
Piotr Balcerowicz, *Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective; Critical Edition and English Translation of Logical-Epistemological Treatises: Nyāyāvatāra, Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti and Nyāyāvatāra-tippaṇa with Introduction and Notes*. Alt-und Neu-Indische Studien 53, 1-2, Stuttgart 2001, xli + 536 Pp.

Introduction:

The *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara is one of the Jaina treatise on logic that have been studied by western scholars even in the earlier period of the 20th century. This Sanskrit text was translated into English by S.C. Vidyabhusana in 1915. We have a Japanese translation with the original text by the late Prof. E. Kanakura in 1943. The fact that the University of Bombay prescribed this work for the B.A. examination in Sanskrit for the years 1929 and 1930 shows its popularity in modern India. In ancient India also many Jaina authors wrote various commentaries on this work. With these it can be said that the *Nyāyāvatāra* has been regarded as a standard work on Jaina logic in India as well as outside it.

As a work on logic the *Nyāyāvatāra* discusses various logical topics within 32 verses. In the first verse, for example, the author gives definitions of *pramāṇa* and its variation; *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. The idea of *antarvyāpti* (internal concomitance) is discussed in the twentieth verse. The 30th verse contains the terms *naya* and *syādvāda* which are typical to the Jaina epistemology.

Contents and Comments:

Among the commentaries, the present author chose, as the subtitle shows, to edit and translate two commentaries into English along with the *Nyāvatāra*. The first volume contains an introduction and an English translation with elaborated notes while the second one has Sanskrit text critically edited. The text is followed by some indexes and bibliography.

The main purpose of the introduction of the present work (first volume, pp. iii-xli) seems to show how Siddhasena was influenced by the Buddhist

philosophers beginning with Dignāga, Dharmakīrti. Before doing so, the author shows two problems related to the *Nyāyāvatāra* and its author. The first one is whether the work can be ascribed to the author of the *Dvātriṃśikās* or the *Sanmati-tarka-prakarāṇa*. The second is the date of the *Nyāyāvatāra* itself. The author avoids dealing with the former topics and mainly discusses the latter.

According to the author, the opinions on the date of the *Nyāyāvatāra* or Siddhasena fall into four groups: Siddhasena was (1) pre-Dignāgan, (2) after Dignāga and before Dharmakīrti, (3) post-Dharmakīrtian and (4) his date is still an open question. The author advocates the third opinion; "Siddhasena probably took recourse to Dharmakīrti (p. xxix)."

To reach this conclusion the author uses two approaches. First, he examines the three reasons given by H. Jacobi and P.L. Vaidya to support the third opinion mentioned above. Though the first reason that Siddhasena uses the term *abhrānta* in the definition of *pratyakṣa* satisfies the author, he is not convinced of the second argument wherein Siddhasena distinguishes *svārtha* from *parārtha*. The author says (p. ix) that Vaidya's third point wherein the sixth and seventh of the *Nyāyāvatāra* contain the favorite view of the Yogācāra School is rather weak.

With regards to the second approach (p. xii ff.), in total 21 portions are showed to have resemblance with those of Dharmakīrti's works. First, the author points out "The opening line of NA. 0 (*pramāṇa-vyupādanārtham idam ārabhyate*) closely resembles the formulations of H.B." (p. xii) (NA = *Nyāyāvatāra*; H.B. = *Hetubindu*). Does the line, however, belong to the *Nyāyāvatāra*? We do not have this line in other editions: *Nyāyāvatāra-nārtika-vṛtti* ed. by D. Malvaniya, Bombay (Singhī Jain Series No. 20) 1949. *Nyāyāvatāra*, ed. by S. C. Vidyabhusana, Arrah 1915 (reprinted in *Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra and other Works*. ed. by A.N. Upadhye. Bombay 1971).

In p. xii the similarity between the first ideas expressed in the *Nyāyāvatāra* and the *Nyāyabindu* is pointed out. To add to this we can say that there is a similarity between these ideas and those showed in *Tattvārtha Sūtra* I, 10, 11 and 12; tat *pramāṇe. ādye paroḥsam. pratyakṣam anyat*. According to the author, Siddhasena marks an important shift in Jaina epistemology, "to interpret the directness of *pratyakṣa* in terms of sensory organs (*akṣa = indriya*)" and this interpretational shift is the one that "diverts from the Āgamic tradition advocated, e.g., by Akalaṅka among many others." Akalaṅka refers to *akṣajñāna* in his *Pramāṇasamgraha* verse 4 and paraphrases the word with *caḥsurādijñāna* in the auto commentary on the verse. Cannot we say that Akalaṅka interpreted *akṣa* in *pratyakṣa* as *indriya* before Siddhasena?

The author maintains that "Whereas we quite frequently find typological definitions of *pramāṇa* (viz., statements of its divisions) in Jaina literature, we do not, as matter of fact, come across any attempt at a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa* of the second type in any works, both in Jaina and non-Jaina, prior to NA (p. xiv)." Here "a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa*" refers to Siddhasena's definition in *Nyāyāvatāra* 1ab: *pramāṇam svaprābhāsi jñānam bādhavivarijitam*. In the *Svayambhūstotra* of Samantabhadra we come across the phrase as follows: *svaparāvabhāsakaṃ yathā pramāṇam bhuvī buddhilakṣaṇam* (verse 63). The

historical priority between Siddhasena (as an author of the *Nyāyāvātāra*) and Samantabhadra is an enigma to be solved. To make a long story short, however, Samantabhadra is prior to Dharmakīrti.

“The pāda C (*tad-vyāmohanivṛttiḥ*, of NA. 3 recalls Dharmakīrti’s statement found in PV. (1,3) 1.7 (p. xvi).” (PV = *Pramāṇavārttika*) This pāda also reminds us of Akalaṅka’s statement in auto commentary on *Pramāṇasamgraha* 10ab: *vyāmohavicchedena pramāṇāntaravat*.

The word *nyāya vid* in *Nyāyāvātāra* 20 is puzzling as the author expresses (p. xxi). It is actually difficult to determine “whom Siddhasena might have had in mind when he speaks of ‘expert in logic’ (do.)” There is a possibility that with the word he implicitly refers to Samantabhadra. Siddhasena uses the word in the context of explaining *antarvyāpti* or the intrinsic invariable concomitance. Samantabhadra, on his side, shows that the Jaina savior(s) is (are) alone omniscient one(s) in verse six of his *Āptamīmāṃsā*. Doing so he uses syllogism without example or *dr̥ṣṭānta*. Exactly speaking the syllogism cannot have any examples because no one will be omniscient except Jaina saviour(s). This is the first usage of the *antarvyāpti* in the history of Jaina philosophy.

It is sure that the work of Dr. P. Balcerowicz shows how Jain logic explained in the *Nyāyāvātāra* and *vivṛtti* has a close relationship with that of Dharmakīrtian. The coming researchers on the *Nyāyāvātāra*, it is hoped, should trace the relationship between the ideas of Siddhasena expressed in the work and those works of other Jaina philosophers before and after him in logical context as well as in dogmatic one.

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