

THE THEORY OF TRUTH IN THE CLASSICAL NYĀYA SYSTEM : ON THE CONDITION OF *PRAVR̥TTI* AND THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION*

Taisei SHIDA

I. INTRODUCTION

From ancient times philosophers, both Eastern and Western, have formed the theory of how to determine whether a judgment or rather an instance of cognition (henceforth, simply “a cognition”) is valid or invalid. In Indian philosophy, this topic is discussed within the framework of the Theory of Truth (*prāmāṇyavāda*).¹ In the history of Indian thought, the *codanā* section of Kumārila’s *Ślokavārttika* (ca. 7 C.) probably includes the earliest extant text which systematically treats with the Theory of Truth in a comprehensive manner. In the Classical Nyāya system, this theory is developed primarily in commenting on the opening words of Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāyabhāṣya* (ca. 5 C.).² Even before Kumārila, Uddyotakara (ca. 6-7 C.) had already discussed the matter, but not in such a general and elaborate way as Kumārila.³

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1 For example, Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (*TC*) has a section entitled *prāmāṇyavāda* which consists of the three division in the following order: (1) whether the justifying process of a cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic (*jñaptivāda*), (2) whether the validity and invalidity is internal or adventitious at the time of arising of a cognition (*utpattivāda*), (3) what the definition of a valid cognition (*pramālakṣaṇa*) is. The “Theory of Truth” as exemplified in the *TC*, if not in such a full form or if not so designated, seems to date back to much earlier periods. In this paper when I use the term “*prāmāṇyavāda*”, I mainly refer to the first issue, i.e., the problem of how to justify the validity of a cognition.

2 Although Jayanta expounds this argument in his commentary on *NS* 1.1.7, he positively quotes the opening words of the *NBh* there more than once. Cf. *NM* I pp. 446,6-11, 450,8-11.

3 Even if one adopts the limited sense of the term “*prāmāṇyavāda*” in which merely the issue of justification (*jñaptivāda*) is meant, it is inappropriate to apply it to Uddyotakara’s argument on the opening words of the *NBh*, because his argument is still too primitive as compared with relevant discussions of later times as found in the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

In contrast to the Mīmāṃsakas, who advocate the Intrinsic Theory of Truth (*svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*) and claim that every cognition is in principle valid and requires no positive justification, the Naiyāyikas advocate that the validity is not self-evident and that every cognition is to be justified extrinsically. As for the criteria of justification, they mainly appeal to pragmatic considerations.⁴

In order to understand the development of Naiyāyikas' *prāmāṇyavāda*, it is essential to clarify how they linked their idea of undertaking an action (*pravṛtti*) with the discussion of ascertaining the validity of a cognition. One of the basic questions for them, it seems, was, "Can we determine whether or not a given cognition is valid before we commence an action based on it?" This question is especially significant when they try to justify the cognition gained from (i.e., of the meaning of) Vedic statements regarding rituals which should lead to heaven according to the Brahmanical tradition to which Naiyāyikas also belong. Here it is impossible in principle for us to turn to an empirical means of justifying the Vedic statements since we cannot experience the fruit of heaven in this life.

In the present paper I try to throw new light on the historical development of the Extrinsic Theory of Truth (*parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*) of the Classical Nyāya System, especially by focusing on the linkage between following two issues: (i) the basis or the condition of *pravṛtti* (undertaking of an action) and (ii) the means of justifying a cognition. At the same time, I will also examine Uddyotakara's relevant arguments as a primitive precursor of the *prāmāṇyavāda*, because it seems quite possible that his arguments served as a sort of foundation for the later formulation of their *prāmāṇyavāda*.

⁴ From the viewpoint of comparative philosophy, Tanizawa [2000] characterizes the Naiyāyikas' 'Extrinsic Theory of Truth (*parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*)' as being one of Foundationalism. Foundationalists are those who try to justify cognition empirically until they arrive at the terminal beliefs that do not owe their credibility to anything else. Against the Naiyāyikas, opponents (as represented by Kumāṛila and others) pose a question concerning 'the problem of infinite regress in the process of justification': If another cognition (K2) were required in order to justify a relevant cognition (K1), then the validity of K2, which justifies K1, would also require to be justified. Thus the Naiyāyikas could not avoid the regress problem inasmuch as they resort to empirical foundationalism. In a separate paper (Shida [2002]), I have already discussed how Jayanta and Vācaspati respectively solve the epistemic regress problem which is fundamental for foundationalists.

II. THE PROBLEM

The Naiyāyikas' *prāmāṇyavāda* may be considered to be rooted in the opening words of the *NBh*. There, Vātsyāyana seems to make the following two assertions:⁵

- (a) Labelling the cognition based on a *pramāṇa* (valid means of cognition) as A and the effectiveness of a *pravṛtti* as B, when there is A there is B, and when there is not A there is not B.
- (b) An agent undertakes an action on the basis of the cognition of the object in order to obtain or avoid it.

Assertion (a) shows that the *pravṛtti* based on a *pramāṇa* is the cause of a successful activity, and assertion (b) shows the causal relationship in which *pravṛtti* in general follows cognition in general.⁶

But is it really the case that a human being undertakes an action merely after he has cognized something? For example, Vātsyāyana states elsewhere that all actions of living creatures depend on memory.⁷

How does a human being go into an action to gain or avoid the object in question if he cognizes it for the first time in his life? For example, how does a newborn baby undertake an action? Even in the case of an adult, the question remains to be answered how we can undertake ritual actions in accordance with Vedic commands when the expected results from them are, in principle, not empirically justifiable because their content is not mundane?

⁵ *NBh* p. 1,6-9: *pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam/ pramāṇam antareṇa nārthapratipattiḥ, nārthapratipattim antareṇa pravṛttisāmarthyam/ pramāṇena khalv ayaṃ jñātārtham upalabhya tam artham abhīpsati jihāsati vā/ tasyepsājihāsāprayuktasya samihā pravṛttir ity ucyate/ sāmartyam punar asyāḥ phalenābhisambandhaḥ/* "When there is a cognition based on a *pramāṇa* (valid means), because of the effectiveness of the *pravṛtti* (undertaking of an action), *pramāṇa* is effective. There is no [valid] cognition but for a *pramāṇa*, and there is no effectiveness of *pravṛtti* but for a [valid] cognition of an object. As is generally known, this cognizer, after having cognized an object [independently of whether it is valid or not], tries to obtain or avoid this object. It is called *pravṛtti* that is the effort of this person prompted by the desire to obtain or avoid it. And effectiveness is the connection of this [*pravṛtti*] with the fruits."

⁶ In the later period, Naiyāyikas clearly hold the theory that one justifies a cognition (K1) on grounds of success or failure of the actual undertaking arising from the cognition K1. And the following principle, which is core to the theory of justification in the later Nyāya system, may be derivable from these two assertions: (i) *pravṛtti* follows after cognition K1, aiming at obtaining or avoiding the object; and (ii) K1 is justified on the grounds of subsequent success or failure of this *pravṛtti*.

⁷ *NBh* 3.1.14, p. 143,3: *smṛtyāśrayāḥ prāṇabhṛtām sarve vyavahārāḥ/*

First of all, a theory is needed which explains how a human being undertakes an action, and what type of cognition forms the basis of that action. Furthermore, there follow two problems:

- (A) Which is the precedent, the justification of a cognition or the undertaking of an action?
 (B) If the undertaking of an action precedes, is subsequent justification beneficial?

Bearing these problems in mind as a background of Naiyāyikas' *prāmāṇyavāda*, I will examine how three Naiyāyikas, i.e., Uddyotakara, Jayanta and Vācaspati, explain (i) the condition of *pravṛtti*, and (ii) the means of justification of cognition.

III. UDDYOTAKARA

Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyāyavārttika* (*NV*), which is a sub-commentary of the *Nyāyasūtra* (*NS*), discusses the problem concerning *pravṛtti* and the justification of cognition when he comments on the opening words of the *NBh*.⁸ There, the opponent in the argument asks which precedes, valid cognition or successful activity [based on that cognition].⁹ His argument can be summarized as follows: *pravṛtti* would not be successful without a valid cognition, and if *pravṛtti* were not successful, a cognition would not be justified as valid. Thus, a mutual dependence would follow between "valid cognition" and "successful activity" just as between chicken and egg; therefore we cannot determine which is the first.

Uddyotakara replies to this as follows:

⁸ *NV* ad *NBh* 1.1.1, p.1,1-9,17.

⁹ *NV* p. 3,4-9: *parasparāśrayatvād ubhayāsiddhiḥ ... yadi pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyam, yadi vā pravṛttisāmarthyāt pramāṇato 'rthapratipattiḥ, kiṃ pūrvaṃ kiṃ paścād iti vācyam/ yadi tāvat pramāṇataḥ pūrvaṃ arthapratipattiḥ, pravṛttisāmarthyam antarena kiṃ iti pratipadyate/ aṥa pūrvaṃ pravṛttisāmarthyam anavadhāryārthe kiṃ iti pravartate/ tasmāt pravṛtteḥ pramāṇato 'rthapratipatter vā pūrvāparabhāvo na kalpata iti/* "Both of them (= the cognition of an object and a *pravṛtti*) would not be established. ... If a *pravṛtti* is effective when there is a cognition based on a *pramāṇa*, or if there is a cognition based on *pramāṇa* on the grounds of the effectiveness of the *pravṛtti*, [then] it should be stated which is precedent and which is subsequent. First of all, if the cognition of an object based on *pramāṇa* precedes, why does one comprehend [the object correctly] without the effectiveness of the *pravṛtti*? Or if the effectiveness of *pravṛtti* precedes, why does one undertake an action towards the object while it is not yet determined? Therefore, no sequential order is possible for *pravṛtti* nor comprehension of an object based on *pramāṇa*."

It is not the case. Why? Because of beginninglessness. It will be explained in the sūtra “Repeated previously ...¹⁰” that “*samsāra* (wheel of life) is beginningless.”

If *samsāra* had beginning, this would be a fault: whether the cognition of object based on *pramāṇa* precedes, or effectiveness of *pravṛtti* precedes.¹¹

By this reply Uddyotakara seems to admit justification before *pravṛtti* regarding all cognitions: he explains, presupposing beginningless *samsāra*, that even in the case of the first cognition in this life, such as the cognition of a newborn baby, the cognition has already been justified by the successful activity in the former lives. Later Naiyāyikas hold that the effectiveness of *pravṛtti* based on a certain cognition (K1) is applied to the justification of K1 itself, but unlike them, Uddyotakara holds that this effectiveness is applied to another cognition which is in the same [or similar] situation as K1. And because of the presupposition of the beginningless *samsāra*, every cognition has been justified by the past *pravṛtti*. Thus, he solves the problem of mutual dependence between valid cognition and successful activity.

1. Awareness of the *pravṛtti* arising from erroneous cognition

Incidentally, Uddyotakara, who presents the above-mentioned theory as just depending upon the beginningless *samsāra*, does not seem to pay attention to *pravṛtti* arising from an erroneous cognition, such as a cognition which mistakes shell for silver. If *samsāra* were beginningless, human beings would certainly have failures based on erroneous cognition at times. Thus, for instance, a person who had mistaken shell for silver and had failures in action sometime in his former continuous lives could not be sure in this life about the validity of cognition “this is silver” before he tries. In short, his theory does not explain the *pravṛtti* arising from erroneous cognition inasmuch as

¹⁰ Cf. NS 3.1.18, 3.1.21, pp. 741, 745: *pūrvābhyastasmṛtyanubandhāj jātasya harṣabhaya-śokasampratipatteḥ// pretyāhārābhyāsakṛtāt stanyābhilāṣāt//* “On the grounds of the succession of [his] previous repeated memory, a newborn [baby] comprehends pleasure, fear, and grief. [A newborn baby], in the next life, craves after breasts on the grounds of [the memory] made by the repetition of taking foods [in his former life].” Cf. Namai [1996: 250-251, n.62], Hattori [1966].

¹¹ NV p. 3.9-12: *tac ca naivam/ kasmāt? anāditvāt/ anādir ayam samsāra iti pūrvābhyastāsūtre pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ/ ādimati ca samsāra eṣa doṣaḥ, kim pūrvam pramāṇato 'rthapratipattiḥ, utāho pravṛttisāmarthyam iti/*

it merely resorts to the *samsāra* as a basis, even though it avoids the regress problem.

2. Association with the justification of Vedic sentences

One can clearly see that in and after the time of Jayanta (ca. 9 C.), the Naiyāyikas pay close attention to the precedent justification of Vedic sentences. They incorporate the theory of justifying Vedic sentences situated in *NS* 2.1.68 into the *prāmāṇyavāda*. But Uddyotakara does not refer to the justification of Vedic sentences in his commentary on the opening words of the *NBh*.¹² Therefore his argument in the *NV* is not yet of much relevance for the justification of Vedic sentences.

IV. JAYANTA

After Kumāriḷa advocated the Intrinsic Theory of Truth (*svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda*), Mīmāṃsakas evidently became the main opponents of Naiyāyikas with regard to the *prāmāṇyavāda*. In the time of Jayanta, the *khyātivāda* (Theory of [Erroneous] Cognition), which analyzes the mechanism of error, is systematized in each school. Consequently *prāmāṇyavāda* was also probably required for explaining *pravṛtti* arising from erroneous cognition.¹³

1. Problem of subsequent justification

On the other hand, against the Naiyāyikas who advocate the Extrinsic Theory of Truth (*parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*), the opponent in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (*NM*) raises the issue of subsequent justification: regarding all cognition, precedent justification is impossible; furthermore, regarding a particular Vedic ritual requiring a large amount of money and exertion, the subsequent justification is pointless. To answer to these objections, the theory was expounded which could explain the ascertainment of validity of Vedic sentences in advance of *pravṛtti*.¹⁴

¹² In *NV* ad *NS* 2.1.68, Uddyotakara establishes the authority of the Veda in the same manner as in the *NS* and the *NBh*.

¹³ The following context of the *NM* would support the fact that Jayanta regards the theory as something that is capable of explaining the *pravṛtti* arising from erroneous cognition: (i) *prāmāṇyavāda* (pp. 419,20-451,21) → (ii) *khyātivāda* (pp. 451,23-481,5) → (iii) the conclusion of the Extrinsic Theory of Truth (pp. 481,7-483,23).

¹⁴ Jayanta and Vācaspati explicitly pay close attention to the necessity of precedent justification of Vedic sentences:

Jayanta classifies the issues into two cases. One is the mundane case which deals with, for example, the cognition of water. The other is the non-mundane case which deals with, for example, Vedic sentences. On the grounds of this classification, Jayanta solves the problem as to whether subsequent justification has a point.

In the case of mundane cognition, justification itself is not so important because everyday life is feasible without any justification. But if one dare justify a cognition, Jayanta explains, he should do so by means of the effectiveness of subsequent *pravṛtti*.¹⁵ On the other hand, in the case of non-mundane cognition such as that of Vedic sentences, wise men must justify it in advance.¹⁶ And only those who justify mundane cognitions about *Āyurveda* and the like by pragmatic means can justify non-mundane cognitions about Vedic sentences by means of inference for which the examples are those mundane objects.¹⁷

NM I pp. 435,16-436,4: *pratyakṣādiṣu dr̥ṣṭārtheṣu pramāneṣu prāmānyaniścayam antareṇaiva vyavahārasiddhes tatra 'kiṃ svataḥ prāmānyam uta parataḥ' iti vicāreṇa na naḥ prayojanam; anirṇaya eva tatra śreyān/ adṛṣṭe tu viṣaye vaidikeṣv aganītadraviṇavitaraṇādikleśasādhyeṣu karmasu tatprāmānyāvadhāraṇam antareṇa prekṣāvātām pravartanam anucitam iti tasya prāmānyaniścayo 'vaśyakartavyah/ tatra parata eva vedasya prāmānyam iti vakṣyāmah/* "Because everyday life is feasible without ascertaining the validity of *pramānas*, such as perception of which the object is seeable, it is needless for us to examine whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic regarding them. It is better not to settle it. On the other hand, in the case of an unseen object, regarding Vedic rituals which are accomplished by means of pain, such as countless expenditure of money and others, it is irrational for wise men to undertake an action without ascertaining the validity of the [Vedic sentence]. Therefore its (= Vedic sentence's) validity must be ascertained by all means. On this point it will be stated that the validity of the Veda is certainly extrinsic."

NVTT p. 4.14-16: *tad evaṃ dr̥ṣṭārthāḥ prānabhṛtām vyavahārā bhavantu sandehād api yathā tathā, adṛṣṭārthāḥ tu bahuvittavyayāyāsasādhyā vaidikā vyavahārā dattajalāñjalayaḥ prasaktāḥ/* "In such a way, [when] the actions of living beings have seeable objects, let them take place in any way, even from doubt. But Vedic activities, whose objects cannot be seen and which are to be accomplished by means of countless expenditure of money and affliction, culminate in vain."

15 NM I p. 445,2-5: *na hi nilagrāhiṇā pramāṇeṇa nilasvarūpam iva svaprāmānyam api tadānīm niścetum śakyata iti/ kālāntare tatprāmānyaniścayaḥ satyam asti, na tu tatra nairapekṣyam, pravṛttisāmarthyādhinatvāt tanniścayasya/* "A cognition which grasps blue (K1) cannot grasp its own validity too at that time, in the way that it grasps the nature of blue. It is true that the validity of it (= K1) is ascertained afterwards. But it (= the ascertainment of K1's own validity) is not independent. [In other words, the justification of its own validity is extrinsic.] Because it depends on the effectiveness of the *pravṛtti*."

16 NM I pp. 435,16-436,4 see footnote 14; *ibid.* p. 451,16-21: *adṛṣṭe tu parikṣyāḥ avaśyākartavyatvād upapattē ceti// tasmād *adṛṣṭapurūṣārthapathopadeśi mānam maṇṣibhir avaśyaparikṣaṇīyam/ prāmānyam asya parato niraṇāyi ceti cetaḥpramāthibhir alaṃ kuvikalpa-jalāih/81// *-purūṣārthapathopadeśi] em.; -purūṣārthapadopadeśi MVS; cf. *ibid.* p. 481,13-14: *śabde punar adṛṣṭapurūṣārthapathopadeśini prāmānyam ...* "For, on the other hand, when [the object is] not experienced, investigation must be done and is appropriate. Therefore it is mandatory for wise men to examine the means [i.e. a Vedic sentence] which teach the path to the aim of human beings. And its validity has been already ascertained extrinsically. Thus enough of a net of bad alternatives which disturb one's mind."*

17 NM I p. 446,1-5: *vaiyarthyaṃ tu dr̥ṣṭe viṣaye satyam iṣyate, kin tu tatra pravṛttisāmarthyena prāmānyam niścinvam āptoktatvasya hetoḥ prāmānyena vyāptim avagacchatiṭy adṛṣṭa- viṣayopayogivedāpīprāmānyaparicchede pāramparyenopāyatvāt svaviṣaye vyartho 'py*

2. Cognition as a condition of *pravṛtti*

Jayanta explicitly states that each cognition is doubtful as to its own validity at the time of its arising.¹⁸ In remarkable contrast to Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, who resort to previous repeated cognitions for precedent justification, Jayanta states that even if such cognitions were repeated, or rather because of this very reason, every cognition is in principle doubtful about its own validity.¹⁹ Regarding the condition of *pravṛtti* too, he classifies the issue into two cases. In short, the non-mundane case requires justification before *pravṛtti*, and in the mundane case *pravṛtti* may arise from doubt about the validity of relevant cognition.²⁰ Moreover Jayanta shows a negative attitude

asau tatra sārthakatām avalambata ity adoṣaḥ// “On the other hand, it is certainly accepted that [the subsequent justification] would be pointless regarding seeable object. But in this case, those who ascertain the validity on grounds of effectiveness of *pravṛtti*, comprehend that the reason [of inference] ‘being taught by a reliable person’ is pervaded by the validity. Therefore this [justification on grounds of effectiveness in mundane case], which would be indirectly a means for justifying the validity of a *pramāṇa* as Veda which communicates an unseen object, holds up significance in this respect, even though it is meaningless regarding its own object. Thus there is not any fault.”

¹⁸ Jayanta argues about this issue at *NM I* pp. 439,12-440,14, 441,17-442,10. Particularly in the latter part he sums up the argument as follows:

NM I p. 442,5-7: *na ca sarvathā samśayasamarthane 'smākam abhiniveśaḥ/ prāmānyam tu jñānotpattikāle grhītum aśakyam iti naḥ pakṣaḥ/ prāmānyāgrahaṇam evānadhavyavasāya-svabhāvaṃ samśayaśabdeneha vyapadekṣyāmah/* “And we do not necessarily stick to the establishment of doubt. On the contrary, our position is that one cannot grasp the validity at the time when a cognition arises. Here we call by the word ‘doubt’ nothing but the non-apprehension of validity, of which the nature is non-determination.”

¹⁹ *NM I* p. 440,6-14: *yat tu nānubhūyate samśaya iti --- satyam --- ananubhūyamāno 'pi nyāyād abhyaste viśaye *vinābhāvyasmaranāt sa parikalpyate, niścayanimittasya tadānim avidyamānatvāt, samśayajananaheṭoś ca sāmagryāḥ sannihitavāt/ tathā hi yathārthetarā-rthasādharmaṇo dharmo bodharūpatvam ūrdhvatvādivat tadā prakāśata eva/ na ca prāmānyāvinābhāvi viśeṣaḥ kaścana tadānim avabhūti/ tadagrahane ca samānadharmā-dhigamaprabodhyamānavāsānādhīnā tatsahacaritaparyāyanubhūtavīśeṣasṃrtir api sambhavaty evetīyatīyaṃ sā samśayajanāni sāmagrī sannihitaiveti katham tajjanyāḥ samśayo na syāt/ *vinābhāvyasmaranāt* em.; *vinābhāvasmaranāt MVS*. “On the other hand, it is a fact that doubt is not experienced. [But] though [it (= doubt) is] not experienced, regarding a repeated object, it (= doubt) is logically postulated on the grounds of non-recollection of what is invariably concomitant [with validity]. Because the cause of determination is absent at that time, and because the totality of the causes of arising of doubt is present. To explain, the nature of ‘being a cognition’, that is, the property common to both corresponding (= true) and opposite (= false) [cognition], does appear at that time, just as the nature of ‘being upright’ [which is common to human beings and pillar] appears. In addition there does not appear any particularity which is invariably concomitant with validity at that time. And if it (= the particularity) is not grasped, then there could be the recollection of the particularity which was experienced now and then together with it. Therefore, because this amount of totality [of the causes] which produces doubt is present, how would there not be the doubt [about validity] produced from that [totality of the causes].”

²⁰ *NM I* p. 445,14-17: *tatrādrṣte viśaye prāmānyaniścayapūrvikāyāḥ pravṛtter abhyupagamān netaretarāśrayaṃ cakrakaṃ vā/ drṣte viśaye hy anirñītaprāmānya evārthasamśayāt pravṛtīrūpam, anarthasamśayāc ca nivṛtyātmakaṃ vyavahāram ārabhamāno drṣyate lokah/* “Among them, in the case of an unseen object, since we accept *pravṛtti* preceded by the ascertainment of validity, there would be no [fault of] mutual dependence or circularity. For we see ordinary people commence an action towards an object only when [the object] is seeable and [its] validity is not yet ascertained: the nature [of his action] is *pravṛtti* when he suspects it to be beneficial or is *nivṛtti* when he suspects it to be harmful.”

toward the theory that “repeated cognitions are intrinsically valid.” He quotes this theory as a *prima facie* argument of “those who fancy themselves intelligent (*prājñamānī*),”²¹ and he explains that those cognitions are extrinsically valid.

V. VĀCASPATI

Vācaspati (ca. 10 C.) sets out the theory in such a way that it can justify both cognitions of water and Vedic sentences, maintaining the classification of mundane and non-mundane cases. Since I have already discussed the details of his theory elsewhere,²² I give here only its outline.

In order to explain both cases by means of a uniform theory, Vācaspati introduces another classification: repeated and non-repeated. He conceives of a type of “cognitions which have reached the state of repetition (*abhyāsadaśāpanna*),” cognitions which have been empirically justified to be pervaded by truth on the grounds of repeated practice. Based on the invariable concomitance between such cognitions and truth, he introduces another conception of “being the same kind (*tajjātīyatā*),”²³ as a property of cognition that is the same kind with cognitions repeatedly justified in the past. In such a way, he explains that we can determine the truth before *pravṛtti* regarding such a cognition.²⁴

21 Uno [1996: 343, 400] holds that this theory is referable to Jaina Scholars as well as Buddhists by exemplifying the *TSP*, the *PKM*, and the *NKC*. Buddhists already had such opinion at the time of Jayanta. In *TSP* ad *TS* 2944 Kamalaśīla lists several kinds of intrinsically valid cognition, one of which is *abhyāsavat pratyakṣam* (Cf. Wakahara [1985: 165], Steinkellner [1992: 259], Inami [1993: 87]). But regarding Jaina Scholars, it is still ambiguous whether they held such opinion before Jayanta. Thus, the source of this theory should be reconsidered.

22 Shida [2002]

23 *NVTT* p. 11,9-11: *jñānatatajjātīyatvaliṅgagrāhiṇaś ca jñānasya mānasapratyakṣasya tādrśasyādrśtayabhicāratayā parito nirastasamastavibhramāśaṅkasya svataḥ prāmānyam iti nānavasthā/*

24 *NVTT* pp. 10,2-8: *satyaṃ na svataḥ prāmānyam śakyāvadhāraṇam/ paratas tu dr̥ṣṭārtheṣv anabhyāsadaśāpanneṣu pravṛttisāmarthyād eva tad gamyate/ ... tad amī samśayānā api pravartamānāḥ pravṛttisāmarthyāt pramānasya tattvaṃ viniścītya tajjātīyasānyasyābhyāsadaśāpannasya pravṛttisāmarthyāt prāg eva tajjātīyatvena liṅgena prāmānyāvadhāraṇād arthavinīścayena pravartante/* “It is a fact that validity cannot be ascertained intrinsically. Or rather [it is ascertained] extrinsically. [To explain,] regarding the [cognition], which is not arrived at the state of repetition and whose object is seeable, it (= validity) is comprehended only on the grounds of the effectiveness of the *pravṛtti*. ... And those who are undertaking an action with doubt, having ascertained the *pramāna* as such (= to be a *pramāna*) on the grounds of the effectiveness, undertake an action, regarding another [cognition] which has arrived at the state of repetition and is of same kind, precisely before the effectiveness of *pravṛtti*, based on determining the object on the grounds of ascertainment of the validity by means of [an inference for which] the middle term [is] ‘being the same kind’.”

1. Condition of *pravṛtti*

Regarding the condition of *pravṛtti*, he states that *pravṛtti* may take place not only from the determination of an object (*arthāvadhāraṇa*) but also from the mere cognition of it (*arthapratīti*).²⁵ Afterwards, he rephrases the condition of *pravṛtti* as the inference of “being the means of something desired (*apekṣitopāyatā*).”²⁶ Therefore, he admits that there could be a *pravṛtti* with doubt when the relevant cognition is not yet justified.

2. Treatment of the “beginninglessness” and assumption of *samsāra*

On the other hand, Vācaspati’s view differs from that of Uddyotakara concerning the first cognition in this life. First of all, the *prāmāṇyavāda* of the *NVTT* takes place in his commentary on the *NV*’s argument about the mutual dependence between cognition and *pravṛtti*.²⁷ In its final part, he adds an argument on the topic of “the cognition of a newborn baby.”²⁸ In contrast to Uddyotakara, who holds that the cognitions of former lives are essential for explaining

25 *NVTT* p. 10,4-5: *arthapratītyadhīnā tu pravṛttir nārthāvadhāraṇādīnā, arthasandehād api prekṣāvātām pravṛtteh/ no khalūpāyatāviniścayenāpi pravartamānā nānāgataphale sandīhate/* “On the other hand, *pravṛtti* depends on comprehension of an object, but it does not depend on the determination of an object. For, wise men undertake an action even from doubt about the object. As is generally known, it is not the case that [people], undertaking action on the ground of determining [an object] to be a means, never have doubt about the result in the future.”

NVTT p. 3,10-12: *vinīcīūptabhāvās ca muner āptatvena tadvākyaṭ prayojanādi vinīcītya *pravartsyanti, āptatviniścaye tv arthasamśayāt/ na khalu kṛsyādāv api vinīcītasasyādyadhigamānām pravṛtīh, antarāvagrahādīpratibandhena phalānūtpādasyāpi sambhavāt/ *pravartsyanti] C; prakṛtsyanti T.* “And those who ascertained the state of being reliable, since the sage is reliable, having determined the purpose, etc., based on his sentence, undertake an action. On the other hand, when [the property of] ‘being reliable’ is not ascertained, [they undertake an action] based on doubt about the object. As is generally known, even in the case of agriculture, etc., it is not the case that [only] those who comprehend the fruits undertake an action. Because there might be a situation where the result is absent because of obstacles such as drought, etc., in midstream.”

26 Cf. footnote 28.

27 Cf. footnotes 9, 11.

28 *NVTT* pp. 11,19-12,3: *arthasyāpekṣitopāyatānumānapravṛttisāmarthyayoḥ parasparāpekṣitvam avaśisyate/ tatrāpy anādītāparihārah/ utpannamātrakasya hi bālakasya stanam *dṛṣtvā prāgbhavīyas tajjātyāpekṣitānubhavajanītaḥ saṃskāra āvirasti/ tataś ca smaraṇam/ tato *pekṣitopāyatānumānam/ tataḥ pravṛtīh/ tatas tasyāḥ sāmartyam/ evaṃ pūrvasmin pūrvasmiṅ janmanīy anādītayā na bijāṅkuravat parasparāpekṣitēti/ arthapratīpattir iti arthapratīpattīś cārthasyāpekṣitopāyatāpratīpattīś cety arthaḥ/ *dṛṣtvā] C; dṛṣṭā T.* “There remains the mutual dependence between the inference of an object as a means of a desirable thing and the effectiveness of *pravṛtti*. It (= mutual dependence) is also denied on the grounds of ‘being beginningless’. Because for a newborn baby who has seen breasts, [his] previous impression appears which is produced from experiences of a desirable thing of such a type. And there is a recollection based on it (= impression). There is an inference [of an object] as a means of desirable thing based on it (= recollection). There is a *pravṛtti* based on it (= inference). Then it (= *pravṛtti*) becomes effective. Similarly, in each preceding life, there would not be the mutual dependence because of ‘being beginningless’, just like seed and bud. ‘A comprehension of an object’ means comprehension of object [itself] and comprehension of an object as a means of desirable thing [too].”

both *pravṛtti* and justification regarding the first cognition in this life, Vācaspati seems to hold that they are essential for explaining the *pravṛtti* alone. For, as abstracted above, according to Vācaspati (1) *pravṛtti* may arise from unjustified cognition too, and (2) only the “*abhyāsadaśāpanna*” type cognition can be justified before *pravṛtti*. Therefore, even though he refers to the *samsāra* regarding the cognition of a newborn baby, he might only state that it could be the condition of *pravṛtti* alone, but not of justification.

VI. CONCLUSION

We do not know who the opponent of Uddyotakara is in the part he comments on the opening words of the *NBh*, but after Kumārila, Mīmāṃsakas are the main opponents of Naiyāyikas’ *prāmāṇyavāda*. Uddyotakara, assuming that cognition itself needs to have been already justified as a condition of *pravṛtti* [following this cognition], explains that every cognition has already been justified on the grounds of effectiveness in the former continuous lives. By presupposing beginningless *samsāra* in such a way, he solves the problem of the sequential order of cognition and *pravṛtti*. However, his theory cannot explain *pravṛtti* arising from an erroneous cognition, and his theory has little to do with the justification of Vedic sentences.

Jayanta, taking into consideration *pravṛtti* from erroneous cognition, asserts that every cognition is doubtful as to its validity, and that *pravṛtti* arises from such cognition. He also holds that in the mundane case, a cognition is justified precisely after the *pravṛtti*. The justification of mundane cognition is pointless in itself, but in terms of its application to the inferential justification of the non-mundane cognition before *pravṛtti*, the subsequent justification of mundane cognition as examples has some degree of positive significance.

Vācaspati also admits the occurrence of *pravṛtti* with doubt, even for wise men. Even though he refers to *samsāra* regarding the cognition of a newborn baby, there remains ambiguity about whether he assumes beginningless *samsāra* for the sake of the justification of Vedic sentences. His presupposition of *samsāra* and the memory of past lives may serve only for explaining the newborn baby’s *pravṛtti*. Regarding justification, he shows a uniform theory about both cases of mundane and non-mundane as follows: in the case of non-repeated cognition there is subsequent justification by means of effectiveness

of *pravṛtti*, while in the case of repeated cognition there is precedent inferential justification for which the middle term is “the property of being the same kind (*tajjātīyatā*).”

In general, Naiyāyikas are said to hold the Extrinsic Theory of Truth (*paratahprāmāṇyavāda*), but in the process of formulating the theory, each polemist does not have the same opinion. Especially they have different views regarding the condition of *pravṛtti* and the means of justifying a cognition. From the time of Uddyotakara, they seem to be aware of the problem of the sequential order between cognition and *pravṛtti*. Jayanta clearly takes account of the problems of (i) *pravṛtti* arising from an erroneous cognition, (ii) whether the subsequent justification is meaningless, (iii) the necessity of preceding justification with regard to Vedic statements, and (iv) infinite regress in the process of justification. Vācaspati makes efforts to establish the uniform justification theory which can apply to both cases of ordinary cognition and Vedic statement.

Table of the Three Naiyāyikas on the Theory of Truth

		Uddyotakara	Jayata	Vācaspati
non-repeated cognition	basis of <i>pravṛtti</i>	————	doubt	inference of <i>apekṣitopāyatā</i>
	justification	————	subsequent	subsequent
	justifying means	————	effectiveness	effectiveness
repeated cognition	basis of <i>pravṛtti</i>	justification	same as non-repeated case	justification
	justification	precedent		precedent
	justifying means	previous effectiveness		inference
Vedic sentences	basis of <i>pravṛtti</i>	————	justification	same as repeated case
	justification	————	precedent	
	justifying means	————	Inference	

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- NKC* *Nyāyakumudacandra* of Prabhācandra, edited by Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series No. 121, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991 (1st ed. 1938).
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 T edited by Anantalal Thakur, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996.
 C See *ND*
- PKM* *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* of Prabhācandra, edited by Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series No. 94, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1990 (1st ed. 1912).
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Ph.D. Candidate
University of Tokyo
Tokyo