

THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN INDIAN GRAMMATICAL TRADITION (3)[†]

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CHAPTER IV: THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN THE LATER GRAMMATICAL TRADITION

There are two divergent opinions existing in the grammatical tradition itself regarding time:¹

1) time is a separate entity which is eternal 2) time is nothing but *kriyā* itself. The later grammatical tradition believes in the second school of thought. Here the metaphysical aspect of time is absent and much emphasis is laid on the concept of *kriyā* which includes *kāla* according to them.

Among the grammarians in the later grammatical tradition who have discussed the notion of time, Kaiyaṭa, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa deserve a special mention. Apart from their discussion, there are a few stray references found here and there in the different commentaries. However, often they are repetitions of the earlier statements.

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1 Vide *Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.84: *tatra kecin nityam kālam padārthānām abhyanuñjāpratibandhārthābhyām sthity utpattipralayahetum ācakṣate / tatra saṃsargi-sūryādikriyābhedāśrayo māsādibhedavyavaharo bhūtādivyapadeśas ca / anye tu prasiddha-parimānā kriyā sūryādikarṭṭkā aprasiddhaparimānāyāḥ kriyāyāḥ paricchedāyopāttā aharādivyapadeśyā kāla ity āhuḥ;* also vide *Pradīpoddyota* under *a i u ṅ* (*śivasūtras*): *kriyāiva kālo nātiriktamate idam;* also vide *Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.115: *yathā kālasya nityapakṣa upādhibhedād bhūtādivyapadeśas tathā parokṣatvam api / anityakriyārūpakālapakṣe tu svata eva parokṣatvam /*

1. Kaiyaṭa

Kaiyaṭa, a notable grammarian of 11th Century, wrote the commentary called *Pradīpa* which marks the end of the first period in the history of Pāṇinian school, contains a few notable discussions which are noted below.

According to Kaiyaṭa, time is a well-known measure of action (*prasiddhaparimāṇākriyā*) by which other less significant actions are measured² i.e., in the usages like ‘*divasam adhīte*’ (he is studying the whole day) the word *divasam* signifies the movements of the Sun from rising to setting and every compact action of the Sun is time.³

Kaiyaṭa is aware of the two prominent views existing within the grammatical tradition itself. He interpretes a concept according to both the views. For example, he explains how the concept of ‘*parokṣa*’ fits well according to *nityapakṣa* (holding time as eternal) and *anityapakṣa* (holding time as a transitory thing).⁴

On the one hand, Kaiyaṭa believes in the view that *kriyā* is *kāla*; on the other, he describes *kāla* as the substratum of action,⁵ as Bhāṣyakāra perhaps wanted it to be.

However, Kaiyaṭa accepts *kāla* as a perceptible thing for Yogins⁶ whereas for common people it is inferential. Under *Mbh.* on P.III. 2.102, Kaiyaṭa shows the close affinity existing between *kāla* and *kriyā*.⁷

Under *Mbh.* on P.III.2.123, Kaiyaṭa holds the strong view that the existence of present time is essential for the sake of the existence of past and future time. And it is through (or with reference to) present

2 Vide *Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.84: *prasiddhaparimāṇā kriyā sūryādikarṭṭkā aprasiddhaparimāṇāyāḥ kriyāyāḥ paricchedāyopāttā aharādivyapadeśyā kāla ity āhuḥ; also vide prasiddhaparimāṇā kriyāiva kriyāntarapricchedāt kāla ity uktam. (Op.cit. under P.2.123.)*

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.115 *yathā kālasya nityapakṣa upādhibhedād bhūtādivyapadeśas tathā parokṣatvam api / anityakriyārūpakālapakṣe tu svata eva parokṣatvam /*

5 Vide *Ibid* on *Mbh.* on P.III.2.123: *tāsām eva kālarūpatvāt kālasya ca kriyādhikarānatvād iti bhāvah /*

6 *Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.123: *yogināḥ, ye bhāvanāvasena trīn api kālān yogi-pratyakṣeṇa vidanti /*

7 *Ibid.* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.102: *tatra avayavānām kālatrayayogāt kriyāyā api kālatrayayogaḥ /*

time only that something is called past or present.⁸ Present time is that which is devoid of past and future.

In the *Bhāṣya* divergent opinions are found regarding the explanation of *parokṣa* for which Kaiyaṭa suggests the *lit.* suffix for the action which is not perceived in case of non-today past.⁹

Kaiyaṭa has offered his own definition about *anadyatana* and *adyatana* as '*atīkrāntarātripraharatrayavasānam anadyatanam*'¹⁰ and '*ekasyārātreś caturtho yāmo divasāś ca sarvo dvitīyāyās ca rātreḥ prathamodyatana*'¹¹ respectively.

2. Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa

As it has been mentioned earlier, there are two schools among the grammarians of which one believes that time is a separate entity other than *kriyā* whereas the other one does not admit of time as a separate entity than *kriyā*. Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa is the founder of latter school.¹²

In his famous work called *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, he has dealt with the concept of time in his own way. He has solved two main problems:

- 1) Whether time is to be considered as the same as action.
- 2) Whether time is a denoted (*vācya*) or indicated (*dyotyā*) meaning of tenses.

According to him, time is not distinct from a series of activities, as there is no proof to accept it as being separate from a series of activities.¹³

According to Grammarians, it is the sentence that is the basic indivisible unit and that alone has real existence in language. This is already stated in the beginning of the third chapter. However, here the question arises: If the sentence is the basic indivisible entity, then how do we get different meanings out of different words? So, it is said that by artificial divisions of sentence into individual words we get the various word meanings. This way it becomes easier to analyse a

8 *Ibid.* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.123: *nityapravṛttasya bhūtabhaviṣyattvā 'bhāvād vartamānavā 'bhāvah /*

9 *Ibid.* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.115: *indriyā 'gocarasādhanāsādhitānadyatanakriyāyāvācīnas tu dhātor lit pratyaya iti nirṇayah /*

10 *Vide Ibid.* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.110.

11 *Ibid.*

12 *Vide VKB.* (Lin.), p. 75: *vastutaḥ kālo nātīriktaḥ kin tu kriyāiva.*

13 *Vide Ibid.* p. 73: *kālo na vyāpārasantānātīriktaḥ mānābhāvāt.*

sentence. Now, the question is — in this analytical method, how do we get the sense of time from a sentence. This issue is discussed by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in his *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*.

A word is composed of two things — root and suffix. The question here is whether we get the sense of time from root or suffix. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa advances different arguments regarding the issue and finally offers his own opinion. This is stated below.

First he shows the difficulty in all the views.

(1) The difficulty in accepting verbal root as expressive of time.

If time is accepted to be the denoted meaning of the verbal root, a separate denotative function will have to be assumed as existing in every verbal root for this one meaning. So, it is difficult to accept a verbal root as denotative of time.¹⁴

(2) The difficulty in accepting *lakāras* as denotative of time.

On the one hand, time also cannot be accepted as a denoted meaning of *lakāras*. *Laṭ* etc. denote the meanings which belong to all the: *l*-members (i.e., the agent, the object and action if the verbal root is intransitive). Thus, if the expectancy is fulfilled then there is no reason why *laṭ* etc. should be applied to any additional meanings like time.

Again, if it is accepted that time is a specific meaning of that *lakāra*, the general meanings namely, agent and object, will be set aside to provide place for the specific meaning. Thus, if time is accepted to be denoted meaning of the *lakāras*, then the general meanings agent etc. will not be denoted by them.¹⁵ Thus, the second view accepting *lakāras* as denotatives of time is rejected.

(3) The authoritativeness of the *Bhāṣya* regarding the problem: Support for both the views.

After thus first discussing both the alternatives and showing how there are the difficulties in accepting either of these views, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa shows the *Bhāṣyakāra*'s opinion in this regard. The *Bhāṣya* shows support for both these views.

Here, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa suggests that the fault that all the roots will have to have an additional denotative function to denote time can be

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 73: *na ca sa śakta eva / bahūnām dhātūnām tatra śaktatve laṭas tatrāśaktatve kartāpi vācya na syāt.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 73: *kiñca vartamāne laṭiti viśiṣya vidhāne 'pi laṭas tatra āśaktatve kartāpi vācya na syāt.*

solved by accepting time as series of activities (*vyāpārasantāna*).¹⁶ Thus, if *vyāpārasantāna* is the meaning of a verbal root then it is clear that time is denoted by verbal root and *lakāras* can be accepted as indicatives of that.

The other alternative point i.e., whether *lakāras* can be regarded as denotative of time can be accepted by avoiding the fault already mentioned. The *bādhyabādhakabhāva* is not accepted here. So, the general meaning will not set aside the specific meaning and both can exist together.¹⁷ This way time also can be said a denoted meaning of a *lakāra*. In the above way time is both denoted and indicated by *lakāras* and both the views are supported by the *Bhāṣya*.

Finally, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa holds the view that it is only a general notion of time that is denoted by the verbal root. But, specific *lakāras* denote specific aspects of time, such as, presentness, pastness etc. So, general notion of time being denoted by the specific verbal root is indicated by a specific *lakāra*.¹⁸ This is the final view of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa.

According to Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, time is twofold: pertaining to today and non-today or exclusive of today. Again, this two fold time is divided into two: Past and future.¹⁹ Diagram 7 is shown given below indicating this position.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa gives the Pāṇinian ten *lakāras* and shows how they are used to convey these different senses. Actually, these *lakāras* are not used in language. But, these are markers for the different suffixes like *tip* etc. These *lakāras* are used with reference to time and modalities. Out of these ten *lakāras* i.e., LAṬ, LIṬ, LUṬ, LRṬ, LAN, LOT, LUṆ, LET, LIN and LRṆ, the first six are used to convey the aspects of time and the other four are used to convey modalities. A detailed discussion will be found in the fifth chapter on this issue.

16 *Ibid.* p. 73: *na ca tasya dhātuvācyasya uktadoṣa syṣṭ iti vācyam / vyāpārasantānātiriktakālasyaṅ abhyupagamāt tasya ca dhātuvācyatvasyopapādītavāt/ tathāhi / kālo na vyāpārasantānātiriktaḥ mātābhāvāt.*

17 *Ibid.* p. 73: *tathāpi pravṛttau ca viśeṣeṇa sāmānyasya takrakaunḍiny anyābādhāt kartṛvācyatvānāpatter iti cen naivam / pakṣadvayasyāpi ākare 'bhīhitatvādyuktisiddhatvāc ca.*

18 Vide Gune, *The Meaning of Tenses and Moods*, p. 65ff.

19 Vide VKB. (Lin.), p. 75: *kālas tāvad adyatanānadyatanabhedena dvividhaḥ / dvividho 'pi bhūtabhaviṣyad rūpaḥ.*




Diagram 7

3. Nāgeśa

The latest among the traditional reputed scholars, Nāgeśa is an author of many valuable texts like *Mahābhāṣyapradīpodyota*, *Mañjūṣā*, *Laghuśabdenduśekhara*, *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* are a few to his credit.

While commenting upon Kaiyaṭa's *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*, in his *Uddyota* commentary he has refuted some points of Kaiyaṭa's view regarding the concept of time. However, Nāgeśa's view is considered as against the *Bhāṣya* and the whole tradition. Sometimes, he is considered as against the *Bhāṣya* and the whole tradition. Sometimes, he is considered as an ardent supporter of *yoga* view of time.²⁰ His views on time are often criticised by the critics.

According to Nāgeśa also time is a substratum of action.²¹ Time, such as, present etc. is directly understood from *laṭ* etc. The *āśraya* is understood through secondary sense.²² *Laṭ* etc. denote 'activity' and 'activity' denotes time.²³ Nāgeśa says that these meanings, such as, present etc. are the meanings of the substitutes of *lakāras*. He further argues — the Grammarians accept meaningfulness only for what is

²⁰ Vide *A Comparative Study of the Concepts of Space and Time in Indian Thought* (p. 121); also vide *Saṃskṛta Vyākaraṇa Darśana*, p. 214; also vide *KSD*. pp. 28-29.

²¹ Vide *PLM*. (DL.), p. 151: *laṭā svādhikaraṇakālopādhis panda eva vartamānaḥ pratyāyyate*.

²² Vide *PLM*. (DL.), p. 151: *tatra lāṭā śaktyā vartamānatvaṃ, lakṣaṇayā "śrayatvaṃ bodhyata iti viśeṣaḥ / laṭā svādhikaraṇakālopādhis panda eva vartamānaḥ pratyāyyate*.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 150: *tatra vyāpārādibodhakena laṭā vartamānatvaṃ vyāpārādāv eva bodhyate*.

actually spoken and therefore, discuss the meaning of the substitutes which are the actual verbal suffixes.²⁴ Pāṇini gives meanings to *laṭ* and so on for the convenience of description,²⁵ he stated.

Nāgeśa has found fault with the definition of time provided by Helārāja and later on by Kaiyaṭa. According to that view time is a major action by which other less-significant actions are measured. Nāgeśa argues on the point that even a major action (*prasiddha-parimāṇākriyā*) is also measured by some other action and there arises an *anavasthā* and hence he says: it is a faulty definition. He has offered his own explanation about the *nityatva*, *ekatva* and *vibhutva* of time differently.²⁶ Nāgeśa criticises both the views: those who hold time as *nitya* and those who hold it as *anitya*.²⁷ He offers his own definition of time (*Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* P. 2.2.5) as '*kṣaṇadhārārūpaḥ kālah*' which is against the Bhāṣya²⁸ and hence disputed by many critics. But it is worth-noting here that even if Nāgeśa holds the view of atomic stream (*Kṣaṇadhārārūpa*) of time still he is aware that it is one of the opinions regarding time.²⁹

CHAPTER V: ISSUES RELATED TO THE CONCEPTION OF TIME: A RÉSUMÉ

In recent days, a dozen of issues are raised both in Indian and Western philosophical systems with regard to the concept of time. Some common issues raised in almost all systems of philosophy with regard

24 *Ibid.*, p. 138: *yady api lakārāṇām evārthanirūpaṇaṃ tārkkikaiḥ kṛtam, tathāpi 'uccārīta eva śabdo 'rthapratyāyako nānuccārīta' iti bhāṣyāl loke tathāivānubhvāc ca tad ādeśatīnām artho nirūpyate.*

25 *Ibid.*, p. 138: *vartamāne laṭ ity ādi vidhāyaka laḥ karmaṇi iti śaktigrāhakaśūtrāṇām ādeśārthaṃ sthāniny āropya pravṛtīḥ.*

26 Vide *Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* under P.II.2.5: *nityaḥ pravāhanityatayā, ekaḥ samūharūpeṇa vibhuh kṣaṇasya vibhuvāt /*

27 Vide *Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* under P.III.2.84: *ādye pakṣe kṣaṇopādher nirvaktum aśakyatvam/ uttaradeśasaṃyogā 'vacchinnakriyeti cet tasyā viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇasambandharūpatve trayāṇām api sthīratvāt kṣaṇavyavahārānīyamakatvā 'bhāvāḥ / atiriktatve siddho 'tiriktaḥ kṣaṇapadārtha itī tat pracayair eva kalāmūhūrtīdivyavahāropapattau kim akhaṇḍena tena/ ... anye tv itī mate 'py eṣa doṣa asty eva /*

28 *vastutas tu ekatve tasya kāryavaicitryānīyamakatvānupapattir itī bhāṣyoktalakṣaṇā-nupapattiyā kṣaṇadhārārūpaḥ kāla itī yuktam. (loc.cit.)*

29 *kṣaṇapakṣe tad dhārāvīcchedena tasyānantatvād aparicchedyatvam itī bhāvāḥ. (loc.cit.)*

to the concept of time, are discussed here. My approach here is to discuss them with modern comparative approach and while doing so, I will try to analyse the problems with possible solutions from within the framework of the Grammatical literature, if possible. I have also taken into consideration some of the important points as special issues raised, discussed and thus confined to Grammatical literature.

1. Common issues raised regarding time

- (i) What is time?
- (ii) Definition of the concept
- (iii) How does it function?
- (iv) Whether time is eternal
- (v) Whether time is single and all-pervasive.
- (vi) Whether time is perceptible
- (vii) Time: a subjective or objective entity.
- (viii) The relation between time and motion/activity.
- (ix) Time and Space.
- (x) The relation of time with the Ultimate.
- (xi) Divisions of time.
- (xii) Two levels of time: empirical and transcendental, a common standpoint taken by almost all philosophers whether can be envisaged.

As stated earlier, the notion of time for its multi-dimensional nature, is visualized differently from different angles. Being a very fundamental concept, it is not a study of any particular branch but studied as an interdisciplinary concept and minute attempts are made to elucidate the very nature of it and yet it is a controversial topic to decide: what is time? Even most rational approach varies from time to time, person to person. However, there are some fundamental answers attempted. In Indian Grammatical tradition, two distinct views are available. According to one view, it is a force or power behind the creation, its continuation and destruction to which Bhartṛhari calls a power of Brahman. According to another view a series of activities are called time.

It is said³⁰ that most interesting concepts cannot be elucidated by explicit definitions. *Siddhānta Kaumudī* (under P.1.2.57) also records

³⁰ Vide *The Encyclopaedia of Britannica* (under Time), p. 126.

that time is a wellknown concept; it does not require any definition. However, Patañjali and Bharṭṛhari, both have provided the definition of time in their own way. According to Patañjali, time is that by which growth and decay of material objects are perceived. But, it is a *taṭasthalakṣaṇa* of time in contrast to *Svarūpalakṣaṇa* which is considered as more required or desired definition. Bharṭṛhari provides an etymological definition of time as: it is called *kāla* since it drives (*kālayati*) the beings.³¹

In the 3rd chapter of the present dissertation, it is stated that according to Bharṭṛhari time functions with its two powers (*śaktis*) called *pratibandha* and *abhyanujñā* of which former prohibits and the latter permits a thing to appear.³² Again, three powers of time are admitted of which future and past are of covering or concealing and present is of opening nature and permits a thing to appear.³³ Thus, time like a puppet master or a string-puller plays with the universe by which things automatically get order.

The question has been asked whether time is an eternal (*nitya*) or non-eternal (*anitya*) thing. According to the Grammatical school, it is an eternal thing.³⁴ It is neither created nor comes to an end and Helārāja says — even this is earlier than the existence of the Universe.³⁵ It is continuum, circular and hence never ends.

In the whole range of Grammatical literature the singularity of time is emphasized. Though time is single, it appears as many due to differences in activities. This is a mere superimposition of multiplicity on time, otherwise time is one.³⁶ Among the Grammarians, Nāgeśa does not agree with the singularity of time. However, he admits its singularity from the angle of collective entirety of atomic moments. About its all-pervasiveness, it is said that time is an all-pervasive thing.³⁷

There is no unanimity among the different philosophical systems over the issue whether time is a perceptible entity or not. Patañjali has

31 *VP*.III.9.14.

32 *Ibid.*, III.9.4-5.

33 *Ibid.*, III.9.48-50.

34 Vide *Mbh.* on P.IV.2.3: *nityae hi kālanakṣetre /*

35 Vide *PR.* on *VP*.III.9.62: *tatra ca kālabhedo jagatsrṣṭer ādyaḥ /*

36 Vide *VP*.III.9.6-8; also vide *PR.* on *Ibid.* III.9.31: *tad ayam eko 'py anuṣṭhātrbhedād vibhāgam āsādayati kālaḥ /*

37 *Ibid.*, III.9.14.

stated that it is known through inference.³⁸ Bhartṛhari also agrees upon this point. Moreover, Bhartṛhari provides the reason for which it is to be accepted as inferential. According to him, it is a common linking factor between activities. How can an exact discrimination be possible between two ending activities, which are inherent in separate objects, if there is not a single linking factor?³⁹ Thus, time is inferential. However, Kaiyaṭa has clarified the point that even if it is inferential for others, for Yogins a perceptible thing.⁴⁰ According to Nāgeśa, it can be known by sense organs.⁴¹

The issue whether time is a subjective or objective element is found more vibrant in the Western and in Buddhist literature. Indian Grammarians are not concerned more about this aspect of discussion. However, the issue has been raised in *VP*.III. 9.58 and discussed. Helārāja has clearly pointed out that it is not the concern of Grammar whether time may be something having an existence in the mind or outside the mind. Further, he says: We are more concerned with the notion of time which is the basis of the tense distinctions in Sanskrit language as the verbs: *abhūt, asti, bhaviṣyati* etc.⁴²

There are two distinct views found in the grammatical tradition regarding the relationship of time and motion. One admits a cause and effect relationship between time and motion and according to other, the cause i.e., *kāla* is subsumed under effect i.e., *kriyā* itself. Thus, two distinct views are found in the tradition.

Those who hold the first view, according them, time is an eternal thing and it functions with its powers. It is the cause of the creation, continuation and destruction. It measures action. Some others say that time is nothing but the well-known activities of Sun etc. which measures the other activities.

Bhartṛhari seems to be a believer in the former view whereas post-Bhartṛhari grammatical school has been influenced by the latter thought. However, there are references in the *Vākyapadīya* supporting both the views. Some views are quoted below:

38 Vide *Mbh.* on P.III.2.123: *sūkṣmo hi bhāvo 'numitena gamyah;* also vide *Uddyota* under *Mbh.* on P.II.2.5: *padārthānān anyathāsiddhavyoppekṣayānumeyah kāla iti bhāṣyāśayah /*

39 *VP*.III.9.27.

40 *Pradīpa* on *Mbh.* on P.III.2.123: *yoginah ye bhāvanāvaśena trīn api kālān yogipraty-apakṣeṇa vidanti /*

41 Vide *Laghumahūṣā:* *kṣaṇasamūharūpaś ca śadindriyavedyah /*

42 Vide *PR.* on *VP*.III.9.58: *nāsmābhir darśanavivekaḥ prārabdhah, kintu śābde vyavahāre yad aṅgam tat pariṣyam/ asti ca bhinnakālah śābdo vyavahāro 'bhūd asti bhaviṣyatīti /*

- 1) *Kriyābhedāya kālastu* (VP.III.9.2)
- 2) *Kāla eva hi viśvātmā vyāpāra iti kathyate* (VP.III.9.12)
- 3) *Kālādevaṃ kriyāgatih* (VP.III.9.28)

The first reference indicates *kāla* as a differentiator of action. The second reference says that *kāla* is nothing but *vyāpāra* 'activities'. The third view shows the relationship between time and action i.e., time is the measure of action. In all the above, an important enquiry is whether time is a separate entity other than action or not.

In actuality, they are two different concepts. In the *VP.*, their relationship is clear and the reason for which they are sometimes identified with each other is also clearly stated. Both of these are two powers of *Śabdabrahman*, stated by Bhartṛhari. One way, time is a substratum of action and it measures action. Again, the difference between these two is that action is responsible in bringing about the manifestation of the Universe and time is responsible in bringing about the manifestation in a particular order.⁴³ The sequence is the essential property of time.⁴⁴ Thus, action and time are fundamentally two different concepts but sometimes used as one for the empirical usages. This status is also made clear by Helārāja. Actually, in commonsense, we know the difference between these two. The cause and effect relationship accepted in case of time and action are not properly followed by some and they don't accept the effect as separate entity than cause. This is made clear by Helārāja.⁴⁵ Thus, these are separate things like *tantu* 'thread' and *paṭa* 'cloth'. Bhartṛhari has accepted a separate power called *samavāya* which gives answer to this problem.⁴⁶

In the Western philosophy the two concepts *viz.* time and space are always closely associated so much so that the whole universe is believed to be a space-time continuum. In Indian philosophical systems also these two concepts come side by side.

In Indian Grammatical tradition these two are considered as the two powers of *Śabdabrahman*. The context of their usage is beautifully stated as: the priority or posteriority of a region is based on the assumption of Direction whereas 'earlier' and 'later' amounts to

43 Vide PR. on VP.III.9.27: *iha kriyā tāvad anekakṣaṇasamāhārātmikā yugapat kṣaṇānām abhāvāt sakrameti kālaśaktyanugrhitāiva /*

44 Vide PR. on *Ibid.*: *sarvaḥ kramo hi kāladharmaḥ /*

45 *Ibid.* on VP.III.9.18: *tathā ca kecit kāraṇavyatiriktaṃ kāryaṃ necchanti/ ... iva śabdaḥ /*

46 Among the western philosophers, Aristotle defines Time as the measure of motion or change which can be compared with the view of Grammarians.

sequence is an effect of time-power.⁴⁷ Further, it is stated that the conception or assumption of space and time is as established as that of consciousness. It is the very nature of Beings that they understand time and space since all experiences take place in time and space.⁴⁸ Again, in space measurement, *Diṣṭi*, *Vitasti* etc. are found with regard to length; *prastha*, *droṇa* etc. are found with regard to weight but time measurement is with reference to action.⁴⁹ Thus, activities are divided with reference to time and material forms, with reference to space.⁵⁰ Among them, space resides in time so one is *ādhāra* and another is *ādheya* i.e., time being the substratum (*ādhāra*) of Space.⁵¹

According to Indian Grammarians, *Śabdabrahman* is the Ultimate Reality. There are four important powers of *Śabdabrahman* among which time is held to be the independent and chief of all powers because it is represented as holding the control⁵² over them and they function according to its direction.⁵³ Bharṭṛhari clarifies the relation of Brahman and its powers in his *Vākyapadīya* (*Brahmakāṇḍa*, K.2). Though, Brahman is one, it appears as many due to multiplicity of its powers. According to him, Brahman possesses unlimited powers and is not different from them.⁵⁴ Thus, according to Bharṭṛhari a power is that which renders some service or action. It is not visible.

47 Vide *VP*.III.6.4.

48 *Ibid.*, III.6.18.

49 *Ibid.*, III.9.2.

50 *Ibid.*, III.7.153: *kālāt kriyā vibhajyante ākāśāt sarvamūrtayaḥ /*

51 Vide *Mbh.*: *kālo hi jagadādhāraḥ /*

52 Subramania Iyer translates the word *karṭṛśakti* as creative power with which Peri Sarveswar Sharma does not agree. According to Sharma time is not only a creative power but also destructive. (vide Sharma's article 'The Idea of Power (*śakti*) in *Vākyapadīya*')

53 Vide Puṅyarāja's commentary on *VP*.I.3: *kālākhyeṇa svātantryeṇa sarvāḥ paratantrā janmavatyāḥ śaktayaḥ samāviṣṭāḥ kālaśaktivṛttim anupatanti/ tataś ca pratibhāvaṃ vaiśvarūpyasya pratibandhābhyanujñābhyaṃ śaktiyavacchedena kramavāninābhāsopagamo lakṣyate/ sarveśaṃ hi vikārāṇāṃ kāraṇāntareṣv apekṣāvatāṃ pratibaddhajanmanām abhyanujñayā sahakārikāraṇaṃ kālah /*

54 Peri Sarveswar Sharma in his article 'The idea of Power (*śakti*) in *Vākyapadīya*', points out that the relation between the powers and the Brahman is that of Rāhu and its head (*rāhoḥ śirah*). But, the question is whether the Brahman is a bundle of powers only? In such a case only, the comparison will be a valid one. Abhinavagupta in his *Bodhapancaśikā* defines the relation in the following K.:

*śaktiś ca śaktimadrūpād vytirekaṃ na vāṃchati/
tādātmyamanayor nityaṃ vahnidāhikayor iva//*

This seems a better comparison.

Behind each and every action there is some power without which no action is possible.⁵⁵

It is already stated⁵⁶ that although time is SINGLE, it becomes many due to its various powers. Through them it sports with being causing their creation, existence and destruction. However, with regard to the time-divisions expressed by the verbs, Indian Grammarians have conceived mainly three divisions called past, present and future. This three fold division called past, present and future is based on the distinctions of the activities. Thus, a systematic picture of the three-fold division according to Grammarians is given below:

past (*bhūtakālah*): *Utpannadhvastā yadā kriyā bhavanti tadā tadupādhikālo bhūta iti vyapadiśyate* 'When the activities are created and later on destroyed, then having these activities as their superimposition, is designated as past time.'⁵⁷

present (*vartamānakālah*): *prārabdhāparisamāptakriyopādhistu vartamānasamjñāḥ* 'Time having begun and not completed (activity as its superimposition) is called present time.'⁵⁸

future (*bhaviṣyatkālah*): *yadā tu sannihitasādhanāḥ sambhāvya-mānodayāḥ kriyāḥ tadā tadupādhikālo bhaviṣyattām pratipadyate* 'when activities have their means nearby and when their emergence is expected, then time, having these activities as its superimposition, becomes future time.'⁵⁹

Above mentioned three-fold division of time is again based on today and non-today difference. However, apart from these well-known divisions of time, the other kinds of divisions are traced in the calander time, such as, *māsa*, *ṛtu*, *saṃvatsara* etc. which of course, again, can be very well brought under these three. Time is also divided according to different units, such as, *kṣaṇa*, *lava* etc.

The three-fold character of time which is based on the today and non-today division, again, is divided into eleven varieties or division found used in Sanskrit language. This division is already discussed in the third chapter.

55 Vide *VP.III.6.6*: *śaktayah khalu bhāvānām upakāraprabhāvitāḥ*; Bergson, a western philosopher, also holds the view that time is a force- a force that creates and transforms. (see Bhattacharjee, 'Space Time and Brahma', p. 71.)

56 Vide under *Bhartrhari's Conception of Time* (Ch.III).

57 Vide Peri Sarveswar Sharma's tr. of *PR.* under *VP.III.9.37*.

58 *Ibid.*

59 *Ibid.*

However, these divisions are always as per the usages meant for easy communication in language; otherwise time has no actual divisions.⁶⁰ This is always maintained in the Grammatical tradition.

There is a very common stand-point we find in almost every school of philosophy regarding the acceptability of two levels of time-empirical and transcendental. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system maintains the two levels of time i.e., *Mahākāla* and *khaṇḍakāla*.⁶¹ Similarly in *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* time is of two types: *sthūlah* and *sūkṣmah*.⁶² *Sūtasamhitā* talks of two levels of time i.e., *Paramah* and *aparamah*.⁶³ Jains also maintain the two levels though they use different terminologies i.e., *niścayakālah* and *vyavahārakālah*.⁶⁴ In the grammatical tradition these two levels are also maintained. These two levels of time are named as *nityah* and *bhedarūpah*,⁶⁵ sometimes in other words as *ekah* and *vibhaktah* and in other times *kālasāmānyah* and *kālavaiśeṣah* referring to eternal and empirical time respectively.

2. Special Issues

Following special issues considered here are:

- i) Problem of commentaries and whether *vṛtti* and *Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā* contribute anything to understand the concept.
- ii) How far Bhartṛhari agrees with the ideas he has quoted.
- iii) Whether time is a conceptual or physical entity according to Grammarians (particularly to Bhartṛhari)
- iv) Language and Reality (or *Pada-padārtha* relationship).
- v) Levels of language and time.
- vi) Time in language.
- vii) Whether a historical development of the concept of time can be traced out in the Grammatical tradition.

60 Vide PR. on VP.III.9.38: *tad ete śāstrakāryaprabhāgārtham kālasya bhedāḥ kalpitāḥ, na tv asāviyat samkhyah /*

61 Vide Nyāyaratnāvalī: *vastutas tu mahākāle mānābhāvaḥ, idānim idam ity ādibuddher janyamātrārūpakhaṇḍakālavaiśayatvam eva /*

62 Vide Śrīmadbhāgavatam III.11.3:
*evaṃ kālo 'py anumitah sauksmye sthaulye ca sattamah /
samsthānabhuktyā bhagavānavyakto vyaktabhug vibhuh //*

63 Vide KSD., p. 79.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 103.

65 Vide PR. on VP.III.9.31: *tad ayam eko 'py anuṣṭhātṛbhedād vibhāgam āśādayati kālah /*

Some of the problems and issues already discussed at the end of the third chapter and some other fundamental issues related to the concept of time are discussed hereafter.

It is really difficult to understand why on a text like *Vākyapadīya*, written before 7th century, very few commentaries are available. In third *kāṇḍa*, no other commentary than Helārāja's *Prakāśa*, is available today. Perhaps the reason seems like this that since there are two main streams of thought prevailing in India viz. Vedic (*Vaidikavicārasarāṇi*) and non-vedic (*avaidikavicārasarāṇi*) and because Bhartr̥hari has accepted the views of many other non-vedic source of knowledge, many just hesitated to comment upon it (on *Vākyapadīya*). Another reason seems to be that *Vākyapadīya* is difficult to understand in its essence because of its multi-dimensional approach.

Moreover, whatever old commentaries are there like that of Helārāja's *Prakāśa*, they are difficult to understand and sometimes as difficult as the basic text is. At the same time these commentaries, particularly, Helārāja's *Prakāśa* has thrown much light on the understanding of the *Vākyapadīya*. Many a times we have to depend on the commentary, particularly where the basic text is not clear. Here, the question is whether we can depend on such commentary or in other words whether Helārāja's *Prakāśa* is a dependable commentary. It is difficult to believe, because the gap between Bhartr̥hari and Helārāja was not less than five hundred years. In the meanwhile *Vākyapadīya* fell in the hands of many other schools like Buddhists, as the historians and scholars like R.C. Majumdar and H. Coward believed it to be.⁶⁶ In this circumstance the way out is whether we can prove his own ideas and get clear picture of his theories by contemplating more and more on the interlinking ideas found in the *Vākyapadīya* and elsewhere in his other texts.

A doubt is raised⁶⁷ now-a-days by some scholars regarding the authorship of the *Vṛtti* which is traditionally attributed to Bhartr̥hari. The *Vṛtti* has thrown some light on the concerned aspect of study.⁶⁸ A fragment of *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* is available today. It is a great commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, the first reference to

66 Vide Coward, *Bhartr̥hari*, p.31; also vide his note no.1.

67 A reference to such is already noted by Abhyankar and Limaye in the introduction to *Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari*, p. x (under commentaries on *VP.*).

68 Vide *Vṛtti* under *VP.I.3.*

which is available in Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* commentary. Kaiyaṭa writes in the beginning of his commentary:

*bhāṣyābdhiḥ kvātigambhīraḥ kvāhaṃ mandamatis tataḥ |
chātrāṇām upahāsyatvaṃ yāsyāmi piśunātmanām || 6 ||
tathāpi haribaddhena sāreṇa granthasetunā |
kramamāṇa śanaih pāraṃ tasya prāptāsmi paṅguvat || 76 ||*

It gives the idea that this commentary by Bharṭṛhari was fully accessible to Kaiyaṭa as scholars like K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye have concluded it.⁶⁹ However, it does not necessarily imply whether the commentary was fully available to him or not; Nevertheless, a single Ms. containing some parts of the commentary preserved in the Berlin library, now published from B.O.R.I.⁷⁰ Pune, has not brought any significant qualitative or quantitative development on the aspect of study on time.

Much would have been expected, so far the particular aspect of this study is concerned, from a commentary like *śabdaprabhā*, the references to which are available at Helārāja's *Prakāśa*⁷¹ but is unfortunately lost to us. Again, however, the problem is the commentary was by Helārāja and obviously not from the respectable Bharṭṛhari. Thus, the above problems are posed here regarding the commentaries.

In the *Vākyapadīya*, Bharṭṛhari has referred to many ideas of different schools. The question here is — how far Bharṭṛhari agrees with such views. It seems, as Subramania Iyer and others hold the view⁷² that Bharṭṛhari has brought those views to explain some of his own points which he wants to emphasize. Again, it seems he has not contradicted such views of others. Perhaps, Bharṭṛhari could see relevancy of those views in the context of his discussions. Another reason seems to be that during the period of Bharṭṛhari, some of the ideas he has quoted were not strictly identified as the thought of a particular school. That is the reason why sometimes, he mentions those views of others by the term *eke*, *apare* etc. and sometimes not.

69 Vide Abhyankar & Limaye, *Vākyapadīya of Bharṭṛhari*, Intr., p. IX.

70 Vide the list of the publications of B.O.R.I.

71 Vide PR. on VP.III.9.62: ... iti kṛtanirṇayaṃ śabdaprabhāyām asmābhis tata eva avagamānyam; also vide Ibid. on VP.III.1.3: athyāhita ... / janmādyo ... yonayaḥ // ity atra śabdaprabhāyām nirṇīto 'yam arthaḥ /

72 Vide Iyer, *Bharṭṛhari*, p. 403, lines 16-19.

In such cases, where Bhartrhari does not provide any clue to understand the views of others, Helārāja identifies them. Perhaps, by the time of Helārāja the areas and branches of different thought channels were more specifically distinguished. However, even if Bhartrhari has quoted the views of others and not contradicted, it does not necessarily mean that he has supported the views of others in all the cases. For example, in the *kālasamuddeśa*, he has refuted the views of Mādhyamika Buddhists on time.⁷³

In Bhartrhari's metaphysics of *Śabdādvaita* philosophy, time functions in the realm of *śabda*. It is not an entity which can be said to be existing outside the domain of *śabda*. Thus, it is related to internal process of *śabda*. But, since according to Bhartrhari, all the outside realities are related to internal realities and viceversa, thus (we can say) time as a power of *Śabdabrahman* also related to external or physical time. But, there is a controversy regarding the very basic presupposition of Bhartrhari's metaphysics.

It was a long time debatable issue whether the relation of language and meaning is constitutional and natural or conventional and accidental. The latter alternative is the conclusion of the Naiyāyikas whereas Mīmāṃsakas and Grammarians endorse the former theory *viz.* that language and thought, though not ontologically identical, are logically inseparable.⁷⁴

Cognitions are usually classified into two-determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). Of these two types of perception, the Buddhists regard the indeterminate one as alone valid and Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas uphold the validity of both. The Grammarians differ from both the views. According to them, it is the determinate perception that is the only possible type of perceptual cognition. They have denied the validity of indeterminate perception since it is not at all conceivable, they argue. According to them, nothing can be conceived without the awareness of its 'nomenclature' that is associated with it. Thus, every act of our knowledge is relational, its content being invariably determined by a name. If the name is extracted from the form of cognition, it ceases to be a

73 Vide *VP*.III.9.85-88.

74 Vide Bishnupada Bhattacharya's preface to his book *A Study in Language and Meaning*, Calcutta (Reprint), 1984.

cognition as it lacks illumination per se and consequently is as much inert as a jar made of clay.⁷⁵

Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, all the cognition is necessarily being identified with language. There is no cognition in the world which does not involve language. The external world and internal world have one to one correspondence with each other.⁷⁶ This the very basic presupposition on which Bhartṛhari's whole metaphysics advances further.

According to Bhartṛhari, there are three levels of language through which *Śabda* passes from speaker to listener. *Śabda* is internal. It is externalized for the purpose of communication. In case of speaker the order of communication is descending whereas in case of hearer it is ascending. Thus, the three levels of language are: *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī* through which any idea is communicated and received. A process of communication between a speaker and a listener is presented in a diagram below:




Diagram 8

For Bhartṛhari, the highest ontological level is Brahman as '*Śabdatattva*'. It is called *Paśyantī* which is the innermost stage and direct experience of *sphoṭa*. At this stage there is no distinction

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17-18.

⁷⁶ Vide *KSD.*, p. 71 (fn.): *sā ca sṛṣṭir dvedhā -- arthamayī śabdamayī ceti / ... sā ca dvividhāpi sṛṣṭiḥ samānakālotpattikā samānakālābhivṛddhiśalinī ca, yathā bijād ankuratacchāye / tatra cchāyādarśane vṛkṣānumitir anubhavasiddhā / sā ca cchāyāyām vṛkṣasamānākāratvaṃ vṛkṣāvinābhāvaṃ ca vinā 'nupapanneti tad dvayam api kalpyam'* (a view quoted from *Varivasyārahasyaprakāśa* (II.67-68) of Bhaskararaya. The above simile of *Varivasyārahasyaprakāśa* can be considered as helpful to understand Bhartṛhari's presupposition in a better manner.

between the word and meaning and there is no temporal sequence in it. Although, time is inherent in this stage, no sequence has yet occurred and it is pure potentiality.

The next ontological level, in descending order, is that of *madhyamā*. At this level, *kāla* begins to push or drive delimited portions of Brahman into sequence. This is accomplished with the help of *Prāṇa* or breath. In our experience of language this corresponds to the separation of the unitary *sphoṭa* into mental sequence of thoughts. All the parts of speech that are linguistically relevant to the sentence are present here in a latent form.

The third level, in descending order is *vaikharī* which is the external and differentiated level and in which *vāk* is commonly uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener. Here speech is fully sequential through different sounds produced by different places of articulation.

Bhartṛhari's conception of time as summed up by Helārāja in the *kālasamuddeśa*⁷⁷ also reflects the idea of above process of the function of language.

Apart from the above mentioned three levels of language, another level is identified in some *śaiva* texts⁷⁸ believed to be still higher than *Paśyantī*. Nāgeśa also admits that level and accepts four levels of language.⁷⁹ The believer of these four levels of language take the support of the vedic hymn:

“*catvāri sṛṅgā trayo asya pādā dve śirṣe saptahastāso asya /
tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti maho devo martyā āviveśa //*”

However, Bhartṛhari includes the three levels of speech. Whether he could have speculated the fourth one is a matter of enquiry.

So far the three levels of language are concerned, we can say that soul, mind and body are involved in the process of *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī* respectively. Here the process is from subtle to gross in case of speaker and in case of hearer it is opposite. The idea of seed and tree also can be traced in this process.

77 Vide *PR.* on *VP.III.9.62.*

78 Vide Shukla, Suryanarayana (ed.), *Vākyapadiyam (Brahmakāṇḍam)*, intr., pp. 16-17.

79 Vide *PLM.*

While speaking on the levels of language, even if we extend the ideas to language in general, still we have a particular language in our mind viz. Sanskrit language to which references are made.

In Sanskrit language we can realize the sense of time in several categories of sentences. Here, different sentences are chosen as sample sentences through which time sense can be realized differently.

The following sentences are selected for the discussion:

- i) *rāmaḥ grāmaṃ gacchati.* (Rāma goes to the village.)
- ii) *he rāma; atrāgaccha.* (O! Rāma, come here.)
- iii) *ete grham gatāḥ.* (These people have gone to their house.)
- iv) *bhavatā yaṣṭavyam.* (You have to perform *yāga* in its proper time.)
- v) *bhavān yajatām.* (Do perform the *yāga* in its proper time.)
- vi) *māsam aste.* (He stays for a whole month.)
- vii) *māsajātaḥ.* (Born a month ago.)
- viii) *vasan dadarśa.* (Living there he saw.)
- ix) *gaccati sma / purā asti.* (He was going. / There was.)
- x) *bhūto ghaṭaḥ / bhūtā sattā.* (The jar is past. / The existence existed.)
- xi) *satvaram grham āgaccha / ciram jīvatu.* (Come quickly to home. / Wish you long live.)
- xii) *kālo madhu.* (This is the spring time.)

The first category of sentences belong to that category where tense system operates. This is already discussed in the second chapter and several other occasions. A diagram is drawn⁸⁰ showing how Grammarians' notion of time is emphasized in a sentence like this.

In the second category of sentences the emphasis is laid upon the length of time required to pronounce a *pluta* 'protracted' sound. Similarly, it can be realized in case of long (*dirgha*) and short (*hrasva*) vowels too. The time required to pronounce a phoneme is called *mātrā*.⁸¹ The short the long and the protracted vowels require one, two and three *mātrās* respectively.⁸² There is also a half short vowel which requires *ardhamātrā*. These different measurements of different phonemes are compared with the activities of different phenomena in

80 Diagram No. 1.

81 Vide *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar* by K.V. Abhyankar, p. 306.

82 Vide *SK.* under P.I.2.27; also vide *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā*, 49.

the nature, such as, an *ardhamātrā* which is the measure of a half short vowel's time, is equal to the throbing of the eye or flash of lightning, or a note of a wood-cock,⁸³ a short vowel's time is equal with the timing required for chirping of a sparrow, a long vowel's time is equal with the time required for a crow (sound) of a crow, and a protracted vowel's time is equal with the timing of a scream of a peacock.⁸⁴

These short, long and protracted vowels do not really differ from one another in time, but temporal distinctions in the suggestive elements are attributed to them, just as there is no distinction based on time between the two cognitions which find expression in the words: *kṣīpram idaṃ kṛtam, cīram idaṃ kṛtam*, = 'this was done quickly', 'this was done slowly'⁸⁵ etc. Actually, they differ in objects only and not in themselves.⁸⁶ This is the accepted view in Grammar. But, as against this a problem is raised. But it is said that when a short vowel is repeated, there is only a little flow of water from water-clock⁸⁷ and when a long vowel is repeated, there is more flow of water. How would we account this if there is more flow of water and when a protracted vowel is repeated, there is still more flow of water. How would we account this if there is no real distinction of time between these three?⁸⁸ To this Bhartṛhari answers: The essence of sound, though undivided by time and not increased by nature, is increased due to the increase of the causes of its manifestation.⁸⁹ Helārāja supports it by supplying the gist of the *kārikā*: *Vp.* 1.85. He also says that the manifesting sounds are not the true nature of the eternal sound (*sphoṭa*). The manifested word appears in the intellect together with the last manifesting sound.⁹⁰ Thus, the real essence of word (*sphoṭa*) remains SINGLE, unaffected by manifested sounds (*Vyañjakavarnas*)

The above explanation is extended in case of word (*pada*), sentence (*vākya*) etc. It is said that the essence of the true nature of

83 Vide *Paribhaāṣenduśekhara* of Nagoji, *PBh.* 132.

84 Vide *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā*, 49.

85 Vide *VP.* III.9.63-64.

86 Vide *PR.* on *Ibid.*

87 This is one of the ancient devices to measure time (already referred to it in earlier discussions).

88 Vide *VP.* III.9.64.

89 Vide *Ibid.* III.9.65.

90 Vide *PR.* on *Ibid.*: *antyena dhvaninā saha buddhau śabdo 'vabhāsate ity uktam*; here Helārāja refers to the discussion already had taken place under *VP.* I.85.

sound which is otherwise called *sphoṭa* remains unchanged everywhere in the sphere of words and sentences and looks only as if were different due to the variation of the manifested sounds.⁹¹ Hence, according to Bharṭṛari, the essence of word '*sphoṭa*' remains 'one' in case of a short, a long and a protracted vowel. Thus, the singularity of the idea of *Śabdabrahman* is not effected. The plurality is a mere appearance in case of words due to the power of time (which effects manifesting sounds expressing them in sequence).

In the third category of sentences, the underlined words are the nouns derived from root or otherwise called *kṛdantas*. The *kṛdantas* are the words ending with *kṛt* suffixes. Among the *kṛt* suffixes there are certain suffixes which give the sense of something done in the past time, some give the idea of an activity in present time and some others give the idea of time in future. The suffixes which express the sense of past time are - *kta*, *ktavatu*, *ktivā* etc., the suffixes which give the sense of present time are - *śatṛ*, *śānac* etc. and the suffixes which give the sense of future time are - *ṇini*, *tumun*, *ṇvul* etc. Thus different *kṛdanta* suffixes indicate the three different timings viz. past, present and future. In the quoted examples, all the three *kṛdanta* suffixes indicate past. A glimpse of the subject matter is already discussed in the second chapter.⁹²

In the fourth category of sentences, such as, *bhavatā yaṣṭavyam*, the word '*yaṣṭavyam*' also gives the idea of time according to '*Praiṣātisargaprāptakāleṣu kṛtyāś ca*' (P.3.3.163). The suffix *tavya* gives the idea of 'proper time' apart from its usual meaning.

In the fifth category of sentences, such as, '*bhavān yajatām*' the *loṭ* is also used in the sense of 'in proper time'⁹³ as an additional meaning to its usual meanings. Thereby the meaning is - 'you should perform sacrifice in proper time'.

In the sixth category of sentences, the period of time becomes the grammatical object of a verb. In the sentences like '*māsam āste*', '*godoham āste*' = 'he stays, covering one month', 'he stays covering the period of the milking of a cow', respectively. This type of usage is permitted according to the *vārttika*: '*akarmakadhātubhir yoge deśaḥ*

91 *VP*.III.9.66.

92 Under Diagram No. 2.

93 According to P.III.3.163.

kālo bhāvo gantavyo 'dhvā ca karmasamjñaka iti vācyam'.⁹⁴ Bhartṛhari also gives sanction to this type of usage in *VP.III.7.67*.

In the seventh category of sentences, such as, '*māsajātaḥ*' the relation between time and objects as measurer and measured is clear. Words denoting time, such as, *māsa* etc. are compounded with words denoting the object whose duration is measured by the time.⁹⁵ Thus, the sentences, such as, *māsajātaḥ*, 'a month-old', *saṃvatsarajātaḥ* 'a year old', *dvyahajātaḥ* 'two days old' etc. are formed.

In the eighth category, a typical syntactical agreement is found between the two words expressing two different times. In the sentence '*vasan dadarśa*' the word '*vasan*' expresses present time whereas '*dadarśa*' gives the idea of past and still there is a syntactical agreement between the two and the whole sentence gives the idea of past since *dadarśa* is considered as the chief expressive of time (*mukhya-kriyākāla*). This is already discussed in the second chapter (Pg.42-43)

In the ninth category, time sense is expressed through different terms, such as, *sma*, *purā* etc. which give the idea of past time. In association with such terms the verbal forms, such as, *gacchati*, *asti* etc. which are in present, give the idea of past, in a whole sentence.

In case of tenth category, the activity called existence which is denoted by the verbal root '*bhū*' is made known to have become past through the affix '*kta*'. This category of sentence is different from the category illustrated in the third place, in the sense that in this case (*bhūto ghaṭaḥ* etc.) the existence is inherently connected with the pot; but there is no direct relation between a substance and time.⁹⁶ In the second illustrated sentence (*bhūtā sattā*), the *sattā* expressed by the root is in the form of action and *sattā* expressed by the word *sattā* is in the form of substance. Thus, the pastness of the latter is understood through the pastness of the former. Hence, there is no inconsistency of the understanding of time element in case of these complex sentences.

In the eleventh category, the time expressives are independent of grammatical analysis and they express the idea of different units of time, relative terms of time etc.

94 The *vt.* is found in the SK. under P.I.4.51. In the critical study of *Mbh.*, it is not studied as a *vt.* but a line is found as *kālabhāvādhyvagantavyāḥ karmasamjñā hy akarmaṇām /*

95 According to P.II.2.5.

96 Vide *VP.III.9.79*.

Finally, in the last category, time expressions, such as, *kālah*, *samayaḥ* etc. in a sentence, help to determine the meaning from different polysymic words. For example, in the given example, the word *madhu* is understood in the sense of 'spring' since it is used in the context of *kāla*. The reference to this type of usages is found in the *VP*. 2.314-316 and famous in the poetics as one of the determining factors of deciding the meaning from a word, mentioned in '*samyogādayaḥ*'. It is already discussed in the 3rd chapter under 2.4.6.

Apart from the above illustrations, there are some other illustrations where time sense is realized through the relating speed of the speech of different speakers, such as, *druta*, *madhya* and *lambita*. This comes closer to time realization through *hrasva*, *dīrgha* etc. but in a different level.

In the above, we have discussed how time is realized through the different usages of the language. Now, one important aspect of discussion remained to be seen whether a historical development of the concept of time can be traced out in the works of Pāṇinian tradition.

It is really difficult to trace out a historical development of the concept in a line. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the philosophical aspect of time is avoided and only grammatical aspect of time is dealt in. As a result, we find different usages of Tenses expressing three divisions of time. Patañjali, on his way of usual discussion raised a question (under P. 2.2.5) 'what is time?', and provides a definition of time which is already discussed in the 2nd chapter. Patañjali's conception of time as it seems refers to *kāla* as a substance in the way Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas have believed it to be. Coming to Bharṭṛhari, we find references to different opinions about time. However, for Bharṭṛhari, time is a power (*śakti*) which functions in the realm of *śabda*. The later Grammatical school has included *kāla* under the concept of *kriyā*. Again, Nāgeśa's view is slightly different from others. Considering the above factors, we can say that there are apparently divergent opinions found in the tradition itself regarding time. But, however, we find a holistic approach in the *Vākyapadīya* regarding the concept. The *kārikā* under *VP* 3.7.84 refers to different conceptions of time as:

*apūrvam kālaśaktim vā kriyām vā kālameva vā /
tam eva lakṣaṇam bhāvaṃ kecid āhuḥ kathañcana //*

“Others maintain somehow or other that it is *apūrva* (a new factor) or the power of Time or action or Time itself which is such a factor”.

In the tradition, two different approaches *viz.* grammatical and philosophical or rather metaphysical, are clear. Since the concept has a wider scope of analysis from different grounds, it has been considered differently. Here, we cannot say that they are different contradicting views. These views can exist simultaneously and Bhartṛhari has provided ground for holding such views. Thus, historically we find different approaches towards the concept putting emphasis on grammatical or metaphysical aspect of time. *Kāla*, as a substance also seems acceptable to Grammarians. However, these different aspects can be considered as not mutually contradictory among themselves and thus a holistic approach can be traced out. Bhartṛhari rightly remarks:

*prajñā vivekaṃ labhate bhinnair āgamadarśanaiḥ /
kiyaḍ vā śakyam unnetuṃ svatarkamanudhāvatā // VP.II.486.
bhinnam darśanam āśritya vyavahāro 'nugamyate /
tatra yan mukhyam ekeṣāṃ tatrānyeṣāṃ viparyayaḥ // VP.I.74.
caitanyavat sthitā loke dikkālaparikalpanā /
prakṛtiṃ prāṇināṃ tām hi ko 'nyathā sthāpayiṣyati // VP.III.6.18.*

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

In the last chapter of the present dissertation, the discussion on time according to relevant issues are already summarized. Therefore, here the results attained therein and few remarks on such a study are summed up as follows.

1. In the grammatical tradition apparently, divergent views regarding time are found. There are two distinct angles from which the concept of time is dealt with. One view is that time is an independent power of *Śabdabrahman* and the other is time is nothing but *kriyā* itself. Further, the two levels of time generally accepted in different school of thought also can very well be traced in the grammatical tradition itself. The *nityakālapakṣa* and

anityakriyārūpakālapakṣa found in the tradition represent the two commonly accepted levels viz., transcendental and empirical. The views of grammarians on the concepts of *kriyā* and *kāla* show close affinity with the ideas of Bergson, the famous western philosopher.

2. Pāṇini has not defined time but he has discussed all the relevant points related to time aspect of study. Following usage he has divided time into three divisions, viz., *bhūta*, *bhaviṣyat* and *vartamāna* which are further subdivided on the basis of *adyatana* and *anadyatana* and different *lakāras* are employed to them. The interchanging of different *lakāras* in changing situations, reminds us of the indivisibility aspect of time reflected in the world Literature. Pāṇini's analysis also clearly implies that time is a substratum of action and also a more fundamental concept than space. It is also a measure of activity according to him.

Patañjali's definition of time shows that time is a substance and objective reality. The ancient views quoted by Patañjali in the context of present time hold a close similarity with the views of Permenides, the famous classical western philosopher.

According to Bhartṛhari, time is an independent power of *Śabbarahman* which functions with its two powers, namely, *abhyannjñā* and *pratibandha*. There are some other minor powers of time acceptable to him, namely, *krama*, *jarā* etc. The three divisions of time viz. *bhūta*, *bhaviṣyat* and *vartamāna* are accepted as three powers of time according to him. Bhartṛhari has also accepted another power called *samavāya*.

The opinion of critics that the two powers of time viz. *pratibandha* and *abhyannjñā* are Bhartṛhari's contribution is doubtful as indicated by Helārāja in his introduction to *VP*. III.9.56. Further, it is also commented that if *abhyannjñā* and *pratibandha* are accepted then they serve the purpose of the power of sequence and hence adoption of a separate power called *krama* (sequence) remains unsolved/ unexplained.

Bhartṛhari prepared a solid background of philosophy of grammar by explaining some of the philosophical questions and queries about different concepts like time etc. which were already raised by Patañjali. However, Bhartṛhari's time power is beyond the scope of formal grammatical analysis and can be understood through the analysis of the function of language on different levels. His time power functions in the realm of *Śabda* or speech viz.,

Paśyantī, *Madhyamā*, and *Vaikharī* which involve in the process of communication with reference to realities. Over and above his ideas on time, Bharṭṛhari presents a reconciliation among divergent conception of time found in different schools of thought. Bharṭṛhari's contribution consists in his elaborate discussion of a particular topic and the study of contemporary and early contributions. At length Bharṭṛhari's ideas are originated from Vedic and non-vedic sources. Therefore, the understanding of the theories of some of his early and contemporary schools, particularly, *kāsmiraśaivāgama*, Buddhist philosophy (esp. *Dīnāga*) *Śāṅkhya-Yoga*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* will bring a clearer understanding of Bharṭṛhari. Bharṭṛhari's style of explaining the things poses some difficulties in understanding his theories. Moreover, he has mentioned many other views and it requires utmost attention while deciding his contribution. Finally, it is realised that Bharṭṛhari, even if he claims to be ardent follower of *trimunis*, is a fundamental thinker.

3. Among the other schools, Katantra has formulated an *adhikāra* rule for time as *kāle* III.1.10. Different grammars have used different terms for different *lakāras*, Candra, Devanandin *etc.* have followed Pāṇinian terms for *lakāras*. However, there is no conceptual discussion on time available in other grammars. But, the references to time aspect of discussion found in other grammar also can be incorporated.
4. Since the concept of time is a multi-disciplinary concept, there are several approaches of study and they can exist together without being contradictory among themselves and thus a holistic approach to the study on time can be realised in the grammatical tradition.

(the end)

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