

The World View of John Foster Dulles.

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John Foster Dulles was the central figure in the creation of the Pacific Alliance between the United States and Japan. His role on this issue is discussed extensively in Kent Calder's book.¹⁾ This article focus on the prewar and postwar continuity in the world view of John F. Dulles, a topic that has not been taken up well among scholars. By examining Dulles's world view prior to the Pacific War, one will have a better understanding of Dulles's post-World War II international outlook that is often the focus of many research. This article demonstrates the continuity since the late 1930's in not only Dulles's outlook on U.S.-East Asia relations, but also his perception of international relations in general.

During a national security meeting in 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles commented that he could not obviously put Japan back to control Manchuria and worried about Japan's flirtations with Communist China for trade. Dulles thought that if Japan could be incorporated into the GATT regime, it could find raw materials and markets outside of China.²⁾ Although Dulles's comment here is a reflection of his typical Cold War thinking about American-centered anti-communist new world order, in the late 1930's and early 1940's, Dulles had argued that Japan would not have expanded into China as it had, if it had enjoyed world-wide economic opportunity under an

1) Kent Calder, *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

2) As part of the Cold War strategy the U.S. wanted Japan to economically expand into Southeast Asia. See U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1952-1955, Vol. XIV, Part II* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985), pp. 1406-8, and pp. 1411-15. 次のサイトにこの文章は存在する <http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/>

open trade system. For example, at the time the U.S. terminated the bilateral trade treaty with Japan in July 1939, Dulles wrote to British Ambassador Lothian “I agree [with you] that the basic difficulty in Japan was the universal economic nationalism to which you refer. *Except for that the Japanese probably would not have been greatly interested in China* (italics mine).” Dulles argued that Japan “would doubtless have much preferred to get raw materials and find markets elsewhere. As, however, these possibilities gradually shrank, they then looked to China feeling that if the western white races put trade barriers up against them at least they should have a free hand with the adjoining yellow race.” But when Japan tried to economically expand into China, it felt that the English merchants and traders were at an advantage over the Japanese merchants and traders because of “the type of control which were exercised by the British in China.” Although Dulles thought the British “powers” in China benefitted the Chinese and the Japanese dominance would not have benefitted China, he nonetheless believed the Japanese were put to a disadvantage and “the aggravation of the Japanese was not unnatural and explosion into China was more or less inevitable.”³⁾

It is remarkable that Dulles did not see Japan’s expansionism into China as primarily determined by domestic forces to expand their interests in geographically contiguous areas.

In the winter of 1938 a leading figure from the American business community visited Japan and China to assess the Far Eastern situation. The Japanese military victories in China had triggered financial disarray in the Shanghai money market to such an extent that it prompted a famous Wall Street lawyer, John Foster Dulles, to tour Japan and China to obtain a first hand view of the Far Eastern political and economic situation. Dulles’s interest in the Far East was partly influenced by the fact that his grandfather, Secretary of State John W. Foster, assisted Li Hung Chang in the Shimonoseki treaty that

3) Dulles to Lothian, January 3, 1940, “Lothian, Marquess of,” Box 18, John F. Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

ended the first Sino-Japanese War, and his uncle, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, had struck the Lansing-Ishii agreement in 1917. Dulles planned to collect information for his law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, the firm's clients, the Foreign Policy Associations, and some other organizations of which he was a member, including the Rockefeller Foundation, a highly influential foundation interested in assessing future philanthropic activities in the Far East. Meeting Dulles right before this trip, the leading State Department critic of Japanese actions in China, Stanley Hornbeck, received the impression that Dulles's main task was to form his opinion regarding the financial situation in Japan and China. In spite of Hornbeck's suspicion, it was uncertain as to whether or not he thought of financing Japan, China, or both.

After leaving for the Far East, Dulles first spent about a week in Tokyo. In planning his trip, including people he sought to see in Japan, Dulles received advice from his friend, Jean Monnet, the future founding father of the European Union, who, in 1934-1936 had been advising Chiang Kai-shek on economic issues, including the Chinese railroad system.

Dulles met influential figures such as Koki Hirota, Reisuke Ishida of the Mitsui Trading Company, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Shinken Makino, Kensuke Horinouchi, Kijuro Shidehara, Kinmochi Saionji, Komatsu of Asano Shipbuilding Company, Sotomatsu Kato, and Ayske Kabayama, a good friend of J.P. Morgan and Company's Thomas W. Lamont. Kabayama's son-in-law, Jiro Shirasu, worked as a top business executive under Yoshisuke Ayukawa, a man who at the time was attracting attention in Japan and the U.S. for wooing American business interests to make massive investments in Manchukuo. Dulles was not only aware that the financial and industrial circles in Japan were disturbed by the extent of military control in the government but also was aware that the Japanese government was not correctly conveying to its public the negative American public opinion towards

Japanese actions in China.

Although the State Department was suspicious that Dulles was interested in siding with the Japanese and financially aiding them, Dulles told at a dinner hosted by Kabayama that financial cooperation between the U.S. and Japan was impossible, given the current Japanese violation of American rights and interests in China. The Japanese business leaders told Dulles that Japan was going to maintain the Open Door principle in North China and avoid shutting out foreign enterprises as they had done in Manchuria. In spite of American skepticism towards Japanese promises, Dulles was aware that there were American businessmen in Japan who thought American trade volume in Japanese occupied China may increase; as Dulles was probably aware, at the time there was an American export boom to not only Japan but also Manchukuo and these Americans thought a similar boom would occur in areas in China newly occupied by the Japanese.

Beneath Dulles's comment lay a cool observation of Japan's current situation. In spite of Japanese victories in China, Dulles did not think the Japanese military would be able to induce a desired cooperation from the Chinese but they have yet to realize that. Although this did not preclude Japan from gaining dividends from its war with China, Dulles did not think that will happen for the next few years. The question, then, was how financially stable was Japan, which now faced dwindling foreign currency reserve. Dulles thought the Japanese financial system and the yen will be stable for another two or three years even if the war with China continued.

Given this situation surrounding the Japanese yen, another important question was substituting the Japanese yen for the sterling pound as the main foreign currency link to the Chinese currency in North China. Although Dulles saw no difference in the principle involved, he thought that would damage American trading interests because the pound was freely exchanged whereas the yen was a

controlled exchange.

In China, Dulles visited Shanghai to meet British and American bank executives, visited Hong Kong to talk with members of the Soong family including H.H. Kung, and then flew to Hankow to meet Chiang Kai Shek and T.V. Soong. Dulles, while impressed by Chiang Kai-shek, was not impressed by people surrounding him, particularly Chiang's brother-in-law, H.H. Kung and Madame Kung.

On the question of whether or not China was changing, Dulles observed that while "[t]he Embassy crowd" and the head of the American fleet in China, Admiral Yarnell, unanimously thought that "a new spirit has come," "the English and American merchants at Shanghai and Hongkong" argued that China has not changed. They emphasized "'the same old China' -- the coolies and farmer interested only in his bowl of rice, the general and the public official only in his 'squeeze.'" Dulles commented that "[o]n the question of the origin of this putative 'new spirit'," while the American Ambassador to China "ascribes it primarily to the influence of the Chinese colleges and their professors who have learned in American universities our concept of patriotism," others in the Embassy gave "more weight to the communistic or red influence which has emanated from Russia." Whether or not China was changing, Dulles was convinced by the end of his China trip that the bulk of rising Chinese nationalism came from China's interior and Japan would have to localize its claims for a settlement; Dulles thought no Chinese government would acquiesce to a demand for a general Japanese tutelage. He thought the present war was fundamentally caused by the rapprochement between the Kuomintang and the Communists after the Sian Incident.

Aside from this observation of the Sino-Japanese War, Dulles was well aware of China's political, economic, and military disarray. While in Shanghai, he received internal reports of the National City Bank's Shanghai branch regarding the Chinese financial market situation. In this report the branch's Assistant Vice President, James

A. Mackay, reported to Vice President Boies C. Hart of the Far Eastern Division in New York the severely bad financial positions of Chinese commercial banks, corruption in the Chiang family, and economic mismanagement of their banks. The report indicated China as economically unstable and Japan as a suitable business partner in the Far East. Dulles also heard from the representative of the Rockefeller Foundation in Shanghai the internal political struggle centered around T.V. Soong and H.H. Kung regarding the political pressures for the former to take over the latter's position as the Finance Minister. In spite of reading this report and though Dulles thought China's financial situation might further deteriorate within six months, he also thought the situation might stabilize for another year depending on Chinese government's economic policy.

Upon his return to New York City, Dulles gave a talk on April 13 during a luncheon meeting at the Foreign Policy Association. Those who attended included E.C. Carter of the Institute for Pacific Relations (IPR), John D. Rockefeller III, former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, journalist T.A. Bisson, and lawyer and a son of a former Secretary of State Elihu Root Jr. What he said there is unknown but the aforementioned thoughts were undoubtedly in his mind. It would be interesting to know if there were any exchange of opinion between Dulles and Bisson about Ayukawa's project in Manchuria since the latter, a journalist, had written an article in the April issue of *Amerasia*, a periodical published by IPR, presenting Japan as deficit ridden and financially drained and wrote a negative report arguing that Ayukawa's proposals to potential American investors relegated them to second class partnership.⁴⁾

4) The quote is taken from p. 10 of "Trip to Hankow: March 6-9, 1939" in "China and Japan Folder -- Trip (1938)," Box 17, John Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University; in addition, see p. 13, and pp. 15-16 of the same document. In the same folder see the following: Japanese name cards; Schedule in Japan; Dulles to Ishida, February 14, 1938; "Not Floating a Loan, Dulles Says in China," *New York Times*, 7 March 1938; Buell to Dulles, April 6, 1938; and Dulles to Popper, May 27, 1938. In addition, see the following in "Dulles, John Foster," Box 151,

Regardless of what he said, Dulles certainly wanted the U.S. to avoid unnecessary entanglement in the East. And, several months after this speech, Dulles told Raymond B. Fosdick of the Rockefeller Foundation on January 4, 1939, "It is my impression that outside of a few Chinese, who have been touched by missionary and educational influences from the western powers, the only real resistance comes from the so-called Red Army group of the northwest." Dulles saw Kuomintang as highly ineffective and pointed to the fact that it discords with the Red Army even after the Sian Incident. Dulles argued "that much of our recent solicitude about China is protective coloring -- perhaps unconscious -- for playing power politics with Japan in the Far East." He was puzzled by such American action because "we had no great concern about the Chinese during the ten years of civil war when the loss of life and suffering were fully comparable to that which now occurs." Fosdick concurred.⁵⁾

Dulles's thoughts during his Far Eastern trip show detached observations of the situation there, but in the late 1930's and early

Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace: March 30, 1938 Memorandum; and "The Situation in the Far East," March 30, 1938. See T.A. Bisson's April 1938 *Amerasia* article, "Aikawa's 'Open Door,'" in Microfiche Number 511.1 of the Yoshisuke Ayukawa Papers.

Dulles's view of the Japanese business community the same as the one argued by Joseph Grew in the pre-1945 years and by the Japan Lobby that Grew belonged to after World War II. With regard to the Japan Lobby, see Howard Schonberger, *Aftermath of War* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press).

Dulles received the information on the financial and political situation in China during his tour there in February and March 1938 from the National City Bank and Dulles made observations of Kung and Soong; see the following in "China and Japan Trip File," Box 17, John Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University: James A. Mackay to Boies C. Hart, February 10, 1938; John B. Grant to John Foster Dulles, February 10, 1938; Mackay to Dulles, February 28, 1938; and "Trip to Hankow," p. 13. According to a State Department memorandum, Dulles reported to the officials upon his return from China that while Chiang impressed him, he was not impressed by people surrounding him such as H.H. Kung and Madame Kung; see "The Situation in the Far East," March 30, 1938, p. 8, "Dulles, John Foster," Box 151, Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University.

5) Dulles to Fosdick, January 4, 1939, and Fosdick to Dulles, January 5, 1939, "Fosdick, Raymond," Box 18, John F. Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

1940's, how did Dulles view the international system? This is understood by reading "America's Role in World Affairs," a lecture Dulles gave on October 28, 1939 for the National Council of the Young Men's Christian Associations at Detroit, Michigan. Two ideas were central to Dulles's vision of a new world order. First, he believed that democracies in Germany, Italy, and Japan were undermined as a result of collapses in their domestic economies because of the breakdown of an open world trade system. Second, he conceptualized "the dilution of sovereignty." Those countries "which now possess the preponderance of power" should wield it, particularly in economic matters, to provide equal world-wide economic opportunity and prevent the occurrence of bloc economies. This solution meant that these nations had to help other nations and not just their own "exclusive self advantage." Such an act meant depriving "some of the advantages of sovereignty" and, from this viewpoint, the League of Nations would have succeeded had this view been supported by nations with "the preponderance of power." Dulles believed a variation of the federal principle in which nations would agree on an open international trade system without "discretionary federal authority" may be possible. The application of the federal principle to create a new world order, Dulles thought, was the answer to make "responsibility more nearly coextensive with power."

Based on this relation between power and sovereignty, Dulles argued that "if the League of Nations had functioned, England and the United States might have been called upon to take a more benevolent attitude toward Japan's needs for markets and raw materials." This could have alleviated "mass discontent within Japan . . .," preserved Japan's "moderate leadership," and prevented Japan's "explosiion into China." Dulles neither condemned England or France for its inaction to revive a free trade system and check German, Italian, and Japanese aggression nor condoned the acts of the latter three nations.

To realize this new world order Dulles wanted the U.S. "which

now almost alone combines the power, influence and intellectual capacity to lead the way” and avoid participating in World War II. Participation “would be to reaffirm an international order which by its very nature is self-destructive and a breeder of violent revolt.” But as the U.S. takes leadership in a world which he understood as economically interdependent and where the “well-being and livelihood depend upon power elsewhere which is exercised without any responsibility toward them,” he saw two ways to bring change. The first was Communism, which he opposed. Dulles argued that “Lenin foresaw that another general war . . . would so disrupt and sicken society to lead to mass revolt.” He thought the Soviet Union seemed within its grasp to succeed world revolution, “the goal of Soviet policy.” Dulles wanted “a peaceful and gradual” transition rather than “world revolution through world war” so as to preserve “the experience, culture, personal liberty and material comforts which the old order has given us.” As Dulles wrote to Henry Leach in October 1939, “Our task is to preserve democracy and liberal thinking, not in the spirit of isolation but to the end that we ourselves may come to recognize that our own vast economic power throughout the world must be exercised, not merely selfishly but with a sense of responsibility to all of those who are affected by it.”⁶⁾

To some, Dulles’s detached view of international relations was interpreted as amoral.⁷⁾ For example, he apparently offended his boss,

6) For the text of “America’s Role in World Affairs” delivered on October 28, 1939 before the National Council of Young Men’s Christian Associations at Detroit, Michigan, October 28, 1939, see “Re Church Activities: Miscellaneous,” Box 18, John Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. In the same box, see also the following: Dulles to Leach, October 19, 1939, “Leach, Henry Goddard”; and Dulles to Paton, November 29, 1939, “Information Service, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.”

7) Although I, as argued here, do not believe Dulles underwent “transformation” in thinking from “prophetic realism” to “priestly nationalism” as Mark G. Toulouse argues, I do not deny “Dulles’s moralism . . . resulted from his consistent practice of viewing historical events through religious lens.” However, Toulouse’s excessive focus on the religious aspects of Dulles’s speeches and writings prevented him from understanding the fact that in the aforementioned Detroit speech Dulles was deeply concerned about

Eustice Seligman, at his law firm by arguing neither the Allies nor Germany were morally superior to one another; Seligman stated “you . . . by implication and apparently take the view that Germany’s position is morally superior to that of the Allies.” Seligman, disgusted by Hitler’s aggressions and sanctioning of anti-Semitic activities, could not understand Dulles’s international outlook; though Dulles, who preached Christianity, must have felt repugnant towards Germany’s anti-Semitic actions, the current war to him was the by-product of the old order which he wanted to remedy into a new one.⁸⁾ As Dulles explained to Lothian, when international economic breakdown causes bad domestic economy and “whenever there is any plausible pretext to attribute these conditions to the policies of other nations, then domestic leadership tends to do so and excites the people to violent reaction against the foreign policies which are held to be repressive.” In Dulles’s mind, the situation in Japan, Italy and Germany was just that.⁹⁾

Initially Dulles’s approach to international relations did not favor any of the parties that were at war in the Far East and Europe. However, as Britain became the sole bastion between Germany and the U.S., he and his brother, Allen, made an exception to this rule by supporting British war efforts short of actual American participation in the war. In their view, “no area can contemplate with equanimity the costs of defense in a world at war, or be wholly self-sufficient economically, or be indifferent to the destruction elsewhere of economic and the lowering of standards of living.” Hence, “peace

the spread of Communism in the late 1930’s and about preserving “the experience, culture, personal liberty and material comfort” of the western civilization even in midst of bringing a gradual change in world order. See his book, *The Transformation of John Foster Dulles: From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism* (Mercer University Press, 1985), p. xxi for the above quote, pp. xxiii-xxvii for the definitions of the two terminologies, and p. xxviii and pp. 153-58 for the content of “prophetic realism,” including his mention of 1945.

8) Seligman to Dulles, October 25, 1939, “Seligman, Eustice,” Box 18, John F. Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

9) Dulles to Lothian, January 3, 1940, “Lothian, Marquess of,” Box 18, John F. Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

elsewhere should be the constant objective of our foreign policy.”

This and other world outlook of the Dulles brothers was elaborated in a paper called “Statement of an American Foreign Policy” dated September 6, 1940, a paper which was jointly written with Allen and categorized as strictly confidential and “[t]entative and [p]rivate.” According to this document the Dulles brothers thought their vision of a world ordered according to the Federal principle could only be achieved gradually. While confronting the aforementioned situation in Europe and in the Far East, they thought the U.S. should seek the following: “organic unity” with Canada, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean; support the British Empire short of having the U.S. enter war but not support the preservation of the present form of that empire; impose American moral and economic force to counter the excessively expansionist tendencies of Germany, Italy, and Japan; disengage the U.S. from Continental Europe and disallow the preservation of the pre-war situation; and allow Japanese hegemony in the Far East. The brothers emphasized that the U.S. “should seek the restoration of peace throughout the world, not by concession and compromise, but by the creation of basic conditions conducive to peace.”

In pursuing the aforementioned “organic unity,” the U.S. should apply to the entire hemisphere the Monroe Doctrine, “opposing any new extension by any foreign power of political control over any part of this hemisphere.” The brothers wanted “a vast yet compact area of defense” which also provided “a new and enlarged area of economic unity which will open up new opportunity and new sources of wealth.”

Such an economic bloc was to be formed by considering worldwide economic interdependence. It was natural for the brothers to state that they were interested in supporting Britain “so long as its leadership remains liberal as over the past century.” In their view, in spite of the fact that the British Empire was not based on the Federal

principle, the British leadership “has . . . created an interconnection between many lands and peoples of a nature calculated to preserve peace between them.” According to the Dulles brothers, such a creation “is an asset to the world which we desire to see preserved and toward the preservation of which we should adopt benevolent action.” Britain should have “every opportunity to use her financial and economical resources for her self-preservation -- hoping that she still has the strength and vitality to preserve and perpetuate herself.”

For the Dulles brothers, supporting Britain was important as long as it could help realize their vision of world order. They did not want to guarantee the preservation of the British Empire because it lacked “the cohesion which results from application of the Federal principle to areas of geographic propinquity.” Britain no longer maintained its position as the leader of the industrial revolution, the most important condition to exert world leadership. The brothers pointed to the underlying tendency among “[t]he principal self-governing dominions -- Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa,” having “relatively small populations holding vast and rich areas of the world,” to move away from the metropole. The latter over time cannot keep this force in check. Since the direction of the Empire is unpredictable, the brothers argued against helping Britain its present form of its Empire.

While the Dulles brothers were uninterested in preserving the British Empire in its present form, this did not mean they supported the “excessive and unlimited ambitions” of Japan, Germany and Italy because “no durable and tolerable peace is practical until” they have been checked. Although the brothers acknowledged that “[t]he aggressive dispositions of these countries can doubtless be explained, in its origin, in terms of errors and injustices of the past and the inherent vices of excessive nationalism,” they supported applying American moral and economic influence against them because “their present objectives seem to go far beyond anything necessary to

redress those errors and to be calculated to impose upon others, in even greater degree, the same injustices of which they themselves complained.”

In spite of this posture against Japan, Germany and Italy, in dealing with the latter two, the Dulles brothers argued the U.S. “should avoid any political commitments in the affairs of Continental Europe” because European nations, “in the face of repeated warnings, have sought to perpetuate precisely that political system which, as the Federalist papers demonstrate with such logic and wealth of historical precedent, is bound to lead to recurrent wars.” The brothers argued that “through agony, they” might “evolve toward some system of interconnection, which could have been achieved peacefully had not short-sighted, selfish policies prevented.” The U.S. should certainly “not commit ourselves to a restoration of the pre-war status which contains within itself the seeds of its own violent destruction.”

As for Japan, the Dulles brothers argued that the U.S. “should avoid any commitments designed to restore in the Far East the status quo preceding the incursion of Japan into Manchuo [sic] and . . . avoid projecting, into the Far East, any part of our domain which we would feel bound to preserve by force.” The brothers supported giving the Philippines its independence and called for applying in the Far East “our vital sphere in accordance with the dictates of effective defense.” Although the brothers expressed “strong sympathy with China,” it, “with such economic aid as we may peacefully extend, must work out her own salvation.” The brothers stated that “China, through her internal weaknesses, has brought many of her troubles on herself and some external explosion from Japan has been made almost inevitable by the repressive economic and social policies of the western powers.” The Dulles brothers thought that the U.S., “[w]ithout participation in belligerency in this distant area, . . . can use [its] influence toward creating a sound economic basis for peaceful Japanese policies and a China of greater political stability.” In their

view, this approach “will best preserve” American “economic interests within the oriental area.”

The Dulles brothers in analyzing international relations envisioned a world order under American leadership based on the Federalist principles of the American Constitution; the sovereign nations, just like the way the original thirteen states were organized under the Constitution, should promote economic interdependence based on the principle of equal economic opportunity, cooperation for common defense and foreign policies, and the preservation of local autonomy. Although the brothers acknowledged that their foreign policy stance could get American into war, “under existing conditions such risks are inherent in any policy and perhaps the greatest risk is in seeming to be afraid to take any risks.” They “believed that our action can avoid war for ourselves and be conducive to ultimate peace elsewhere, if this be our genuine objective and if our actions be taken calmly, without invectives which accentuate hatreds and create in ourselves a war psychosis.”¹⁰⁾

It is likely that the Dulles brothers did not change their views on American foreign policy towards Europe and the Far East before America entered World War II. After Pearl Harbor, while they supported the war effort, their vision of the new world order under American leadership probably did not change much.

Although Dulles frequently expressed moralistic and religious views when he wrote or spoke about international relations because of his “consistent practice of viewing historical events through a religious lens,”¹¹⁾ Dulles’s actions and thoughts discussed here demonstrate that at least since the late 1930’s Dulles understood international relations

10) “Foreign Policy Association,” Box 19, John Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. The Dulles brothers stated that South America should be welcomed if they sought “organic unity” with the American order but argued “any grandiose scheme for an immediate organic unity of all the Americas is foredoomed to failure.”

11) Toulouse, p. xxi.

in Wilsonian terms. Here, what I mean by Wilsonian outlook is understood in Frank Ninkovich's term.¹²⁾ Although Wilson had used idealistic rhetoric, Wilsonianism was not an "utopian idealism."¹³⁾ Instead, Wilson had recognized during World War I that local conflicts no longer could be geographically limited under the balance-of-power approach.¹⁴⁾ Distant and seemingly insignificant local conflicts now had the potential to cause "a chain of events . . . which then mushrooms into a decisive global struggle on whose outcome hinges the survival of America's liberal institutions."¹⁵⁾ Because this "new, and supremely threatening, global dynamics had taken over,"¹⁶⁾ it, like balance of power, could undermine global economic integration based on "a system controlled in the interests of liberal development" and "the continued progress of civilization."¹⁷⁾ The Wilsonian solution to this problem was "[c]ollective security based on world public opinion"; the former "relied upon the sanction of force" that was credible enough to prevent aggression because of united world opinion. But the latter was constrained by distortion in communication originating from "among other things, . . . levels of development, culture, ideology, and . . . differing political systems and traditions."¹⁸⁾ More importantly, the Wilsonian solution was discredited with appeasement policies in the 1930's, namely Munich.¹⁹⁾

In 1940 Dulles (and his brother) decided to support Britain based on his Wilsonian outlook; Dulles was willing to risk American participation in the European war to support Britain because it and the U.S. had common political and cultural values that contributed to

12) Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).

13) Ninkovich, p. 66 and p. 68.

14) Ninkovich, pp. 49-52.

15) Ninkovich, p. 53. See also p. 92.

16) Ninkovich, p. 54.

17) Ninkovich, pp. 55-56.

18) Ninkovich, p. 62 and p. 169.

19) Ninkovich, p. 68, pp. 111-13, pp. 129-32, and pp. 167-71.

global economic integration based on “liberal development.” In pursuing this issue, he wanted to bring a gradual change to world order rather than the violent and highly disruptive Communist alternative. Dulles saw the latter’s revolutionary approach as a fundamental threat to what he saw as positive values passed from the “old order,” upon which he wanted to find the new world order based on the federal principle. It was natural, then, that he became a Cold Warrior based on his Wilsonian outlook after 1945; after the end of World War II, though Dulles did not reject negotiation for achieving peace, the Communist, namely Soviet, threat, which he had emphasized in 1938, had to be dealt with, just like the recent German challenge.²⁰⁾

Use of force, however, had to be exercised with caution. American policymakers after World War II rejected balance of power, collective security and appeasement.²¹⁾ America’s “preponderance of power” had to be credible and needed the backing of “a credible determined world opinion” to prevent wars.²²⁾ In order to avoid another total war, cold war had “to be fought on psychological and symbolic ground.”²³⁾ As nuclear arms race began between the two superpowers, Dulles, based on his Wilsonian outlook, “realized fairly early that massive retaliation was no diplomatic trump card.”²⁴⁾ In the end, in spite of Dulles’s moralistic and religious rhetoric used during the Cold War, one should examine his thoughts by applying Ninkovich’s discussion of Wilsonianism and by analyzing his hopes to realize eventual organic unity of the world based on the federal principle. These factors are the keys to understanding the intellectual foundations of American efforts in the postwar years to establish regional military and economic organizations during the Cold War (e.g.,

20) I disagree with Toulouse’s interpretation of Dulles’s approach to Soviet Union as based on “priestly nationalism.” See Toulouse, pp. xxv-xxvii, pp. 169-71, pp. 236-40, and p. 247. No such transformation in Dulles’s thinking regarding the Soviet Union took place before and after World War II.

21) Ninkovich, pp. 168-69.

22) Ninkovich, p. 170 and p. 193.

23) Ninkovich, p. 170 and pp. 190-93.

24) Ninkovich, p. 210. See also pp. 207-209 and p. 211.

EC, NATO, SEATO, and ASEAN) and after (e.g., WTO, NAFTA and APEC).

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