

THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN INDIAN GRAMMATICAL TRADITION (2)*

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CHAPTER II: TIME IN *TRIMUNIVYĀKARAṆA*

It has been observed in the previous chapter that the notion of time with its multi-dimensional nature, is visualised differently in different schools of thought in India. In the grammatical school 'time' is internalised in the principle of *bhāvapradhānatā* or fundamentality of a verbal meaning and rules for handling temporal contents of sentences. Further, time is also accepted as a power '*Kālaśakti*' of the '*Śabdabrahman*' of the grammarians.

In linguistic analysis the concept of time also plays an important role for explaining the formulation of verbs and verbal derivatives. It is one of the meanings figuring in a complete verb form. Thus, how a sentence which is the basic indivisible (but divided for the sake of usage) unit, can be analysed according to grammarians is given in Diagram 1.

The illustrated sentence (in Diagram 1) can be paraphrased according to grammarians as: *devadattaikakarṭṛkaḥ grāmakarmakaḥ vartamānakālikah gamanānukūlo vyāpārah*. Here 'Devadatta' is a *prātipadika* (P.1.2.45) to which the suffix *sup* is added (P.4.1.2) and 'Devadattah' is formed. Devadatta is the agent (*karṭṛ*) of the verb 'going' and '*grāma*' is the desired object of Devadatta. So, *grāma* being the desired object of Devadatta takes *karmasaṃjñā* (P.1.4.49) and '*am*' (accusative case-suffix) is added to *grāma*. The verb *gacchati* is divided into two parts: root *gam* and suffix *tip*. Here the later one is important for the present study here. The verbal suffix *tip* conveys so many meanings. It is added to the root *gam* when the action

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in present time is to be conveyed.¹ It is here that time comes to picture. Apart from the sense of time, it indicates the agentship² of Devadatta who is third person³ and singular.⁴ This is portrayed in the diagram 1.




Diagram 1

However, whether time (past, present or future) is a denoted or indicated (implied) meaning of verb is a matter of controversy. Some grammarians hold⁵ the view that it is indicated (*dyotyā*) by *lakāra* whereas others are of the opinion that it is also a denoted (*vācya*) meaning⁶ of the same. The above problem will be discussed latter (Ch. IV).

1 *vartamāne laṭ*. (P.3.2.123)

2 P.3.4.69.

3 P.1.4.108.

4 P.1.4.102.

5 Vide *Bālaṃānoramā* under *SK.* on P.3.2.123: *kin tu dhātvartha-viśeṣaṇam eva vartamānatvam / laṭ tu tasya dyotaka eva /*

6 Vide *Tattvabodhini*: *vastutas tu vācyatvā 'bhyupagamo 'pi sugama iti vidhyādisūtre vaksyāmah /* (under *loc.cit.*)

1. The Concept of Time and Pāṇini

Pāṇini has not defined time.⁷ However, the concept of time with its rudimentary divisions into three was already well-known before Pāṇini. Though Pāṇini has not defined time, in fact, he has grouped verbal endings under three *adhikāras* referring to three divisions of time-*bhūte ... bhaviṣyati ... and vartamāne ...*. Therefore, Pāṇini certainly regards time as one of the fundamental meaning categories related to verbal form. Thus, he has divided time (following the usage) into three parts, *bhūta* (past) *vartamāna* (present) and *bhaviṣyat* (future) to which different *lakāras* are employed. Pāṇini's important contribution to the concept of time is that he has made it a component of meanings understood from a verbal form in a sentence. Pāṇini's analysis also implies that time is a substratum of action, since he associates it with a verbal ending. Moreover, there are different sections in the *Aṣṭ.* which discuss these matters in relation to time (in their own way). A number of *sūtras* starting from P.3.2.84 onwards discuss the peculiarities of time with reference to verbal forms; whereas another two sets of rules starting from P.4.3.43 to 52 and again from P.5.1.78 to 96 discuss the morphological and syntactic peculiarities of the various words and sentences in relation to time.

The reason why Pāṇini has not defined time becomes clear from the interpretation of *sūtra* P.1.2.57 under *K.*⁸ and *SK.*⁹ Pāṇini did not feel it necessary to define the term *kāla* since he used it in its well-known sense.

a. Pāṇini and 'akālakam vyākaraṇam'

The *Kāśikā* under P.2.4.21 states: 'Pāṇinyupajñam akālakam vyākaraṇam'.¹⁰ Different readings of the version are suggested by Laddu in his article: 'Pāṇini and akālakam vyākaraṇam.'¹¹ It is generally said

⁷ Vide *Mbh.* on P.3.2.115: *na vai kālādhikāro 'sti*; also vide *Nyāsa* under *K.* (P.2.4.21): *sa svasmin kālādikāram na kṛtavān /*

⁸ Vide *K.* under P.2.4.21: *pāṇinyupajñam akālakam vyākaraṇam / pāṇiner upajñānena prathamataḥ prañītam akālakam vyākaraṇam*; also vide *Padamañjari*: *pūrvāni vyākaraṇāny adyatanādikāla-paribhāṣāyuktāni, tadrahitam tu vyākaraṇam pāṇiniprabhṛtipravṛttam (loc.cit.)*

⁹ Vide *SK.* under *kālopasarjane ca tulyam / (P.1.2.57): atitāyāḥ rātreḥ paścārdhenā-gāminyāḥ pūrvārthena ca sahito divaso 'dyatanah, viśeṣanam upasarjanam ityādi pūrvācāryaiḥ paribhāṣitam / tatrāpy aśiṣyatvaṃ samānam / lokaprasiddheḥ /*

¹⁰ A variant reading of the version is noted in the Varanasi ed. of the *K.* as *akālāpakam*.

¹¹ Vide Bibliography.

that Pāṇini has not defined and discussed time and hence his grammar is called *akālakavyākaraṇa* in the tradition. This we come to know from *Kāśikā*'s statement. The commentators have interpreted this statement according to the general belief. Laddu has discussed the point and concluded in the following: 'the phrase *akālakam vyākaraṇam* employed in the *Kāśikā* is wrongly understood first by the commentators and then by most of the modern scholars'.¹² Laddu's statement seems convincing. However, the fact remains that Pāṇini has not defined time; whether on that basis grammar is to be declared as *akālaka-Vyākaraṇa* or not.

b. Various terms expressive of time

The various terms expressive of time used in the *Aṣṭ.* can be classified under the following groups:




Diagram 2

¹² Vide Laddu, 'Pāṇini and *akālakam Vyākaraṇam*', p.102.

¹³ There are other general terms used in the *Aṣṭ.* such as *kāla*, *samaya*, *velā* etc. expressing the sense of time.

The first category includes the terms expressive of time which generally used depending upon solar motion.¹⁴ It also gives the idea of time as a cyclic continuum. A number of *sūtras* in the *Aṣṭ.* have described these phenomena of time. Pāṇini has used different terms, such as, *māsa*, *saṃvatsara*, *amāvāsyā*, *pakṣa*, *ṛtu*, *adyatana*, *anadyatana*, *vartamāna*, *bhūta*, *bhaviṣyat* etc. which express the different parts of time.

The second category of time-expressions can be divided into two: verbs and *ḥṛdantas*. When some action appears through verbs in a temporal order that can be called verbal time. In the examples like *paṭhati*, *gamisyati* etc. different time-variations like *vartamāna*, *bhūta* etc. are indicated. It is through different verbal suffixes that these time variations are indicated. This part is most important aspect of grammatical analysis. This is also explained in the beginning of this chapter with example. The other kind of time-expressions are *ḥṛdanta* affixes. When time is understood from nouns derived from roots, such as, *gatavān*, *gataḥ*, *pacan*, *kriyamāṇa* etc., those are called *ḥṛdantas*. These terms indicate the different time variations, such as, *vartamāna*, *bhūta* and *bhaviṣyat*. The different *ḥṛt* suffixes are used in the *Aṣṭ.* through which these variations are realized. The *niṣṭhā* suffixes employed in the *sūtras* P.3.2.102 express the sense of past time. There are also other suffixes like *ktvā* (employed in P.3.4.21) which indicate the past time. The suffixes like *ṣatṛ* and *śānac* (employed in P.3.2.124) express the meaning of present time, whereas the suffixes *ini* (employed P.3.3.3) and *tumun* (employed in P.3.3.10) indicate the future time. Thus, there are different *ḥṛt* suffixes employed by Pāṇini which indicate the past, future and present time.

The third category of time, in the present context, refers to different technical terms with a bearing on time (*kālamātrās*) taken in pronouncing different letters, viz. *hrasva*, *dīrgha* and *pluta*. The *sūtra* P.1.2.27 gives the idea of this variety of time expression. The different *mātrās* required for *hrasva*, *dīrgha* and *pluta* are, *ardhamātrā* (half-*mātrā*), *ekamātrā* (one *mātrā*) and *dvimātrā* (two *mātrās*) respectively. In the *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā* these *mātrās* are told to be measured by different sounds of birds.¹⁵

14. This is very common to our day today behavior; thus *Śivarājajivijaya* (a historical novel in Sanskrit) writes: *aruṇa eṣa prakāśaḥ pūrvasyāṃ bhagavato maricimālinah /sūtradhārah sarvavyavahārasya, inaś ca dinasya, ayam eva aḥorātram janayati, ayam eva vatsaram dvādaśasu bhāgeṣu vibhanakti, ayam eva kāraṇam ṣaṇṇām ṛtunām,/ (p.4)*

15 Vide *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā* 49:

The fourth category of time expresses indicate the smaller units of time, such as, *muhūrta*, *kṣana* etc. The above mentioned categories can be explained according to different linguistic approaches, such as, Semantic, Morphological, Phonological etc.

The first and 4th categories of usage are based on semantic understanding of time aspect, whereas the second category can be explained according to morphological analysis (where the time sense is directly understood from the affixes attached to the roots or nouns). The third category of expression can be brought under the phonological study.

Apart from the above study, the time sense also can be realized in syntactical level of language, according to Pāṇini. For example, when there is a syntactical relation between the senses of the verbs, the affixes are valid even in denoting time other than that for which they have been employed. According to P.3.4.1, the action denoted by the conjugated verb being the Principal, regulates time-element of the verb subordinate to it. Thus, in the example like '*vasan dadarśa*'¹⁶ (living there he saw) the term '*vasan*' being in present, agrees with the term '*dadarśa*' which is in past. This is the agreement in syntactical level between two terms expressive of two different times and thus *gaṇakriyākāla* (time expressive of subordinate action) is understood according to *mukhyakriyākāla* (time-expressive of Principal action).¹⁷

c. Time and tenses in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*

Pāṇini has divided (following the usage) time into three main parts: *bhūta* (past), *bhaviṣyat* (future) and *vartamāna* (present). Among the three divisions, each of *bhūta* and *bhaviṣyat* is further subdivided into two: *adyatana* 'today' and *anadyatana* 'non-today'. Then, *anadyatanabhūta* (non-today past) is again subdivided into two: *parokṣa* and *aparokṣa*. Thus, all the divisions of time conveyed by verbal suffixes can be shown in diagram 3.

*cāṣas tu vadate mātrām dvimātram tv eva vāyasaḥ /
sikhī rauti trimātram tu nakulas tv ardhāmātrakam //*

16 The usage can be attested in *Śiṣupālavadhā* I.1:

*Śriyaḥ paṭiḥ śrīmati śāsitum jagat jagan nivāso vasudevasadmani /
vasan dadarśāvatarantambarāt hiraṇyagarbhāṅgabhuvaṃ munim hariḥ //*

17 Vide Vasu, SK. (Eng. tr.) Part II, p.708-10.

TIME IN INDIAN GRAMMATICAL TRADITION (2)




Diagram 3




Diagram 4




Diagram 5

There are different *lakāras* employed by Pāṇini to express the above meanings from the verbs. There are ten *lakāras* out of which six express the above mentioned time variations or levels. Other four *lakāras* express the modalities or *bhāvas*. Thus, two charts showing the each *lakāra* against its relevant *sūtra* expressing time and modalities are given in diagrams 4 and 5.




Diagram 6

Between the two diagrams (5 and 6) mentioned above, the first diagram shows a list of *lakāras* showing past, present and future time. Again, it has been already stated that past and future are divided on

the basis of today and non-today. Further, non-today past is divided into two: *parokṣa* and *aparokṣa*. This is already shown in a diagram. So, the above mentioned six *lakāras* expressing time are further subdivided into eight varieties because two more additional variations of time are postulated within these. On the basis of P.3.3.131, one more time variation is postulated within the scope of *vartamāna*. Similarly, on the basis of P.3.3.132 one more variation is also postulated within the scope of past. Thus, a diagram showing the eight varieties according to Pāṇini is shown in diagram 6.

Although the arrangement of the divisions of time by the respective *lakāras* is almost fixed, in a few cases these functions of *lakāras* are seen to be changing. Thus the function of one *lakāra* is found to be performed by another. Pāṇini has taken note of such changeability and laid down rules to explain usage of this type. The following chart notifies such changes found among the tenses and moods.

(i): Tense and moods, (ii): Sūtra, (iii): Condition, (iv): Example, (v): Exception

1. (i) *andyatanabhūta* into *bhaviṣyat*
 (ii) *abhijñāvacane lṛt* (P.3.2.112)
 (iii) in case of the word conveying the sense of recollection
 (iv) *smarasi kṛṣṇa gokule vatsyāmaḥ* (remembrest thou, Kṛṣṇa, we were dwelling (lit. we will dwell) in Gokula)
 (v) *na yadi* (P.3.2.113) not with the term *yat*
2. (i) same as 1(i)
 (ii) *vibhāṣā sākāṃkṣye* (P.3.2.114)
 (iii) when two verbs occurring in the same complex sentence have mutual expectancy
 (iv) *smarasi kṛṣṇa vane vatsyāmaḥ tatra gāś cārayiṣyāmaḥ* (Do you remember kṛṣṇa we went to the forest and there did cause the cows graze)
 (v) optionally
3. (i) *parokṣabhūta* into *aparokṣabhūta*
 (ii) *haśāsvator liṅ* (P.3.2.116)
 (iii) if 'ha' or 'śāśvat' follows
 (iv) *iti ha akarot/ śāśvad akarot* (Alas: he did it/ again and again he did it)
 (v) optionally
4. (i) *parokṣabhūta* into *aparokṣabhūta*
 (ii) *praśne cāsannakāle* (P.3.2.117)
 (iii) if an immediate question is to be asked
 (iv) *agacchat kim?* (Did he go?)
 (v) optionally
5. (i) *parokṣabhūta* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *laṭ sme*¹⁷¹⁸ (P.3.2.118)
 (iii) if the term 'sma' follows
 (iv) *yajati sma yudhiṣṭhira* (Yudhisthira sacrificed)
 (v) invariably
6. (i) *andyatanabhūta* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *aparokṣe ca* (P.3.2.119)
 (iii) if the term 'sma' follows
 (iv) *evam sma pitā bravīti* (thus said the father)
 (v) invariably
7. (i) *bhūta* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *nanau pṛṣṭa prativacane* (P.3. 2.120)

18 *Tattvabodhini* on *SK.* (Sū. 2778) mentions that *sma* indicates past time.

- (iii) if an answer is given to a question with the term 'nanu'
 (iv) *akāṣhī kim, nanu karomi bhoḥ* (Did you make the mat? 0, yes, I did make it)
 (v) invariably

8. (i) *bhūta* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *nanvor vibhāṣā* (P.3.2.120)
 (iii) if follows a term 'na' or 'nu'
 (iv) *akāṣhī kim? ahaṃ na karomi/ ahaṃ nu karomi* (Did you make (it) No, I did not/I did it)
 (v) Optional

9. (i) *anadyatanabhūta* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *puri laṅ cāsme* (P.3.2.122)
 (iii) if the term *purā* follows
 (iv) *vasantīha purā chātrāḥ* (the pupils lived here formerly)
 (v) optionally (not with 'sma')

10. (i) any tense into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *yāvatpurā nipātayor laṭ* (P.3. 3.4)
 (iii) if *yāvat* and *purā* (*nipātas*) added
 (iv) *yāvad bhūṅkte/ purā bhūṅkte* (he will certainly eat)
 (v) no.

11. (i) *bhaviṣyat* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *vibhāṣā kadākarhyoḥ* (P.3.3.5)
 (iii) if the term 'kadā' or/and 'karhi' follows
 (iv) *kadā karhi vā bhūṅkte?* (when will you eat?)
 (v) optionally

12. (i) *bhaviṣyat* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *kimvṛtte lipsāyām* (P.3.3.6)
 (iii) if any derivatives of the word 'kim' follow
 (iv) *kaṃ kataraṃ katamaṃ vā bhojayasi?* (whom will you feed?)
 (v) optionally

13. (i) *bhaviṣyat* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *lipsyamānasiddhau ca* (P.3.3.7)
 (iii) When the success that would accrue to another by fulfilling the desire of the speaker is intended
 (iv) *yo' nnaṃ dadāti sa svargaṃ yāti* (he who gives food, goes to heaven)
 (v) optionally

14. (i) *bhaviṣyat* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *lodartha lakṣaṇe ca* (P.3.3.8)

- (iii) if preceded by another verb having the sense of the imperative mood
 (iv) *kṛṣṇaś ced bhūṅkte tvam gās cāraya* (if kṛṣṇa will eat, thou graze the cattle)
 (v) optionally

15. (i) *bhaviṣyat* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *līṅ cordhvamauhūrtike* (P.3.3.9)
 (iii) if future is in between one 'muhūrta'
 (iv) *upādhyāyaś ced āgamisyati tvam chando' dhiṣva* (If the teacher comes after an hour (of 48 minutes), you had better read the prosody)
 (v) optionally

16. (i) *bhaviṣyat/ bhūta* into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *vartamānasāmīpye vartamānavadvā*¹⁹ (P.3.3.131)
 (iii) if not remote from the present
 (iv) *kadā āgato'si? ayam āgacchāmi* (When did you come? I come now)
 (v) optionally

17. (i) *bhaviṣyat* into *bhūta/ vartamāna*
 (ii) *āsaṃsāyām bhūtavat ca* (P.3.3. 132)
 (iii) when hope is to be expressed
 (iv) *devaś cedavarṣid dhānyam avāpsma/ vapāmaḥ* (if it rained, we will sow paddy)
 (v) optionally

18. (i) *adyatana* in case of *anadyatana*
 (ii) *nānadyatana vatkriyāprabandha sāmīpyayoḥ* (P.3.3.135)
 (iii) if continuity or nearness of past/ future is intended
 (iv) *yāvat jīvamannamadāt/ dāsyati* (He gave food throughout his life)
 (v) *parasmin vibhāṣā* (P.3.3.138)

19. (i) *Sāmānyabhaviṣyat* in case of *anadyatanabhaviṣyat*.
 (ii) *bhaviṣyati maryādāvacaṇe' varasmin* (P.3.3.136)
 (iii) when a statement is made regarding a limit on the side of another place.
 (iv) *ā pataliputrāt tasya yadavaraṃ kauśāmbyaś tatra saktūn pāsyāmaḥ* (On this side of the road from the city of Kośāmbi to the city of Pāṭaliputra

19 Bhartṛhari has taken *Vartamāna-sāmīpya* as one of the eleven varieties or divisions of time.

TIME IN INDIAN GRAMMATICAL TRADITION (2)

- there we will eat rice, and there we will drink *saktū*)
- (v) *kālavibhāge cānahorātrāṇām* (P.3.3.137) not when the division with regard to *ahorātra* is intended
20. (i) *lṛñ* in case of *liñ*
 (ii) *liñnimitte lṛñ kriyātipattau* (P.3.3.139) *bhūte ca* (P.3.3.140) *votapyoh* (P.3.3.141)
 (iii) when the action has not taken place
 (iv) *Suvṛṣṭis cedabhaviṣyat tadā subhikṣa-mabhaviṣyat* (if there had been good rain, then there would have been plenty of food)
 (v) no.
21. (i) Three div. of time into *vartamāna*
 (ii) *garhāyām ladapijātyoh* (P.3.3.142)
 (iii) When the words '*api*' and '*jātu*' conveying the sense of blame are used
 (iv) *api jāyām tyajasi/ jātu ganikāmā-dhase* (Fie! you abandon your wife)
 (v) it is optional if it is construed with the word '*katham*' and in that case *liñ* is optionally used
22. (i) Three div. of time into *liñ/lṛṭ*
 (ii) *kimvṛtte liñlṛtau* (P.3.3.144)
 (iii) when interrogative words like *kim* etc. are in composition with it and censure is conveyed
 (iv) *kaḥ katarah katamo vā hariṃ nindet/ nindiṣyati* (who will censure Hari?)
 (v) no.
23. (i) Three div. of time into *liñ* and *lṛṭ*
 (ii) *anavakṛptyamarṣayorakim vṛtte 'pi* (P.3.3.145)
 (iii) when something is not likely to take place or is not to be tolerated
 (iv) *na sambhāvaye na marṣaye vā bhavān hariṃ nindet*
 (v) no.
24. (i) *lṛṭ* (*bhaviṣyat*) in case of *liñ*
 (ii) *kimkilāstyarthesu lṛṭ* (P.3.3.146)
 (iii) When the word '*kimkila*' or those having the sense of *asti* are used and when the action is not likely to occur or is not to be tolerated
 (iv) (I do not believe or I can not tolerate that you can revile or will revile Hari) *na śraddadhe na marṣaye vā kimkila tvam sūdrānam bhokṣase/ asti bhavati vidyate vā sūdrim gamiṣyasi* (I do not believe or can tolerate that thou shouldst eat the food of a *sūdra*/ Is it possible that thou shouldst go to a female *sūdra*)
 (v) no.
25. (i) *liñ* in case of *lṛṭ* (*bhaviṣyat*)
 (ii) *jātuyadoḥ liñ* (P.3.3.147)
 (iii) when '*jātu*' and '*yat*' are in construction with a root and the sense is the action is not believed to be likely or is not to be tolerated
 (iv) *jātu yadyadā yadi vā tvādr̥ṣo hariṃ nindet nāvakalpayāmi na marṣayāmi*. (neither do I think, nor do I tolerate that one like you should blaspheme Hari)
 (v) no.
26. (i) *liñ* in case of *lṛṭ* (*bhaviṣyat*)
 (ii) *yacca yatrāyoh* (P.3.3.148)
 (iii) when used, with '*yacca*', and '*yatra*' and the sense of '*garhā*' is implied
 (iv) *yacca yatra vā tvam sūdraṃ yājayeḥ āścaryametat* (I do not think, nor can I tolerate that thou wilt do so)
 (v) no.
27. (i) *liñ* in case of *lṛṭ* (future)
 (ii) *citṛikarane ca* (P.3.3.150)
 (iii) When wonder is implied
 (iv) *yacca yatra vā tvam sūdraṃ yājayeḥ anyāyyam tat* (it is wonder that you should perform a sacrifice for *sūdra*)
 (v) no.
28. (i) Three div. into *bhaviṣyat*
 (ii) *śeṣe lṛḍayadau* (P.3.3.151)
 (iii) When wonder is implied with the help of words other than *yacca* and *yatra*
 (iv) *āścaryamandho nāma kṛṣṇaṃ drakṣyati* (a miracle that the blind see *kṛṣṇa*)
 (v) not with *yadi*
29. (i) *liñ* in case of three times
 (ii) *utāpyoh samarthayor liñ* (P.3.3.152)
 (iii) When both *uta* and *api* are used simultaneously in one sentence having same meaning are in composition
 (iv) *uta api vā hanyādaghāṃ hariḥ* (assuredly Hari destroys all sin)
 (v) no.

30. (i) *lin* in case of three times
(ii) *kāmapravedane' kacciti* (P.3.3.153)
(iii) When expression of desire is intended
(iv) *kāmo me bhuñjita bhavān* (it is my wish that you will eat)
(v) not with the term *kacchit*

31. (i) *lin* in case of three times
(ii) *Sambhāvane'lamiti cet siddhā prayoge* (P.3.3.154)
(iii) When the expectation is implied
(iv) *api girim śirasābhindyāt* (I expect he will break even the mountain with his head)
(v) no.

32. (i) *lin* in case of three times
(ii) *Vibhāṣā dhatau sambhāvanavacane 'yadi* (P.3.3.155)
(iii) in case of expectation
(iv) *sambhāvayāmi bhuñjita bhokṣate bhavān* (I expect you will eat)
(v) no.

33. (i) *lin* in case of three times
(ii) *hetuhetumator lin* (P.3.3.156)
(iii) in case of condition and consequence
(iv) *Kṛṣṇaṃ namec cet sūkhaṃ yāyāt* (If he bow kṛṣṇa, he will get happiness.)
(v) optionally

34. (i) *lin* and *loṭ* in case of three times
(ii) *icchārthesu linloṭau* (P.3.3.157)
(iii) in the sense of wishing
(iv) *icchāmi bhuñjita bhuktām vā bhavān* (I wish, desire or pray that your honour may eat)
(v) no.

35. (i) *lin* in case of three times
(ii) *lin ca* (P.3.3.159)
(iii) when the agent of both the verbs are same
(iv) *bhuñjīyeticchati* (he wishes that he will read)
(v) no.

36. (i) *lin* in case of *vartamāna*
(ii) *icchārthebhyo vibhāṣā vartamāne* (P.3.3.168)
(iii) when desire is intended
(iv) *icchet* (he wishes)
(v) optional

37. (i) *lin* in case of future
(ii) *lin cordva mauhūrlike* (P.3.3.164)

- (iii) if it is after an hour (*muhūrta*) (48 minutes)
(iv) *muhūrtādūrdhvoṃ yajeta* (you may, sacrifice after an hour)
(v) not with the word '*sma*'

38. (i) *lin* in case of all times
(ii) *lin yadi* (P.3.3.168)
(iii) if the word '*yat*' follows after '*kāla*' '*samaya*' and '*velā*'
(iv) *kālah samayo velā vā yad bhuñjita bhavān* (it is time that your honour should take your meals)
(v) no.

39. (i) *lin* in case of all times
(ii) *arhe kṛyatras ca* (P.3.3.169)
(iii) when fitness of the agent is implied
(iv) *tvam kanyāṃ vaheḥ* (your honour is fit to marry the girl)
(v) no.

40. (i) *lin* in case of all times
(ii) *śaki lin ca* (P.3.3.172)
(iii) when capacity is to be conveyed
(iv) *bhavaṃ tvam vaheḥ* (you can carry the weight)
(v) no.

41. (i) *luṅ* in case of all times
(ii) *māni luṅ* (P.3.3.175)
(iii) When particle '*mā*' is added
(iv) *mā kāṛṣiḥ* (Do not do)
(v) no.

42. (i) the *gaṇakriyākāla* into *mukhyakriyākāla*
(ii) *dhātusamvandhe pratyayāḥ*²⁰ (P.3.4.1)
(iii) When there is a syntactical relation between the senses of the two verbs.
(iv) *vasan dadarśa* (living there he saw)
(v) no

20 The *sūtra* is important for the study on time; vide a discussion in this chapter (p. 6); it will be discussed in 5th chapter also.

The above chart shows how the divisions of time are loosely found in the usage. It also shows the minute observation of the *sūtrakāra* of the usage with regard to time and its division and his attempt to formalize it. The usage thus recorded by Pāṇini also indicates the artificial character of divisions of time and their inter-changeability. The usages treated by Pāṇini further make it clear how past and future events are often expressed in term of present. Pāṇini's observation of the various usages with regard to time thus speaks for the inadequacy of language in maintaining the distinctions of time divisions. In some contexts, *lakāras* expressing modalities also express the sense of time.²¹

2. The Concept of Time according to Kātyāyana

Kātyāyana who has followed Pāṇini did not discuss the concept of time as such. His advancement consists in making some remarks on Pāṇini's *sūtras* on present (P.3.2.123) and divisions of time. Since Pāṇini has not explained *vartamāna* (present), Kātyāyana has devoted five of his *vārttikas* for the explanation of the concept of *vartamāna* while discusses P.3.2.123.

The first *vārttika* states that *vartamāna* is to be used for an action which is started but intervened by other minor actions. The *vārttika* '*pravṛttasyā virāme śāsitavyā bhavantyavartamānatvāt*' (Vt. 1, under P.3.2.123) teaches that *vartamāna* is to be used where an action has been started but not come to an end. In the examples like *iha adhīmahe* (We are studying here), '*iha vasāmaḥ*' etc. the action goes on for quite some time. While it is going on, various interruptions occur. For example, the activity of studying is interrupted by the act of eating.

In the next two *vārttikas* Kātyāyana points out that it is not necessary to make a separate statement for this kind of use of *vartamāna* because this also involves action.

- i) *nyāyyā tvārambhānapavargāt* 'The used present is proper because the action has started but not completed.'
- ii) *asti ca muktasamśaye virāmaḥ* 'there is also a break even in clear and undoubted sentences'.

In the sentences like '*bhunkte devadatta*' (Devadatta is eating) the action of eating is not constant. So, if usages like '*bhunkte devadatta*'

²¹ Vide P.3.3.163: *praiṣātisargaprāptakāleṣu kṛtyāś ca /*

are accepted as being correct sentences of the present tense then *iha adhīmahe* etc. must be accepted since minor actions like 'taking meal' do not cause any actual break in the action of studying.²²

The second problem is concerning the use of present tense when an action goes on continuously without stopping. It is difficult to characterize such an usage as either past, present or future. For such a problem Kātyāyana states: *nityapravṛtte ca kālāvibhāgāt* (Vt.2, under P.3.2.123). *Laṭ* is to be used to express present which has been explained as the time characterized by an action which has begun but not ended. In the sentences, such as, 'the mountains stand' or 'the self exists' there is no conceivable beginning or end. Therefore, how can we speak of it as having existed, existing now and will exist. The use of present, past or future is difficult to explain in this case. Since the three divisions of time cannot be associated with the standing of the mountain or existing of the self, they cannot be actions and actions are only connected with three divisions of time.²³

The above problem is solved by the *vārttika* '*santi ca kālāvibhāgāḥ*' (Vt.5 under *Mbh.* ad. P.3.2.123). The *vārttika* says that even in these cases there are divisions of time. Patañjali advances the discussion further and shows their relation with the three divisions of time.²⁴ Now, as they can be associated with time, they can be called actions.²⁵

In the above manner, Kātyāyana solved the two main problems raised regarding 'present time'.

b. Some suggestions with regard to divisions of time.

The *Vārttika* 6: '*vā cā'dyatanyām*' on P.3.2.102 suggests that past tense indicated by *luṅ* can be used in the sense of *adyatanabhūta* 'today-past' and the example of such can be '*prākārṣīt kaṭam devadattaḥ*' etc. This is one category of past out of five types indicated by Bhartr̥hari in later period.²⁶

22 Kaiyaṭa even goes further and says that it is impossible to go on studying without a meal and so the action of taking a meal can be said to be a part of action of studying (*atha vā adhyāyanasyaiva avayava-kriyete bhāvāḥ* (*Pradīpa* on vt. 4 on P.3.2.123).

23 Vide *Uddyota* on vt. 2 ad. P.3.2.123: *bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānavyavahāraviṣyatvasvabhāvāt tasyā itibhāvāḥ* /

24 The *Bhāṣya* further elaborates the matter with examples which will be discussed under Patañjali's concept of time.

25 Vide *Ibid.* on vt. 5 ad P.3.2.123: *yataḥ kālatrayayoga ataḥ kriyārūpatvam ityarthāḥ* /

26 *VP.3.9.38: bhūtaḥ pañcavidhas tatra bhaviṣyamś ca caturvidhaḥ* / *vartamāno dvi-dhākyāta ity ekādaśa kalpanāḥ* // Vide Helārāja: *adyatano dviṭīyo bhūtabhedāḥ* (*loc.cit.*).

Again, *vārttika* 1: *anadyatana iti bahuvrīhi nirdeśo 'yam hyo 'bhukṣmahīti'* on P.3.2.111 suggests that past comprising the fusion of that applicable to current day is indicated by *luñ*, such as, '*adya hyo' bhukṣmahi* etc. This is also a type of *bhūta* 'past' indicated by Bhartṛhari.²⁷

Thus, Kātyāyana provides a few more details about the usage of verb forms conveying time and shows how Pāṇini's analysis of time is capable of explaining them. He also shows that precise sense of continuity is not intended.

3. Concept of Time according to Patañjali

It is Patañjali who for the first time opens a philosophical discussion on time. He says that through *kāla* 'time' the growth and decay of material objects are perceived.²⁸ It is divided into days, months etc. which is an artificial process of calculation. It is the moment of the Sun which is the basis of our conception of the so called division of time.²⁹ Patañjali considers time to be the Ultimate substratum of the Universe.³⁰ Under P.4.2.3, he expressly states that both time and stars are permanent.³¹ He regards time as indivisible, permanent, One and all-pervading.

Patañjali makes a three-fold classification of time into present, past and future with regard to one and the same existent thing on the basis of its conjugation with the senses or absence of it. There are two different actions, one of the senses and other of mind. The action of the senses is approach and action of mind is conceiving.³² A person anxious to go to Pāṭaliputra says: "On the way to Pāṭaliputra which I am to traverse, there will be a well". When he has reached the well, says-

27 Vide *Prakāśa*: *adyatanānadyanasamudāyas tābhyām anyatvāc caturthaḥ (loc.cit.)*.

28 Vide *Mbh.* on P.2.2.5: *yena mūrṭinām upacayāpacayās ca lakṣyante taṃ kālam ity āhuh / tasyaiva kayācit kriyayā yuktasyāhar iti bhavati rātrir iti ca*; Bhartṛhari also gives emphasis on the same idea as: *mūrṭinām tena bhinnānām ācayāpacayāḥ pṛthak / lakṣyante pariṇāmena sarvāsām bhedayoginā// (VP.3.9.13)*

29 Vide *Mbh.* on P.2.2.5: *tasyaiva kayācit kriyayā yuktasyāhariti ca bhavati rātrir iti ca/ kayā kriyayā? ādityagatyā / tasyaivāsakṛdāvṛtyā māsa iti bhavati saṃvatsara iti ca /*

30 Vide *Mbh.*: *kālo hi jagadādhārah*; so we can say that Time is more fundamental than Space.

31 Vide *Mbh.* on P.4.2.3: *nitye hi kālanakṣatre /*

32 Vide *Mbh.* on vt. 8 ad. P.3.3.133: *kiñcid indriyakarma, kiñcid buddhikarma / indriya-karma samāsādanam buddhikarma vyavasāyah /*

“the well is” and when he crosses the well says- “the well was” and further he uses the non-today past and so on. In all these, we have action of the senses we have the past and future tenses (with their variations) but, when we have the action of the mind, we have the present tense.³³

Patañjali presents a very ancient view according to which there is no movement in the world, hence no time including present. According to the same view: the wheel does not move, the arrow is not thrown, the rivers do not flow to the sea, the world is motionless and there is no active agent; he who views the state of things thus is also not blind. The idea is again narrated as: in all the three divisions of time there is no motion; hence the usage like ‘he goes’ is not possible.³⁴

In connection with the above problem Patañjali quotes an another view which says that the present does exist. It is not perceived like the motion of the Sun. Yet, it is there. The five lotus-fibres in the inside of lotus-stalk, when being burnt are not noticed as being burnt, similarly, subtle things are knowable by inference.³⁵

Patañjali justifies the usage *gacchati* (he goes) in the following manner: First there is a mental action, that is, the desire to achieve a thing. The mental action leads to physical action. Both these actions, mental and physical, prior and posterior, ending with the production of the fruit are unified by the mind which has the power of piecing things together and presented as one action. Therefore, the usages like *gacchati* etc. are justified.³⁶ Thus, according to Patañjali, time through senses is different from time through mind-real time and relative time.

33 *tad yad indriyakarma tadaitā vibhaktayo yadā hi buddhikarma tadā vartamānā bhaviṣyati (loc. cit.)*

34 Vide *Mbh.* on P.3.2.123:

*na vartate cakram iṣur na pātyate na syandante saritaḥ sāgarāya /
kūṭastho 'yam loko na viceṣṭitā 'sti yo hy evaṃ paśyati so 'py anandhaḥ //
anāgatam atikrāntaṃ vartamānam iti trayam /
sarvatra ca gatir nāsti gacchatīti kim ucyate //*

The above view is comparable with the view of Parmenides, the famous western classical thinker.

35 *apara āha --- asti vartamānakāla iti / ādityagativan nopalabhyate/ api cātra ślokaṃ udāharati, ---*

*visasya vālā iva dahyamānā na lakṣyate vikṛtiḥ sannipāte
astīti tām vedayante tribhāvāḥ sūksmo hi bhāvo 'numitena gamyaḥ (loc. cit.);*

while explaining the word *Tribhāvāḥ* Kaiyaṭa writes: *yoginaḥ ye bhāvanāvaśena trīn api kālān yogipratyakṣena vidanti/* Here Kaiyaṭa perhaps wants to say -- Time is an inferential thing for common human beings whereas it is perceptible for Yogins.

36 Vide *Mbh.* on P.3.2.123: *kriyāpravṛttau yo hetus tadarthaṃ yad viceṣṭitam / tatsamīkṣya prayuñjita gacchatīty avicārayan //*

Patañjali, among the *trimunis*, was regarded as the highest authority in the tradition,³⁷ whose views were regarded and carried out down the ages. Bhartrhari being a very fundamental and independent thinker in the grammatical history, has also shown his adhesion towards Patañjali. However, Bhartrhari's philosophical aspect of time indeed, has remained unique in the grammatical tradition. The subsequent chapter deals with the concept of time according to Bhartrhari.

CHAPTER III: TIME ACCORDING TO BHARTRHARI

1. Bhartrhari's Own View

After Patañjali, it was Bhartrhari who is regarded with utmost attention for his valuable contribution to the development of the history of grammatical thought, particularly for making a solid philosophical background of the grammatical concepts. Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya* is a unique work which discusses many such concepts and establishes grammar as a complete system of philosophy like other systems.

Bhartrhari was the first grammarian who undertook the task of evolving a school of philosophy which is known by the name of verbal monism, *śabdādvaita* or *śabdabrahmavāda*. Monism in India, is said to have expression in three ways: the *Brahmādvaita* or the *Bhāvādvaita* of the Vedantins, the *Vijñānādvaita* of Buddhists and the *Śabdādvaita* of Grammarians. Bhartrhari represents the third school of thought.

Bhartrhari for the first time in the grammatical history pays special attention to time as a concept and here he does not confine himself only to the explanation of time with reference to tense forms of Sanskrit verbal system but raises the fundamental question, what time is and how it is related to the ultimate reality.

The ultimate reality, according to him, is *śabdabrahman* which is in the form of *śabdatattva* 'the word principle' out of which the whole cosmos is manifested in the form of objects.³⁸ This *śabdatattva* consists

37 Vide *Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* on P.I.1.29: *yathottaram muninām prāmānyam.*

38 *VP.I.1.*

of word and its referent (*vācya* & *vācaka*) The *śabdabrahman* is one but with manifold powers appears as many.³⁹

Time (*kāla*) is an independent power (*śakti*) of *śabdabrahman* by which manifestation takes place. This manifestation in the Universe is an evolution which involves actions and processes. All animate and inanimate things, according to Bharṭhari, are liable to change and this change according to Vārṣyāyaṇi (quoted by Yāska in his *Nirukta*) is analysed into six states⁴⁰ as follows: *jāyate* (genesis), *asti* (existence) *vipariṇamate* (alteration), *vardhate* (growth) *apakṣīyate* (decay) and *vinaśyati* (destruction).

According to Bharṭhari, this time is an independent power of *śabdabrahman*.⁴¹ It is the instrumental cause for the creation, continuation and destruction of the transitory objects.⁴² It is also called the operator of this mechanical world⁴³ and measurement of the course of activity.⁴⁴ Since it is an instrumental cause of the activities it is treated as being identical with activity⁴⁵ though it is really different from it.⁴⁶

Again, time is comparable to a water-wheel which drives (*kālayati*) the beings and hence designated as *kāla*.⁴⁷ From the explanation given by Helārāja it is understood that the only true Being is *parabrahman* (which can be considered as *śabdabrahman* here). It has definite

39 *Ibid.* I.3.

40 Vide *Nirukta* (Ch.I): *śad bhāvavikārā bhavantīti vārṣyāyaṇiḥ / jāyate 'sti vipariṇamate vardhate 'pakṣīyate vinaśyati*; also vide *VP.* I.3.

41 Vide *Prakāśa* on *VP.* III.9.62: *kālākhyā svātantryaśaktir brahmaṇa iti tatra bhagavad-bharṭharer abhiprāyah*; also vide *Ibid.* on *VP.* III.9.14.

42 Vide *VP.* III.9.3:
*utpattau ca sthitau caiva vināśe cā 'pi tadvatām /
nimittam kālam evāhur vibhaktanātmanā sthitam //*

43 Vide *VP.* III.9.4: *tamasya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṃ pracakṣate //*

44 Vide *VP.* III.9.28: *gurutvaṃ parimīyeta kālād evaṃ kriyāgatih //*

45 Vide *VP.* III.9.18:
*tatas tu samavāyākyā śaktir bhedasya bādhiḥ /
ekatvam iva tā vyaktir āpādayati kāraṇaiḥ //*

46 Vide *Prakāśa* on *Ibid.*: *kecit kāraṇavyatiriktaṃ kāryaṃ necchanti / bhedapratyaya-
viśayebhyo 'bhedapratyayaviśayasyāvayavino 'vayavebhyo vastuto 'bhedān naikatvam iti iva
śabdah /*

47 Vide *VP.* III.9.14:
*jalayantrabhramāveśa sadṛśibhiḥ pravṛttibhiḥ /
sa kalāḥ kalayan sarvāḥ kālākhyāṃ labhate vibhuḥ //*

powers through which it produces all kinds of effects and again since it creates effects in cyclic manner (*kālayati*) it is called *kāla*.⁴⁸

Time functions with its two prominent powers called *pratibandha* and *abhyanuḥjñā*.⁴⁹ There are two powers of time through which the sequence in the manifestation of states of change is brought about. Of these, *pratibandha* is a preventive power which prevents things from appearing, or it hides a thing; and *abhyanuḥjñā* permits a thing to appear. This way time like a puppet-operator or a stringholder causes opening and closing of an act.⁵⁰ Thus, time works through its two powers in such a systematic way that automatically things get priority and posteriority through their activities and everything becomes ordered. In the absence of these two prominent powers called *abhyanuḥjñā* and *pratibandha* all the functions would take place at one time and there will be no order.⁵¹ This order or sequence also is a power of time itself.⁵² The notion of slowness and quickness are explainable only on the admission that time exists and functions in a dynamic way. It is by virtue of an action which has a greater continuity, it is called slow (*ciram*) and quick (*ksīpram*): what is intended is that the notions *cira* and *ksīpra* must have an *adhikaraṇa* 'substratum' in which they could reside and that *adhikaraṇa* is the time.⁵³ According to Bharṭṛhari, again, every object is governed by the power of time. Why does the Sun rise and set at a regular time? Why do the planets move in a particular order? All these movements, can be explained according to Bharṭṛhari only as being due to the powerful nature of *kāla*. The coming into existence, the appearance and

48 Vide *Prakāśa* on *Ibid.*: *viśvātmaika eva parabrahmābhīdhānasatyō bhāvah / sa eva nānā-vidhakāryakāritayānantaśaktitvena vyavahriyate / tathā ca kramikāmś cakrabhramavata parāvarta-mānān bhāvān prakāśayan kālayati bhūtānīti kāla ity ucyate;*

Here from the explanation it is understood that one aspect of Brahman is designated as *kāla* here *abheda* between *śakti* and *śaktimat* is obvious.

49 Vide *VP. III.9.4*: *pratibandhābhyanuḥjñābhīyāṃ tena viśvaṃ vihajāyate /*

50 *tamasya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṃ pracakṣate* (loc. cit.)

51 *VP. III.9.5*: *yadi na pratibadhnīyāt pratibandhaṃ ca notsrjet / avasthā vyatikāryeran paurvāparyāṃ vinākṛtāḥ //*

52 Vide *VP. III.1.91-92*:

*yathānupūrvīnyamo vikāre kṣīrabhījayoh /
tathāiva pratīpatrñam niyato buddhiṣu kramah //
bhāgavatsv api teṣv eva rūpabhedo dhvaneḥ kramāt /
nirbhāgeṣv abhyupāyo vā bhāgabhedaprakalpanam;
also vide *Prakāśa* on *Ibid. III.9.27*: *sarvah kramo hi kāladharmah //**

53 Vide *VP. III.9.47*: *ciraḥksīpravyavasthānaṃ kālādihikaraṇaṃ tathā //*

disappearance of all objects are due to time alone.⁵⁴ So, according to him, time is the cause of the motion. The relation between time with the motion is that of cause with effect. Due to *Samavāya* (inherency), they appear as one. Just as *tantu* (thread) is related to *pata* (cloth), so also are the parts of time related to time.⁵⁵

According to Bhartrhari, time appears to be inferential. It is not a thing which can be perceived. It is inferred through activities. It is inferred as a linking factor between two ending activities which are inherent in separate objects. How can an exact discrimination be possible between two ending activities which are inherent in separate objects, if there is not a single linking factor?⁵⁶ This factor, according to Bhartrhari, is time. Again, sequence is the very essential property of time through which time can be inferred. From the usages like *cira*, *kṣipra* etc. time also can be inferred because time is the *adhikaraṇa* (substratum) for them.

Time, according to Bhartrhari, is one single unit.⁵⁷ It is because of its relation to motion that it becomes many. The divisions of time, such as, the days, months, seasons and years are due to the motion of the Sun that is superimposed upon time and are not integral to it.⁵⁸ Bhartrhari tries to explain it with a very good example. He says just as the same individual becomes a carpenter when he is chiseling a piece of wood and in other times a blacksmith when works with a piece of iron and yet retains its original nature.⁵⁹ In the same manner, time is called spring when there is blossoming of flowers and cooing of cuckoo etc. and autumn when there is falling of the leaves of the trees. These are

54 Vide VP. III.9.13:
*mūrtinām tena bhinnānām ācayāpacayāḥ pṛthak /
lakṣyante parināmena sarvāsām bhedayoginā //*

55 Vide VP. III.9.18.

56 Vide VP. III.9.27:
*kriyayor apavarginyor nānārthasamavetayoḥ /
sambandhinā vinaikena paricchedaḥ katham bhavet //*

The above idea goes very well with the idea of great Sociologist of the recent times; Alvin Toffler in his famous book *Future Shock* writes: Time can be considered as the intervals during which events occur. p. 29.

57 Vide VP. III.9.32, 48-49.

58 Vide VP. III.9.68:
*viśiṣṭam avadhim tam tam upādāya prakalpate /
kālah kalāvātām ekaḥ kṣanamāsartubhedabhāk //*

59 Vide VP. III.9.32:
*kriyābhedaḥ yathaikasmimś taksādyākhyā pravartate /
kriyābhedaḥ tathaika-smin nṛtvādyākhyopajāyate //*

not the real parts of time but are superimposed on time. Thus, actually time is one.

According to Bharṭṛhari, time is an eternal thing and because of different *mātrās*, it appears differently.⁶⁰ The simultaneity in language exists because time expresses itself in a sequence.⁶¹

About the three divisions of time *i.e.*, present past and future, Bharṭṛhari says that these are not three different times but the same single time appears as three through its three powers.⁶² Further, these three divisions of time are artificially divided into eleven varieties for the sake of the different usages in Sanskrit language,⁶³ but otherwise these are not actual varieties. Again, three fold division related to the three powers of time is very well brought under the two main powers of time called *abhyanujñā* and *pratibandha*. The function of *prati-bandha* is to prevent or to close (*nimilana*) and of *abhyanujñā* is to permit or to open (*unmilana*). Among future, past and present first two *viz.* future and past are preventive and present is permissive. That means when future and past hide a thing present permits a thing to act its role.⁶⁴

2. Bharṭṛhari's Discussion and Explanation on the Views of Earlier Predecessors : Pāṇini, Katyāyana and Patañjali.

Apart from the ideas about *kāla* of different schools, Bharṭṛhari has also discussed the views of earlier predecessors on time.

In the *kālasamuddeśa* from the *kārikā* No. 79 onwards the discussion has been specifically laid upon various Pāṇinian *sūtras* which

60 Vide VP. II.24: *na nityaḥ paramātrābhiḥ kālo bhedaḥ ihārhati //*

61 Vide Vṛtti on VP. II.22: *kramapratyavabhāsatvaḥ ekatvānatikrameṇa akrame buddhi-lakṣaṇe kṣaṇikavādināḥ sarvasya viruddhaḥ ivāviruddhaḥ bhavati / tryantavidāḥ tu viśvātmany ekatvānati-krameṇa kramapratyavabhāsatvaḥ bhavati /*

62 Vide VP. III.9.49:
*ekasya śaktayaḥ tīśraḥ kālasya samavasthitāḥ /
yacchambandhena bhāvānām darśanādarśane satām //*

63 Vide VP. III.9.37-38:
*kriyopādhiś ca sanbhūtabhaviṣyad vartamānatā /
ekādaśabhir ākārair vibhaktāḥ pratipadyate //
bhūtaḥ pañcavidhas tatra bhaviṣyamś ca catur vidhaḥ /
vartamāno dvidhākhyāyata ity ekādaśa kalpanāḥ //*

64 Vide VP. III.9.56:
*dve eva kālasya vibhoḥ keśāmcicchaktivartamanī /
karoti yābhyām bhāvānām unmīlananimīlane //*

will be worth-noting here. Moreover, Helārāja specifically mentions in the following words: *idānīm kālasvarūpe nirñite tadāśrayaḥ sāstre vyavahāro vicāryate*⁶⁵ (after the nature of time has been decided, the reference in the grammar depending upon it is discussed now) The *sūtras* on which Bhartṛhari has focused are mentioned below:

<i>Karikā</i>	<i>Sūtras and Nos.</i>
1. 29	<i>haś ca vrīhikālayoḥ</i> (P.3.1.148)
2. 37-38	<i>niṣṭhā</i> (P.3.2.102) <i>anadyatane lañ</i> (P.3.2.111) <i>parokṣe liṭ</i> (P.3.2.115) <i>āśamsāyām bhūtavac ca</i> (P.3.3.132) <i>lṛṭ śeṣe ca</i> (P.3.3.13) <i>liñ co'rdhvomauhūrtike</i> (P.3.3.164) <i>anadyatane luṭ</i> (P.3.3.15) <i>bhaviṣyati maryādāvacanatve 'varasmin</i> (P.3.3.135) <i>vartamānasāmīpye vartamānavadvā</i> (P.3.3.131)
3. K.65	<i>taparas tatkālasya</i> (P.1.1.70)
4. K.79-90	<i>vartamāne laṭ</i> (P.3.2.123)
5. K.93-101	<i>dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ</i> (P.3.4.1)
6. K.102	<i>vartamānasāmīpye vartamāna vad vā</i> (P.3.3.131)
7. K.103-105	<i>āśamsāyām bhūtavac ca</i> (P.3.3.132)
8. K.106-113	<i>kṣipravacane lṛṭ</i> (P.3.3.133)
9. K.114	<i>striyām</i> (P.4.1.3)

Apart from the discussion on the above *sūtras*, Bhartṛhari has also discussed Patañjali's opinion on p.3.3.139-40 in his *kārikā* no. 91-92 and on p.3.2.123 in k. 80-90 in detail.

Hence, the discussion commences on the above mentioned *kārikās* against the relevant *sūtras*:

K. 29: P.3.1.148.

jahāti sahavṛttās ca kriyāḥ sa samavasthitāḥ /
vrīhir yathodakam tena hāyanākhyām prapadyate //

65 Vide *Prakāśa* on *VP*. III.9.79.

Tr.: "It (time) passes (*jahāti*) the actions associated with it just as rice grains abandon water. Hence, it is called *hāyana*".

Notes: '*jahāti kriyā iti hāyanah* (that which passes or abandons) Here, Halārāja clearly states that '*has ca vrīhikālayoḥ* (P.3.1.148) *iti sūtrakāreṇa upamāgarbham sahaiva vyutapattir anuśiṣṭā yathā jalaiḥ vrīhiḥ sahāvasthitair upakriyate tathā kriyābhis sahakāriṇībhir bhāvānupakaroti iti aupādhiko 'sya bhedah'* /;⁶⁶ SK under P.3.1.148 also mentions: '*jahāti udakam iti hāyano vrīhiḥ / jahāti bhāvān iti hāyano varṣam*'. Here *hāyana* which is the name for *saṃvatsara* 'year' is identified with time.

(2) K. 37-38.

*kriyopādhiś ca san bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānatā /
ekādaśabhir ākārair vibhaktāḥ pratipadyate //
bhūtaḥ pañcavidhastatra bhaviṣyamś ca caturvidhaḥ /
vartamāno dvidhākhyāta ity ekādaśa kalpanāḥ //*

Trs.: '(Time), having activity as its superimposition, becomes past, future and present, divided into eleven forms. The past is of five kinds; future is of four kinds and the present is of two kinds. Thus, there are eleven assumptions'.

Notes: The above mentioned 11 assumptions or varieties in time are based on the *sūtras* mentioned in the chart. Halārāja has clarified the 11 varieties. Thus, the five varieties of past are: 1) *bhūtasāmānya* 'past general' (based on P.3.2.110), 2) *adyatanabhūta* 'today-past' (based on *Mbh.* on P.2.2.24), 3) *anadyatanabhūta* 'non-today past' (based on P.3.2.111), 4) *adyatanānadyatana samudāya* 'applicable to both today and non-today past' (based on *Mbh.* P.3.2.111), 5) *adhyāropitabhūta* 'extended application of past' (based on P.3.3.132), 6) *bhaviṣyat-sāmānya* 'the future general' (based on P.3.3.13), 7) *adyatana-bhaviṣyat* 'today-future' (based on P.3.3.164), 8) *anadyatana-bhaviṣyat* 'non-today future' (based on P.3.3.15), 9) *adyatana-anadyatana-samudāya* 'the fusion of today-future and non-today-future' (based on P.3.3.15), 10) *mukhyavartamāna* (principal present' based on P.3.2.123), 11) *atidiṣṭavartamāna* 'extended present' (based on P.3.3.131).

K 65:P.1.1.70

abhiviyaktinimittasya pracayena pracīyate /

66 *Ibid.* on VP. III.9.29.

abhinnaṃapi śabdasya tattvam apracayātmakam //

Tr.: 'The essence of sound, though it is undivided (by time) and not increasing by nature, is increased through the increase of the causes of manifestation'.

Note: Helārāja takes help of 'taparas tatkālasya' P.1.1.70 to interpret the above *kārikā*.

K. 79-90: P.3.2.123]

bhūto ghaṭa itīyaṃ ca sattāyā eva bhūtata /

bhūtā satteti sattāyāḥ sattā bhūtābhīdhīyate //

Tr.: 'In the expression like' *bhūto ghaṭaḥ* (the pot existed) it is the existence of pot which is said to be past. In the expression 'the existence is past (*bhūtā sattā*) the existence of existence is expressed as past'.

parato bhidyate sarvam ātmā tu na vikalpate /

parvatādisthitis tasmāt pararūpeṇa bhidyate //80//

Tr.: 'Everything acquires distinction through other things. In itself, nothing has distinction. The existence of mountains etc. is therefore, diversified through other things'.

prasidhabhedā vyāpārā virūpāvayavakriyāḥ /

sāhacaryeṇa bhidyante sarūpāvayavakriyāḥ // 81 //

Tr.: 'Well-known actions (like action of kings etc.) have dissimilar parts. Through association with them, actions having similar parts are diversified.

vyavadhānam ivopaiti nivṛtta iva drśyate /

kriyāsamūho bhūjyādir antarālapravṛttibhiḥ // 82 //

na ca vicchinnarūpo 'pi so 'virāmān nivartate /

sarvaiva hi kriyānyena samkīrṇevopalakṣate // 83 //

Tr.: 'The activity, such as, "eating" etc. which is the aggregate of many component activities, appears to be interrupted or stopped by other actions coming in between'. 'Though interrupted, it is not yet finished because the ultimate result is not there. All action appears to be mixed with other actions'.

tadantarālabrṣṭā vā sarvaivāvayavakriyā /

sādrśyāt sati bhede tu tadaṅgatvena grhyate //84 //

Tr.: 'Or, indeed every subsidiary activity, seen in the middle of it (*i.e.*, the main activity), is accepted as a part of it, due to similarity (with another essential of the hand etc.) despite its difference (with the moments of the main activity).

sad asad vāpi vastu syāt tṛtīyaṃ nāsti kiñcana /
tena bhūtabhaviṣyantau muktva madhyaṃ na vidyate // 85 //

Tr.: 'A thing may be either existent or non-existent; there is no third possibility. Therefore, excepting past and future, there is no middle course'.

nirvṛtirūpaṃ ekasya bhedābhāvān na kalpate /
sad asad vāpi tenaikam kramarūpaṃ katham bhavet //86. //

Tr.: 'A thing, being free from distinctions cannot be in the nature of a sequence. How can one thing, whether it be existent or non-existent, be in the nature of sequence.

bahūnām cānavasthānādekamevopalabhyate /
yathopalabdhismaranaṃ tatra cāpyupapadyate // 87 //

Tr.: 'Because many cannot co-exist, only one is perceived. And there the recollection takes place according to perception'.

sadasadrūpaṃ ekaṃ syāt sarvasyeikatvakalpane /
nirvṛtirūpaṃ nirvṛtteḥ sāmānyam athavā bhavet // 88 //

Tr.: 'If action is regarded as one, everything would be one, consisting of partly existent and partly non-existent elements'.

kāryotpattau samarthaṃ vā svena dharmeṇa tat tatha /
ātmatattvena grhyeta sā cāsmiṃ vartamānatā // 89 //

Tr.: 'When it is perceived in its own form, that is, that which enables it to produce the fruit, that is its present time'.

kriyāprabandharūpaṃ yad adhyātmaṃ vinigrhyate /
saṃrāntabimbam ekatva tām āhu vartamānatām // 90 //

Tr.: 'When series of momentary acts is cognised within and is reflected in one act of cognition, that is said to be its oneness and its presentness'.

Note: The above *kārikās* from 79-90 in the *kālasamuddeśa* explains the *sūtra*: '*Vartamāne laṭ*' P.3.2.123 and *vārttika* and *Bhāṣya* under

that. In the *kārikās* 85-88 the Buddhist (*Mādhyamika*) view is raised and refuted by Bhartṛhari. In the *kārikās* 79-90, Bhartṛhari gives the idea what is present and what is presentness.

K 91-92: *Mbh.* on 3.3.139-140.

*kriyātipattiratyantam kriyānutpattilakṣaṇā /
na ca bhūtam anutpannam na bhaviṣyat tathāvidham // 91 //*

Tr.: 'The non-accomplishment of an action is its absolute non-production. Such a thing cannot be past or future'.

*prāg viruddhakriyotpādān nirvṛtte vā virodhini /
vyāpāre' vadhibhedena viṣayas tatra bhidyate // 92 //*

Tr.: 'Before the production of a contrary activity or after the contrary activity has been accomplished, the subject matter differs there through the difference of time'.

Note: In the *kārikā* No. 91, an objection is raised to what is taught in the *Mbh.* under *līnimitte lṛṇ kriyātipattau* (P.3.3.139) and a solution is attempted in k. 92.

K. 93-101: P.3.4.1.

*vyabhicāre nimittasya sādhutvaṃ na prakalpate /
bhāvvyāsīditi sūtreṇa tatkāle 'nyatra śiṣyate // 93 //*

Tr.: 'When the particular circumstance (in which a suffix is taught) is absent, its use would not be correct. Therefore, *sūtra* in question makes it expressive of another point of time also in the sentence *bhāvya āsīt'*.

*svakāla eva sādhuś cet kālabhede gatiḥ katham /
vākyaṛthād atadartheṣu viśiṣṭatvaṃ na sidhyati // 94 //*

Tr.: 'If a suffix is correct only when it expresses the particular point of time for which it is taught, how can it express another? When the suffixes are incapable of expressing other points of time, how can a single meaning with parts related by the relation of qualifier and qualified be understood from the sentence?'

*tadarthaś ced avayavo bhāvino bhūtatāgatiḥ /
na syādatyantabhūtatvamevaikaṃ tatra sambhavet // 95 //*

Tr.: 'The idea that which was future is no longer so would not be understood if (according to the *sūtra*) the suffix in *bhāvī* expresses the

same point of time as in *āsīt*. Only the absolute past would be understood’.

*viśiṣṭakālatā pūrvam tathāpi tu viśeṣane /
āśrayāt so ’ntarāngatvāt tatra sādthur bhaviṣyati // 96 //*

Tr.: ‘Before entering into a sentence, a suffix expresses the particular time for which it is taught. It continues to do so when it enters into relation with another word as a qualifier. The particular time which is the basis of the suffix is its inner circumstance. It will always express it’.

*āmīśra eva prakrāntaḥ sa padārthaḥ tathāvidhaḥ /
kevalasya vimiśratvaṃ nitye ’rthe nopapadyate // 97 //*

Tr.: ‘The meaning of the individual word is already qualified (by those of other words) that is how it is taught. Meaning being eternal, it would not be right to believe that the unqualified word becomes qualified later’.

*suddhe ca kāle vyākhyātam āmīśre na prasidhyati /
sādhutvam ayathākālam tat sūtrenopadiśyate // 98 //*

Tr.: ‘That which is taught as expressive of a simple tense would not be correct if made to express a complex one. Therefore, the *sūtra* teaches the correctness of the suffix when it expresses a different tense’.

*ākhyātapadavācye ’rthe nirvartyatvāt pradhānatā /
viśeṣaṇam tadākṣepāt tatkāle vyavatiṣṭhate // 99 //*

Tr.: ‘The idea expressed by the verb is the main one because it is a process. That which it calls forth is subordinate and follows its tense.’

*saṃpratyayānukāro vā śabdavyāpāra eva vā /
adhyasyate viruddhe ’rthe na ca tena viruddhyate // 100 //*

Tr.: ‘The two cognitions: ‘this is past’ and ‘that is future’, themselves present, assume the opposite forms of their objects without giving up their own form’.

Note: The above mentioned *kārikās* explain the *sūtra*: ‘*dhātu-sambandhe pratyayāḥ* P.3.4.1, which seem to teach a verbal suffix for expressing a tense. For detailed discussion, vide ch. 2 (under 1.3.0).

K. 102: P.3.3.131.

*adhvono vartamānasya yaḥ śeṣo yaḥ upakramah /
tad vartamānasāmīpyam śāstre bhedena darśitam //*

Tr.: That, which is the remainder and which is the commencement of the present time has been shown distinctly in Grammar, as the vicinity of the present time.

Note: [The *kārikā* explains the *sūtra*: *vartamānasāmīpye vartamānavad vā* P.3.3.131] Here Helārāja explains the two kinds of *vartamānasāmīpya* as: [*ā phalasarāmāpteh kriyāprabandho' vyuparato vartamānaḥ kāla ityuktam*] *tasya ca yaḥ śeṣaḥ samāptatve 'pi saṁskārānuvṛttilakṣaṇaḥ tad bhūtavīṣayam vartamānasāmīpyam / yaś ca prārambho mānasaḥ saṁkalpo vartamānasya tad dvitīyam bhaviṣyad viṣayam vartamānasāmīpyam* 'And the remainder of it (i.e., of the present time), which is characterized by a continued course of reminiscent i.e., mental desire for (the state of) present time, is the second vicinity of the present time!]⁶⁷

K.103-105: P.3.3.132.

*āsamsā vartamānāpi viṣayeṇa bhaviṣyatā /
bhāsyē bhaviṣyatkāleti kāryārtham vyapadiśyate //*

Tr.: 'Expectation, though present, is, on account of (its) future object, referred to in the *Mbh.* (on P.3.3.132) as possessing future time, for the purpose of grammatical operations'.

*icchā cikīrṣatīty atra svakālamānuranudhyate /
bhaviṣyati prakṛtyarthe tatkālam nānuranudhyate //*

Tr.: 'In the word *cikīrṣati*, 'desire' follows its own time. Even though the meaning of the base relates to the future, desire is not expressed by the future tense'.

*āsamsyamānatantratvādāsamsāyām viparyayaḥ /
prayokṛdharmah śabdārthe śabdairvānuṣajyate //* 105 //

Tr.: 'Just the opposite happens in the case of hope because it depends on its object. The words themselves impose a property of the speaker on the meaning of the words'.

Note: The above mentioned three *kārikās* explain the *sūtra*: *āsamsāyām bhūtavac ca* P.3.3.132.

⁶⁷ Vide Sharma, *The Kālasamuddeśa of Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya*, p.128.

K. 106-113:P.3.3.133.

*ap̄s̄ālibījasamyoge vartate niṣpadir yadā /
tatrāvayavavṛttivād bhaviṣyatpratiṣedhanam // 106 //*

Tr.: 'When the verb 'niṣpad' denotes the combination (or, connection) of water and seed, the future tense is rejected because there it (i.e., the activity) represents a component'.

*phalaprasavarupe tu niṣpadau bhūtakālatā /
dharmāntareṣu tadrūpamadhyasya parikalpyate // 107 //*

Tr.: 'When niṣpad has its real meaning of production of fruit, then it is attributed to the special properties (brought about by contact of water etc.) and the past tense is used (because these properties are already there)'.

*upayukte nimittānām vyāpāre phalasiddhaye /
tatra rūpaṃ yadadyastam tatkālam tat pratīyate // 108 //*

Tr.: 'The function of the cause in the production of the fruit is superimposed on the fruit. Therefore, the latter is understood as having the former's time'.

*niṣpattāv avadhiḥ kaś cit kaś cit pratvivakṣitaḥ /
hetujanmavyapekṣātaḥ phalajanmeti cocyate // 109 //*

Tr.: 'In the accomplishment (of the result) sometimes this and sometimes that particular cause is recommended. And it is with regard to the accomplishment of (any particular) cause that the accomplishment of the result is spoken of'.

*abahissāadhanādhinā siddhir yatra vivakṣitā /
tat sādhanāntarābhāvāt siddhamityupadiśyate // 110 //*

Tr.: 'When it is meant to be conveyed that the production of the result does not depend upon any external cause, it is declared to be already produced, just to exclude the necessity of other causes'.

*tasmād avadhibhedena siddhā mukhyaiva bhūtātā /
anāgatatvam astitvaṃ hetudharmavyapekṣane // 111 //*

Tr.: 'Therefore, the essential pastness alone has been established through the difference of the cause. Futurity and presence (become

essential) when the operation (*dharmā*) of (future and present) causes is taken into consideration’.

*satām indriyasambandhāt saiva sattā viśiṣyate /
bhedena vyavahāro hi vastvantaranibandhanaḥ // 112 //*

Tr.: ‘The Being of things is differentiated according to sense-contact. It is due to other factors that the same thing is spoken of differently.’

*astitvaṃ vastumātrasya budhyā tu pariḡrhyate /
yaḥ samāsādanād bhedaḥ sa tatra na vivakṣitaḥ // 113 //*

Tr.: ‘The existence of a mere thing is ascertained by the intellect. There it is not intended to express the difference (resulting) from the contact (of the objects with the organs of sense and action).’

Note: The above mentioned *kārikās* explain the *sūtra*: *kṣipravacane lṛṭ* P.3.3.133 and the *vārttikas* and *Bhāṣya* under the same.

K. 114: P.4.1.3.

*yogād vā strītvapumstvābhyām na kimcid avatiṣṭhate /
yaḥ samāsādanād bhedaḥ sa tatra na vivakṣitaḥ // 114 //*

Tr.: ‘Or, due to association with masculinity and femininity, nothing remains the same. Past and future are, therefore, different from such variations’.⁶⁸

Apart from the above explanations on various *sūtras* and *vārttikas* and *Bhāṣya* under these, Bharṭṛhari has also discussed many such theoretical issues relating to time and other related topics, already arisen in the *trimunivyākaraṇa*. For example, the definition of time given by Patañjali in his *Mbh.* under P.2.2.5 as: ‘*yena mūrtinām upacayāpacayāś ca lakṣante taṃ kālam ity āhuḥ*’ it is time through which the growth and decay of material things are perceived’, is nicely embodied in the 13th *kārikā* of *kālasamuddeśa*:

*mūrtinām tena bhinnānām ācayāpacayāḥ pṛthak /
lakṣyante pariṇāmena sarvāsām bhedayoginā //*

Tr.: ‘By it (time) differentiated through its associates, the increase and decrease of all objects are distinctly observed as transformations’.

⁶⁸ The *kārikās* of *Kālasamuddeśa* with their translations (from k. 79-114) are given here according to Subramania Iyer. Sometimes Peri Sharma’s tr. is also followed where it is felt lucid.

3. Views of Other Thinkers Incorporated in the *Vākyapadīya*

As it has been already stated, *Kālasamuddēśa* exclusively deals with the notion of time. While discussing it, Bhartrhari has quoted the views of many other disciplines and borrowed the ideas of different schools of philosophy and popular traditions apart from his own views on time. It is sometimes difficult to identify the views of others in the sense that sometimes he refers them in the term *eke, apare* etc. and many a times not. In such cases where Bhartrhari has not identified them it is known from Helārāja's Commentary. Among the views he has quoted, he has categorically refuted the view of Mādhyamikas on the concept of time with reference to the non-existence of present time and sequence in time.⁶⁹ However, it is difficult to say how far he agrees with the other views. This problem will be dealt with in the fifth chapter. The views of the different schools are as following:

- 1) Astronomers view
- 2) Buddhist Sautrāntika view
- 3) Buddhist Vaibhāṣika view
- 4) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view
- 5) Sāṃkhya-Yoga view
- 6) Popular view (the *Atharva-veda*, *Purānas*, the *Mahābhārata* and *Āgamas*)⁷⁰

According to Astronomers, the movement of the Sun, the planets and the stars are called time. In the *kārikā* no. 76 of the *kālasamuddēśa*, Bhartrhari refers to their view as:

*ādityagrahanakṣatraparisbandamathāpare /
bhinnamāvṛttibhedena kālam kālavidō viduḥ //*

Helārāja while commenting upon it has referred to it as the view of astronomers (*evam anyeṣām api grahanakṣatrānām jyotiṣasāstra-prasiddhena ... kālo 'nusartavyaḥ*).⁷¹ A The movement of the sun from dawn to dusk makes a day, from dusk to dawn a night, fifteen cycles of the day and night make a fortnight, thirty such cycles make a month and so on. This way when the moon has traveled all the twenty-seven stars, it makes a month and when Brhaspati completes its

69 Vide *VP*. III.9.85-87.

70 The list is as per the book *The Kālasamuddēśa of Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya* by Peri Sarveswar Sharma (Vide intr. p.13).

71 Vide *Prakāśa* on *VP*.III.9.76.

revolution round a single *rāsi* (asterism), it makes a year.⁷² Since it is the movement of the planets that leads to the division of time, this movement itself is looked upon as time by some astronomers.⁷³

There are certain schools of thought which do not recognize *kāla* as an independent entity.⁷⁴ Buddhists are one among them. According to them time is never an object of our experience. The abstract indivisible time lacks the proof of its existence. However, they accept it as an intellectual fiction. It is purely subjective. Thus Bhartṛhari refers to them in the following *kārikā* (*Kālasamuddeśa*, K.58):

*jñānānugataśaktim vā bāhyaṃ vā satyataḥ sthitam /
kālātmānam anāsritya vyavahartum na śakyate //*

Helārāja clearly refers to it as the view of Buddhists.⁷⁵ Bhartṛhari has not shown any disagreement regarding the problem whether time is a subjective or objective entity. However here, he has refuted the view of those who hold time is non-existent. He has refuted their view by arguing that it is difficult to do without time.

According to some other philosophers, three *guṇas*: *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are assumed to possess the three powers past, future and present.⁷⁶ Through these powers, things appear or disappear. They do function respectively; they give rise to such usage as 'a thing was', 'a thing will be', 'a thing is'. These powers are inseparable and non-distinct from the three *guṇas*. The past and future powers remove things away from our consciousness and make them invisible, while the power called present brings them into our relative consciousness.

There are about 25 *kārikās* in the *kālasamuddeśa* in which *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* views on time are embodied. The very first *Kārikā* of the *kālasamuddeśa* expresses the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* views on time. For *Vaiśeṣikas*, time is single, all-pervading and an eternal substance.⁷⁷ It

72 Vide *VP*. III.9.76:
*ādityagrahanakṣatrapariṣpandam athāpare /
bhinnam āvṛttibhedena kālaṃ kālavido viduḥ //*

73 Vide *Prakāśa* on *Ibid*.

74 Vide Helārāja's introduction to *VP*. III.9.58: *nāsty anyo bāhyaḥ kaścit kāla iti buddha-
prāyāḥ /*

75 Vide *VP*. III.9.57: *kecit buddhyanusamhāralakṣaṇe te pracakṣate /*

76 *VP*. III.9.59:
*tisro bhāvasya bhāvasya keśāmcidbhāvaśaktayaḥ /
tābhiḥ svaśaktibhiḥ sarvaṃ sadaivāsti ca nāsti ca //*

77 *VP*. III.9.1:
*vyāpārvyatirekeṇa kālam eke pracakṣate /
nityam ekaṃ vibhu dravyaṃ parimāṇaṃ kriyāvatām //*

is also a measure for activities. Again, it is said that cause and effect are identified through inherency (*samavāya*) which comes true in case of activities and time. Bhartrhari seems to have agreed on this point with Naiyāyikas.⁷⁸

4. Aspects of Discussions Concerning Time in the *Vākyapadīya*

There are other important aspects of discussions regarding time found in the *Vākyapadīya* and Helārāja's *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*. Many other references to time are scattered in the various chapters and other *prakaraṇas* of the 3rd *kāṇḍa*. Considering the subject matters related to time in the *Vākyapadīya*, they can be arranged into following headings:

- 1) Time as a power of *Śabdabrahman*
- 2) Time and six *bhāvavikāras*
- 3) The relation of the concepts: *kriyā, kāla, dik* and *ākāśa*
- 4) Sequence as the prominent aspect of time
- 5) Time through manifesting sounds vs. *sphoṭa*
- 6) How time is a factor for the understanding of meaning from a sentence.
- 7) Reference to time reckoning
- 8) Relativistic aspect of time
- 9) Different views and theories about time
- 10) A misinterpretation of Bhartrhari's view on time-pointed out by Helārāja and the argument offered against it.
- 11) Conception of time: Bhartrhari's view as summed up by Helārāja.

The first two points, namely, time as a power of *Śabdabrahman* and time in relation to six *bhāvavikāras* are already discussed under Bhartrhari's central conception of time.

It is also stated by Bhartrhari that sequence is a power of Brahman. In the *Vākyapadīya*, so much of emphasis is given on this aspect. In the first *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartrhari says: just as there is a definite sequence in the transformation of milk or of the seed in the same way, there is a definite sequence in which the cognitions of

also vide Pr. on ibid.: *parāparādipratyayaliṅgo vyāpaka eko 'mūrto 'ta eva akṛtatvān nityaḥ kālah kriyāvyatirikto janmādikriyādvāreṇa bhāvaparicchedako vaiśesikair āmnātaḥ /*

⁷⁸ Vide Cardona, 'A Path still taken: Some early Indian arguments concerning Time', for some early references and contributions to the concept.

perceivers place in regard to the word (sentence).⁷⁹ Again it is said that difference in parts of a word is due to the sequence of sounds and this appearance of parts is the means for their cognition.⁸⁰ In the *Sambandha-samuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari shows how this sequence is not different from objects and ultimately not different from the Reality.⁸¹ In the same *samuddeśa*, he discusses, how sequence is not different from simultaneity, though they are opposite to each other.⁸² In the *sādhanasamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari discusses how one Reality shines with the divisions of time. It appears sequential though it is sequenceless in reality.⁸³ This sequence is the very essence of Being, emphasized in the very first *prakaraṇa* of the 3rd kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadya*.⁸⁴ Sequence as an essential nature *kriyā* is presented in the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*.⁸⁵ Above all, sequence as the very essential property of time is emphasized in *VP.2.50*.

The appearance of time through different manifesting sounds and its relationship with *sphoṭa* is a very important subject matter in the *Vākyapadya*. The following *kārikās* explain the subject matter in detail:

sphoṭasyābhinnakālasya dhvonicālānupātinah /
grahanopādhibhedena vṛttibhedam pracakṣate //
svobhāvabhedānnityatve hrasvadīrghapluṭādiṣu /
prākṛtasya dhvaneḥ kālah śabdasyetyupacaryate //
śabdasyordhvomabhivyakteḥ vṛttibhede⁸⁶ tu vaikṛtāḥ /

79 Vide Iyer's tr. on *VP.1.91*.

80 *Ibid.* on *VP.1.92*.

81 Vide *VP.III.3.83*: *bhāvaśakti ataś cainām manyante nityavādinah /*

82 Vide *VP.III.3.84*.

83 Vide *VP.III.7.42*:

kālavicchedarūpeṇa tadevaikam avasthitam /
sa hy apūrvāparo bhāvah kramarūpeṇa lakṣyate //

84 Vide *VP.III.1.37*:

ātmabhūtaḥ kramo 'py asyā yatredam kāladarśanam /
pauvāparyādirūpeṇa pravibhaktam iva sthitam //

85 Vide *VP. III.8.1*:

yāvat siddham asiddham vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate /
āśritakrama-rūpatvāt tat kriyety abhidhīyate //

86 Vide notes to *Bhāvapradīpa* commentary of Suryanarayana Shukla, on *VP. I.77*:
Vṛttibhede iti / vṛttayaś ca tisraḥ --

abhyāsārtham drutā vṛttir madhyā vai cintane smṛtā /
śiṣyānām upadeśārtham vṛttir iṣṭā vilambitā //

vṛttiṣu upalabdhyā eva bhinnakālāḥ varṇās tu tatkāle eva sarvāsu vṛttiṣu na varṇānām
upacayāpacayau / yathā gatiṅnām ālasyādibhedād gatibhede 'pi na mārgabheda ity arthah,
 p.87.

dhvonayah samupohante sphoṭātmā tair na bhidyate //

VP.1.75-77

‘Of the *sphoṭa* which has no temporal distinction and which appears to follow the duration (*Vṛtti*) have been declared on the basis of distinctions in the manifesting sounds. According to the view that the word is eternal, the short, the long and the protracted being different in nature, distinctions in time belonging to the primary sound are attributed to the *sphoṭa*. After the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*, the secondary sounds cause difference in speed of utterance, but the essence of the *sphoṭa* is not effected by them’.⁸⁷

The above idea becomes more clear from other three *kārikās* of the same *kāṇḍa* (chapter):

tasmād abhinnakāleṣu varṇavākyapadādiṣu /
vṛttikālah svakālaś ca nādabhedād vibhāvvyate //
yah saṃyogavibhāgābhyāṃ karaṇair upajanyate /
sa sphoṭa śabdajāḥ śabdā dhvonayo ’nyair udāhṛtaḥ //
alpe mahati vā śabde sphoṭakālo na bhidyate /
paras tu śabdasantānaḥ pracayāpacayātmakaḥ // VP.1.101-103.

‘It is therefore, due to the difference in time of the manifesting sounds, their own time and that of the duration of their cognition are attributed to the phoneme (*varṇa*) word (*pada*) and sentence (*vākya*) which have no difference in time. Others have declared that whatever is produced by the organs of articulation, through contacts and separations is the *sphoṭa*; the sounds produced by this initial sound are the *dhvanis*. Whether sound in question is short or long, the time of the *sphoṭa* is invariable. The series of sounds which follows is susceptible of greater or lesser duration’.⁸⁸

In the different contexts in the *Vākyapadīya*, the above idea of sound and word, and the idea of time involving in it get repeated differently in other places. The *kārikās*: VP.2.23 and 50 discuss the same idea. The *śabdātman* is not differentiated through time is emphasized in the VP.2.460, but it (*śabdātman* ‘*tattva*’) obtains time divisions (though actually devoid of divisions) is a subject matter discussed very clearly in the VP.3.2.8. Again, the subject matter is discussed (temporal and non-temporal aspect) in the VP.3.3.50.

Although *kāla* and *kriyā* are very closely connected with each other, Bhartṛhari has clearly maintained the difference between *kāla* and

87 Vide Iyer’s tr. on VP. I.75-77.

88 Vide *Ibid.* on VP. I.101-103.

kriyā.⁸⁹ *Kāla* being measurer of actions or activities is different from it. The difference is clearly maintained by Bharṭṛhari when he accepts these two as two different concepts being two powers of *śabda-brahman*. Time being an independent one always remains a substratum of actions. It differentiates action.⁹⁰ But, Bharṭṛhari says that these two (*kāla* and *kriyā*) are so much related to each other that sometimes some identify one with another,⁹¹ particularly, action (*kriyā*) with time (*kāla*). It seems, later Grammarians were the follower of this view. The issue will be taken up and discussed in the fifth chapter.

In Bharṭṛhari's philosophy also, there is a close affinity existing between *kāla* and *Dik* (space). *Kāla* and *Dik*, both are accepted as powers of *Śabdabrahman*.⁹² Both the concepts come side by side in Indian philosophy as it is in the Western philosophy. There are many *kārikās* in the *Vākyapadīya* where both the concepts are treated as related topics of discussion. The word *ākāśa* also sometimes found used for *Dik*. These two concepts viz. *kāla* and *Dik* are considered as the very fundamental concepts like that of Consciousness (*Caitanya*).⁹³ *kāla* discriminates actions whereas *Dik* discriminates the visible entities.⁹⁴ This issue also will be taken up in the fifth chapter.

Time as a determining factor for the understanding of meaning from word, is emphasized in the following three *kārikās*:

vākyāt prakaraṇād arthād aucityāddeśakālataḥ /
śabdārthāḥ pratipadyante na rūpādevakevatāt //
saṃsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā /
arthāḥ prakaraṇaṃ līngaṃ śabdasyānyasyasannidhiḥ //
sāmarthyam auciti deśaḥ kālo vyaktisvarādayaḥ /
śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ // VP.2.314-316.

'The meanings of the words are determined according to the sentence, situation, meaning, propriety, place and time and not according to mere external form. Connection, separation, association, apposition, the presence of another word, suitability, propriety, place, time, gender

89 Vide VP. III.7.153: *kālāt kriyā vibhajyante ākāśāt sarvamūrtayaḥ /*

90 Vide VP. III: *kriyābhedāya kālas tu saṃkhyā sarvasya bhedikā //*

91 Vide VP. III.9.18.

92 Vide VP. III.6.1:

dik sādhanam kriyā kāla iti vastv abhidāyinaḥ /
vasturūpe padārthānām atyantam anavasthitāḥ; also vide PR. on *Ibid.* III.6.7: *yathā pūrvā-*
parādipratyayalakṣaṇena kāryeṇānumītasatvā tathābhyupagantavyā śaktirūpā dik /

93 Vide VP. III.6.18: *caitanyavat sthitā loke dikkālaparikalpanā /*

94 Vide VP.III.7.153.

and accent etc., these are the causes of our determining the meaning of a word when there is no definiteness in it.'⁹⁵

From the references of *Vākyapadīya*, three ways of reckoning time are indicated. The first standard way was by the motion of sun (and stars) that time was measured. The second was by waterclock and the third was by calculating the breathings. The first two methods were common to all and references to those are often found in the *Vākyapadīya*; whereas the third one was mostly confined among the Yogins and a few other people. This becomes clear from Helārāja's statement. While lying an introduction to the *VP.3.9.78*, he states as: *antarmukho 'pavarakāntargata sūryādisañcāram nālikāsrutiṃ ca anavadhārayan katham kālavibhāgam avaiti iti āha* 'How can he, whose vision is introverted and lies in the inner apartment without determining the motion of the Sun etc. and the flow (of the water) from the water-clock, know the division of time.'⁹⁶ Having raised this doubt, Bhartrhari suggests the third alternative method of calculating time through calculation of breathing. Thus, Bhartrhari says:

*jñāne rūpasya samkrāntir jñānenaivānusamhṛtiḥ /
ataḥ kriyāntarābhāve sā kriyā kāla isyate // VP.3.9.78*

Helārāja explains the above *kārikā* in the following manner:

*antarmukho 'pi prakṛtām kāñcid eva prānapravāhādirūpām
kriyām buddhau samkrāntākārām avaiti / buddhyantaraiś ca tām
buddhiniveśinaḥ kriyākṣaṇān samkalayati ... prānacāreṇa-
kalayantyeva arthān yoginaḥ / anye 'pi prānakṣaṇagananayā iti
prasiddhametat / tathā hi śaṣṭhyuttarasatatrāyāvadhīprāna-
pracāranālikākalanayā sahasrānyekaviṃśatiḥ ṣaṭśatāni ca
ahorātragananām āhuḥ*

'(A man), though his vision is introverted, knows of a certain commenced activity, such as, the flow of the vital air etc., the form of which enters the intellect. (Then he) calculates the moments of the activity entered into the intellect through other (calculating) perceptions ... / The saints observe, indeed, air; and it is well-known to others too that they observe the things through counting moments of the vital air. For example, through the calculation that 360 motions of the vital breath are equal to one 'nādikā' (i.e., 24 minutes) and it is said that 21,600 (twenty-one thousand and six hundred motions of the

95 Vide Iyer's tr. of the *kārikās* of Bhartrhari.

96 Vide Sharma's tr. of *PR*.

vital air) make a day night'.⁹⁷ Thus, the references are found to three ways of calculation of time in the *Vākyapadīya*.⁹⁸

The time calculated through the activities of Sun etc. are: *divasa*, *saptāha*, *pakṣa*, *māsa*, *saṃvatsara* etc. whereas time calculated through *jalayantra* (water clock) are *nāḍikā*, *pala* etc. and time calculated through vital breath are: *niśvāsa*, *praśvāsa*, *ucchvāsa* etc. These different measurements through different methods have their eternal equations among themselves.

The relativistic aspect of time and space is emphasized at one place in Helārāja's *prakāśa* commentary. Under *VP.3.9.47*, Helārāja says: *dūro 'yam adhvā nikaṭo 'yam iti karṭṛgatibhedena adhvani vyavasthā ... / ya eva mandagatīnām dūraḥ sa eva caturaceṣṭānām āsanno 'dhvā'* due to the difference of the manner of going, the decision with respect to "way", such as, "this way is far" and "this way is near" is made. But there is no difference of way for, the way which is far for slow-goers, the same way is near for people moving fast."⁹⁹

In *kārikā* 62 of the *kālasamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari states that there are different theories/ doctrines of time: Some call it power (*śakti*) some soul (*ātman*) and some others deity (*devatā*).¹⁰⁰ Who are the holders of these views is a question which needs to be discussed. However, time as a *śakti* is quite understandable from the discussion by Bhartṛhari on time. Helārāja also points out clearly as it is Bhartṛhari's own view.¹⁰¹ Some Śaiva school also hold the same view.¹⁰² They consider time as a power of śiva (*Parameśvarasya hi paramārthataḥ etāḥ śaktayo yastattvagrāmaḥ, IPV.3.3.3*)

According to another doctrine stated by Bhartṛhari, the individual soul alone is called time, because there alone appears the sequence. For, he who is incapable of recognising things in their true nature, accomplishes a sequence there according to time which is his own

97 *Ibid.*

98 Vide Murti, 'Time Reckoning in ancient India', which throws some light on different methods of reckoning time (vide biblioglyphy).

99 Vide Sharma's tr. of *PR.* on *VP.III.9.47*.

100 Vide III.9.62: *śaktyātmādevatāpakṣair bhinnam kālasya darśanam /*

101 Vide *PR.* on *Ibid.*: *kālākhyā svātantryaśaktir brahmaṇa iti tatra bhagavad bhartṛharer abhiprāyah /*

102 Vide *KSD.* .p. 43-47.

reflection. Thus, because the time-division results from him, he is designated as time by implication.¹⁰³

According to an other doctrine *kāla* is considered as a deity, having its own form and great power. In this doctrine also the *svātantryāsakti* of *brahman* is taken into consideration.¹⁰⁴

Who hold the above mentioned two other views is a question to be discussed. Neither there is any indication given by Bhartrhari nor any mention found in *Prakāśa* about the other two views. Again, what is the opinion of Bhartrhari about two other views cannot be understood.¹⁰⁵

a. A misinterpretation of Bhartrhari's view on time pointed out by Helārāja and the argument against it.

Under *kārikā* 62 in *kālasamuddeśa*, Helārāja refers to certain earlier commentators (unknown to us) who believed or interpreted 'śakti' of Bhartrhari, as a generating cause which in itself called time. Helārāja finds fault with it as follows: [*vyākhyātāras tu kāraṇasakti kāla iti vyācakhyate*] 'tathā hi bijaśaktiraṅkuropajanam abhyanujānati kāṇḍaprasavam ca tadānīm pratibadhnaṭi kālakāryakaraṇāt kālāḥ evam āṅkurādiśaktāv api yathottaramanantarakāryajanānād vyavahitakāryapratibandhāc ca kālatattvam boddhavyam" [*etac cāyuktam iti lakṣyate*].

The power of seed, permitting the development of sprout, at the same time, suspending the growth of stalk, is called time, because the power of seed performs the function which is generally thought to be performed by time. In this way, the power of sprout etc. which is a regular order permitting the production of its next effect and suspending the effect which is not immediately connected is called time."¹⁰⁶

103 Vide PR. on VP. III.9.62: *ātma puruṣo jīva eva kāla eva jīvas tasyaiva kramāvabhāsāt / sa hi yathātattvam arthān pratyetur asamarthaḥ svābhāsakālānusāreṇa tatra kramam adhyavasyati / tataś ca tataḥ kālabhedaprapkṣteh sa evopacāreṇa kālākhyām pratipadyate /*

104 *anye tu vighrahavatīm mahāprabhāvām devatām kālatvena pratipannāḥ / atrāpi cid-rūpasya brahmaṇaḥ śaktir devataiva sakalajagadgrāsaghasmarety etadānugūnyam evetīdam evātra siddhāntarūpaṃ darśanam. (loc.cit.)*

105 However, according to Pt.V.B.Bhagavat, a traditional scholar from Pune, the doctrine of soul (*ātma*) is of logicians whereas the doctrine of deity (*devatā*) is of Yājñikas (*karmavādins*).

106 Tr. of the PR. on *Ibid*.

The above interpretation appears to be wrong, says Helārāja. According to him, objects have their special causes and they are produced when these special causes are present. So, the production of effects certainly depends upon the capacity of the causes. But, the effect only comes at particular times and not at other times, so, it is different from the causes. The objects which are produced appear in a certain sequence. *Kālaśakti* which is essentially a sequence is a condition of all objects. The Lord who manifests the objects also manifests them in a sequence. Thus, time is called a *śakti* of *Brahman*.¹⁰⁷

b. Conception of time: Bhartrhari's view
as summed up by Helārāja

Helārāja, after showing the argument against misinterpretation by some earlier commentators of Bhartrhari's conception of time, and discussing the various theories of time held by different schools, offers the gist of Bhartrhari's idea of time under the same *kārikā*. He says:

*'ata evaitat kāladarśanam - samsārahetubhūtāyām prathamam
bhedāvabhāsamayo hi samsārah, bhedaś ca deśakālābhyām,
tatra ca kālabhedo jagatsrṣṭerādyah akramā hi paśyantīrūpā
samvit prānavṛttim upārudhā kālātmanāparigrhīta krameva
cakāsti iti kṛtaniścayam vākyapadīye śabdapradhāyām asmābhis
tata eva avagamanīyam'*.¹⁰⁸

"This is the conception of time. Within Nescience (*avidyā*) which is the cause of the phenomenal world (*samsāra*) consisting in the appearance of differentiation. Differentiation is spatial and temporal. Of these two, temporal differentiation comes first in the creation of the world. Consciousness in the form of *paśyantī* is without any sequence, but when it is associated with *prāna* principle (activity) it shines as time, although it had sequence. This has been established by me in my commentary called *Śabdaprabhā* on the *Vākyapadīya* and it should be understood from that work."¹⁰⁹

Further, Helārāja also clarifies the above issue. He says: The reality called Brahman, is without any sequence and consists of true knowledge and not affected by time. Under the influence of

¹⁰⁷ Vide *PR.* on *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *PR.* on *VP.* III.9.62.

¹⁰⁹ Vide Iyer, Bhartrhari, p.123.

Nascience, it assumes sequence and appears as this and that. Thus, through the intervention of time, the phenomena appear in a temporal sequence to the individual selves, coming down from time immemorial. Because all the differentiation consists of Nescience, all divisions of time adopted from different points of view, are also creations of Nescience. Once true knowledge dawns, all differentiation disappears, and, therefore, this division (of time) also disappears. Therefore, to discuss whether it (the division) is right or not, would result in labour only. In the empirical stage, everything is unreal and the truth cannot be determined. This is the substance of what is meant.¹¹⁰ This way *kāla* stands as an essential thing for the creation, says Helārāja.

5. Some Problems

There are certain problems we face during the study of *Vākyapadīya*, particularly while discussing the concept of time according to Bhartrhari, such problems and issues emerge out of the study are just pointed out here below:

1. How far Helārāja's *Prakāśa* is helpful to understand Bhartrhari's idea on time; and difficulty of the commentary.
2. Unavailability of other commentaries.
3. Whether *Vṛtti* and *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* contribute anything to understand the concept.
4. How far Bhartrhari agrees with the ideas, he has quoted.
5. Background of Bhartrhari's idea of time vis-a-vis kāsmira śaivāgama, Dīnāga and Śankara.
6. How does the concept of time fit into the metaphysical frame work of Bhartrhari.
7. Whether time is conceptual or a physical entity according to Bhartrhari. Whether it has any reality outside the realm of *śabda* vs. subjectivity and objectivity of time.
8. Whether *kārikās* in the *Kālasamuddēśa* require rearrangement.

The above problems and issues will be taken into consideration in the fifth chapter.

(to be continued)

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

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