

第 2 部

軍国主義と極端な国家主義 (超国家主義) の除去

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おわりに

はじめに－天皇再利用方針－

周知のように、米国が日本を軍事占領した究極の目的は、ポツダム宣言の降伏条項を実施することで、「日本が再び米国の脅威となり、又は世界の平和と安全の脅威となることなき様保証すること」¹⁾にあった。「最小の兵力と資源の投入により目的を達したい」米国は、「日本社会の現在の性格」をふまえ、効率的な手段として、「天皇を含む日本政府機構および諸機関を通じて」、最高司令官がその権限を行使するという、間接統治を実施した。

大日本帝国を解体するための政治プロジェクトは、「武装解除および非軍国主義化」、「戦争犯罪人の処罰」、「個人の自由および民主主義過程への希求の奨励」の3項目であった。²⁾そこで、コア・タームとして用いられたのが、「Militarism (軍国主義)」と「Ultra-nationalism (極端な国家主義 / 超国家主義 / 過激な国家主義)」³⁾であった。

1) 「降伏後ニ於ケル米国ノ初期ノ対日方針」、横田喜三郎代表・日本管理法令研究会『日本管理法令研究』1-2、大雅堂、「法令条文(日英対照文)」18頁。

2) 同前 22 - 24 頁。

3) 当時の訳語としては、管見の範囲ではあるが、「極端な国家主義」が多く使われていたため、本稿の記述でも「極端な国家主義」の訳語を使用する。3つ

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全体主義や国家主義とも異なる、“Ultra-nationalism”は、9月の「降伏後ニ於ケル米國ノ初期ノ対日方針」において登場した。その後の指令や覚書における“Ultra-nationalism”は常に“Militarism”と共に、“and”で結ばれて使われていた。

1945年9月22日付けで発表された「降伏後ニ於ケル米國ノ初期ノ対日方針」の「第三部 政治」によると、コア・タームとミッションの関係が次のように説明されていた（下線は筆者註、以下同じ。）⁴⁾

「a 武装解除及非軍国主義化

（略）

極端ナル国家主義的又ハ軍国主義的ノ社会、政治、職業並ニ商業上ノ団体及機関ハ解消セラルベシ。

理論上並ニ実践上ノ軍国主義及極端ナル国家主義（軍事教練ヲ含ム）ハ教育制度ヨリ除去セラルベシ。嘗テ陸海軍ノ職業的將校並ニ下士官タリシ者其他軍国主義並ニ極端ナル国家主義ノ代表の人物タリシ者ハ凡テ監督的及教育的地位ヨリ排除セラルベシ。

b 戦争犯罪人

（略）

c 個人ノ自由及民主主義過程ヘノ冀求ノ奨励

宗教的信仰ノ自由ハ占領ト共ニ直チニ宣言セラルベシ同時ニ日本人ニ対シ極端ナル国家主義的並ニ軍国主義的組織及運動ハ宗教ノ外被ノ蔭ニ隠ルヲ得ザル旨明示セラルベシ。日本国民ハ米國及其他ノ民主主義国家ノ歴史、制度、文化及成果ヲ知ル機会ヲ與ヘラレ且ツ其ノ事ヲ奨励セラルベシ。」

ちなみに、約2ヶ月前の7月26日のポツダム宣言では、“Ultra-nationalism”は使われておらず、“Militarism”が次の二カ所（下線部—筆者註）で用いられていた。⁵⁾

の訳語の出典は、前掲、『日本法管理法令研究』、文部省『新教育指針 第一分冊 一第一部 前べん 新日本建設の根本問題一』（<http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1281779> を参照）、マーク・T・オア著、土持ケーリー法一監訳『占領下日本の教育改革政策』玉川大学出版部、1993。H. J. ワンダーリック著、土持ケーリー法一監訳『占領下日本の教科書改革』、玉川大学出版部、1998。

4) 前掲、『日本管理法令研究』1-2、「法令条文（日英対照文）」21 - 24 頁。

5) 山極晃・中村政則編、岡田良之助訳『資料日本占領1天皇制』、1990、大月

「4 無分別な打算から日本帝国を滅亡の淵に陥れた身勝手な軍国主義の助言者によって、日本国が引き続き支配されるか、それとも理性の道を歩むかを日本国が決断すべき時期は到来している。」

「6 われわれは、無責任な軍国主義が世界から駆逐されるに至るまでは、平和、安全および正義の新秩序が実現されえないことを主張するがゆえに、日本国民を欺瞞し、その道を誤らせ、あえて世界征服の挙に引き入れた徒輩の権力および勢力は永久にこれを除去しなければならない。」

ところで、戦時中から米国政府は天皇と天皇制の分析を行い、利用するのか、廃止するのか、退位させるのか等、その利害得失について検討していた。⁶⁾ その結果、ポツダム宣言の時点では、天皇自身は軍国主義者ではなく、政府とともに連合国最高司令官の命令を実施する側に位置づけられることとなった。

また、よく知られていることであるが、占領開始直後から、最高司令官のマッカーサー元帥および彼の側近である親日派のフェローズ准将は、帝国陸海軍の自発的即時全面降伏を実現させた天皇の支配力と従順な姿勢を高く評価し、天皇の最強の保護者となった。特に、極東裁判への訴追を免れる対策として、天皇側近とマッカーサー側近が協力し、天皇の弁明書（和文、英文の「独白録」）を作成したり、マッカーサーが退位しない方針を支持したりしたことは、天皇の身体と地位の保証という点で決定的となった。⁷⁾

しかし、当然のことながら、最高司令部の天皇再利用方針に対し、戦争被害国から異議申し立ての声があがることとなる。たとえば、1945年11月、フィリピンの弁護士会全国評議会は、トルーマン大統領宛の書簡の中で、「天皇を心ならずも利用される道具として、つまり、全権力を握る軍閥の掌中のたんなる道具として描こうとする企てがなされて

書店、所収、「資料 81 [ポツダム]宣言」365頁。

6) 同前、第一部・戦中を参照。

7) 五百旗頭真『米国の日本占領政策』上下、中央公論社、1985。ジョン・ダワー著、三浦陽一、他訳『敗北を抱きしめて』下、岩波書店、2001。高橋紘・鈴木邦彦『天皇家の密使たち—占領と皇室—』文春文庫、1989。東野真著、栗屋憲太郎・吉田裕解説『昭和天皇二つの「二つの独白録」』NHK、1998、を参照。

きました。」「裕仁が神として尊崇されているだけでなく、この神がマッカーサーの命令に『従順』であるがゆえに、天皇を戦争犯罪人として裁くのは許しがたい不得策である、とされています。」「通用しがたい専門用語、神秘主義、便宜主義などに惑わされるならば、たとえ気づかないとしても、再び緩やかな侵略をもたらし、また、将来再び戦争を生み出す可能性をはらんだ根を無傷のまま残すことになるでしょう。」⁸⁾と訴えていた。

戦後の国際社会において、はたして日本の侵略的軍国主義を根絶できるのか、また、狂信的な日本人の天皇崇拝を無くせるのか、という疑念が起こっていた。総司令部は天皇再利用方針と両立しうる改革の具体策を早急に打ち出さなければならなかった。最高司令官の指令および日本政府宛の覚書により、教職員の追放、教科書の黒塗り・没収、神道指令による政教分離と国家神道廃止、戦前・戦時の図書・雑誌等の宣伝物の没収、公職者の追放、等の方針が次々と実施されていった。それらを通じて、軍国主義と極端な国家主義が除去されていくこととなる。

本論は、占領初期の種々のプログラムの実施において、軍国主義と極端な国家主義がどのように定義され、具体的に何を除去することに用いられたのかを、考察しようとするものである。種々のプログラムを横断して行われたこの思想の除去作業は、占領政策の重要な政策として位置づけられ、独自の分析対象として扱う意義を持つと考える。

軍国主義と極端な国家主義の除去は、冷静に振り返ると、狂信からの解放という側面と、野蛮な思想浄化という側面を持つものであった。軍国主義による抑圧に耐えてきた日本の知識人、官僚、大学教員の協力があつたことは事実であり、その点からすると、狂信から文明への復帰を促進するこの政策に一定の正当性があつたことは間違いない。だが、それが行きすぎれば、文明の名を借りた歴史の抹殺となってしまう。本稿は、その点を意識して、占領直後から始まった性急な軍国主義と極端な国家主義の除去の足跡をたどっていくこととする。

8) 前掲、『資料日本占領1 天皇制』所収、「資料144 フィリピン弁護士会全国評議会議長アントニオ・アラネータのトルーマン大統領あて[書簡] 1945年11月17日」、459頁。

第1章 「国体」デモクラシーの登場

総司令部は、軍国主義については、ポツダム宣言の4、6条において、天皇を軍国主義の主体ではなく、軍国主義者の助言を受けた客体だったと扱った。だが、極端な国家主義と天皇の関係については、天皇の宗教的地位により、日本人の軍国主義的、極端な国家主義的精神が強められたとして、改革の対象となった。⁹⁾

1945年12月15日の祭政一致・国家神道廃止のために行われた「神道指令」と、その半月後に発表された、1946年元旦の年頭詔書「人間宣言」は、日米双方の様々な関係者が、検討を重ねた成果であったことは、すでによく知られている。¹⁰⁾

「人間宣言」は、次の表に示すように、「神道指令」の骨子を取り入れ、天皇が「現御神（あきつきかみ＝現人神、人の姿をした神）」であることを否定するものとなった（太字参照。下線と太字は筆者註）。

ところが、詔書案の作成段階で、木下侍従次長の機転により、「神の末裔」を「現御神」という言葉に差し替えたことで、天皇が天照大神の子孫、つまり「神の末裔」であることを否定せずにすんでいた。¹¹⁾ さらに、天皇の発意による明治天皇の五箇条の誓文の全文を、詔書の冒頭に、新日本建設の国是として掲げることができた。¹²⁾

神道指令（抜粋） 「国家神道（神社神道）ニ対スル 政府ノ保証、支援、保全、監督及 弘布ノ廃止ニ関スル覚書」 ¹³⁾	人間宣言（抜粋）「年頭詔書」 ¹⁴⁾
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9) 同前、「資料158 PR 三四予備a 天皇制の取り扱い」482頁。「Post WW II foreign policy planning: State Department records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1945」名古屋大学附属図書館所蔵・所収、「[R-34 Preliminary, December-11, 18,-1945, February-8-1946.](#)」。

10) ジョン・ダワー『敗北を抱きしめて』下、岩波書店、2001。藤樫準二「“人間宣言”秘録」、前田多聞「「人間宣言」のうたとそと」、鶴見俊輔・中川六平編『天皇百話』下、ちくま文庫、1989、192 - 224頁。高橋・鈴木前掲書、79 - 90頁。木下道雄『側近日誌』文藝春秋社、1990、84 - 96頁。

11) 前掲、『側近日記』89 - 90頁。

12) 同前、89 - 92頁。前掲、「「人間宣言」のうたとそと」219 - 220頁。

13) 前掲、『日本管理法令研究』1 - 6、「法令条文（日英対照文）」30 - 34頁。

14) 原文は、<http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/056shoshi.html>、を参照。和英対訳については、<http://japanesehistory.de/Documents/NingenSengen.htm>を参照。

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<p>一 (前略) 神道ノ理論及ビ信仰ガ、日本国民ヲ欺キ、コレヲ侵略戦争ニ導カントスル軍国主義的及超国家主義的宣伝ニ再ビ悪用サル、コトヲ防止スル為、(中略) (i)「国体ノ本義」、「臣民ノ道」及ビ神道ニ関スル一切ノ同種ノ官刊行ノ図書、注釈書、解説書又ハ訓令ヲ政府ニヨリ普及スルコトヲ禁止ス。 (j)「大東亜戦争」「八紘一字」及ビ其ノ他ノ語句ニシテ、ソノ日本語ノ内容ガ国家神道、軍国主義及ビ超国家主義ト緊密ニ結合スルモノハ、コレヲ公文書中ニ使用スルコトヲ禁止シ、即時ソノ使用ヲ停止ス。</p> <p>二 (中略) 本指令ハ神道ノミナラズ一切ノ宗教、信仰、宗派、信条、又ハ哲理ノ信奉者ニ対シ、政府ト連結スルコト、<u>軍国主義並ニ超国家主義的観念ノ宣伝ト弘布ヲ禁止ス。</u> (中略) (f) 本指令ニ用ヒタル<u>軍国主義的及ビ超国家主義的観念ハ、左記理由ニヨリ、日本ガ他ノ諸国家ト諸国民ニ其ノ統治権ヲ及ボサントスル使命ヲ主張又ハ弁護スル教旨、信仰及ビ理論ヲ包含スルモノトス。</u> (1) 日本国天皇ハ其ノ古キ祖先、連続セル血統又ハ特殊ナル起源ノ故ニ他ノ諸国元首ニ優ルモノナリトスル教義。 (2) 日本国民ハ其ノ古キ祖先、連続セル血統又ハ特殊ナル起源ノ故ニ他ノ諸国民ニ優ルモノナリトスル教義。 (3) 日本諸島ハ其ノ神聖又ハ特殊ナル起源ノ故ニ他ノ国土ニ優ルモノナリトスル教義。 (4) 日本国民ヲ欺キテ侵略戦争ニ乘リ出サセ、又ハ他国民トノ紛争解決ノ手段トシテ武力ヲ使用スルコトヲ礼賛セシムル傾キアル一切ノ教義。 (後略)</p>	<p>(前略)</p> <p>然レドモ朕ハ爾等国民ト共ニ在リ、常ニ利害ヲ同ジウシ休戚ヲ分タント欲ス。朕ト爾等国民トノ間ノ紐帯ハ、終始相互ノ信頼ト敬愛トニ依リテ結バレ、單ナル神話ト伝説トニ依リテ生ゼルモノニ非ズ。天皇ヲ以テ現御神トシ、且日本国民ヲ以テ他ノ民族ニ優越セル民族ニシテ、延テ世界ヲ支配スベキ運命ヲ有ストノ架空ナル観念ニ基クモノニモ非ズ。 (後略)</p>
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	<p>.....</p> <p>(英文)</p> <p>The ties between Us and Our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world.</p>
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ところで、総司令部は、「現御神」を否定したことで、天皇の神格、“the Emperor is divine”を否定し、神秘のベールをはがせたと確信していた。だが、実は、「神の末裔」であることを否定することと、「現御神（現人神）」であることを否定することの決定的違いを認識できていなかった。

そもそも皇位にある天皇は神性を祖先から継承した人間であった。人の姿をした神ではない。もともと人間である天皇が人間宣言をあらためて行うことになんら矛盾はなかった。当然、国体を否定することにもならなかった。しかし、祖先神から万世にわたり神勅を受け継ぐ者である天皇が、「神の末裔」であることを否定することは、国体を否定することを意味し、「断じて許し難い」(木下侍従次長)ことであったのである。¹⁵⁾

さらに、五箇条の誓文を掲げたことで、天皇は「日本の Democracy 化とは、日本皇室古来の伝統を徹底せしむるにあり。」¹⁶⁾「皇室古来の伝

15) 前掲、『側近日誌』90 頁。

16) 同前、119 頁。侍従次長木下道雄は、「Democracy 化とは、民意主義と訳す

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統に民の心を以て心とする精神があり、この精神を徹底させることが日本の民主化である。」¹⁷⁾ といった、国体に依拠したデモクラシーによる「王政復古」を語っていた。

この、およそアメリカン・デモクラシーとかけ離れた、天皇の「国体」デモクラシー論は、実は、明治天皇が五箇条の誓文と同日（1868（慶応4）年3月14日）に、民衆に対して発した「億兆按撫の宸翰」（「維新の宸翰」）の骨子にほかならなかった。天皇が東宮時代、東洋史学者の白鳥庫吉から学んだ『国史』の記述の口語訳と宸翰の前半部分を紹介する。¹⁸⁾

「このとき天皇は、別に国民に直筆の文書を下され、為政者と人民が天地のように離れていた古い時代のならわしを捨て、君と臣が親しみあい、為政者と人民がおたがいに愛しあった上代のそほくな風習に戻り、困苦をかえりみずにみずから政に励み、万民にみなそれぞれ自分にあったところをみつけるようにさせ、万民もまた私を無にして公議にのって、維新の大業に協力するように、と詔されました。」

「朕幼弱を以て猝に大統を紹ぎ爾來何を以て万国に対立し
列祖に事へ奉らんやと朝夕恐懼に堪ざる也窃に考るに中葉
朝政衰てより武家権を専にし表は
朝廷を推尊して実は敬して是を遠け億兆の父母として絶て赤子の情を
知ること能ざるやふ計りなし遂に億兆の君たるも唯名の上に成り果其
が為に今日
朝廷の尊重は古へに倍せしが如くにて
朝威は倍衰へ上下相離るゝこと霄壤の如しかゝる形勢にて何を以て
天下に君臨せんや今般

べきこと」と語っていた。

17) 「昭和天皇実録」巻三五、昭和21年3月15日条、宮内省所蔵。

18) 白鳥庫吉著、出雲井晶口語訳『昭和天皇の歴史教科書 国史 口語訳』講談社、2004、391 - 392頁。村上重良編『正文訓読 近代詔勅集』新人物往来社、昭和58、28 - 31頁。原文は、国立公文書館データベース http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/DAS/meta/listPhoto?XSLT_NAME=frame&NO=4&BID=F0000000000000087471&IS_STYLE=default&IS_TYPE=PDF&LANG=default&ID=M00000000000000940189&act=&GID=&IMG_FLG=&TYPE=AJAX、を参照。

朝政一新の時に膺り天下億兆一人も其処を得ざる時は皆
朕が罪なれば今日の事
朕自身骨を勞し心志を苦め艱難の先に立古
列祖の盡させ給ひし蹤を履み治蹟を勤めてこそ始めて
天職を奉じて億兆の君たる所に背かざるべし往昔
（後略）」

他方、マッカーサーと総司令部は、この天皇の「国体」デモクラシーを、「はなはだ満足である。天皇は国民の民主化をうながすとともに、自己の将来の立場をハッキリ示した。この健全な思想は、ついにこれをさまたげうるものがないだろう。」と、積極的に支持してしまっていた。¹⁹⁾さらに、マッカーサーはこの3週間後、天皇訴追を阻止すべく、天皇の支配力と国民への影響力を強調し、それが失われた場合の、悲劇的事態の招来について、陸軍参謀総長アイゼンハワーへ意見具申した。²⁰⁾

「天皇を告発するならば、日本国民の間に必ずや大騒乱を惹き起こし、その影響はどれほど過大視してもしすぎることはなからう。天皇は、日本国民統合の象徴であり、天皇を排除するならば、日本は瓦解するであろう。」

当時の日本には抵抗勢力は存在せず、マッカーサーは「国体」ナショナリズムを誇張して、天皇再利用方針の有効性を訴えていた。だが、日本の国体、すなわち神話と信仰により結ばれた天皇と国民の紐帯を強調するのであれば、その裏返しとして、日本に再び侵略的軍国主義が復活するのではないかという、警戒感を惹起させるという矛盾が生じることとなる。天皇再利用方針は、その補完物として、日本人の表現の自由を

19) 藤樫前掲「“人間宣言”秘録」210頁。マッカーサーのコメントの原文は、国会図書館データベース <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/057/057tx.html>、を参照。

20) 前掲、『資料日本占領1』所収、「資料147 CA第5723号ダグラス・マッカーサー元帥から米国陸軍参謀総長（アイゼンハワー）あて 1946年1月25日 機密 緊急 1946年1月25日午前1時54分 東京発信、1月26日受信」、463 - 464頁。国会図書館データベース <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/064shoshi.html>、http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/064/064_0011.html、を参照。

抑圧し、個人とメディアへの徹底的な監視と検閲を行う「警察国家」を登場させたのだと考えられるのである。²¹⁾

第2章 軍国主義と極端な国家主義の定義

軍国主義と極端な国家主義の除去は、民間情報教育局（CI&E：Civil Information and Education Section）と文部省とによる、「軍国主義と極端な国家主義的教育の禁止と教職員の追放」と「修身、日本歴史及地理ノ学科課程停止」から始まった。以下、覚書を紹介しておく。（下線は筆者註）

「・日本ノ教育制度ノ行政ニ関スル覚書 1945年10月22日²²⁾

一 (略)

イ 一切ノ教育ノ内容ハ下記ノ方針ニシタガヒコレヲ批判的ニ検討、修正及ビ統制スルコトヲ要ス

1、軍国主義的、並ニ極端ナル国家主義的觀念ノ普及ハコレヲ禁止シ、凡ユル軍国主義的教育及ビ訓練ハ之ヲ中止セラルベシ（中略）

ロ 一切ノ教育機関ノ職員ハ下記ノ方針ニシタガヒ之ヲ調査、認可、若クハ退職、復職、任命、再教育及ビ監督セラルベシ

1、教師及ビ教育職員ハ可及的速カニ之ヲ調査シ、一切ノ職業軍人、軍国主義、及ビ極端ナル国家主義ノ積極的提唱者、並ニ占領ノ方針ニ積極的ニ敵意ヲ有スル者ハ退職セシメラルベシ（中略）

ハ 教育機構ニ関シテ下記ノ方針ニ基キ批判的ニ検討、修正、及ビ統制セラルベシ

1、現在ノ学科、教科書、教範、及ビ教材ハソノ使用ヲ緩急ノ必要ニ基キ一時的ニ許可セラルルモ、可及的速カニ之ヲ検討シ、

21) この問題については、先行研究から多くの知見を授かった。江藤潤『閉ざされた言語空間』、文春文庫、1994。西尾幹二『GHQ 焚書開封』徳間書店、2008。有山輝雄『占領期メディア史研究－自由と統制・1945年』柏書房、1996。ジョン・ダワー『占領を抱きしめて』下、第一四章新たなタブーを取締まる－検閲民主主義、参照。

22) 『日本管理法令研究』1-4、所収、「法令条文（日英）」43－46頁。

軍国主義的マタハ極端ナル国家主義的觀念ノ促進ヲ目的トスル
箇所ハ除去セラルベシ

（後略）

・教職員ノ調査、精選及資格決定ニ関スル覚書 1945年10月30日²³⁾

一 過去ニ於テ日本ヲ敗戦、戦争犯罪、災害、窮乏ニ導キ、且ツ日本人ヲ現在ノ悲境ニ陥レルコトニ寄与シタル軍国主義的及極端ナル国家主義的勢力ヲ日本ノ教育制度ヨリ除去スルタメニ且ツ軍籍又ハ軍関係ヲ有セシ教師及ビ教育職員ヲ防止スルタメニココニ以下ノ如ク指令ス

イ 軍国主義者トシテ、極端ナル国家主義者トシテ、又ハ連合国軍ノ占領ノ目的及ビ政策ニ対スル反对者トシテ知ラレ、且ツ現在日本ノ教育事業ニ現実ニ従事セル一切ノ人ハ直チニ解職サレ、日本ノ教育事業ニ於ケル如何ナル地位モ占ムコトヲ禁止セラルベシ

（後略）

・修身、日本歴史及地理ノ学科課程停止ニ関スル覚書 1945年12月31日²⁴⁾

一 国家神道及ビ其ノ教義ニ対スル政府ノ保証及支持ノ廃止ヲ布告セル一九四五年一二月一五日附ノ基本指令ニ従ヒ、而シテ学生生徒ニ課セラレタル或種教科書中ニ抜ク可カラザル如クニ織リ込マレタル軍国主義的及ビ極端ナル国家主義的觀念ヲ注入スルコトニ日本政府ガ教育ヲ利用セル事実ニ鑑ミ、茲ニ左ノ通り指令ス。

（後略）

文部省と民間情報教育局は、暫定版教科書（初等、中等、師範および実業学校、1億7000部）を次年度の新学期までにまにあわせなければならず、そのため現行教科書・指導書の英訳と検閲作業において、東京帝国大学助教授の岸本秀夫（宗教学）と海後宗臣（教育史）の協力を取り付けた。²⁵⁾

23) 同前、1-4 「法令条文(日英)」63 - 64頁。

24) 同前、1-6 「法令条文(日英)」42頁。

25) 教育課で教科書とカリキュラムの制定を担当したH. J. ワンダーリック中佐（在職1946年11月7日～翌年4月）と、教育課長マーク・T・オア（在職1946年6月～翌年2月）の二人が、それぞれ詳細な著述を残しており、翻訳書が刊

文部省はポツダム宣言受諾後から、自主的に教科書の回収・検閲を開始していたが、総司令部はそれを引き継ぎ、1945年10月22日付の「日本ノ教育制度ノ行政ニ関スル覚書」²⁶⁾を発した。岸本の協力により作成された、教育局の軍国主義と極端な国家主義の定義は、前掲表の「神道指令」の条項（太字(f)1～4)と同じものが使われた。²⁷⁾ 神道指令と教科書の検閲で同じ定義が用いられたのは、岸本が同局の宗教課にも協力していたためと考えられる。²⁸⁾ 検閲を行う基準については、教育課長オアと教科書担当のワンダーリックの著述がほぼ共通しているため、ワンダーリック本の記載によって次表にそれ示すこととする。²⁹⁾

また、現行教科書の記述を検閲する作業では、「軍国主義と超国家主義の性格を帯びた文章を判定するため」、海後と日本人大学院生のグループが、ボランティアで「国定教科書のすべてを見直し、削除すべき文章に朱印をいれ」、といった作業を行った。³⁰⁾ 日本の専門家たちの「援助なしには、超国家主義や神道の微妙な考え方を明確にして、暫定教科書から完全にふり落とししてしまうことは決してできなかったかもしれない。」というのが、実情であった。

行されている。本稿は両書から有益な示唆を得た。H. J. ワンダーリック著、土持ゲーリー法一監訳『占領下日本の教科書改革』、玉川大学出版部、1998。マーク・T・オア著、土持ゲーリー法一監訳『占領下日本の教育改革政策』玉川大学出版部、1993。

26) 前掲、『日本管理法令研究』1-4「法令条文(日英)」43～46頁。ワンダーリック前掲書、246～7頁。Education in Japan, Part II、国会図書館憲政資料室所蔵、CIE(B)925、63頁。

27) ワンダーリック前掲書、249頁。オア前掲書、119頁。

28) 高橋・鈴木前掲書、193～209頁。ワンダーリック前掲書、53～55頁。

29) オア前掲書、120～121頁。ワンダーリック前掲書、54頁。

30) ワンダーリック前掲書、262～263頁。

民間情報教育局（CI&E）の検閲基準

・軍国主義

他国の権利を尊重し、平和的そして責任ある日本政府の究極的な設立をもたらすために、以下の基準が設定され、軍国主義および侵略の精神を促そうとする教材は、教科書から削除されるべきである。

- 1 国民の英雄のおよび一般的活動として、戦争を賛美すること。
- 2 天皇や祖国のための戦死を名誉とすること。
- 3 人間の最高の名誉として、軍事的偉業や戦争の英雄を美化すること。

・超国家主義

人々の平等権利と自己決定の原則の尊厳にもとづいた、国家間の友好的関係を発展させるために、以下の基準が設定され、教科書から超国家主義が削除されるべきである。

- 1 大東亜共栄圏主義の下での領土拡張。
- 2 日本は世界に冠たる国である、とする日本中心的な八紘一宇的な考え。
- 3 天皇を防御し、国家発展のために、桜の花びらが散るかのごとく人間の生命を犠牲にする大和魂。
- 4 国際連合憲章の目的および原則と矛盾する教育内容。

・天皇制

日本国民間の民主的傾向の復活、強化および個人の自由への願望、基本的人権の尊厳を奨励するために、以下の基準が設定され、天皇制と関連のある教材が教科書から削除されるべきである。

- 1 天皇は神の起源であるとの崇拜。
- 2 天皇のために死ぬことを義務とする考え。
- 3 天皇の勅令に対しての従属的な忠誠心。

さて、「人間宣言」の出された一月を境に、司令部の教育政策の重点が、ネガティブな軍国主義・極端な国家主義の除去から、民主化への建設的作業に移行した。³¹⁾ 前者が追放・検閲・没収等による強圧的な手法であったのに対し、民主化は、国民の抵抗感や反発心を極力抱かせないソフトな手法がとられ、やがて文部省教科書『民主主義』に結実していくこととなる。

ところで、教育改革の民主化路線への移行と入れ替わるかのように、1946年2月15日から、戦時宣伝物の没収（廃棄）が、民間諜報局民間検閲支隊（Civil Intelligence Section, Civil Censorship Detachment）の、出版・映画・放送部調査課（PPB：Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Division, Research Section）によって開始された。³²⁾ 1946年3月17日付の「宣伝用

31) オア前掲書、121頁。

32) 「GHQ/SCAP Records, Civil Intelligence Section = 連合国最高司令官総司令部民

第2部 連合国の「寛大なる講和」と旧枢軸国の対応

刊行物の没収に関する覚書」の出る約1ヶ月前のことであった。

宣伝用刊行物として没収対象となったのは、戦前政党政治全盛期の1928年の1月1日から、1945年9月2日までに刊行された本・定期刊行物・雑誌・レコード、等であった。没収事務の所管は、1947年5月10日の閣令により、出版物の所管が内務省から文部省に移ったのに伴い、総司令部から文部省に移された。³³⁾

ちなみに、PPBが用いた軍国主義と極端な国家主義の判定基準は次のような内容であった。³⁴⁾ 前掲表の情報教育局の教育課・宗教課の作成した内容と同じであった。

「a. 内容上軍国主義的刊行物とみられるもの

1. 軍国主義または帝国主義を高揚しているもの
2. 武士道を奉るもの
3. 国防・軍備を賞揚するもの
4. 敵愾心を唆（そそる）もの

b. 超国家主義的思想を扇動するもの

1. 日本民族の優越性を宣伝するもの
2. 国家神道の神秘性を詳述するもの
3. 大東亜共栄圏の建設または日本をしてアジアや世界の覇者と宣伝するもの
4. 日本の侵略を擁護する立場で連合国を攻撃しているもの」

第3章 戦時宣伝刊行物の没収

実際にどのような作業がPPBで行われていたのか、1946年3月22日付PPB文書で概要が確認できたので紹介したい。³⁵⁾ 1946年2月21

間諜報局文書：CIS - 00154」(国立国会図書館憲政資料室所蔵) 所収、"List of Confiscated War Publications, from 14 January 1947 to 30 April 1947, PPB., CCD." (RG331, BOX8650)。SCAPの検閲組織については、山本武利『GHQの検閲・諜報・宣伝工作』岩波書店、2013、第1章、参照。

33) 同前、「CIS - 00154」。

34) 奥泉栄三郎・古川純「戦時教化・宣伝用刊行物—日本占領下の没収計画とそのゆくえ—」『東京経大会誌』121、1981年6月、35 - 36頁。「CIS - 05301」(国立国会図書館憲政資料室所蔵) 所収、"Propaganda Confiscation" (RG331, BOX8562)。

35) 「CIS - 00175」(国立国会図書館憲政資料室所蔵) 所収、"War Propaganda Confiscation Program" (RG331, BOX8562)。

日から3月21日の1ヶ月間、PPBの調査課は、書店、貸本屋、政府代理店、民間企業、出版社、新聞社から宣伝物と情報を収集し、当該宣伝物の禁止を推奨するか否かの判定を行った。3月22日文書において、疑わしい著作物として本56タイトル、定期刊行物2タイトル、雑誌9タイトルが収集されており、そのうち禁止を推奨（Condemnation Recommended）された本は28タイトル、定期刊行物はなし、雑誌は5タイトルであった。禁止されずに審査をパスしたのが、本9タイトル、定期刊行物1タイトル、雑誌0タイトルであった。残りは、未報告の状態であった（本19タイトル、定期刊行物1タイトル、雑誌4タイトル）。サンプル数は少ないが、約77%が禁止推奨の対象となっていた。

また、著作物を読まないと、公平で偏りのない処理ができないという理由から、実際に担当者が書店に行き、目視して疑わしい刊行物を収集し、持ち帰って通読した上で、禁止するか否かを調査課内で判断し、その報告をPPBに上げる、という作業の流れが定められていた。

没収計画の開始から1年経過後の状況についても、1947年5月21日付PPB文書により確認できた。³⁶⁾ まず、調査課の翻訳者たちは、収集した本に目を通して判定を行い、禁止と判定した本については、日本政府に報告し、所定の手続きに則って内務省警保局や地方の軍政当局チームが、書店、貸本屋等からそれらの刊行物を没収し、倉庫に収容する、という流れとなっていた。

疑わしくないと判定され、禁止されない物もあった。同文書の記載によると、全860タイトル中、671タイトル、31402冊が収集されたのに対し、審査をパスしたのは189タイトルとなっていた。禁止されたタイトル数は、前述した実施当初のサンプリング調査とほぼ同じ78%の比率であった。

PPBは出版の禁止、ページの削除、原版の廃棄、本・雑誌の収集を行い、1947年5月までに約6万点以上となった。没収された戦時宣伝物は内務省の倉庫に送られた後、パルプ製造の資源となった。トンあたり6割が再生紙にできると期待されていた。教育図書の没収においてもそうであったが、宣伝物の没収は、決して「焚書」ではなく、紙資源不

36) 前掲、「CIS - 00154」所収、「List of Confiscated War Publications, from 14 January 1947 to 30 April 1947, PPB., CCD.」（RG331, BOX8650）。

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足のため、パルプの原料にリサイクルされるというのが、最高司令部の弁明であった。³⁷⁾ なお、調査・没収にかかるあらゆる違反行為は、1946年7月15日に施行された、勅令311号、「連合国軍の占領目的に有害な行為に対する処罰等に関する勅令」違反による処罰の対象となった。

先行研究によると、民間検閲支隊による宣伝物没収計画が、1946年3月～1948年7月まで実施されたことが確認されている。³⁸⁾ 実際には、これ以後も継続実施されていた。筆者は、翌1949年7月31日まで没収作業が継続していたことを示す集計表を確認している。³⁹⁾

1946年3月17日～1948年7月10日までの没収宣伝物の総計は、タイトル7769点、3万8330冊であった。筆者が確認した集計表によると、1948年7月25日～翌49年7月31日までの没収数は、2517冊となっていた。1946年3月から1949年7月31日までの合計は、4万847冊にのぼったことになる。

他方、日本出版配給統制会社（The Japan Publication Distribution Controlling Co., Ltd.）と出版社が自主的に、戦時宣伝物を廃棄していた。1946年2月20日付、PPBの「破棄された刊行物」のリストにとると、日本出版配給統制会社が破棄した刊行物は、9タイトルで20万5226冊、出版社が破棄した刊行物は、講談社、小学館など4社で5タイトル、48万8100冊、出版協会と出版社が共同で破棄した刊行物は2タイトル、37万8000冊となっていた。総計107万1326冊にのぼった。⁴⁰⁾

ところで、没収計画実施当初に、出版・映画・放送部（PPB）の調査課（RS）で興味深い判定が出されていた。翻訳者の報告作業時に、「神道指令」で禁止されていた『国体の本義』が、禁止を推奨しない方に分類されていたのである。1946年3月22日付PPB文書によると、⁴¹⁾ 文書中、“Seishin Do”書店（誠心堂カ、東京神田神保町1丁目3）から没収

37) ワンダーリック前掲書、46、82、271頁。

38) 奥泉・古川前掲論文、35－37頁。文部省社会教育局編『連合国軍総司令部没収指定図書総目録』、今日の話題社、1982、1－8頁。

39) 前掲、「CIS－05301」所収、“Propaganda Confiscation”（RG331,BOX8562）。

40) 「CIS－00176」（国立国会図書館所蔵）、所収、“War Propaganda Confiscation Program”（RG331,BOX8650）。

41) 前掲、「CIS－00175」。「CIS－00153」（国立国会図書館所蔵）所収、“List of Confiscated War Publications, from 4 March 1946 to December 1946, War Publications Section PPB., CCD.”（RG331,BOX8650）。

した10点の本の判定をしたところ、禁止を推奨しないものが5割にも上った（下記の表参照）。禁止を免れた5点のうち、PPB 部内でどのように処理されたのか不明であるが、『国体の本義』、『われ等の勝利』『日英必戦論』の3点は、何時の時点かは未詳であるが、日本政府へ没収（廃棄）が指示された。⁴²⁾

軍国主義と極端な国家主義の定義と基準が、総司令部内で統一されていたことは、既述した通りである。では、なぜ調査課内でこのような結果が出たのだろうか。特に『国体の本義』は、神道指令で『臣民の道』とともに禁止された本であり、また、前章の末尾に掲げた判定基準の、「b. 超国家主義的思想を扇動するもの」の、「1. 日本民族の優越性を宣伝するもの」および「2. 国家神道の神秘性を詳述するもの」に該当していることは明らかであった。⁴³⁾

Condemnation is recommended	Condemnation is not recommended
『思想戦の勝利へ』	『東亜社会研究』
『思想戦』	* 『国体の本義』
『大東亜太平洋圏の新展望』	『皇道と生命の宗教』
『興亜青年の道』	* 『われ等の勝利』
『日本世界観』	* 『日英必戦論』

判定には当該著作物の要約とコメントが付されていた。次の表に併記したように、『国体の本義』の要約とコメントは、主に『国体の本義』の「緒言」と「結語」の一部分を要約して書かれており、はたしてどの程度読解してコメントが書かれたのかは不明である（太字部分一筆者註）。

禁止を推奨しない（Condemnation is not recommended）理由としては、「今日の、開かれた自由で偏見のない視点で読むと大変教訓的である」とコメントされていた。日本人にとって、日本が破滅に至った教訓を引き出せる著作物だという見解が示されていた。⁴⁴⁾

42) 前掲、文部省社会教育局編『連合国軍総司令部 没収指定図書総目録』。

43) 『国体の本義』。原文は、<http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1219377>、を参照。44) 前掲、「CIS - 00175」、「CIS - 00153」。

第2部 連合国の「寛大なる講和」と旧枢軸国の対応

この、歴史の教訓となりうる学術的、歴史的著作物は、廃棄するのではなく、後世に残すべきだという考え方は、注目に値する。このコメントを誰が書いたのかは不明だが、日本人の理性と知性に信頼を寄せることのできた人物であったと思われる。だが、こうした意見は受け入れられることなく、すくなくとも約三年半にわたって没収計画は実施され続けた。その結果、占領期の日本人は、過去十数年の苦い経験に向き合うための、手段と機会の両方を失ったのであった。

<p>KOKUTAI NO HONGI (The True Meaning of National Polity) Edited by the Ministry of Education: Published by the Naikaku Insatsu Kyoku; 31 March 1943.</p>	<p>『国体の本義』の緒言と結語</p>
<p>「The True Meaning of National Polity compares the Eastern and Western concept of politics and life. The present western thought, it declares, is considered as the 'enlightenment thought' which originated from the 18th century. It values rationalism, realism, and individualism as basis of human life and the universe. As a result Westerners pursue freedom and equality to such an extent that's morality is generally underestimated and neglected.</p> <p>On the other hand, the Eastern concept is based on the belief is the unbroken Imperial lineage, filial piety and loyalty, harmony and concord. It disregards self and places nationalism and subservience above the individual. Eastern thought stresses solidarity and national morals.</p>	<p>(前略)</p> <p>「抑々我が国に輸入せられた西洋思想は、主として十八世紀以来の啓蒙思想であり、或はその延長としての思想である。これらの思想の根底をなす世界観・人生観は、歴史的考察を欠いた合理主義であり、実証主義であり、一面に於て個人に至高の価値を認め、個人の自由と平等とを主張すると共に……」。 (緒言 3 頁)</p> <p>「従つて、恣な自由解放のみを求め、奉仕といふ道德的自由を忘れた謬れる自由主義や民主主義が発達した。(後略)」。 (結語 151 頁)</p>
<p>This book reviews the Meiji period when the Japanese people readily accepted Western philosophy and ignored their traditional thought and spirit. As a result dualism prevailed because people were not prepared mentally to accept Western science and thought.</p>	<p>「明治以来の我が国の傾向を見るに、或は伝統精神を棄てて全く西洋思想に没入したのがあり、或は歴史的な信念を維持しながら、而も西洋の学術理論に関して十分な批判を加へず、そのまゝこれを踏襲して二元的な思想に陥り、而もこれを意識せざるものがある。」 (結語 149 頁)</p>

<p>The book concludes, “the mission of our countrymen’s lies in promoting the Japanese spirit as well as fostering Imperial prosperity.”</p> <p>The True Meaning of National Polity, if read now by a Japanese with an open, free, and unbiased mind, would be very instructive. The contents, as such, are harmless. The condemnation of this book is not recommended. 」</p>	<p>「我等が世界に貢献することは、たゞ日本人たるの道を彌々發揮することによつてのみなされる。国民は国家の大本としての不易な国体と、古今に一貫し中外に施して悖らざる皇国の道とによつて、維れ新たなる日本を益々生成発展せしめ、以て、彌々天壤無窮の皇運を扶翼し奉らねばならぬ。これ、我等国民の使命である。」（結語 156 頁）</p>
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第 4 章 「正しい」国体明徴運動の登場

民主化への移行事業に着手した情報教育局においても、興味深い判断が行われていた。1946 年 5 月、教育課では、日本人に抵抗感や反発を招くことなく、過去を反省させ、民主主義・個人主義の価値を理解させるため、『新教育指針』と題した教育指導書を作成した。⁴⁵⁾ その『新教育指針』においても、軍国主義・極端な国家主義が、コア・タームとして用いられていた。

ところが、『新教育指針』の記述において、教育における国体啓発運動が「正しい運動」、「These movements were in the right」として容認されていた。次の表の、日英対照文の波線部を見ていただきたい。「第二章 軍国主義及び極端な国家主義の除去」の「三、日本の軍国主義及び極端な国家主義は、どのやうにして起り、どんなあやまちをおかしたか」から抜粋したものである。（下線部の直線、波線は筆者註）

45) オア前掲書、121 頁。文部省『新教育指針 第一分冊 第一部 前へん 新日本建設の根本問題一』文部省、1946 17 - 18 頁。<http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1281779>、を参照。

<p>文部省『新教育指針 第一分冊 —第一部 前ぺん 新日本建設の 根本問題—』</p>	<p>Guide to New Education in Japan Volume I, Part A, Fundamental Problems Establishment of New Japan ⁴⁶⁾</p>
<p>(前略) 日本の軍国主義及び極端な国家主義は、ここに明らかな出発点を見ることができる。すなはちこの事変（満州事変—筆者註）をきっかけとして、これまでおさへられてゐた軍人の勢力が再び盛り上がり、この機会に国内の改革も行はうとする青年将校の仲間も出てきた。</p> <p>(略) かうした情勢のもとに、たくさんの右翼団体がつくられ、学者・思想家のうちからも、国する主義を主張し、外国文化をしりぞける人々があらはれた。また役人の一部にもこの傾向に属する仲間が勢力を得て、いはゆる新官りようとなり、さらに財ばつのうちにもこの形勢を利用して資本主義の発展をくはだてる人々があらはれた。このやうな軍ばつ・右翼団体・国する思想家・官りよう・財ばつが最近の日本の指導者となつて、ここに軍国主義及び極端な国家主義が明らかに形づくられたのである。「国防国家」、「新体制」、「国民精神総動員」、「大政翼賛」などの標語のもとに行はれたすべての運動は、そのあらはれにほかならない。</p> <p>教育においても「国體明徴」とか、「教育刷新」とか、「皇国の道に則る国民錬成」とかがさかんに説かれて、制度も教科書も方法もあらためられ、また教学局や国民精神文化研究所といふやうな機関がつくられたり、『国體の本義』、『臣民の道』、『国史概説』などの書物が出されたりした。これらは、日本国民がいつまでも西洋のまねをすることをやめて、自主的態度をも</p>	<p>In education, too, such principles as “Clarification of National Characteristics”, “Education and Learning Reform”, “Discipline of the Nation along the Way of the Empier”, etc., were enthusiastically preached, systems, textbooks, and methods were changed, Education and Learning Board, National Spiritual Culture Research Institute and other institutions were established; “The Principle of</p>

46) 「CIE(C)01746」(国立国会図書館所蔵)、所収、“Guide to New Education in Japan- Volume I , Part A, Fundamental Problems of the Establishment of New Japan”, (RG331, BOX5345)。

<p>つて、国體を自覺し、国史を尊重し、国民性の長所を生かして、特色ある文化を發展させ、世界人類のためにつくさうとするものであるかぎり、正しい運動であつた。しかしながら、軍国主義者や極端な国家主義者は、この運動をあやまつた方向に導いた。すなはち、国民としての自覚や国民性の長所をあまり強くいひすぎて、もはや外国から何事をも学ぶ必要がないかのやうに説き、西洋諸国は東亜をうばひ取つたものであるからこれを追ひはらはねばならぬと教え、日本固有の精神をもつて大東亞諸民族を指導し支配することが、皇国の道を実現することであると主張した。 (略)</p>	<p>National structure”, “The Way of the Subjects”, “A Survey of Japanese History”, and other books were published. These movements were in the right, insofar as the ideal of the Japanese people was to cease to imitate Europe and America, to be conscious of the national characteristics in an independent attitude, to respect the history of the country, and, by letting grow the strong points in the national traits, and by developing a culture of their own, to contribute to the welfare of the world. But the militarists and ultra-nationalists diverted these movements into the wrong direction.</p>
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『新教育指針』は、国体精神の涵養を目指す啓蒙運動を「正しい」とする一方、「しかしながら、軍国主義者や極端な国家主義者は、この運動をあやまつた方向に導いた。」と説明した。おそらく、国体精神を涵養する「正しい」国体明徴運動に参加した学者、知識人の協力を得たことで、このような自己正当化の記述が登場したのではないかと推測する。具体的な検証は他の機会に譲るが、ここでは、CI&E 教育課が国体について、「正しい」国体明徴運動と、国体の「悪用」という二分法を用い始めたことに注目したい。国体の悪用が「極端な国家主義」に分別されるのであれば、当然、あるべき国体と、「極端ではない」国家主義の存在が了解されていたことになる。

前掲表の CI&E 文書の英文の波線部を見れば明らかなように、文部省は翻訳上の操作で教育課のチェックをすり抜けていたわけでは決していない。1945 年 12 月 15 日の「神道指令」で始まった、軍国主義・極端な国家主義の除去は、半年後、「正しい」国体明徴運動を肯定するに至ったのであった。しかも、「神道指令」により、『国體の本義』と『臣民の道』は禁止されていた。この『新教育指針』では、「神道指令」に背反

する判断が出てしまっていたのであった。⁴⁷⁾

おわりに

既述したように、総司令部による、各種改革プログラムを通じた軍国主義と極端な国家主義の除去政策は、次第に矛盾点を露呈するようになった。本来この政策は、民主主義的憲法改正案を起案するための発射台を作ることで、役目を終えてよいはずであった。また、総司令部による天皇再利用方針については、日本人の自由な言論活動の中で見直されてしかるべきであった。

ところが、周知のように、マッカーサー元帥は、極東委員会の介入を嫌い、総司令部内で極秘に作成された憲法改正案を、日本政府と帝国議会に受け入れさせた。そして、この憲法を超越した統治者は、新憲法を都合良く無視することで、占領政策における矛盾点をさらに増大させていったと考えられるのである。軍国主義と極端な国家主義の除去は、様々な矛盾点を抱え込んだまま、憲法改正問題において、戦争放棄、主権、国体観念をめぐる議論に影響を及ぼしていくこととなる。残念ながら、紙幅が付きため、この課題については稿を改めて検討したい。

附記

本稿は JSPS 科研費 23243026 の助成を受けた、基盤研究 (A) 「日米特殊関係による東アジア地域再編の政治経済史研究」における研究成果である。

※本論文は『名古屋大学学術機関リポジトリ』 (<http://ir.nul.nagoya-u.ac.jp/jspui/>) 内に電子版が掲載されており、閲覧・ダウンロードが可能である。

47) 長谷川亮一『皇国史観という問題 十五年戦争期における文部省の修史事業と思想統制政策』白澤社、2008、318 - 321 頁、では、『新教育指針』のこの記述を戦後の新しい国体観だと指摘している。

SECRET



970
"R-34 Preliminary
December 11, 1945

TREATMENT OF THE INSTITUTION
OF THE EMPEROR

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate a policy regarding the treatment of the institution of the Emperor in Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A" for "Facts Bearing on the Problem".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B" for "Discussion".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. In view of the nature of American assurances to the Japanese regarding their immediate and ultimate form of government, the Japanese should be allowed to retain a monarchical form of government, if they so desire.

b. If the Japanese people should show a desire for the complete elimination of the throne in Japan, the Supreme Commander should give encouragement and aid to the creation of a Republic, but, in view of the extreme improbability that the Japanese will be willing to eliminate the institution of the emperor, the Supreme Commander should not take the initiative in advocating such a move but, instead, should exert whatever pressure he deems advisable to transform the imperial institution in Japan into a Constitutional Monarchy.

c. The

c. The Supreme Commander should give the Japanese people as much time as possible to make up their minds regarding the ultimate role of the imperial institution in Japan, for the longer the decision is delayed the more time there will be for a liberal and enlightened attitude regarding the institution of the emperor to develop.

d. The Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese government the desirability of the following reforms, but he should not order the Japanese government to effect these reforms, unless the Japanese government has clearly shown its unwillingness to act in these matters:

(1) Articles I, III, and IV of the Constitution should be changed in wording and in spirit so as to eliminate the implications that the imperial line is divine and so as to have it made clear that the emperor is under the Constitution. As a sign of the new position of the emperor under the Constitution, the bulk of the personal fortune of the imperial family, particularly income producing property and securities, should be classed as public property, and the financial support of the imperial family should be provided largely by the regular government budget, voted by the Diet.

(2) The use of public schools for teaching the divinity of the imperial line and for inculcating a sense of blind devotion to the emperor should be stopped, textbooks should be so modified as to eliminate all statements or implications of the divine origin of the imperial line or the divinity of the emperor, Shinto Shrines housing portraits of the emperor should be banned from public school property, enforced obeisance to pictures of the emperor should not be permitted, and there should be no special ceremonial connected with the handling of the imperial rescript on education, if it is still read in schools.

(3) Extreme measures to keep the person of the emperor mysteriously distant from the public and veiled in awesome secrecy should be abandoned.

e. The Supreme Commander should exert every effort to influence the emperor voluntarily to demonstrate by word and deed to his people that he is an ordinary human being not different from other Japanese or from foreigners,

that

that he himself does not believe in the divine origin of the imperial line or the mystical superiority of Japan over other lands, and that there is no such thing as the "imperial will" as distinct from government policy. Specific measures the emperor could take would be to remove the veil of mystery about his personal life, to mix more freely and on terms of greater equality with foreigners and Japanese, and to make whatever pronouncements regarding the origin of the imperial line, the equality of all races, and the true nature of the "imperial will" that the Japanese government is willing to let him make. Any attempt to persuade the emperor to participate in his own "debunking" should be made in such a manner as to be unknown to the Japanese people and should be handled with such diplomacy as to give no suggestion of compulsion.

f. The Supreme Commander should not indict the emperor as a war criminal or demand his abdication, unless conclusive evidence is discovered of the emperor's personal insistence upon war or upon measures now classed as war crimes. The emperor's support of war measures on the advice of his government should not be classed as a war crime on his part, and he should be held responsible only for such of his acts as were performed against the wishes of his government.

g. If the present emperor shows a disposition to cooperate in his own "debunking", the Supreme Commander, without publicly committing himself, should attempt to persuade the emperor to remain on the throne, at least until the Crown Prince attains his majority, should that also be the wish of the Japanese people.

Appendix "A"

APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. In the Potsdam Declaration it is stated that:

"The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason."

* * * *

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest. We insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

* * * *

"The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."

* * * *

"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible Government."

2. The Japanese note to the United States of August 10, 1945, expressed the willingness of the Japanese Government to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."

3. The American reply to Japan, dated August 11, 1945, did not flatly reject the Japanese condition but stated:

"From

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms."

* * * *

"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."

4. The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan states:

"The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

"(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.

"(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people."

* * * *

"The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

"In view

"In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it."

Appendix "B"

APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The Potsdam Declaration, the American reply to the Japanese Government of August 11, 1945, and the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy" together constitute clear assurances to the Japanese people that during the initial post-surrender period the United States, as far as is practicable, would exercise its authority over Japan "through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor" and that our long-range policy is to see to it that "the ultimate form of the government of Japan shall be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people," provided that the result be "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government". With the United Kingdom as one of the signers of the Potsdam Declaration, no interpretation of these statements can exclude a monarchical form of government as one which is consistent with Allied demands and therefore to be permitted to the Japanese, if that is what they desire. The retention of a monarchical form of government in Japan, which has had but one ruling family for at least the past 1500 years, can only mean the retention of the present imperial family on the Japanese throne.

2. The main objective of the Allies in Japan, "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government," may be obtained either through a Republic or a Constitutional Monarchy. The United States would doubtless prefer to see a Republican form of government adopted in Japan, and, if the Japanese people were to show a desire to eliminate the throne entirely, the United States would be ready to give encouragement and aid to the creation of a Republic. However, all available evidence as to public opinion in Japan leads to the conclusion that the Japanese as a whole are strongly devoted to the institution of the emperor and wish to retain it. Of the various political groups in Japan, only the Communists, a relatively small group, have expressed any desire to abolish the throne. Consequently, any insistence on our part that Japan abandon the monarchy not only would run counter to the American assurances discussed in the preceding paragraph but also would encounter bitter opposition from the Japanese people as a whole. Such a policy would undermine faith in the word of the United States Government and would have a most deleterious influence upon the effective control of Japan by the occupation forces and also upon the attainment of our ultimate objectives in Japan.

3. The United

3. The United States could exert pressure to influence the Japanese to abandon the imperial institution, but even this would be unwise. Such a course would probably so antagonize the vast majority of Japanese as to necessitate far greater commitments of American forces and resources than is now contemplated, would probably endanger the spirit of cooperation now being shown by the Japanese government and people, and might greatly increase the difficulties of creating "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government" in Japan. One specific outcome of strong American advocacy of the complete abolition of the throne in Japan would probably be the undermining of the political strength of those elements which stand for political democracy and economic liberalism and the strengthening of the extremist elements, such as the anti-occidental militaristic reactionaries on the one side and the Communists on the other.

4. In view of the extreme improbability that any action on our part could persuade the Japanese Government or people willingly to abandon the imperial institution, it is believed that the United States, instead of insisting upon or exerting pressure in behalf of the creation of a Republican form of government in Japan, should exert whatever pressure is deemed advisable to transform the imperial institution in Japan into a British type Constitutional Monarchy. Such a policy would not endanger the effective control of Japan by the occupation forces and would unquestionably bring us more quickly and more surely to the attainment of our ultimate objectives in Japan.

5. If the ultimate form of the Japanese Government is to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, it is imperative that the Japanese people as a whole have a liberal and enlightened attitude toward the institution of the emperor before they make their final decision regarding the future position of the throne in Japan. All evidence indicates that only very small groups in Japan now have what might be termed a liberal and enlightened attitude toward the institution of the emperor and it will take considerable time before the masses of Japan can revise their thinking regarding the imperial institution. Since this is the situation, we should not force the Japanese to make any hurried decision regarding the ultimate role of the emperor in Japan but should encourage them to wait as long as possible before making their decision, in the hope that the longer they wait the more liberal and enlightened Japanese public opinion will have become.

6. Although

6. Although the final decision regarding the institution of the emperor must be made by the Japanese themselves, there are certain modifications in the institution which should be made as soon as possible, if, as is stated in the Potsdam Declaration, we are to be certain that the Japanese people have "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government," if "the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest" are to be eliminated for all time, if "irresponsible militarism" is to be driven from the world, and if "all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people" are to be removed. Such modifications in the imperial institution are all thoroughly consistent with the policy of transforming the institution into a Constitutional Monarchy.

7. The position of the emperor, as it has existed in the past in Japan, is threefold, - political, religious, and symbolic and sentimental. Many modifications in the political and religious aspects of the institution of the emperor are called for. SWNCC 228, entitled "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System", adequately treats the reforms concerned with the emperor's political position by suggesting modifications in the Constitution and in the processes of government in Japan which will help insure that the imperial institution will not be a bar to the creation of a responsible government, an obstacle "to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people", or an opening wedge for the return of "irresponsible militarism." There remains, however, the religious position of the emperor, which in the past has been used to strengthen an ultra-nationalistic and militaristic spirit among the Japanese and has been utilized by "irresponsible militarists" in their climb to power and which, therefore, is a factor militating against the creation of a peacefully inclined government in Japan.

8. The religious role of the emperor is twofold. Firstly, he is the high priest of traditional Shinto cults, and, secondly, he himself is considered to be a semi-divine person and an object of veneration. The imperial function as high priest has been exercised uninterruptedly since remote antiquity and, during most of Japanese history, has been performed by emperors who had no direct connection with the actual administration of the land or any position of authority in the world of politics. It consists of the performance of many

rituals

rituals which are purely traditional and which are little known and little noticed by the general public. The performance by the emperor of such rituals would seem to be consistent with a position as a Constitutional Monarch and should, therefore, be permitted, unless general policy on the treatment of state Shinto should necessitate the disassociation of the emperor from all Shinto cults.

9. The position of the emperor in the eyes of the Japanese as a semi-divine personage has resulted in modern times in the following specific dangers to the creation of a peacefully inclined government:

a) The supposedly divine origin of the imperial family and the divinity of the person of the emperor himself have been used to justify a theory of Japanese superiority and a belief in the natural right of the Japanese to rule over other lands.

b) The cult of emperor worship, fostered by extreme indoctrination in the schools, by surrounding the imperial family with a mysterious veil of secrecy, intended to create a feeling of awe in the average subject, and by enforced acts of veneration, such as obeisance to imperial portraits in schools, and excessive signs of respect in the handling of imperial rescripts, has created a blind devotion on the part of the common people to the emperor, and this devotion has been susceptible of ready conversion into support for wars of foreign aggression.

c) The belief that there is such a thing as a mystic "imperial will" distinct from the policies of the government has been cited as justification for militaristic and ultra-nationalistic acts not authorized by the government and has, therefore, been used by militarists to help them win control over the government by illegal acts.

10. The position of the emperor as a semi-divine personage rests primarily upon the belief in the hearts of millions of Japanese and only secondarily upon official statements and on enforced acts of veneration and of excessive respect. The following are certain specific measures which should be taken to remove these secondary bases for belief in the emperor's divinity:

a) Articles

a) Articles I, III, and IV of the Constitution should be changed in wording and in spirit so as to eliminate the implications that the imperial line is divine and so as to have it made clear that the emperor is under the Constitution. The phraseology used by Professor Minobe in describing the emperor as an "organ" of the Constitution may have been so discredited in Japan as to be unacceptable, but the spirit of Professor Minobe's interpretation should be officially accepted. As a sign of the new position of the emperor under the Constitution, it would be desirable to have the bulk of the personal fortune of the imperial family, particularly income-producing property and securities, classed as public property and the financial support of the imperial family provided largely by the regular government budget, voted by the Diet.

b) The use of public schools for teaching the divinity of the imperial line and for inculcating a sense of blind devotion to the emperor should be stopped, textbooks should be so modified as to eliminate all statements or implications of the divine origin of the imperial line or the divinity of the emperor, Shinto shrines housing portraits of the emperor should be banned from public school property, enforced obeisance to pictures of the emperor should not be permitted, and there should be no special ceremonial connected with the handling of the imperial rescript on education, if it is still read in schools.

c) Extreme measures to keep the person of the emperor mysteriously distant from the public and veiled in awesome secrecy should not be permitted.

The above reforms should, if at all possible, be effected without any public order from the Supreme Commander, for, if it were known that these measures had been imposed by the Allies, it would rob them of most of their efficacy.

11. The belief in the hearts of the Japanese that the emperor is divine cannot be attacked frontally. Any too direct or too open insistence by Allied authorities that the Japanese abandon this belief would probably only strengthen it. All that can be done is to give free rein and encouragement to all individuals or groups among the Japanese who attempt to disprove the supposed divinity of the emperor. By far the most effective attack on imperial divinity could be made by the emperor himself, and there is good reason to believe that the emperor may be willing to cooperate in "debunking" himself. Every effort should be made to influence the emperor voluntarily to demonstrate by word and deed to his

people

people that he is an ordinary human being not different from other Japanese or from foreigners, that he himself does not believe in the divine origin of the imperial line or the mystical superiority of Japan over other lands, and that there is no such thing as the "imperial will" as distinct from government policy. Specific measures the emperor could take would be to remove the veil of mystery about his personal life, to mix more freely and on terms of greater equality with foreigners and Japanese, and to make whatever pronouncements regarding the origin of the imperial line, the equality of all races, and the true nature of the "imperial will" that the Japanese government is willing to let him make. Any attempt to persuade the emperor to participate in his own "debunking" would have to be made in such a manner as to be unknown to the Japanese people and should be handled with such diplomacy as to give no suggestion of compulsion.

12. The treatment of the institution of the emperor is intimately tied up with the more specific problem of the treatment of the person of the present emperor. Assurances given by the Allies and by the United States Government regarding the temporary retention of the emperor and the freedom of the Japanese to choose their ultimate form of government, although not constituting a definite pledge not to treat the present emperor as a war criminal nor to insist upon his abdication, unquestionably have been so interpreted by the Japanese people. Moreover, references in the Potsdam Declaration to "self-willed militaristic advisers", and "those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest" are so phrased that they can only be understood by the Japanese as implying that we hold the militaristic advisers of the emperor guilty for the war and not the emperor himself. This being the case, any sudden step now on our part to treat the emperor as a war criminal or to force his abdication would be viewed by the Japanese as a serious breach of faith, would threaten the effective control of Japan by the occupation forces, and, by undermining Japanese confidence in our fairness and honesty, would adversely influence the attainment of our ultimate objectives in Japan. It is, therefore, deemed advisable to adopt a policy of avoiding indictment of the emperor as a war criminal and of abstaining from demands for his abdication, unless conclusive evidence is discovered of his personal insistence upon war or upon measures now classed as war crimes. In view of our belief that he should be a Constitutional Monarch, his support of war measures on the advice of his government should not be classed as a war crime on his part, and he should be held responsible only for such acts as were performed against the wishes of his government.

13. If the present emperor shows a disposition to cooperate in his own "debunking", it would be to the advantage of the Allies to have him remain on the throne, should that also be the wish of the Japanese people. The accession of a minor to the throne and the institution of a Regency at this time would keep the person of the emperor necessarily remote from the people, until the Crown Prince reaches his majority, and would, thus, make the "debunking" of the imperial institution far more difficult than if there were an adult on the throne who is willing to cooperate in the process of humanizing the institution and in removing the veils of secrecy from around it.

SECRET

PR-34 Preliminary a
December 18, 1945

TREATMENT OF THE INSTITUTION
OF THE EMPEROR

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate a policy regarding the treatment of the imperial institution in Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. The United States has made assurances to the Japanese that the ultimate form of the government of Japan shall be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, provided that the result be a peacefully inclined and responsible government, and we are, therefore, committed to accept any such government.

b. A monarchical form of government in Japan, if so modified as to be a peacefully inclined and responsible Constitutional Monarchy, would not be inconsistent with American objectives in Japan. Consequently, the Japanese, if they so desire, should be allowed to retain their present monarchy, provided it be transformed into a peacefully inclined and responsible Constitutional Monarchy.

c. If the Japanese people should show a desire for the complete elimination of the throne in Japan, the Supreme Commander should give encouragement and aid to the creation of a republic, but, in view of the

improbability

improbability that the Japanese will be willing to eliminate the institution of the emperor, the Supreme Commander should not take the initiative in advocating such a move. Instead, he should give support and aid to Japanese efforts to transform the imperial institution in Japan into a Constitutional Monarchy, if that is what the Japanese wish.

d. The Supreme Commander should give the Japanese people as much time as possible to make up their minds regarding the ultimate role of the imperial institution in Japan, for the longer the decision is delayed the more time there will be for a liberal and enlightened attitude regarding the institution of the emperor to develop.

e. The Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese government the desirability of the following reforms, but he should not order the Japanese government to effect these reforms, unless the Japanese government has clearly shown its unwillingness to act in these matters.

(1) Articles I, III, and IV of the Constitution should be changed in wording and in spirit so as to eliminate the implications that the imperial line is divine and so as to have it made clear that the emperor is under the Constitution. As a sign of the new position of the emperor under the Constitution, the bulk of the personal fortune of the imperial family, particularly income producing property and securities, should be classed as public property, and the financial support of the imperial family should be provided largely by the regular government budget, voted by the Diet.

(2) The use of public schools for teaching the divinity of the imperial line and for inculcating a sense of blind devotion to the emperor should be stopped, textbooks should be so modified as to eliminate all statements or implications of the divine origin of the imperial line or the divinity of the emperor, Shinto Shrines housing portraits of the emperor should be banned from public school property, enforced obeisance to pictures of the emperor should not be permitted, and there should be no special ceremonial connected with the handling of the imperial rescript on education, if it is still read in schools.

(3) Extreme measures to keep the person of the emperor mysteriously distant from the public and veiled in awesome secrecy should be abandoned.

f. The Supreme Commander should exert every effort to influence the emperor voluntarily to demonstrate by word and deed to his people that he is human being not different from other Japanese, that he himself does not believe in the divine origin of the imperial line or the mystical superiority of Japan over other lands, and that there is no such thing as the "imperial will" as distinct from government policy. Specific measures the emperor could take would be remove the veil of mystery about his personal life, to mix more freely and on terms of greater equality with foreigners and Japanese, and to make whatever pronouncements regarding the origin of the imperial line, the equality of all races, and the true nature of the "imperial will" that the Japanese government is willing to let him make. Any attempt to persuade the emperor to participate in his own "debunking" should be made in such a manner as to be unknown to the Japanese people and should be handled with such diplomacy as to give no suggestion of compulsion.

Appendix "A"

APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. In the Potsdam Declaration it is stated that:

"The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason."

* * * *

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest. We insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

* * * *

"The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."

* * * *

"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible Government."

2. The Japanese note to the United States of August 10, 1945, expressed the willingness of the Japanese Government to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."

3. The American reply to Japan, dated August 11, 1945, did not flatly reject the Japanese condition but stated:

"From

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms."

* * * *

"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."

4. The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan states:

"The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

- "(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.
- "(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people."

* * * *

"The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

"In view

"In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it."

Appendix "B"

APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The Potsdam Declaration, the American reply to the Japanese Government of August 11, 1945, and the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy" together constitute clear assurances to the Japanese people that during the initial post-surrender period the United States, as far as is practicable, would exercise its authority over Japan "through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor," and that our long-range policy is to see to it that "the ultimate form of the government of Japan shall ... be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people," provided that the result be "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government". Such statements mean that the United States is ready to accept any peacefully inclined and responsible government in Japan which is created or supported by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

2. With the United Kingdom as one of the signers of the Potsdam Declaration, no interpretation of the above statements can exclude a peacefully inclined and responsible Constitution Monarchy as a form of government consistent with Allied demands and therefore to be permitted the Japanese, if that is what they desire. The retention of a monarchical form of government in Japan, which has had but one ruling family for at least the past 1500 years, can only mean the retention of the present imperial family on the Japanese throne.

3. The main objective of the Allies in Japan, "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government," may be obtained either through a republic or a Constitutional monarchy. The United States would doubtless prefer to see a republican form of government adopted in Japan, and, if the Japanese people were to show a desire to eliminate the throne entirely, the United States would be ready to give encouragement and aid to the creation of a republic. However, all available evidence as to public opinion in Japan leads to the conclusion that the Japanese as a whole are strongly devoted to the institution of the emperor and wish to retain it. Of the various political groups in Japan, only the Communists,

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a relatively small groups, have expressed any desire to abolish the throne. Consequently, any insistence on our part that Japan abandon the monarchy not only would run counter to the American assurances discussed in the preceding paragraphs but also would encounter bitter opposition from the Japanese people as a whole. Such a policy would undermine faith in the word of the United States Government and would have a most deleterious influence upon the effective control of Japan by the occupation forces and also upon the attainment of our ultimate objectives in Japan.

4. The United States could exert strong pressure to influence the Japanese to abandon the imperial institution, but even this would be unwise. Such a course would probably so antagonize the vast majority of Japanese as to necessitate far greater commitments of American forces and resources than is now contemplated, would probably endanger the spirit of cooperation now being shown by the Japanese government and people, and might greatly increase the difficulties of creating "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government" in Japan. One specific outcome of strong American advocacy of the complete abolition of the throne in Japan would probably be the undermining of the political strength of those elements which stand for political democracy and economic liberalism and the strengthening of the extremist elements, such as the anti-occidental militaristic reactionaries on the one side and the Communists on the other.

5. In view of the improbability that any action on our part could persuade the Japanese Government or people willingly to abandon the imperial institution, it is believed that the United States, instead of insisting upon or exerting pressure in behalf of the creation of a republican form of government in Japan, should exert whatever pressure is deemed advisable to transform the imperial institution in Japan into a Constitutional Monarchy. Such a policy would not endanger the effective control of Japan by the occupation forces and would unquestionably bring us more quickly and more surely to the attainment of our ultimate objectives in Japan.

6. If

6. If the ultimate form of the Japanese Government is to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, it is imperative that the Japanese people as a whole have a liberal and enlightened attitude toward the institution of the emperor before they make their final decision regarding the future position of the throne in Japan. All evidence indicates that only very small groups in Japan now have what might be termed a liberal and enlightened attitude toward the institution of the emperor and it will take considerable time before the masses of Japan can revise their thinking regarding the imperial institution. Since this is the situation, we should not force the Japanese to make any hurried decision regarding the ultimate role of the emperor in Japan but should encourage them to wait as long as possible before making their decision, in the hope that the longer they wait the more liberal and enlightened Japanese public opinion will have become.

7. Although the final decision regarding the institution of the emperor must be made by the Japanese themselves, there are certain modifications in the institution which should be made as soon as possible, if, as is stated in the Potsdam Declaration, we are to be certain that the Japanese people have "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government," if "the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest" are to be eliminated for all time, if "irresponsible militarism" is to be driven from the world, and if "all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people" are to be removed. Such modifications in the imperial institution are all thoroughly consistent with the policy of transforming the institution into a Constitutional Monarchy.

8. The position of the emperor, as it has existed in the past in Japan, is threefold,-- political, religious, and symbolic and sentimental. Many modifications in the political and religious aspects of the institution of the emperor are called for. SWNCC 228, entitled "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System", adequately treats the reforms concerned with the emperor's political position by suggesting modifications in the Constitution and in the processes of government in Japan which will help insure that the imperial institution will not be a

bar to the creation of a responsible government, an obstacle "to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people", or an opening wedge for the return of "irresponsible militarism". There remains, however, the religious position of the emperor, which in the past has been used to strengthen an ultra-nationalistic and militaristic spirit among the Japanese and has been utilized by "irresponsible militarists" in their climb to power and which, therefore, is a factor militating against the creation of a peacefully inclined government in Japan.

9. The religious role of the emperor is twofold. He is not only the high priest of traditional Shinto cults, but he himself is also considered to be a semi-divine person and an object of veneration. The imperial function as high priest has been exercised uninterruptedly since remote antiquity and, during most of Japanese history, has been performed by emperors who had no direct connection with the actual administration of the land or any position of authority in the world of politics. It consists of the performance of many rituals which are purely traditional and which are little known and little noticed by the general public. The performance by the emperor of such rituals would seem to be consistent with a position as a Constitutional Monarch and should, therefore, be permitted, unless general policy on the treatment of state Shinto should necessitate the disassociation of the emperor from all Shinto cults.

10. The position of the emperor in the eyes of the Japanese as a semi-divine personage has resulted in modern times in the following specific dangers to the creation of a peacefully inclined government:

a) The supposedly divine origin of the imperial family and the divinity of the person of the emperor himself have been used to justify a theory of Japanese superiority and a belief in the natural right of the Japanese to rule over other lands.

b) The cult of emperor worship, fostered by extreme indoctrination in the schools, by surrounding the imperial family with a mysterious veil of secrecy, intended to create a feeling of awe in the average subject, and by enforced acts of veneration, such as obeisance to imperial portraits in schools and excessive signs of respect in the handling of imperial rescripts, has created a blind devotion on the part of the common

people to the emperor, and this devotion has been susceptible of ready conversion into support for wars of foreign aggression.

a) In the past, many ultra-nationalists and militarists in Japan have sought sanction for their own beliefs by indentifying them with the "imperial will", which they claimed was not being properly represented by the government authorities. They were often successful in convincing a large part of the public that their own personal interpretations of this mystic "imperial will" was more accurate than that of the government, and they thus were able to win considerable public support for entirely illegal acts, such as political murders, which greatly aided the militarists and ultra-nationalists to win control over the government.

11. The position of the emperor as a semi-divine personage rests primarily upon the belief in the hearts of millions of Japanese and only secondarily upon official statements and on enforced acts of veneration and of excessive respect. The following are certain specific measures which should be taken to remove these secondary bases for belief in the emperor's divinity:

a) Articles I, III, and IV of the Constitution should be changed in wording and in spirit so as to eliminate the implications that the imperial line is divine and so as to have it made clear that the emperor is under the Constitution. The phraseology used by Professor Minobe in describing the emperor as an "organ" of the Constitution may have been so discredited in Japan as to be unacceptable, but the spirit of Professor Minobe's interpretation should be officially accepted. As a sign of the new position of the emperor under the Constitution, it would be desirable to have the bulk of the personal fortune of the imperial family, particularly income-producing property and securities, classed as public property and the financial support of the imperial family provided largely by the regular government budget, voted by the Diet.

b) The use of public schools for teaching the divinity of the imperial line and for inculcating a sense of blind devotion to the emperor should be stopped, textbooks should be so modified as to eliminate all

statements

statements or implications of the divine origin of the imperial line or the divinity of the emperor, Shinto shrines housing portraits of the emperor should be banned from public school property, enforced obeisance to pictures of the emperor should not be permitted, and there should be no special ceremonial connected with the handling of the imperial rescript on education, if it is still read in schools.

c) Extreme measures to keep the person of the emperor mysteriously distant from the public and veiled in awesome secrecy should not be permitted.

The above reforms should, if at all possible, be effected without any public order from the Supreme Commander, for, if it were known that these measures had been imposed by the Allies, it would rob them of most of their efficacy.

12. The belief in the hearts of the Japanese that the emperor is divine cannot be attacked frontally. Any too direct or too open insistence by Allied authorities that the Japanese abandon this belief would probably only strengthen it. All that can be done is to give free rein and encouragement to all individuals or groups among the Japanese who attempt to disprove the supposed divinity of the emperor. By far the most effective attack on imperial divinity could be made by the emperor himself, and there is good reason to believe that the emperor may be willing to cooperate in "debunking" himself. Every effort should be made to influence the emperor voluntarily to demonstrate by word and deed to his people that he is a human being not different from other Japanese, that he himself does not believe in the divine origin of the imperial line or the mystical superiority of Japan over other lands, and that there is no such thing as the "imperial will" as distinct from government policy. Specific measures the emperor could take would be to remove the veil of mystery about his personal life, to mix more freely and on terms of greater equality with foreigners and Japanese, and to make whatever pronouncements regarding the origin of the imperial line, the equality of all races, and the true nature of the "imperial will" that the Japanese government is willing to let him make. Any attempt to persuade the emperor to participate in his own "debunking" would have to be made in such a manner as to be unknown to the Japanese people and should be handled with such diplomacy as to give no suggestion of compulsion.

SECRET

PR-34 Final
February 8, 1946

TREATMENT OF THE INSTITUTION
OF THE EMPEROR

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate a policy regarding the treatment of the Imperial institution in Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. The United States in the Potsdam Declaration, the American reply to Japan of 11 August 1945, and the "Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan", has given assurances to the Japanese that the ultimate form of the government of Japan shall be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, provided that the result be a peacefully inclined and responsible government. We are, therefore, committed to accept any such government.

b. A monarchical form of government in Japan, if so modified as to be a peacefully inclined and responsible constitutional monarchy, would not be inconsistent with American objectives in Japan. Consequently, the Japanese, if they so desire, should be allowed to retain their present monarchy, provided it be transformed into a peacefully inclined and responsible constitutional monarchy.

c. If the

c. If the Japanese people should show a desire for the complete elimination of the throne in Japan, the Supreme Commander should give encouragement and aid to the creation of a republic. However, it should be recognized that, although the Japanese are showing a willingness to eliminate the most objectionable aspects of the imperial institution, it seems improbable that they will be willing to eliminate the institution entirely. The Supreme Commander, therefore, should not take the initiative in advocating its complete elimination. Instead, he should give support and aid to Japanese efforts to transform the imperial institution in Japan into a constitutional monarchy, if that is what the Japanese wish.

d. The Supreme Commander should give the Japanese people as much time as possible to make up their minds regarding the ultimate role of the imperial institution in Japan, for the longer the decision is delayed the more time there will be for a liberal and enlightened attitude regarding the institution of the Emperor to develop.

e. The Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese government the desirability of the following reforms, but he should not order the Japanese government to effect these reforms, unless the Japanese government has clearly shown its unwillingness to act in these matters.

(1) Articles I, III, and IV of the Constitution should be changed in wording and in spirit so as to eliminate the implications that the imperial line is divine and so as to have it made clear that the Emperor is under the Constitution. As a sign of the new position of the Emperor under the Constitution, the bulk of the personal fortune of the imperial family, particularly income producing property and securities, should be classed as public property, and the financial support of the imperial family should be provided largely by the regular government budget, voted by the Diet.

(2) The use of public schools for teaching the divinity of the imperial line and for inculcating a sense of blind devotion to the Emperor should not be permitted, statements or implications of the divine

origin of the imperial line or the divinity of the Emperor should be eliminated from textbooks, Shinto Shrines housing portraits of the Emperor should be banned from public school property, enforced obeisance to the Emperor or to his pictures should not be permitted, and there should be no special ceremonial connected with the handling of the imperial rescript on education, if it is still read in schools.

(3) Extreme measures to keep the person of the Emperor mysteriously distant from the public and veiled in awesome secrecy should be abandoned.

f. The Supreme Commander should attempt to influence the Emperor voluntarily to continue to demonstrate by word and deed to his people that he is a human being not different from other Japanese, that he himself does not believe in the divine origin of the imperial line or the mystical superiority of Japan over other lands, and that there is no such thing as the "imperial will" as distinct from government policy. Specific measures the Emperor could take would be to remove the veil of mystery about his personal life, to mix more freely and on terms of greater equality with foreigners and Japanese, and to make whatever pronouncements regarding the origin of the imperial line, the equality of all races, and the true nature of the "imperial will" that he is willing to make. Any attempt to persuade the Emperor to participate in his own "debunking" should be made in such a manner as to be unknown to the Japanese people and should be handled with such diplomacy as to give no suggestion of compulsion.

APPENDIX "A"

APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. In the Potsdam Declaration it is stated that:

"The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason."

* * * * *

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest. We insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

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"The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."

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"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible Government."

2. The Japanese note to the United States of 10 August, 1945, expressed the willingness of the Japanese Government to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."

3. The American

3. The American reply to Japan, dated 11 August, 1945, did not flatly reject the Japanese condition but stated:

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms."

* * * * *

"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."

4. The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SINCC 150/4/A) states:

"The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

- "(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.
- "(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people."

* * * * *

"The authority

"The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

"In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, however, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it."

5. The first four articles of the Japanese Constitution read as follows:

"Article I. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.

Article II. The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

Article III. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.

Article IV. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution."

6. In his

6. In his New Year's Day Rescript of 1 January, 1946, the Japanese Emperor stated:

"The ties between us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated upon the false conception that the Emperor is divine and the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world."

7. On 15 December 1945, the Supreme Commander issued a directive to the Japanese Government regarding the "abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetration, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto." This document stated in part:

"1. a. The sponsorship, support, perpetration, control and dissemination of Shinto by the Japanese national, prefectural, and local governments, or by public officials, subordinates, and employees acting in their official capacity are prohibited and will cease immediately.

* * * * *

c. All propagation and dissemination of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in Shinto doctrines, practices, rites, ceremonies, or observancesare prohibited and will cease immediately."

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2. f. Militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology, as used in this directive, embraces those teachings, beliefs, and theories, which advocate or justify a mission on the part of Japan to extend its rule over other nations and peoples by reason of:

(1) The doctrine that the Emperor of Japan is superior to the heads of other states because of ancestry, descent, or special origin."

APPENDIX "B"

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DISCUSSION

1. The Potsdam Declaration, the American reply to the Japanese Government of August 11, 1945, and the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy" together constitute clear assurances to the Japanese people that during the initial post-surrender period the United States, as far as is practicable, would exercise its authority over Japan "through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor," and that our long-range policy is to see to it that "the ultimate form of the government of Japan...be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people," provided that the result be "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government". Such statements mean that the United States is ready to accept any peacefully inclined and responsible government in Japan which is created or supported by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

2. With the United Kingdom as one of the signers of the Potsdam Declaration, no interpretation of the above statements can exclude a peacefully inclined and responsible constitutional monarchy as a form of government consistent with Allied demands and therefore to be permitted the Japanese, if that is what they desire. The retention of a monarchical form of government in Japan, which has had but one ruling family for at least the past 1500 years, can only mean the retention of the present imperial family on the Japanese throne.

3. The main objective of the Allies in Japan, "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government," may be obtained either through a republic or a constitutional monarchy. The United States would doubtless prefer to see a republican form of government adopted in Japan, and, if the Japanese people were to show a desire to eliminate the throne entirely, the United States should be ready to give encouragement and aid to the creation of a republic. However, all available evidence as to public opinion in Japan leads to the conclusion that the Japanese as a whole are strongly devoted to the institution of the Emperor and wish to retain it. Of the various political groups in Japan, only the Communists, a relatively small group, have

expressed

expressed any desire to abolish the throne. Consequently, any insistence on our part that Japan abandon the monarchy not only would run counter to the American assurances discussed in the preceding paragraphs but also would encounter bitter opposition from the Japanese people as a whole. Such a policy would undermine faith in the word of the United States Government and would have a most deleterious influence upon the effective control of Japan by the occupation forces and also upon the attainment of our ultimate objectives in Japan.

4. The United States could exert strong pressure to influence the Japanese to abandon the imperial institution, but even this would be unwise. Such a course would probably so antagonize the vast majority of Japanese as to necessitate far greater commitments of American forces and resources than is now contemplated, would probably endanger the spirit of cooperation now being shown by the Japanese government and people, and might greatly increase the difficulties of creating "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government" in Japan. One specific outcome of strong American advocacy of the complete abolition of the throne in Japan would probably be the undermining of the political strength of these elements which stand for political democracy and economic liberalism and the strengthening of the extremist elements, such as the anti-occidental militaristic reactionaries on the one side and the Communists on the other.

5. In view of the improbability that any action on our part could persuade the Japanese Government or people willingly to abandon the imperial institution, it is believed that the United States, instead of insisting upon or exerting pressure in behalf of the creation of a republican form of government in Japan, should exert whatever pressure is deemed advisable to transform the imperial institution in Japan into a constitutional monarchy. Such a policy would not endanger the effective control of Japan by the occupation forces and would unquestionably bring us more quickly and more surely to the attainment of our ultimate objectives in Japan.

6. If the ultimate form of the Japanese Government is to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, it is imperative that the Japanese people as a whole have a liberal and enlightened attitude toward the institution of the Emperor before they make their final decision regarding the future position of the throne in Japan.

All evidence

all evidence indicates that only relatively small groups in Japan now have what might be termed a liberal and enlightened attitude toward the institution of the Emperor and it will take considerable time before the masses of Japan can revise their thinking regarding the imperial institution. Since this is the situation, we should not force the Japanese to make any hurried decision regarding the ultimate role of the Emperor in Japan but should encourage them to wait as long as possible before making their decision, in the hope that the longer they wait the more liberal and enlightened Japanese public opinion will have become.

7. Although the final decision regarding the institution of the Emperor must be made by the Japanese themselves, there are certain modifications in the institution which should be made as soon as possible, if, as is stated in the Potsdam Declaration, we are to be certain that the Japanese people have "a peacefully inclined and responsible Government," if "the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest" are to be eliminated for all time, if "irresponsible militarism" is to be driven from the world, and if "all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people" are to be removed. Such modifications in the imperial institution are all thoroughly consistent with the policy of transforming the institution into a constitutional monarchy.

8. The position of the Emperor, as it has existed in the past in Japan, is twofold,--political and religious. SWNCC 228, entitled "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System", adequately treats reforms concerned with the Emperor's political position by suggesting modifications in the constitution and in the processes of government in Japan which will help insure that the imperial institution will not be a bar to the creation of a responsible government, an obstacle "to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people", or an opening wedge for the return of "irresponsible militarism". There remains, however, the religious position of the Emperor, which in the past has been used to strengthen an ultra-nationalistic and militaristic spirit among the Japanese and has been utilized by "irresponsible militarists" in their climb to power and which, therefore, has been a factor militating against the creation of a peacefully inclined government in Japan.

9. The religious

9. The religious role of the Emperor has been two-fold. He was not only the high priest of traditional Shinto cults, but he himself was also considered to be a semi-divine person and an object of veneration. The imperial function as high priest has been exercised uninterruptedly since remote antiquity and, during most of Japanese history, has been performed by Emperors who had no direct connection with the actual administration of the land or any position of authority in the world of politics. It consists of the performance of many rituals which are purely traditional and which are little known and little noticed by the general public. The performance by the Emperor of such rituals would not seem to be inconsistent with a position as a constitutional monarch and should, therefore, be permitted, except insofar as the performance of these rituals would run counter to the provisions of the Supreme Commander's directive on State Shinto.

10. The position of the Emperor in the eyes of the Japanese as a semi-divine personage has resulted in modern times in the following specific dangers to the creation of a peacefully inclined government:

a) The supposedly divine origin of the imperial family and the divinity of the person of the Emperor himself have been used to justify a theory of Japanese superiority and a belief in the natural right of the Japanese to rule over other lands.

b) The cult of Emperor worship, fostered by extreme indoctrination in the schools, by surrounding the imperial family with a mysterious veil of secrecy, intended to create a feeling of awe in the average subject, and by enforced acts of veneration, such as obeisance to imperial portraits in schools and excessive signs of respect in the handling of imperial rescripts, has created a blind devotion on the part of the common people to the Emperor, and this devotion has been susceptible of ready conversion into support for wars of foreign aggression.

c) In the past, many ultra-nationalists and militarists in Japan have sought sanction for their own beliefs by identifying them with the "imperial will", which they claimed was not being properly represented by the government authorities. They were often successful in convincing a

large

large part of the public that their own personal interpretations of this mystic "imperial will" was more accurate than that of the government, and they thus were able to win considerable public support for entirely illegal acts, such as political murders, which greatly aided the militarists and ultra-nationalists to win control over the government.

11. The position of the Emperor as a semi-divine personage rested primarily upon the belief in the hearts of millions of Japanese and only secondarily upon official statements and on enforced acts of veneration and of excessive respect. The following are certain specific measures which should be taken to help remove these secondary bases for belief in the Emperor's divinity:

a) Articles I, III, and IV of the Constitution should be changed in wording and in spirit so as to eliminate the implications that the imperial line is divine and so as to have it made clear that the Emperor is under the Constitution. The phraseology used by Professor Minobe in describing the Emperor as an "organ" of the Constitution may have been so discredited in Japan as to be unaccertable, but the spirit of Professor Minobe's interpretation should be officially accented. As a sign of the new position of the Emperor under the Constitution, it would be desirable to have the bulk of the personal fortune of the imperial family, particularly income-producing property and securities, classed as public property and the financial support of the imperial family provided largely by the regular government budget, voted by the Diet.

b) The use of public schools for teaching the divinity of the imperial line and for inculcating a sense of blind devotion to the Emperor should not be permitted, statements or implications of the divine origin of the imperial line or the divinity of the Emperor should be eliminated from textbooks, Shinto shrines housing portraits of the Emperor should be banned from public school property, enforced obeisance to the Emperor or to his pictures should not be permitted, and there should be no special ceremonial connected with the handling of the imperial rescript on education, if it is still read in schools.

c) Extreme measures to keep the person of the Emperor mysteriously distant from the public and veiled in awesome secrecy should not be permitted.

The above

The above reforms should, if at all possible, be effected without any public order from the Supreme Commander, for, if these measures were imposed by the Allies, they would lose much of their efficacy.

12. The belief in the hearts of the Japanese that the Emperor is divine cannot be attacked frontally by us. Any too direct or too open insistence by Allied authorities that the Japanese abandon this belief would probably only strengthen it. All that can be done is to give free rein and encouragement to all individuals or groups among the Japanese, who attempt to disprove the supposed divinity of the Emperor. The Emperor's New Year's Day Rescript is by far the most effective attack as yet made on imperial divinity and further statements or acts on his part would unquestionably be of great aid in destroying the myth of his divinity. Efforts, therefore, should be made to influence the Emperor voluntarily to continue to demonstrate by word and deed to his people that he is a human being not different from other Japanese, that he himself does not believe in the divine origin of the imperial line or the mystical superiority of Japan over other lands, and that there is no such thing as the "imperial will" as distinct from government policy. Specific measures the Emperor could take would be to remove the veil of mystery about his personal life, to mix more freely and on terms of greater equality with foreigners and Japanese, and to make whatever further pronouncements regarding the origin of the imperial line, the equality of all races, and the true nature of the "imperial will" that he is willing to make. Any attempt to persuade the Emperor to participate in his own "debunking" would have to be made in such a manner as to be unknown to the Japanese people and should be handled with such diplomacy as to give no suggestion of compulsion.