

Qing China's View of the Eastern Shan States and Northern Thailand in the 1760s

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This paper discusses Qing China's view of the eastern Shan States and northern Thailand in the 1760s. Until at least 1750, Qing China did not know that the Tai states in southernmost Yunnan, the eastern Shan States, and northern Thailand had had close relations with Burmese dynasties. However, in the middle of the 1760s, when the troops of Konbaung Burma advanced from the eastern Shan States to Sipsongpanna, Qing China had to fight them because Sipsongpanna was recognised as the Chinese interior. Although the Tai states in the eastern Shan States and northern Thailand were temporarily subordinated to Qing China in 1766, and Qing China tried to extend the *tusi* system to the areas, Konbaung Burma brought these Tai states under its control in 1767. During this war, Qing China gathered more information about the relations between Burmese dynasties and the Tai states in southernmost Yunnan, the eastern Shan States, and northern Thailand. In 1768, new and reliable information reached the Qing imperial court. On this occasion, Qing China probably understood and accepted that those Tai states had close relations with Burma and that they would continue to have relations with Konbaung Burma, even if they sometimes submitted to China.

Keywords: Qing China, Shan States, northern Thailand, Sipsongpanna, Sino-Burmese War

1. Introduction

This paper discusses how Qing China's view of the Tai¹ states which were located in what is now northern Thailand and the eastern Shan States of Myanmar² changed in the 1760s.

In a previous paper, I discussed Qing China's view of those Tai states in the mid-18th century. As for the border areas of southernmost Yunnan and the Shan States of Myanmar, Qing China at that time was conscious of the boundary that separated the Chinese interior, or *neidi* 內地, from the exterior. Qing China recognised Sipsongpanna³ inside the boundary, or the 'interior', because it had already belonged to Pu'er Fu 普洱府, which was established in 1729⁴, and many Tai lords there had been appointed as native military officers⁵ since the end of the 1720s. On the other hand, Chiang Tung⁶, Chiang Khaeng⁷, and Muang Yawng were recognised as being outside the boundary. The boundary line might have been vague, but it was clearly recognised at the passes, which needed to be protected when disputes occurred outside the boundary. This conception of 'interior' led to a prohibition against interior *tusis* 內地土司, or native officials going out to the 'exterior' [Kato 2021].

In fact, not only the Tai states in the eastern Shan States of Myanmar and northern Thailand but also Sipsongpanna and the other Tai states in southernmost Yunnan had been tributary states of Nyaungyan Burma. However, such relations might have been unimaginable, or unacceptable,




Fig. 1: Map around Sipsongpanna

The shaded area indicates present-day Xishuangbanna Autonomous Prefecture of Day Nationality

-----: borders between present-day nation states

for Qing China in the mid-18th century.

The lords of these Tai states had been given official titles by either the Chinese dynasties⁸ or the Burmese dynasties,⁹ or both, since the end of the 13th century at the earliest.¹⁰ However, in the early Qing period, Qing China seemed to have little information about the relations between the Tai states and Burmese dynasties. Only after Qing China's establishment of the system to control Sipsongpanna via Pu'er fu in 1729¹¹ did the present-day eastern Shan States of Myanmar start to be recognised as *Pu'er bianwai* 邊外, or outside the frontier of Pu'er. Qing China might also have felt closer to present-day northern Thailand than before.

In the previous paper, I analysed the descriptions from the 1730s to the 1750s in the *Qing Shilu*, or the 'veritable records of the Qing Dynasty'.¹² This source has only two articles related to the Tai states in the eastern Shan States and northern Thailand during the period. On the other hand, the *Qing Shilu* has many articles referring to the Tai states in these areas after the 1760s, when the Sino-Burmese War began. As a result of the war, Qing China must have increased its knowledge of the Tai states and of the corresponding areas, and Qing China's view of them could have changed accordingly. In this paper, I plan to use the articles of the *Qing Shilu* in the 1760s as the main historical sources. I will also analyse a confidential report by government officials to the throne, or *zouzhe* 奏摺.

Before analysing historical documents, it is necessary to understand the general situation

concerning the relations between Burma and Tai states of northern Thailand, the eastern Shan States, and Sipsongpanna just before the fall of Nyaungyan, or the Restored Taungoo Dynasty, in 1752. After we look at that, I would like to discuss Qing China's view of the Tai states by analysing historical documents chronologically.

2. Burma and Tai states of northern Thailand, the eastern Shan States, and Sipsongpanna in the late Nyaungyan period

The Tai states of present-day northern Thailand, the eastern Shan States, and Sipsongpanna had been under the influence of the Nyaungyan Dynasty, either through directly or almost independently. A new political power was established in 1740 in Pegu and had started to attack the Nyaungyan Dynasty in 1742, eventually resulting in the fall of the dynasty in 1752. However, Aung Zeya, who later named himself Alaungpaya, did not obey the Pegu government and fought against it. After removing the Pegu government, he established the Konbaung Dynasty.

In the following section, I will show the general situation concerning the relations between Burma and the Tai states of northern Thailand, the eastern Shan States, and Sipsongpanna in the late Nyaungyan period.¹³

(1) Burma and the Tai states of northern Thailand in the late Nyaungyan period

The Tai states of northern Thailand had been under Nyaungyan Burma's control until the beginning of the 18th century. However, in 1727, Chiang Mai defeated Ava's¹⁴ garrison and killed the *myo-wun*, or Burmese governor, and the *sit-ke*, or Burmese military commissioner¹⁵ [Lieberman 1984: 200–205]. Subsequently, Chao Ong Kham, a member of a Tai ruling family,¹⁶ took the throne at Chiang Mai in 1727. Burma sent troops and tried to recapture Chiang Mai four times but failed to do so. [Simms 2001: 112–113; Lieberman 1984: 204–205]. Chao Ong Kham probably governed Chiang Mai until his death in 1769. Therefore, in the 1760s, Chiang Mai must have been independent of Burma.¹⁷

On the other hand, Chiang Saen was still under Nyaungyan Burma's control until at least 1741.¹⁸ Chiang Saen was attacked by Chiang Mai in 1728, when Chiang Mai was under the rule of Chao Ong Kham. After repelling the attack, Burma put Phrae, Nan, Lampang, Muang Fang, Muang Saat, Chiang Khong, and Muang Thoeng¹⁹ under Chiang Saen [Sarasawadee 2008: 298]. This means that Burma made Chiang Saen a base from which to govern the area of present-day northern Thailand. Burma sent *myo-wun* as Chiang Saen's governor, although Burma allowed the native Tai ruling family to maintain the position of *chao muang*.²⁰

(2) Burma and the Tai states of the eastern Shan States and of Sipsongpanna in the late Nyaungyan period

Until at least the end of the 1730s, Chiang Tung was under Nyaungyan Burma's influence, but at that time the people of Chiang Tung did not always obey Ava's decisions. In about 1739, Chiang Tung expelled Ava's chosen ruler²¹ [Lieberman 1984: 206].

As for Muang Yawng, Chiang Khaeng, and Sipsongpanna, Nyaungyan Burma recognised them as tributary states and assumed the authority to settle their disputes. In the late 1740s, Muang

Yawng attacked Chiang Khaeng. Because the people of Chiang Khaeng fled to Moeng Long, a *moeng* in the Sipsongpanna, Muang Yawng also intended to advance into Moeng Long. In this situation, Nyaungyan Burma dispatched 20 to 30 officials to Muang Yawng to arbitrate. Burma also sent an official letter to the lord of Cheng Hung, or the supreme ruler of Sipsongpanna, to go to Muang Yawng to arbitrate together. Thereafter, Chiang Saen, which was governed by a Burmese governor²² at that time, also sent a letter written in Burmese to Moeng Long.²³

(3) Qing China's view of the Tai states of northern Thailand, the eastern Shan States, and Sipsongpanna in the late Nyaungyan period

From the descriptions in the articles of the *Qing Shilu* referring to the above two incidents, we can understand the Qing's view of the Tai states of northern Thailand, the eastern Shan States, and Sipsongpanna in this period.

According to the article of the day of Renxu of the fifth month of Qianlong 7, or 1 July 1742, about the incident in which the chief of Chiang Tung was expelled, Qing China recognised Chiang Tung outside of the area of Moeng Chae 猛遮界外. Moeng Chae was a *moeng* of Sipsongpanna and belonged to Pu'er Fu. When Qing China learned of the incident, it shielded the mountain passes from the dispute. This clearly shows that Chiang Tung was recognised outside Qing territory [*Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 167; Kato 2021: 318–319, 323 (note26)].

The article of the day of Jiyou in the 12th month of Qianlong 13, or 16 February 1749, which referred to a series of events resulting from Muang Yawng's attack on Chiang Khaeng, says that Qing China also recognised Muang Yawng outside Pu'er, that is, outside Qing territory. When Qing China learned that Muang Yawng also intended to advance into Moeng Long, it tried to prevent Muang Yawng from doing so [the day of Jiyou in the 12th month of Qianlong 13, *Da Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi Shilu*, vol. 331; Kato 2021: 319–320, 323–333 (note 30)].

Through these events, Qing China became aware that both Muang Yawng and Chiang Khaeng belonged to Chiang Saen and that Chiang Saen was a vassal of Burma. The governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou at that time thought that Burma should resolve the issue by itself without involving Sipsongpanna because Muang Yawng and Chiang Khaeng were vassals of a vassal of Burma. This means that the governor-general effectively accepted that Muang Yawng and Chiang Khaeng belonged to Burma. All Qing China needed to do was to protect the passes along the border to prevent those states from disturbing the interior of the Qing [Kato 2021].

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that Qing China recognised the Tai lords of Sipsongpanna as the interior officers. In other words, Qing China believed that the Tai lords in Sipsongpanna belonged to China. However, Nyaungyan Burma also recognised Sipsongpanna as a tributary state, as mentioned above.

3. Qing China's change in attitude and view toward 'outside of the frontier Pu'er' in 1766

After the fall of the Nyaungyan Dynasty in 1752, the Tai states in present-day northern Thailand, the eastern Shan States, and Sipsongpanna were free of Burmese influence for some time. However, the Konbaung Dynasty soon started to send troops to subjugate these states, just as the Nyaungyan

Dynasty had done.

As mentioned above, at least until the end of the 1740s, Qing China only protected the passes along the border so as not to allow outsiders to disturb the interior. However, in the middle of the 1760s, when *Mang zei* 莽賊, or Burmese troops, advanced to Sipsongpanna, Qing China had to send troops to confront them. It was probably because Sipsongpanna was *neiti*, or the interior for China.

At first, the Qianlong emperor took it for granted that Chinese troops won the battle against Burmese troops. According to an article in the *Qing Shilu* on the day of Binzi in the first month of Qianlong 30, or 19 February 1765, after Chinese troops defeated the Burmese troops of Baitasi to recapture the town of Cheli *xuanweishi*,²⁴ the governor of Yunnan, Chang Jun 常鈞, reported the victory quickly. However, the emperor said that Chang Jun did not have to exaggerate the victory, because it was a small one.²⁵

About one year later, the emperor changed tack, instructing Chinese troops to go beyond the border. On the day of Gengshen of the 12th month of Qianlong 30, or 29 January 1766, he ordered the Chinese troops to pursue and capture Burmese troops, attack their 'dens', and root them out. He also said that the border areas needed to be cleared up.²⁶

At almost the same time, on the 21st day of the 12th month of Qianlong 30, or 31 January 1766, Chinese troops at Sipsongpanna were hit hard by a Burmese sneak attack. According to the article of the day of Bingxu of the first month of Qianlong 31, or 24 February 1766, the emperor still responded magnanimously to the report by the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, Liu Zao 劉藻, about this defeat, and showed understanding that Liu Zao was not experienced in military operations. However, the emperor decided to transfer Liu Zao to the position of governor-general of Hu Guang 湖廣 and appoint Yang Yingju 楊應琚, who was experienced in planning military operations, as the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou [*Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 753].

In the article of the day of Renyin of the second month of Qianlong 31, or 12 March 1766, the emperor showed that the reports from Yunnan were misleading because Liu Zao had believed the lies of Han military officers. The emperor accordingly re-evaluated the defeat in Sipsongpanna, which was more severe than the one that took place about three weeks earlier. The emperor demoted Liu Zao from governor-general to governor and transferred Liu Zao to the governor of Hubei 湖北. However, Liu Zao had to deal with affairs in Yunnan until Yang Yingju arrived in Yunnan as the new governor-general [*Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 754].

Liu Zao continued to send reports to the throne about the war situation, but the emperor continued to take a harsh attitude toward Liu Zao. On the day of Guihai of the second month of Qianlong 31, or 2 April 1766, the Ministry of Personnel suggested that Liu Zao and Daqi 達啟, who was the admiral of the Green Standard Army 綠營, or the Han army of Yunnan, should be dismissed from office. The emperor agreed [*Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 755]. On the third day of the third month of Qianlong 31, or 11 April 1766, Liu Zao committed suicide [Article of the day of Dinghai of the third month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 757].

All this proved that the emperor's attitude and view toward 'outside of the frontier Pu'er' was changing because the war situation was not good. The emperor started to consider the war seriously

and ordered the Chinese troops to pursue and capture Burmese troops, attack their ‘dens’, and root them out.

4. The temporary subordination of the Tai states in the eastern Shan States and northern Thailand to Qing China in 1766

(1) New information about Moeng Lem

Until the middle of the 1760s, Qing China, or at least the emperor and the imperial court, do not seem to have known that there had been close relations between Burmese dynasties and some of the Tai states that Qing China recognised in ‘neiti’, or interior.

For example, in the article of the day of Bingxu of the first month of Qianglong 31, or 24 February 1766, concerning a report by the governor of Yunnan, Chang Jun, that the lord of Moeng Lem was ‘a descendant of Burma’ and that there were comings and goings between Moeng Lem and Burma on Chao Paixin’s succession to become a new lord of Moeng Lem, the emperor complained that the governor-general and the governor had never informed him of that before.²⁷ In addition, on the day of Wuwu of the second month of Qianglong 31, or 28 March 1766, the emperor said he had never heard that the lord of Moeng Lem was ‘a descendant of Burma’, which was what Chao Paisian said in his report, and blamed Liu Zao for reporting that without evidence.²⁸

This shows that the emperor heard about the relations between Burma and Moeng Lem for the first time on 24 February 1766 and as of 28 March 1766, he still could not believe, or did not want to believe, that the lord of Moeng Lem had had close relations with Burma.

(2) New information and the temporary subordination of the Tai states in the eastern Shan States

After Yang Yingju, a new governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, arrived in Yunnan, he sent new information about Chiang Tung to the emperor. According to the article of the day of Jichou of the third month of Qianlong 31, or 28 April 1766, Yang Yingju reported that Chao San, who was a cousin of Chao Ping, the lord of Chiang Tung, allied with Burma to defeat Chiang Tung and that Chao Ping had fled to Langsang and then to Moeng Chae of Sipsongpanna, and Moeng Chae sheltered him. Yang Yingju also said that Chinese troops had already gone out to the Shan States.²⁹

The Chinese troops, which were accompanied by Chao Ping, started attacking Chiang Khaeng on the fourth day of the third month, or 12 April 1766, and Chiang Tung on the 10th day of the third month, or 18 April 1766. The Chinese troops captured Chiang Khaeng and Chiang Tung. Chao San and his supporters fled to Ava.³⁰ We understand that Konbaung Burma intended to extend its influence to the eastern Shan States by taking advantage of the dispute over the position of the lord of Chiang Tung, and so did Qing China.

Qing China let Chao Ping and Phaya Saen Pong govern Chiang Tung and Chiang Khaeng, respectively, and appointed them as *tu shihuishi* 土指揮使.³¹ This was the highest position of native officials, or *tusi*; it was, of course, higher than *xuanweishi*, the title of the lord of Cheng Hung or the supreme ruler of Sipsongpanna. About two or three months later, Moeng Lem also

offered to subordinate to Qing China with two elephants as tribute. Qing China accordingly appointed its lord as *tu qianzong* 土千總 [Daoguang Pu'er Fu Zhi, vol. 18 Tusi], a native military officer,³² which was a lower title than *tu shihuishi* or *xuanweishi*. In addition, Yang Yingju also suggested that Qing China impose taxes on Chiang Khaeng and Chiang Tung, just as it imposed them on Sipsongpanna.³³ This shows that Qing China intended to enlarge the *tusi* system to the eastern Shan States and that it placed more importance on Chiang Tung and Chiang Khaeng than Sipsongpanna.

Through a series of these events, Qing China obtained a great deal of information about these three *moengs* of the eastern Shan States.³⁴ However, Qing China did not attach any importance to their relations with Burma; it simply recognised them as new *tusi*.

(3) The temporary subordination of the Tai states in northern Thailand

According to the article of the day of Wushen of the tenth month of Qianlong 31, or 13 November 1766 Yang Yingju reported to the throne that the lords of Chiang Mai, Chiang Saen, and Chiang Rai had offered to subordinate to Qing China.

Yang Yingju, who is a *daxueshi* 大學士,³⁵ and taking charge of governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, reported to the emperor as follows: the head of Chiang Mai 整賣, Chao Chaiyati 召齋約提, the head of Chiang Saen 景線, Nasai 啞賽, and the head of Chiang Hai (Chiang Rai) 景海, Chao Hanpiao 召罕彪,³⁶ led their people to Moeng Koen (Chiang Tung) and offered to subordinate (to Qing China). In addition, Chao Chaiyati said that the head of Liuben 六本, Chao Moengchai, would come soon. The old name of Chiang Mai 整賣 was Jingmai 景邁, and its other name was Babaixifu-guo 八百媳婦國. During the Yuan Dynasty, it could not be conquered, even though large military forces were used. Chiang Saen and Chiang Hai are also the largest towns located outside. Now all of them want to be subordinate. [the day of Wushen of the tenth month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 770]

Yang Yingju then proposed, as rewards, that the lords of Chiang Mai and Chiang Saen be appointed as *xuanwushi* 宣撫使; that the lords of Chiang Rai and Liuben, which were smaller than Chiang Mai and Chiang Saen, be appointed as *tu shoubei*, a lower title than *xuanwushi*; and that tax be imposed on them in the same way as for Moeng Lem. The emperor agreed to that proposal.³⁷

Both *xuanwushi* and *tu shoubei* were lower titles than *tu shihuishi*, which were given to Chiang Tung and Chiang Khaeng. This might show that Qing China considered the eastern Shan States to be more important than northern Thailand. However, it is noteworthy that Qing China also intended to enlarge the *tusi* system to northern Thailand, similar to the eastern Shan States.

5. Qing China's shifting views of the relations between Burma and the Tai states

(1) The subordination of the Tai states in the eastern Shan States and northern Thailand to Konbaung Burma in 1767

Although the Tai states in the eastern Shan States and northern Thailand temporarily submitted to Qing China in 1766, they became the vassal states of Konbaung Burma in 1767.

In the second half of 1766, the main battlefields between Qing China and Konbaung Burma moved to the area around Bhamo, and the Qing troops withdrew from the eastern Shan States.

The emperor's words about the Tai states in the eastern Shan States and northern Thailand appear in the articles of the *Qing Shilu* in 1767. For example, in the article of the day of Gengyin in the first month of Qianlong 32, or 23 February 1767, the emperor said that Mubang 木邦 (Hsenwi), Chiang Khaeng, and Chiang Mai had asked for help from Chinese troops when they offered to submit to the Qing, but the governor-general, or Yang Yingju, left them unprotected.³⁸ According to the article of the next day, the emperor also said that, for those who had offered to submit, such as Chiang Mai, Chiang Saen, and Chiang Rai, Yang Yingju had proposed to appoint the lords of the states as native officials, and the emperor consented to that, but Yang Yingju had not made any progress.³⁹ This evidence shows that, in reality, Qing China was not able to control the Tai states in the eastern Shan States and northern Thailand.

According to the article of the day of Guiwei in the third month of Qianlong 32, or 17 April 1767, Burmese troops came to disrupt order in Chiang Tung as well as Chiang Saen and Cheng Mai. Qing China tried to defend them by using the military power of the Tai native officials themselves.⁴⁰ However, this did not work. The eastern Shan States and northern Thailand were lost to Qing China and eventually became vassal states of Konbaung Burma.

(2) Qing's understanding of the relations between Burma and the Tai states in 1768

In Qianlong 33, the emperor ordered Aligun 阿里衮⁴¹ and others to investigate the behind-the-scenes circumstances of the 'rebels' outside Pu'er. They sent the emperor several reports. A report written on the fifth day of the fifth month of Qianlong 33, or 19 June 1768,⁴² includes information on the relations the Tai states of Sipsongpanna and the Shan States had had with Burma. According to the report, this information was obtained from a person who knew the circumstances very well [Confidential report by Alikun, Shuhede, and E'ning to the throne, in *Gong Zhong Dang Qianlong Chao Zouzhe*, vol. 30].⁴³ The English translation of the parts of the report relating to Sipsongpanna and the Shan States are shown below.⁴⁴ These indicate what new information the emperor learned at this stage.

1) Relationships between Burma and the Tai states of Sipsongpanna

Tusi 土司 (native officials) of Jiulong Jiang 九龍江, which is identical with Cheli in the old days, was originally a branch of Burma 緬甸分支. In Kanxi 20, Tao moeng'tao 刀孟挑, who would be a *tusi*, submitted (to Qing China), and his territory came under the control of *xuanweisi* 宣慰司. Puteng 普騰, Liukun 六困, Cheng Tawng 整董, Moeng Baan 猛旺, Wu Tai 烏得, Moeng Wu 猛烏, Moeng Laa 猛腊, Moeng Ngaat 猛阿, Moeng Chae 猛遮, Yibang 倚邦, Yi'nguu 易武, and Moeng Long 猛籠 were twelve *tusi* 十二土司.⁴⁵ With the addition of *xuanweisi*, they became 13 *panna* 十三版納. Although they had already submitted (to Qing China), they paid tribute to Burma once a year. Both sides were satisfied with this, and no troubles occurred. After Aung Zeya (Alaungpaya), the head of Moksobo (Mushu 木梳), usurped the throne of Burma, Cheli *tusi*, and others stopped paying tribute to Burma. In the autumn of Qianlong 30, Burmese rebels dispatched *jikai* throughout Jiulong Jiang in order

to request the payment of tribute again. *Jikai* is the common name of the Burmese chiefs in charge of administration.⁴⁶ The *tusi*s refused to pay tribute, which led to disturbances in their border areas. [A confidential report by Alikun, Shuhede, and Ening to the throne, in *Gong Zhong Dang Qianlong Chao Zouzhe*, vol. 30, 529–530]

The emperor learned from this credible report that the Tai lords of Sipsongpanna had paid tribute to Burma every year before the fall of the Nyaungyan Dynasty and that Burmese troops advanced to Sipsongpanna, because it refused to pay tribute to a new Burmese dynasty, the Konbaung Dynasty.

2) Relationships between Burma and the Tai states of the Shan States

... As for Chao San 召散, he was a nephew of Mengmengrong 猛孟容,⁴⁷ who had been appointed as a native official of Moeng Koen (Chiang Tung) by Burma. Later, Chao San went to Ava. He plotted to usurp his uncle's position. Chao San sent for and restrained Mengmengrong. People objected to Chao San and helped Chao Ping 召丙, a son of Mengmengrong, to be a chief of Moeng Yang Long. Chao San conspired with Burma again and expelled Chao Ping. Chao Ping had no place to put himself, so he fled to the interior around Mongsa (Moengsat) Jiang 猛撒江 and submitted (to Qing China). In the year before last, Chinese soldiers subjugated Moeng Koen, so Chao San fled to Ava. Yang Yingju immediately appointed Chao Ping, who had submitted (to Qing China), to be the Moeng Koen *tusi*. Later, after Chinese soldiers withdrew so as to avoid 'zhang' 瘴 (miasma), Chao San called the Burmese rebels together again, expelled Chao Ping, and brought unrest to Talaw 打樂 and Jiulong Jiang.

The people of Chiang Khaeng had also been subject to Burma. When Chinese soldiers went out the year before last, those people thought they would not be able to resist, so they fled instantly. Yang Yingju appointed Phaya Saen Pong 叭先捧, a native chief who had participated in this expedition and achieved military exploits, as Chiang Khaeng *tu zhihui*(*shi*) 整欠土指揮(使). However, after our soldiers withdrew, the people got together, returned to their 'dens', and caused a disturbance again. In addition, the people were not satisfied above all that Phaya Saen Pong had a higher position than the lord, although he had originally been a village chief under Cheli *tusi*. This caused Chao Kaeo 召教 and Chao Yuan 召淵, who were chiefs of Chiang Khaeng and Chao Kong 召工, who was a Muang Yawng chief, to conspire with Burma in order to fight with Phaya Saen Pong...

However, if you observe carefully, you find that the reason Chao San was able to call *jikai* together to cause a disturbance is that they are the same kind of people as the Burmese rebels and have had communication with the Burmese rebels. If those people see our soldiers appear suddenly and find that the Burmese rebels are in a distant place and cannot come to help in time, they flee and hide immediately. After the Chinese soldiers withdrew, they got together again to commit evil deeds one after another. Chao Kong and Chao Yuan fight with Phaya Saen Pong because they expect assistance from Burmese rebels. That is why they can do as they please. Although these small-time scoundrels are but a minor detail in a frontier area, they conspire with Burmese rebels to commit evil deeds and communicate with Burmese

rebels. As for the *mang* 莽 and the *mian* 緬, people living in the interior (*neiti* 內地) call them *laomian* 老緬 and *mianzi* 緬子 because they are *miandian* 緬甸 (Burmese), but the outsiders know only the name *mangzi* 莽子.

Now the area beyond the border of the interior *tusi* belongs to *laomian*. Reports by officers of the Green Army used the words ‘some real *mianzi*’, but this is a crude way of speaking to distinguish them forcibly. In fact, various kinds of people living outside the border are all Burmese rebels and, in reality, constitute one unit... [A confidential report by Alikun, Shuhede, and Ening to the throne, in *Gong Zhong Dang Qianlong Chao Zouzhe*, vol. 30, 529–530]

The emperor was informed that the Tai states located in the eastern Shan States had been subjected to Burma and that Burma offered military support to one faction in struggles for power in the Tai states. The report also emphasised that those Tai people had had communication with the Burmese and that it was difficult to differentiate people living in the eastern Shan States from Burmese.

What was the emperor’s reaction upon learning of the ongoing close relations between Burma and those Tai states? On the confidential report, the emperor only wrote a short response to show that he gave an order in a different way than by writing something there. There are also articles of the *Qing Shilu* on the 17th day of the fifth month of Qianlong 33 which show the content of the report and orders by the emperor in response to that report.⁴⁸ However, we do not know what the emperor thought about the close relations between Burma and the Tai states. This probably shows that the emperor was ultimately able to understand and accept it as true.

6. Conclusion

As stated above, Qing China’s behaviour and attitude toward the Tai states gradually changed from 1765 to 1768. In 1765, an incident occurred that led Qing China to end its policy of only protecting the border so as not to allow outsiders to disturb the ‘interior’. That was Konbaung Burma’s ‘invasion’ of Sipsongpanna and the capture of Cheng Hung, also known as Cheli *xuanweisi*. China had no choice but to send troops to Sipsongpanna, because Cheli *xuanweisi* was the ‘interior’. After a serious defeat at Sipsongpanna at the beginning of 1766, the emperor appointed a new governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, who was experienced in planning military operations. The emperor then sent troops outside the boundary into the eastern Shan States. China succeeded in capturing Chiang Tung and Chen Khaeng in April 1766 and tried to enlarge the *tusi* system there by appointing new *tusis* for Chiang Tung and Chen Khaeng. When the lords of the Tai states of northern Thailand offered to subordinate to Qing China in November 1766, China also planned to appoint them as *tusis*.

Through these events, Qing China obtained a great deal of information about the Tai states, including their relations with Burma. However, Qing China did not believe that the Tai states in the ‘interior’ had relations with Burma. As for the Tai states located in the eastern Shan States and northern Thailand, Qing China did not consider it important. By subordinating new Tai states, China tried to enlarge the *tusi* system without thinking about Burmese influence there.

It was not until Qing China had lost the Tai states in the eastern Shan States and northern

Thailand in 1767 that it changed its view of the Tai states. At first, the emperor only blamed the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou for leaving the Tai states unprotected despite the fact that they had asked for help from Chinese troops. In 1768, however, the emperor himself ordered an investigation and learned from the resulting report that the Tai states, including those which Qing China recognised as the 'interior', had been tributary states of Burma. At this point, Qing China probably understood and accepted the truth at last. Thereafter, Qing China changed its policy to give the Tai states in the 'interior' tacit approval to continue to give tribute to Burma and to obtain titles as lords of vassal states from Burma, as Sipsongpanna continued to do so until the fall of Konbaung Burma in the late 19th century.

Notes

- 1 The word 'Tai' here means Southwestern Tai languages and people who speak the languages. It includes 'Dai' in the People's Republic of China as well as 'Thai' in Thailand.
- 2 Chiang Mai, Chiang Saen, and Chiang Rai (Chiang Hai) were among the Tai states located in present-day northern Thailand. Chiang Tung, Muang Yawng, and Chiang Khaeng were some of the states in the present-day eastern Shan States of Myanmar.
In this paper, names of the Tai states outside China are written in spellings showing Thai pronunciations. As for names of the Tai states in China, I have written Tai words in a form as close as possible to the local pronunciations. For some words, spellings showing Thai pronunciation are added in parentheses so that they can be related to Thai words used in previous studies.
- 3 Sipsongpanna as a Tai state existed until the 1950s. It consisted of approximately 30 small Tai states called *moeng* (*muang*), and the lord of Moeng Cheng Hung also held the position of supreme ruler. Most of the former Sipsongpanna belongs to the present-day Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture. It borders on Myanmar and Laos.
- 4 After Simao Ting 思茅廳 was established in 1735 under Pu'er Fu, Sipsongpanna was under the immediate control of Simao Ting.
- 5 The Qing appointed Tai lords of *moengs* (*Chao Moeng*) who had aided the suppression or had not sided with the rebellions as native military officers such as *tu shoubei* 土守備, *tu qianzong* 土千總, and *tu bazong* 土把總 in 1728, 1729, and 1732, respectively (Young Zheng 6, 7, and 10). These were Chinese official titles given to non-Han indigenous leaders. The supreme ruler of Sipsongpanna, or the lord of Cheng Hung had already appointed as Cheli *xuanweishi* 車里宣慰使. The ranks of *tu shoubei*, *tu qianzong*, and *tu bazong* were lower than the rank of *xuanweishi* [Kato 1997, 2015].
- 6 Chiang Tung is also called Keng Tung or Moeng Koen.
- 7 The names of *moeng* (*muang*) were called 'Moeng' ('Muang') plus the proper name following that. If the proper name had more than one word or syllable, it was sometimes called only by the proper name without 'Moeng' ('Muang'). I also sometimes follow this system to indicate a *moeng's* (*muang's*) name, such as Cheng Hung, Chiang Tung, and Chiang Khaeng.
- 8 They were the Yuan 元, Ming 明, and Qing 清 dynasties, in chronological order.
- 9 They were the Taungoo, Nyaungyan or Restored Taungoo, and Konbaung dynasties, in chronological order.
- 10 For example, the lord of Cheng Hung was given official titles by both the Chinese and Burmese dynasties. The Chinese title in the Qing period was Cheli *xuanweishi* 車里宣慰使. It meant the head of a Chinese office named Cheli *xuanweisi* 車里宣慰司.
- 11 Qing China began annexing the southern part of Yunnan in the 1720s after establishing a stable government in Yunnan. Many native rulers, including those who governed the northern area adjacent to Sipsongpanna, were replaced with regular imperial officials; this policy was known as *gaituguilu* 改土歸流. As for Sipsongpanna, the Qing established Pu'er Fu in its northern region in 1729, as well as Simao Ting under Pu'er Fu in 1735, to which most of the *moengs* of Sipsongpanna belonged. However, the Qing did not replace any Tai rulers of Sipsongpanna with regular imperial officials. Instead, the Qing appointed Tai chiefs of the *moengs* in Sipsongpanna, whose supreme ruler was the lord of Cheng Hung or Cheli *xuanweishi*, as native military officers such as *tu shoubei*, *tu qianzong*, and *tu bazong* in 1728, 1729, and 1732 [Kato 1997, 2015]. This meant that the Qing had a system of controlling Sipsongpanna through the native officers, who received orders from Simao Ting and Pu'er Fu.
- 12 Aside from the *Qing Shilu*, there are other useful historical documents, including *zouzhe* 奏摺 (confidential reports by local government officials to the throne). However, I have not had a chance to read the *zouzhe* of this period, which, to the best of my knowledge, were not included in *Gong Zhong Dang Qianlong Chao Zouzhe* or any other

publications.

- 13 In the previous paper, I already described the situations in northern Thailand from the second half of the 17th century to the first half of the 18th century and the situations of the eastern Shan States and Sipsongpanna in the first half of the 18th century.
- 14 Ava was the capital of the Nyaungyan Dynasty at that time.
- 15 Lieberman writes that a leader of the Chiang Mai revolt, who had murdered the Burman governor of Chiang Mai, received military support from Nan in 1727 or 1728 [Lieberman 1984: 206].
- 16 He had been a prince of Luang Prabang from 1713 to 1723. He and his two cousins—Chao Kingkitsarat and his brother, Chao Intasom—were raised in Sipsongpanna [Simms 2001: 112].
- 17 Lieberman also says that ‘only when, as in the mid-eighteenth century, neither Ava nor Ayudhya was able to offer effective military protection or to threaten credible chastisement were Chiengmai and other such principalities likely to opt for independence’ [Lieberman 1984: 200].
- 18 According to a version of the *Chiang Saen Chronicle*, in 1741, the Burmese king ordered a person named Mankharalak to be the *myo-wun* of Chiang Saen.
- 19 These *muangs* were all located in present-day northern Thailand.
- 20 The Burmese king appointed Phra Ngaam, who was a son of the late *chao muang*, as the new *chao muang* of Chiang Saen [Sarasawadee 2008: 294]. He belonged to the native rulers’ family from Chiang Saen. However, Sarasawadee pointed out that *chao muang* at that time might not have wielded much power [Sarasawadee 2008: 294].
- 21 He was a Tai prince who had been born and educated at the Burmese court and thus appears to have had weak ties with the local population. This incident is also described in the *Jengtung State Chronicle* [Mangrai 1981: 252–255] and the *Qing Shilu* [*Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 167].
- 22 The title of this governor was *myo-wun*.
- 23 These were described in an article of the *Qing Shilu* from 1749 (Qianlong 13) [*Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu*, vol. 331; Kato 2021: 319–320, 323–333 (note 30)]. Muang Yawng’s attack on Chiang Khaeng must be identical to the ‘buffalo war’ that was described in the chronicles of Muang Yawng and Chiang Khaeng [Tamnan Mong Yawng: 46; Grabowsky and Renu 2008: 31, 102].
- 24 This means that the town of Cheli *xuanweishi*, or Cheng Hung, had once been captured by Burmese troops.
- 25 ‘雲南巡撫常鈞奏。九龍江領兵參將劉明智等、攻破白塔寺莽賊、乘勝奪回宣慰土城。飛報捷音。得旨。有旨諭劉藻。小小之勝、何足侈言捷音。汝非未經大敵者比。何乃亦入綠旗之習。’ [the day of Binzi in the first month of Qianlong 30, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 727]
- 26 ‘庚申。諭軍機大臣等。據劉藻等奏、莽匪竄入猛捧等土司地方、肆行焚掠、現在飭派營協各員、調兵進剿、並親往督辦一摺。此等醜類、野性難馴、敢於擾害邊境、非大加懲創、無以警兇頑而申國法。劉藻等既經調兵進剿、必當窮力追擒、搗其巢穴、務使根株盡絕、邊徼肅清。恐劉藻拘於書生之見、意存姑息、僅以驅逐出境、畏威逃竄、遂爾苟且了事。不知匪徒冥頑不靈、乘釁生事、視以為常。前此阿溫波半扎乃占一案、未嘗不重治其罪、甫經半載、仍敢怙惡不悛。即其屬擾邊界、已屬罪無可逭、此次若復稍存寬縱、難保其不再干犯。養癰貽患之說、尤不可不深以為戒。著將此傳諭劉藻知之。’ [the day of Gengshen of the 12th month of Qianlong 30, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 751]
- On the day of Bingxu of the first month of Qianlong 31, or 24 February 1766, the emperor again said that if the ‘robbers’ disturbed the border areas, Chinese troops should attack their ‘dens’ and root them out.
‘又諭。據常鈞奏、永順邊境木匪滋事、請俟普洱莽匪辦有端緒、再將孟連土司之案辦理一摺、所見亦是。前於乾隆二十八年間、曾經降旨、以此等鼠竊狗偷、原屬不成事體、只可如此辦理、係就彼時情形指示。若匪徒敢於侵擾邊境、則當搗其巢穴、務使根株盡絕。自無容仍拘泥前旨。…’ [the day of Bingxu of the first month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 753]
- 27 ‘…即該撫所奏、孟連土司刁派先係緬甸支裔、應襲土司之刁派新時、與緬甸往來一節、從前該督撫等何以並未奏聞。…’ [the day of Bingxu of the first month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 753]
- 28 ‘又奏、孟連土司地方、上年時有莽子往來、查據刁派先稟彙內、有先係緬甸支裔之語。此在滇九載以來、未之前聞。是以無憑具奏。…’ [the day of Wuwu of the second month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 755]
- 29 ‘…皆因孟良應襲土司召丙之堂兄召散謀奪其地、勾結莽子打破孟良。召丙逃至南掌國、後又至內地土司猛遮藏匿。…總兵華封克復猛遮、內附土司境地廓清、已出險進剿孟良景綠等處。…’ [the day of Jichou of the third month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 757]
- 30 ‘大學士管雲貴總督楊應琚奏。據總兵劉德成報稱、參將劉明智等、於三月初四日進剿與整欠相近之猛辛、斃賊數十名、帶傷者無數、生擒莽匪十八名、擒獲木城三座、糯米五百餘石、一面搜勦山箐、一面相機前進。查猛辛整欠一百餘里、莽匪倚為門戶。今副將孫爾桂、已抵整欠。總兵劉德成、亦將抵大巢。莫若令提臣達啟、將擬攻猛勇一路官兵、亦親身率領進攻整欠。三路協勦、賊巢不日可平。並令於隘口堵截、勿任漏網。至華封所攻孟良、亦係賊巢、且有召散首惡在內、此路應令專攻、不必再分其勢。至賊匪中如有廠棍漢奸在內、尤須生擒活口、以便解赴內地根究懲治。得旨。諸凡皆妥行俟捷音。’ [the day of Bingshen of the third month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 757]
- ‘大學士管雲貴總督楊應琚奏。據總兵華封呈報、官兵於猛腊猛麻、四山搜捕餘賊、已被兵練截殺。又參將哈國興帶領兵練、並飭召丙頭人在大猛養堵禦截殺。土練先由猛養後路進攻。莽子三百餘人在大猛養扎營占據、當經

攻敗、賊已逃回孟艮。至大猛養大小頭人百姓等、原係召丙舊人、現已招來投順。查係大小二十三寨頭人二十三名、夷人男婦一千二百餘名口、尚有各處山箐夷人未經到齊。令召丙清查安插。哈國興即自猛麻一路進勦。華封亦進勦孟艮。查大猛養本係外夷應襲土目、召丙所屬前為伊堂兄召散等占據。今既經召丙招降、似應准其投誠、至其中如有前已順賊擾害邊境、焚掠夷寨抗拒官兵者、仍不得一併准降。應令召丙查明詳請治罪、並飭華封將孟艮賊巢上緊勦平、並擒拏賊首召散、五定瑞凍、召猛烈務獲。得旨。是此最不可姑息。若兵到投降、兵徹復叛、成何事體。總之此番既用兵威、不可苟且了事。

又奏。據總兵劉德成報稱、三月初五日潛抵整欠江邊、紮筏搭橋飛渡至城、隨奮勇攻進、賊人不能相顧、殺死無數。連日搜躡近巢、已無匪蹤。但附近整欠賊徑繁多、現復各路搜勦。得旨。嘉獎。

又奏。據總兵華封稟稱。三月初八日領兵至邦籠管。令參將哈國興等進攻。賊匪隨拒隨退。因路險不能長驅、又分遣兵練。由賊隘左右深箐潛上山梁。初九日辰刻賊潰。遂乘勢攔、破營一座、獲賊首五十餘級、鎗礮擊斃二百餘人。初十日兵至孟艮壩口之夏法街、分三路進攻。午刻抵孟艮城、砍開盡係空營。追至猛引等處、亦無蹤跡。弁兵同召丙四山搜捕、得男婦八十餘名口。其孟艮土城係依山挖壕。周圍約十一二里。得城時、倉糧已自燒毀。惟得牛百數十隻、當交召丙收用。召散、召猛烈、召猛珍、尚未獲。雖傳言逃赴阿瓦、已派令官兵嚴拏。得旨。知道了。即果逃至阿瓦、亦應向彼勒索。不可苟且了事。

又奏。前以整欠為翦賊平定之區、若聽其荒棄、恐無業莽子漸聚滋事、請令叭先捧管轄、照甘省土司例、給指揮職銜。並以孟艮係召丙故土、請兵除匪、得復舊業。應更傾心向化。可否賞給內地土司職銜。業經奏開、今孟艮賊巢已得。召丙如准為內地土司、與叭先捧一體給以指揮使職銜、俾地土皆附入版圖、伊等自長為臣僕。至整欠孟艮兩處地方、暨原管各堡寨多水田、有業夷戶已散、應令招來歸附。其並未從賊者、即為安插、俾速佈種。其兩處賊首、仍飭該鎮嚴行勦捕、與召丙叭先捧協力擒拏。得旨。諸凡妥當。如所議行。

又奏。整欠孟艮賊匪、兩路勾結。孟艮係召散巢穴、整欠係素領散撰巢穴。整欠賊首六人、已除其四。惟召散乃此案構霧渠魁。已飭委哈國興等追拏。再召散殺死召丙之父、占踞孟艮。召丙與伊原係深仇。並令商同追緝。得旨。如此認真辦理方是。[the day of Jihai of the third month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 757]

- 31 Those appointments seem to have been based on a suggestion by Yang Yingju, which was in the article of the day of Jihai of the third month of Qianlong 31, or 8 May 1766 [*Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 757].
- 32 This appointment also seems to have been based on a suggestion by Yang Yingju, which was in the article of the day of Bingwu of the sixth month of Qianlong 31, or 14 July 1766 [*Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 762].
- 33 ‘丁酉。諭。據楊應琚奏、新定整欠孟艮地方、請仿照普洱邊外十三土司之例、酌中定賦、於丁亥年入額徵收等語、整欠孟艮業經附入版圖、願輸糧賦。其酌定徵額之處、俱著照所請辦理。但念該處地方、連年經莽匪擾害、今雖得安耕作、而元氣尚難驟復、若遽於丁亥年責令輸、將恐夷民生計未免拮据、所有應徵錢糧、著加恩緩至戊子年入額徵收、以示優恤邊黎至意。’ [the day of Dingyou of the seventh month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 765]
- 34 The *Qing Shilu* contains several descriptions showing that many reports containing new information on the Tai states of the eastern Shan States reached the emperor in 1766. Some of them were mentioned above.
- 35 This was one of the highest positions at the imperial court of Qing China.
- 36 We do not know the Tai pronunciations of the names of the Tai lords, because they were written in Chinese characters.
- 37 ‘大學士管雲貴總督楊應琚奏。整賣頭目召齋約提、景線頭目訥賽、景海頭目召罕彪、各率夷民前來孟艮投誠。並據召齋約提稱、六本頭目召猛齋隨即前來等語。查整賣、舊名景邁、又名八百媳婦國。元時曾大費兵力征之不下。其景線、景海、亦外域最大部落。今俱歸誠向化、似應從優賞給。擬將召齋約提、訥賽、均賞四品宣撫司職銜。其景海地方較小、擬將召罕彪同六本頭目召猛齋、均賞土守備職銜。應納賦稅、請照孟連等土司之例、每年徵收差發銀兩。得旨。著照所請行。該部知道。’ [the day of Wushen of the tenth month of Qianlong 31, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 770]
- 38 ‘…且蠻暮而外、尚有木邦、整欠、整賣等處、前此懇求內附時、並請我兵保護。今該督亦置之不言。…’ [the day of Gengyin in the first month of Qianlong 32, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 777]
- 39 ‘…再從前投誠之眾、如整賣、景線、景海等處、俱經該督奏請賞給職銜、已允所請、交部發鈔、又中外所共知者。此等人地、現在作何光景、該督亦未籌及。…’ [the day of Xingmao of the first month of Qianlong 32, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 777]
- 40 ‘又諭。據湯聘等奏、緬匪竄入孟艮地方、將整賣景線乘虛侵占、已同楊重英、夔舒前往普洱、就近督率料理一摺、已另有旨諭矣。此事先據楊應琚奏稱、探聞緬匪有欲滋擾整賣之信、普洱相距尚遠、已飭該土司並附近土司協力防禦。’ [the day of Guiwei in the third month of Qianlong 32, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 781]
- 41 Aligun was xieban daxueshi 協辦大學士, which was the second highest position of the cabinet, at that time.
- 42 It probably arrived on the 17th day of the same month of Qianlong 33, or 1 July 1768. [the articles of the day of Jiachen of the fifth month of Qianlong 33, *Da Qing Gaosong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 811]
- 43 ‘臣阿里哀、臣舒赫德、臣鄂寧謹奏、為覆奏普洱邊外賊匪底裏情形事。竊查近日九龍江外、賊匪滋擾、業經官兵剿殺敗退緣由、臣阿里哀、臣鄂寧節次奏明在案。
今蒙諭旨、令臣等先行查明賊匪底裏。臣等查得普洱邊外九龍江、橄欖壩等處、邇年賊匪滋擾、經劉藻、楊應琚先後剿撫、辦理未竟。臣等詳細根究、詢之熟悉彼地夷情之人。九龍江土司、即古之車里、從前原係緬甸分支。康熙二十年、土司刀孟挑首先向化歸隸、版圖為宣慰司統轄。普騰、六困、整董、猛旺、烏得、猛烏、猛

腊、猛阿、猛遮、倚邦、易武、猛籠、是為十二土司、加以宣慰司、為十三版納。從前各土司、雖經內附、每年亦有納緬甸規禮、彼此相安無事。及木梳頭人魏籍牙篡奪緬甸後、車里土司等遂不致送禮物。乾隆三十年秋間、緬賊遣節蓋到九龍江各處、索要舊規。節蓋係辦事夷目之通稱。該土司等不肯給予、隨即滋擾土境。

臣等查十三版納、惟宣慰、猛遮、猛籠在九龍江外、逼近緬境。乾隆二十八年、莽西滋擾猛籠、候襲土把總刀整乃被傷身死。其猛遮宣慰土司、連年雖被賊匪滋擾逃避、賊去旋即招回復業、官兵亦往往派帶土練、探聽賊踪、防守邊界。其餘倚邦、易武、整董、普騰、猛烏、六困、猛腊、猛旺、烏得、猛阿等各土司、俱照常內附、並無為賊所用。

至召散、本係緬甸所置孟良土司猛孟容之姪。召散後往阿瓦、謀奪伊叔之職、將猛孟容撤回收禁。旋因眾夷不服、復立猛孟容之子召丙為大猛養土目、召散復勾結緬賊、將召丙驅逐。召丙無地容身、逃至猛撒江內地投誠。迨前年官兵進剿孟良、召散逃走阿瓦、楊應琚隨將投誠之召丙令為孟良土司。後因大兵避瘴撤回、召散又糾合緬賊、驅逐召丙、遂分擾打樂、九龍江等處。

其整欠夷人、亦係緬甸附屬。前年官兵出口、該夷等見勢難抵禦、亦即逃竄、楊應琚將隨征効力之土目叭先捧立為整欠土指揮。迨我兵撤退後、夷眾聚集回巢、又復滋擾。且該夷人等以叭先捧原係車里土司頭項、今越在夷長之上、尤為不服、以致整欠頭人召教、召淵、及猛勇之召工等、勾連緬賊、與叭先捧仇殺。上年夏秋間、由整欠攻破猛彥、追逐叭先捧、復由小猛崙漫入茨通、小猛養、九龍江、橄欖壩等處。此近年召淵等與叭先捧仇殺之緣由也。

但詳察召散之得以糾節節蓋等滋擾、總由該夷等與緬賊本屬一氣相通。見我兵猝至、緬賊又遠不及援、遂即避匿、迨至官兵既撤後、又復黨聚、踵躡為奸。即召工、召淵等與叭先捧仇殺相尋、亦恃有緬賊聲援、敢於肆逞。是此項小醜、雖屬一隅之枝節、其實與緬賊狼狽為奸、首尾相應。是莽是緬、在內地夷民、因其係緬甸呼為老緬、即呼為緬子、而外夷則知有莽子之稱。

現在內地土司之外境、俱屬老緬。其綠營將弁所報、內有真緬子若干、亦不過約畧其辭、強為分別、其實邊外各種夷人、皆為緬賊、實屬一事。統容臣阿里袞、臣舒赫德於秋深瘴退後、帶兵親往普洱思茅邊外一帶、確勘切實情形。倘有賊匪潛踪抗拒、務在剿殺、以清邊境。所有查明普洱邊外賊匪底實情由、理合覆奏、仰祈睿鑒。謹奏。

另有旨諭

乾隆三十三年五月初三日

- 44 I would like to thank Emeritus Professor Susumu Inoue for useful discussions about the translation.
- 45 They were *moengs* in Sipsongpanna. See notes 3, 5, and 11.
- 46 *Jikai* was there also called *sit-ke*. Lieberman says that *sit-ke* was Burmese military commissioner. [Lieberman 1984: 200–205]
- 47 If I do not know the Tai pronunciations of the names of Tai lords and chiefs in this report, I give their pronunciations based on the Chinese characters.
- 48 ‘甲辰。協辦大學士公副將軍阿里袞、尚書參贊大臣舒赫德覆奏。查普洱邊外九龍江、橄欖壩等處、九龍江土司、即古之車里、係緬甸分支。康熙年間、土司刀孟挑內附、屬宣慰司統轄。普騰、六困、整董、猛旺、烏得、猛烏、猛腊、猛阿、猛遮、倚邦、易武、猛籠、是為十二土司、加以宣慰司、為十三版納。自各土司內附、緬甸屢屢滋擾土境、而各土司俱不為賊用。至召散、本係緬甸所置孟良土司猛孟容之姪。後謀奪伊叔之職。眾夷不服、共立猛孟容之子召丙為土目、復為召散驅逐。召散遂分擾打樂、九龍江等處。其整欠夷人、亦係緬甸附屬。前年官兵出口、該夷逃竄。楊應琚將隨征効力之土目叭先捧、立為整欠土指揮。眾夷不服、致整欠頭人召教、召淵、及猛勇之召工等、勾結緬賊、與叭先捧仇殺。由整欠攻破猛彥、追逐叭先捧。此等賊匪、實與緬賊狼狽為奸。至是莽是緬、在內地夷民呼為緬子、外夷則稱莽子、不過強為分別、其實各種皆為緬賊、實屬一事。統容臣等秋深瘴退後、帶兵親往普洱思茅一帶、確勘情形、務在剿殺、以清邊境。得旨。另有旨諭。諭軍機大臣等。今日阿里袞等奏到各摺、其中多有早經傳旨詢問久應覆奏之事。阿里袞前此何以未經次第辦理。直至舒赫德到彼、方行彙奏。看來阿里袞於領兵頗能向前、而經理事務則未能剖決明捷。若舒赫德於常行案件、似所優為、而於大處又不足恃。可見用人之難。著傳諭阿里袞、嗣後諸事務須加意提策、隨到隨辦、毋致再有遲擱。’ [the day of Jiachen of the fifth month of Qianlong 33, *Da Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi Shilu* vol. 811]

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