

# A STUDY ON SANSKRIT SYNTAX (3)\*: ŚABDAKAUSTUBHA ON P.1.4.25-31 [Apādāna (2)]

Sanskrit Text and Annotated Translation

Noriyuki KUDO

## Introductory Remarks

In this study, P.1.4.25-31 are discussed. These rules prescribe the items to which the term *apādāna* is given in seven different cases, i.e., *bhayahetu*, *asoḍha*, *yenādarśanam icchati*, *īpsita*, *ākhyātr*, *prakṛti*, and *prabhava*. However, according to Patañjali, these are all downgraded to a sort of sub-classes of the previous one, *dhruva*, because the condition given in P.1.4.24, *apāye*, can be interpreted extensively. The meaning of *apāya* is 'separation' and this meaning is re-interpreted as the one which connotes not only the physically perceived separation but also the mentally conceived separation such as cancellation, abandonment, indifference, etc. Most typical his comment is that "*iha tāvad vṛkebhyo bibheti, dasyubhyo bibhetīti ya eṣa manusyah prekṣāpūrvakārī bhavati sa paśyati yadi māṃ vṛkāḥ paśyanti dhruvo me mṛtyur iti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nivartate. tatra dhruvam apāye 'pādānam [P.1.4.24] ity eva siddham*" [MBh ad. P.1.4.25, I, 327, 24-328, 1]. Commentators after Patañjali do not criticize his refusal of 25-31 but Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita alone does so.

## Text, Translation and Notes

3. *bhītrārthānām bhayahetuḥ* [P.1.4.25: SK. 588]

3.0. Explanation of the rule {118, 18-20}

Text: *bhayam bhīḥ, trāṇam trāḥ, bhayārthānām trāṇārthānāñ ca yogo bhayahetuḥ kārakam apādānam syāt. "corebhya udvijate; bibheti; rakṣati vā trāyate."*

---

\* Previous parts of this study, part (1) = Kudo[1996] and part (2) = Kudo[1997], are all published in *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Sambhāṣā*, vols. 17, 18 respectively.

Translation: The word  $\sqrt{bhī}$ - in this rule means “*bhaya*: fear” and  $\sqrt{trā}$ - “*trāṇa*: protect.” [This rule means that] when the [verbal roots] in the sense of fear or protection are used, the one which causes that fear or protect is *kāra*ka [and gets the designation] *apādāna*. Examples are “*corebhya udvijate; bibheti; rakṣati; trāyate*: he is frightened of; is scared of; guards against; protects from thieves.”

Notes: *KV* on P.1.4.25 says [I, 538]: *bibhetyarthānām trāyatyarthānām ca dhātūnām prayoge bhayahetur yas tat kārakam apādānasamjñam bhavati*. Here, something to which someone feels a fear (*bhayahetu*) is termed as *apādāna* when the verbal root expected in the sentence means the fear or the protection.

### 3.1. On the word *bhayahetu*

#### 3.1.1. pūrvapakṣa <unnecessity of the word *bhayahetu*> {118, 20-21}

Text: *bhayahetugrahaṇam cintyaprayojanam. “araṇye bibheti” ity-ādau tu paratvād adhikaraṇasamjñā.*

Translation: The word *bhayahetu* in this rule is redundant. If the word *bhayahetu* is not mentioned here, in case of “*araṇye bibheti*: he fears in the forest,” [*araṇya* might be wrongly termed as *apādāna* because the verb *bibheti* is used]. However, such a wrong application is avoidable by means of the *paratva*-principle and *araṇya* might be correctly termed as *adhikaraṇa*. [Thus, the word *bhayahetu* is redundant.]

Notes: In the previous rule (P.1.4.24), the word *apāya* is, according to Patañjali, meant not only for the physical separation but also for the mentally conceived separation. If the word “*bhayahetu*” is not mentioned in this rule, in the sentences wherein the verbal roots having a sense of fear or protect are used every item from which one wants to keep away would be designated as *apādāna* and thus take a fifth case ending. Here, let us consider following situation. If someone is wondering in the forest and he/she feels vague fear about the situation where he/she is staying, then the forest would be designated as *apādāna* because the situation, that is staying in the forest, is regarded as a source of fear.

However, when the forest is simply intended to express the place where the person is staying or in which something causes the fear,<sup>1</sup> it is

<sup>1</sup> Commentators, such as Jinendrabuddhi and Haradatta, say as follows: *Nyāsa* on do. [I, 538]: *nātrāraṇyād bhayam, kiṃ tarhi? tatrasthebhyaś caurādibhyaḥ; PM* on do. [Ibid.]: *araṇye iti. atra tatssthebhyo vṛkṣādibhyo bhayam nāraṇyāt.*

to be designated as *adhikaraṇa*. In spite of the intention of speaker, since the verb √*bhī-* is used in the usage, the forest would be termed as *apādāna*. In order to prevent this wrong assignment we need the word *bhayahetu* as the scope of application, which in turn excludes this case from the scope of this rule. Once it is mentioned in this rule, the forest in above situation does not receive the designation *apādāna*. This is a supposition for this argument.

Against this claim of the necessity of the word *bhayahetu* in this rule, pūrvapakṣa says that resorting to the *paratva*-principle we can manage correct application. Even though the word *bhayahetu* is not prescribed in this rule, since the designation *adhikaraṇa* is prescribed after the designation *apādāna*, the former would set aside the latter. Therefore, the word *bhayahetu* is not necessary. In this case, as the pūrvapakṣa says, we can manage correctly without the word *bhayahetu*. Then, how about the case where the genitive case is introduced?

### 3.1.2. Reply {188, 22-23}

Text: “*kasya bibhyati devāś ca jātaraṣosya saṃyuge*” *iti Rāmāyaṇa-ślokaś tu kasya saṃyuge iti yojanayā vyākhyeyah.*

Translation: [It is not correct] because of the usage in the *Rāmāyaṇa* verse [1.4cd]: “*kasya bibhyati devāś ca jātaraṣosya saṃyuge*: of whom anger is feared even by the gods, aroused in the battle.” In this case, [the use of genitive form *kasya*] is explained by the usage.

Notes: As explained earlier, we can adequately operate the rule 25 without the word *bhayahetu* by means of the *paratva*-principle. This *paratva*-principle is a grammatical device which functions in case that two rules having same validity are in conflict. In the conflict between *apādāna* and *adhikaraṇa* this device works well and we can avoid undesired application. That is why the commentators do accept the objection and do not further say the necessity of the word *bhayahetu*. (The actual reason why they do not take this objection seriously is that they consider this rule itself as unnecessary.) See *Nyāsa* and *PM* on this rule: *Nyāsa* [I, 538-9]:

*nanu cātrādikaraṇasamjñā paratvād bādhikā bhaviṣyati. api ca — dhruvam ity anuvartate, “dhruvañ cāvadhībhūtam” ity uktam. na cāraṇyam avadhībhāvena vivakṣitam, tat kim etan nivrtyarthena bhayahetugrahaṇena? evaṃ tarhi pūrvasyāyaṃ prapañcaḥ, na hi kāyasamprāptipūrvaka evāpāyo bhavati, kiṃ*

*tarhi? buddhisamprāptipūrvako 'pi. asti ceha buddhisamprāptipūrvako 'py apāyah, tathā hi — caurebhyo bibhēṭy atra yas tāvat puruṣaḥ prekṣāvān bhavati sa evaṃ paśyati — “yadi mām caurāḥ paśyeyur dhruvaṃ me mṛtyuḥ” iti. vicārayaṃs tān buddhyā prāpnoti, prāpya ca tato nivartate. tatra dhruvam ityādinaiva siddham. tasmāt pūrvasyāyaṃ prapañcaḥ.*

*PM [Ibid.]: nanu ca dhruvam ity anuvartisyate, na cāraṇyam avadhivena vivakṣitam, paratvāc cādhikaraṇasamjñāiva bhavi-syati. satyam, pūrvasyaivāyaṃ prapañcaḥ.*

Then, how about the case quoted from the *Rāmāyaṇa*? This established example is quoted to illustrate the necessity of the word *bhayahetu*. Here someone in strong anger of whom even the gods are afraid is referred in the form of *kasya jātarōṣasya*, both having a genitive case. In this case, the rule 25 without the word *bhayahetu* would be applied because of the verb  $\sqrt{bhī}$ - and the word *kasya* would become *\*kasmāt*. However, is ‘someone’ really the source of fear? If someone is really the source of fear, he would be termed as *apādāna*, whether the word *bhayahetu* is in 25 or not, because the verb  $\sqrt{bhī}$ - is used. If someone is not the source of fear and we have 25 with the word *bhayahetu*, the form *kasya* is correct (this genitive case is introduced by P.2.3.50: *śeṣe*), that is to say the designation *apādāna* would not be applied because he is not *bhayahetu*. If he is not so and we do not have the word *bhayahetu*, he would be termed as *apādāna* and thus the usage cannot be admitted. Therefore, it is the only way to justify above usage that we have the word *bhayahetu* in 25. My explanation is based on the following commenting passage from the *Tattvabodhinī* on SK. No. 588 [I, 658]:

*“kasya bibhyati devāś ca jātarōṣasya saṃyuge” iti Rāmāyaṇe tu kasyety asya saṃyugenānvayān nāsti bhayahetutvam iti ṣaṣṭhī-prayogaḥ saṃgacchata eva. na caivaṃ saṃyugasyāpādānavāpattir iti vācyam. parayā adhikaraṇasamjñayā apādānasamjñābādhāt.<sup>2</sup> adhikaraṇatvāvivakṣāyāṃ tu iṣṭāpatteh. (Tr.: In the *Rāmāyaṇa* verse, since the word *kasya* is related to the word *saṃyuga*, it does not serve as the source of fear. Thus, it is realized that a genitive case is used in this case. It should not be*

<sup>2</sup> Another edition of the *Tattvabodhinī* (2) reads *apādānasamjñābādhāt*. Here, this reading is preferred because on the problem of the conflict between *apādāna* and *adhikaraṇa* we have already seen that *apādāna* is blocked by *adhikaraṇa* which is prescribed later (*parayā adhikaraṇasamjñayā*).

argued that the word *saṃyuga* would be termed as *apādāna* because the designation *adhikaraṇa* [which is prescribed] later would block the application of *apādāna*. However, if [to express] the location is not intended, [the application of *apādāna*] is desired.)

We have idiomatic usages of the genitive case used instead of the ablative case which represents the *bhaya*hetu. Speijer gives several examples [*Sanskrit Syntax* § 126]: *Rāmāyaṇa*. II.29.4: *tava sarve hi bibhyati*; *Pañcatantra*. III.195: *yā mamodvijate nityam*; *Rāmāyaṇa*. III.46.29-31: *iha śākhāmṛgāḥ siṃhāḥ ... katham tebhyo na bibhyase. ... kuñjarāṇām tarasvinām katham ... na bibheṣi*.

4. *parājer asodhaḥ* [P.1.4.26: SK. 589]

4.0. Explanation of the rule {118, 24-26}

Text: *parāpūrvasya jayateḥ prayoge 'soḍho hyorthā<sup>\*1</sup> 'pādānam syāt. "adhyayanāt parājayate" glāyatīty arthaḥ. akarmakaś cāyam. tatra śaṣṭhyām prāptāyām vacanam.*

\*1. Read 'sahyo 'rtho. [MS93Ob9]. Also KV reads *parāpūrvasya jayateḥ prayoge 'soḍho yo 'rthaḥ — soḍhum na śakyate, tat kārakam apādānasamjñam bhavati* [I, 539] and SK. 589 [I, 659]: *parājeḥ prayoge 'sahyo 'rtho 'pādānam syāt.*

Translation: When the verbal root √*ji-* prefixed by *parā-* is used, the one which is not endured, i.e., not bearable (*asahya*) [is *kāraka* and] becomes *apādāna*. For example, “*adhyayanāt parājayate*: he cannot stand study.” It means “he is not be able to study (*glāyati* < √*glai-*).” This verbal root [*parā-√ji-* in the sense of “not being able to bear] is an intransitive verb. In this case, since [otherwise, i.e., it is a transitive verb] the genitive case would be applicable, this rule is to be prescribed.

Notes: The verbal root *parā-√ji-* has two opposite meanings, namely an intransitive meaning and a transitive one. In the former, it means “*asahya*: not bearable” or “*nyūyībhāva*: unable” and is paraphrased by the commentators into “*glāyati*: he/she is tired of” or “*hrasati*: is diminished.” (ŚK gives the paraphrase *glāyati* and Kaiyaṭa gives *hrasati* but this is used in the sense of *glāyati*).<sup>3</sup> In case of this meaning, this verbal root is intransitive. On the other hand, it means also “*abhibhava*: defeat.” It is a transitive verbal root. In this rule, the

<sup>3</sup> *Pradīpa* on P.1.4.26 [II. 250r]: *adhyayanāt parājayate hrasati. adhyetum glāyatīty arthaḥ. atra cārthe 'karmakatvāt śaṣṭhyām prāptāyām vacanam.*

former meaning is intended and when the verbal root *parā-√ji-* is used in the latter sense, the usage is not covered by this rule and thus is regarded as *śeṣa* which introduces a genitive case (See *PM* on P.1.4.25 [I, 540]: *akarmakaś cāyam atrārtho, tatra śaṣṭhyām prāptāyām vacanam, pratyudāharāṇe tv abhivhave vartate.*)

Therefore, in order to elude this confusion concerning to the meaning of *parā-√ji-* the word *asodha* is mentioned. By this word, the verbal root *parā-√ji-* is referred to in the meaning of “not being able to” but not “to defeat.” As for this, *Nyāsa* clearly explains these two meanings in the contrary way [on P.1.4.26, I, 539]: *sodhum na śakyata iti. abhivhavitum na śakyata ity arthaḥ. adhyayanāt parājayata ity adhyayanam abhivhavitum na śaknoti, na pārayatīty arthaḥ* (Tr.: On “*sodhum na śakyate.*” This means that the person cannot defeat. In case of “*adhyayanāt parājayate,*” it means that the person cannot defeat the study, not but overcomes it.) Here, *parā-√ji-* is paraphrased into “*na abhivhavitum,*” i.e., “not being able to” but it does not mean “*pārayatī,*” i.e., “defeat.” According to this explanation, this verb, when it is intransitive, means “not defeat” and means “defeat” when transitive.

#### 4.1. The purpose of the word *asodhaḥ* { 118, 26-28 }

Text: *asodhaḥ kim?, “śatrūn parājayate.” abhivhavatīty arthaḥ. asodha iti Ktārtho bhūtakālo ’trāvivakṣitaḥ. tena “adhyayanāt parājeṣyate” ityādi siddham.*

Translation: What is [the purpose of mentioning the word] *asodha* in this rule? [In order to prevent the application of *apādāna* to *śatru*] in the expression “*śatrūn parājayate*: he defeats the enemies.” Here *parā-√ji-* means “defeating (*abhivhavati*).” The word *asodha* is derived with a past passive participle suffix *-Kta* but the sense of past is not intended here. Thus, the expression “*adhyayanāt parājeṣyate*” [in the future sense] is possible.

Notes: To mention the word *asodha* in this rule is aimed to ascertain the meaning of the verbal root *parā-√ji-*. This purpose has been partly treated in 4.0. When the verb *parā-√ji-* means “to defeat,” the transitive meaning, 26 is not to be applied to the example “*śatrūn parājayate.*” Here, the word *śatru-* is termed as *karman* by P.1.4.49 and takes an accusative case by P.2.3.2. Only when the verb *parā-√ji-* is intransitive, 26 brings into effect. See *Pradīpa* on do. [II, 250r]: *iha tv asodhagrahaṇān nyūyibhāvavṛttir grhyate.* (Tr.: Here, because of

the mention of the word *asoḍha*, [the meaning of that verb] is known as *nyūyībhāva* [i.e., its meaning is of intransitive]). Therefore in order to indicate that *parā-√ji-* is intransitive the word *asoḍha* is mentioned. (However, we will see later, this justification using above example is wrong. See 4.2).

The word *asoḍha* (*nañ-tatpuruṣa*) is formed with the past passive participle *-Kta*. As for the derivational form of *asoḍha*, it might lead to a restrictive interpretation of this rule, namely that this rule is concerned only to the past tense. The *prakriyā*-s of *soḍha* and *asoḍha* are as follows:

*soḍha-*

√*sah-* + *-Kta* : P.3.2.102 (*niṣṭhā=Kta* by 1.1.26; *bhūte* 84)

*sah* + °*ta* : P.1.3.8 [*K=IT*], 9 [*IT→ϕ*]

*saḍh* + *ta* : P.8.2.31 *haḥ dhah* [*h → dh*]

*saḍh* + *dha* : P.8.2.40 *jhaṢas tathor dhah adhaḥ* [*th → dh*]

*saḍh* + *dha* : P.8.4.41 *ṣṭUnā ṣṭUh* [*dh → dh*]

*so*° + *dha* : P.6.3.112 *sahivahor oTavarṇasya* [*-adh → -odh*]; 8.3.13 *dhah*

*dhe lopah* [*-dh + dh-→ ° + dh-*]

*soḍha*

*asoḍhaḥ*

[[*nañ + sU*] + [*soḍha + sU*]] + *sU* : P.2.2.6

[[*na*° + *s*°] + [*soḍha + s*°]] + *sU* : P.1.3.2 [*U=IT*], 3 [*ñ=IT*], 9 [*IT→ϕ*]

[[°*a* + °] + [*soḍha + °*]] + *sU* : P.6.3.73 [*na-→°a-*], 2.4.71 [*s°→ϕ*]

[*a + soḍha*] + *s*° : P.8.2.66 [*-s → -r*], 8.3.15 [*-r → -h*]

*a-soḍha-h*

Since this word *asoḍha* is derived with the past passive suffix *-Kta*, it is possible to interpret that the scope of this rule is restricted to the cases of past events. In order to avoid such a restricted operation, ŚK and *Uddyota* give remark. See *Uddyota* on do. [II, 250r]: *atra kālo 'vivakṣitah. tena parājeṣyata ity api bhavati* (Tr.: In this case, the [notion of ] time is not intended. Thus, an usage such as “*parājeṣyate*: he will defeat” in the future sense is also allowed).

#### 4.2. Siddhānta {118, 28-29}

Text: *vastutas tv asoḍhagrahaṇam vyartham, “śatrūn parājayate” ity atra paratvāt karmasamjñāsiddheḥ.*

Translation: Really speaking, the word *asoḍha* in this rule is meaningless. According to the *paratva*-principle, *śatru* would get the designation *karman*.

Notes: If we accept the above-mentioned purpose of mentioning the word *asoḍha* in this rule, without this word we come to face a

difficulty that the *apādāna* instead of the *karman* (which is actually desired) would be introduced to the word *śatru-* in the expression “*śatrūn parājayate*” because the verb *parā-√ji-* is used anyway, regardless of its meaning. However, even if the word *asodha* is not mentioned, the *karman* is duly introduced by means of the *paratva-*principle. Thus it is useless.

However, this example is unsuitable to this case because the verb *parā-√ji-* as intransitive verb is a condition for applying the *apādāna*.<sup>4</sup> Previously, we see that this verb has two meanings and these two meanings are respectively of intransitive and of transitive verb. By the presence of the word *asodha* in 26 two examples “*upādyāyān parājayate*” — the verb is intransitive — and “*śatrūn parājayate*” — it is transitive — are realized as the cases being handled by different rules. If this word is not in 26, since the meaning of *parā-√ji-* is not decided, the conflict seems to come arise. However, when a speaker intends to use the verb as the intransitive, rule 26 would be applied and when the speaker wants to use it as the transitive, rule 49 would be applied. In other words, the problem which is implied here (and this should be considered) is that when the word *asodha* is not in this rule and the verb is used as transitive, if 26 is to be applied to here, then this case is not covered by this rule but by P.2.3.50. As for this, *PM* says [I, 540]: *tena pratyudāharāṇe paratvāt karmasamjñā bhaviṣyatīti na codanīyam* (Tr.: Therefore, it is not put forward that as for the counter-example [“*śatrūn parājayate*”] the *karman* will prevail by the *paratva-*principle). Therefore, the word *asodha* is necessary in order to prevent the application of P.2.3.50.<sup>5</sup>

#### 4.3. About the form of *parājeḥ* { 118, 29-32 }

Text: *iha sūtre parājer iti rūpaṃ “viparābhyāñ jeḥ” [P.1.3.19] itivat samarthanīyam. yat tu paratvāt “GHEr Nīti” [P.7.3.111] iti guṇa iti Haradattenoktaṃ tatsūtrabhāṣyādiviruddham iti prāg eva prapañcitam.*

Translation: In this rule the form *parājeḥ* representing the verbal root *parā-√ji-* is terminated as a nominal *i-*stem. Such an usage is authorized by the form *jeḥ* in P.1.3.19: *viparābhyāñ jeḥ*. However, according to Haradatta, the *guṇa* replacement should be

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Sharma [1990], p. 237.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Tattvabodhinī* [I, 659]: *atrāpi vadanti — karmatvāvivakṣitāyām śeṣaśaṣṭhīm bādhitvā pañcamī syāt, sā mā bhūd iti kartavyam evāsodhagrahaṇam.*

taken place by P.7.3.111. It is already explained that this is contradictory to the *bhāsyā*, etc. on that *sūtra*.

Notes: This passage deals with the form *parājeḥ* in this rule. This form is the genitive form of *i*-stem *parā-ji-* representing the verbal root *parā-√ji-*. The verbal roots, when they are referred to in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* or in other grammatical texts in order to show themselves, are usually terminated as the nominal stems by adding *-i* to the verbal roots or by using them in 3rd person singular form. (On this, it is said by Kātyāyana that “*iKṣīPau dhātunirdese*” [Vt II on P.3.3.108]. See 8.1.2 and 8.1.4). In grammar, such forms are regarded as the original by this *paribhāṣā*: *prakṛtivad anukaraṇam bhavati* (An imitative form is treated as its original).<sup>6</sup>

As for the form *jeḥ*, we have the authorized form in P.1.3.19: *viparābhyām jeḥ*. Then, how is this genitive form *parājeḥ* [*< parāji- + Nas*] derived? Haradatta mentions the introducing process of substitute that P.6.4.77 is firstly introduced but this rule is prevailed by subsequent rule P.7.3.111.<sup>7</sup>

√*ji-* + *Nas*

\**j-iyāṅ + Nas* : P.6.4.77 *aCi Śnudhātubhruvāmyvor iyaṅNanaṅau* [*i → iyaṅ*]

*ji-* + *as*

*je- + as* : 7.3.111: *GHEr NITi* [*i → e* (*guṇa* replacement)]

*je + °s* : 6.1.110: *NasINasoś ca* [*-e + a- → -e-*]

*jeḥ*

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *MBh* ad *pratyāhārasūtra* 2 [I, 21, 7]. The number of this *paribhāṣā* is different according to different authors of *paribhāṣā* text: Vyāḍi = 86; Puruṣottama = 114; Śiradeva = 18; and Nāgeśa = 36 (see *Paribhāṣendusekhara*, vol. I, p. 175)

<sup>7</sup> *PM* on do. [I, 539]: *parājer asoḍhaḥ. atra dhātupāṭhagatasya jīty etāvanmātrasyā-nukaraṇam. tataḥ parāpūrvo jiḥ parājir ity uttarapadalopī samāso draṣṭavyaḥ. nanu “prakṛtivad anukaraṇam bhavati” ity adhātur iti prātipadikasamjñāyāḥ pratiṣedhād asubantatvāt samāso na prāpnoti, na; apratiṣedhāt. nāyaṃ prasajyapraṭiṣedhaḥ — dhātor neti. kim tarhi? paryudāso ‘yam — yad anyad dhātor iti. dhātor na vidhir na pratiṣedhaḥ. evam apīyāñādeśaḥ prāpnoti, paratvād gher nīti guṇo bhaviṣyatīti* (Tr.: Here the form *ji-* is an imitation form of that which is enumerated in the *Dhātupāṭha*. Therefore, it is to be known that this form is a compound giving dropped the middle member in the form of *parā-pūrva-ji-*. Here is an objection: According to the *paribhāṣā* “*prakṛtivad anukaraṇam bhavati*,” *ji-* in *parāji* is originally a verbal root √*ji-*. [However,] since an application of the designation *prātipadika* is prohibited because of the prescription of “*adhātuḥ*” [in P.1.2.45], that is to say, it is not a nominal, the compounding should not be made. Answer: [Objection] does not [stand] because it is not prohibited. The reason is that the form *adhātuḥ* does not mean the prohibition after tentatively applied (*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*) in the sense of “it is not so to the verbal root” but the exclusion [of it from the scope] (*paryudāsa*) in the sense of “it is applied to the one other than the verbal root.” Thus, this is not the prescription as to verbal root nor the prohibition. In this way, a substitute *iyāṅ* is added after [*ji-*]. However, this operation is prevailed by subsequent rule P.7.3.111).

However, this operation is not correct because P.6.4.77 does not work in this case. This rule gives substitute *iyaÑ* when the final phoneme to which it is added is followed by affixes beginning with the vowels. The genitive affix *Ñas* is not the affix beginning with vowels. This form is derived from P.7.3.111 but this operation is not that is applied after prevailing.

As for this, Bhattoji also says in *ŚK* on P.1.3.19 [I, 66, 13-26]:

*nanu "jeh" iti katham nirdeśah. "prakṛtivad anukaraṇam" ity atideśena dhātutayā iyaÑ "jyah" iti vaktavyatvāt. na ca "niyah" "kriyah" iti dīrgha sāvakāśam iya paratvād "GHEr NITi" [P.7.3.111] iti guṇo bādhatā iti yukta. hrasveṣv api pūrvavipratishedhenyaÑ iṣṭatvāt. ata eva "kṣiyah" iti nir-diśyate. kiñ ca "kṣiyo dīrghāt" [P.8.2.46] iti sūtre dīrgha-grahaṇam apīha jñāpakam. anyathā "kṣiyah" iti nirdeśād eva dīrghasya nirṇaye kiṃ tena? ucyate. anityoyam atideśah. ato neyaÑ. anityatāyām pramāṇan tu "ṛK" [Śiva. 2] sūtra evoktam. avivakṣitārtharūpamātrānukaraṇād vā. yat tu "parājeh aso-dhah" [P.1.4.26] iti sūtre iyaÑah paratvād "GHEh [NITi]" [P.7.3.111] iti guṇa iti Haradatenoktam, tac cintyam. "kṣiyo dīrghāt" [P.8.2.46] ity etatsūtrasthabhāṣyakaiyaṭavṛttigranthais tatratyehatyasvagrānthābhyāñ ca saha viruddhāt.*

Tr.: Objection. How is the form *jeh* taught? According to the *paribhāṣā*: "*prakṛtivad anukaraṇam*," the affix *iyaÑ* is introduced after [ $\sqrt{ji}$ -] as the verbal root and it results in the form "*jyah*." However, since this suffix is *sāvakāśa* to the long vowel [of the *aṅga* final] such as "*niyah* (< *nī*-)" or "*kriyah* (< *krī*-)," according to the *paratva*-principle the *guṇa*-replacement by P.7.3.111 would prevail. It is not correct because the suffix *iyaÑ* is required due to the conflict with the preceding rule even if the *aṅga* final is a short vowel. Thus the form '*kṣiyah*' is taught. Furthermore, in P.8.2.46, the word *dīrgha* mentioned in this rule again [serves] as *jñāpaka*. Otherwise, since the form *kṣiyah* is taught, what is taught by it when the word *dīrgha* is ascertained [in the rule]? Answer: It is because it is non-obligatory substitute [that is taught]. Therefore, the substitute *iyaÑ* is not to be introduced. As for this "non-obligatory", it is already stated wherein the *pratyāhārasūtra* *ṛK* is discussed. Or rather, it is for the imitation of the form but not the meaning. Then, it is said by Haradatta that P.7.3.111 prevails over P.6.4.77 because it is

subsequent. This claim is meaningless since it is contradictory to the statement of *MBh*,<sup>8</sup> *Kaiyata*,<sup>9</sup> and *KV*<sup>10</sup> on one hand and to that mentioned in this book here and there<sup>11</sup> on the other hand.

5. *vāraṇārthānām īpsitam* [P.1.4.27: *SK*. 590]

5.0. Explanation {118, 33-119, 2}

Text: *vāraṇārthānām prayoge kriyayā aptum iṣṭam kārakam apādānam syāt. "vr̥ṅ āvaraṇe" [1814; Dhṛ.10.271] curādih. pravṛtti- vighāto vāraṇam.*

Translation: In the expression wherein [the verbal roots having] the meaning of keeping back [from doing something] are used, the object which is desired to be reached by that action is *kāraka* and [becomes] *apādāna*. The verbal root √vr̥ṅ- means 'intervention' and belongs to the tenth class. 'Intervention' means the act of obstructing someone from doing something.

Notes: *KV* explains this rule as follows [I, 540]: *vāraṇārthānām dhātūnām prayoge ya īpsito 'rthah tat kārakam apādānasamjñam bhavati. pravṛttivighātaḥ = vāraṇam, yavebhyo gā vārayati.*

The word *āvaraṇa* means an act of intervening or obstructing someone from doing something (*pravṛttivighāta*). Here, we can understand two actions, namely the act of preventing (*vighāta*) and the act of doing something (*pravṛtti*), and basing on this understanding, we can translate the word *āvaraṇa* as "X is obstructing Y from doing/approaching Z." While the agent of obstructing is X and the object of this action, i.e., the one desired to be reached is Y, the agent of doing something is Y and its object is Z. In the example given in the next passage "*yavebhyo gām vārayati*," Y is a cow (*gām*) and Z is bean field (*yavebhyah*). In order to apply the designation *apādāna* to *yava-*, we have to realize this rule as to intend that the designated is the one desired by the object of the act of obstructing, viz., Z and not

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *MBh.* ad P.8.2.46 [III,407,22-408,1]: *nātra nirdeśaḥ pramāṇam śakyam kartum. yathaiatrāprāptā vibhaktir evam iyañādeśo 'pi.*

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Pradīpa* on do. [VI, 120]: *nātra nirdeśa iti. na hīyañādeśād dīrghasya grahaṇam pratyetum śakyate, iyañnimitasya vibhakter durlabhatvāt tato 'prāptā yathā vibhaktiḥ sautratvān nirdeśasya bhavaty evam hrasvasyāpiyañādeśaḥ syād iti dīrghagrahaṇam arthavat.*

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *KV* on P.8.2.46 [VI, 413]: *hrasvasyāpi dhātvanukaraṇasya iha iyañā nirdeśaḥ. kṣiyah "niṣṭhāyām aranyad arthe" [P.6.4.60] ity atra dīrghagrahaṇam kriyate. "viparābhyām jeḥ" [P.1.3.19] ity evamādau tu dhātutvam anukāryagataṃ sad apy avivakṣitatvāt jirūpasāmānyānukaraṇam draṣṭavyam.*

<sup>11</sup> The word *tatratyehatya* probably refers to the passage 4.3 of this *ŚK* itself.

the object of the act of obstructing, viz., Y. As for this, Kaiyata says [*Pradīpa* on P.1.4.27, II, 2511]: *tatra vāraṅakriyayā parakīyā api māṣā vārayitur āptum iṣṭā bhavanti mā naśann ete ity etebhyo 'sau gā vārayati* (Tr.: Even when the beans are owned by other, they are the one desired to be reached by the act of obstructing of the person who obstructs). And see also *Uddyota* on do. [II, 2511-r]:

*sa ca tadvyāpārajanyatatphalābhāvapravrajako bhakṣaṅādi-janakavyāpārābhāvānukūlo vyāpārah kvacit. kvacit tadvyāpārajanyatatphalābhāvapravrajakah saṃyogānukūlavvyāpārābhāvānukūlavvyāpārah* (Tr.: This means, in certain case [to prevent something from eating], the activity conducive to the absence of the activity producing the act of eating, etc., which instigates the absence of that result produced by that activity. In another case [to prevent someone from approaching somewhere], this means the activity conducive to the absence of the activity conducive to the contact, which instigates the absence of that result produced by that activity).

### 5.1. The purpose of the word *īpsita*

#### 5.1.1. Conflict 1 <*apādāna* and *adhikarāṇa*> {119, 2-3}

Text: '*īpsita*' iti kim? "yavebhyo gāṃ vārayati kṣetre."

Translation: What is [the purpose of] the word *īpsita* in this rule? [The counter-example is] "yavebhyo gāṃ vārayati kṣetre: he keeps a cow back from [eating] barley in the field." [If there is no word *īpsitam*, "kṣetra" would get *apādāna* designation because it is related to the act of preventing].

Notes: If the word *īpsita* is not mentioned in this rule, wrong application would arise according to a pūrvapakṣin. That is to say, in the example, the verbal root which means the act of preventing (*vārayati*) is used and thus all items related to this action are called *apādāna*. The field can be regarded as *īpsita* because someone wants the cow not to approach the barley, in other words the field where that barley is growing. Supposing like this, pūrvapakṣin points out the possibility of applying the *apādāna* to *kṣetra*.

However, in this case what is actually meant for by the word *kṣetra* is to denote the place and on this reason *kṣetra* is termed as *adhikarāṇa* by P.1.4.45 which is prescribed subsequently. Therefore, the conflict between *apādāna* and *adhikarāṇa* cannot happen and this rule is well-managed even without the word *īpsita*. See *Nyāsa* on do.

[I. 540-541]: *atra kṣetrasyānīpsitasya na bhavati samjñā, īpsitagrahaṇāt. nanu cātra paratvād adhikaraṇasamjñayaiva bādhitatvād apādānasamjñāyāh, kṣetrasyāpādānasamjñā na bhaviṣyatīty ato na kartavyam īpsitagrahaṇam iti, etan nāsaṅka-nīyam, uktottaratvāt.*

5.1.2. Conflict 2 <apādāna and karman> {119, 3-5}

Text: *nanv iha paratvād adhikaraṇasamjñā bhaviṣyati yathā kṛte 'pīpsitagrahaṇe goṣv īpsitatamatvaprayuktā karmasamjñā.*

Translation: In this case, according to *paratva*-principle, the designation *adhikaraṇa* would be applied to *kṣetra*. And furthermore, even if “*īpsitam*” is not mentioned in this rule, the word *gau*- which denotes the most desired object would take *karman* designation.

Notes: Next difficulty concerning to the application of *apādāna* is the conflict with the designation *karman*. In the rule 27 the word *īpsita* is mentioned and on the other hand in 49 the word *īpsitatama* is prescribed. The notion of *īpsitatama* is included in that of the word *īpsita* and this seems to imply that rule 27 would be applied to the whole *īpsita* items including the *īpsitatama* items. In the above example, we have two *īpsita* objects, *yava* and *gau*. Do we apply 27 to both? It is not correct. In spite of the presence of the word *īpsita* in this rule, the one which is realized as *īpsita* item by this rule is not the *īpsitatama* item because the *īpsitatama* items are all *īpsita* item but not vice versa. Both the cow and the barley are *īpsita* but the former is not mere *īpsita* but again realized as *īpsitatama*. Thus, it is called *karman* by P.1.4.49. In this way, the conflict between *apādāna* and *karman* does not arise, regardless of whether the word *īpsita* is mentioned in this rule or not, and *karman* designation is properly applied. As for this, *PM* says [on do., I, 541]:

*athātra gavām apādānasamjñā kasmān na bhavati, īpsitatamo 'pīpsito bhavaty eva, yathā śuklatamo 'pi śuklah? paratvāt karmasamjñā bhaviṣyati.* (Tr.: Then, why is the designation *apādāna* not applied to the cow because the most desired thing is nothing but the desired thing such as the most brilliant thing is included in the bright ones? [That application is not taken place] because due to the *paratva*-principle the designation *karman* would be applied).

Patañjali re-formulates this rule [I, 328, 17]:

Alternative A:(*vāraṇārthānām*) *karmaṇo yad īpsitam* (what is desired [to be reached] by the *karman* [is called *apādāna*]).

Alternative B: (*vāraṇārthānām*) *īpsitepsitam* (what is desired [to be reached] by the *īpsita* object [is called *apādāna*]).

In order to overcome the conflict of application, in case of “*agner mānavakam vārayati*,” Patañjali rephrases P.1.4.27. As is seen in the rephrased rule, since the word *karman* is already introduced, P.1.4.49 is at first to be applied, and then 27 is applied to in the remaining domain.<sup>12</sup> This rephrase is not of Patañjali because Kātyāyana has already stated that *vāraṇārtheṣu karmagrahaṇānarthakyaṃ kartur īpsitatamaṃ karmeti vacanāt* (In this rule, i.e., 27, the word *karmanah* is not necessary because 49 is prescribed). This seems that original Pāṇini rule might be formulated with the word *karmanah*. (See in detail Joshi and Roodbergen [1975], pp. 86-87).

### 5.1.3. Siddhānta { 119, 5 }

Text: *satyam, cintyaprayojanam evepsitagrahaṇam*.

Translation: True. Thus, it is meaningless to mention the word “*īpsitam*” in this rule .

Notes: Here, Bhaṭṭoji claims that the word *īpsita* is not necessary in this rule. As we have seen in part (2) of this study (2.5, pp. 165-166; 2.8.1, p. 178), P.1.4.25-31 are regarded as unnecessary because P.1.4.24 alone can manage the application of *apādāna* to the different cases described by P.1.4.25-31. However, Bhaṭṭoji does not admit this unnecessary of P.1.4.25-31, and re-approves them (9.2-3). Therefore, Bhaṭṭoji needs P.1.4.25-31, and especially 27 without the word *īpsita*.

## 6. *antardhau yenādarśanam icchati* [P.1.4.28: SK. 591].

### 6.1. On the word *antardhau* { 119, 6-7 }

Text: ‘*antardhāv*’ *iti saptamī*.

Translation: The word *antardhau* is the locative form of “*antardhi*.”

Notes: This rule means that a person/being<sup>13</sup> by whom someone wishes not to be seen when the act of hiding is taken place [or when it is

<sup>12</sup> See Joshi and Roodbergen [1975], p. 85. It says that “The different wordings mentioned by Patañjali do not affect the meaning of the rephrased rule. This remains the same in both cases.”

<sup>13</sup> Deshpande[1991(b)], although its context he refers to is not of *apādāna* but of *sampradāna*, says “the masculine gender in these rules clearly seems to point to the fact that *sampradāna* in all these cases is prototypical animate, preferably human.” (p. 476) And he translates the *apādāna* item of this P.1.4.28 as “The person or being.” I follow his translation.

caused by the act of hiding] is called *apādāna*. Example, “*upādhyāyād antarddhatte*: a person is hiding from [his] teacher.”

At first, the meaning of the locative case of the word *antardhau* is dealt with. There are two interpretations. According to *KV* and *Nyāsa*, this locative case means “*nimittasaptamī*: a locative case which means a cause/ a condition.” (*KV* on P.1.4.28 [I, 541]: *antardhinimittam yenādarśanam ātmana icchati tat kārakam apādānasamjñam bhavati*; *Nyāsa* [ibid.]: *nimittāt karma(sam)yoge iti saptamī*). Second interpretation is given by Haradatta, namely “*viśayasaptamī*” or “*sat(i)-saptamī*” [*PM*, ibid.]. This is supported by Nāgeśa. ([*Uddyota* on do., II, 251r]: *antardhir vyavadhānaṃ “yasya ca bhāvena [bhāvalakṣaṇam. P.2.3.37]” iti saptamī*).

First interpretation, *nimittasaptamī*, is based on *Vt* VI on P.2.3.36: *nimittāt karmasamyoge* (the locative case is introduced after [the word denoting] *nimitta*<sup>14</sup> when it is related to the object). For example, “*carmaṇi dvīpinam hanti*: someone kills a tiger for (its) skin.” Here, as for the act of killing, the object, i.e., a tiger (*dvīpin*) is killed because the person wants its skin. We can easily understand that its skin (*carman*) is here intended as *nimitta* for killing. If we accept *KV*’s interpretation, it is meant by “*antardhinimittam adarśanam*” that someone wishes ‘not-to-be-seen’ (*adarśana*) which is caused by the act of hiding. Since the form *antardhau* is explained by above *Vt* according to *KV* and *Nyāsa*, the act of hiding must have a relation to the object. What is the object to be referred? It might be the object of wishing, in other words, of ‘not-to-be-seen,’ namely ‘oneself’ (*ātmānam*, not explicitly referred in the example). However, is there really the relation between the act of hiding and oneself in the form of a sort of causal relation? Haradatta clearly criticizes this interpretation as follows [*PM* on do., I. 541]:

*antarddhau iti neyaṃ “nimittāt karma(sam)yoge” iti saptamī,  
yathā hi vetanena dhānyam lunātīty atra vetanasya dhānyena  
yogo ’sti, tathehāpy adarśanam icchatīicchākarmaṇā’dar-  
śanenāntarddher yogo nāsti. athādarśanasya yat karma ātmā-*

14 According to Kaiyaṣa, this word *nimitta* denotes “*kriyāphala*: result of the action” and if there is no (intimate <Note. This qualifier is given by Joshi and Roodbergen [1980, p. 85]>) relation between *nimitta* and *karman*, the locative case is not used. Therefore, in “*vetanena dhānyam lunātī*” the word *vetana* cannot have the locative case but the instrumental case which denotes the cause (*hetu*) by P.2.3.23 because between *vetana* and *dhānya*, there is no relation. (Strangely enough, Haradatta says that there is a relation between *vetana* and *dhānya*. See the subsequent quotation from *PM* in this section.)

*khyam ātmano 'darśanam icchatīti tenāntarddher yogo 'sti? yasyaivādarśanam — tasyaivāntarddhānam ity ucyate. evam api "nimittāt karmayoge" iti kiṃ nimittam gṛhyate, kāraṇam? prayojanam vā? kāraṇam cej jādyena baddhaḥ — atrāpi prāpnoti, ya eva baddhyate tatraiva jādyam iti; tasmāt prayojanasya tatra grahaṇam. yathā — carmaṇi dvīpinam hantīti carma dvīpihanānasya prayojanam. iha tv antardhānam adarśanasya kāraṇam, antarhitāḥ khalv asau na dr̥syate.*

Tr.: The locative case of the word *antardhau* is not meant for *nimitta* introduced by *Vt. VI* on P.2.3.39. In case of "*vetanena dhānyam lunāti*: he is reaping a harvest for the earnings," we can find the connection between *vetana* and *dhānya*. [However, in case of "*antarddhau yenādarśnam icchati*"] such a connection between the object of wishing [not to be seen] and the act of hiding is not found. If [you say that] the object of wishing not to be seen is 'oneself' and this [object] has the connection with the act of hiding, [it is replied that] one who [wants not to be seen] is the same person who hides himself. Furthermore, if *antarddhau* denotes *nimitta*, what kind of *nimitta* is intended, a cause (*kāraṇa*) or a purpose (*prayojana*)? If it means *kāraṇa*, see the example "*jādyena baddhaḥ*: he was kept in custody due to his stupidity." In this case, we see the cause, namely stupidity is existing in that person kept in custody. Then the instance of *prayojana* is mentioned. For example, "*carmaṇi dvīpinam hanti*." Here *carman* is the purpose for killing the tiger. However, in the instance of P.1.4.28, namely when one hides, the act of hiding is the cause of non-seeing. In fact the one which hides is not seen.

According to him, the *nimitta*-interpretation does not stand because the relation between the word denoting *nimitta* and the *karman* is not seen in this case of P.1.4.28.

As for the second interpretation, the locative case of *antardhau* denotes only the situation, namely "in case the person hides" or "if he hides" and thus, the application of *apādāna* does not concern to the relation between the object and the item to which the *apādāna*-designation is applied. (Nāgeśa, while admitting that this locative case means *satisaptamī*, gives *nimitta*-interpretation of this rule later: *antardhinimittakam yat kartrkam ātmakarmakādarśanam icchati tad apādānam ity arthaḥ* [*Uddyota*, II. 252r]).

6.2. On the word *yena* {119, 7-8}

Text: 'yena' iti kartari tṛtīyā. na ca kṛdyoge\*<sup>1</sup> śaṣṭhīprasāṅgaḥ.  
 "ubhayaprāptau karmaṇy [P.2.3.66] eva" iti niyamāt.

\*1. MS93R7. kṛdyogaśaṣṭhī-. This reading is also supported by *Tattva-  
 bodhini* [on SK 591, I. 660].

Translation: The instrumental case of the word *yena* means 'agent.'  
 However, it is not proper to say that in connection with a word  
 ending in the *kṛt*-suffix [the word standing for the agent] takes the  
 genitive case. Because of the restriction that when two words, [the  
 word standing for the agent and the word standing for the object,  
 are used in connection with the word ending in the *kṛt*-suffix,  
 then only the word standing for] the object takes the genitive  
 case.

Notes: The word *yena* is considered as incorrect (or ungrammatical)  
 word by the commentators.

According to P.2.3.65, the word denoting the agent takes the  
 genitive case when it is used with the word ending in the *kṛt*-suffix. By  
 applying this rule to the sentence of P.1.4.28, "*yena adarśanam*: by  
 whom [someone wishes] 'not-to-be-seen'" should be "*\*yasya adarśa-  
 nam*" because it is along with the word *adarśana* deriving from *nañ-*  
*√drś-LyuT* [P.3.3.113; -yu- → -ana- by P.7.1.1]. However, when two  
 words — one denotes the agent and the other the object — are  
 expressed along with the word ending in the *kṛt*-suffix in the same  
 sentence, the latter will take the genitive case by P.2.3.66 and the  
 former will have the instrumental case by P.2.3.18. In P.1.4.28, since  
 we have the word *adarśana* and as far as the surface vocabulary of  
 this rule is concerned, we have no word denoting the object. Therefore  
 we have to apply P.2.3.65 to this rule and the word denoting the  
 agent, *yat-*, should be put in a genitive form. The fact is not so.

Commentators have puzzled about how to interpret this ungram-  
 matical use of instrumental case. There are two solutions to maintain  
 the Pāṇini's wording. One is mentioned in *KV*. Its comment (see 6.1)  
 shows that by adding the word *ātmanah* in this rule the instrumental  
 case of the word *yena* denotes the agent. *Nyāsa* gives more explanation  
 that the word *yena* means the agent (of the verb *√iṣ-*) and the object  
 of 'not-to-be-seen' is oneself (*ātmanah*). (*Nyāsa* on do. [I, 541-2]:  
*yeneti. kartari tṛtīyā. nanu ca "kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti" iti śaṣṭhyā  
 bhavitavyam iti? naitad asti; "ubhayaprāptau karmaṇi" iti niyamāt  
 karmaṇy eva, na kartari. karma tv atrādarśanasyaātmā, tasyā-  
 ntarāṅgatvāt sa eva karma vijñāyate*). If we supply the word *ātman*

in this rule, since both the words are used and then by P.2.3.66 the word *ātman* would take the genitive case and by P.2.3.18 the instrumental case of the word *yena* is justified. Then *PM* gives further explanation that when someone is asked that who does want not to be seen by other, he might reply that I myself. Thus, although the word *ātmanah* is not mentioned in this rule, at least its meaning is implied in this rule. (*PM* on do. [I, 541]: *nanv ātmane iti na śrūyate, mā śrāvi; yenādarśanam icchatīty ukte kasyety apekṣāyām ātmana iti gamyate*). Both *PM* and *Nyāsa* admit the form *yena* as correct. This reasoning paradoxically makes alternation in Pāṇini's wording by adding the word *ātmanah*.

Bhattoji does not explicitly speak of the supplement of the word *ātmanah* but, as far as it can be inferred from his statement: *na ca kṛdyoge śaṣṭhīprasaṅgaḥ*, it might be concluded that he also admits to supply the word *ātmanah* because unless this word is in this rule the genitive form of \**yasya* is inevitable.<sup>15</sup>

However, Nāgeśa opposes to this view. According to him, since we do not have the word *ātmanah*, we cannot apply P.2.3.66 to this case. Although the usage of P.1.4.28 is opposed to P.2.3.65, we have to accept it as correct simply because Pāṇini himself prescribes this rule. (*Uddyota* on do. [II, 252r]: *yeneti sautrī trītiyā. ubhayaḥ prayogābhāvenobhayaprāptāv ity asyāpravṛtteḥ. ubhayaprayoge eva tatpravṛttir ity "ātmamāne [KHaś ca. P.3.2.83] iti sūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam.*<sup>16</sup> *antardhinimittakaṃ yat kartṛkaṃ ātmakarmakādarśanam icchati tad apādānam ity arthaḥ.*) Nevertheless, Nāgeśa states contradictory opinion in his *LŚ* on do. [I, 690-691]: *yenety atra "kartṛkarmaṇoḥ" [P.2.3.65] iti śaṣṭhī na sautratvāt. "ātmanah" iti pratyāsattilabdham.*<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Bālamānoramā* on SK 591 [I,661]: *ātmana iti darśanaśabdāyoge karmaṇi śaṣṭhī. ātmana ity adhyāhāralabhyam. ata eva yeneti kartari trītiyā saṅgacchate. anyathā kṛdyogaśaṣṭhī-prasaṅgāt. āmana ity adhyāhāre tu ubhayaprāptau karmaṇy eveti niyamān na kṛdyogaśaṣṭhī.*

<sup>16</sup> *MBh* ad P.3.2.83 [II, 110, 8-10]: *nanu cokaṭaṃ kartary api vai tenaiva vidhīyate. tatra kuta etat. karmaṇi bhaviṣyati na punaḥ kartarīti? evaṃ tarhy ātmagrahaṇasāmarthyāt karmaṇi vijñāyate. Uddyota* on do. [III, 175r]: *ātmagrahaṇam anarthakam iti. yady apy ubhayaprāptāv iti niyamād api na kartarīti vaktuṃ śakyam. tathāpy ubhayaḥ prayogābhāvād atra tad aprāptih.*

<sup>17</sup> *LŚ* is the shorter version of his commentary on SK. The larger one is called *Bṛhatśabdendusekhara* and it is, according to Kapil Dev Shastri, the editor of the *Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhāntamañjūṣā* of Nāgeśa, "probably completed before the completion of his *Uddyota*." (Introduction of *VSM*, p. vi) It is not clear that *LŚ* is earlier than *Uddyota* but it is highly possible.

6.3. Bhaṭṭoji's interpretation of P.1.4.28 {119, 8-10}

Text: *vyavadhāne sati yat kartṛkasyātmano darśanasyābhāvam icchati tad kārakam apādānam syāt. "mātur niliyate kṛṣṇah."* "līṅ śleṣaṇe"[1139; Dhṛ. 4.31] *daivādikaḥ*.

Translation: When the placing [something] in between is taken place, [a person] to whom someone wishes the absence of seeing of which has agent and oneself [as the object] is *kāraka* and *apādāna*. For example, "*mātur niliyate kṛṣṇah*: Kṛṣṇa is hiding from his mother." Here, the verbal root √līṅ- means "to attach, cling to" and belongs to fourth conjugation [but not the passive form].

Notes: This comment is same as that of SK. No. 591 [I, 661]<sup>18</sup> with minor changes: *vyavadhāne sati yat kartṛkasyātmano darśanasyābhāvam icchati tad apādānam syāt. mātur niliyate kṛṣṇah*. Bhaṭṭoji gives his interpretation of the word *antardhau*, i.e., "*vyavadhāne sati*," and this is apparently the usage of absolute locative. See 6.1. Nāgeśa comments on this passage [LŚ, I. 690]: *antardhir anyakartṛkasva-karmakadarśanābhāvānukūlo vyavahitodeśasthirūpaḥ, tadghaṭikam yat kartṛkadarśanābhāvam icchati tad apādānam ity arthas phalitam āha — vyavadhāne satīti* (Tr.: The act of hiding means the situation where something is blocking between, which is conducive to the absence of seeing having the other person as its agent and oneself as its object. As such the person of which someone wishes the absence of that agent's seeing is *apādāna*. To clarify this meaning, [Bhaṭṭoji] says "*vyavadhāne satī*").

6.4. Again on the word *antardhau* {119,10-11}

Text: *atra 'antardhāv' iti cintyaprayojanam.*<sup>19</sup> "*na didṛkṣate corān*" *ity atra hi paratvāt karmatā siddhā*.

Translation: The word *antardhau* is redundant [in this rule]. It is because, according to the *paratva*-principle, [if it is not in the rule, then the word *caura*] would be termed as *karman* [and take the accusative case] in the expression "*na didṛkṣate caurān*: he does not want to see the thieves".

18 Cf. *Bālamānoraṃā* [ibid.]: *iha tūpasargavaśād vyavadhānena parakartṛkasvaviṣayakadarśanavirahānukūlavayāpare vartate. tatas ca kṛṣṇo mātrkartṛkasvaviṣayakadarśanavirahāya kuḍyādīnā pracchanno bhavatiṭy arthaḥ. atra vyavadhānam āśritya mātrkartṛkasvaviṣayakadarśanavirahasya kṛṣṇneṣyamāṇatayā mātur apādānatvāt pañcamī*.

19 *Tattvabodhinī* [I, 661] says "Śabdakaustubhe tu "*antardhau*" ity etac cintyaprayojanam iti sthītam."

Notes: In this section the (un-)necessity of the word *antardhau* is again discussed by giving the counter-example. See the comment of Jinendrabuddhi.

*Nyāsa* [I, 542]: *caurān na didr̥kṣata iti. atra yaś caurān na didr̥kṣata iti sa tair ātmano 'darśanam icchati, na tv antarddhi-nimittam; kintūpaghātānivr̥ttyartham. vispaṣṭārthañ cāntarddhi-grahaṇam. paratvāt karmasamjñayaiva bādhitvāc caurāṇām apādānasamjñā na bhaviṣyati.*

Tr.: On "*caurān na didr̥kṣate.*" Here in this counter-example the person who does not want to see the thieves is the one who wishes not to be seen by them. [In this case, the act of not-seeing] is not caused by the act of hiding. Rather, it aims at the escape from injury. The mention of the word *antardhi-* is very clear [because if it is not in this rule, the thieves by whom the person does not wish to be seen would be termed as *apādāna*. However, it is not necessary] because by means of the *paratva-*principle the designation *karman* will prevail over *apādāna*.

Joshi and Roodbergen [1975] say that this counter-example is wrong because Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of that example itself is not correct and as such P.1.4.28 cannot be applied.<sup>20</sup>

#### 6.5. On the word *icchati* {119,11-12}

Text: '*icchati*' *iti kim? icchāyām asatyām*<sup>\*1</sup> *saty api darśane yathā syāt.*

\*1. Read "*icchāyām satyām*" instead of "*icchāyām asatyām.*" This reading is supported by *KV* and *SK* No. 591: *icchatigrahaṇam kim — adarśane-cchāyām satyām saty api darśane yathā syāt.*

Translation: What is the purpose of the word *icchati*? When someone has a desire of "not-to-be-seen," even if the act of seeing is taken place [against his wish, *apādāna* designation] would be [applied to].

Notes: This remarks the case where the act of seeing is actually taken place. If someone wishes not to be seen and against his wish the other person sees him, since the intention of the former person conforms to

<sup>20</sup> "Strictly speaking, however, *sa tair ātmano 'darśanam icchati* cannot be a correct interpretation of the sentence *caurān na didr̥kṣate*, because, according to P.1.3.7, the desiderative suffix can only be used, if the agent of the action denoted by the verbal base and the person who wishes are one and the same person. Therefore *caurān na didr̥kṣate* can only mean: 'he does not want to see the thieves.'" (p. 89) Also they refers to the interpretation suggested by D.H.H.Ingalls, although his translation of the *KV* is still unpublished. See *ibid.* p. 90.

the condition prescribed in P.1.4.28, this rule can be applied. *KV* on do. [I, 542]: *icchatigrahaṇam kim ? adarśaneccchāyām satyām saty api darśane yathā syāt*. Also see *LŚ* [I, 691]: *saty apīti. adarśaneccchā tadanukūlavāpārakarāṇe daivavaśād darśane saty apīty arthaḥ. athavā yatra darśanābhāva eva tatraiva syād iti bhāvah*. (Tr.: On “*saty api*.” It means that “when the activity conducive to the desire of ‘not-to-be-seen’ is employed, even though he is seen by chance.” Or rather, it is implied that only when the act of seeing is absent [this rule] would be applied).

7. *ākhyātopayoge* [P.1.4.29: *SK*. 592].

7.0. Explanation { 119, 13-15 }

Text: *upayogo niyamapūrvakam vidyāsvikāraṇa. tasmin sādhye ya ākhyātā tat kārakam apādānam syāt. “upādhyāyād adhīte.”*

Translation: The word *upayoga* means “an acquisition of knowledge following a discipline (*niyamapūrvakavidīyasvikāraṇa*),” [namely taking a lesson regularly]. When such [an acquisition] is to be done, a person who provides [instruction] is *kāraka* [and becomes] *apādāna*. For example, “*upādhyāyād adhīte*: he learns from a teacher.”

Notes: *KV* on P.1.4.29, [I, 543]: *ākhyātā = pratipādayitā. upayogaḥ = niyamapūrvakam vidyāgrahaṇam. upayoge sādhye ya ākhyātā tat kārakam apādānasamjñam bhavati. upādhyāyād adhīte. upādhyāyād āgamayati.*

Patañjali states that the word *upayoga* means ‘*prakarsagati*: to reach the higher level’ or ‘*niyamapūrvaka*: to follow the discipline’ [*MBh* ad P.1.4.29, I, 329, 9-10]. However, the commentators prefer the latter sense and say “*niyamapūrvakam vidyāsvikāraṇam (vidyāgrahaṇam)*.” *Uddyota* on P.1.4.29 says [II, 253r]: *upayogaśabdasya tatraiva rūdhir anyatra tu lakṣṇayā prayoga ity arthaḥ. niyamo bhikṣācaraṇabhūśayyādīḥ*. (Tr.: The word *upayoga* means “*rūdhi*: a traditional custom” in this case but in other cases “*prayoga*: [simple] practice” through the secondary meaning. *Niyama* is, for example, “going for alms,” or “sleeping on the ground,” etc.).

The word *niyama* means “*vidyāgrahaṇārtham śiṣyapravṛttiḥ*: the activity of the student in order to obtain the instructions.” (This explanation is given by the *Nyāsa* on do. [I, 543]). As for what kind of activity, Nāgeśa says in above quotation, viz. *bhikṣācaraṇa* and *bhūśayyā*, etc. or Haradatta says [*PM* I, 543]: *yathā teṣāṃ mantrāṇām*

*upayoge dvādaśaham adhaḥ śiṣyete niyamo bhikṣācaraanādhī.* We have, for example, the following traditional statement about these: *Manusmṛti* 2.108: *agnīndhanam bhaiṣṭacaryām adhaḥśayyām guror hitam / ā samāvartanāt kuryāt kṛtopanayano dvijah //* (The *dvija* who completes his *upanayana* rite should continue to do the act of keeping a [sacred] fire, going for alms, sleeping below [= on the ground], and serving for his *guru* until he arrives at the time of *samāvartana* rite).<sup>21</sup>

### 7.1. On the word *upayoge* {119, 15}

Text: ‘*upayoge*’ *iti kim?* “*naṭasya śṛṇoti.*”

Translation: What is the purpose of the word *upayoga*? [To prevent the application of *apādāna* to *naṭa*] in the expression “*naṭasya śṛṇoti*: he listens to the song.” [In this case, since mere act of listening is intended, it has no regular lesson].

Notes: This counter-example is oft-cited to show the difference between the *kāraka* and non-*kāraka*, i.e. *śeṣa*. (See part (1) 2.8.5, pp. 49-50 and part (2) 2.3.1, pp. 150-152). Since to hear the actor singing has no regularity and academic aspect, *naṭa* cannot be regarded as *ākhyātr* and thus 29 would not be applied. (*Nyāsa* on do. [I, 543]: *naṭasya gāthām śṛṇotīti. sambandhalakṣaṇā ṣaṣṭhī. niyamapūrvakam iha vidyāgrahaṇam nāsti.*)

If non-regularity becomes a criterion to decide whether the word *upayoga* is to be in this rule or not, even though *upayoga* is in this rule, it is not possible to block the application of the designation *apādāna* to *naṭa* because to hear the *gāthā* of the actor regularly and, putting in another way, to have a lesson how to sing the *gāthā* from the actor adjusts to the condition of P.1.4.29. Therefore Haradatta acquiesces in this interpretation, namely *naṭa* can serve as the fixed point from which the *gāthā* comes (this understanding of Haradatta apparently follows Patañjali’s refusal of P.1.4.25-31) but he entrusts this problem whether *naṭa* is termed as *apādāna* or *śeṣa* to the speaker who expresses it. (*PM* [ibid.]: *nanu naṭasya saty apy avadhivte śeṣarūpeṇa viśeṣanāt ṣaṣṭhī bhaviṣyati, yathā na māṣāṇām aśnīyād iti vastutaḥ karmatvaṃ māṣāṇām, satyam, sa eva vivakṣāniyamah*

<sup>21</sup> As for the *niyama* during the *brahmacārīn* period prescribed in the *Manusmṛti*, see 2.173-242. For examples, 182 *udakumbham sumanasā gośakṛmṛttikākuśān / āharedyāv arthāni bhaiṣṭam cāharaḥ caret //*; 183 *vedajajñair ahīnānām praśastānām svakarmasu / brahmacāryāhared bhaiṣṭam grhebhyaḥ prayato ’nvaham //*; 184 *guroḥ kule na bhikṣeta na jñātikulabandhuṣu / alābhe tv anyagehānām pūrvam pūrvam vivarjayet //*; 185 *sarvam vāpi cared grāmaṃ pūrvoktānām asaṃbhave / niyamya prayato vācam abhiśastāms tu varjayet //*

*sūtrakāreṇa pradarsyate — upayoge 'vadhivam vivakṣitam, anyatra śeṣatvam iti).*

8. *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ* [P.1.4.30: SK. 593]

8.0. Explanation { 119, 16-17 }

Text: *jāyamānasya hetur apādānaṃ syāt. "putrāt pramādo jāyate."*

Translation: The cause of one who is born becomes *apādāna*. Example, "putrāt pramādo jāyate: a mistake arises from a son."

Notes: *KV* on P.1.4.30 [I, 543-4]: *janeḥ karttā janikarttā. janyarthasya janmanah karttā jāyamānaḥ, tasya yā prakṛtiḥ kāraṇam, hetuḥ tat kārakam apādānaṃjñam bhavati.*

Bhaṭṭoji gives another example in his *SK.*, i.e., "*brāhmaṇaḥ prajāḥ prajāyante.*" Why does he quote this example instead of the ordinarily used one? According to the *Tattvabodhinī*, this example can cover two positions concerning to how to interpret the meaning of the word *prakṛti*. (*Tattvabodhinī* on do. [I, 662]: *tadubhyasādhāraṇam udāharaṇam āha — brāhmaṇa iti*). This concern leads to the ontological issue discussed later (8.2).

8.1. On the word *janikartuḥ* { 119, 17-18 }

8.1.1. About the form and meaning of *jani-*.

Text: *iha janir utpattiḥ. "janir utpattir udbhavaḥ" ity Amaraḥ* [AK. 1.4.30].

Translation: Here, *jani-* means a production. Amara says that *jani-* means a production or a generation.

Notes: The first constituent of the word *janikartuḥ*, *jani-*, is explained. The verbal root  $\sqrt{\text{jani-}}$  belongs to the fourth conjugation class (*Dhp.* IV, 41: *jānī prādurbhāvé*).<sup>22</sup> Bhaṭṭoji refers to the *b pāda* of verse from the *Amarakoṣa*: *janur janananjanmāni janir utpattir udbhavaḥ / prāṇī tu cetano janmī jantujanyuśarīriṇaḥ //30//*.

8.1.2. Two alternatives of the formation *jani-* { 119, 18-20 }

Text: "*iÑajādibhyaḥ*<sup>\*1</sup>" [*Vt* on P.3.3.108] *iti janer bhāve iÑ*,<sup>\*2</sup>

"*janighasibhyaṃ*" (*Uṇādi-sūtra* 579) *ity Uṇādisūtreṇeṇ vā.*

"*janivadhyoś ca*" [P.7.3.35] *iti vṛddhipratishedhaḥ.*

\*1 and \*2. Should we read "*iÑajādibhyaḥ*" instead of "*iÑajādibhyaḥ*" and '*iÑ*' instead of '*iÑ*'? See the following Notes.

<sup>22</sup> *MDhV*, p. 415, 11-12 and 18-19: *prādurbhāva utpattir abhivyaktir vā. atrāyam akarmakah. ... "janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ" iti jāyamānasya kāraṇam śṛṅgam apādānam.*

Translation: (1) According to *Vt.* “*iÑajādibhyaḥ*,” suffix *iÑ* denoting the state of production is added to  $\sqrt{\text{jan-}}$ . (2) [However,] according to *Uṇādisūtra*, the word *jani-* is formed by adding suffix *iN* to  $\sqrt{\text{jan-}}$ . [In both cases,] the *vrddhi* is prohibited by P.7.3.35.

Notes: In discussing the form of *jani-*, there are two possibilities of its derivation: (A)  $\sqrt{\text{jan-}}$  + *iÑ* and (B)  $\sqrt{\text{jan-}}$  + *iN*. Alternative (A) is based on the *Vt.* VII on P.3.3.108: *iÑvapādibhyaḥ* [in *MBh* ad P.3.3.108, II, 155, 5] and (B) is based on *Vt.* VI on do.: *iÑajādibhyaḥ* [ibid., 3]. Both forms are directly introduced after the verbal roots. And the *vrddhi* replacement does not occur on account of P.7.3.35: *janivadhyoś ca* ([The *vrddhi*<sup>7.2.114</sup> replacement does not<sup>3.34</sup> occur on the short penulti-mate vowel *-a*<sup>2.116</sup> of]  $\sqrt{\text{jan-}}$  and  $\sqrt{\text{vadh-}}$  [before the suffixes<sup>3.1.1</sup> having *Ñ* or *N* as *IT*<sup>2.115</sup>]). We have one more alternative which is introduced after the verbal root to specify it. *Vt.* II on do. [ibid., 154, 18]: *iKṣṭiPau dhātunirdēse*. This derivational possibility is rejected in 8.1.4.

Here, we fall into a confusion about the suffix. *ŚK* quotes the *Vt* in the form of “*iÑajādibhyaḥ*” but this does not conform to the present *Vt.* VII. Haradatta, supporting alternative (A), gives different reading [PM on do. I, 543-4]: *etaḍ uktaṃ bhavati — janiśabdo 'yam “iÑjādibhyaḥ” iti janer bhāve iÑam utpādya vyutpāditāḥ. “janivadhyoś ca” iti vrddhipratīṣedho janyārthavācī*. On the other hand, alternative (B) is supported by the commentators of *SK*, namely *Bālamānoramā* on *SK.* 593 [I, 662]: *janī prādurbhāve daivādiko 'karmakaḥ. iÑajādibhyaḥ iti bhāve iN. “janivadhyoś ca” iti niṣedhān nopadhāvṛttiḥ; Tattvabodhinī* on do. [ibid.]: “*iÑajādibhyaḥ*” *iti janer bhāve iN. “janivadhyoś ca” iti vrddhiniṣedhaḥ*. This alternative corresponds to the *Uṇādisūtra*,<sup>23</sup> and Dhātuvṛtti-s such as the *MDhV* and the *Kṣīratarāṅgiṇī* quote this *Uṇādisūtra* as a reference (*MDhV.* [p. 417, 7-8]: *janiḥ — “janighasibhyām iN” itiN; Kṣīratarāṅgiṇī* [p. 126]: *janighasibhyām iN* [U. 4.129], *janivadhyoś ca* [VII.3.35] *iti vrddhiniṣedhaḥ janiḥ*). Why do the two commentaries on *SK*, quoting the passages of the *ŚK* so frequently, give different derivation and *Vt*? Does it mean that the passage of *SK* in this section is misunderstood and thus they correct it because the *Vt* which Bhaṭṭoji refers to is a

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Commentary on the *Amarakoṣa* [pp. 55-56]: “*janighasibhyām iṅ*” (Uṇ. 4.130). “*janivadhyoś ca*” (7.3.35) *iti vrddhiniṣedhaḥ. utpattisāhacaryāḥ janeḥ strītvam*. As for the number of this *Uṇādisūtra*, according to the Osmania University edition of the *KV(a)*, it is 1.58 in *daśapādyuṇādisūtra* and 4.139 in *pañcapādyuṇādisūtra* [part III].

mixture of *Vts* VI and VII? Therefore, tentatively speaking, if the present *Vt* given in the *MBh* is to be accepted, the text of *ŚK* should be read as suggested under the text portion (in this case the passage of the *PM* also needs correction) and if we read the text of *ŚK* as it is, it should be rendered that it reflects simply a difference of opinions. In both cases, the meanings are not different.

8.1.3. The formations of *janikartṛ* {119, 20-24}

Text: *tasyāḥ karteti śaṣṭhītatpuruṣaḥ. "kartari ca" [P.2.2.16] iti pratiśedhas tv anityaḥ, ata eva jñāpakāt. yadvā, śeṣaśaṣṭhyā samāso 'yam. niṣedhas tu karmaśaṣṭhīviṣaya iti "kārake" [P.1.4.23] iti sūtre Kaiyataḥ. tathā cārthamātrasya grahaṇād dhātvantarayoge 'pi bhavati "aṅgād aṅgāt sambhavati" yathā.*

Translation: (1) [The compound *janikartṛ*] is a genitive *tatpuruṣa* which means the agent of the production. However, as the prohibition of compounding by P.2.2.16 is not obligatory, so that this formation is allowed as the indicator. (2) Or, this is the compound of *śeṣa-śaṣṭhī*. However, Kaiyata says that the prohibition is prescribed in the domain of *śaṣṭhī* which denotes *karman*. Thus, since the meaning alone is obtained, even if another verbal root is used, it is possible to have the usages such as "*aṅgād aṅgāt sambhavati*: from each part it comes arise."

Notes. About the formation of the compound *janikartṛ*-. According to the *KV*, this compound is analyzed as *janeḥ karttā janikarttā* (see 8.0). The underlying string is [[*jani-* + *Ńas*] + [*karṭṛ-* + *sU*]] + *sU*. However, this compounding is prohibited by P.2.2.15: *ṭṛJakābhyāṃ kartari* ([The word ending in the sixth case<sup>8</sup>] denoting the agent [is not<sup>1.10</sup> compounded<sup>1.3</sup> with<sup>1.4</sup>] the word having the suffix *-ṭṛC* or *-aka*) and P.2.2.16: *kartari ca* ([The word ending in the sixth case<sup>8</sup> is not<sup>1.10</sup> compounded<sup>1.3</sup> with<sup>1.4</sup> the word having the suffix *-ṭṛC* or *-aka*<sup>15</sup>] denoting the agent). These readings of Pāṇini rule follow the Katre's translation. In this case, when the genitive case of the word *janeḥ* denotes the agent, the compounding is prohibited by P. 2.2.15. And if we consider this form as the genitive case denoting the object (see *PM* [I, 543: *janeḥ kartā janikarteti karmaṇi śaṣṭhyāḥ samāsaḥ. ayam eva ca nirdeśo jñāpayati — "kartari ca" iti pratiśedho 'niyta*

*iti*),<sup>24</sup> this case is outside of the scope of P.2.2.15. However, since this formation is allowed as the indicator (*jñāpaka*), this prohibition is not regarded as “obligatory.”

As for the reading of P.2.2.15-16, commentators and translators have different opinions. *KV* reads *kartari* in 15 as the qualifier to *śaṣṭhī* continued from P.2.2.8 and *kartari* in 16 as the qualifier to *-ṭṛC* and *-aka* (*KV* on P.2.2.15 [II, 116]: *karṭṛgrahaṇam śaṣṭhīviśeṣaṇam*; on 16 [ibid., 116-117]: *sāmarthyād akasya viśeṣaṇārthaṃ karṭṛgrahaṇam itaratra vyabhicārābhāvāt*). This reading is taken by the modern translators. See the followings (not the translation as the whole):

Böhtlingk [1887, I, 53]: ... ein subjectiver Genetiv (15); Auf nicht ein (objectiver) Genetiv mit einem Nomen ag. auf *ṭṛ* oder *aka*. (16);

Vasu [1891, I, 262]: ... when the force of the genitive case is that of an agent (15); ... when the force of these latter affixes is that of an agent (16)<sup>25</sup>;

Renou [1966, I, 104]: ... quand (ledit Gén. a valeur d’) agent (15); ... quand (ledit dérivé à “*ṭṛC*” ou *aka* a valeur d’) agent (16);

Katre [1987]: [A nominal pada ending in the sixth sUP triplet] introduced as an agent marker ... (15); ... [the affixes *-ṭṛC-* or *-aka-*] introduced as agent markers ... (16)<sup>26</sup>;

Cardona [1988, 255]: ... bases ending in *ṭṛC* and *aka* (*ṭṛjakābhyām*) introduced to signify an agent (*kartari*) (16).

Sharma [1995, 81, 84]: A *pada* which ends in *śaṣṭhī* and denotes *karman*<sup>27</sup> does not combine, ... with a syntactically related *pada* which ends in sUP, contains a stem in *ṭṛC* or *aka*, and denotes *karṭṛ* (15); A *pada* which ends in *śaṣṭhī* and denotes *karṭṛ* ....

However, Bhattoji considers that *kartari* in 15 is the qualifier not to *śaṣṭhī* but to *-aka* of *ṭṛJakābhyām* (*ŚK* on P.2.2.15 [I, 206, 1-2]:

24 If the condition *karmani* in P.2.2.14 is continued to 15, this interpretation of Haradatta, *karmaśaṣṭhī*, does not stand but, as he says, this compounding is allowed as *jñāpaka*. See the footnote 27.

25 Vasu says that *kartari* in 16 does not qualify “*ṭṛC*” but “*aka*” alone.

26 Katre gives the *sūtra*-number of continuing rules but they are omitted.

27 Sharma [1995] here thinks that *karmani* in P.2.2.14 is continued to 15 as the qualifier to *śaṣṭhī* (Böhtlingk translates 16 as “(objectiver) Genetiv.” This means that *karmani* is the qualifier to *śaṣṭhī* in 16). And Joshi and Roodbergen [1973] discusses these problems that whether *karmani* is continued to 15 or 16 and that what is represented by this *karman* (pp. 164-176), although Patañjali did not comment on P.2.2.15-16. To clarify the functions of P.2.2.14-16 it is necessary to be treated at another occasion.

*kartrarthatṛJakābhyām śaṣṭhyā na samāsaḥ. kartarīty akasyaiva viśeṣaṇam na tu ṛCo 'pi*) and that *kartari* in 16 qualifies the *śaṣṭhī* and *-ṛC* is not continued to 16 (ŚK on P.2.2.16 [ibid., 15]: *pūrvatra dvandvena nirddiṣṭo 'pi ṛC nehānuvartate*).<sup>28</sup> According to this interpretation of Bhattoji, the prohibition of the genitive *tatpuruṣa* in this case is by P.2.2.16 because the *karṛśaṣṭhī* is not excluded from the scope of P.2.2.15.<sup>29</sup>

Another interpretation of the formation is that in this compounding the genitive case does not denote any *kāraka*-meaning but non-*kāraka*-meaning (*śeṣa*). Since the genitive case does not represent *kāraka* and thus it is not covered by P.2.2.15-16, the compounding is allowed by P.2.2.8. This alternative is probably the solution by Bhattoji. (See *Bālamānoramā* [I, 662]: *janeḥ karteti vighrahaḥ. śeṣaśaṣṭhyā samāsaḥ "ṛJakābhyām kartari" iti niṣedhas tu kārakaśaṣṭhyā eveti vakṣyate; Tattvabodhinī* [ibid.]: *tasyāḥ karteti śeṣaśaṣṭhyā samāsa(h); na tu kārakaśaṣṭhyā, "ṛJakābhyām —" iti niṣedhāt*).

As for the reference to Kaiyaṭa, such a description is not found in his commentary on P.1.4.23 but instead the following is found in the *Pradīpa* on P.2.2.14 [II, 434r]: *ṛJakābhyām ceti. kartari yau ṛjakau tatra sāmāthyāt karmany eva śaṣṭhī anenaiva pratiṣedhaḥ siddhaḥ. (Cf. ŚK on P.2.2.15 [I, 206, 10-12]: Kaiyaṭas tu śeṣaśaṣṭhyā samāsa ity āha. "janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ" [P.1.4.30] "tatprajayako hetuś ca" [P.1.4.55] iti jñāpakād anityo 'yaṁ pratiṣedha iti tu bahavaḥ).*

#### 8.1.4. What is denoted by *jani-*? {119, 24-27}

Text: *etena "iKŚtiPau dhātunirdeśe" [Vt II on P.3.3.108] iti Kā nirdeśo 'yam ity āsṛitya "gamahana[-janakhanaghasām lopah KNITy anaNi]" [P.6.4.98] ity upadhālopam arthāsaṅgatim codbhāvayanto Mīmāṃsāvārtikakārāḥ samāhitāḥ.*

Translation: Therefore, depending on the derivation of *jani-* on account of the *Vt. II* on P.3.3.108 that "*iK-Ś-tiPau dhātunirdeśe*: when the verbal root itself is cited, the *kṛt*-suffix *-iK* or *ŚtiP* [i.e., *ŚaP* and *tiP*] is added [after the verbal root]," Kumārila said that the elision of *upadhā* (a penultimate vowel) and the non-acquisition of the meaning are explained.

<sup>28</sup> SK No. 709 [=P.2.2.15, II, 53]: *kartrarthatṛjakābhyām śaṣṭhyā na samāsaḥ*; No. 710 [P.2.2.16, ibid., 54]: *neha ṛJ anuvartate. tadyoge karturabhīhitatvena karṛśaṣṭhyā abhāvāt.*

<sup>29</sup> As for the opposite interpretations presented in *KV* and *SK*, see Sharma[1995], pp. 80-84.

Notes: In this section, what is meant for by the word *jani-* is discussed. Is it representing the verbal root  $\sqrt{jani}$  or the meaning of that verb ?

If it is intended to indicate the verbal root, it will lead to two difficulties. One is that since the final vowel *-i* of *jani-* is added on account of *Vt* II on P.3.3.108: *iKṢtiPau dhātunirdeśe*, P.6.4.98 is inevitably introduced and the drop of the penultimate vowel (*upadhālopa*) results. The other difficulty is that P.1.4.30 cannot cover the cases wherein other verbal roots having the meaning of “production; coming forth, etc.” such as *saṃ-√bhū-* is used. In order to avoid those difficulties it is admitted that the form *jani-* represents the meaning of “production; coming forth, etc.” denoted by the verbal roots such as  $\sqrt{jani}$ , etc.

The reference of the *Tantravārttika* is as follows [on *JS*.1.3.24, 1, 515, 5-11]:

*sūtre tāvat “janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ” [P.1.4.30] ity atra hi dvāv apaśabdau janiśabdena hi “iKṢtiPau dhātunirdeśa” ity anena lakṣaṇenānvito dhātur eva nirdeśyate. na ca tasya kartuḥ prakṛter apādānasamjñesyate. jāyamānasya punar arthasya janiśabdo vācakatayā naiva lakṣaṇenānugataḥ. tenāyaṃ daridra ivāśvaśabdo jani mātravācivāt tadarthaṃ praty asādhur eva vijñāyate. tathā “trjakābhyāṃ kartari” [P.2.2.15] iti pratiśedhaśaṣṭhīsamāsaprayogād vyākaraṇaphalaparityāgaḥ. evaṃ “tatprayojakaḥ” [P.1.4. 55] iti pratiśiddha eva samāsaḥ.*

Tr.: In case of P.1.4.30, there are two incorrect [ungrammatical] usage. (1) Namely, the word *jani-* means the verbal root  $\sqrt{jani}$  which is based on *Vt*. “*iKṢtiPau dhātunirdeśe*.” In this case, the designation *apādāna* is not to be applied to the agent of that, i.e., its source. The word *jani-* is not admitted as denoting “the one which is born (*jāyamāna*)” which is desired by the rule. Therefore, as the word *aśva* is used in the sense of “*daridra* (poor)”, the word *jani-* as the denotatum of that meaning is incorrect.

(2) Since P.2.2.15 prohibits the compounding with the word ending in the genitive case, [if you admits the compound *janikartṛ-*] it is nothing but a cancellation of the grammatical effect. In this way, the compounding of *tatprayojaka* is also prohibited.

The context whence this passage is quoted is to show how the grammarians themselves used ungrammatical forms. In this passage,

although the *upadhālopa* is not mentioned, two problems are treated. If the form *jani-* represents the verbal root itself, the compound form *janikartṛ-* cannot denote the meaning “*jāyamānasya kartuḥ*” and the compound itself is ungrammatical form.

## 8.2. On the word *prakṛti*

### 8.2.1. First view { 119, 27-30 }

Text: *atra prakṛtigrahaṇam upādānamātraparam ity eke. ata eva “prakṛtiś ca pratijñādr̥ṣāntānuparodhāt” [Brahmasūtra 1.4.23] ity adhikaraṇe brahmaṇo jagadupādānatāyām “yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante ” iti pañcamim upāmbhikām āhuḥ.*

Translation: Some hold that the word *prakṛti* is used to refer the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) alone. Thus, in the section of *BS. 1.4.23* “[Brahman] is the [material] cause because [such understanding is not contradictory to the statement (*pratijñā*) and the example (*dr̥ṣtānta*),” when the Brahman is regarded as the material cause of this world there is *śruti* to prove that the ablative case denotes [the material cause] such as “*yato vā (imāni) bhūtāni jāyante*: from it [=Brahman] these elements come arise.”

Notes: In the passages 8.2, two interpretations of the word *prakṛti* are discussed. One provocates that *prakṛti* is *upādānakāraṇa* and the other is that it is *hetu* or *kāraṇa* in general. As far as the grammarians are concerned, the former position is hold by Patañjali and Kaiyata and the latter by *KV* and *Nyāsa* (see *Tattvabodhinī* on *SK. 593 [I, 662]*: *iha prakṛtigrahaṇam hetumātraparam iti Vṛttikṛmatam. putrāt pramādo jāyata ity udāharaṇāt. upādānamātraparam iti tu Bhāṣya-Kaiyaṭa-matam*).<sup>30</sup>

Patañjali, although he himself does not explicitly claim that the word *prakṛti* means *upādānakāraṇa*, gives examples “*gomayād vṛściko jāyate*: a scorpion is born from cowdung” and “*golomā-*

<sup>30</sup> See also *Bālamānoramā*. On the example given by Bhaṭṭoji in his *SK*, namely “*brāhmaṇaḥ prajāḥ prajāyante*,” it comments as follows [on *SK 593, I, 662*]: *brāhmaṇa ity hiraṇyagarbhād ity arthaḥ. ghaṭādiṣu kulālādivat tasya prajotpattau nimittakāraṇatvam iti bhāvāḥ. Vṛttikṛmatam etad ayuktam, saṃyogaviśeṣasattvena “dhrumam apāye —” ity eva siddhatvāt. ato ‘tra mūle hetuśabda upādānakāraṇapara eva. ata eva Bhāṣya-Kaiyaṭayoh “gomayād vṛścikā jāyante,” “golomāvilomabhyo durvā jāyante” ity udāhṛtya pariṇāmeṣu prakṛtidravayāvayāvānusūyūtisattve ‘pi buddhikṛtaviśeṣasattvād “dhrumam apāye —” ity eva siddham iti pratyākhyānam saṃgacchate. evaṃ ca “brāhmaṇaḥ prajāḥ prajāyante” ity atra brahmaśabdena māyopahitam iśvaracaitanyam eva vivakṣitam. tad dhi sarvakāryopādānam iti Vedāntasiddhāntaḥ.*

*vilomabhyo dūrvā jāyante: dūrvā* grasses are born from the hairs of a cow and of a sheep.” These examples show that Patañjali thinks of the word *prakṛti* as the material cause. Kaiyaṭa further explains Patañjali’s position. *Pradīpa* on P.1.4.30 [II, 2551]: *lokaprasiddhyāśrayenaitad ucyate. loke hi yad yasmāj jāyate tat tasmān nirgacchatīty ucyate. tarkāśrayās tu prakriyā bhidyante. Vaiśeṣikadarśane paramāṅvādi-samavetaṃ kāraṇebhyo ’pṛthagdeśaṃ kāryam utpādyata iti nāsti kāryasyāpakramah. Sāṅkhyadarśane ’py āvirbhāvatirohāvalakṣaṇa-janmanāsarūpapariṇāmābhyupagamān nāsty apakramah.*<sup>31</sup>

The latter view is stated in the *Nyāsa* on P.1.4.30 [I, 544]: *dvididham hi kāraṇam — upādānakāraṇam, sahakārikāraṇaṃ ca. tatra yat kāryeṅābhinnadeśaṃ tad upādānakāraṇam, yathā — ghaṭasya mṛtpiṇḍaḥ. sahakārikāraṇam yat kāryeṅa bhinnadeśam, yathā — tasyaiva daṇḍacakrādi. tatrāsati prakṛtigrāhaṇe pratyāsatter upādānakāraṇasyaiva syāt, netarasya. prakṛtigrāhaṇe tu sarvasyaiva kāraṇamātrasya bhavati* (Tr.: The cause is of two types, namely a material cause and a co-operating cause.<sup>32</sup> The material cause is the one which exists in the same place where the result does. For example, a lump of clay for a pot. The co-operating cause is that which exists in the place whereon the result does not. Example, a stick or a potter’s wheel, etc. for [the pot]. If the word *prakṛti* is not mentioned in this rule, [it means] the material cause alone because of the proximity. However, when it is mentioned, [it means] the cause in general for everything).<sup>33</sup>

In order to show how the ablative case standing for the *apādāna* denotes the *prakṛti*, Bhaṭṭoji refers to the Vedānta school who claims

31 As for the translation and explanation of this passage, see Joshi and Roodbergen [1975], pp. 100-105.

32 The co-operating cause (*sahakārikāraṇa*) is nothing but the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*).

33 *KV* simply says “*prakṛtiḥ kāraṇam, hetuḥ*” (see 8.0). Generally, *kāraṇa* is classified into two by Vedānta, namely *upādānakāraṇa* and *nimittakāraṇa*. On the other hand, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hold three, i.e., *upādānakāraṇa*, *samavāyikāraṇa*, and *asamavāyikāraṇa*. See, for example, *Tarkasaṃgraha* of Annaṃbhaṭṭa, section 40 [pp. 26-27]: *kāraṇam trividham samavāyīya-samavāyīnimittabhedāt. yat samavetaṃ kāryam utpadyate tat samavāyikāraṇam. yathā tantavaḥ paṭasya paṭas ca svagatarūpādeḥ. kāryeṅa kāraṇena vā sahaikasminn arthe samavetaṭve sati yat kāraṇam tad asamavāyikāraṇam. yathā tantusamyogaḥ paṭasya tanturūpaṃ paṭarūpasya. tadubhayabhinnam kāraṇam nimittakāraṇam. yathā turivemādikaṃ paṭasya.* In this study, I limit myself to see the discussion presented in the grammatical texts because this issue is too much wider to treat here.

that the Brahman is the material cause as well as the efficient cause. See the following Śaṅkara's commentary on BS 1.4.23 [340]:

*yata itīyaṃ pañcamī "yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante" ity atra "janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ" iti viśeṣasmarāṇāt prakṛtilakṣaṇa evā-pādāne draṣṭavyā. nimittatvaṃ tv adhiṣṭhātrantarābhāvād adhi-gantavyam. yathā hi loke mṛtsuvarṇādīkam upādānakāraṇaṃ kulālasuvarṇakārādīn adhiṣṭhātṛn apeksya pravartate naivaṃ brahmaṇa upādānakāraṇasya sato 'nyo 'dhiṣṭhātāpeksyo 'sti, prāgutpatter ekam evāditīyam ity avadhāraṇāt. adhiṣṭhātr-antarābhāvo 'pi pratijñādrṣṭāntānuparodhād evodito vedita-vyaḥ. adhiṣṭhātari hy upādānād anyasminn abhyupagamyamāne punar apy ekavijñānena sarvavijñānasyāsambhavāt prati-ñādrṣṭāntoparodha eva syāt. tasmād adhiṣṭhātrantarābhāvād ātmanaḥ kartṛtvam upādānāntarābhāvāc ca prakṛitvam.<sup>34</sup>*

Tr.: As the ablative case of the word 'yataḥ' in the passage from the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* is introduced by a special rule P.1.4.30, this case ending should be known as denoting the source (*prakṛti*). However, since there is no ruler (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) [other than this], the efficient cause-ness [of it] is also to be admitted. Although in the ordinary world the material cause such as clay or gold, etc. is depending on a potter or a goldsmith as its *adhiṣṭhātṛ*, the Brahman as the material cause is not subject to other *adhiṣṭhātṛ* because it is already established that it is nothing but the one before this world is created. Furthermore, that it does not have any *adhiṣṭhātṛ* [other than itself] is clearly realized because [such understanding] is not contradictory to *pratiñā* and *drṣṭānta*. If it is admitted that there is *adhiṣṭhātṛ* other than this material cause, it would lead to the fault that from one cognition all the knowledges are not obtained and thus make a contradiction to *pratiñā* and *drṣṭānta*. Therefore, Ātman is the agent [i.e., *nimittakāraṇa*] because there is no other *adhiṣṭhātṛ* and it is the *prakṛti* as well because of the lack of other material cause.

34 See also sub-commentaries on Śaṅkarabhāṣya [ibid.]: *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā*: "yato vā" ity atra śrutau yata iti pañcamī prakṛtau draṣṭavyety anvayaḥ. janikartur jāyamānasya kāryasya prakṛtir apādānasamjñikā bhavati sūtrārthah; *Bhāmatī*: yata iti ca pañcamī na kāraṇamātre smaryate api tu prakṛtau, "janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ" iti. tato 'pi prakṛitvam apagacchāmah; *Nyāyanirṇaya*: jāyamānasya kāryasya prakṛtir upādānam apādānasamjñam bhavati apādāne pañcamī smarāṇān na kāraṇamātre sū yuktety arthah. yady api sūtre prakṛtigrāhaṇaṃ sarvakāraṇasamgrahārtham ity uktam tathāpi tadanādrṣṭya "prakṛtiś ca" iti sūtrasthaprakṛtiśabdavad ayam apīti manyate, tathāpi katham nimittatvaṃ, tad āha — nimittatvam iti.

Śaṅkara refers to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* III(Bhṛguvallyadyāya)1: *bhṛgur vai varuṇiḥ / varuṇam pitaram upasasāra / adhīhi bhagavo brahmeti / tasmā etat provāca — annam prāṇam cakṣuḥ śrotram mano vācam iti/ tam hovāca — yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante / yena jātāni jīvanti/ yat prayanty abhisamviśanti / tad vijijñāsasva tad brahmeti / sa tapo 'tapyata / sa tapas taptvā //*<sup>35</sup>

### 8.2.2. Second view { 119, 30-33 }

Text: *anye tu "putrāt pramādo jāyate" iti vṛttisvarasāt prakṛtiśabda iha kāraṇamātrapara ity āhuḥ. asmimś ca pakṣe "yato vā" iti sāmānyaśabdo 'py upādānarūpaviśeṣaparaḥ. "chāgo vā mantra-varṇāt" [Jaiminisūtra 6.8.31] iti śāṣṭhanyāyāt.*

Translation: However, others say that since the meaning of the expression "*putrāt pramādo jāyate*" is favoured, the word *prakṛti* means here the cause [not only the material cause]. According to this view, the word which expresses the general meaning [such as the word *prakṛti*] can denote the particular such as the material cause (*upādāna*). It is said by the maxim in the sixth [chapter] that "On the other hand, it is he-goat because of the *mantra*" [JS.6.8.31].

Notes: *PM* says [ibid.]: *anye tu dhruvagrahaṇānuvṛtter eva prakṛti-parigrahe siddhe prakṛtigrahaṇam kāraṇamātraparigrahārthaṃ varṇayanti. ata eva vṛttāv uktam — kāraṇam iti, na punar upādāna-kāraṇam iti. tena ca putrāt pramādo jāyata ityādāv api bhavātīti* (Tr.: On the other hand, others say that since, when the word *dhruva-* is continued from [P.1.4.24], the meaning of the word *prakṛti* is included in [that notion], the purpose of mentioning *prakṛti* is to show the general term *kāraṇa*. Therefore, it is said in *KV* that *kāraṇam iti*. It does not mean the material cause alone. In this way, the example is given).

In this passage, the discussion of sixth chapter of the *JS* is referred to. *JS* 6.8.30-43 are concerned to the problem which kind of animal is to be offered to Agni and Soma gods. Even though there is no special rule that prescribes the kind of animal, since we have another statement that "Invoke with the fat of the marrow of a goat," it is

<sup>35</sup> See also *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* I.9.1: *asya lokasya kā gatir iti / ākāśa iti hovāca / sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāny ākāśād eva samutpadyante / ākāśam pratyastam yanti / ākāśo hy evaibhyo jyāyān / ākāśaḥ parāyaṇam //*

clearly realized that the animal to be offered is the goat.<sup>36</sup> And the goat is one of species of animal. When the animal as the genus is referred to, it includes its species, i.e., the goat. In this way, when the general notion is expressed, it includes the particulars. See Śabarabhāṣya on JS 6.8.35 [5, 370]:

*niyamo vaikarthyam hy arthabhedād bhedaḥ prthaktvenābhidhānāt //35// aniyamo vā. aikyārthyam hi paśuchāgaśabdayoḥ. sāmānyam paśur iti. chāgādayo viśeṣā ucyante. katham. vai sāmānādhikaranyāt. paśuś chāgaḥ, paśur utṣtraḥ, paśur meṣaḥ, paśur usraḥ iti. evaṃ sati na mantravarṇaḥ paśuśadena viruddhyate. tena chāgo 'py ālabdhavyaś coditaḥ. mantravarṇa upādīyamāne, idam avagamyate. chāgaṃ vivakṣitvā 'yam paśuśabda uccarita iti, nānyān viśeṣān iti. chāgopakaraṇam asyopadaṃśitam. yad upadaṃśane paśuśabdaś chāgābhīprāya iti gamyate. yathā yugavaratropadaṃśite, iṣācakraḍi-saṃnidhāne ca akṣam ānayety ukte, yānākṣam adhikṛtya brūta iti gamyate, na tu videvanākṣam iti. yadi hy arthabhedo bhavet paśuchāgaśabdayoḥ prthaktvenābhidhānam, tato bhedaḥ syāt, na chāga eva niyamate. avihitaś chāgārtha ity aśvopādānam. api ca chāgapakṣe taṃ mantravarṇaḥ prakāśayet. chāgārthāhidhāne punaḥ paśuśabdasya, chāgaprapṛtāv anyeṣāṃ aprapṛtir ity anyasmin prāpte liṅgena niyamaḥ kriyata iti; on 43 [ibid., 373]: jātir vā tatprāyavacanārthavattvābhyām //43// vāśabdo 'vadhāranāyām. tasmād avayavaprasiddhyā samudāyaprasiddhir na bādhyate. tasmāj jāter eva chāgaśabdo vācakaḥ. evaṃ samudāyasyārthavattā 'nugṛhītā bhaviṣyati. tasmāt tatprāyavacanam upapadyate.*

### 8.2.3. Appositional relation {119, 33-120, 3}

Text: "aham eva bahu syām" iti hi sāmānādhikaranyam śrūyate. tac ca caturdhā — bhrame, bādhyām, abhede, tādātmye ca. prakṛte tādātmye, bhinnatve saty abhinnasattālatvam āvidyakāḥ sambandhaviśeṣo vā tādātmyam ityādy Uttaramīmāṃsāyām spaṣṭam.

<sup>36</sup> See Śabarabhāṣya on JS. 6.8.31 [5, 368]: vāśabdaḥ pakṣam vyāvartayati. naitad asti. yatrakvacana dravye paśutvam upādeyam iti. asty utsraṣṭavyasya niyamakāraṇam mantravarṇaḥ. chāgasya = vapāyā medaso 'nubrūṭīti, chāgaprakāśanasamartho mantravarṇaḥ samāmnāyate. yadi chāgo nopādeyas tatas tatprakāśanasamarthasyopādānam anarthavat. tenāvagamyate chāgam adhikṛtyotsargaṃ vidadhātīti. māntravarṇiko dravyaniyamavidhir iti.

Translation: The identical relation [of Brahman and material cause] is clearly stated in the passage “*aham eva bahu syām*: I will be many.” There are four types whence the appositional relation is realized, namely, in case of the error (*bhrama*), of an absurdity (*bādhā*), of an [imposed] non-difference (*abheda*) and an [actual] same-ness (*tādātmya*). In this case, [what is meant for] is the same-ness. The same-ness is the state of having the same existence if there [seems to be] a difference or the particular relation which is based on *avidyā*. This is clear in the view of Vedānta.

Notes: On the *śruti* “*aham eva bahu syām*,”<sup>37</sup> see *Chāndogya Up.* VI.2.3: *tadaikṣata — bahu syām prajāyeyeti / tat tejo 'srjata / tat teja aikṣata / bahu syām prajāyeyeti / tad apo. 'srjata / tasmād yatra kva ca śocati svedate vā pirīṣas tejasa eva tadadhyāpo jāyante //; Taittirīya Up.* II (Brahmavallyadhyāya) 6: *so 'kāmayata / bahu syām prajāyeyeti / sa atapo 'tapyata / sa tapas taptvā / idaṃ sarvaṃ asrjata / yad idaṃ kiṃ ca / tat sṛṣṭvā / tad evānuprāviṣat / tad anuprāviṣya / sac ca tyac cābhavat / niruktaṃ cāniruktaṃ ca nilayanam cānilayanam ca / vijñānam cāvijñānam ca / satyam cānṛtam ca / satyam abhavat / yad idaṃ kiṃ ca / tat satyam ity ācakṣate / tad apy eśa śloko bhavati //*

Śaṅkara states the appositional relation (*sāmānādhikarānya*) of the Brahman and the *prakṛti* as follows [on BS. 1.4.26, 341]: *pariṇāmād iti vā pṛthaksūtram. tasyaiṣo 'rthaḥ — itaś ca prakṛtir brahma, yat kāraṇam brahmaṇa eva vikārātmanā pariṇāmaḥ sāmānādhikarānyenāmnāyate “sac ca tyac cābhavat. niruktaṃ cāniruktaṃ ca” [Tai. Up. II.6] ityādineti* (Tr.: Or rather, “*pariṇāmāt*” [which is a part of this *sūtra*] itself is an independent *sūtra*. It means that the Brahman is *prakṛti* because it is said that *pariṇāma* as the transformation of the Brahman is expressed appositionally [with the Brahman] such as “[Having entered here, It] became ‘existence (*sat*)’ and ‘that (*tya*)’; ‘what is expressed (*nirukta*)’ and ‘what it not expressed (*anirukta*)’ [Tai. Up. II.6]”). (Unfortunately, its source stating the four factors which cause the notion of *sāmānādhikarānya* collectively, as is referred in this ŚK, is untraced).

37 Śaṅkara comments on this *śruti* as follows [on BS. 1.4.24, 340]: *abhidhyopadeśaś cātmanah kartṛtvaprakṛtīve gamayati “so 'kāmayata bahu syām prajāyeya” [Tai. Up. II.6] iti, “tadaikṣata bahu syām prajāyeya” [Ch. Up. VI.2.3] iti ca. tatrābhidhyānapūrvikāyāḥ svatantryapavṛtteḥ karteti gamyate. bahu syām iti pratyagātmaṣayatvād bahubhavanābhidhyānasya prakṛtir ity api gamyate.*

9. *bhuvah prabhavaḥ* [P.1.4.31: SK. 594]

9.0. The meaning of the rule {120, 4-7}

Text: *bhūkartuḥ prabhavaḥ prāgvat. "himavato gaṅgā prabhavati."*  
*"kaśmīrebhyo vitaratā<sup>\*1</sup> prabhavati."* "tasu upakṣaye" [1213;  
 Dh.4.103] *bhāve Ktaḥ. vīgatastā vitastā. aśoṣyety arthaḥ. atropalabhateḥ karmavyāpāre prabhavatir vartate. prakāśate ity arthaḥ.*

\*1. Read *vitastā*. This reading is supported by MS94R2 and PM. And ŚK itself gives the form *vitastā* in explaining its derivation.

Translation: The point of origin for an agent of the verbal root √*bhū-* is [kāraṅga and called *apādāna*] as is explained earlier. For examples, "*himavato gaṅgā prabhavati*: the Gaṅgā river flows from the Himālaya," and "*kaśmīrebhyo vitastā prabhavati*: the Jhelum (Vitastā) river comes from Kashmir." In the second example, the name *vitastā* is derived from the verbal root "√*tasU-*: to decrease" plus affix *-Kta* which means the state (*bhāva*). Furthermore, the prefix *vi-* is attached. [Totally,] it means "not to be dry" (*aśoṣya*). The form *prabhavati* means the same as the meaning of the passive form of *upa-√labh-*. It means "to come arise" (*prakāśa*).

Notes: KV [I, 545]: "*kartuḥ*" *ity vartate. bhavanaṃ bhūḥ. bhavaty asmād iti prabhavaḥ bhūkartuḥ prabhavo yas tat kāraṅgam apādāna-samjñam bhavati. ... prathamata upalabhyata ity arthaḥ.* This rule prescribes the application of the term *apādāna* to the point of birth (*prabhava*) when the verbal root √*bhū-* is used. The meaning of the word *prabhava* is paraphrased into "*prathamata upalabhyate*: something is perceived for the first time" (by KV) and "*prathamataṃ prakāśate 'sminn iti prabhavaḥ, prathamaparakāśasthānam ity arthaḥ*: whereon something appears for the first time, namely the place of its first appearance" (given by *Bālanoramā* on SK. 594 [I, 663]).

It is Haradatta who gives the explanation of the word *vitastā* but the reason why such an explanation is mentioned is unclear [PM, *ibid.*]:

*karteti. bhavatyarthasya kartety arthaḥ, bhūvo vā dhātoḥ. katham punar dhātor nāma kartā syād, dhātur vai śabdah, śabde 'sambhave 'rthe kāryaṃ vijñāsyate. "tasu upakṣaye" bhav Ktaḥ, "vi gatau" tastā, vitasteti, aśoṣyety arthaḥ. upalabhateḥ karmavyāpāre prabhavatiḥ, pravartata ity arthaḥ. prakāśata iti yāvat. etena janyarthābhāvāt pūrvenāsiddham darśayati. anekārthatvād dhātūnām asminn arthe vṛttiḥ.*

9.1. The rejection of P.1.4.25-31 { 120, 7-14 }

Text: “*bhītrārthānām [bhayahetuḥ]*” [P.1.4.25] *ity ārabhyeyam saptasūtrī bhāṣye pratyākhyātā.*<sup>\*1</sup>

[P.1.4.25] *tathā hi “corebhyo bibheti.” bhayān nivartata ity arthaḥ. “trāyate,” rakṣaṇena corebhyo nivarttayatīty arthaḥ.*

[P.1.4.26] *“parājāyate,” glānyā nivartata ity arthaḥ.*

[P.1.4.27] *“vārayati,” pravṛttim pratibadhnan nivartayati.*

[P.1.4.28] *“nilīyate,” nilayanena nivartata ity arthaḥ.*

[P.1.4.29] *“adhīte,” upādhyāyān nihsarantaṃ śabdaṃ grhṇātīty arthaḥ.*

[P.1.4.30] *“brahmaṇaḥ prapañco jāyate” ity atrāpi tato ‘pakrāmati.’<sup>\*2</sup> yathā “vrkṣāt phalam” iti lokaprasidhyāśrayeṇā-pāyo bodhyah.*

[P.1.4.31] *“prabhavati” ity atra bhavanapūrvakaṃ nihsaraṇam arthaḥ.*

<sup>\*1.</sup> *Tattvabodhinī* adds *tatrettham upapattisambhavaḥ.* <sup>\*2.</sup> *Tattvabodhinī* adds *nirgacchatīty arthaḥ* and omits the sentence beginning from *yathā.*

Translation: Pāṇini *sūtras* 1.4.25-31 are rejected in the *MBh.* [According to Patañjali, the scopes covered by 25-31 are all managed by P.1.4.24 alone. Examples of respective rules are interpreted as follows].

On “*corebhyo bibheti*” [which is covered by P.1.4.25]. It means that he escapes (*nivartate*) because of the fear. [The thieves are the point of separation. Thus, it is termed as *apādāna* and takes the ablative case ending]. On the usages like “*trāyate.*” It means that someone makes himself to escape from the thieves by protection. [Here, he perceives a certain relation with the thieves in his mind and, then, he makes himself turn away from them. Thus, the thieves serve as the point of separation.]

On “*parājāyate*” [by 26]. It means that someone turns away by his delibity.

On “*vārayati [yavebhyah gām]:* he prevents [a cow] back from [eating] barley” [by 27]. It means that he stops the activity [of the cow] after binding it with [something].

On “*nilīyate [upādhyāyāt]:* he conceals [himself from his teacher]” [by 28]. It means that he escapes from the teacher by hiding.

On “*adhīte [upādhyāyāt]:* he learns [from his teacher]” [by 29]. It means that he gets word which is going forth from the teacher.

On “*brāhmaṇaḥ prapañco jāyate*: a dialogue comes from brahmin” [by 30]. It means that it [= *prapañca*] moves away from that [= brahmin]. [This understanding] is just as “*vrkṣāt phalam*: a fruit moves away from tree.”<sup>38</sup> [Namely, a speech is moving from brahmin.] In the same manner, the separation should be realized through the established fact in this world.<sup>39</sup>

On “*prabhavati [gaṅgā himavataḥ]*” [by 31]. It means that [the Gaṅgā river,] appearing for the first time, flows.

Notes: This and the following passages, 9.1-3, are quoted, although with minor changes, in the *Tattvabodhinī* which says in the end of its quotation that *etac ca Śabdakaustubhe spaṣṭam* [I, 663].

Here is dealt with the unnecessary of P.1.4.25-31, apparently put forward by Patañjali. His interpretation of the word *apāya* in P.1.4.24 is, as we have seen,<sup>40</sup> that the word *apāya* does not only mean mere separation that something moves from one point to another, i.e., a sort of physical separation but also a non-participation or an abandonment which is not seen, i.e., a sort of mental separation. The meanings prescribed in 25-31 which are the condition for introducing the term *apādāna* such as the frightening, the intolerance, the prevention, etc. are all included in the notion of mental separation.<sup>41</sup> Depending on this extended interpretation, he invalidates the effect of 25-31 [MBh. ad P.1.4.24, I, 327, 2-7: *tat tarhīdaṃ vaktavyam. na vaktavyam*].

As for the rejection of P.1.4.25-31 proposed by Patañjali, although *KV* says nothing, Jinendrabuddhi and Haradatta agree with him

38 This refers to Kaiyaṭa’s explanation but it is found in his commentary on P.1.4.29 [II, 254]: *yathā phalaṃ vrkṣād apakrāntaṃ na punar vrkṣe tad bhavati, evaṃ śabde ’pi prasāṅga ity arthaḥ* (Just as a fruit moved away from a tree does never grow on that tree, the speech would be so [if it moves away from the teacher]).

39 Taking “*lokaprasiddhi*” as its proof is found in the *Pradīpa* on P.1.4.30 [II, 255]. See Notes on 8.0.

40 See Kudo[1997] 2.5 p.165; 2.8.1 p.178.

41 MBh. ad P.1.4.25 [I, 327, 24-26]: *iha tāvad vrkṣebhyo daśyubhyo bibhetīti ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakārī bhavati sa paśyati yadi mām vrkṣāḥ paśyanti dhruvo me mṛtyur iti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nirvartate*; ad 26 [I, 328, 5-7]: *ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakārī bhavati sa paśyati duḥkham adhyayanam durdharam ca guravaś ca durpacārā iti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nirvartate*; ad 27 [ibid., 21-23]: *paśyaty ayaṃ yadimā gāvas tatra gacchanti dhruvam sasyavināśaḥ sasyavināśe ’dharmaś caiva rājabhayaṃ ca. sa buddhyā samprāpya nirvartayati*; ad 28 [I, 329, 2-3]: *paśyaty ayaṃ yadi mām upādhyāyah paśyati dhruvam preṣaṇam upālambho veti. sa buddhyā samprāpya nirvartayati*; ad 29 [ibid., 20-21]: *apakrāmati tasmāt tad adhyayanam. yady apakrāmati kiṃ nātyantāyāpakrāmati. saṃtatatvāt*; ad 30 [330, 1-2]: *apakrāmati tās tebhyaḥ. yady apakrāmati kiṃ nātyantāyāpakrāmati. saṃtatatvāt*.

(*Nyāsa*, for instance, says: *evaṃ tarhi pūrvasyāyaṃ prapañcaḥ* [on P.1.4.25, I, 539]).

9.2. Justification of P.1.4.25-31 { 120, 15-19}

Text: *atredaṃ vaktavyam, \*1 nivṛtinihsaranādi\*<sup>2</sup>-dhātvantarārtha-  
viśiṣṭe svārthe vṛttim āśritya yathākathañcid uktaprayogaṇām  
samarthane 'pi mukyārthapuraskāreṇa ṣaṣṭhīprayogo durvārah.  
"naṭasya śṛṇoti" itivat. na hy upādhyāyanaṭayoh kriyānukūla-  
vyāpārāmṣe viśeṣo vaktuṃ śakyah. anabhidhānabrahmāstram  
āśritya pratyākhyānan tu nātivamanoramam.*

\*1. *Tattvabodhinī*: *vastutas tu.* \*2. *Tattvabodhinī*: *-vismaraṇādi-*.

Translation: It should be stated. Even though depending on [the interpretation that] its own meaning [of the verbal root mentioned in the rule] is qualified by [the meaning of] another verbal root such as "to escape (*nivṛtti*)" or "to go forth (*nihsaraṇa*)," etc. these usages are justified in somehow or other [by P.1.4.24 alone], the use of the genitive case is irrepressible as is in case of "*naṭasya śṛṇoti*" because the primary meaning [which is expressed by the word(s) used in the sentence] is [always] the first consideration. In fact we cannot make a difference between the case of *upādhyāya* and that of *naṭa* when both consist of the part of the activity conducive to the whole action. Furthermore, it is not exceedingly pleasant to make a denial [of 25-31] by [using the meaning which is] not expressed as the last-weapon such as Brahma's missile.

Notes: In the previous passage, Bhaṭṭoji makes mention of Patañjali's rejection of 25-31 but the interpretation of the word *apāya* as the denotative of both physical and mental separation and the implantation of additional meaning to the contextual verbal roots are not accepted by Bhaṭṭoji. Patañjali's rejection is based on the extended interpretation of the word *apāya* and the re-explanation of the usages in accordance with that interpretation, viz., to take the *saṃjñins* prescribed in 25-31 in the scope of the word *dhruva*. In case of rule 25, for example, someone is afraid of (*bhaya*) the wolves or something else and he/she imagines as follows: "If the wolves find me, my destiny is decisive." Here his/her relation to the wolves is supposed even in his/her mind and then that person decides to escape from them (*nivṛtti*). In this way, the separation, although it is not perceived optically, is taken place and the point of departing (*dhruva*) is verified. Therefore, we can manage this case by 24 alone, which is to be managed by 25.

However, this process how to operate 24 in lieu of 25-31 needs additional meanings such as *nivṛtti* or *niḥsarāṇa*, etc. to fulfill the requirement of 24.<sup>42</sup> Unless we resort to these additional or secondary meanings we cannot cover the scopes of 25-31. For Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, such a process is cumbersome and seems to be not what was originally intended by Pāṇini. Thus, he rejects Patañjali.

### 9.3. Conclusion {120, 19-24}

Text: *evañ ca “jugpsāvīrāma[-pramādārthānām upasañkhyānam]”* [Vt. I on P.1.4.24] *ityādiVārttikam apy avaśya<sup>\*1</sup>rambhañīyam. tathā ca sūtravārttikamatam eveha prabalam iti yāvad bādham sādhu.<sup>\*2</sup> tathā dhruvaṃ bhayahetur asodha ityādisamjñinirdeśo 'pi sārthakaḥ. paratvāt tattatsamjñāprāptāv api śeṣatva-vivakṣāyāṃ “na māśāṇām aśnīyāt” ityādāv iva ṣaṣṭhyā iṣṭatayā tatrāpādānasamjñāyā vārañīyatvād ity avadheyam.<sup>\*3</sup>*

\*1. *Tattvabodhinī* omits the word *avaśya*. \*2. *Tattvabodhinī* omits *iti yāvad bādham sādhu* \*3. *Tattvabodhinī* gives *iti Śabdakaustubhe ṣaṣṭam*.

Translation: In this way, *Vts* on P.1.4.24 are inevitably to be made.

Since the opinions of Pāṇini and Kātyāyana are, here, the authority [of the grammar, that is, stronger than that of Patañjali], the rejection [of Patañjali's proposal] is right. Thus, the entries of *samjñin-s*, i.e., *dhruva*, *bhayahetu*, or *asodha*, etc., becomes meaningful. Even though those to be designated get respective designations by the *paratva*-principle, if *śeṣa* is desired as in case of “*na māśāṇām aśnīyāt*: do not eat the beans,” the genitive case would be preferred. [In this case, *dhruva*, etc. is required] in order to prevent the application of *apādāna* to [the one which is supposed to take the genitive case].

Notes: If we do not accept Patañjali's refusal of 25-31, the word *apāya* stands for the separation wherein something changes its physical position from one place to another. This comprehension is doubtlessly of Pāṇini himself, otherwise he would not lay down the rules 25-31 in order to cover the usages cited.<sup>43</sup> For Bhaṭṭoji, Pāṇini is the (final) authority of the Pāṇinian grammar and thus, even if Patañjali speaks of

<sup>42</sup> *Pradīpa* on P.1.4.25 [II, 250]: *bhayaṃ ākulībhāvāḥ, trāṇam anarthapratighāta iti. tatra ca nāsti mukhyo 'pāya iti praśnaḥ.*

<sup>43</sup> See Deshpande[1991(b)], p. 476. He says “It is obvious that Pāṇini, for whatever reasons, did not believe that all of these meanings could be reduced to a common factor, and therefore formulated these eight rules for *apādāna*.” Also see Joshi-Roodbergen[1975], p. 75.

the unnecessary of 25-31,<sup>44</sup> Pāṇini rules are to be authenticated. Therefore, as far as we accept the narrow interpretation (of course, in relative to that of Patañjali and it might be Pāṇini's idea) of the word *apāya*, rules 25-31 and the additional prescriptions given by Kātyāyana are needed. If we follow Pāṇini's notion of *apāya* on one hand and if, on the other hand, there are no rules of 25-31, these examples cited in respective rules are not covered by P.1.4.24. When the cases are not covered by 24, it leads to wrong applications of rules, for instance, introducing *adhikaraṇa* instead of *apādāna* (see 3.1.1), *śeṣa* instead of *apādāna* (see 4.0 and 6.2), *karman* instead of *apādāna* (see 5.1) would happen.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, in order to apply the term *apādāna* to the desired cases and prevent its application from the cases undesired, we need P.1.4.25-31 (as Pāṇini formulated).

(To be continued)

### BIBLIOGRAPHY [Additional]

(A-1) Sanskrit Sources [Pāṇinian]

*KV* (a) Part III (Indices), Eds. by B.R.Sastry and Surendra Sarma, Sanskrit Academy Series No. 23, 1976.

*LŚ: Laghūśadendūśekhara* of Nāgeśa (Nāgoji) Bhaṭṭa.

with a commentary *Chandrakalā* by Bhairava Miśra, Ed. by Narahari Śāstrī Pende (Re-ed. by Gopāla Śāstrī Nene), Vols. 2, Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 5, Varanasi: Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, 2nd. 1987.

*Paribhāṣendūśekhara* of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa.

Ed. and explained by F.Kielhorn, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, 2 vols, Poona: BORI (Rev. by K.V.Abhyankar, 1960, 1962).

*Tattvabodhinī* (2) in *Siddhāntakaumudī*.

Ed. by Vasudev Lakshman Shastri Panashikar, Vrajajivan Prachyabharati Granthamala No. 5, Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan, Rep. 1985 (Reproduction of NSP edition, 1915).

(A-2) Sanskrit Sources [Other Systems]

*AK: Amarakośa* or *Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana*.

with the Commentatary *Vyākhyāśudhā* or *Rāmāśramī* of Bhānuji Dīkṣita.

Ed. M.M. Pandit Sivadatta Dādhimatha (Rev. Vāsudeva Lakshmana Panāśikara), Vrajajivan Prachyabharati Granthamala, Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan, 2nd ed., 1987.

*Brahmasūtra*.

44 As for Patañjali's argument, Deshpande writes "It is interesting to note that while Patañjali offers this reductionist argument for the rules defining *apādāna*, he does not put forward a similar argument for other *kāraṅkas*." (Emphasis by N.K.) [1991(b), p. 477, footnote 48]

45 See *Pradīpa* on P.1.4.25 [II, 250r]: *sūtrārambhapakṣe tu kāraṅkaśeṣatvāt śaṣṭhyām prāptāv idam vacanam*.

- See *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣyam*.  
*Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣyam*,  
with the commentaries *Bhāṣyaratnāprabhā* of Govindānanda, *Bhāmāṭī* of Vācaspati-miśra,  
*Nyāyanirṇaya* of Ānandagiri.  
Ed. by J.L.Shastri, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980 (rep. 1988, original edition is from  
Nirṇaya Sanskrit Press Edition).  
*Manusmṛti* with the Sanskrit Commentary *Manvarthamuktāvalī* of Kullūka Bhaṭṭa.  
Ed. by J.L.Shastri, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983 (rep. 1990).  
Upaniṣad Text:  
*Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads*, vol. I (Upaniṣadic Text with Parallels from extant Vedic  
Literature, Exegetical and Grammatical Notes). Eds. by V.P.Limaye and R.D.Vadekar,  
Poona: Vaidika Saṁśodhana Maṇḍala, 1958.  
(B) Secondary Sources.  
Böhtlingk, Otto  
1887 *Pāṇini's Grammatik*, Leipzig (Reprint of 2nd edition by The Rinsen Book  
Company, Kyoto 1977).  
Joshi, S.D. and J.A.F.Roodbergen  
1973 *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Tatpuruṣāhnikā* (P.2.2.2-2.2.23), Pune:  
University of Poona.  
1980 *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Vibhaktiyāhnikā* (P.2.3.18-2.3.45), Pune:  
University of Poona.  
Kudo, Noriyuki  
1997 "A Study on Sanskrit Syntax (2): Śadakaustubha on P.1.4.24 [*Apādāna* (1)]," in  
*Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saṁbhāṣā*, No. 18, pp. 143-181.  
Renou, Louis  
1966 *La Grammaire de Pāṇini (Texte Sanskrit Traduction Française avec Extraits des  
Commentaires)*, 2 tome, Bibliothèque de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris:  
École Française d'Extrême-Orient.  
Speijer, J.S.  
1886 *Sanskrit Syntax*, Leiden (Rep., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980).  
Sharma, Rama Nath  
1995 *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*, Vol. III, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.  
Vasu, Śrīśa Chandra  
1891 *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*, 2 vols, Allahabad (Rep., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,  
1980).

*Part-time Lecturer*  
*Bukkyo University*  
*Kyoto*