

Qing China's View of the Eastern Shan States and Northern Thailand in the Mid-eighteenth century

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Qing China's view of the eastern Shan States and Northern Thailand in the mid-eighteenth century was discussed.

As for the border areas of Southernmost Yunnan and the Shan States of Burma, Qing China at that time was conscious of the boundary that separated the Chinese interior (*neidi*) from the exterior. Moengs in Sipsongpanna were inside the boundary and belonged to the 'interior'. Cheng Tung, Cheng Khaeng, and Moeng Yawng were outside the boundary. The boundary line might be vague, but it was clearly recognised at the passes, which should be protected when disputes occurred outside the boundary. Qing China prohibited the chief of Sipsongpanna to go out to the 'exterior' because he had been appointed as Cheli Xuanweishi, which was an 'interior' *tusi* or native official.

The Tai states in Southernmost Yunnan, the eastern Shan States of Burma, and Northern Thailand had native relationships with other Tai states and Burma. Such relationships might be unimaginable, or unacceptable, for China in the mid-eighteenth century.

Keywords: Qing China, Shan States, Northern Thailand, mid-eighteenth century, Sipsongpanna

1. Introduction

There had been many Tai¹ pre-modern states until the middle of the twentieth century in the southern and southwestern parts of the present-day Yunnan Province of China as well as the northern part of Mainland Southeast Asia. The Tai states located at the border areas of Southernmost Yunnan and the Shan States of Burma were, for example, Cheng Hung (Chiang Rung²), Cheng Tung³, Moeng Yawng, Cheng Khaeng, and so on (Fig. 1). The lord of Cheng Hung also held the position of the supreme ruler of Sipsongpanna⁴, which consisted of approximately thirty small Tai states called 'moeng (muang)'⁵.

The chiefs of these Tai states had been given official titles by both or either one of the Chinese Dynasties⁶ and Burmese Dynasties⁷ since the end of the thirteenth century, at the earliest, to the beginning of the twentieth century. The lord of Cheng Hung was given official titles by both the Chinese and Burmese dynasties. The Chinese title in the Qing period was Cheli Xuanwei Shi 車里宣慰使⁸.

Qing China began annexing the southern part of Yunnan in the 1720s after establishing a stable government in Yunnan. Many native rulers, including those who governed the northern area adjacent to Sipsongpanna, were replaced with regular imperial officials under a policy known as *gaituguilu* 改土歸流.⁹ As for Sipsongpanna, the Qing established Pu'er Fu 普洱府 in its northern region in 1729 as well as Simao Ting 思茅廳 under Pu'er Fu in 1735, to which most of the moengs



Fig. 1: Map around Sipsongpanna

The shaded area indicates present-day Xishuangbanna Autonomous Prefecture of Day Nationality

-----: borders between present-day nation states

of Sipsongpanna belonged. However, the Qing did not replace any Tai rulers of Sipsongpanna with regular imperial officials¹⁰. Instead, the Qing appointed Tai chiefs of the moengs in Sipsongpanna, whose supreme ruler was the lord of Cheng Hung or Cheli Xuanwei Shi, as native military officers such as Tu Shoubei 土守備, Tu Qianzong 土千總, and Tu Bazong 土把總 in 1728, 1729, and 1732 (Youg Zheng 雍正 6, 7, and 10).¹¹ [Kato 1997, 2015] This meant that the Qing had a system of controlling Sipsongpanna through the native officers, who received orders from Simao Ting and Pu'er Fu.

After Qing China's establishment of this system to control Sipsongpanna via Pu'er Fu, the present-day eastern Shan States of Burma began to be recognised as Pu'er bianwai 邊外, or outside the frontier of Pu'er. Qing China might also feel closer to present-day Northern Thailand than before.

In this paper, I would like to discuss Qing's view of the Tai states located in the eastern Shan States and Northern Thailand in the mid-eighteenth century. Hence, I will mainly focus on the descriptions in Qing Shilu or the 'veritable records of the Qing dynasty'¹². I could find only two articles related to the Tai states in the eastern Shan States and Northern Thailand among Qing Shilu's descriptions from the 1730s to the 1750s. On the other hand, Qing Shilu has many descriptions referring to the Tai states in these areas after the 1760s, when the Qing-Burma war began. Qing's knowledge of the Tai states and of the areas must have increased through the war,

and Qing's view of them could be changed by the new knowledge. If so, we first need to ascertain Qing's view of the Tai states in the regions prior to the war. To answer this question, I would like to shed light on the two articles in this paper.

One of the two articles was written in 1742 (Qianlong 乾隆 7) and is about Cheng Tung, which was in the eastern Shan States. It refers to an incident in which the chief of Cheng Tung was expelled. [*Da Qing Gaozong Chun Huangdi Shilu* vol. 167]

The other is an article from 1749 (Qianlong 13) and it is about Moeng Yawng's 'invasion' of Cheng Khaeng, in which Moeng Long, a moeng in the Sipsongpanna, was also involved. Both Moeng Yawng and Cheng Khaeng were in the present-day eastern Shan States. Burma also came in contact with Cheng Hung of Sipsongpanna to find a way to solve this incident. In addition, Chiang Saen, which was in present-day Northern Thailand, also sent a letter to Moeng Long about this. [*Da Qing Gaozong Chun Huangdi Shilu* vol. 331]

From these articles, we can not only understand Qing's view but also comprehend the relationships among the Tai states in this area and learn how Burma interacted with them.

In the two articles, we find the names of one of the Tai states of present-day Northern Thailand, three states of the present-day eastern Shan States, and three states of Sipsongpanna. They are Chiang Saen in Northern Thailand, Cheng Tung, Moeng Yawng, and Cheng Khaeng in the eastern Shan States, and Cheng Hung, Moeng Chae, and Moeng Long in Sipsongpanna.

Before analysing the articles themselves, it is necessary to understand the general situation of these states in the mid-eighteenth century. In the next section, I will illustrate them individually.

2. Northern Thailand in the first half of the Eighteenth Century

In Northern Thailand, we should pay attention to Chiang Saen, which was mentioned in the article of 'Qing Shilu', and I will also illustrate the situations of Chiang Mai because it was another centre of Northern Thailand. Although we focus on the mid-eighteenth century, the situations since the second half of the seventeenth century will also be described if necessary.

(1) Chiang Mai

Whether considerably directly or almost independently, present-day Northern Thailand had been under the influence of the Burmese Dynasties since the latter half of the sixteenth century.

After the Nyaungyan Dynasty overcame a severe challenge to its hegemony in the 1660s¹³, the Burmese king at that time, Pye (r. 1661–1672), sent a governor called 'myo-wun' to Chiang Mai, who may have been Chiang Mai's first myo-wun. [Lieberman 1984: 200–201] Normally, myo-wun was the highest position, but sometimes 'po' or a general was sent and took a leading position instead of the myo-wun. [Sarasawadee 2008: 294] In 1704 Po Maengsara, who had been sent to Chiang Mai as po, ordered the myo-wun of Chiang Saen to come to Chiang Mai and killed him. [Sarasawadee 2008: 295] Other than the myo-wun and po, there was a position of 'sit-ke' or 'chetkai', which was the military commissioner¹⁴.

After a new myo-wun and a new sit-ke were sent to Chiang Mai in 1718, Chiang Mai rebelled against Burma¹⁵. In 1727, the people in Chiang Mai defeated Ava's¹⁶ garrison and killed the myo-wun and the sit-ke¹⁷. [Lieberman 1984: 204–205] Subsequently, Chao Ong Kham¹⁸,

who had been a prince of Luang Prabang from 1713 to 1723, took the throne at Chiang Mai in 1727. Burma sent troops and tried to recapture Chiang Mai four times, however, they were not successful. [Simms 2001: 112–113; Lieberman 1984: 204–205] Chao Ong Kham probably governed Chiang Mai until his death in 1769. In short, during the mid-eighteenth century, on which I will focus in this paper, Chiang Mai was independent of Burma under Chao Ong Kham¹⁹.

(2) Chiang Saen

According to a version of the Chiang Saen Chronicle, the Burmese king sent Fasangkung to Chiang Saen as ‘po-suk’. He governed Chiang Saen from 1672 to 1693. After the death of Chaofa Charoengmuang, who had been chao muang or ‘chief of muang’²⁰ of Chiang Saen, in 1692 Fasangkung appointed Chaofaluang as the new chao muang, while Chaofa Charoengmuang’s sons were appointed as ‘myo-wun naasaai’ and ‘myo-wun naakhwaa’. Fasangkung returned to Ava in the following year. [Sarasawadee 2008: 295].

The new chao muang, Chaofaluang, seems not to have been a son of the late chao muang. If so, we might say that the po-suk had the power to appoint a chao muang of his or Burmese will. However, at least, the position of chao muang was maintained in Chiang Saen, even if it was under Burmese rule. In addition, the po-suk appointed the late chao muang’s sons as myo-wun nasaai and myo-wun nakhwaa. This reveals that Burma allowed the locally influential families to maintain their authority.²¹

In 1701, the position of myo-wun was established in Chiang Saen. [Sarasawadee 2008: 295, 297] At that time Burma intended to send troops to Muang Maen²², which was located along the border area with China. In 1701, Ava’s troops were stationed at Chiang Saen, from where the troops would advance into Muang Maen. [Sarasawadee 2008: 298–299] The establishment of the position of myo-wun in Chiang Saen might be related to the expedition.

The expedition failed and the troops retreated to Cheng Hung of Sipsongpanna and stayed there. In 1704, the troops returned to Chiang Saen again.

At about the same time, Maengsara was sent to Chiang Mai as po. As mentioned above, in 1704, Po Maengsara killed the myo-wun of Chiang Saen. [Sarasawadee 2008: 295] This incident might also be related with the failed expedition. Even though we do not know the details of the incident, we understand that when Chiang Saen did not have a po but only a myo-wun, the po of Chiang Mai had a great influence on Chiang Saen’s myo-wun.²³

In 1728, Chiang Saen was attacked by Chiang Mai, which was at that time independent from Burma under the rule of Chao Ong Kham. [Sarasawadee 2008: 298] After repelling the attack, Burma put Phrae, Nan, Lampang, Muang Fang, Muang Saat, Chiang Khong, and Muang Thoeng, all of which were muang in present-day Northern Thailand, under the control of Chiang Saen. [Sarasawadee 2008: 298] This means that in the mid-eighteenth century, when Burma could not control Chiang Mai, Burma made Chiang Saen the base to govern the area of present-day Northern Thailand.

According to a version of the Chiang Saen Chronicle, in 1741, the Burmese king ordered a person named Mankharalak to be the myo-wun of Chiang Saen. At the same time, the Burmese king appointed Phra Ngaam, who was a son of the late chao muang, as the new chao muang of Chiang Saen. [Sarasawadee 2008: 294] He belonged to the native rulers’ family from Chiang Saen.

We found that in the mid-eighteenth century, Burma sent myo-wun as Chiang Saen's governor, but also allowed the native Tai family to continue to keep the position of chao muang. However, as Sarasawadee pointed out, chao muang at that time might not have wielded much power. [Sarasawadee 2008: 294]

In Burma, a new political power was established in 1740 in Pegu and had attacked the Nyaungyan Dynasty since 1742, which finally resulted in the fall of the dynasty in 1752.²⁴ Therefore, after 1742, the Nyaungyan Dynasty might not have been able to pay enough attention to the region that now forms present-day Northern Thailand as well as the area of present-day eastern Shan States and Sipsongpanna. Chiang Saen sometimes may have made independent decisions without waiting for orders from Ava, which was in confused circumstances.

3. The Eastern Shan States and the Sipsongpanna in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century

As mentioned above, the articles of Qing Shilu referred to Cheng Tung, Moeng Yawng, and Cheng Khaeng of the eastern Shan States and Cheng Hung, Moeng Chae, and Moeng Long of the Sipsongpanna. I will illustrate their situations below.

(1) Cheng Tung

Burma also had political influence on the present-day eastern Shan States and the Sipsongpanna.

Lieberman says that Sanei, the Burmese king whose reign ranged from 1698 to 1714, devoted considerable effort to campaigns in the southeast Tai region, and actually seems to have strengthened Burmese influence over Chiang Tung. However, the succession struggle after Sanei's death made Burma withdraw forces from the outlying area. [Lieberman 1984: 204] Lieberman also pointed out the following.

'In about 1739 Keng Tung expelled Ava's nominee as ruler, a Tai prince who had been born and educated at the Burmese court and who in consequence appears to have had weak ties with the local population'. [Lieberman 1984: 206]

This incident is also described in the Jengtung State Chronicle. [*The Jengtung State Chronicle* (Sao Saimong Mangrai trans. 1981: 252–255)] This shows that even though Chiang Tung was under Ava's influence, the people of Chiang Tung did not always obey Ava's decision and had the right to expel a puppet prince.

(2) Moeng Yong and Cheng Khaeng

As for Moeng Yong and Cheng Khaeng, we can also obtain some information from the chronicles.

The Moeng Yawng Chronicle explains the relationship between Moeng Yawng, Cheng Khaeng, and Cheng Hung of Sipsongpanna. The chronicle does not tell when it happened, however, Moeng Yawng had been subordinate to Cheng Hung. Subsequently, Cheng Khaeng wanted to possess Moeng Yawng, which eventually went away from Cheng Hung and became

subordinate to Cheng Khaeng. Then, the chronicle says that after three reigns of the Moeng Yawng lords, thieves from Cheng Khaeng stole Moeng Yawng's buffaloes, and this caused a strife between Cheng Khaeng and Moeng Yawng, which continued for three years. [*Tamnan Mong Yawng* (Thawi transliterated 1984: 46)]

Grabowsky and Renu called the incident the 'buffalo war'. According to them, the Cheng Khaeng Chronicle says that the ruler of Moeng Yawng rebelled against the ruler of Cheng Khaeng and they fought against each other. [Grabowsky and Renu 2008: 31, 102]

(3) Cheng Hung, Moeng Chae, and Moeng Long

Sipsongpanna had paid tributes to both the Chinese and Burmese dynasties since the latter half of the sixteenth century.

As mentioned above, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, after its failed expedition to Moeng Maen, the Burmese troops retreated to Cheng Hung and stayed there. This explains that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Chiang Hung was in Burmese sphere of direct influence.

However, as mentioned above, Qing China annexed the southern part of Yunnan in the 1720s and established Pu'er Fu in 1729 and Simao Ting in 1735 in the northern region of Sipsongpanna. China appointed Tai chiefs of the major moengs in Sipsongpanna as native military officers. China was able to order them via Simao Ting and Pu'er Fu. Cheng Hung's chief had been the only one appointed as *tusi* 土司 or a native official before, but from that time on, chiefs of other moengs began to be appointed as native military officers. This means that China was able to control the chiefs of Sipsongpanna more directly.

As for Moeng Chae and Moeng Long, which were mentioned in the two articles of Qing Shilu, Moeng Chae's chief received the title of Tu Shoubei first in 1729, and his son who succeeded to the position of Moeng Chae's chief was appointed as Tu Qiangzong, which was a lesser title. Moeng Long's chief received the title of Tu Qiangzong in 1729, and the successor was also given a lesser title, Tu Bazong. [Kato 2018: 5–6; *Daoguang Pu'er Fu Zhi* vol. 18 Tusi]

4. Qing's Understanding and Views of the Tai States in the Eastern Shan States and Northern Thailand

Having understood the general situation of the states, we are now ready to read the two articles of Qing Shilu. I would like to describe an English translation and then analyse them to know Qing's view of the Tai states.

(1) Article about Cheng Tung on 1 July, 1742.

This article presents the contents of a report to the throne by the acting governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou 署雲貴總督, Zhang Yunsui 張允隨,²⁵ and the response from the emperor.

(The acting governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, Zhang Yunsui) reported to the emperor again as follows:

'Chao Hohán 召賀罕, the head of Moeng Koen (Cheng Tung), which is located outside of the area of Moeng Chae 猛遮界外, which belongs to Pu'er, is high-handed and cruel. Phaya

San Moeng 叭三猛, who governs the area, expelled Chao Hohān. He fled to the Burmese territory 緬境. I ordered Tu Qianzong to protect each pass'.

He (Zhang Yunsui) got the imperial order as follows: 'Just clear up my boundary 我疆. Strictly manage mountain passes'.²⁶

This expulsion of the prince of Chiang Tung seems identical to the incident *the Jengtung State Chronicle* mentioned²⁷. In Qing Shilu, the expelled prince is called Chao Hohān, whereas in *the Jengtung State Chronicle*, he is called Maung Myo. Chao Hohān might be Chao Hokham in Tai. This means 'Lord of Golden Palace' which indicates the lord of the state. On the other hand, Phaya San Moeng, who expelled Chao Hohān, is called Phaya Saen Moeng in *the Jengtung State Chronicle*. [*The Jengtung State Chronicle* (Sao Saimong Mangrai trans. 1981: 252–255)]

From the description of this article of Qing Shilu, we know that Zhang Yunsui recognised Cheng Tung outside the area of Moeng Chae 猛遮界外. He ordered Tu Qianzong, the chief of Moeng Chae, to protect each pass. The emperor also ordered Zhang Yunsui to manage the mountain passes. It is noteworthy that the emperor was conscious of his boundary. In this case, Moeng Chae was inside the boundary and Cheng Tung was outside the boundary. There were passes on the boundary line between the two Tai states. This boundary line might be vague, however it was clearly recognised at the passes.

(2) Article about Moeng Yawng's 'invasion'

This article also started with the contents of a report sent to the throne by Zhang Yunsui, who had become the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou 雲貴總督 in 1747, on the day of Jiyou 己酉 of the 12th month of the 13th year of Qianlong, or 16 February 1749.

The governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, Zhang Yunsui, reported to the emperor as follows:

'The head of Moeng Yawng, which is located outside the frontier of Pu'er (Pu'er bianwai 普洱邊外) of Yunnan, invaded the area of Cheng Khaeng (Zhengxian yijing 整謙夷境) because he had a strong military power, so the people of Cheng Khaeng fled to the area of Moeng Long (猛籠界上), which belongs to Pu'er Fu. This head (of Moeng Yawng), Phaya Yawng said he wanted to advance into Moeng Long. I ordered Dao Shaowen 刀紹文 in charge of Cheli Xuanweisi to lead the native head of Moeng Long to block Phaya Yawng's ways severely and to prevent Phaya Yawng from going out of the area and doing something prohibited. Burma sent an official letter to Dao Shaowen to tell him to go to Moeng Yawng in order to reach a settlement. This *tusi* (native official)²⁸ asked me for instructions. I considered that because Cheli was an interior (neidi 內地) *tusi*, I could not let him go, but as for solving the incident, I could not neglect it either; therefore, I ordered him to despatch a native officer (土弁) in his place. According to Dao Shaowen's report, he had already despatched qianmu²⁹, and Burma had also despatched 20 to 30 barbarian headmen to Moeng Yawng to arbitrate. Moeng Yawng had a strong military power, so it did not comply. In addition, according to a report by Dao Axing, Moeng Long Tu Bazong, the head of Chiang Saen named Niuwang, sent a letter written in Burmese on the eleventh day of the tenth month (1 December 1748)

to say as follows: ‘Moeng Yawng and Cheng Khaeng hate and kill each other. They never comply despite repeated arbitrations. Now, the king of Burma despatched big headmen who are charge of the thing. It should be coordinated appropriately. You should tell Xuanwei that each protects one’s own territory 各守各界 and that he should not despatch people’.

I investigated and know that both Moeng Yawng and Cheng Khaeng belong to Chiang Saen and that Chiang Saen is a vassal of Burma. The barbarian headmen of these two places caused strife. Burma should resolve the issue by itself, but unexpectedly, at first, Burma sent an official letter to Dao Shaowen to settle this issue together. Then, Burma made Niuwang send a letter to stop Dao Shaowen. I guess that in general the barbarians have a suspicious nature, so at first they were afraid that the issue was difficult to resolve and wanted Cheli *tusi* to persuade together with them, but now they were afraid that interior native officers (內地土弁) were going to spy on the area secretly and find what is false and what is true. Therefore, they stopped Dao Shaowen despatching people to Moeng Yawng. In Burma, they already do not want interior officers (內地弁目) to go over the border. They order their headmen to settle things down. Things can easily be solved. Now, I order Pu’er Zhen and Fu and strictly ordered each moeng’s native officer to protect important passes along the border and pay special care and guard’. He got the imperial order as follows: ‘I understand. The barbarians near the border can manage to solve the problem. Use the barbarians to subdue the barbarians. However, do not let them disturb the interior areas’³⁰.

Moeng Yawng’s invasion of Cheng Khaeng must be identical to the ‘buffalo war’ mentioned above, which was described in the chronicles of Moeng Yawng and Cheng Khaeng.

We find that Zhang Yunsui recognised Moeng Yawng to be outside the frontier of Pu’er (普洱邊外), whereas Moeng Long belonged to Pu’er Fu. After he knew that the chief of Moeng Yawng planned to attack Moeng Long, he ordered Cheli Xuanweishi or the chief of Sipsongpanna to prevent the chief of Moeng Yawng from ‘going out of the area’, which means going out of Moeng Yawng’s territory to enter Moeng Long.

As for the inquiry of the chief of Sipsongpanna, on whether he should go to Moeng Yawng following the request by Burma, Zhang Yunsui did not permit him to go. This was because he was an interior *tusi*. It must show that an interior *tusi* could not go to the ‘exterior’, that is, Moeng Yawng in this case.³¹

Zhang Yunsui knew that both Moeng Yawng and Cheng Khaeng belonged to Chiang Saen and that Chiang Saen was a vassal of Burma, and he thought that Burma should resolve the issue by itself without involving Sipsongpanna because Moeng Yawng and Cheng Khaeng were vassals of a vassal of Burma. This means that the governor-general virtually accepted that Moeng Yawng and Cheng Khaeng belonged to Burma.

Because the letter from Chiang Saen said that the chief of Sipsongpanna should not despatch people, Zhang Yunsui guessed that Burma was afraid that the interior native officers were going to spy on the area belonging to Burma. This also indicates that Zhang Yunsui thought it natural for Burma to be afraid of the Tai chiefs in Sipsongpanna because they were the interior native officers of China.

All this proves that China recognised that Tai chiefs in Sipsongpanna belonged to China, but the chiefs of Moeng Yawng and Cheng Khaeng did not. Moreover, China took it for granted that Burma also had the same recognition, that is, Tai chiefs in Sipsongpanna did not belong to Burma; therefore, Burma must have been afraid of the chief of Sipsongpanna. At the end of his report to the emperor, the governor-general said that he had ordered to protect important passes. It means there were several passes dividing the areas into the 'interior' and the 'exterior', even though there was not an apparent borderline. In addition, we find that China was strongly conscious of the 'interior'. The emperor also ordered not to let them disturb the interior areas.

5. Relationships among the Tai states and between the individual Tai states and Burma

Observing Qing China's view of the Tai states at the time analysed above, we know that China not only failed to correctly understand the relationship of each Tai state with Burma, it also did not understand the relationship between each Tai state.

Zhang Yunsui, who was the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou at that time, seems to have been confused by the difference between the two letters. The letter from Burma to Cheng Hung told the chief of Cheng Hung, or the chief of Sipsongpanna, to go to Moeng Yawng. On the other hand, the letter from Chiang Saen to Moeng Long said Cheng Hung should not despatch people to Moeng Yawng. Zhang Yunsui thought that at first Burma wanted the chief of Cheng Hung to go to Moeng Yawng, but later Burma feared Cheng Hung spied on the area and let Chiang Saen send a letter to stop Cheng Hung despatching people to Moeng Yawng.

The reason Moeng Yawng intended to make an advance into Moeng Long was probably to take the people of Cheng Khaeng back³², and not to invade Moeng Long. Moeng Long also probably wanted to keep the people of Cheng Khaeng as new manpower. This caused a dispute between Moeng Yawng and Moeng Long in addition to the dispute between Moeng Yawng and Cheng Khaeng.

Moeng Long belonged to Sipsongpanna, where the lord of Cheng Hung was the supreme ruler. On the other hand, according to the *Moeng Yawng Chronicle*, Moeng Yawng had been subordinate to Cheng Hung before it came to belong to Cheng Khaeng as mentioned above. Moreover, the 'ruler of Chiang Khaeng (Cheng Khaeng) probably sent tribute not only to Chiang Rung (Cheng Hung) but also to Ava' at that time³³. [Grabowsky and Renu 2008: 31] It also means that Moeng Yawng was vassal of the vassal of Cheng Hung³⁴. Therefore, since Cheng Hung had a close relationship with each of the three moengs, Cheng Hung should have been responsible for settling the dispute among the three moengs. Burma must have known these relationships and ordered Cheng Hung, which Burma recognised as a tributary of itself, to arbitrate the disputes in the official letter.

However, the chief of Cheng Hung could not go by himself because China did not permit him to go. Consequently, the envoy despatched by the chief of Cheng Hung as well as headmen despatched from Burma could not arbitrate the dispute.

Then, there was another letter from Chiang Saen. Qing Shilu's article says that the letter was written in Burmese. This shows that the sender of the letter could not be the Tai chief or chao

muang of Chiang Saen, but might be the Burmese governor or myo-wun of Chiang Saen³⁵. We do not know whether this letter was written based on an order from Ava or by myo-wun's own judgement, but Chiang Saen might be the local Burmese office in charge of the eastern Shan State, so it is not strange for Chiang Saen to send business correspondence. The destination of the letter was Moeng Long, which was a party concerned. This letter let Moeng Long know how Burma was going to settle the disputes after the first arbitration did not work.

Thus, the two letters were not contradictory to each other. The first letter was an official and formal letter from Ava to one of its tributaries, Sipsongpanna, to order an ideal action, and the second was a business correspondence from a Burmese local office to a concerned party to the dispute, Moeng Long, to show remedial measures because the first action did not work.

6. Conclusion

I have discussed Qing China's view of the eastern Shan States and Northern Thailand in the mid-eighteenth century. It was found that Qing China at that time was conscious of the boundary that separated the Chinese interior (neidi) from the exterior. The boundary line might be vague, but it was clearly recognised at the passes, which should be protected when disputes occurred outside the boundary. This conception of 'interior' (neidi) led to the prohibition of 'interior' *tusi*'s going out to the 'exterior'. This prohibition was also seen in the 1840s. [Kato 2006: 38 (note 62)]³⁶ Once Qing China knew that Cheng Khaeng and Moeng Yawng were vassals of the vassal of Burma, it decided to protect important passes along the border and not to interfere with them.

However, the Tai states at that time had native relationships with other Tai states and with Burma. For example, Cheng Khaeng, which was in the 'exterior' for China, was a kind of vassal of Cheng Hung, and Cheng Hung itself was also a vassal of Burma. Such relationships might be unimaginable, or unacceptable, for China in the mid-eighteenth century.

After the 1760s, however, Qing China had to confront exterior matters that needed to be dealt with. Some exterior forces entered the interior areas, which were followed by the Qing-Burma war. In the next article, I will illustrate how Qing's knowledge of the Tai states and the areas would increase due to the disputes and the war, and I will also discuss how Qing's view of them was changing with the new knowledge.

Notes

- 1 The word 'Tai' here means Southwestern Tai languages and people who speak the languages. It includes 'Dai' 傣 in the People's Republic of China as well as 'Thai' in Thailand.
- 2 I have written Tai words in a form as close as possible to the local pronunciations. For some words, spellings showing Thai pronunciation are added in parentheses when they first appear so that they can be related to Thai words used in previous studies.
- 3 It is called Keng Tung in Burmese. In historical documents, it is often called Moeng Koen.
- 4 Most of Sipsongpanna belongs to the present-day Xishuangbanna Autonomous Prefecture of Day Nationality 西双版纳傣族自治州. It borders on Myanmar and Laos. The Mekong River flowed through Sipsongpanna from north to the south.
- 5 The names of moeng (muang) were called 'Moeng' ('Muang') plus the proper name following that. If the proper name had more than one word or syllable, it was sometimes called only by the proper name without 'Moeng' ('Muang'). I also sometimes follow this system to indicate a moeng's (muang's) name, such as Cheng Hung, Cheng Tung, and Cheng Khaeng. The chiefs of moengs (muangs) were called Chao Moeng (Muang) in Tai.

- 6 They were Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties in chronological order.
- 7 They were Taungoo, Nyaungyan or Restored Taungoo, and Konbaung Dynasties in chronological order.
- 8 It meant the head of a Chinese office named Cheli Xuanwei Si 車里宣慰司.
- 9 Gaituguilu means replacing native rulers with regular imperial officials.
- 10 I have examined Qing's behaviour toward Sipsongpanna in the Yongzhong 雍正 Period (1723–1735) to reveal how Qing's view of Sipsongpanna had changed in the process of trying to annex it. After replacing some native rulers adjacent to Sipsongpanna with regular imperial officials, the Qing tried to annex the east bank of the Mekong River in Sipsongpanna. However, the Qing found this to be a difficult task. If the Qing placed the region under the control of regular imperial officials, most of the Tai people would take refuge in other Tai states located south of Sipsongpanna, which were beyond Qing's control. In addition, even if the Qing despatched officials and workers there, they would face the threat of deadly infectious diseases such as malaria. Therefore, the Qing did not replace any Tai rulers of Sipsongpanna with regular imperial officials. [Kato 2018]
- 11 They were Chinese official titles gave to non-Han indigenous leaders. These ranks were lower than the rank of Xuanwei Shi. The chiefs of moengs (Chao Moeng) of Sipsongpanna who had aided the suppression or had not sided with the rebellions were given the titles.
- 12 Other than the veritable records of the Qing dynasty, which were formal official records, there are other useful historical documents including confidential reports by local government officials to the throne, or zouzhe 奏摺. However, I have not had a chance to read zouzhe of this period, which are not put in *Gong Zhongdang Qianlong Chao Zouzhe* or any other publications insofar as I know.
- 13 It was caused by the invasion of Upper Burma by Ming partisans and followed by a challenge by Ayutthaya. Chiang Mai became estranged from Burma temporarily at that time. [Lieberman 1984: 200–201]
- 14 Sarasawadee says there were also positions such as 'naasaai', 'naakhwaa', 'naakham', 'ca lac', and 'mang saam'. [Sarasawadee 2008: 295] Saai means left and khwaa means right in Tai.
- 15 Lieberman shows that the Hman-nan chronicle noted Chiang Mai rebelled due to heavy taxes, and probably due to heavy levies. [Lieberman 1984: 204]
- 16 Ava was the capital of the Nyaungyan Dynasty at that time.
- 17 Lieberman writes that a leader of the Chiang Mai 'revolt', who had murdered the Burman governor of Chiang Mai, received military support from Nan in 1727 or 1728. [Lieberman 1984: 206]
- 18 He and his two cousins, who were Chao Kingkitsarat and his brother, Chao Intasom, were raised in Sipsongpanna. [Simms 2001: 112]
- 19 Lieberman also says that 'only when, as in the mid-eighteenth century, neither Ava nor Ayudhya was able to offer effective military protection or to threaten credible chastisement were Chiangmai and other such principalities likely to opt for independence'. [Lieberman 1984: 200]
- 20 See note 5.
- 21 It is not clear what were the differences between the positions of myo-wun nasaai, myo-wun nakhwaa, and the position of chao muang.
- 22 It might indicate the land where Pu'er Fu was established later [Wyatt and Aroonrut 1998: xxvii (Map 4)].
- 23 Lieberman says that in Sane's reign (r. 1698–1714), Burma seems to have strengthened its influence over Chiang Saen as well as over Nan and Cheng Tung. [Lieberman 1984: 204]
- 24 However, Aung Zeya, who named himself Alaungpaya later, did not obey the Pegu government and fought against it. After removing the Pegu government, he established the Konbaung Dynasty.
- 25 Zhang Yunsui was a member of Han Bordered Yellow Banner. After he had experienced various positions of Yunnan's high-ranking bureaucrats, such as the governor of Chuxiong Fu, the governor of Qujing Fu, the surveillance commissioner, the administrative commissioner, he was appointed as the governor of Yunnan in 1730 or Yongzhong 8. In 1733, Chao Xingguo, the head of Simao, rallied Kucong man that lived outside and raised a rebellion. Zhang Yunsui and the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, Gao Qizhuo suppressed it. Zhang Yunsui became the acting governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou in 1741 and the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou in 1747. [*Qing Shi Gao* Vol. 307]
- 26 '又奏、普洱所屬猛遮界外之孟艮酋長召賀卑、橫行殘虐。經掌管地方之叭三猛等逐之。逃入緬境。現飭土千總防範各隘。得旨。惟在清理我疆。嚴謹關隘也。' [*Da Qing Gaosong Chun Huangdi Shilu* vol. 167: on the day of Din Hai 丁亥 of the 5th month of the 7th year of Qianlong]
- 27 See the section 3, (1).
- 28 It means Dao Shaowen.
- 29 It may mean a Tai high-ranking official.
- 30 '雲貴總督張允隨奏。雲南普洱邊外猛勇夷目。恃強侵擾整謙夷境。致整謙夷口、逃避普洱府屬之猛籠界上。該夷目叭勇、輒聲言欲進猛籠。臣飭車里宣慰司刀紹文、督率猛籠土弁、嚴加堵截、不得出境多事。緬甸莽子行文刀紹文、令赴猛勇和解。該土司稟臣請示。臣以車里係內地土司、未便令其前往緬甸、為息事起見、亦未可竟置不理、酌令轉委土弁代往。茲據刀紹文稟稱、已遣幹目前往。緬甸亦差夷目二三十人來勇勸解。猛勇恃強不依。又據猛籠土把總刀興稟稱、十月十一日、景線頭目牛萬、送到緬文。內稱、猛勇、整謙、兩處仇殺、屢勸不依、今莽王差掌事大頭人來、必要調理妥當、可稟宣慰、各守各界不要著人來等語。臣查猛勇整謙、俱係景線

- 所屬、景線向服緬甸。該二處夷目搆舞。緬甸應自為剖斷。乃始則行文刀紹文、會同勸息繼又令牛萬寄信阻止。臣揣情形、大率夷性多疑。始慮事難辦理、欲令車里土司協同勸諭。今又恐內地土弁、窺見彼地虛實、故又阻止。在緬甸既不願內地弁目涉伊境界。自必令伊頭目調停妥帖。事屬易結。臣現檄令普洱鎮府、嚴飭各猛土弁、於沿邊要隘、加意防範。得旨。知道了。邊夷固當將就了事。以夷治夷。但不可令其騷擾內地可也。’ [Da Qing Gaosong Chun Huangdi Shilu vol. 331: on the day of Jiyu 己酉 of the 12th month of the 13th year of Qianlong]
- 31 On the other hand, Zhang Yunsui ordered the ruler of Sipsongpanna to despatch an envoy to Moeng Yawng. We can guess from this that people appointed as *tusi* by China could not be permitted to go outside, but other native people had no restrictions to go outside.
- 32 More people a Tai state gained, more prosperity it might achieve because there was much land left to be cultivated.
- 33 If so, it makes sense that the people of Cheng Khaeng fled to Moeng Long, which was a part of Sipsongpanna, the state which Cheng Hung headed.
- 34 Grabowsky and Renu say that ‘in the first half of the eighteenth century Moeng Yong and Chiang Khaeng fell under Chinese influence’, [Grabowsky and Renu 2008: 31] but that is not true. According to *Daoguang Pu'er Fu Zhi*, they submitted to China in Qianlong 31 or 1766. [Daoguang Pu'er Fu zhi vol. 18: 20]
- 35 In Qing Shilu, the name of the head of Chiang Saen was Niumang. Mang means Burma in Tai. Niu could be Ngiu, which means Shan people.
- 36 The lord of Cheng Hung refused to go to Ava and Bangkok in the 1840s since China did not permit him to go out of Sipsongpanna because he was appointed as Cheli Xuanwei Shi. [Kato 2006: 38 (note 62)]

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