

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SVĀTANTRIKA AND PRĀSAṄGIKA IN LATE MADHYAMAKA: ATIŚA AND BHAVYA AS PRĀSAṄGIKAS*

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1. Introduction: Distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

In the long history of Indian Madhyamaka, differing views developed and doctrinal bifurcations took place. Of these bifurcations, we know of the distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika from Tibetan accounts. Nevertheless, it is not yet clear whether these terms were used by Indian Mādhyamikas themselves,¹ or even whether this distinction existed in India.²

Bhāviveka³ (ca. 500-570 CE), in the *Prajñāpradīpa*, criticised Buddhapālita (ca. 470-540 CE) for not employing syllogistic inference to explicate Nāgārjuna's teaching. In response to this, Candrakīrti (ca. 600-650 CE), in the *Prasannapadā*, raised an objection to Bhāviveka in support of Buddhapālita. This is considered to be the origin of the dispute between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika positions. It is, however, not known if this controversy over the use of inferential reasoning led to the development of opposed positions in India later

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¹ To the best of my knowledge, the earliest text that mentions the term *rang rgyud pa*, which can be a translation of *svātantrika*, is the *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* (D. ra 281b6, ra 282a3, P. ra 337a8, ra 337b6) of Jayānanda. See Ogawa [1984]. Yonezawa [1999] also mentions the use of a term *svatantrasā[dha]navādin* in the **Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*, which is probably written in the twelfth century CE. Because the **Lakṣaṇaṭīkā* was written by a Tibetan Dharmakīrti in Sanskrit but with the *dBu med* script, and the *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* was written outside India, they may not be regarded as Indian accounts in a strict sense. See also footnote 85.

² For example, Dreyfus [2003: 3] states: The late and retrospective nature of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, as well as its apparent non-Indian provenance, together signal its unusual status as a doxographical category that should render us cautious about its use in the interpretation of Indian material.

³ I call the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* 'Bhāviveka' but not 'Bhāvaviveka' following the proposal of Ejima [1990], which is based on Chinese and Tibetan translation as well as of an examination of 12 manuscripts of the *Prasannapadā*, each mentioning his name four times. The name 'Bhāviveka' is attested in the **Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*. See Yonezawa [1999].

on. This is caused by a lack of clear descriptions concerning this controversy in Indian sources after Candrakīrti. As a result, most studies of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction so far undertaken are based on either the controversy between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, which took place in the seventh century CE, or on the Tibetan accounts, which are later than the twelfth century CE. In this paper, therefore, I will attempt to explain why we cannot find a clear distinction of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in Indian sources after Candrakīrti, and to narrow the 500 years' gap between Candrakīrti and the Tibetan accounts.

2. Historical evidence from later materials and translations

When we compare how later Mādhyamikas treated Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, we realise that evidence for Candrakīrti's popularity is rare in accounts before 900 CE. The *lTa ba'i khyad par* of Ye shes sde (ninth century CE), one of the earliest Tibetan accounts of Indian Buddhism, names Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Bhāviveka, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, but not Candrakīrti. Moreover, Ye shes sde does not mention the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction although he classifies the Madhyamaka into the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.⁴ As far as Tibetan translations are concerned, the only work of Candrakīrti available in the earlier dissemination is the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*, a commentary on Nāgārjuna's work. All of Candrakīrti's other works were translated later than the eleventh century CE.⁵ Furthermore, not one of Candrakīrti's works is found in the Chinese *Tripitaka*.⁶ There is no surviving Indian commentary on his main works except for the auto-commentary, the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*, and the *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* of Jayānanda (late eleventh century CE), which was written outside India.⁷ To the best of my knowledge, among texts written prior to Śāntarakṣita, i.e. before

⁴ In this paper, I refrain from using the terms Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka when I simply denote Madhyamaka that conventionally accepts external objects and Madhyamaka that conventionally accepts mind-only respectively. Instead, I provisionally employ 'externalist Madhyamaka' and 'internalist Madhyamaka'. According to most Tibetan doxographical texts, the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka is classified into the Svātantrika, but we are not yet sure if the distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika existed in India.

⁵ See Inaba [1966] and [1967].

⁶ See Tsukamoto, Matsunaga and Isoda [1990: 232-233].

⁷ See Ogawa [1984: 170] for Jayānanda. The **Lakṣaṇaṭīkā* can be added to the list. See Yonezawa [1999].

the eighth century CE, the only surviving text mentioning Candrakīrti is the *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* of Avalokitavrata (seventh century CE?). It names Candrakīrti as one of the commentators on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna.⁸ Nevertheless, since he does not mention the views of Candrakīrti,⁹ we do not know how he understood Candrakīrti's criticism of Bhāviveka. We can, however, find many references to Candrakīrti in Indian works after the tenth century CE, such as those of Prajñākaramati (ca. 950-1030 CE)¹⁰ and Atiśa (982-1054 CE).¹¹

As for Bhāviveka, in addition to the fact that he is mentioned by Ye shes sde, his *Prajñāpradīpa* as well as the commentary, the *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* of Avalokitavrata, was translated during the time of the earlier dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet. The *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* and its commentary, the *Tarkajvālā*, are mentioned in the *IDan dkar ma* catalogue as treatises in the process of translation.¹² The **Karataratna* (*Zhang zhen lun*) and the *Prajñāpradīpa* were translated into Chinese.¹³ Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788 CE) in the *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* quotes a passage from the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* as the view of the externalist Mādhyamika.¹⁴ In addition to this, there are two commentaries on the *Prajñāpradīpa*, one of which was written by Avalokitavrata and the other, which is now lost, was written by Guṇadatta.¹⁵ Thus

⁸ *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D. wa 73a5, P. wa 85a8). See Kajiyama [1963]. In the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, a certain Bhavya mentions Candrakīrti by name. The time of its composition is assumed to be around the ninth-tenth century CE, on the basis of its quotations. (Cf. Ruegg [1989: 206-209]) This may possibly be the earliest surviving text which mentions Candrakīrti by name after Avalokitavrata.

⁹ It is not clear why he does not discuss it while he mentions Candrakīrti by name. Kajiyama [1982: 16] speculates that Avalokitavrata was contemporary with Candrakīrti, based on the fact that he does not discuss Candrakīrti's view. There is, however, a possibility that he had not read the *Prasannapadā*, or that he did not regard Candrakīrti as a major opponent.

¹⁰ Prajñākaramati in the ninth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* quotes 6 and a half verses from the *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti. See *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, p. 353,3-6 (*Madhyamakāvatāra*, v. 6:28), p. 353,13-16 (v. 6:25), p. 361,4-7 (v. 6:23), p. 365,2-5 (v. 6:29), pp. 369,15-360,2 (v. 6:27), p. 372,15-16 (v. 6:80ab) and p. 472, 4-7 (v. 6:89).

¹¹ For example, *Satyadvayāvatāra*, v. 19 is a quotation of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, v. 6:80. See Ejima [1983: 365-366], Lindtner [1981: 192 and 195] and footnotes 49, 50 and 56.

¹² Lalou [1953: 337, no. 732], Yoshimura [1974: nos. 728 and 729]. See also Inaba [1966: 29].

¹³ See Tsukamoto, Matsunaga and Isoda [1990: 217].

¹⁴ When Śāntarakṣita, in the *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* on verse 91, examines whether conventional entities are mind-only or external, he quotes verse 5:28cd of Bhāviveka's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*. Concerning the identification of Bhāviveka's verse, see Kajiyama [1982: 35-36] and Matsumoto [1984: 147-151]. See also *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* (pp. 290,14-292,8) for the Tibetan passage of Śāntarakṣita.

¹⁵ See Lindtner [1981: 211 and 212 note 16]. Although Atiśa, in the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*, mentions that Avalokitavrata and Devaśarman wrote commentaries on the *Prajñāpradīpa*

Bhāviveka's works are frequently quoted and commented by Indian teachers before the eighth century CE. These pieces of evidence show that Bhāviveka was probably well known in India in this period and in Tibet at the time of the earlier dissemination, but Candrakīrti was not. Only after the ninth century CE can textual evidence for Candrakīrti's works be found.

This makes us assume that there was no codified opposition between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika before the ninth century CE. Also, it is almost impossible to know how Candrakīrti's view was transmitted due to lack of reference to him before the ninth century CE.

3. *The distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika: Bhāviveka's view on paramārtha*¹⁶

Mādhyamikas consider that the ultimate truth is free from discriminative thought (*prapañca*) and from conceptual construct (*vikalpa*), as Nāgārjuna expresses in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, verse 18:9:

Being not dependent on others, calm, not discriminated by discriminative thought (*prapañca*), free from conceptual construct (*vikalpa*) and without objects differentiated: This is the definition of reality. (v. 18:9)¹⁷

The highest reality is thus beyond any verbal or conceptual activity. Therefore, it is indeed impossible to explain anything directly from the point of the view of the ultimate truth. It is, on the other hand, necessary for the Mādhyamikas to explain what the ultimate truth is, to a certain extent, in order both to defend it against opponents and to realise it for themselves. The difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika can be understood as a difference of methods used to

(see footnote 63), according to Lindtner, it is not Devaśarman but Guṇadatta who wrote its commentary.

¹⁶ Concerning Bhāviveka's interpretation of *paramārtha*, my discussion is heavily indebted to Nasu [1999].

¹⁷ *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, v. 18:9, p. 372,12-13:
aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcair aprapañcitam⁽¹⁾ |
nīrvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam⁽²⁾ ||
 (1) Ed: *aprapañcitam*. (2) Ed: *lakṣaṇam*.

establish the ultimate truth, that is to say, autonomous inference¹⁸ and the *prasaṅga* method.

Bhāviveka's attitude towards inference is clearly expressed at the beginning of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, a commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*:

The venerable *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna] teaches, in verses only, inferences (**anumāna*) and refutations (**dūṣaṇa*) which are clear and true, and expounds the way of *prajñāpāramitā*, which eliminates the net of wrong views. Among fellow practitioners, however, some do not understand it. Wishing to make them understand, therefore, I shall explain the *Madhyamakasāstra* (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*) according to scriptural authority.¹⁹

In this statement, Bhāviveka understands that Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is a work grounded in reasoning. According to Ejima's study of this passage, if inference here means syllogism with a three-fold inferential mark (*trairūpyaliṅga*) and refutation means indication of a fault in an opponent's syllogism, it is impossible for Nāgārjuna to have known concepts underlying these terms because it seems that a three-fold inferential mark as a condition of valid inference was introduced around the fifth century CE.²⁰ However, it is reasonable, as Ejima maintains, that Bhāviveka intends to interpret the teachings of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as being syllogistic.

What Nāgārjuna is actually teaching is 'non-arising' as is evident in the very first verse of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*:

No entities at all that have arisen from themselves, nor from

¹⁸ This does not necessarily mean that there is a term *svatantrānumāna* in Sanskrit. In the *Prasannapadā*, we find *svatantram anumānam* three times (p. 16,2, p. 34,4, p. 34,4) and *svatantrānumānābhīdhāyivāt* twice (p. 16,11, p. 18,5). This may suggest that *svatantra(m)* is used in adverbial sense which does not mean 'autonomous' but 'autonomously'. At least, the term *svatantrānumāna* itself is not used as a *karmadhāraya* compound. Therefore, we have to note that it is possible that there is no such type of inference as *svatantrānumāna* mentioned in the *Prasannapadā*. See Matsumoto [1997: 371-385] and Yotsuya [1999: 47-72].

¹⁹ *Prajñāpradīpa*, pp. 1,13-2,3 (D. tsha 45b6-46a1, P. tsha 53b7-54a1):
slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas kyis⁽¹⁾ tshig le'ur byas pa dag kho nas rjes su dpag pa dang/ sun dbyung ba'i gsal ba dang/ de kho na dag bstan pa dang/ lta ba ngan pa'i dra ba zhi bar byed pa dang ldan pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i tshul bka' stsal mod kyi/ tshangs pa mtshungs par spyod pa rnam las kha cig gis mi rtogs pas/ de'i phyir de dag gis rtogs par bya bar 'dod nas lung ji lta ba bzhin du dbu ma'i bstan bcos bshad par bya'o//
 (1) Em: *kyis*, D: *kyi*, Ed. P: omit.

²⁰ Ejima [1982: 154-155]

another, nor from both, nor from a non-cause, ever exist anywhere. (v. 1:1)²¹

In view of this, Bhāviveka considers that the teaching of non-arising presented by Nāgārjuna should be established by means of syllogistic inference. The following is an example of such inference given by Bhāviveka in the *Prajñāpradīpa*:

Ultimately (*don dam par, paramārthatas*), internal sense fields (*skye mched, āyatana*) do not arise from themselves.
Because they exist.
Like the Universal Soul (*caitanya*).²²

Here Bhāviveka applies a condition ‘ultimately’ (*paramārthatas*) to the preposition. As I mentioned above, the ultimate is non-conceptual for the Mādhyamikas and cannot be the object of verbal activity. However, Bhāviveka attempts to prove entities’ ‘non-arising from themselves’ by such reasoning. To explain this, it is necessary to clarify the relation between the ultimate truth and inference for Bhāviveka. First, let us examine Bhāviveka’s interpretation of the ultimate (*paramārtha*) in the *Prajñāpradīpa* on verse 24:8 of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*:²³

Regarding ‘*paramārtha*’, [it is a *karmadhāraya* compound, to be analysed as follows:] it is ‘*paramārtha*’ because it is the object (*artha*) and also ultimate (*parama*). Or, it is ‘*paramārtha*’ because it is [a *tatpuruṣa* compound analysed as] the object (*artha*) of the ultimate (*parama*) cognition which is non-conceptual. It is the reality (*de kho na, *tattva*) whose definition is ‘being not dependent on others’ (*aparapratyayam*,

21 *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, v. 1:1, p. 12,13-14:
na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyām nāpy ahetutaḥ |
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana ||

22 *Prajñāpradīpa*, p. 11,1-2 (D. tsha 49a2-3, P. tsha 58b1-2):
don dam par nang gi skye mched rnam s bdag las skye ba med par nges te/ yod pa'i phyir
dper na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no⁽¹⁾ ||
(1) Ed: *bzhi no*, D, P: *bzhin no*.

Cf. *Prasannapadā*, pp. 25,9-26,1:
na paramārthata ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni svata utpannāni | vidyamānatvāt | caitanyavad iti |

23 *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, v. 24:8, p. 492,4-5:
dve satye samupaśrītya buddhānām dharmadeśanā |
lokasamvrtisatyam ca satyam ca paraśmārthataḥ ||

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 18:9)²⁴ and so on. Due to being the truth (*satya*) which is nothing but *paramārtha*, it is the ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*), since it stays in that way for all times in all aspects.

[It is a *bahuvrīhi* compound, to be analysed as follows:] a non-conceptual cognition whose object is that [ultimate] is also '*paramārtha*' due to its way of not having objects, because it takes *paramārtha* [as the object]. The explanation of non-arising and so forth, which accords with elimination of that [object], and the wisdom arisen from hearing, thinking and meditation are also *paramārtha*, because they are unmistaken due to being the means of understanding *paramārtha*.²⁵

In these passages, Bhāviveka interprets the compound *paramārtha* in three different ways: as *karmadhāraya*, *tatpuruṣa* and *bahuvrīhi* compounds. Of these, in the first interpretation, he takes *paramārtha* as the ultimate object. The second, as a *tatpuruṣa* compound, means the object of the ultimate cognition which is non-conceptual. Thus, the first two interpretations are the ultimate object and the object of the ultimate cognition, which are explained as the reality defined in verse 18:9 of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Therefore, they are considered non-conceptual and cannot be expressed with words. He then explains *paramārtha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound in three ways: (1) the non-conceptual cognition whose object is *paramārtha*, (2) the teaching of non-arising and so forth and (3) the wisdom arisen from hearing, thinking and meditation. Of these only the first one is considered to be non-conceptual. Not only the ultimate object but also the cognition of it is called *paramārtha*. The second is regarded as the teaching of the Madhyamaka which Nāgārjuna postulates in the very first verse of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* quoted above.²⁶ According to Avalokita-vrata, this conceptual *paramārtha* interpreted as a *bahuvrīhi*

24 See footnote 17. *Aparapratyaya* is translated into Tibetan as *gzhan las shes pa ma yin pa* ('not known from others').

25 *Prajñāpradīpa* (D. tsha 228a3-6, P. tsha 286a7-b3):
don dam par ni de don kyang yin la/ dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa'am/ rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes dam pa'i don yin pas/ don dam pa ste/ de kho na gzhan las shes pa ma yin pa la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid do// don dam pa nyid bden pa yin pas/ don dam pa'i bden pa ste/ de dus thams cad dang rnam pa thams cad du de bzhin du gnas pa'i phyir ro// rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes de'i yul can yang yul med pa'i tshul gyis don dam pa ste/ de la don dam pa yod pa'i phyir ro// de 'gog pa dang rjes su mthun⁽¹⁾ pa skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa dang/ thos pa dang bsams⁽²⁾ pa dang/ bsgoms⁽³⁾ pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyang don dam pa⁽⁴⁾ ste/ don dam pa rtogs pa'i thabs kyi phyir phyin ci ma log pa'i phyir ro//
 (1) D: *mthun*, P: *'thun*. (2) D: *bsams*, P: *bsam*. (3) D: *bsgoms*, P: *bsgom*. (4) D: *pa*, P: *par*.

26 See footnote 21.

compound is called ‘concordant ultimate truth’ (*brdar brtags pa’i don dam pa’i bden pa*, **sāṅketikaparamārthasatya*).²⁷ This interpretation as a *bahuvrīhi* compound may require some more explanation. In the *Tarkajvālā*, Bhāviveka explains the meaning of *paramārtha*, as follows:

As for [the term] ‘*paramārtha*’, because *artha* is what is to be known, *artha* means what is to be examined and to be grasped. *Parama* is a term denoting ‘supreme’. The compound *paramārtha* is:

(1) The ultimate object because it is the object (*artha*) and is ultimate (*parama*). (*karmadhāraya* compound) Alternatively, (2) the object (*artha*) of the ultimate (*parama*). It is the object of the ultimate because it is the object of the ultimate cognition which is non-conceptual. (*tatpuruṣa* compound) Alternatively, (3) what is conformable to *paramārtha*. It is conformable to *paramārtha* because the wisdom which accords with the understanding of *paramārtha* takes *paramārtha* [as an object] (*bahuvrīhi* compound). ‘Ultimately’ (*paramārthatas*) [in syllogistic inference] is ultimately also concerning that same ultimate [as a *bahuvrīhi* compound].²⁸

The first two interpretations as ‘the ultimate object’ and ‘the object of the ultimate cognition’ are considered non-conceptual. However, the third is explained as ‘that which is conformable to *paramārtha*’ or ‘that which takes *paramārtha* [as an object]’ i.e. as a *bahuvrīhi* compound. This explanation is slightly different from that in the *Prajñāpradīpa*. There, a non-conceptual cognition which takes *paramārtha* as its object is also called *paramārtha*. Here, however, the wisdom which accords with the understanding of *paramārtha* that takes *paramārtha* [as an object] is called *paramārtha*. The former is non-conceptual and the latter conceptual even though their

²⁷ *Prajñāpradīpatīkā* (D. za 236b7, P. za 282b8). I use this term to denote the interpretation of *paramārtha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound that is not non-conceptual.

²⁸ *Tarkajvālā*, pp. 82,33-83,8 (D. dza 59a7-b2, P. dza 63a1-4):
don dam pa zhes bya ba la don zhes bya ba ni shes par bya ba yin pa’i phyir/ don de brtag par bya ba dang go bar bya ba’i tha tshig go/ dam pa zhes bya ba ni mchog ces bya ba’i tshig gi sgra yin te/ don dam pa zhes bsdu ba ni/ de don yang yin la dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa’o// yang na dam pa’i don de rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes dam pa’i don yin pas dam pa’i don to/ yang na don dam pa dang mthun pa ste don dam pa rtog pa dang rjes su mthun pa’i shes rab la don dam pa de yod pas don dam pa dang mthun pa’o// don dam par na zhes bya ba ni don dam pa de nyid du’ang⁽¹⁾ don dam par ro//

(1) D: ‘ang, Ed, P: ‘am.

explanations are similar at first glance. Therefore, in the *Tarkajvālā*, the interpretation of *paramārtha* as cognition which is non-conceptual (*nirvikalpajñāna*) is missing.

The condition ‘ultimately’ in Bhāviveka’s proposition²⁹ is used in the sense of *paramārtha* conformable to *paramārtha*, i.e. the concordant ultimate. According to the *Prajñāpradīpa*, the teaching of non-arising is considered to be this concordant ultimate. As is seen in verse 1:1, the teaching of non-arising is nothing but the main subject of the *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*, which Bhāviveka considers to be inference (*anumāna*) and refutation (*dūṣaṇa*). Because the concordant ultimate is not non-conceptual but simply designated ‘ultimate’ in the sense of being ‘conformable to the ultimate’, inference can operate concerning this ultimate.

In this way, Bhāviveka includes the teaching of non-arising into the concordant ultimate. As we have seen, in the *Prajñāpradīpa*, he claims that Nāgārjuna’s work consists of inference and refutation, and insists that Nāgārjuna’s teaching, non-arising, should be established through syllogistic inference. This reflects the difference of attitudes towards inference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Bhāviveka, a Svātantrika, postulates the concordant ultimate in which the teaching of non-arising is included so that inference with regard to the ultimate can be valid. Therefore, this concordant ultimate is understood as an important characteristic of the two truth theory upheld by the Svātantrika.

Candrakīrti, on the other hand, interprets *paramārtha* only as the ultimate object (*karmadhāraya* compound) as is seen in the *Prasannapadā*:

That which is an object (*artha*) and is ultimate (*parama*) is *paramārtha*.³⁰

Although not interpreting the word *paramārtha*, in the *Madhyamakāvātāra*, he interprets the ultimate reality as ‘the object of correct perception’ in a manner similar to the *tatpuruṣa* interpretation of *paramārtha*:

²⁹ See Bhāviveka’s syllogistic inference in footnote 22.

³⁰ *Prasannapadā*, p. 494,1: *paramaś cāsāv arthaś ceti paramārthaḥ* | See Nasu [1999: 102, note 6].

All entities bear a twofold nature whose being is perceived by correct and erroneous perception [respectively]. It is said that the object of correct perceptions is real (*tattva*) and that of erroneous perceptions is the conventional truth. (v. 6:23)³¹

Thus Candrakīrti accepts the interpretation of *paramārtha* as the ultimate object, i.e. as a *karmadhāraya* compound and he may also take it as the object of ultimate cognition, i.e. as a *tatpuruṣa* compound. He, however, does not adopt the interpretation as a *bahuvrīhi* compound.

In this paper, therefore, a distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika is made depending on whether or not this concordant ultimate is accepted.

4. Later Svātantrikas' understanding of *paramārtha*

As we have seen, Bhāviveka postulates two types of ultimate (*paramārtha*): the non-conceptual ultimate and the concordant ultimate. The latter, which he defined as the teaching of non-arising and so on, is understood to be the ultimate as admitting of inferential reasoning. This interpretation of *paramārtha* is adopted by the later Mādhyamikas who are, in the Tibetan tradition, regarded as Svātantrikas. Of these, Jñānagarbha (eighth century CE) explains this concordant *paramārtha* in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, as follows:

Truth regarding the ultimate is the ultimate truth, and the meaning is that this is the truth which is accordant with reasoning (*nyāya*).³² Why is this?

31 *Madhyamakāvātāra*, v. 6:23, as cited in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, p. 361,4-7:
samyagmṛṣādarśanalabdhabhāvaṃ rūpadvayaṃ bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ |
samyagdrśāṃ yo viśayah sa tattvaṃ mṛṣādrśāṃ samvṛtisatyam uktam ||
 See Nasu [1999: p. 102, note 6].

32 Eckel [1987: 110, note 7] points out that v. 17 of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* is quoted in the *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* of Haribhadra, from which we know the original Sanskrit of *rigs pa*.
Satyadvayavibhaṅga, v. 17, p. 173,6-11:

kun rdzob de bzhin nyid gang yin|| de nyid dam pa'i don gyis bzhed ||
tha dad min phir rigs de yang|| ji ltar snang ba bzhin du gnas || 17 ||

Abhisamayālamkāralokā, p. 407,25-26:

saṃvṛtes tathatā yaiva paramārthasya sā matā |
abhedāt so 'pi hi nyāyo yathādarśanam āsthitah ||

Truth (*tathatā*) of the ultimate is taught to be [that] of the conventional, because [they are] not different.

This is because that reasoning [i.e. the ultimate] also resorts to what corresponds to seeing [i.e. the conventional].

Reasoning that does not falsify is ultimate (v. 4ab)³³

Ascertainment of objects by means of reasoning does not falsify. Therefore, cognition produced by a three-fold inferential mark is also *paramārtha*, because it [i.e. cognition itself,] is ultimate (*parama*) and is also a cause (*artha*). The object determined by it is also *paramārtha*, it is expressed just as **pratyakṣa* and so on[, which can mean an object of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*)].³⁴

Here Jñānagarbha considers that cognition produced by a three-fold inferential mark is *paramārtha*. This means that this *paramārtha* is accessible by means of inferential reasoning. Nevertheless, he here does not adopt the interpretation of *paramārtha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, although it is not the non-conceptual ultimate. He then explains the relationship between non-arising and the ultimate:

Because the negation of arising and so forth is conformable to reality (*yang dag pa*, **tattva*), it is held to be [the ultimate]. It is clear that there is no negation in reality (*yang dag tu*, **tattvatas*) because there is no object of negation. (v. 9)³⁵

Thus, Jñānagarbha maintains that non-arising is the ultimate conformable to reality (*tattva*) and that there is no negation in reality because negation, which requires an object, is not non-conceptual.

A similar interpretation is adopted by Śāntarakṣita in verses 69-70 of the *Madhyamakālamkāra*:

Therefore, there is no entity which is established in reality.
Tathāgatas, therefore, taught the non-arising of all phenomena.

33 Cf. *Abhisamayālamkāralokā*, p. 636,14-15: *avisamvādako nyāyaḥ paramārtha iti*. See footnote 40.

34 *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti*, p. 156,15-24:
don dam par bden pa ni don dam pa'i bden pa ste/ de ni rigs pa'i rjes su 'gro ba can gyi
bden pa nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go// gang gi phyir/
slu ba med pa⁽¹⁾ rigs pa ni// don dam yin te/ (4ab)
rigs pa'i stobs kyis don la nges pa ni slu bar mi 'gyur te/ de'i phyir tshul gsum pa'i rtags
kyis bskyed pa'i rtags pa gang yin pa de ni dam pa yang yin la/ don yang yin pas don dam
pa'o// des gtan la phab pa'i don kyang don dam pa ste/ mngon sum la sogs pa bzhin du
brjod do//

(1) Ed: *pas*, Em: *pa*. See the previous note.

35 *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, v. 9, p. 161,3-12:
skye la sogs pa bkag pa yang// yang dag pa dang mthun phyir 'dod//
dgag bya yod pa ma yin pas// yang dag tu na bkag med gsal//

(v. 69)

Because it is conformable to the ultimate (*dam pa'i don dang mthun pa*, **paramārthānukūla*), this [teaching of non-arising] should be called ultimate. In reality (*yang dag tu*, **tattvatas*), the [ultimate] is free from all accumulation of discriminative thought (*spros pa*, **prapañca*). (v. 70)³⁶

Śāntarakṣita, too, explains that the teaching of non-arising is the ultimate because it is conformable to the ultimate which is non-conceptual.

Kamalaśīla (ca. 740-795 CE), a direct disciple of Śāntarakṣita, also interprets *paramārtha* in a similar way in the *Bhāvanākrama* and the *Madhyamakāloka*:

And it is taught [in the *Dharmasaṃgītisūtra*] that non-arising is the truth because it is conformable to the ultimate truth (*paramārthānukūlatvāt*). However, ultimately there is neither arising nor non-arising because it (the ultimate truth) is beyond all common usage (*vyavahāra*).³⁷

Thus this non-arising also may be called the ultimate because it is conformable to the ultimate, but [it is] not in actualities (*ḍngos su*, **vastutas*). For, actually, the ultimate is beyond all discriminative thought (*spros pa*, **prapañca*).³⁸

Kamalaśīla, both in the *Bhāvanākrama* and the *Madhyamakāloka*, understands that non-arising is the concordant ultimate in the sense of *paramārthānukūla*. He distinguishes it from the non-conceptual *paramārtha*, i.e. that free from discriminative thought (*prapañca*).

The *Abhisamayālamkāra* of Haribhadra (ca. 800 CE) contains

36 *Madhyamakālamkāra*, vv. 69-70, p. CXXVI,9-16:
de phyir yang dag nyid du na// ḍngos po gang yang grub pa med//
de phyir de bzhin gshegs rnam kyis// chos rnam thams cad ma skyes gsungs// 69 //
dam pa'i don dang mthun⁽¹⁾ pa'i phyir// 'di ni dam pa'i don zhes bya//
yang dag tu na spros pa yi// tshogs rnam kun las de grol yin// 70 //
(1) Ed: 'thun.

37 *Bhāvanākrama*, p. 199,7-9:
etac ca paramārthānukūlatvād anupādah satyam ity uktam | paramārthatas tu notpādo
nāpy anupādah | tasya sarvavyavahārātītatvāt |

38 *Madhyamakāloka* (D. sa 149a5, P. sa 161b4-5):
de ltar na skye ba med pa 'di yang don dam pa dang mthun pa'i phyir don dam pa zhes
bya'i ḍngos su ni ma yin te/ ḍngos su ni don dam pa spros pa thams cad las 'das pa'i
phyir ro//

many passages parallel to those in the works of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Haribhadra's interpretation of *paramārtha* is also indebted to these teachers:

Objection: 'Ultimately' (*paramārthatas*) is a meaningless adverb. To explain, in [the statement] 'reasoning which does not falsify is ultimate', the word 'ultimate' (*paramārtha*) designates apprehension (*dhī*) produced from a three-fold inferential mark.³⁹ In this case, because this [apprehension] also is conventional, how [can it simultaneously] be ultimate? Also if entities' lack of intrinsic nature is established by means of such [apprehension], then how can [a lack of intrinsic nature] be established for that apprehension? It is not possible to establish it from that [apprehension] itself because of the contradiction of operation on itself. Nor is it from any other valid means of cognition because of the undesired consequence of infinite regress. So [a lack of intrinsic nature] is established [for everything] except that one apprehension. Therefore, the selflessness of all objects has not been proved. [Answer:] This is right. However, the apprehension in question can be ultimate because it is conformable to the ultimate which is free from all discriminative thought. And also a lack of intrinsic nature is [established] by it alone. There is no contradiction of operation on itself because the state of having no intrinsic nature is established for all phenomena universally. For, in this case, too, that apprehension is included in universal nature. For example, there being a proof for destruction concerning all phenomena by reason of their existence and so on, this does not exclude [the proof] itself. Thus it should not be criticised.⁴⁰

39 See verse 4ab of Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*. (footnote 33)

40 *Abhisamayālaṅkāralokā*, p. 636,14-26:

*nanu paramārthata iti viśeṣaṇam anarthakam | tathā hy avisamvādako nyāyah paramārtha
iti paramārthaśabdena trirūpalingajanitā buddhir abhidhīyate | tadā tasyā api
samvrtirūpatvāt katham paramārthatvam | yadi ca tadvaśād bhāvānām niḥsvabhāvatvam
vyavasthāpyate tadā tasyāś ca buddheḥ kuto vyavasthāpanīyam | na tata eva sthāpayitum
yuktam svātmani vṛttivirodhāt⁽¹⁾ | nāpi pramāṇāntarato 'navasthānaprasaṅgāt | atha tām
ekām buddhiṃ muktṅvā vyavasthāpyate | na tarhi sarvaśiṣayanairātmyaṃ pratipāditam
bhavatīti ||*

*sādhv etat | kimtu sakalaprapañcaparivarjitaparamārthasyānukūlatvād yathoktabuddheḥ
paramārthatvam | niḥsvabhāvatā 'pi ca tata eva | na ca svātmani vṛttivirodhaḥ sāmānya-
rūpeṇa sarvadharmānām niḥsvabhāvatā vyavasthāpanāt | tatra ca sāmānyalakṣaṇe
tadbuddhirūpasyāntargatatvād yathā sarvadharmeṣu sattvādhietubhyo vināśitvapratyayo
bhavan nātmānam virahayya bhavatīti acodyam ||*

(1) Ed: *svātma-nivṛtti-virodhāt* Em. *svātmani vṛttinirodhāt*. Cf. *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (p. 392,1-2): *svātmani kāritravirodhāt*.

A parallel passage is found in the *Madhyamakālaṅkārapañjikā*, ad. v. 70 (pp. 233,11-235,4) of Kamalaśīla.

Thus Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra postulate the concordant ultimate and the non-conceptual ultimate.⁴¹ The former is the ultimate where inferential reasoning operates so that it can establish non-arising. It is explained as the ultimate conformable to the ultimate (*paramāṛthānukūlaparamārtha*).

5. Atiśa's⁴² understanding of paramārtha

Atiśa is often regarded as a Prāsaṅgika by Tibetan doxographers.⁴³ After Candrakīrti, there is no other famous Indian Madhyamaka teacher who is regarded as a Prāsaṅgika except Śāntideva (ca. 685-763 CE). In Śāntideva's works, we cannot find any criticism of the Svātantrika although he seems to adhere to the *prasaṅga* method. There are hardly any clues in his works that enable us to decide that there was a dispute between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. It is, therefore, necessary to examine Atiśa's view of the two truths in order to judge whether or not Candrakīrti's view was followed by later Indian Madhyamaka teachers and if there was a controversy between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

In the *Satyadvayāvātāra*, Atiśa elucidates his view on the two

⁴¹ In addition, the anonymous author of the *Bodhisattvacaryāvātāravākyānapañjikā* may have commented on the 9-chapter version of the *Bodhisattvacaryāvātāra* from the point of view of the Svātantrika. Although he expresses no clear view concerning the use of inferential reasoning, he distinguishes two levels of *paramārtha*:

Bodhisattvacaryāvātāravākyānapañjikā, p. 58,22-24:

'on te don dam pa de ji ltar blo'i spyod yul ma yin snyam pa la/ don dam pa ni rigs pa ji lta ba bzhin du yin la/ rigs pas dpyad na dngos po gang yang ma grub ste/...

Then [if one asks] how this ultimate is not accessible to apprehension, [I answer] the ultimate is consistent with reasoning, and no entity remains established if it is examined with reasoning.

Bodhisattvacaryāvātāravākyānapañjikā, p. 59,13-16:

yang na don dam pa zhes bya ba ni / gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la/ sgro btags pa'i spros pa rnam par chad pa tsam du zad pas/ de la ni blo dang sgras ji ltar yang yul du byar med de/ dgag pa tsam ni ci yang ma yin pa'i phyir ro//

Alternatively, because the ultimate is simply the elimination of discriminative thought that is superimposed on [entities] dependent on other [entities], apprehension and words never have referent at that [ultimate].

As pointed out by Saito [1996, 1997], the anonymous commentator considers that Akṣayamati (Śāntideva?), the author of the 9-chapter version of the *Bodhisattvacaryāvātāra*, maintains conventional existence of external objects as well as self-awareness. Therefore, the Madhyamaka view expressed in the *Bodhisattvacaryāvātāravākyānapañjikā* can possibly be regarded as the 'Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka' view, in terms of its accepting external objects and self-awareness conventionally and postulating the two types of *paramārtha*.

⁴² I call the author of the *Satyadvayāvātāra*, *Bodhipathapradīpa* and the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* Atiśa in this paper, following Eimer [1977] even though I am not fully convinced by Eimer's argument.

⁴³ For a Tibetan source, see translation of ICang skya's *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa* in Lopez [1987: 260] as well as Mimaki [1982: 27-38].

truths. This work is quite concise consisting of just 29 verses. However, it contains many elements that help our understanding of later Madhyamaka thought. An examination of Atiśa's two truths theory is indispensable to clarify the distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Lindtner and Ejima have already undertaken extensive studies of this work⁴⁴ and much of following is indebted to them.

As we have seen in the previous sections, the Svātantrikas postulate the concordant ultimate. On the other hand, Atiśa explains the ultimate in verses 4-9 of the *Satyadvayāvātāra*, as follows:

The ultimate is only one. Others hold that it is twofold. How can the nature of reality (*chos nyid*, **dharmatā*), which cannot be established as anything, be two, three and so on? (v. 4)

[The ultimate] is characterised as non-arising, non-cessation and the like, according to the formula [given] by the treatises. Because of the way in which different ultimates do not exist, there is neither a subject (*chos can*, **dharmin*) nor its property (*chos nyid*, **dharma*) [for inferential reasoning]. (v. 5)

There is not any differentiation in emptiness. It can be expressed as a conventional designation that emptiness is seen if [it is seen] through cognition by way of no conceptual construct. (v. 6)

It is said in the very profound *sūtras* that the state of non-seeing is seeing the [ultimate truth]. In that [ultimate truth], there is no seeing or no seer. There is calmness without beginning or end. (v. 7)

[The truth is] devoid of existence and non-existence, free from conceptual construct, free from objects, without locus, without staying, coming or going and does not admit comparison. (v. 8)

[It is] inexpressible, invisible, unchangeable and unconditioned. If a Yogin understands it, he eliminates the obscurations of the defilements and the knowable. (v. 9)⁴⁵

44 Lindtner [1981] and Ejima [1983].

45 *Satyadvayāvātāra*, vv. 4-9, pp. 362-363:

*dam pa'i don ni gcig nyid de// gzhan dag rnam pa gnyis su 'dod//
cir yang ma grub chos nyid de// gnyis dang gsum sogs ga la 'gyur// 4 //
bstan pa'i tshig gis sbyor ba yis// skye med 'gag med sogs pas mtshon//
don dam tha dad med tshul gyis// chos can med cing chos nyid med// 5 //
stong pa nyid la tha dad nü// cung zad yod pa ma yin te//
rtog med tshul gyis rtogs pas na// stong nyid mthong zhes tha snyad gdags// 6 //
ma mthong ba nyid de mthong bar// shin tu zab pa'i mdo las gsungs//
de la mthong dang mthong byed med// thog ma tha ma med zhi ba// 7 //
dngos dang dngos med rnam par spangs// rnam par rtog med dmigs pa bral//
gnas pa med pa gnas med pa// 'gro 'ong med cing dpe dang bral// 8 //*

Concerning Atiśa's understanding of the ultimate truth, he very clearly explains in verse 4 that the ultimate is only one and in verse 8 that this ultimate is non-conceptual. This is nothing but an objection to the Svātantrika who postulates the concordant ultimate. The most fundamental difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika is whether or not they adopt inference (*anumāna*) as a means to reach the ultimate. Concerning this point, Atiśa is surely regarded as a Prāsaṅgika. His negative attitude towards the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), including inference (*anumāna*), is seen in verses 10-13:

A fool who sees this side says that Buddhists accept these two: direct perception and inference, and realise emptiness by the two. (v. 10)

[If they did,] it would follow that even outsiders and Śrāvakas understand the nature of reality (*chos nyid*, **dharmatā*), not to mention the proponents of representation[-only], and Mādhyamikas would be no different [from them]. (v. 11)

Therefore, all doctrines would also agree because they understand [the doctrines] through the valid means of knowledge. Because all reasonings are not in agreement, does the nature of reality (*chos nyid*, **dharmatā*) which is understood through the valid means of knowledge not become manifold? [In fact] direct perception and inference are unnecessary. The learned make use of [them] to refute the objection of outsiders. (vv. 12-13)⁴⁶

Atiśa here denies the view that Buddhists accept direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) to understand emptiness. He argues that if the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are perfectly reliable, everyone who resorts to them should have the same view. It is, however, not the case. He therefore denies the validity of them. Nevertheless, he does not reject them entirely. The purpose of

46

*brjod du med pa bltar med pa// 'gyur ba med pa 'dus ma byas//
rnal 'byor pa yis de rtogs na// nyon mongs shes bya 'i sgrib pa spangs// 9 //*

Satyadvayāvātāra, vv. 10-13, pp. 363-364:

*mngon sum dang ni rjes su dpag// sangs rgyas pa yis de gnyis gzung//
gnyis pos stong nyid rtogs so zhes// tshu rol mthong ba 'i rmongs pa smra// 10 //*

*mu stegs nyan thos rnams kyis kyang// chos nyid rtogs par thal bar 'gyur//
rnam rig pas lta smos ci dgos// dbu ma pa la mi mthun med// 11 //*

*des na grub mtha' thams cad kyang// tshad mas 'jal phyir mthun par 'gyur//
rtog ge thams cad mi mthun pas// tshad mas gzhal ba 'i chos nyid kyang// 12 //*

*mang po nyid du mi 'gyur ram// mngon sum rjes dpag dgos pa med//
mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa 'i phyir// mkhas pa rnams kyis byas pa yin// 13 //*

inference is confined to ‘refute the objection of outsiders’, as is seen in verses 12-13. As Ejima points out,⁴⁷ the same attitude is seen in his *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*:

Why were many treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others? The learned composed [them] to refute the objection of outsiders.⁴⁸

In this way, the purpose of composing texts concerning the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is, according to Atiśa, to refute outsiders but not to attain the ultimate truth. It seems that he mentions Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara as authors of these treatises. However, it is not clear if ‘others’ include the Svāntarikas, especially Bhāviveka. Although it is not clear if this is criticism of the Svāntarika, Atiśa’s negative attitude towards the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is evident.

He, in addition, refers to Candrakīrti in verse 15 and 19:

If one asks who understood emptiness, [I reply] Nāgārjuna, who was predicted by the Tathāgata and saw the truth of the nature of reality, and his disciple Candrakīrti. (v. 15)⁴⁹

The *ācārya* Candrakīrti says as follows:

He who does not know the distinction between the two, the conventional truth as a means and the ultimate truth as the goal, gets a bad birth because of erroneous conceptualisation. (v. 19)⁵⁰

47 Ejima [1983: 371].

48 *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* (D. khi 282b5, P. ki 326b6-7):
*chos grags chos mchog la sogs pas// gzhung mang byas pa ji lta bu//
 mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i phyir// mkhas pa rnam kyis byas pa yin//*

49 *Satyadvayāvatāra*, v. 15, p. 364:
*stong nyid gang gis rtogs she na// de bzhin gshes pas lung bstan zhing//
 chos nyid bden pa gzigs pa yi// klu sgrub slob ma zla grags yin// 15 //*

50 *Satyadvayāvatāra*, v. 19, pp. 365-366:
*slob dpon zla grags 'di skad du//
 thabs su gyur pa kun rdzob bden pa dang// thabs las byung ba don dam bden pa dag//
 gnyis po'i dbye ba gang gis mi shes pa// de dag log par rtogs pas ngan 'gror 'gro// 19 //*

Madhyamakāvatāra, v. 6:80, p. 175,3-6:
*tha snyad bden pa thabs su gyur pa dang// don dam bden pa thabs byung gyur pa ste//
 de gnyis rnam dbye gang gis mi shes pa// de ni rnam rtog log pas lam ngan zhugs//*

Quoted in the *Subhāṣītasamgraha*, p. 22,7-10:
*upāyabhūtaṃ vyavahārasatyam upeyabhūtaṃ paramārthasatyam |
 taylor vibhāgaṃ na paraiti yo vai mithyāvikalpaiḥ sa kumārgayātaḥ ||*

Thus Atiśa considers that Candrakīrti, who was Nāgārjuna's disciple, understood emptiness. Atiśa does not hold the concordant ultimate and does not adopt the valid means of knowledge (*pramāna*) including inference (*anumāna*) in order to reach emptiness. These pieces of evidence indicate that Atiśa should be classified as a Prāsaṅgika.

6. Some problems in classifying Atiśa as a Prāsaṅgika

As far as his attitude towards inferential reasoning is concerned, Atiśa should be classified as a Prāsaṅgika. However, there are some pieces of perplexing evidence which oppose this conclusion.

Atiśa quotes Bhāviveka to explain his view of the two truths in verse 14, and verse 20 is also quoted from the *Madhyamakahrdaya-kārikā*:

The *ācārya*, learned Bhavya, says that [the ultimate] cannot be understood clearly even from scriptural authority [or] by [either of] two thoughts: that with conceptual construct or without conceptual construct. (v. 14)⁵¹

Without depending on common usage (*tha snyad, vyavahāra*), the ultimate is not understood. Without a ladder of true conventions, it is impossible for a learned man to reach the top of the palace of reality. (v. 20)⁵²

51 *Satyadvayāvatāra*, v. 14, p. 364:

*lung las kyang ni gsal po ru// rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi//
shes pa gnyis kyis mi rtogs shes// slob dpon mkhas pa bha bya gsung // 14 //*

Ejima [1983: 384 (note 11) and 389 (note 65)] points out a similarity between *pāda* b and c, verse 3:285cd of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* and verse 5:6 of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.

Madhyamakahrdayakārikā, v. 3:285cd, p. 39,16:

savikalpāvikalpena jñānenāpy eṣa durdrśaḥ |

Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, v. 5:6 (D. tsha 272a6, P. tsha 342b6):

*rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi// shes 'pa gnyis kyis 'di mi rtogs//
sgra dang tshad ma 'i tha snyad dag// de don bsgom la dgos pa med//*

Lindtner [1981: 195] translates v. 14 as follows:

In tradition (*āgama*) it is clearly stated by the learned teacher (*ācārya*) Bhavya that [the absolute] cannot be understood by a discursive (*savikalpa*) or a non-discursive (*nirvikalpa*) cognition (*jñāna*).

However, verse 14 should mean that the ultimate (absolute) cannot be understood from scriptural authority (*āgama*), on the basis of its comparison with v. 5:6 in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. See also Ejima [1983: 364] and footnote 77.

52 *Satyadvayāvatāra*, v. 20, p. 366:

*tha snyad la ni ma brten par// dam pa 'i don ni rtogs mi 'gyur//
yang dag kun rdzob rnam kyis skas// med par yang dag khang chen gyi//
steng du 'gro bar byed pa ni// mkhas la rung ba ma yin no// 20 //*

Cf. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, v. 24:10ab, p. 494,12:

Although Atiśa quotes from Bhāviveka, since these are not verses that support the use of autonomous inference to prove emptiness, they may be negligible in terms of evidence to distinguish the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. Nevertheless, it is clear that he does not regard Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti as rivals who have opposing views concerning the two truths. The same is observed in Atiśa's account on his lineage in the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*. He mentions both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti as teachers in his lineage:

The learned in the continent of Jambu declare:

The noble Asaṅga explained a method of teaching. He taught that the meaning of *prajñāpāramitā* was representation-only (**viññaptimātra*).

At present, the *guru* Svarnadvīpa and the *guru* Śānti pa (Ratnākaraśānti) think in this way.

It is taught in the lineage of other learned in this way:

The *ācārya* Nāgārjuna explained the essence of teaching. He understood that the meaning of *prajñāpāramitā* was the meaning of the great Madhyamaka, which transcends existence and non-existence.

At present, the *guru* Bodhibhadra and the reverend Kusulu pa think in this way.

The nectar of the venerable noble Nāgārjuna had satisfied Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhavya and Śāntideva, down to Bodhibhadra. A little has been sprinkled even on me.⁵³

vyavahāram anāśrītya paramārtho na deśyate |
Abhisamayālamkāraḥ, p. 169,19-20:

tathyasamvṛtisopānam antareṇa vipaścitaḥ |
tattvaprāsādaśikharārohaṇam na hi yujyate |

Madhyamakahrdayakārikā, v. 3:12, p. 8,11-12:

tattvaprāsādaśikharārohaṇam na hi yujyate |
tathyasamvṛtisopānam antareṇa yatas tataḥ ||

See Ejima [1983: 385 (note 18) and 389 (note 65)].

53 *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* (D. 280a4-7, P. ki 323b4-8):

'dza⁽¹⁾ mbu'i gling na mkhas ba dag ni 'di skad du/ 'phags pa thogs med gyis⁽²⁾ bstan pa'i rnam grangs bshad pa/ des shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don rnam par rig pa tsam du gsungs shing/ da ltar bla ma su wa rṇṇa dw'i pa dang/ bla ma sh'an ti pa yang de ltar dgongs so//

slob dpon klu sgrub kyis ni bstan pa'i snying po bshad de/ des shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don yod pa dang med pa las 'das pa'i dbu ma chen po'i don thugs su chud cing/ mkhas pa gzhan gyi rgyud la yang de ltar gsungs so// de ltar bla ma byang chub bzang po dang/ rje btsun ku su lu pa yang de ltar dgongs so//

'phags pa klu sgrub zhal gyi bdud rtsi des// a'a rya de ba zla grags bha bya dang//

zhi ba'i lha dang byang chub bzang po'i bar// tshim par gyur ba bdag la'ang cung zhi'g 'thor//

(1) D: 'dza, P: dza. (2) D:gyis, P: kyi.

Here Atiśa clearly shows that both Bhavya (Bhāviveka) and Candrakīrti are included in his lineage. It is also known that Bodhibhadra is his teacher. Moreover, when Atiśa explains the words in verse 51,⁵⁴ he states as follows:

The very [meaning of] ‘*mūla*’ should be explained. The ‘*Mūlamadhyamaka*’ means the root (*mūla*) of wisdom of the Madhyamaka. ‘And so forth’ refers to the *Akutobhayā*, the *Yuktiśaṣṭikā*, the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, the *Śūnyatāsaptati*, the *Ratnāvalī*, the *Mahāyānaviṃśikā*, the *Akṣaraśataka*, the *Śālistambavṛtti* and so forth.⁵⁵ ‘And so forth’ also refers to the teaching written by the true disciples of the noble *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna], the reverend Āryadeva, the *ācārya* Candrakīrti, the *ācārya* Bhavya Bhāviveka (*bha bya snang bral*), the *ācārya* Śāntideva and so forth. And the reverend Āryadeva wrote the *Mahāmadhyamakavaidalya*, the *Hastavāla*, the *Āṅgulikalpavyākhyāna*, the *Jñānasārasamuccaya* and so forth. The *ācārya* Candrakīrti wrote the *Madhyamakāvātāra*, the *Yuktiśaṣṭikāvṛtti*, the *Madhyamaka Pañcaskandha* [*prakaraṇa*], the *Prasannapadā* and so forth. The *ācārya* Bhavya Bhāviveka (*bha bya snang bral*) wrote the *Madhyamaka Tarkajvālā*, the *Prajñāpradīpa* and so forth.⁵⁶

54 *Bodhipathapradīpa*, v. 51 (D. khi 240a7, P. ki 276b7-8):
In the reasoning of *Śūnyatāsaptati* and the *Mūlamadhyamaka* and so forth,
the proof that the intrinsic nature of entities is empty is mentioned.

*stong nyid bdun bcu'i rigs pa dang// dbu ma rtsa ba sogs las kyang//
dngos po rnam kyī rang bzhin ni⁽¹⁾ // stong pa nyid du⁽²⁾ grub bshad pa//*

(1) D: ni, P: gyi (2) D: du, P: ni.

Lindtner [1981: 209] takes *rigs pa* as *Yukti*[*śaṣṭikākārikā*].

55 On these texts ascribed to Nāgārjuna, see Lindtner [1981: 212, note 12].

56 *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* (D. khi 280b2-6 P. ki 324a4-b1):

*rtsa ba nyid bshad par bya ste/ dbu ma'i rtsa ba zhes bya ba ni dbu ma'i rtsa ba shes rab
bo//*

*sogs zhes pas ni ga las⁽¹⁾ 'jigs med dang/ rigs pa drug cu pa dang/ rtsod pa bzlog⁽²⁾
pa dang/ stong pa nyid bdun cu pa dang/ rin po che'i phreng ba dang/ theg pa cen po nyi
shu pa dang/ tshig brgya pa dang/ sa'a⁽³⁾ lu ljang pa'i 'grel pa la sogs pa'o//*

*yang na sogs zhes pa ni slob dpon 'phags pa'i dngos kyī slob ma rje btsun a'a rya de
ba dang/ slob dpon zla grags dang/ slob dpon bha bya snang bral dang/ slob dpon zhi
ba'i lha la sogs pas mdzad pa'i bstan bcos te/ de yang rje btsun a'a rya de bas ni dbu ma
rnam par 'thag pa chen po dang/ lag pa'i tshad dang/ sor mo lta bu'i bshad pa dang/ ye
shes snyin po kun las btus pa la sogs pa mdzad do//*

*slob dpon zla grags kyis/ dbu ma la 'jug pa dang/ rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa dang/
dbu ma phung po lnga pa dang/ tshig don gsal ba la sogs pa mdzad do//*

*slob dpon bha bya snang bral gyis⁽⁴⁾ dbu ma rtog ge 'bar ba dang/ shes rab sgron
ma⁽⁵⁾ la sogs pa mdzad do//*

(1) D: las, P: la. (2) D: bzlog, P: zlog. (3) D: sa'a, P: sa. (4) D: snang bral gyis, P: snang.
(5) D: ma, P: me.

In these two passages above, Atiśa does not mention any difference in their position, and shows that Bhavya Bhāviveka is in his lineage together with Candrakīrti.⁵⁷ Additionally, Bodhibhadra, whom Atiśa mentions as his teacher, does not mention Candrakīrti when he classifies the Mādhyamikas into the externalists and the internalists in the *Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana*.⁵⁸ According to Atiśa, Bodhibhadra is in the lineage that descended from Nāgārjuna through Candrakīrti to Atiśa himself. If we assume that Atiśa adopts the Prāsaṅgika view taught by Bodhibhadra, it is indeed strange that Bodhibhadra, whose teaching Atiśa follows, mentions Bhavya (Bhāviveka) as the representative figure of the externalist Mādhyamikas, but not Candrakīrti.

Lastly and most significantly, even though Atiśa was involved in translation of 104 texts into Tibetan, together with Tibetan translators, we find only two works of Candrakīrti among them: the *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* and the *Triśaraṇasaptati*,⁵⁹ which are not currently regarded as his major works. On the other hand, he took part in translation of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, a genuine work of Bhāviveka, and its commentary, *Tarkajvālā*, as well as the *Madhyamakārthasamgraha* and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, which are ascribed to him but not currently regarded as his genuine works. This is very strange if he is a Prāsaṅgika, who is supposed to follow Candrakīrti rather than Bhāviveka. In this way, while it seems that he rejects the use of the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), including inference, in order to reach the ultimate truth, and therefore is regarded as a Prāsaṅgika, some pieces of evidence show that he does not follow Candrakīrti but espouses Bhāviveka.

57 This is one of the reasons why Dreyfus [2003: 2-3] maintains the non-Indian provenance of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction. See footnote 2.

58 *Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana*, ad v. 28, p. 206,27-30 (D. tsha 44a7-b1, P. tsha 51b7-8):
*'dir dbu ma pa de dag kyang kun rdzob rnam par gzhag pa gnyis te/ snang ba la mi 'jal
ba ni slob dpon bha bya la sogs pa dang/ snang ba'i dngos po ji lta ba ma yin gyi nang gi
shes pa kho na sna tshogs su snang bar smra ba slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho la sogs pa'o//*

Here, also these Mādhyamikas have two ways of establishing the conventional. Those who do not consider appearance are Bhavya (Bhāviveka) and others, and those who assert that things which appear are not as they are [thought to be external], but only internal cognition appears in various ways are Śāntaraksita and others.

Thus, Bodhibhadra names Śāntaraksita and Bhavya (Bhāviveka) as internalist and externalist Mādhyamikas respectively. This may be based on Śāntaraksita's distinction. See footnote 14.

59 The *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D. 3866, P. 5267) and the *Triśaraṇasaptati* (D. 3971, P. 5366). Concerning Candrakīrti's works, see Ruegg [1981: 111 and 105]. He regards the *Triśaraṇasaptati* as a work of the Vajrayānist Candrakīrti.

7. Atiśa's understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage

Since Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti are the representatives of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika respectively, it seems irrational for Atiśa to espouse Bhāviveka while maintaining the Prāsaṅgika view. It is Atiśa's *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa Madhyamakopadeśa* which holds the key to a solution. According to Miyazaki's study, he classifies Buddhist teachers into five exoteric and five esoteric branches according to their works. His classification of the five exoteric branches and distribution of Indian teachers are as follows:

The former *ācāryas* wrote their respective views:

(1) The *ācāryas* Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and others wrote texts on the valid means of knowledge (*tshad ma*, **pramāṇa*) in detail.

(2) The *ācāryas* Dharmatrāta, Buddhadeva, Vasumitra, Ghoṣaka, Manojña (?) and others wrote scriptural authorities (**āgama*) of the Śrāvaka Vaibhāṣika in detail.

(3) The *ācāryas* Śubhagupta, Dharmottara, the early Vasubandhu and others wrote texts of the Śrāvaka Sautrāntika in detail.

(4) The *ācāryas* Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Prajñākaragupta, Kaliṅka (?), Devendrabuddhi, the *upāsaka guru* Asvabhāva and others wrote texts of the Sākāra and the Nirākāra [Yogācāra] in detail.

(5-A) The *ācāryas* Bhavya (Bhāviveka), Buddhapālita, Devaśarman, Avalokitavrata, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and others wrote texts of the Madhyamaka in detail.

(5-B) The *ācārya* Candragomin, the *ācārya* Śūra, the *ācārya* Sāgaramegha, the *ācārya* Śāntideva, the *ācārya* Luntaka (?) and others wrote, for novices just after generation of mind (**cittopāda*), texts of very extensive practice beginning from four infinities (**apramāṇa*) and the four things of attraction (**saṃgrahavastu*), up to *prajñāpāramitā* in detail.

(5-C) Those texts written by the five *ācāryas*, the *ācārya* noble Nāgārjuna, the *ācārya* Āryadeva, the *ācārya* Maticitra, the *ācārya* Kambala and the *ācārya* Candrakīrti, are the foundation (*phyi mo*, **mātrikā*) of all the Madhyamaka texts. Because they are the roots (*rtsa ba*, **mūla*) of all the Madhyamaka texts, there is no rival.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa*, pp. 19-20 (D. ki 112b3-113a1, P. ha 126a2-b2):
sngon gyi slob dpon rnam kyis phyogs re re mdzad de/

Atiśa thus distinguishes teachers of exoteric Buddhism into five: (1) the authors of texts on the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*, *tshad ma*), (2) the authors of *āgamas* of the Śrāvaka Vaibhāṣika (*nyan thos bye brag tu smra pa*), (3) the authors of texts of the Śrāvaka Sautrāntika (*nyan thos mdo sde pa*), (4) the authors of texts of the Sākāra (*rnam bcas*) and the Nirākāra (*rnam med*) Yogācāra and (5) the authors of texts of the Madhyamaka. Then the authors of the Madhyamaka texts are again divided into three. (A) Bhavya, Buddhapālita, Devaśarman, Avalokitavrata, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla are classified under the authors of texts of the Madhyamaka (*dBu ma*). (B) Candragomin, Śūra, Sāgaramegha, Śāntideva and Luntaka are regarded as the authors of texts of practice. (C) Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maticitra, Kambala and Candrakīrti are considered the authors of the root texts of all the Madhyamaka texts.

Unfortunately, Atiśa does not mention what they postulate and it is not clear what is the criterion of this classification. This is neither classification of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika nor that of the externalist and the internalist. However, if we pay attention to the Madhyamaka (A) and (C), we realise some important points. The texts of the five Madhyamaka teachers in (C) are explained to be the foundation (*phyi mo*) or the roots (*mūla*, *rtsa ba*) of all the Madhyamaka texts. The term *phyi mo* is used in the classification of

slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po dang/ dha rma k'i rti la sogs pas tshad ma'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do//

slob dpon chos skyob dang/ slob dpon sangs rgyas lha dang/ dbyig bshes dang/ dbyangs sgrogs dang/ yid 'ong la sogs pas nyan thos bye brag tu smra ba'i lung rgyas par mdzad do//

slob dpon dge bsrungs dang/ chos mchog dang/ dbyig gnyen snga ma la sogs pas nyan thos mdo sde pa'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do//

slob dpon thogs med dang/ dbyig gnyen dang/ blo brtan dang/ shes rab 'byung gnas sbas pa dang/ ka li ngka dang/ lha dbang blo dang/ dge bsnyen bitsun pa ngo bo nyid med pa la sogs pas ni rnam bcas rnam med kyi gzhung rgyas par mdzad do//

slob dpon bha bya dang/ bu ddha p'a li ta dang/ de ba shar ma dang/ spyan ras gzig brtul zhugs dang/ sh'a nta ra kshi ta dang/ ka ma la sh'i la la sogs pas ni dbu ma'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do//

slob dpon tsa ndra go mi dang/ slob dpon dpa' bo dang/ slob dpon rgya mtsho sprin dang/ slob dpon sh'a nta de ba dang/ slob dpon lu nta ka la sogs pas sems bskyed ma thag pa las dang po pa'i phyr tshad med pa bzhi dang/ bsdu ba'i dangos po bzhi dang/ pha rol tu phyin pa la sogs pa ji ltar nyams su blang ba'i spyod pa rgya chen po'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do//

slob dpon 'phags pa klu sgrub dang/ slob dpon a'a rya de ba dang/ slob dpon ma ti tsi tra dang/ slob dpon ka mba la dang/ slob dpon zla ba grags pa dang/ slob dpon lnga bos mdzad pa'i dbu ma'i gzhung de dag ni dbu ma'i gzhung thams cad kyi phyi mo yin no// dbu ma'i gzhung thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin pas 'gran zla med pa yin no//

Concerning the Sanskrit names of teachers, I follow Miyazaki [1993]. He explains that Candrakīrti is classified into the *mūla* authors because Atiśa considers Tantrism more important as he translates a work of Tantrist Candrakīrti. In my opinion, however, Atiśa just thought Candrakīrti was a predecessor of Bhāviveka.

the Madhyamaka of the fundamental texts (*gzhung phyi mo'i dbu ma pa*) and the partisan Madhyamaka (*phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma pa*) by Tsong kha pa, for example.⁶¹ If Atiśa and Tsong kha pa use the term in the same way, those teachers in (A) can be regarded as the partisan Mādhyamikas. Bhāviveka in the *Prajñāpradīpa* criticises Buddha-pālita. Bodhibhadra, Atiśa's teacher, names Śāntarakṣita and Bhavya as respective representatives of the internalist Mādhyamikas and the externalist Mādhyamikas.⁶² Avalokitavrata and Devaśarman are considered by Atiśa the two commentators on Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* in the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*.⁶³ Kamalaśīla is a disciple of Śāntarakṣita. In this way, it is likely that these teachers were thought to have had different views in some way and therefore to be partisan. On the other hand, the five teachers who are the authors of the root texts are problematic. It is considered that at the time of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, the Mādhyamikas did not have different doctrinal views. However, Candrakīrti is regarded as a Prāsaṅgika because he criticised Bhāviveka's usage of inference. Moreover, Kambala is sometimes regarded as a Nirākāra-Cittamātra and sometimes classified as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.⁶⁴

Now we realise a significant point in common to the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* and the *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa*. In the former, Atiśa places Candrakīrti before Bhavya (Bhāviveka) in the passages of the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*, which are quoted in the previous section. Assuming that this is described in a chronological order, Candrakīrti was considered earlier than Bhavya (Bhāviveka). In this passage of the *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa*, Candrakīrti is regarded as one of the authors of the *mūla* Madhyamaka texts, and Bhavya (Bhāviveka) as that of (partisan) Madhyamaka texts.

61 *Lam rim chen mo*, p. 571,17-19.

62 See footnote 58.

63 *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* (D. khi 281a1-2, P. ki 324b3-4):
*de la shes rab sgron ma la t'i ka chen po gnyis yod de/ a'a ts'a rya spyen ras gzigs
 brtul⁽¹⁾ zhugs kyis mdzad pa dang/ a'a ts'a rya de ba sha rmas mdzad pa'i dbu ma dkar
 po 'char ba'o//*
 (1) D: brtul, P: rtul.

64 See Lindtner [1985: 111-112]. Kurihara [1991: 42] points out that the *Grub mtha' chen mo*, the *ICan skya grub mtha'*, the *Grub mtha' rin chen phreng ba* and the *Grub mtha'shel gyi me long* classify Kambala as a Nirākāra-Mādhyamika.

8. *Bhavya's Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*

The reason why Atiśa has this strange understanding of his lineage rests in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* of Bhavya.⁶⁵ Lindtner and Ejima have already pointed out the close relationship between the *Satyadvayāvātāra* of Atiśa and the first chapter of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.⁶⁶ It is possible to explain the problems concerning Atiśa's position on the basis of his dependence on the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. Candrakīrti is referred to in this text many times. Bhavya quotes verse 6:80 of the *Madhyamakāvātāra*,⁶⁷ which is also quoted in the *Satyadvayāvātāra*.⁶⁸ He, moreover, mentions the

65 Through the examination of quotations, Yamaguchi [1943] concludes that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* is not a genuine work of Bhāviveka. I henceforth provisionally call the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* Bhavya in order to distinguish him from Bhāviveka, the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, following the proposal of Ejima [1990].

66 See Ejima [1983] and Lindtner [1981].

67 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D. tsha 261a2-3, P. tsha 328a5). Another significant example is a quotation of verses 6:4-5 from the *Madhyamakāvātāra* (p. 78, 2-13). The verses of Candrakīrti in Tibetan read as follows:

so so skye bo'i dus na'ang stong pa nyid thos nas//
nang du rab tu dga' ba yang dang yang du 'byung//
rab tu dga' ba las byung mchi mas mig brlan zhing//
lus kyi ba spu ldang bar gyur ba gang yin pa// 6:4 //
de la rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas blo yi sa bon yod//
de nyid nye bar bstan pa'i snod ni de yin te//
de la dam pa'i don gyi bden pa bstan par bya//
de la de yi rjes su 'gro ba'i yon tan 'byung// 6:5 //

The original Sanskrit is found in the *Subhāsitasaṅgraha*, p. 13,18-25:

pr̥tagjanatve 'pi niśamya sūnyatām pramodam antar labhate muhur muhuḥ |
prasādajāsrāvanipātalocanaḥ tanūruhotphullatanuś ca jāyate ||
yat tasya sambodhidhiyo 'sti bījāṃ tattvopadeśasya ca bhājanam saḥ |
ākhyeyam asmai paramārthasatyam tadanvayās tasya guṇā bhavanti ||

These verses are quoted in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D. tsha 277b5-6, P. tsha 349b7-8), as follows:

so so skye bo'i dus na stong nyid thos⁽¹⁾// nang gi dga' ba yang dang yang ni 'byung//
dga' ba las byung mig ni mas gang// lus kyi ba spu ldang ba'ang skye bar 'gyur//
gang yin de la byang chub sa bon yod// don mchi dam bden pa de la bstan par bya//
de rtogs⁽²⁾ pa yi yon tan de las 'byung//

(1) D: thos, P: thob. (2) D: rtogs, P: rtog.

They are quite different from the Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakāvātāra* shown above. The quotation of the same verses is found in the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* of Atiśa (D. khi 269a7-b1, P. ki 310b8-311a1):

so so skye bo'i dus na stong nyid thos// nang gi dga' ba yang dang yang du 'byung//
dga' ba las byung mig ni mchi mas gang// lus kyi spu ldang ba yang skye bar 'gyur//
gang yin de la byang chub sa bon yod// don dam bden pa de la bstan par bya//
der rtogs pa yi yon tan de las 'byung//

This difference may have been caused in the process of translation and the original Sanskrit may have been the same. However, lack of *pāda* b in verse 6:5 quoted in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* seems to suggest more relation between the two texts. It may be, on the other hand, nothing significant if we consider the fact that Atiśa was involved in translation of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* into Tibetan.

68 Verse 19 of the *Satyadvayāvātāra*. See footnote 50.

*Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*⁶⁹ of Candrakīrti by name and quotes on four occasions from the *Trīśaraṇasaptati*⁷⁰ of Candrakīrti. They are the only works of Candrakīrti translated into Tibetan by Atīśa.⁷¹ In addition to this, the five *mūla* teachers Atīśa mentions in the *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāta* are all found in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. Maticitra is mentioned by name in the seventh chapter⁷² and verse 13 of Kambala's *Ālokamālā* is quoted in the fifth chapter.⁷³ It is evident that Atīśa regards Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maticitra, Kambala and Candrakīrti, who are found in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* of Bhavya, as the authors of the *mūla* Madhyamaka texts, and seemingly considers that the Madhyamaka was divided into different branches after Bhavya. Atīśa's dependence on the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* can also be known from the history of his translation. Among the works ascribed to Bhavya or Bhāviveka whose translation Atīśa participated in, the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* was the first one translated while Atīśa was still in India.⁷⁴

Therefore, it is almost certain that Atīśa has the later Bhavya in mind when he mentions Bhavya Bhāviveka in the *Bodhimārga-pradīpapañjikā* even though it seems that Atīśa does not realise that Bhāviveka, the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Madhyamaka-hṛdayakārikā*, and Bhavya, who wrote the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, are not identical. In this case, it is possible that Bhāviveka's view which Atīśa assumes and Bhāviveka's view that we know as Svātantrika are not the same. Then reference to Bhāviveka by Atīśa probably amounts to little regarding the classification of Atīśa as a Prāsaṅgika.⁷⁵ On the other hand, it should be noted that Atīśa may not have been very interested in Candrakīrti himself. It is probably

69 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D. tsha 266b4, P. tsha 335b3).

70 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D. tsha 284b6, P. tsha 327b2-3 [=v. 3 of the *Trīśaraṇasaptati*], D. 272a7-b1, 275b6, P. 342b5, 347a6 [=v. 28] and D. 284b6, P. 359a3 [=v. 4]). See Lindtner [1982: 175].

71 Inaba [1966: 23 and 31].

72 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D. tsha 282a2, P. tsha 355b2). This is pointed out by Yamaguchi [1943: 87].

73 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D. tsha 272b4-5, P. tsha 343a2-3). This is pointed out by Lindtner [1982: 175]. Bhavya may quote v. 176 of the *Ālokamālā*. See Lindtner [1981: 203 note 45].

74 According to its colophon, the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* was translated in Somapri. See Inaba [1966: 24-33].

75 Even if we take this position and assume that Atīśa considers that the final position of Bhavya/Bhāviveka is expressed in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, it is not clear how he reconciled two different views of Bhavya and Bhāviveka, whom he does not distinguish.

because Bhavya mentioned the *Triśaraṇasaptati* and recommended reading the *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* that Atiśa translated these works of Candrakīrti into Tibetan. If he considered that Candrakīrti's works were more important than Bhāviveka's, he would have translated other works of Candrakīrti, especially the *Madhyamakāvatāra* and the *Prasannapadā* into Tibetan although we have to note that the *Triśaraṇasaptati* and the *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* as well as the *Madhyamakāvatāra* are considered Candrakīrti's own works that are not commentaries on his predecessors'.⁷⁶

Atiśa's dependence on Bhavya is again ascertained from a similar attitude towards inferential reasoning and the understanding of *paramārtha*. As Ejima points out, in the fifth chapter of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Bhavya states as follows:

This [ultimate truth] is not understood by two cognitions: that with conceptual construct and that without conceptual construct. The common usage (*tha snyad*, **vyavahāra*) of verbal authority (*sgra*, **śabda*) and the valid means of knowledge (*tshad ma*, **pramāṇa*) are not necessary for cultivation towards the goal.⁷⁷

On the occasions when one refutes the objection of outsiders and a treatise is large, verbal authority and the valid means of knowledge should be mentioned, as written by previous teachers.⁷⁸

In the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, it is explained that verbal authority (*śabda*) and the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are not necessary for cultivation of reality and are only used to refute outsiders. In short, Bhavya accepts them conventionally and denies their validity ultimately. Atiśa probably holds the same view in the *Satyadvayāvatāra* and the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*. As we have

⁷⁶ Therefore it is also possible that Indian teachers at Atiśa's time, unlike modern scholars, considered the *Triśaraṇasaptati* and the *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* were the main works of Candrakīrti.

⁷⁷ *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D. tsha 272a6, P. tsha 342b6):
rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi// shes pa gnyis kyis 'di mi rtogs//
sgra dang tshad ma'i tha snyad dag// de don bsgom la dgos pa med//

See footnote 51.

⁷⁸ *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D. tsha 272b1-2, P. tsha 342b6-7):
pha rol rgol ba bzlog pa dang// bstan bcos chen po'i dus dag tu//
sngon gyi mkhas pas bkod pa bzhin// sgra dang tshad ma'ang smra bya//

See v. 13 of the *Satyadvayāvatāra* of Atiśa in footnote 46.

seen above, he states in the latter, as follows:

Why were many treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others? The learned composed [them] to refute the objection of outsiders.⁷⁹

In this verse, Atiśa mentions Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. The phrase ‘verbal authority and the valid means of knowledge’ that Bhavya mentions are replaced by ‘many treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others’ in the *Bodhimārgapradīpa-pañjikā* of Atiśa. Ejima understands that Atiśa here criticises Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. However he does not consider that ‘others’ include Bhāviveka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntaraṣita, Kamalaśīla and Śrīgupta, who accept the concordant ultimate.⁸⁰ As the reason for this, Ejima points out the fact that when Atiśa gives the four kinds of reasoning to prove lack of intrinsic nature, he accepts the reasoning of Śāntaraṣita and Śrīgupta.⁸¹ Nevertheless this is not tenable if Atiśa here follows Bhavya because we find a similar expression again in the seventh chapter of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*:

On occasions when one refutes the objections of outsiders, a large treatise is written and a large dispute should happen, the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning should be mentioned.⁸²

In this verse, instead of ‘verbal authority and the valid means of knowledge’ or ‘many treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others’, ‘the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning’ (*rigs pa'i dbu ma'i gzhung*) are mentioned. Again, they are not regarded as an effective means to reach the ultimate truth, but as a means to refute outsiders and so forth. Even though Bhavya does not mention who the authors of these texts are, it is likely that they are the Svātantrikas.⁸³ Therefore if Atiśa expresses the same view in the *Bodhimārga-*

79 See footnote 48

80 Ejima [1983: 371-372].

81 This is the reasoning of ‘lack of one intrinsic nature and many’. See Tillemans [1984: 361 and 371 note 16] and Lindtner [1981: 209].

82 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D. tsha 281a3, P. tsha 354a5-6):
pha rol rgol ba bzlag pa dang// bstan bcos chen po'i gzhung dang ni//
rtsod pa chen po byung dus su// rigs pa'i dbu ma'i gzhung smra bya//

83 This may possibly be the first reference to the Svātantrika made by a Prāsaṅgika after Candrakīrti. However, it should be noted that what Bhavya mentions here is not a person with a certain view but texts that deal with a certain topic.

pradīpapañjikā, he may include the Mādhyamikas who wrote the texts concerning reasoning in 'others'. It should also be pointed out that Bhavya does not necessarily criticise the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning in this verse. On the contrary, this verse should be understood as his acceptance of these texts in conventional usage. Bhavya and Atiśa do not reject the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning or the treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others, but criticise those who consider that reasoning in these texts is valid to attain the ultimate truth.

In the *Madhyamakaratanpradīpa*, thus the valid means of knowledge and reasoning are given only a low position in the conventional world. In addition to this, Bhavya's definitions of the ultimate truth lack the most important mark of the Svātantrika:

Artha [of *paramārtha*] means what is to be examined and to be grasped. *Parama* is supreme. Alternatively [*paramārtha* means] (1) the ultimate object because it is the object and is ultimate. (*karmadhāraya* compound) Alternatively [*paramārtha* means] (2) the object of the ultimate. It is the object of the ultimate because it is the object of the ultimate wisdom. (*tatpuruṣa* compound) The truth does not falsify.⁸⁴

These interpretations of the ultimate (*paramārtha*) are similar to those in the *Tarkajvālā*, except that there is no interpretation as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, which is a sign of the Svātantrika interpretation of the ultimate truth. This implies that Bhavya composed a treatise based on Bhāviveka's works but eliminated the Svātantrika elements. It is therefore appropriate to regard Bhavya, the author of the *Madhyamakaratanpradīpa*, as a Prāsaṅgika in that he does not accept the concordant ultimate. It is also conceivable that it is absolutely necessary for Bhavya to admit that 'the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning' should be mentioned when one refutes outsiders in order to keep consistency with Bhāviveka's works, to a certain extent, because while in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, inference is positively employed, the *Madhyamakaratanpradīpa*,

⁸⁴ *Madhyamakaratanpradīpa* (D. tsha 260b6-7, P. tsha 327b8-328a1):
don zhes bya ba ni btag par bya ba dang/ go bar bya ba'o// dam pa ni mchog go/ yang na don yang yin la/ dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa'o// yang na dam pa'i don de ye shes dam pa'i don yin pas na dam pa'i don no// bden pa ni mi bslu ba'o//

Compare this with the *Tarkajvālā* in footnote 28.

which is supposed to be composed by the same author, is written from the point of the view of the Prāsaṅgika

Thus Atiśa's understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage is very strange at a glance, but it can be explained clearly depending on the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. It is evident that he is a Prāsaṅgika but follows Bhavya. Here being a Prāsaṅgika does not necessarily mean to be a follower of Candrakīrti's view. Rather, it should be defined as a Mādhyamika who does not postulate the concordant ultimate and accepts the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) including inference (*anumāna*) only for conventional purposes, such as the refutation of outsiders.

9. Conclusion

To conclude, Atiśa considers that Bhavya (Bhāviveka) and Candrakīrti belong to the lineage that descends from Nāgārjuna to Atiśa himself. However, this does not mean that there was no distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in his period. His attitude towards inferential reasoning is surely regarded as that of the Prāsaṅgika, and is based on the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* of Bhavya.

The history of Indian Madhyamaka bifurcation is more complicated than the Tibetan doxographers show. In the middle period, while Candrakīrti was not recognised, Bhāviveka appears frequently in the history. After the tenth century CE, on the other hand, the trace of the externalist Svātantrika-Madhyamaka is hardly found and Candrakīrti reappears in the history. It is clear that there was a shift in Madhyamaka history around the ninth-tenth century CE. As far as I know, the earliest text that mentions Candrakīrti and the Prāsaṅgika view is the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (ca. late ninth-tenth century CE), which is ascribed to Bhavya (Bhāviveka). Here we can see an attempt to integrate Bhāviveka and the Prāsaṅgika view. Therefore it is likely that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* was closely related to this shift.

According to the examination of Atiśa's works, the distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika did not exist between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. In Atiśa's time, it probably existed between the internalist Mādhyamikas, who are generally called the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas, and the externalist Mādhyamikas who

maintained the conventional existence of external objects.⁸⁵ This is one of the reasons why it is difficult for us to find the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction in Indian sources after Candrakīrti.

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⁸⁵ It is, however, not clear if this understanding of the distinction between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika was widely shared by other Indian Mādhyamikas. It seems that both Jayānanda, the author of the *Madhyamakāvatāratīkā*, and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, who translated Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* and *Prasannapadā* into Tibetan, are related to Kashmir. The latter is known for the earliest known account of *rang rgyud* and *thal 'gyur* used in opposition. (See Mimaki [1982: 45, note 110].) Therefore it is possible that in Kashmir there was a tradition of Prāsaṅgika different from Atiśa's.

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