *rajas* and *tamas* may be brought under the power of *sattva*. As such, *sattva* is then no longer dominated by the moral and mental processes of *rajas* and *tamas*. Vyāsa shows (*YB* I, 2) the subtlety and the superiority of the *sattva* of consciousness, which functions as a “bridge” on the “path” to the untainted consciousness of *puruṣa*. The way and journey in Yoga from a tamasic or rajasic disposition to a sufficiently sattvified one thus involves a highly moral process; it is not, as one scholar puts it, an “*a-moral* process.”²³⁹ Yoga does not succumb to an antinomian perspective but seeks to integrate, through an embodiment of being, an enlightened consciousness with an affectively and morally matured sense of identity and personhood.

It is clear from the above analysis that tamasic *vyrttis* are afflicted modifications of the mind and sattvic *vyrttis* are non-afflicted ones. Vijñāna Bhikṣu regards rajasic *vyrttis*²⁴⁰ as mixed, both *akliṣṭa* and *kliṣṭa*. In Classical Sāṃkhya the function of *rajas* is always to impel both *sattva* and *tamas*.²⁴¹ Without the initial impelling force of *rajas* the other two *guṇas* are ineffective and inefficacious. In this sense the rajasic element may be considered to be mixed with either *sattva* or *tamas*, whichever is dominant, and therefore *sattva* or *tamas* is served or supported by *rajas*. The progress of the mind toward pure *sattva* is not possible without the operational capacity of *rajas*.

How do the different qualities of *vyrtti* interrelate in the system, that is, in the mind? Given our prevalent habit patterns of thought and misidentification and their proneness for generating and sustaining turbulence, affliction, and conflict — both within ourselves and in the world — how do nonafflicted states of mind survive in the midst of ignorance and suffering? One could, as does Vācaspati Miśra, pose an argument as follows: It is understood that all beings, with the exception of liberated embodiments (i.e., a “descent” [*avatāra*] or a *jīvanmukta*), bear afflicted *vyrttis* and have various attachments,

²³⁹ See Feuerstein (1979a: 81). I have written more specifically on Patañjali's Yoga and its implications for an embodied state of liberation; see n. 338 below.

²⁴⁰ *YV* I, 5 (p. 58).

²⁴¹ As, for example, in its role of bringing forth the two processes of the *sāttvika* and *tāmasa ahaṃkāra*, i.e., the manifestation of the subjective sensory world and the objective sensed world respectively.

aversions, fears, etc. It would be rare if nonafflicted *vṛttis* were to arise in the constant stream or “whirling” of such afflicted mental and emotional content. Moreover, even if nonafflicted *vṛttis* were to arise among the afflicted ones, they would be powerless, having fallen among innumerable powerful opponents. Therefore, it could be deemed illogical that afflicted *vṛttis* could be overcome through nonafflicted ones, and that even by practicing dispassion (*vairāgya*) toward any manner or type of *vṛtti*, however sattvic,²⁴² the afflicted patterns of *vṛtti*-identification would in the end prove to be insurmountable. To counter this kind of pessimism, Vyāsa assuredly and optimistically replies: “They [non-afflicted *vṛttis*] remain nonafflicted even if they occur in a stream of afflicted ones. In intervals between afflicted ones, there are nonafflicted ones; in intervals between nonafflicted ones are located afflicted ones.”²⁴³ In Yoga, practice (*abhyāsa*) and dispassion (*vairāgya*) can arise from *akliṣṭa-vṛttis*, for example, from *āgama*: reliable testimony — one of the means of knowledge or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*); or from *anumāna*: inference, another *pramāṇa* and through which can take place spiritual upliftment or inspiration, or perhaps the instruction of a teacher resulting in contemplation and greater understanding.²⁴⁴ When practice and dispassion cause a break in the flow or movement of afflicted patterns of thought, the *vṛttis* leading to a “higher good” or “purpose” (*paramārtha*) arise.²⁴⁵ Even though, as Vyāsa states, these latter *vṛttis* arise in the stream of afflictions and afflicted *vṛttis*, they nevertheless remain untouched by them and are not corrupted. The same applies to nonafflicted *vṛttis* that appear in intervals between afflicted *vṛttis*. Similarly, when nonafflicted *vṛttis* are generated or activated, their stream is often interrupted by afflicted *vṛttis*. However, these impure *vṛttis* have no power to alter the purer ones; rather, as the purer *vṛttis* grow in strength through repeated practice, their *saṃskāras* gradually mature, and the impure *vṛttis* and *saṃskāras* lose their hold over the mind. Attention then need no longer be monopolized by afflicted states of identity. The mind and its modifications become progressively infused in the nature of *sattva*, the *guṇa*

242 See *TV I*, 5 (p. 10).

243 *YB I*, 5 (p. 10): *kliṣṭapravāhapatitā apy akliṣṭāḥ. kliṣṭacchidreṣy apy akliṣṭā bhavanti.*

244 See *TV I*, 5 (p. 10).

245 See *Āraṇya* (1963: 18).

that predominates in the makeup of *akliṣṭa-vṛttis* and *samskāras* of “cessation” (*nirodha*). The *yogin*’s identity becomes increasingly sattvified. As dispassion (*vairāgya*) toward forms of misidentification (*sārūpya*) matures into higher dispassion (*para-vairāgya*), even the dependency on sattvic *vṛttis* — previously so necessary for the *yogin*’s growth and spiritual development — falls away. The soteriological point to be made here is that any attachment to *vṛtti*, whether that *vṛtti* is afflicted or nonafflicted, must be transcended in Yoga. By fostering the *akliṣṭa-vṛttis*, one masters the *kliṣṭa-vṛttis*, and then, in turn, one dissolves any attachment to the *akliṣṭa-vṛttis* through higher dispassion.²⁴⁶

Examples of the “nonafflicted” type of *vṛttis* can be alluded to. A valid cognition of the *pratyakṣa* type can be deemed nonafflicted when it leads to higher perception of the true nature of both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. A conceptualization (*vikalpa*) is beneficial when one conceives of, or imagines, greater states of yogic awareness. For example, after having read the “great sayings” (*mahāvākyas*) of the Upaniṣads such as *tat tvam asi* — “That [the all-pervasive Self] you are” (*Chāndogya Up* VI. 12, 3) — one can be left with a purificatory impression in the mind even if the sayings have not been fully understood. *Nidrā* (sleep) can be of value when a particular image in a dream acts as a catalyst for meditation (*YS* I, 38). And memory (*smṛti*) is helpful when, for example, upon viewing “objects” in the world of nature such as a blue sky, one is reminded of the all-pervading nature of *puruṣa* or of descriptions of appearances of one’s favorite “descent” (*avatāra*) or embodiment of the deity (e.g., Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, Śiva, etc.).²⁴⁷

YS I,33 states: “The mind is made pure and clear from the cultivation of friendliness, compassion, happiness and equanimity in conditions (or toward objects) of joy, sorrow, merit or demerit respectively.”²⁴⁸ Thus the sattvic *vṛttis* or attitudes of friendliness (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), happiness (*muditā*) and equanimity (*upekṣā*) replace the rajasic and tamasic attitudes based on more self-centered orientations or egoic modes of being and relating in the world.

²⁴⁶ See *TV* I, 5 (p. 10). The process of dispassion (detachment) has been explained in greater detail in Whicher (1992), (1995), and (1997).

²⁴⁷ Some of the above examples are taken from Nārāyaṇa Tirtha’s *Yogasiddhāntacandrikā* as cited in Arya (1986: 143).

²⁴⁸ *YS* I, 33 (p. 38): *maitrīkaruṇāmuditopekṣānām sukhaduḥkḥapunyāpunyaṣayānām bhāvanā-taś cittaprasādanam*.

This is done in the spirit, as it were, of dispassion toward the moral and mental states of others. Vyāsa writes on the above *sūtra*: “Such devoted cultivation produces *dharma*, and thereby the mind is made pure and clear. When it is clear it attains the state of one-pointed stability.”²⁴⁹ Obviously, not the entire emotive and affective dimension of human nature can be subsumed under the traits of afflicted identity as the above attitudes make clear. The sattvic qualities that adhere within our emotive/affective dimension can be understood as positive (i.e., nonafflicted) aids on the *yogin*’s journey.

Once an aspirant has begun to practice is success in Yoga definitely assured? Do the *vṛttis* associated with affliction (*kleśa*) then cease to have power over the aspirant? The above questions may be answered in two ways: (1) Vyāsa (*YB* I, 1) rejects those with distracted (*vikṣipta*) minds as being unworthy of consideration as serious *yogins*²⁵⁰ and is, therefore, not talking about them. (2) The wording of the Sanskrit commentators (e.g. Vācaspati Miśra, H. Āraṇya) suggests that non-afflicted *vṛttis* have to be strengthened through practice and dispassion until they cease to be intermittent and thus create a flow (*pravāha*) in the *yogin*’s consciousness. As a result, afflicted *vṛttis* arising intermittently lose their power over the *yogin* and are therefore mastered. The *yogin* is no longer enslaved by the afflicted modes of thinking and acting. This is the essence of what Vyāsa says: “It is only by the modifications (*vṛttis*) that the impressions (*saṃskāras*) corresponding to them are generated, and by the impressions are generated new *vṛttis*. Thus the wheel of *vṛttis* and *saṃskāras* revolves.”²⁵¹ The *vṛttis* both generate and strengthen the *saṃskāras*, the latter in turn facilitating the rise of the former. There is no conception of mind as *tabula rasa* to be found here. The only way the saṃsāric wheel of *saṃskāras* and *vṛttis* can cease, implying an end to mistaken identity and the experience of suffering, is through the process or practice of “cessation” (*nirodha*) itself.

Epistemologically, *vṛtti* refers to any mental “whirl,” “wave” or modification. It is, thus, the medium through which a human being understands and experiences: whatever we know is based on the

²⁴⁹ *YB* I, 33 (p. 39): *evam asya bhāvayataḥ śuklo dharmo upajāyate. tataś ca cittam prasīdati. prasannam ekāgraṃ sthitiṣpadam labhate.*

²⁵⁰ *YB* I, 1 (p. 3). The states of mind according to Yoga are discussed in Whicher (1997); see n. 172 above.

²⁵¹ See n. 85 above.

functioning of *vṛtti*. Our total apprehension of a conscious self/person is only by way of observing and recognizing the *vṛttis*, intentions, ideas (*pratyaya*), and thought-constructs that arise in the mind. In other words, in ordinary human experience the existence of consciousness without an object in the mind is not suspected. *Citta* may be described as a network of functions that allows for the relay of information to the uninvolved experiencer (*puruṣa*). These functions include the inner organ (*antahkaraṇa*) composed of *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, and *manas*, in conjunction with sense and motor organs (*buddhīndriyas* and *karmēndriyas*) and their objects. The *citta* is regarded as the vehicle for perception (wherein the contents of experience take form for presentation to the *puruṣa*) as well as the receptacle for the effects of *karma*. The *citta* takes on a karmic shape or mentality due to the arising of each *vṛtti* that pervades it in the form of various perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and so on, and as reference to a prakṛtic sense of self. In ordinary experience, *citta* is thus experienced as a series of particular mental states. However, according to Yoga, the *citta* is not capable of functioning by itself; it derives its semblance of consciousness through the proximity of *puruṣa* (YS IV, 19 and 22-23) in a manner analogous to that in which the moon is illuminated by the light of the sun. As the sun shines on the moon, so the *puruṣa* “shines” its “light” upon the *citta* and thereby knows all that passes in the mind by observing *vṛttis*, thoughts and emotions as a witness (YS II, 20; IV, 18). Hence *puruṣa* is the true experiencer (*bhoktr*, YB II, 6) and knower. However, the capacity to witness or observe the ongoings of the mind is not available to the empirical selves bound as they are to the identity of the body, mind and its modifications, i.e., psycho-physical being.

Human consciousness, due to misidentification, experiences selfhood according to the changing modes (*guṇas*) of *prakṛti*. All our “knowledge” as misidentified selves is structured in the prakṛtic realm of *cittavṛtti* and functions as a masquerading consciousness of phenomenal selfhood. Through the “cessation” (*nirodha*) of misidentification or mistaken identity (YS I, 2) in Yoga the seer (*puruṣa*) is said to be established in its unchanging, ever-wise, ever-pure nature.²⁵² Yet in ordinary consciousness and perception *puruṣa* appears to be misidentified with *prakṛti* (*cittavṛtti*), our self-identity having con-

²⁵² YS I, 3 (p. 7).

formed (*sārūpya*) to the changing nature of *vṛtti*.²⁵³ Does *puruṣa* have two natures? The total and permanent incorruptibility and unchangeability of *puruṣa* is the fundamental tenet of Yoga philosophy. If any of the “attributes” of *puruṣa* were to increase or decrease, the entire tenet would have to be rejected. In that case *puruṣa* would not be transcendent, pure, or free at all because it would be subject to factors outside of itself, namely, alteration, delusion, and suffering. There would simply be no point in pursuing Yoga because it would only lead to a series of temporary states of change and development (*pariṇāma*) rooted in egoity, attachment, aversion, fear, confusion, and conflict, and that ineluctably fuel further afflicted identity. But how and why does conformity (*sārūpya*) of self-identity with *vṛttis* take place?

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The existence of empirical identity or self enveloped in spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) does not mean that *puruṣa* deviates from its essential intrinsic nature of unconditioned freedom and purity. The starting point of the search for liberation in Yoga must be an inquiry into the nature of the “conjunction” (*saṃyoga*) between the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and the seeable (*dṛśya*),²⁵⁴ i.e., of the congenitally conflated realms of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Although the Yoga system has no qualms about expressing the shortcomings of mundane existence, to the discerning one (*vivekin*²⁵⁵) all identity contained within the saṃsāric realm is seen to involve dissatisfaction and suffering. Yet Yoga does not conclude on a note of existential despair by seeking, for example, to negate mundane existence or take flight from the world. From Patañjali’s perspective, *saṃyoga* provides an experiential basis from which the *yogin* can then go on to apprehend the natures of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (*YS II*, 23²⁵⁶) through a rigorous spiritual discipline for overcoming attachment to the modifications of the mind (*cittavṛtti*) and thereby abiding or resting in one’s true identity (*svarūpe ’vasthānam*). Patañjali maintains that in the condition of

²⁵³ *YS I*, 4 (p. 7). See my study (1997), “Nirodha, Yoga Praxis and the Transformation of the Mind,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* Vol. 25, No. 1: 1-67, where I examine Patañjali’s central definition of yoga (*YS I*, 2).

²⁵⁴ *YS II*, 17.

²⁵⁵ *YS II*, 15.

²⁵⁶ See n. 117 above.

saṃyoga the “contact” between the seer and the seeable is merely an apparent junction, since both the seer (intrinsic identity) and the seeable (extrinsic identity) are held to be utterly distinct.²⁵⁷ He does not explicitly analyze this epistemological problem further. This has led to a great deal of speculation in the commentarial literature on the *YS*.

To explain the cognitive processes, Vyāsa resorts to various metaphors and analogies comparing, for instance, the mind to a magnet²⁵⁸ that attracts the objects, and elsewhere (*YB* I, 41 and IV, 23²⁵⁹) compares it to a crystal that reflects the colour of the object near it. Through the “contact” (explained below²⁶⁰) with *puruṣa*, the mind takes on a semblance of awareness and cognizes the objects just as a crystal receives the form of an object and appears identical with that form:

Mind is coloured by an object cognizable to the mind, and by the fact of being an object, it is bound up with the subject, *puruṣa*, by a mental function of belonging to it. It is this very mind alone that is coloured by the seer and the seeable. It assumes the appearance of object and subject, the insentient (“nonconscious”) becoming sentient (“conscious”). The mind, being insentient, essentially an object — conscious as it were, on the analogy of the crystal — is said to comprehend everything.²⁶¹

Due to the association of the mind with *puruṣa*, *puruṣa* then appears to be an empirical state when knowledge and experience are attributed to it. Drawing on the philosophical teachings of both Patañjali and Sāṃkhya (*SK* 20), Vyāsa contends that it is through the conjunction of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (i.e., the mind) that consciousness “takes on” the role of an empirical identity or knower. He understands the “contact”

²⁵⁷ See *YS* III, 35 and III, 49.

²⁵⁸ See n. 277 below.

²⁵⁹ See n. 261 below.

²⁶⁰ See, for example, n. 265 below.

²⁶¹ *YB* IV, 23 (p. 198): *mano hi mantavyenārthenoparaktam, tatsvayaṃ ca viṣayatvād viṣayinā puruṣeṇā*” *tmīyayā vṛtṭyā’ bhisambaddham, tadetaccittameva draṣṭrdrśyoparaktam viṣaya-viṣayinirbhāsam cetanācetanāsvārūpāpannam viṣayātmakam apy aviṣayātmakam ivācetanam cetanam iva sphaṭikamaṇikalpaṃ sarvārtham ity ucyate.*

to be in the form of mere proximity (*saṃnidhi*²⁶²). Yet how can there be ‘proximity’ between these two eternal all-pervasive principles (that is, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*)? The proximity, however, does not mean proximity in time and space because both *puruṣa* and unmanifest *prakṛti* (*pradhāna*) are beyond time and space, engaged as it were, in a beginningless relationship (*anādiḥ sambandha*²⁶³).

Finite categories of time and space would thus seem particularly inappropriate in any description of this “union.” However, *samyoga* is an effective relation through which *prakṛti* is influenced by the presence of *puruṣa*, understood here as a transcendent influence.²⁶⁴ This means that *prakṛti* can neither *be* nor *be understood* without reference to *puruṣa*, the realm of the *guṇas* ultimately serving the purpose or “goal” of spiritual emancipation or *puruṣa*-realization. It is paradoxical that *prakṛti* manifests and is activated because of the transcendent influence of *puruṣa*, and yet *puruṣa* is revealed as being intrinsically free by nature — never really lost, forgotten or acquired — by “contemplating” *prakṛti*. Consciousness learns, from experiencing the manifestations of *prakṛti*, that it (*puruṣa*) is not contained within *prakṛti*. It is even more of a paradox to observe that both *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are realized and recognized as what they truly are only after they have appeared to be what they are not: the mind itself appears conscious and *puruṣa* appears as if to be the empirical agent of activity (cf. *SK* 20). Vācaspati sees the nonspatial and nontemporal connection between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as a kind of “preestablished harmony.” He speaks of their enigmatic relationship in terms of a special “fitness” or “capacity” (*yogyatā*) and explains the “proximity” (*saṃnidhi*) between the two principles as a “capacity” or juxtaposition of two complementary powers. The “proximity” of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, consisting of this “capacity” (*yogyatā*), is qualified by Vācaspati as the “power of being experienceable” (*bhogyasakti*) belonging to *prakṛti* and the “power of being the experiencer” (*bhokṛśakti*) belonging to *puruṣa*.²⁶⁵ *Puruṣa* thus has the capability of being the “experiencer” and *citta* has the capacity of being an object of experience. What is,

262 *YB* I, 4 (pp. 8-9); see n. 277 below.

263 *Ibid*; see n. 277 below.

264 See F. Catalina (1968: 136).

265 *TV* I, 4 (p. 8): *saṃnidhiś ca ... yogyatā lakṣaṇaḥ. asti ca puruṣasya bhokṛśaktiś cittasya bhogyasaktiḥ.*

therefore, the mysterious “union,” termed *saṃyoga*, between *puruṣa* — the “seer” (*draṣṭṛ*) — and *prakṛti* (*citta*) — the “seeable” (*drśya*)? Vyāsa considers the “union” to be a projection or superimposition (*adhyāropa*²⁶⁶) of the contents of consciousness we are aware of as given real existence with respect to *puruṣa*, i.e., they reflect *puruṣa*’s existence. They appear real because of the reality of *puruṣa*. As Vyāsa explains, this superimposition results in a confusion of identity between *puruṣa* and the mental processes wherein *puruṣa* is not distinguishable from the process of the emergence or extraversion (*vyutthāna*) of consciousness that generates an extrinsic sense of self-identity,²⁶⁷ i.e., mistaken identity or misidentification.

In YS II, 23²⁶⁸ the terms “possessor”/“owner” (*svāmin*) and “possessed”/“owned” (*sva*), referring to the seer and the seeable respectively, epitomize well the nature of the conjunction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* is the possessor who is “joined” to its own seen object for the purpose of apprehending or seeing. A *felix culpa*, a confusing temporary misidentification, appears almost a necessary prelude to the realization of yogic wisdom and true identity. Why should there be this apparent “loss” or “fall” of *puruṣa* from its pristine and unencumbered existence into a state of change and enslavement to the prakṛtic realm, only then to be followed by strenuous efforts for liberation? Patañjali’s reply seems to be that the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) takes place so that the essential nature of the seer and the seeable can be grasped and discernment arises. Awareness of the seeable object arising from that conjunction is worldly experience (*bhoga*). Awareness of the nature of the seer, however, is liberation (*apavarga*).²⁶⁹ Vyāsa explains:

Insofar as the conjunction comes to an end and there is seeing (*darśana*) and its result, seeing is said to be the cause of disjunction, and failure-to-see as the opposite of seeing is said to be the cause of the conjunction.... Seeing, namely knowledge (*jñāna*), is said to bring about aloneness

266 YB II, 18 (p. 84): *etena grahaṇadhāraṇohāpoha tattva jñānābhiniveśā buddhau vartamānāḥ puruṣe ’dhyāropitasad bhāvāḥ*.

267 YB I, 4 (p. 8): *vyutthāne yās cittaṃvṛttayas tadaviśiṣṭavṛttih puruṣaḥ*.

268 See n. 117 above.

269 YB II, 23 (p. 91): *puruṣaḥ svāmī drśyena svena darśanārthaṃ saṃyuktāḥ. tasmāt saṃyogā-drśyasyopalabdhir yā sa bhogaḥ. yā tu draṣṭuḥ svarūpopalabdhiḥ so ’pavargaḥ*.

(*kaivalya*) only in the sense that in the presence of seeing there is annihilation of failure-to-see which is the cause of bondage. What then is this failure-to-see (*adarśana*)?²⁷⁰

Vyāsa's commentary on *YS II, 23* becomes an exposition of various definitions of the "failure-to-see" (*adarśana*) or ignorance (*avidyā*). He lists several alternatives for understanding the ignorance which lies at the root of a person's sense of worldly involvement and selfhood.²⁷¹ According to Vyāsa the present conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is caused by *avidyā* producing a mentality or "mind" of its own kind.²⁷² Patañjali states in *YS II, 24*: "The cause of it [i.e. *saṃyoga*] is ignorance."²⁷³ Vyāsa's commentary makes it clear that it is *avidyā*, understood as the subliminal traits or habit patterns (*vāsanās*) rooted in erroneous knowledge (*viparyaya-jñāna*²⁷⁴), that is the cause of "contact" and the resulting bondage of self-identity. This is the theory of the nature of *avidyā* as favoured by the Yoga school. Throughout his commentary (*YB II, 23*), Vyāsa uses the word *adarśana* as a synonym for *avidyā*. The other terms commonly used for *avidyā* in the Yoga system are *viparyaya* (*YS I, 8* and *YB I, 8*) and *mithyājñāna* (*YS I, 8*). Vyāsa stresses that it is the particular conjunction of *avidyā* in relation to the inward individual consciousness (*pratyak-cetanā*) and not simply the impersonal, abstract conjunction of *puruṣa* with *guṇas* metaphysically conceived (which is the same for all beings) that is specifically being

²⁷⁰ *YB II, 23* (pp. 91-92): *darśanakāryāvasānah saṃyoga iti darśanam viyogasya kāraṇam uktam. darśanam adarśanasya pratidvāṃ dvītyadarśanam saṃyoga nimittam uktam. ... darśanasya bhava bandhakāraṇasyādarśanasya nāśa ity ato darśanam jñānam kaivalyakāraṇam uktam. kiṃ cedam adarśanam nāma.*

²⁷¹ See *YB II, 23* (pp. 92-93). The eight alternative explanations for *avidyā* listed by Vyāsa, which were probably prevalent during his time, are summarized as follows: (1) the prevailing of the *guṇas* over the *puruṣa*; (2) the failure of *prakṛti* to bring the *puruṣa* to liberating sight; (3) the fact that the *guṇas* are purposeful; (4) *avidyā* producing a mentality of its own kind; (5) the manifestation of the latent impressions of activity, the potency for stasis having ceased; (6) the need of *pradhāna* to make itself known; (7) the requirement of the presence of *puruṣa* for things knowable to be known, with an attendant apparent reflection of things knowable back upon the *puruṣa*; and (8) the identity of the failure-to-see with knowledge. Later in *YB II, 23* (p. 94), Vyāsa says that the above explanations are the alternatives contained in the [yogic] *śāstra* and that this multiplicity of opinion concerns a common object, namely the conjunction of the constituents (*guṇas*) [of *prakṛti*] with *puruṣa*. For more on the term *avidyā* see T.S. Rukmani (1986), "Avidyā in the System of Yoga and an Analysis of the Negation in it," (The Adyar Library Bulletin) pp. 526-534.

²⁷² *YB II, 23* (p. 92): *avidyā svacittena saha niruddhā svacittasyotpattibijam.*

²⁷³ *YS II, 24* (p. 94): *tasya hetur avidyā.*

²⁷⁴ *YB II, 24* (p. 95): *viparyayajñāna vāsanety arthah.*

pointed to here.²⁷⁵ This is in line with Yoga's more psychological and epistemological approach to reality in contrast to a metaphysical (ontological) approach. It would be misleading to impute to ignorance a cosmogonic function which would be more appropriate in the context of Advaita Vedānta. One scholar, for example, states: "In the Yoga-sūtra the reason given for the emergence or the evolution of the manifest world is *avidyā* ('ignorance')." ²⁷⁶ This appears to be a misunderstanding of the precise viewpoint of Patañjali and Vyāsa.

Vyāsa asserts that through the proximity (*saṃnidhi*) of spirit and psychophysical being (matter) the mind becomes the property of *puruṣa*, that is, is "owned" by *puruṣa*: "The mind is like a magnet, serving by mere proximity, by the fact of being seen. It is the property of its owner, *puruṣa*. There is a beginningless connection and this is the cause of *puruṣa*'s cognition of the mental processes."²⁷⁷ *Samnidhi* (proximity) is a technical term used to describe the immanent association between *puruṣa* and the mind by virtue of which it is possible for the *puruṣa* to perceive the cognitions of the finite mind. The service that the mind performs for *puruṣa* is to be of the nature of the "seeable" (*drśya*) so that cognition may occur and consequently *puruṣa*'s capacity to be the "owner" or "master" (*svāmin*) of the "owned" (*sva, prakṛti*) may be developed and actualized. To serve as the "seeable" means to be *puruṣa*'s object of experience when the mind registers the forms of the objects it encounters within the "objective" world. For example, a sight or sound presented to the mind is refined into a *vṛtti*. In the process of cognition, this *vṛtti* "commingles" with the reflected light of *puruṣa* in the mind and serves *puruṣa* by its proximity without actually affecting it. However, as Vyāsa clarifies, just as victory and defeat encountered by the soldiers are attributed to the ruler (because the ruler experiences the effects of them), so bondage and freedom happening in the mind alone are attributed to *puruṣa* because their effects are experienced.²⁷⁸ That

²⁷⁵ YB II, 23 (p. 94): *tatra vikalpabahutvametat sarvapuruṣāṅām guṇāṅām samyoge sādhanāviśayam. yastu pratyakcetanasya svabuddhi samyogaḥ.*

²⁷⁶ G. Larson (1969: 191).

²⁷⁷ YB I, 4 (pp. 8-9): *cittaṃ ayaskāntamaṅikalpaṃ saṃnidhimātropakāri drśyatvena svaṃ bhavati puruṣasya svāmināḥ. tasmāc cittavṛttibodhe puruṣasyānādiḥ saṃbandho hetuḥ.*

²⁷⁸ YB II, 18 (pp. 83-84): *yathā vijayaḥ parājayo vā yoddhṛṣu vartamānaḥ svāmini vyapadiśyate, sa hi tatphalasya bhokteti, evaṃ bandhamokṣau buddhāv eva vartamānau puruṣe vyapadiśyate, sa hi tatphalasya bhokteti.*

is to say, one experiences sorrow or dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*) in the case of bondage, and liberating knowledge (*jñāna*) in the case of freedom. However, any “change” in the *puruṣa* is only apparent.

Puruṣa has always been the “owner” or “possessor” and *prakṛti* has always been *puruṣa*’s possession (*sva*). Their relationship is beginningless and natural. No other relationship between them is possible because of their respective natures. Referring to the relationship of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, Koelman writes: “the two terms, which *de facto* are in relation, are permanent; yet the relation itself, though without beginning, is not permanent. Hence the relation must be rooted in something over and above, in something additional to the very essence of *prakṛti*”²⁷⁹ The afflictions experienced by each individual are present as modifications in *prakṛti* yet do not wholly belong to the *prakṛtic* essence. Furthermore, as Vācaspati Miśra informs us: “... insofar as the originating of (i.e., the conjunction) is concerned, ignorance is its cause, but insofar as its stability (i.e., its continued existence and activity) is concerned, the purpose of the Self is the cause, since the stability of that (conjunction) is due to this (purpose) of the Self.”²⁸⁰ But how is ignorance the cause of the origination of the conjunction *saṃyoga*? Patañjali’s answer is: by considering empirical selfhood to be the true experiencer and by mistaking the Self to be the active agent — however effected or altered — in the process of cognition and experience. Egoity is neither the pure root-cause, nor *puruṣa*, but rather is the distorted reflection of *puruṣa* in the form of ignorance as the root-cause.

Prakṛti does not plan for either deceptive or liberating knowledge, for *prakṛti* does not intrinsically possess the necessary capacity to be conscious (*cetana*) in herself. Any act of cognition can have a binding effect/affect if the mind is governed by the afflictions (*kleśas*) and afflicted (*kliṣṭa-*) *vṛttis*, or a liberating effect if the nature of the experience is predominately of the nonafflicted (*akliṣṭa-vṛtti*) type and leads to the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyāti*). *Prakṛti* has only to show herself as she is, as the dancing girl image in the *SK* (59) illustrates. *Prakṛti*’s essentially ambivalent nature can lend its activity

²⁷⁹ G. Koelman (1970: 143).

²⁸⁰ *TV* II, 17 (p. 80): *pragbhāvitayā saṃyogasyāvidyā kāraṇam sthithetutayā puruṣārthah kāraṇam tad (= bhogāpavargau puruṣārthatā) vaśena tasya (saṃyogasya) sthiteḥ*. We note here that the purpose “of” the Self (*puruṣa*) is an objective genitive and not a subjective genitive, i.e., *puruṣārtha* means “for the sake of *puruṣa*.” It is not that *puruṣa* actively has purposes.

to both alternatives, can serve both purposes, but has only the capacity to collaborate according to the degree of understanding or misunderstanding which, located in the mind, informs our decisions,²⁸¹ intentions, volitions, and therefore how we experience the world and others.

THEORY OF REFLECTED CONSCIOUSNESS IN YOGA

The samsāric condition of self is the result of the failure to distinguish between the pure experiencer or seer (*puruṣa*) and the seeable or “experienced” thereby making “a mental self out of delusion.”²⁸² The “mental self” referred to by Vyāsa is simply a *vṛtti*-accumulated sense of being and identity, the result of an afflicted condition or deluding process of selfhood called *asmitā*. Any attempts to claim the power of consciousness by way of identifying *puruṣa* within *prakṛti* amount to no more than reified notions or concepts of self and, from Patañjali’s perspective, are clearly misguided; for the Self, not being an object of experience, can never be seen, can never be turned into a thing or entity to be experienced, can never be “thing-ified.” Yet, to whatever extent the “coverings” or “veils” of *vṛtti*-identification (*sārūpya*) eclipse our identity as *puruṣa*, *puruṣa*’s power as the pure experiencer remains constant, for:

The power of the experiencer (*puruṣa*) does not change. Unmoving it has as it were passed into the changing object, conforming to its function. The assumption of its form of borrowed consciousness by mere resemblance to the mental process, and not distinguished from it, is what is called the [normal] mental process of knowing.²⁸³

In the above, Vyāsa is describing how the immutable *puruṣa*, without essentially undergoing modification, appears to conform to the mental

281 Cf. BG XVIII, 30-32 which discusses three types of understanding (*buddhi*): (1) a discerning *buddhi* that knows what is to be done, etc., and is sattvic; (2) a *buddhi* which understands incorrectly and whose nature is rajasic; and (3) a *buddhi*, whose nature being tamasic, is completely deluded.

282 YB II, 6 (p. 64): *ātmabuddhiṃ mohena*.

283 YB IV, 22 (p. 197): *aparīnāminī hi bhokṛśaktir apratisaṅkramā ca parīnāminy arthe pratisaṅkrānt eva tadvṛttimanupatati. tasyaś ca prāpta caitanyaopagraha svarūpāyā buddhivṛtter anukārimātratayā, buddhivṛttyaviśiṣṭā hi jñānavṛttir ākhyāyate*.

state which has assumed the form of an object or content of consciousness and experiences that object or content through a self-reflexive activity.²⁸⁴ Although the presence of the experiencer and its capacity for “seeing” is an unchanging yet dynamic power of consciousness that should not be truncated in any way, nevertheless our karmically distorted or skewed perceptions vitiate against the natural fullness of “seeing.” By definition the *puruṣa* is not the prakṛtic agent of activity and experience, yet it appears to be; although free from ignorance it appears to possess ignorance; and even though as pure awareness *puruṣa* is said to be transcendent of both the mind and the need to discern itself from the mind (which takes place in the *sattva* of the mind), nevertheless it appears to be dependent upon and illuminated by the mind. Vyāsa further explains (repeating the above analogy of the magnet in n. 277 above) that the qualities of the mind become attributed to *puruṣa* because of the condition of their conjunction or *samyoga*, just as the qualities of the magnet are induced in a piece of iron placed close to it.²⁸⁵ When not properly discerned from *puruṣa*, the mental processes are said to be “the secret cave in which is hidden the eternal *brahman*.”²⁸⁶ Misidentification with the form and nature of *vṛtti* conceals our true identity; removing our misidentification reveals our true identity. Thus, a thorough understanding and insight into the mental processes located in the “secret cave” of the mind may be, in Yoga, the key to revealing the knowledge of our true nature and identity.

One of the central theories in Yoga philosophy that attempts to illuminate our understanding of how cognition and perception function in the mind is that of the theory of the “reflection” of consciousness. The notion of “reflection” (*pratibimba*, *bimba*) is a technical term in the epistemology of Classical Yoga especially as interpreted by Vācaspati Miśra. I will now examine this key notion and see how it correlates with an analogical understanding of consciousness in Yoga. Later I will clarify the analogy of “reflection.” “Reflection” denotes

284 Cf. *YB* IV, 23 (p. 198), where Vyāsa uses the term *pratibimba* for “reflection.”

285 *YB* II, 17 (p. 79): *tadetat drśyam ayaskāntamanikalpam saṁnidhimātropakāri drśyatvena svam bhavati puruṣasya drśirūpasya svāminah.*

286 See *YB* IV, 22 (p. 197); Vyāsa is quoting some authority here. The verse quoted tells us that the secret cave in which *brahman* is hidden is neither the underworld, nor the mountain cave, nor darkness, nor the hidden caverns of the sea. The last stanza ends thus: *guhā yasyām nihitam brahma śāsvataṁ buddhivṛttimaviśiṣṭām kavayo vedayante.*

the “reflection” of the transcendent Self-awareness (*caitanya*) in the most lucid aspect of the mind, namely the *sattva* or *buddhi*, that is, the faculty of decision making and discerning. Vācaspati Miśra (*TV* I, 7²⁸⁷) speaks of the mind as a mirror (*darpaṇa*) in which *puruṣa*’s awareness is reflected. While the *YS* itself makes no direct reference to a theory of “reflection,” Vyāsa mentions the term *pratibimba* twice (*YB* IV, 23) and understands it as the “reflection” of the object in the mind. Vyāsa uses the simile of the reflected image to explain the “tinging” of the mind by the object. Vācaspati, writing several hundred years after Vyāsa, makes a distinction (*TV* II, 17) between *bimba*, or the mirroring of the object in the mind, and *pratibimba*, or the reflection of that content of consciousness back to the Self (*puruṣa*). However, Vācaspati frequently uses both terms interchangeably and the simile of the reflected image “becomes almost a philosophical explanation and is applied chiefly to the imaging of the [*puruṣa*] in the [*buddhi*], while the tinging of the mind by the external things is generally rendered by the expression ‘configuration’ (*ākāra*).”²⁸⁸

The “reflection” theory is also referred to by Vācaspati as the “shadow of transcendent consciousness” (*citi-chāyā*) and seeks to explain how knowledge is possible given the fact that the mind (including the *buddhi* aspect) is an evolute of insentient *prakṛti*. Vācaspati subscribes to the *cicchāyāpattivāda*, which can be described as knowledge taking place due to the reflection of *puruṣa* in the intellect.²⁸⁹ The *buddhi* coupled with the sense of self or *ahaṃkāra* becomes as if an agent of knowledge due to the reflection of *puruṣa* in it. *Puruṣa* seemingly becomes “possessed” of knowledge, pleasure, etc., knowledge taking the form of an object through the intelligized *buddhi*. The result is the apparent identity of the two: *puruṣa* — which comes to be erroneously associated or mixed with experience and knowledge²⁹⁰ — with an empirical agent or sense of self that lays claim to or (mis)appropriates that experience and knowledge.

Reflected consciousness is a borrowed state of consciousness, borrowed as it were from *puruṣa*. Moreover, reflected consciousness

287 *TV* I, 7 (p. 11): *caitanyam eva buddhidarpaṇa ...*

288 G. Koelman (1970: 137).

289 *TV* II, 17 (p. 79): *citicchāyāpattivāda eva buddher buddhipratīsamveditvam udāsīnasyāpi pūṃsah*. See also *TV* IV, 23 (p. 198): *tacchāyāpattivādaḥ puruṣasya vṛttih*. See also for *chāyā*: *TV* II, 20, 21, 23; III, 35 and IV, 22.

290 See n. 283 above on *YB* IV, 22; see also *YB* II, 6 and Vācaspati’s *STK* 5.

becomes the locus of selfhood as an empirical identity. It is simultaneously: (1) not real, because it is merely a “reflected” state, of extrinsic value, and in spite of it being derived from the sustaining power and presence of the unchanging transcendent spirit, appears to reduce *puruṣa* to phenomenal existence; and yet, can be said to be (2) real, because it is actually experienced as human awareness although it is understood that, for all but enlightened persons, this state of reflected consciousness constitutes a more or less confused or deluded and dissatisfying sense of self-identity. In Patañjali’s central definition of Yoga (YS I, 2 states: *yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ*), *cittavṛtti* can refer to an analogical understanding of consciousness in that the consciousness reflecting in the mind, and functioning in the form of the modifications of the mind (*cittavṛtti*), is analogous to the consciousness of *puruṣa*. As Patañjali later establishes (YS IV, 19), *cittavṛtti* has no self-luminosity because of its nature being that of the “seeable.” Yet *puruṣa* (as if) becomes like the mind, as the locus of the congenital conflation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. *Samyoga*, the cause of suffering or dissatisfaction, is a false “union” of sorts and refers to the pure Self as if becoming something other than itself. *Samyoga* is the state of the mistaken identity of *puruṣa* with the *vṛtti*-mechanism; and the misperceived identity of Self with the psychophysical being or ego in *samyoga* is merely a construct of the mind, a product of *vṛtti* and *saṃskāra*, which, unlike *puruṣa*, is not the real “center,” “core” or spiritual “essence” of being. The above analogy is alluded to in YS II, 20 where Patañjali describes the nature of the seer as follows: “The seer is seeing only; though pure, it appears in the form of a cognition (idea, apprehension).”²⁹¹ Vyāsa explains:

“Seeing only” means the power of the seer alone, untouched by any qualification. This *puruṣa* is the witness of the mind. It is not like the mind, and not absolutely unlike it. To some extent it is not like the mind. In what way? Because mind is changeable in that an object is [sometimes] known to it and [sometimes] unknown. Its object, whether [for example] a cow or a jar, is known to it and also unknown, which shows its changeability. But the fact that the object of *puruṣa* is always known shows clearly the unchange-ability of *puruṣa*. Why so? Because mind, which is by definition the object of

291 YS II, 20 (p. 87): *draṣṭā dr̥ṣimātraḥ śuddho 'pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ*. For more on the meaning of *cittavṛtti*, see Whicher (1997).

puruṣa, could not be [sometimes] known and [sometimes] unknown to it; hence the unchangeability of *puruṣa* is established in that its object is always known to it.²⁹²

However, *puruṣa* is not absolutely unlike the mind, “Because though pure, it [*puruṣa*] appears in the form of a cognition (i.e., is intentional in the form of an idea, mental construct, apprehension). Looking on, it appears as if it were of the mind’s nature, though it is not.”²⁹³ *Puruṣa*’s intrinsic, unchanging nature as the pure seer has an innate capacity to witness the thoughts, ideas and apprehensions in the mind without any binding identification with or misappropriation of them, i.e., *puruṣa* is the unaffected seer, not enslaved to the “things” of the mind. However, due to ignorance *puruṣa* appears to take on an extrinsic, changing nature of selfhood characterized by a binding identification with the mind: *puruṣa* appears to waver from its unchanging nature. There are, it seems, two very distinct possibilities resulting from the transcendent connection (*saṃbandha*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*: (1) Due to epistemological distortion *puruṣa* is mistaken for *prakṛti* in *saṃyoga*; the reflected consciousness of the mind takes on a confused, deluded nature in the process of *vyutthāna*. (2) Through Yoga self-identity is established in its ever-free, ever-pure nature as *puruṣa*, the reflected consciousness of mind having come into or taken on the enlightened disposition of knowledge (*jñāna*, *YS* II, 28) in the process of *nirodha*. Patañjali does not go into a metaphysical explanation of the beginningless connection between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. His emphasis is on epistemological and psychological concerns relating to consciousness in the system.

The mind’s changing nature consists of the three *guṇas* which, tending to illumination, activity, and inertia (stasis), are said to produce ideas of basically three kinds: peaceful (*śānta*), violent (*ghora*) and deluded (*mūḍha*).²⁹⁴ Each *guṇa*, when predominant in operation and

²⁹² *YB* II, 20 (pp. 87-88): *dr̥ṣimātra itī dr̥k̥saktir eva viśeṣaṇāparāmr̥ṣṭety arthaḥ. sa puruṣo buddheḥ pratisamvedī. sa buddheḥ na sarūpo nātyantaṃ virūpa itī. na tāvat sarūpaḥ. kasmāt. jñātājñāta viśaya tvāt pariṇāminī hi buddhiḥ. tasyaś ca viśayo gavādirghaṭādirvā jñātaś cājñātaś ceti pariṇāmitvaṃ darśayati. sadājñāta viśayatvaṃ tu puruṣasyāpariṇāmitvaṃ paridīpayati. kasmāt. nahi buddhiś ca nāma puruṣaviśayaś ca syād agrhītā grhītā ceti siddham puruṣasya sadājñātaviśayatvaṃ tataś cāpariṇāmitvaṃ itī. See also *SK* I7 for the proofs establishing *puruṣa*.*

²⁹³ *YB* II, 20 (p. 88-89): *śuddho ’py asau pratyayānupaśyo yataḥ. pratyayam bauddham anupaśyati, tamanupaśyan na tadātmā’ pi tadātmaka iva pratyavabhāṣate.*

²⁹⁴ *YB* II, 15 (p. 77): *śāntaṃ ghoram̐ mūḍham̐ vā pratyayam̐ triguṇam̐ evā’rabhante.*

manifesting as an apprehension (*pratyaya*), cognition or idea, clashes with the predominance of the others; but when unmanifest, they cooperate with the predominant one.²⁹⁵ Thus, the three *guṇas* "... come to form ideas of happiness, dissatisfaction and delusion respectively, through the support of the other two, each one having the form of all. However, the distinction is made between them according to which *guṇa* is then in the principal place. The seed (*bīja*) which produces this great mass of suffering is ignorance."²⁹⁶ The idea of happiness (*sukha*) is formed in the *sattva* through the support of *rajas* and *tamas*; in the state of *rajas* is formed the idea of dissatisfaction or frustration through the support of *sattva* and *tamas*; *tamas* comes to its deluded ideas through the support of *sattva* and *rajas*. The various human dispositions will depend on whichever *guṇa* is predominant, the other two being subsidiary and subservient. *Śānta* (peaceful), *ghora* (violent), and *mūḍha* (deluded) are the three major personality dispositions, depending on the "weight" being accorded to each *guṇa* and the quality of the intentions, inclinations, thoughts, words, and acts of each person. Any appearance of these attributes "in" *puruṣa* is a temporary condition of appearance (*aupādhika*) arising from a super-imposed condition (*upādhi*).²⁹⁷

Vācaspati takes recourse to the analogical theory of reflection in order to elucidate the nature of empirical experience illustrating it by the similes of the crystal and the moon. Using the analogy of a crystal and a hibiscus flower, Vācaspati explains that on account of the conjunction of the seer with the mind, we ascribe our mental states to the *puruṣa* by reflecting, "I am peaceful," "I am violent," "I am deluded." The pure consciousness of *puruṣa*, understood analogically as empirical selfhood, takes the function of the mind as its own just as there is redness reflecting in the clear crystal due to the proximity of

295 YB II, 18 and II, 15.

296 YB II, 15 (p. 77): *evam ete guṇā itaretarāśrayeṇoparjita sukhaduḥkhamoha pratyayāḥ sarve sarvarūpā bhavanti, guṇapradhānabhāvākṛtas tveṣāṃ viśeṣa iti ... tadasya mahato duḥkha samudāyasya prabhavabījam avidyā.*

297 TV I, 3 (p. 7). It is interesting to note that the terms *upādhi* and *aupādhika* are not strictly from the early Yoga philosophical system. They have been borrowed by Vācaspati Miśra without reserve from the Vedānta doctrinal system, thus creating a syncretic terminology. This by no means changes the Yoga doctrine itself, but only emphasizes grounds that are, according to Vācaspati, shared by both Vedānta and Yoga.

the hibiscus flower.²⁹⁸ It is like a man thinking his face is dirty when looking into an unclean mirror.²⁹⁹ Vācaspati takes as another example the reflection of the moon in the water. The reflected form of the moon in the water appears as a shining object. Similarly, the intellect (*buddhi*) acts as an agent of cognition with the “light” of pure consciousness reflected in it. The movement of the water around the reflected light of the moon is superimposed upon the moon. Just as the full moon, although “stationary” and round, appears to be moving and ruffled without any activity on its part due to its reflection in the clear water, so *puruṣa*, without any activity or attachment on its part, appears to possess activity or attachment on account of its reflection in the mind.³⁰⁰ In this way, *puruṣa* is erroneously understood to be the locus of the functions of the *buddhi*. The transcendent *puruṣa*, however, is only indirectly related to the process of knowledge as an onlooker or witness and does not experience or know as would the prakṛtic agent in the process of experience. Vyāsa consistently describes the locus of knowledge as *puruṣa*, since the intellect (*buddhi*) or mind is the property of *puruṣa* (see, for example, n. 277 above). In the *cicchāyāpatti* theory adopted by Vācaspati, the locus of knowledge is shifted to the intellect. Vācaspati makes it very clear that there is knowledge only because of the reflection of *puruṣa* in the mind (*citta*), and the empirical consciousness (*cittavṛtti*) is not an object of *puruṣa* as in the empirical or phenomenal subject-object relation.³⁰¹

We can say that the *sattva* aspect of the mind contains a reflection of *puruṣa* that, under the influence of ignorance, then yields the illusions, misconceptions, or errors (*viparyaya*) of the empirical consciousness (*cittavṛtti*). As Vyāsa implies, the empirical consciousness, wrongly understood as constituting intrinsic selfhood, is *viparyaya*. Vyāsa is thus describing the mechanisms of the *guṇas* in the context of an analogical theory of consciousness, i.e., as applied to thought-

298 TV I, 4 (pp. 7-8): *itaratra vyutthāne yās cittavṛttayah śāntaghoramūdhās tā evāviśiṣṭā abhinnā vṛttayo yasya puruṣasya sa tathoktah. ... japākusumasphaṭikayor iva buddhipuruṣayoh samnidhānād abhedagrahe buddhivṛttiḥ puruṣe samāropya ...*

299 Ibid. (p. 8): *yathā maline darpaṇatale pratibimbitaṃ mukhaṃ malinamāropya śocatyā-tmānaṃ malino 'smīti.*

300 TV IV, 22 (p. 198); see also TV III, 35.

301 TV III, 35 (p. 155): *buddheś caitanyabimbodgrāhena caitanyasya śāntādyākārādhyāropah. TV IV, 23 (p. 198): tasmāc cittapratibimbatayā caitanyagocarā' pi cittavṛttir na caitanyāgocareti.*

constructs, ideas or relative states of self-understanding and their different levels or degrees of confused or deluded identity resulting in reified notions of self/personality and as appropriating action. In this regard, the *guṇas* are modifications of consciousness of the mind and are governed by ignorance; they come to form ideas or concepts of reality based on the fundamental error of mistaking *puruṣa* for what amounts to being an afflicted sense of self-identity (*asmitā*) that permeates human consciousness. In other words, the *guṇas* are being understood with an epistemological (and moral) emphasis, the various combinations of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* forming ideas pertaining to a deluded (in which *tamas* is predominant), violent/ aggressive (in which *rajas* is predominant), or happy (in which *sattva* is predominant) nature. The predominance of *sattva* signifies more illuminated degrees of self-understanding which more “closely” resemble or are analogous to the true nature of *puruṣa*. Unlike Classical Sāṃkhya, in Yoga the *guṇas* do not appear to be given an ontological emphasis (i.e., as relating to categories of existence). We see, therefore, that in Yoga our psychosomatic organism involving thoughts, ideas, relationship, etc., is primarily an integral part of the prakṛtic world as consciousness, albeit a reflected and changing consciousness. The *guṇas* therefore apply to the world of phenomenal consciousness and (self-) understanding as much as to the world of things or categories of existence.

While Vijñāna Bhikṣu agrees with Vācaspati that the presentation of the object of cognition to an unchanging Self is not possible except in the form of a reflection, he states that cognition arises through the reflection in the spiritual Self of the mental state that has assumed the form of the object. Bhikṣu speaks of a “mutual reflection” (*anyonya-pratibimba*)³⁰² and offers a different hypothesis called the “double reflection theory” (*bimbapratibimbavāda*).³⁰³ He maintains that not only does the *puruṣa* reflect in *buddhi* (as in Vācaspati’s theory), but a second reflection of *buddhi* into *puruṣa* takes place. Having the reflection of both the *puruṣa* and the object, the *buddhi* is then reflected “into” *puruṣa*. Bhikṣu states: “This conformity with the

302 *SPB* I, 199.

303 See T.S. Rukmani (1988), “Vijñānabhikṣu’s Double Reflection Theory of Knowledge in the Yoga System,” *JIP*, 16: 370.

objects is in the intellect in the form of an alteration ... and is also 'in' the *puruṣa* in the form of a reflection."³⁰⁴

According to Bhikṣu, the first reflection intelligizes the content of the mind (*buddhi*) and the second reflection makes *puruṣa* the agent of the particular knowledge.³⁰⁵ Bhikṣu brushes aside the objection — that this would make *puruṣa* subject to change — by arguing that a reflection is merely an appearance of change, as in the case with the reflection of the red flower reflected in a crystal, and is not a substantial change.³⁰⁶ He justifies his "double reflection" as the correct view and points to the mutual reflection of each in the other as expressed in the *SK* (20) by the use of the two "iva-s." In the *SK* (20), Īśvara Kṛṣṇa states that through the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, the nonconscious intellect appears *as if* it is conscious, and in the same way the *puruṣa* appears *as if* it is the performer of action. Vācaspati Mīśra's interpretation is perhaps "cleaner" in the sense that all transactions of experience occur only in the intellect after it has been "intelligized" by *puruṣa*. Vijñāna Bhikṣu's interpretation has the merit of ascribing experience to *puruṣa* (because the contents of intellect-awareness are reflected back on *puruṣa*).³⁰⁷

Bhikṣu's hypothesis, if understood literally, makes *puruṣa* changeable and subject to development or alteration (*pariṇāma-rūpa*) through the proximity or influence of psychophysical factors (including satisfaction, suffering, confusion, knowledge, etc.) or limited adjuncts (*upādhi*) outside of itself. This goes against the tenets of Yoga philosophy and destroys the very foundation of the doctrine of the eternal purity of *puruṣa*. Probably Bhikṣu hoped to avert a literal interpretation of his theory by citing the analogy of the crystal and using phrases like "semblance of mutability" and "*as if puruṣa* were undergoing a change, but in reality remaining unchanged like the crystal." Of course, Bhikṣu can be understood to be speaking

³⁰⁴ *YV* I, 4 (p. 48): *sā cārthākāratā buddhau pariṇāmarūpā ... puruṣe ca pratibimbarūpā.*

³⁰⁵ *YV* I, 4 (p. 50): *yathā ca citi buddheḥ pratibimbam evaṃ buddhāv api citpratibimbam svīkāryam anyathā caitanyasya bhānānupapatteḥ; svayaṃ sāksātsvadarśane karmakartṛ virodhena buddhyāruḍhatayaivātmano ghatādivajjñeyatvābhyupāgamāt.*

³⁰⁶ *YV* I, 4 (p. 45): *yady api puruṣas cinmātro 'vikāri tathā' pi buddher viśayākāravṛttinām puruṣe yāni pratibimbāni tāny eva puruṣasya vṛttayah, na ca tabhir avastubhūtābhiḥ pariṇāmitvam sphaṭikasy evātattvato 'nyathābhāvād.*

³⁰⁷ The two divergent views of Vācaspati and Vijñāna Bhikṣu regarding the nature of experience by *puruṣa* are discussed further in *TV* IV, 22 and *YV* IV, 22 respectively.

analogically: The reflection of a red flower in a crystal does not mean to imply a change in the crystal nor in the substance of the crystal; rather, any change occurs merely in the (distorted?) “eye of the beholder” of the crystal.

As a result of the process of reflection, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* appear as if united. They “appear” “one” in *saṃyoga* (YS II, 17 and 23) as congenitally conflated realms even though they are distinct. One is not converted into the other though their proximity causes them to seem as one. How is it possible that the formless *puruṣa* reflects in the *citta*, which, though composed of the “material” of *prakṛti*, is so subtle as to appear formless? The analogy of reflection needs to be clarified. It does not mean an *actual* reflection like that of the sun into a pool of water. In ordinary perception, the reflection can be seen as being twofold: (1) through the proximity of *puruṣa* some natural change or alteration occurs in the mind enabling it to cognize; and (2) a certain other modification occurs in the mind upon the proximity of an object or content whereby the mind takes on the very form of the object or content perceived. That change is called a *vṛtti*.

Vṛtti serves the purpose of causing a connection between the mind and the object or content of perception.³⁰⁸ *Vṛtti* gives to the mind a power of knowledge, a “consciousness-of” objects, content, persons, and so on. *Vṛtti* is meant to “ooze out” the knowledge of any object or experience, but its function is not to provide a direct realization or identification as *puruṣa*, for as the true “subject” or experiencer *puruṣa* can never be the object of any experience, can never be known or experienced as can *prakṛti* and her manifestations.³⁰⁹ The active agent in the process of the rise of knowledge is *citta* — the locus of the affliction *asmitā*, the false I-am-ness. The role of *puruṣa*, insofar as *puruṣa* is concealed throughout this process of masquerading consciousness, is said to be that of a passive witness through its mere presence. Thus Yoga emphasizes practices that can help to disclose the presence of *puruṣa* through the *sattva* of the mind. The immutability (YS IV, 18) and unaffected nature of *puruṣa* is retained throughout the modifications occurring in the mind regardless of any misidentification taking place.

³⁰⁸ See n. 202 above.

³⁰⁹ See n. 334 below.

The crux of the problem of *puruṣa*'s appearance of changeability lies in the explanation of the *citta-puruṣa* relation. I suggest the following summary as a clarification of Patañjali's position on this matter. It is against the intent of Patañjali to consider *puruṣa*'s intrinsic nature, pure immutable consciousness, as though impure, changeable and therefore subject to suffering/dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*). It is not *as though puruṣa* mimics the *vr̥ttis* of the *citta* and exclaims "I am impure." *Puruṣa*'s luminosity must remain constant and unaffected. It is the *citta* (and its modes) that, after having been activated by the luminous presence of *puruṣa* and under the grip of ignorance, masquerades as *puruṣa* as if to say, "I am spirit. Though I am pure, I appear as impure. Though not subject to pain and suffering, I appear to suffer." In other words, the locus of misidentification (*sārūpya*) is within the mind.

All the repetitions of the particle *iva* ("as if," "as though") and similar words and phrases employed by the commentators do not literally apply to *puruṣa*. They apply to the afflicted I-am-ness (*asmitā*) — the affliction of egoity being the true explanation of *sārūpya* (YS I, 4). It is in the *sūtra* defining *asmitā* that Patañjali uses the word *iva*: "as if" the two principles — the power of the seer and that of the mind — had assumed an identity appearing as a single self. Any superimposition (*adhyāropa*) goes only this far and does not literally extend to include *puruṣa*. Any assumption of false identity (*abhimāna*) is an act of the ego-consciousness or egoity (*asmitā*), the state of misidentification or mistaken identity (*cittavr̥tti*), and to attribute this extrinsic form of self-identity to *puruṣa* is contrary to the understanding of authentic identity in Yoga philosophy.

A CLOSER LOOK AT "PERCEPTION" IN THE *YOGA-SŪTRAS*

Both Classical Sāṃkhya and Patañjali's Yoga accept three means of knowledge or categories of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*): perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and valid testimony (*āgama*).³¹⁰ Because the mind (*citta*) is constituted of the three *guṇas*, all of its operations such as the processes of logic, modifications (*vr̥tti*) such as valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), and acceptance or rejection of a postulate or a conclusion do not in themselves possess consciousness.

³¹⁰ YS I, 7; see n. 141 above.

Being insentient or nonconscious (*jada*, *acetana*), it is only through the presence of *puruṣa* that the mind and its processes can function and are intelligized.³¹¹

A *pramāṇa* is an instrument, means, or method for reaching a valid apprehension (*pramā*) of a state, condition, fact, object, or principle (*tattva*) previously not obtained.³¹² Vyāsa states that following from the act of perception (*pratyakṣa*) — of internal and external objects, there results (i.e., in *saṃyoga*) an apprehension by *puruṣa* of the *vr̥tti* of perception and not distinguished from it.³¹³ *Puruṣa* appears to become identical with the *vr̥ttis* of the mind. In *YS* IV, 17 Patañjali states: “An object is known or not known due to the requisite colouration of the mind by that [object].”³¹⁴ What is this ordinary act of perception? Vyāsa informs us that:

The mind is coloured (*uparāga*) by an external object through the channels of the senses. With that as its object, a modification (*vr̥tti*) is produced in the mind; this *vr̥tti* is the valid cognition called perception. It takes as its “field” the determination mainly of the particular nature of the object, which has, however, the nature of the universal. The result is an apprehension by *puruṣa* of the mental process, not distinguishable from it.³¹⁵

An external object (*vastu*) is a requisite in perception so that the type of apprehension that occurs in the *vr̥tti* of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) may be excluded. The senses must consistently confirm the reality of the object. Such “proof” contradicts any “perception” of lesser validity (i.e., invalid cognition) and would prove the latter to be an error (*viparyaya*).

We can assume that when one person is attracted to another person, or the mind is drawn toward the experience of an object, the same process of “colouring” (*uparāga*) or “influencing” takes place with the qualities of the person or object reflecting in the mind. In the case of

311 *YS* IV, 22-23.

312 See Monier-Williams (1899: 685).

313 *YB* I, 7; see n. 315 below for text.

314 *YS* IV, 17 (p. 193): *taduparāgāpekṣitvāccittasya vastu jñātājñātam*.

315 *YB* I, 7 (p. 11): *indriyapraṇālikayā cittasya bāhyavastūparāgāt tadviṣayā sāmānyaviśeṣātmano'rthasya viśeṣāvadhāraṇa pradhānā vr̥tīḥ pratyakṣam pramāṇam. phalam aviśiṣṭaḥ pauruṣeyaś cittavrttibodhaḥ*.

pratyakṣa, the qualities of the object of experience pass through the channels of the senses. We can also assume that Vyāsa's phrase *tad-
viśaya* (see n. 315 above): "With that as its object," refers to the entire process of colouring the mind in this way, with the mind taking on the form of the *vṛtti* that is being produced. If it were only a mental perception without contact through the senses, the realist philosophers of Sāṃkhya and Yoga would not classify it as a valid perception (of the ordinary *pratyakṣa* type). When the mind is presented certain information by the senses, a modification occurs in the mind whose object is the sense data. A doubt may arise regarding the actual properties of an object, particularly in the case of an object that also shares certain of its properties with other objects. The determinative process (*avadhāraṇa*) helps the mind to eliminate general shared properties so that it focuses on the specific. For example, one can take the question, "Is that a person or a post?" In this question the general shared properties of the person and the post (e.g., tallness, thinness) are eliminated, and by focusing on the specific properties, one determines the visible object to be either a person or a post. This *vṛtti*, which chiefly determines the specifics, is a valid cognition called direct perception.³¹⁶ A perception is made possible because the origin of the awareness is *puruṣa*. Through its very presence as the witness or knower of the process of apprehension,³¹⁷ *puruṣa* gives to the mind its capacity to perceive. *Puruṣa*'s presence makes possible our processes of perception, which consist of the following: The "light" of *puruṣa* reflects in the pure *sattva* of the mind and enables the mind to perceive objects and experience sensations, and so on. The mind thereby perceives these objects as they also reflect into it. The reflection of *puruṣa* and that of the objects mingle in the mind generating *vṛttis* (perceptions) and the mind in turn can reflect on these perceptions. In ordinary perception the mind does not distinguish between its experience of the object from the external world and the awareness generated by *puruṣa*. A person's mental processes are mistaken as being processes within and of *puruṣa*: the objects, the experience, the *vṛtti*, the mind, and *puruṣa* all being conceived to be as if identical.³¹⁸

³¹⁶ See Arya (1986: 150).

³¹⁷ *YB I*, 7 (p. 11): *pratisamvedī puruṣa* ...

³¹⁸ This is the explanation offered by Vācaspati Miśra and H. Aranya on *YB I*, 7.

The above realism presents a problem because within the major schools of Indian philosophy “yogic perception” (*yogi-pratyakṣa*, see below) is often considered to be the supremely valid type of perception. The ordinary person’s perception definitely requires the presence of external objects and the mind’s contact with them through the functioning of the senses. But does Patañjali intend to include the process of *yogi-pratyakṣa* under *YS I,7*? Even a cursory reading of Vyāsa’s words leads us to understand that *yogi-pratyakṣa* is not meant to be included here. The finer perceptions of the *yogin* are in fact described by Patañjali elsewhere.³¹⁹

Yogi-pratyakṣa is another term for direct apprehension (*sākṣāt-kāra*³²⁰) which involves the *yogin*’s conscious identification with an object. This is the basis of the practice of “unification” (*samāpatti*), and constraint (*śamya*) through which various yogic powers (*siddhi*) can be acquired (e.g. the *yogin*’s perception of past lives, *YS III,18*). If we take our cue from *YS IV,17* (see n. 314 above), it appears that Vyāsa’s use of the phrase *upa-rāga* (“colouring”) is for the purpose of stating the cause and process of the *vyrttis* produced in the mind from merely external sources. The above description of perception should not be taken as part of the definition of yogic perception, otherwise, as Vijñāna Bhikṣu points out, the realization of the Self and *īśvara* could not occur,³²¹ not being a product of, and not having been induced through the contact between external objects and the senses. Nevertheless, Bhikṣu³²² and others (such as Vācaspati and Rāmānanda Yati) have attempted to classify *yogi-pratyakṣa* here (*YS I,7*) as a type of direct perception.³²³ This seems to be in conformity with and supported by the *YS* philosophy in general. It should be noted that ordinary cognition or perception is subject to distortion due to various

³¹⁹ See, for example, *YS III:17-19, 25-29, 33-36, 43, 49, 52, and 54*. An example of *yogi-pratyakṣa* is the *yogin*’s effecting the perception of *samskāras* whereby knowledge of previous births is attained (*YS III, 18*). Another example of yogic perception is the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyaṭi*) that mind-*sattva* and *puruṣa* are different, as we are told in *YS III, 49* (see n. 125 above).

³²⁰ See *TV I, 7* and *YV I, 7*.

³²¹ See *YV I, 7* (p. 61).

³²² *Ibid.*

³²³ In *TV I, 7* Vācaspati sees the definition of *pratyakṣa* in *YB I, 7* as a “pointer” to the implicit and more complete idea of direct realization (*sākṣāt-kāra*). Rāmānanda Yati understands *yogi-pratyakṣa* as taking place in *samādhi*. When the mind is clear and no longer dependent on external objects, there appears a clear reflection of pure consciousness.

karmic factors in the mind (that is, *saṃskāras* and *vāsanās*) that affect or colour how we perceive and appropriate the objects we encounter, as is implied in *YS IV*, 17 (see n. 314 above). Whether classified as being ordinary or yogic, perception is made possible because the origin or root-consciousness is *puruṣa* by which the mind obtains its capacity to perceive³²⁴ and identify with the objects or content of experience.

Patañjali and Vyāsa acknowledge the superiority of perception over inference and valid testimony. Why? Both inference and testimony are concerned only with the general qualities (*sāmānya*) of an object and not with its particularities (*viśeṣa*). Words themselves are incapable of producing knowledge of particulars. Although the generic qualities of an object are also brought to consciousness in perception, still the special “field” of the latter is the ascertainment of particularities. Thus perception is seen to carry with it more conviction than knowledge derived from inference and testimony. Moreover, according to Yoga, the authority and efficacy of *anumāna* (inference) and *āgama* (reliable authority, i.e., *śruta*) is ultimately transcended in higher perception. As Patañjali makes clear in *YS I*, 49: “The condition of that insight [which is Truth-bearing, *ṛtaṃbharā*] is of a particular purpose, and is different from the insight gained by tradition or from inference.”³²⁵ Direct perception gives knowledge of anything particular, but the yogic perception of “truth-bearing insight”³²⁶ that arises in *samādhi* is entirely different in scope from that of heard (cf. *BG II*, 52-53) or inferred knowledge as well as sensory perception in the ordinary world. Vyāsa writes:

Scriptural authority and the teaching received orally are the same as the knowledge within the category of valid testimony (*āgama*). The area is generalities. Valid testimony cannot communicate the particular. Why not? Because the particular does not have the conventional association with a word. Inference too has only universals for its object. Furthermore, inference leads to a conclusion through a generality ... Ordinary perception gives no knowledge at all of some subtle, remote or hidden object, but we should not think that the latter is not demonstrable and has no existence.

³²⁴ See *YS IV*, 22-23 and *YB IV*, 22-23.

³²⁵ *YS I*, 49 (p. 52): *śrutānumānaprajñābhyām anyaviṣayā viśeṣārthatvāt*.

³²⁶ *YS I*, 48 (p. 51): *ṛtaṃbharā tatra prajñā*.

A particular relating to subtle elements or to *puruṣa* is only perceptible through the insight [attained in] *samādhi* alone.³²⁷

Ordinary valid cognition as understood in the *YS* is therefore a sort of knowing wholly different from yogic “insight” (*prajñā*). In its conventional usage, valid cognition is knowledge *about* reality (*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*). Insight (*prajñā*) is direct yogic perception (*sākṣātkāra*), and its purpose is to enable knowledge of *puruṣa*.³²⁸ It may be concluded therefore that ordinary perception, inference, and valid testimony (authority) can produce correct knowledge *about* reality. But in Patañjali’s system the above means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) are merely instruments of conventional understanding, rational knowing, or even metaphysical knowledge, all of which can function as a buffer separating one from insight-by-direct-experience. Ordinary valid cognition is a mediated knowledge of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*; yogic insight or *prajñā* (attained in *samādhi*) is immediate.

Pedagogically, it may well have been the case that Patañjali initiated disciples into yogic disciplines that, although including reasoned investigation (*tarka*) or discursive thought (*vitarka*, *YS* II, 33-34), transcended the limitations of reasoning and discursive thinking.³²⁹ Moreover, whereas the valid cognition of *YS* I, 7 has the limited capacity to bring about intellectual conviction, yogic “insight” (*prajñā*) has the power to effect spiritual emancipation (*apavarga*). Both levels of perception (*pratyakṣa*) are communicated in a pedagogical context in the service of soteriology. Therefore, the mind — the vehicle of perception — performs a crucial role in Patañjali’s soteriological methodology. When, from textual sources such as scripture and the teachings of spiritual preceptors or *gurus*, as well as exercising our own processes of rational analysis and understanding, we have learned of and contemplated upon the culminating state of liberation in Yoga,

327 *YB* I, 49 (pp. 52-53): *śrutamāgamavijñānam tatsāmānyaviṣayam. na hy āgamena śakyo viśeṣo 'bhīdhātum, kasmāt, na hi viśeṣeṇa kṛtasamketah śabda iti. tathā'numānam sāmānyaviṣayam eva. ... anumānena ca sāmānyenopasaṃhārah. tasmāc chrutānumānaviśayo na viśeṣah kaścid astīti. na cāsya sūksmavyavahitaviprakṣṭasya vastuno lokapratyakṣeṇa grahaṇam asti. na cāsya viśeṣasyāpramāṇakasyābhāvo 'stīti samādhiprajñā nirgrāhya eva sa viśeṣo bhavati bhūtasūksmagato vā puruṣagato vā.*

328 *YS* III, 35; see n. 333 below.

329 As, for example, in the processes leading up to *savitarka-samāpatti* (*YS* I, 42) and culminating in *nirvitarka-samāpatti* (*YS* I, 43).

there nonetheless can linger doubts (*saṃśaya*, *YS I*, 30) about any existence subtler than that of the obvious world we “see” and “know,” a world comprising the “things” of our daily perceptual experience. Perception, as defined in *YS I*, 7 and the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* (I, 7), therefore needs to be extended and expanded to include the direct experience of the subtler aspects (*sūkṣma*) of *prakṛti* through *yogi-pratyakṣa*. Having attained yogic insight directly through the vehicle of one’s body and mind, the experience reinforces the faith (*śraddha*, *YS I*, 20) that what one had previously arrived at through inference, and based upon what teachers and texts have propounded, is true. Such perception strengthens one’s resolve to proceed to the subtler “invisible” reality and seek that identity (i.e., *puruṣa*), which one has not yet “experienced” and which alone can result in a state of freedom and lasting satisfaction. In Yoga epistemology, reality is accurately “seen” only by the seer “who” alone can “see” without any epistemic distortion caused by ignorance (*avidyā*) and the intervention of egoic states or egoity (*asmitā*).

The mind can be understood as having a twofold faculty of perception. On the one hand, there is an “outward facing” capacity of the *citta*, which, directed towards the object of perception, functions in a rational and conceptual mode and issues in a reflective cognition and discerning power of the intellect (equivalent to *adhyavasāya* in the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*: *SK* 23). On the other hand, the mind has an “inward facing” capacity “toward” *puruṣa* where it is temporarily disengaged from the external world of things and objects of the senses, and can function as a vehicle for the liberating knowledge of discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyāti*). Perception of the ordinary kind (*pratyakṣa*) as studied in *YS I*, 7 functions by way of the “outward facing” power of the mind to perceive objects through the senses. Yogic perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) takes place through the “inward facing” power of the mind. The volitions of reasoned investigation (*pramāṇa*) and the higher knowledge called “insight” (*prajñā*) arise in the mind and both are types of mental content presented to *puruṣa* for its viewing. However, it is yogic perception that eventually leads to the mind’s total purification, sattvification, and liberation. Yogic perception — liberating insight — is soteriologically the most efficacious means in Yoga. At no time is the former lower level of perception to be confused with yogic perception and the discriminative discernment (between *puruṣa* and the mind or *prakṛti*) that occurs in the higher

stages of *samādhi* and culminates in the realization of *puruṣa*. Rather, perception in its “outer facing” mode is initially to be understood in the context of the apparent identity of the mind and *puruṣa* wherein extrinsic selfhood in the situation or mode of “emergence” (*vyutthāna*) is mistaken for *puruṣa*, intrinsic identity.

Patañjali explains the mind’s epistemological limitations. *YS* IV, 20 tells us that the mind (i.e., *vṛtti*) and the “object” cannot in one circumstance (i.e., simultaneously) be clearly ascertained.³³¹ The mind cannot ascertain itself and the “object” at the same time; the mind’s function is to cognize objects while its processes are witnessed by the self-luminous *puruṣa*. Also, if one mind were to know another mind, this would result in an unending series of minds each perceived by another. This infinite regress or overextending of the intellect from the intellect (from one cognition to another) would result in a confusion of memory.³³²

Unlike empirical selfhood, which is part of the “seeable” (*dr̥śya*), *puruṣa* can never be made an object, nor can *puruṣa* be realized through the ordinary processes (*vṛttis*) of valid cognition (*YS* I, 6). Patañjali tells us (*YS* IV, 18) that *puruṣa* is transcendent of the object-oriented realm of the “seeable” as the knower or witness of the content and intentions of the empirical consciousness or mind. In *YS* III, 35, however, it *appears* that *puruṣa* can be made an object of knowledge. Patañjali states: “Since it is for the purpose of the other [*puruṣa*], experience is [based on] the idea that there is no distinction between the *puruṣa* and the *sattva*, though they are absolutely unmixed; from *saṃyama* (constraint) on the purpose being for itself (serving its own purpose), there arises knowledge of *puruṣa*.”³³³ Vyāsa surmises that *puruṣa* cannot be known in the ordinary way and cannot be made an object of constraint (*saṃyama*): “It is not that *puruṣa* is known through the *sattva*-intellect which has the idea of *puruṣa*. It is *puruṣa* that sees the idea supported by its own self (*ātman*). Thus it is said [*BĀ Up* IV.

330 Cf. *YS* I, 21-22.

331 *YS* IV, 20 (p. 195): *ekasamaye cobhayānavadhāraṇam*.

332 *YS* IV, 21; see n. 40 above.

333 *YS* III, 35 (p. 154): *sattvapuruṣayor atyantāsaṃkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ parārthatvāt svārthasaṃyamāt puruṣajñānam*.

5, 15): 'By what indeed would one know the knower?' ”³³⁴ Why is it that *puruṣa* cannot be known or seen in the ordinary way? It is not that all distinctions necessarily collapse in some Absolute realm; rather, it is that as pure experiencer and knower, *puruṣa* can never be made an object of experience and knowledge. *Vṛttis* and *puruṣa*'s awareness of them are two separate factors. The final goal is not one of knowledge as a mental state or activity, nor could it be a subjective state of being. In Yoga one cannot “find” true identity for *puruṣa* is not an entity or object to be found, i.e., “there is no one there to find; the witness cannot be witnessed.”³³⁵

Puruṣa as pure “subject” is both transcendent and immanent, uninvolved yet present and necessary to ordinary experience. The reality of *prakṛti* (and hence of *citta* and *vṛtti*) is not denied. However, what are normally held to be real independently existing “things” (*vastu*) or categories of existence (*tattvas*, as in Sāṃkhya) are seen in Yoga to be linked to the perceptual processes of the mind and as appropriated by empirical selfhood. The “world” thus experienced becomes an egoically referenced reality based on reified notions or ideas (*pratyaya*) of self and world that, having formed as sediment in the mind, limit human identity within the confines of a distorted way of “seeing” (i.e., a “failure-to-see”) and “relating” to the world (i.e., how the sense-of-I relates to the “things” of the world). Psychologically, in such a fractured or fragmented state of selfhood (*cittavṛtti*), the network of impressions (*samskāras*), habit patterns (*vāsanās*) and *vṛtti*-identifications continues to sustain and reinforce a predominantly afflicted human nature. The power of consciousness potentially present to all is forgotten and concealed within this framework or “wheel” (or “whirl”) of misidentification and spiritual ignorance. Life is experienced through a repetitive or seemingly unending generation of habit patterns (*vāsanās*) rooted in dissatisfaction and affliction. Yet mistaken identity and its self-centered misappropriation of the world can, according to Yoga, be ended.

We have seen that cognition and knowledge play a crucial role in Patañjali's system, and are structured and function in the mind due to a reflection (understood analogically) of the presence of *puruṣa*.

³³⁴ YB III, 35 (p. 155): *na ca puruṣapratyayena buddhisattvātmanā puruṣo drśyate. puruṣa eva taṃ pratyayaṃ svātmāvalambanaṃ paśyati, tathā hy uktam — “vijñātāram are kena vijñāniyāt ” iti.*

³³⁵ Chapple and Kelly (1990: 116); see also *BĀ Up* III. 7, 23.

Without *puruṣa* or pure consciousness, ordinary “knowledge” and experience would not take place. Based on yogic insight into the nature of human identity, Patañjali was then able to communicate a “path” of Yoga through which the afflictions (*kleśas*), so fundamental to the human condition of struggle and conflict in *saṃyoga*, can be uprooted and overcome. But the “path” from *saṃyoga* to Yoga (liberation) requires, as we have seen, a thorough study of the mind, for it is only by way of the transformation of the *mind* and its “modifications” (i.e. mental processes) that the key to success in Yoga becomes evident. *Puruṣa*, by definition being ever-free, ever-wise, unchanging, etc., could never be in bondage, and its intrinsic nature is therefore unaffected by any apparent loss of true identity or by any form of limitation. Vyāsa reveals that: “These two, experience and emancipation, are created by the mind (i.e., *buddhi*) and function only in the mind. ... In the mind alone are bondage, which is the failure to fulfil the purpose of *puruṣa*, and emancipation, which is completion of that purpose.”³³⁶ According to the above statement made by Vyāsa, it would make more sense to understand spiritual emancipation as referring to a liberated state of mind (i.e., the mind is liberated from its former condition of spiritual ignorance) and not literally as referring to a *puruṣa*, which is by definition already free and has no intrinsic need to be liberated from the fetters of worldly existence. Therefore, the concept of the mind (*citta*) — its nature, structure, and functioning — is an essential component or building block of Patañjali’s philosophy. Yoga has been described as a “theory-practice continuum,”³³⁷ a philosophy, including a discipline, which unites theory and practice. With this idea held in mind, it would now seem appropriate to examine closely Patañjali’s soteriological methodology and praxis-orientation beginning with an analysis of the meaning of “cessation” (*nirodha*) in Yoga, and then moving on to look at central methods of Yoga discipline showing how Yoga can be seen to culminate in an embodied and integrated state of liberated consciousness and identity.³³⁸

336 YB II, 18 (pp. 83-84): *tāvetau bhogāpavargau buddhikṛtau buddhāv eva vartamānau ... buddher eva puruṣārthāparisamāptir bandhas tadarthāvasāyo mokṣa iti.*

337 C. Pensa in G. Feuerstein (1980: vi).

338 For more here, see the discussion in Whicher (1995) and (1997) as well as my larger work (1998) entitled, *The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana: A Reconsideration of Classical Yoga* (forthcoming with State University of New York Press). This present paper on the mind (*citta*) in a

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way presupposes an understanding of Yoga ontology and metaphysics both of which are looked at in detail in chapter two of the above mentioned book, *The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana*.