Agency and Everyday Politics of the Urban Poor: Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement in Metro Manila, Philippines

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Problem

According to the UN-Habitat (2020), virtually all countries are becoming increasingly urbanized, and globally, more people live in urban areas than live in rural areas, with 56.2 percent of the world's population residing in urban areas in 2020 and 60.4 percent by 2030. However, unplanned or inadequately managed urban expansion has resulted in cities consuming land faster than they grow in population, resulting in an increasing number of urban people residing in slums (UN-Habitat 2018, 2020). This urban growth has resulted in a global urban housing crisis, in which 1 billion people, or 24 percent of the world's urban population, reside in slums and informal settlements (Karaos 2020).

In the Philippines, the government's urban development projects and the city's neoliberal urban transformation, where urban land use prioritizes privatization and the real estate market, have resulted in different and unequal displacement outcomes for the urban poor. This market-driven urban development results in local government units selling or leasing public lands, where informal settlers reside, to private developers. These lands are developed into business centers or used to construct shopping malls and high-rise condominiums. On the other hand, while this development of city centers creates job opportunities, it also means less accessibility to decent housing in the city or eviction of the urban poor from informal settlements because of these competing urban land uses. The urban poor are usually affected adversely by these development programs and city economic development because of their lack of land tenure and access to power. Due to poverty and lack of financial means, they reside in areas in cities that

are affordable and near their means of livelihood. However, the lands they occupy are considered either “prime land” for economic development or lands in urban fringes considered “danger zones,” which either way would subject them to eviction at any time.

In the National Capital Region or Metro Manila, the Philippines, a metropolis where land values are high and with competing demands for land by both public and private entities, land for housing for the urban poor remains a perennial problem. Around 600,000 families reside in informal settlements, with no security of tenure. This number translates to about 3 million individuals—or one in every four—living in informal settlements (World Bank 2016). As the metropolis continues to develop with its urban renewal projects, infrastructure development, and gentrification (Porio 2009), informal settlement residents are further pushed to marginalization. Urban development also means implementing the government’s resettlement program for those displaced due to this urban land use. About 66 percent of informal settler families (ISFs) who reside in danger zones are affected by government projects, government-owned land, and areas for priority development sites (Department of Interior and Local Government [DILG] 2011).

As provided by the Urban Development Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA), the local and national government must provide adequate relocations to the evicted families. Despite the government’s effort to provide socialized housing for resettlement to displaced urban poor informal settlers, the housing problem remains an issue because resettlement areas are mostly outside the city. The urban poor rights advocates claim these socialized housing facilities located outside the city have not addressed the housing concerns of the urban poor because they are far from their income sources. They claim this violates their spatial rights (Arcilla 2018; Ortega 2018; Saguin 2020). The proponents of the urban poor’s right to the city stress that the

use of urban spaces should be for economic and social mobility, human interaction, and democratic participation; thus, it must work for the people. Development workers, researchers, and academe present the general human cost of urban development and the inequalities within, such as the displacement and organizational resistance of the urban poor against it (Alvarez 2019; Arcilla 2018; Nelson 1979; Oliver-Smith 2010; Ortega 2018; Roderos 2013; Saguin 2010; Seki 2010; Shatkin 2007).

Several reports have presented that many of the relocated ISFs in distant relocation sites migrate back to the cities (DILG 2011; Ballesteros and Egana 2012; Gilles 2012; World Bank 2016). The most common reasons for returning to the cities are economic and social displacement with the loss of livelihood, leading to them being uprooted from their communities, among other hardships they face at the relocation sites. Aside from these aspects, due to their economic displacement, some families have difficulties paying for their monthly amortizations (DILG 2011).

Heeding to the calls of urban poor groups to improve the delivery of socialized housing to ISFs, in 2010, the national government, under the administration of President Benigno Aquino III, initiated a resettlement program that prioritized in-city relocation with consideration of affected urban poor's voices, or the People's Plan. Beneficiaries were ISFs in danger zones who needed to be relocated, particularly those residing along waterways for priority cleanup in Metro Manila. The plan was dubbed Oplan Lumikas Para Iwas Kalamidad at Sakit (Operation Evacuate to Avoid Calamity and Illness) or OPLAN LIKAS (OPERATION EVACUATE). The program targeted the relocation of more than 104,000 ISFs. It also allocated PhP50 billion (approximately US$1 billion) over five years, from 2011 to 2016, to finance land acquisition

and housing construction (World Bank 2016). Although in-city relocation was the priority under the People's Plan, in 2015, about 67 percent of the resettlement areas were still off-city due to lack of affordability, land constraints, and institutional challenges in the cities, among other factors (World Bank 2016).

The national government undertook institutional measures to address the challenges of socialized housing and resettlement of the ISFs. In 2016, before the current administration of President Rodrigo Duterte took over, a housing summit, attended by government agencies, development organizations, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and urban poor groups, was conducted to identify key issues on affordable socialized housing. Congress and Senate resolutions were also submitted to prioritize on-site, in-city, or near-city resettlement for ISFs who need to be relocated. In 2019, under the administration of President Duterte, the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development was created as "the sole and main planning and policy-making, regulatory, program coordination and performance monitoring entity for all housing, human settlement, and urban development" (Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development 2019). This creation of the department aims to improve the delivery of housing programs and urban development in the country. However, despite these measures for better relocation and socialized housing for the urban poor, the ISFs in Metro Manila continue to confront challenges with their housing and at the same time deal with threats of evictions with the planned and ongoing development programs in the metropolis.

With the complexity of issues surrounding the relocation of ISFs affected by government programs, I join other social science scholars in probing the voices of the ISFs on their housing concerns behind these broad discussions on the structural marginalization of urban poor in

development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR). I am curious about the ways they experience DIDR and establish their new life in the relocation sites as well as the ways their everyday politics enable them to negotiate the government's policies and programs to push for their housing strategies. This curiosity led me to study one informal settler community along a waterway called the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City, Metro Manila, which experienced massive flooding due to a typhoon in 2009. As a result, the waterway was among the priorities for rehabilitation, and it was considered a danger zone. This situation resulted in the community's experience of threats of eviction and later relocation to different sites.

1.2 Research Questions and Proposition

The experiences of the informal settler community along the east bank road of Manggahan Floodway in dealing with threats of eviction and resettlement has sparked my curiosity to examine the internal logic and everyday politics of the urban poor in pursuing their housing strategies amid their dealing with forced eviction and resettlement. This brought me back to one remark from a relocated resident in the in-city resettlement in 2017 when a study related to the ways government policies and programs pushed them further to marginalization was presented to them. A resident whispered to me that he already knew about the marginalization, what he wanted to know was what they have done and what more they can do for their housing needs as well as how they can better manage their new community in the resettlement site.

While the issues of the displacement and relocation of the urban poor to give way to development projects are widely discussed in the literature, the dominant discussions related to DIDR focused on macro discussions concerning neoliberal governmentality, gentrification, structural marginalization, and the organized struggle of the urban poor. Although the agency of the urban poor or their internal logic and their everyday politics are widely discussed, especially their everyday dealing with poverty and marginalization in urban development, the discussions on their internal logic to pursue their housing strategies amid their dealing with DIDR are limited. The dominant literature is insufficient to explain the flexible and inconsistent practices of the urban poor on their housing strategies when dealing with threats of evictions and resettlement, as I observed in Manggahan Floodway.

First, although the urban informal settlers faced the same eviction threats, they opted for different housing strategies: distant off-city resettlement, in-city resettlement, and onsite development. Some families immediately accepted the distant off-city resettlement in Calauan, Laguna, and in Tanay, Rizal, whereas other families initially decided to form a local organization partnering with a civil society organization (CSO) to advocate for onsite development. However, they dropped this advocacy two years later. Instead, they pushed for in-city resettlement under a vertical socialized housing through the People's Plan. Some families who initially opted for in-city resettlement eventually changed their resettlement option to off-city resettlement in Tanay, Rizal. Later on, some families eventually decided to push for on-site development and collaborated with progressive urban poor groups for their advocacy.

Second, despite the different responses to threats of eviction and resettlement options and conflicted feelings among some residents due to these differences, the ISFs generally

maintained an amicable relationship and mutual help, and they reconstructed social capital beyond antagonism for the success of their housing strategies. Some residents availed of the off-city relocation because of the uncertainties of their situation and constant threats of eviction. Many of those who stayed in the community organized, formed their people's organization (PO), and fought for their in-city resettlement. Later on, some of the residents who were not happy with their PO's housing agenda for in-city resettlement formed a new group to fight for onsite development. This change of housing agenda among some residents resulted in antagonism and loss of trust among them. Despite these different and contrasting responses to threats of evictions, a majority of the residents maintained an amicable relationship and provided mutual help. Those residents in the off-city resettlement who experienced hardship were allowed by the PO leaders to return with the condition that they would not build new homes and that their names would be excluded from the master list submitted to the housing authority.

Although there were tensions and antagonism among the divided residents, including some PO leaders and members who pursued in-city resettlement and onsite development, many of them did not completely sever their ties. The hostility was apparent between the PO leaders and the new leaders who pursued for onsite development and who had no established relationships with the former. For the PO leaders who supported the onsite development but were not visible in meetings and street protests for this housing agenda, they still attended meetings and social gatherings for in-city resettlement. Although no direct confrontations occurred among them, there were unspoken issues of trust, and discussions about their housing agenda were limited when these PO leaders were around. Some residents who initially pursued the onsite development were provided assistance with their housing application in the in-city

resettlement by the PO leaders through the help of former neighbors and relatives who acted as mediators for them. Although there was antagonism between them at the height of the housing issues, it took a while before these residents reached out to the PO leaders for help. Despite still having conflicted feelings, the genuine concern for their former neighbors enabled them to provide assistance in housing applications for the in-city resettlement to those in need.

Third, while the government and the elected in-city resettlement leaders (who were mostly the PO leaders in their previous community) installed and implemented strict rules and regulations premised on civic morality to be "decent citizens" in a gated community, the in-city resettlement leaders and residents negotiated them to accommodate the gradual change in their way of life from their previous community. Thus, as much as possible, they addressed minor violations by talking with the residents first, and they tried to avoid imposing fines on them. Through their established bonding social capital with their former neighbors, they were able to negotiate their civic morality to accommodate minor violations from these neighbors. At the same time, they ensured these given favors would not be abused and would not be in violation of government-imposed rules and regulations. By negotiating and accommodating these minor violations, the community-elected building and floor leaders could focus on controlling serious violations from the residents.

These different ways of responding and experiencing of the ISFs along Manggahan Floodway on their housing strategies led me to this academic inquiry to explore the agency of the poor through their everyday politics in their responses to DIDR. Such agency of the poor has led to their heterogeneity over housing strategies, continuous amicable relationship beyond antagonism over housing strategies, and successful negotiation with "civic morality" in the in-

city resettlement site. This study also stresses that the success of their PO, the Alliance of People's Organizations Along Manggahan Floodway (APOAMF), in their housing strategies lies in its ability to respond and respect the various expressions of everyday politics or internal logic of the urban poor. Based on these observations of ISFs along the east bank road of Manggahan Floodway, this dissertation aims to address the following research questions:

(i) Why did they have different responses to DIDR despite receiving the same threats of eviction?

(ii) Why did the community members' antagonism over different strategies and varied outcomes in housing not completely result in social disintegration?

(iii) Why did the relocated ISFs in in-city housing install strict community rules and regulations that call for "civic morality" but implement them flexibly?

From my perspective, the dominant literature on urban poor's displacement and resettlement are insufficient to answer these research questions because they appear to have mostly framed it in the discourse of spatial rights, structural marginalization, and organized resistance of the urban poor (Alvarez 2019; Arcilla 2018; Nelson 1979; Oliver-Smith 2010; Ortega 2018; Roderos 2013; Saguin 2010; Seki 2010; Shatkin 2007). The existing literature also highlighted that the external factors such as the government's programs, support from CSOs, and neoliberal governmentality determine the practices and movements of the urban poor. While they clarified the structural marginalization under the neoliberalism and their organized resistance against DIDR, they tended to overlook or discuss minimally the agency and everyday politics of the urban poor in their housing strategies.

First, the representation and framing of the urban poor's responses and the roles of social forces (i.e., CSOs, government agencies, and development organizations) generally focus on macro discussions on structural marginalization and organized resistance. The urban poor's agentive capacity, through their practices of everyday politics, has often been underemphasized as their power of dealing with their conditions amid the threats of eviction and resettlement. Their emphasis on the urban poor's structural marginalization and their organized resistance against displacement with support from CSOs tends to overlook their household conditions to care for their family's well-being when experiencing DIDR. It is problematic to assume that they always prioritize their resettlement struggle and affiliations over individual and family well-being.

Second, the representation or the overemphasis on the fragmentation of the urban poor in the processes of displacement and resettlement negates their agency to repair or re-establish relationships after their division through resettlement. In fact, the network built by the locality has been maintained despite the difference in strategies, housing options, and even locations from their postdislocation.

Third, studies that highlight the deepening division of the urban poor by the "civic morality" to transform themselves into "good citizens" through government and community regulations do not explain how residents negotiate with such regulations for everyday necessities in cooperation with their community members. The previous studies' emphasis that the neoliberal governmentality subjugates the people by inculcating civic morality does not explain the contradiction that the people who uphold the norm eventually negotiate and reconfigure it, if not subvert it.

To examine the research gaps of the previous studies, this study would clarify the internal factors that determine the urban poor's diverse and flexible responses and coping strategies under the oppressive and limiting neoliberal structure when dealing with their housing strategies amid the threats of eviction and resettlement. To analyze the internal factors, this study would use the agency of the poor as an analytical framework and locate it through their practices of everyday politics and notion of well-being.[1] While the agency of the poor has been extensively used by development organizations, CSOs, and government agencies, they frame the agency or the capacity of the poor according to their ideologies or the way they see the reality of the urban poor's situation (Canuday 2009). This study is an attempt to explore the agency of the poor or their internal logic further through a different lens to see how it is actually an instrument for the urban poor's assertion of their power and well-being despite the structural restrictions in their pursuit of their housing strategies amid the DIDR. The perspective of everyday politics would allow this study to examine the informal, nonorganizational, flexible, hidden, yet collective practices of the urban poor that are not framed by these organizations and their ideologies in the issues of the forced evictions from their homes and resettlement of the urban poor.

This study also presents the way the urban poor make sense of their household condition and respond to it according to their different experiences of poverty, their value for their family's well-being, their access to social capital, and the dynamics among community members, which are actually the assertion of their power in dealing with their housing

[1] This study is inspired by Canuday's (2009) analysis of the agentive capacity of the *bakwit* or internally displaced individuals due to the armed conflicts in some areas in Mindanao, Philippines.

conditions and housing strategies. Their different responses to displacement and resettlement through individual and collective responses, their capacity to tap the local and larger network of power relations, and their capacity to negotiate the civic morality in the strictly enforced rules and regulations show the politicized nature of the urban poor's experience in dealing with DIDR.

To examine the agency of the urban poor to pursue their housing strategies as their responses to DIDR, I first discuss the earlier representation and framing on the effect of displacement and resettlement on the well-being of the affected urban poor and their responses to DIDR. I then highlight the analytical and empirical gaps that need to be addressed. Then I propose the agency of the poor through analysis of their agency and everyday politics as an alternative perspective to understand the ISFs' conceptual formulation of their experiences in dealing with threats of evictions and eventual resettlement. This then provides a nuanced understanding of the ways these aspects matter for their everyday politics and well-being. I then proceed to examine the DIDR experiences of the ISFs along the east bank road of Manggahan Floodway to illustrate the arguments of this present study.

This dissertation does not aim to generalize the experiences of the urban poor to DIDR. Instead, the aim is to present the general overview of the agency and everyday politics of the urban poor in pursing their housing strategies in a community setting. I hope that the insights from the experiences of this informal settler community could provide wider theoretical and analytical implications that could be examined and be developed further in future similar investigations. To illustrate the scenario of the agency of the poor through their practices of everyday politics in their responses to DIDR, it presents the heterogeneity over housing

strategies, the continuous amicable relationship beyond antagonism over housing strategies, and the successful negotiation with the civic morality of the ISFs in one informal settler community. Particularly, I chose the case of the ISFs along the east bank road of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City, Philippines.

In general, this dissertation asserts that the ISFs' diverse individual and collective responses to threats of eviction and resettlement are a display of their power and agency to respond to the condition. Their responses also represent the way they try to find meaning and reorder their lives in the experiences of eviction and resettlement. Specifically, this dissertation presents three arguments corresponding to the three questions. First, the agency and everyday politics of the ISFs within one informal settler community resulted in their heterogeneity over housing strategies. This is demonstrated through their different household situations (i.e., the impact of flooding on their family and economic condition), consideration of their family's well-being (the way threats of eviction and demolition of their homes affect their peace of mind), and the estimation of their bonding and bridging social capital (i.e., remittances from relatives and friends as well as relatives who can provide temporary housing arrangements and job opportunities in the city).

Second, the agency and everyday politics of the community members who chose different resettlement options resulted to their continuous amicable relationships with other community members beyond their disagreement and antagonism over differing housing strategies. This is because of their agency to repair or re-establish relationships after their division through resettlement, which was facilitated by years of living together in the same locality and the network they built.

Third, the agency and everyday politics of those who avidly opted for in-city resettlement resulted in their successful negotiation of the "civic morality" to transform them into "good citizens" in a gated community. This eventually allowed them to negotiate minor violations because of their individual agency to uphold the norm, negotiate, and reconfigure their everyday necessities in cooperation with community members.

1.3 Relevance of the Study

The relevance of this study is both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical aspect, by doing ethnography to examine the agentive capacity of the urban poor to respond actively to their housing strategies amid the DIDR through their internal logic and everyday politics, the study will contribute to a broader understanding of the urban poor's informal practices, such as non-organizational, flexible, and hidden yet collective practices. The study will also contribute to understanding their capacity to respond through formal practices by tapping a local and larger network of power relations to push for their housing strategies. These diverse actions in both informal and formal arenas matter for both the politics and well-being of the urban poor.

On the practical aspect, the study provides insights into the different housing strategies of the urban poor in one informal settler community amid the experiences of DIDR, such as the case of the informal settler community in Pasig City. By presenting the different strategies of the urban poor and the implication of resettlement, the study hopes to contribute in the continuous development and delivery of people-centered resettlement programs— particularly, in the ongoing effort to promote strong collaboration with local and national government, CSOs

and NGOs, and the urban poor such that the local context of the experiences of urban poor in affected communities are integrated in the design and implementation of the resettlement programs. This way, the rigid nature of the resettlement programs can meet the general precariousness in the urban poor's housing strategies when experiencing DIDR. This effort also promotes ownership of the affected urban poor of the resettlement projects.

The DIDR experiences of the informal settler community along the east bank road of Manggahan Floodway are significant to contribute in the continuous development and delivery of people-centered resettlement of urban poor communities. First, the community members' different individual and collective responses present their active participation in the whole DIDR process. This provides a picture of the dynamics of people before, during, and after they are relocated to different resettlement sites. Second, the success of their PO, the APOAMF, was recognized by the local and national government through the awarding of near-site, in-city resettlement that is based on their People's Plan. Learning from their experiences can provide insight to both local and national government on how to collaborate with urban poor communities to plan and implement relocation in a way that is participatory.

1.4 Research Methodology

The study was conducted by means of ethnography, primarily through participant-observation. By doing the ethnographic research, this study presents the dynamics in an informal settler community—as a place where people create a sociality; adapt to their physical environment; strategize to provide for their family's needs despite the poverty; and resist, assert,

and negotiate with the formal arena and informal practices for their housing strategies when confronting the threats of evictions from their homes and relocation to different resettlement sites. This study focused on examining the internal logic and everyday politics of the informal settlers in relation to their experiences of poverty, the well-being of their family and community, their relationships with relatives, community members, NGOs, government officials, and other stakeholders, and the structural challenges they experience to determine their level of internal consideration and the calculations of their responses.

I visited the informal settler community along the east bank road of Manggahan Floodway from 2012 to 2017, during the height of their struggle with threats of eviction until they relocated to their chosen resettlement sites. In 2012, my friend who did earlier research in the community introduced me to the housing issues confronted by the residents in the informal settler community. To better understand their housing issues, she also walked me through to the community. We also had brief chat with some of her key informants. This initial information I gathered led to my academic curiosity to understand more about the urban poor's experiences in dealing their housing issues amid the threats of eviction and resettlement. In 2013, I was introduced to the PO leaders in the community by that friend and another one who used to be the community organizer of their partner CSO, the Community Organizer Multiversity (CO-Multiversity). I was then doing my research for my master's degree, and one of my thesis advisers is also affiliated to CO-Multiversity. This network helped me to gain the immediate trust of the APOAMF leaders and establish rapport with them. Although I was already working in an international development organization when I conducted my study in the community, it had no influence on my relationship with the residents or the process of my research as I had no dealing with the projects in the Philippines. My positionality and relationship with the

residents was as a graduate student conducting anthropological research in the area. Despite my network to the community through my friends, I formalized my entry by writing to APOAMF and presenting the objectives of my research to the APOAMF leaders. During my first house visits, I was accompanied by an APOAMF leader who introduced me to the residents. The APOAMF leader's company was a way to legitimize my presence as a student doing research for my study and to build the trust among the residents. The APOAMF leaders provide me with a list of residents, both members and nonmembers of the PO, which served as my basis for selecting the key informants. Realizing that I was taking up the time of the leader who guided me to the residents' homes, I asked APOAMF to allow me to go around by myself during the succeeding visits to the community. This also gave me the chance to know the place and residents more. The established rapport with the residents in the informal settler community was helpful when I conducted my follow-up research in the resettlement sites. I either already knew some residents in the resettlement sites or I was endorsed by their friends or relatives in the informal settler community who were yet to be relocated.

Based on my participant-observations and key informant interviews with residents, I gathered their narratives and analyzed their shared experiences of residing in the informal settlement community, dealing with forced eviction, negotiating with the local and national governments, and partnering with CSOs for their housing strategies, as well as building a new life in the resettlement sites. Intermittent visits to the resettlement sites in Manggahan Floodway in-city resettlement, Calauan Laguna and Tanay, Rizal, were conducted from 2017 to 2020. Data gathering was primarily conducted by means of a *kwentuhan* (chatting) approach to make people comfortable with sharing their narratives with me. During my entry to the informal settler community, many residents were hesitant to be involved in structured interviews (i.e.,

pen, paper, and recorder) because they would associate them with "government people" who would evict them from their homes. At that time, local and national government personnel were doing a survey on the residents about relocation. To establish trust with people to *kwentuhan* with me, I mostly only prepared questions as guides and let the discussions flow according to narratives shared by the informants. Many of the informants allowed me to record them or take notes during a *kwentuhan*. I also asked follow-up questions for clarification on the shared narratives. I used the same *kwentuhan* approach when I conducted my key informant interviews in the resettlement sites.

The language used for communication was also crucial during the *kwentuhan* to make the residents feel comfortable chatting with me. I used local languages such as Cebuano or Ilonggo sometimes (local languages spoken by informants who originated from Mindanao and Visayas regions) or Tagalog, depending on the informant's preference. Being a Cebuano who speaks the Cebuano language and can understand Ilonggo helped me establish rapport easily with residents coming from the Mindanao and Visayas regions. I spoke Tagalog with informants coming from Luzon region. The informants also were more confident in sharing their stories when speaking in their native languages or in Tagalog for Luzon region residents.

The interviews were conducted informally, mostly in the afternoons when the women were not doing household chores or in the evenings when their husbands were around, and the family members were having their siesta. I was sometimes invited to attend informal gatherings or parties, and during this time, I had *kwentuhan* with the hosts and their guests. For the households with male members who work in the tracking business as drivers or are assigned elsewhere, the ideal day to interview them was Sundays, when they were mostly in their homes.

In the informal settler community, with permission from the APOAMF leaders, I also attended their community meetings, including those with officials from the Pasig city government. I also conducted separate interviews with the local Pasig government officials and housing authorities.

The key informants were selected based on the proximity of their homes to the rivers as they were the government's priority for relocation and on the availability of household members during my fieldwork and their willingness to be *kakwentuhan* (to chat with). For the informal settler community, the key informants were ten women and eight men. The informants' ages ranged from 18 to 70 years old. Most women were interviewed on weekdays, usually after their household chores were done around 9–11 a.m., 2–4 p.m., and 7 p.m. Men were mostly interviewed on Sundays.

As for the off-city resettlement sites, there were fifteen key informants; thirteen were women since their husbands were working elsewhere and they were not scheduled to go home during my fieldwork. Two men were available, and one had just arrived from working in Metro Manila and was only there for the weekend. The other key informant owned a small store in the community, which was his primary source of income.

For the in-city resettlement, there were twenty key informants, five of whom were men. Among those who pushed for on-site development, three PO leaders were interviewed, and four residents were interviewed during focused group discussions and during an informal setting.

This study also used the APOAMF-prepared socioeconomic profiles of the ISFs both in the informal settler community along the east bank road of the Manggahan Floodway and in the in-city resettlement. In addition, for the informal settler community, I also referred to the report prepared by Australian Aid for the socioeconomic profile of the ISFs along the Manggahan Floodway. In parallel, I also prepared a socioeconomic form for the families who participated in the in-depth interviews and *kwentuhan* in the resettlement sites.

I also conducted interviews with the community organizers from CO-Multiversity, officials from the National Housing Authority (NHA), and local government units of Pasig City and Laguna. I was not able to interview an official from the local government of Tanay because of conflicting schedules and eventually the travel and gathering restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The study also used secondary materials. These include related studies on history and socioeconomic assessments conducted in the Manggahan Floodway; policy reports from national government agencies related to the relocation of informal settlers; and policy and project documents related to urban poverty and involuntary resettlement from donor agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank,.

Secondary materials such as journal articles, newspaper clippings, policy papers, books, and materials downloaded from the internet were used to gather insights on generic themes related to the overall studies on the urbanization of poverty, well-being of the urban poor, DIDR, and agency of the poor.

To analyze the everyday politics of the urban poor, the study explored the meaning and experiences of the residents through their narratives. The study employs the phenomenological approach. It follows the core inquiry of the approach, that is, “What is the meaning of the structure, and essence of the lived experience of this phenomenon for this person or group of people?” (Patton 2015, 14). This approach emphasizes the agentive capacity of the people and the dynamics in the community. In this study, it locates the everyday politics in how poverty and DIDR are viewed and experienced by the families and the communities in their everyday lives and in dealing with evictions and resettlement. This connects the agency of the poor to themes related to relationships and well-being among the urban poor, their community, and other stakeholders. The phenomenological approach inquires about the following: (1) How do the residents see themselves as urban poor in an informal settlement? This leads to queries on the bonding established and the bridging of social capital, experiences of poverty and adaptive strategies in the community. (2) What does it mean to be an informal settler who experienced threats of evictions and resettlement? This leads to discussions related to coping strategies, individual or collective responses, and the concept of well-being. (3) How do they see their new lives in the resettlement community? This leads to discussions on how they would negotiate the rules and regulations in the community to obtain their everyday necessities.

1.5 Ethical Considerations

Prior to the interviews, I conducted meetings with the APOAMF leaders to explain my study and ask their permission to allow me to conduct my research in the Manggahan Floodway community. I sought prior informed consent from the interviewees, including during informal

conversations, and I explained to them the purpose of these conversations with them. I also informed them when I recorded the interviews and assured them that the information they shared in confidence would be excluded in the notes and in the paper. Pseudonyms were assigned to the interviewees to maintain their anonymity. When taking photos, I ensured them that I would take pictures only of structures, and I asked the owners' permission. I also presented my initial findings to the residents for verification prior to finalizing the paper.

1.6 Scope and Limitation

First, I would like to define the basic terms and concepts used in this study. The following were the keywords: development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), informal settler families, in-city relocation, off-city relocation, the well-being of the urban poor, individual agency, and the People's Plan. The DIDR in the study is within the context of urban development in Metro Manila, which the planned development or construction of infrastructure projects triggers the displacement of affected people (in this case, the ISFs along the Manggahan Floodway) and the building of new settlements in other areas (Navarra 2011), such as the off-city resettlement outside of Metro Manila.

The concept of the well-being of the urban poor follows a study by Filipino anthropologists Racelis and Guevara (2003), who examined the concept of having enough food, decent shelter, adequate clothing, stable livelihoods, good health, necessary strength, and acceptable appearance and being accorded respect no matter how poor one is. Harmonious family and community relations also contribute to this concept. This study added peace of mind

based on experience of the urban poor with DIDR. It follows Racelis and Guevara's argument that well-being is culture-specific and needs to be assessed within a specific context that considers the views of the poor themselves.

The social capital referred to in this study consists of the social connections and networks built inside and outside the community to help the poor survive adverse conditions and develop measures to respond to their situation. These may be horizontal or egalitarian associations (i.e., family, friends, and neighbors), also called bonding social capital, or vertical or hierarchical associations (i.e., civil society), also called bridging social capital (Racelis and Guevara 2003, 67–71).

The ISFs referred to in this study are the urban poor families living in housing units or facilities constructed in "danger zone" areas (e.g., waterways, creeks, rivers) within Metro Manila or the National Capital Region. The community leaders referred to in the study are the APOAMF leaders in the informal settlement community, the building and floor leaders in the in-city resettlement, and the homeowners' association leaders in the off-city resettlement who were elected by the residents to lead them regarding issues within their respective communities. They are the different from the "barangay" or city government leaders who held government positions.

The study does not intend to generalize the experiences of the urban poor in the research communities to represent the experiences of the urban poor in general. This study emphasizes that ISFs have different experiences and responses to DIDR depending on their local contexts' social, cultural, economic, and political conditions. Instead, the framework provides a general

trend of the heterogeneity of the ISFs' responses to DIDR on the community level. The experiences of the informal settlers in the Manggahan Floodway may be different from the experiences of other informal settlers in Metro Manila or elsewhere.

While the study stressed the ISFs' agentive capacity to respond to DIDR, the study also emphasized that the poverty they were experiencing and their lack of tenure limited their access to basic social services and decent housing in the city. They had to be creative and resourceful with whatever means they had and support they could obtain. This study is an attempt to present ISFs' voices in exploring their experiences of living in an informal settler community, their relationships with their neighbors and relatives, and the things they valued most regarding how those factors influenced their responses to evictions and how they formed a new community in resettlement sites.

While this study offers a representation and framework of positioning social forces, such as development organizations, government agencies, CSOs, NGOs, and even the urban poor themselves, it also acknowledges that my educational and work background in the development field may also influence how I frame the voices of the poor in this study.

1.7 Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is composed of seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents the general background of the study. They highlighted an overview of the problem, the objectives, the

research questions, and the relevance of the study. The research methodology, scopes, and limits of the study are also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical foundations of the dissertation. It starts with the different representations or frameworks of the impact of involuntary resettlement and the urban poor's responses to such conditions. It includes international development agencies' approaches to the impoverishment risks of and policy frameworks for involuntary resettlement due to development projects. The chapter also presents previous studies' arguments regarding heterogeneity and neoliberal urban development as factors in the fragmentation of the urban poor and social capital and locality as factors that lay the foundation for the urban poor to organize and seek the assistance of external groups to push their housing agenda. This study also presents the gaps in these arguments, explaining how these gaps could also facilitate cohesion among the poor despite the different housing options and how the gaps enables the poor to negotiate and reconfigure house rules and regulations that aim to transform them into "good citizens" in the resettlement sites. To introduce the agency of the urban poor through everyday politics as an analytical framework, the study presents previous studies on which this framework builds.

Chapter 3 provides the context of the urban poverty and the rise of the informal settlement in Metro Manila. This chapter discusses how the national government frames discourses on the involuntary resettlement of the urban poor through a policy approach. Particularly, the chapter provides an overview of the laws and policies related to involuntary resettlement in the Philippines. It also presents the different socialized housing programs, including the People's Plan as the government's participatory approach to resettlement.

The main analytical parts of this dissertation are in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the case study. It builds the foundations of the ISFs' internal logic for their housing strategies. It presents the everyday politics and well-being of the urban poor through the experiences of poverty among the ISFs along the east bank road of the Manggahan Floodway. It also presents their experiences when Typhoon *Ondoy* devastated Metro Manila in 2009, which influenced their resettlement options. Chapter 5 presents the internal logic of the resettled ISFs as they confronted new challenges in the resettlement sites. These two chapters aim to answer research questions 1 and 2. These questions examine why the ISFs from the same informal settler communities have different responses to DIDR despite receiving the same threats of evictions and why their varied outcomes in socialized housing did not entirely result in social disintegration.

Chapter 6 discusses how the relocated ISFs are able to negotiate the house rules in the relocation site to form new urban informalities and rebuild their localities in their new community. It emphasizes the residents' experiences in the in-city resettlement, where the housing authority strictly enforces its estate management. This chapter answers research question 3 on how the relocated ISFs in in-city housing negotiate the call for "civic morality" in the prevailing housing agenda of their community. Chapter 7 provides a general summary and conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER 2: IMPACTS OF DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT AND RESPONSES OF THE URBAN POOR INFORMAL SETTLERS: CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL REVIEW

This chapter reviews previous studies' discussions on the impacts of DIDR on the urban poor and their responses to it. It examines the dominant discussions on the urban poor's well-being in the context of DIDR and the early analyses of the agency or internal logic of the poor in the context of their everyday lives and their responses to DIDR. This also includes the patterns of social relations and fragmentation of the urban poor. To further the earlier studies' discussions and arguments, this chapter also presents their limitations in answering the research questions of this dissertation. First, this chapter discusses how development organizations and government agencies frame the concept of well-being in the context of involuntary resettlement through their resettlement frameworks and policy-oriented approaches. It also presents the limitations and criticisms of these development approaches to involuntary resettlement. Second, the chapter illustrates how the previous studies frame the cohesion and fragmentation of the urban poor in their responses to displacement and resettlement and identifies their limitations in answering the research questions of this dissertation. Last, it presents the analytical framework of the agency of the poor through their everyday politics to overcome the limitations of the previous studies.

2.1 Policy Frameworks to Mitigate DIDR

Development organizations and government agencies have recognized the potential negative impact of development projects on the affected population, in this case, in the urban

setting. The most common results are the displacement and resettlement of residents who illegally occupy government land or areas along danger zones on the urban fringes. To address the potential negative impacts of DIDR on the well-being of the affected population, these organizations and agencies framed the impacts according to impoverishment risks and policy orientations to provide compensation and socialized housing in resettlement areas.

To avoid or minimize the negative impact of involuntary resettlement on affected populations, international development organizations integrate involuntary resettlement policy frameworks into their projects, especially those involving land acquisitions. These frameworks focus on minimizing or mitigating the traumatic experiences faced by those undergoing physical and economic displacement and aspire to convert displacement into a development opportunity for those who are already displaced (Bisht 2014; Perera 2014).

The Philippine government's laws and national policies related to the evictions and the demolitions of underprivileged citizens' homes additionally include provisions for the restoration or improvement of the lives of the affected populace. The Philippines' Department of Social Welfare and Development is mandated to address the dehumanizing conditions and social welfare concerns of the disadvantaged population, especially those informal settlers who are to be relocated, by providing projects for their income restoration (Department of Social Welfare and Development 2013).

These policy frameworks follow Michael Cernea's (2002) impoverishment risk reconstruction (IRR) model. Cernea's IRR model (Satiroglu and Choi 2014) was used to predict impoverishment risks resulting from involuntary resettlement due to development projects. He

identified eight impoverishment risks: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of common property, resources, and community disarticulation (Cernea 2000). The model also suggests policy actions to turn risks into reconstruction opportunities, such as by addressing landlessness through land-based resettlement, joblessness through reemployment, and homelessness through house reconstruction (ibid.).

The IRR model can also be used to assess the impact of resettlement on relocated families. For example, Quetulio-Navarra's (2014) study in a distant off-city resettlement site in Rodriguez, Rizal, Philippines, used Cernea's IRR model to examine the ISFs' conditions a few years after their relocation. Her study's findings show that concerns about landlessness and homelessness did not apply to the relocated families. The relocation site provided security of tenure, and they did not have to worry about demolition and eviction. However, the distance of the relocation site from their original settlement in Metro Manila contributed mainly to a lack of access to basic services, livelihood, and employment opportunities. This lack of access contributed to the families' marginalization, social disarticulation, joblessness, morbidity, mortality, and educational loss, especially during their first years in the resettlement site (ibid.). Quetulio-Navarra's (2014) findings echo the general sentiments of the ISFs who were relocated to distant resettlement sites. Their relocation resulted in hardships due to a lack of employment opportunities and basic services in the area. Many of the families who left the relocation sites cited these hardships as their reasons, and these were the same reasons the urban poor groups advocated for in the in-city resettlement.

The IRR framework is helpful in understanding the economic and social impacts of relocation on affected families. However, while it provides a general picture of what could be and the actual general conditions of the relocated ISFs at the resettlement site, it also reveals a gap in the internal logic or agency of the poor, who flexibly pursue their housing strategies according to their well-being. These policy frameworks could not address the complex and flexible responses of the urban poor to DIDR, especially regarding their internal logic for responding to its negative impacts on the well-being of their households. These impacts include how they assert, contest, or introduce actions on and solutions to their conditions through resources within their households or from their social networks that are essential in their daily survival (Canuday 2009).

According to critics of the IRR framework (Bisht 2014), analyses of the framework need to be expanded to examine how the relocated ISFs assess their conditions and strategize according to their family's needs. Equally important is the examination of how the urban informality, including the informal structures, networks, and social practices that were borne from the years of living in their locality, are actively recreated in their strategies to either establish their residence in the resettlement community or return to the city with their family.

Critics of the involuntary resettlement policy frameworks also argue that in resettlement planning and the rehabilitation of displaced persons, very little attention has been paid to the informal structures, networks, and social practices in communities. They believe these structures, networks, and social practices play essential roles in people's everyday lives and meet various contingencies in life (Bisht 2014, 16).

To understand the complexities of displacement, Bisht (2014) suggests the importance of identifying the displaced persons' informal networks and social practices. He stresses that informal structures and practices fall outside the established institutional domains of formalized roles and norms. Although informal, they have evolved and have their own rules, norms, and mechanisms to ensure compliance. They are also socially shared and internalized and have become the way of life in a community.

Although the IRR model presents social disarticulation as one of the impoverishment risks, Muggah (2000, quoted in Satiroglu and Choi 2014) notes that it does not sufficiently consider the vulnerabilities and capabilities of individual displaced persons. Moreover, the model's anticipation of improvement in resettlement planning and implementation has been criticized for being rather optimistic, given the complexities inherent in a resettlement process that is characterized by "non-rational" political motivation and financial and institutional challenges (Horgan 1999, de Wet 2001, quoted in Satiroglu and Choi 2014). The IRR model does not sufficiently present how the relocatees develop new sets of socioeconomic relationships in unfamiliar sites amid fierce competition for resources (Koenig 2002, quoted in Satiroglu and Choi 2014).

2.2 Strong Community Relationship

To understand better the importance of the urban informality, such as the informal networks, informal practices, and social practices in the internal logic of the urban poor concerning their housing strategies, this section analyzes the bonding social capital of the urban

poor that is developed in their localities. In his study of the local organizations of the urban poor in Metro Manila, Berner (1997) stresses that the enabling factor for organizing in the community and successfully pursuing an agenda is cohesion among community members. This is built from their years of living together in the same locality, which eventually leads to trust, a multitude of social relations, interactions, interdependencies, and the formation of overlapping networks that become the basis of collective consciousness among members (Berner 1997; Racelis and Guevara 2003). Emphasis is placed on the importance of the bonding social capital and locality in facilitating social cohesion among community members. Thus, this suggests that the cohesion of the urban poor in one community is their "weapon" for responding to threats of DIDR. This assumes that the fragmentation in their housing strategies would not give them the collective voice to respond to the threats of eviction and eventual relocation.

The urban poor's interconnectedness is important to their survival. Most of the time, the voices of the urban poor in informal settlements are often unheard, or the poor do not have access to state-initiated systems due to unstable sources of income, a lack of land tenure, and a dearth of access to national and local power. As a result, social capital, particularly bonding social capital (Claridge 2013), plays an essential role in their daily struggles. They can rely on local ties with relatives or neighbors to meet their basic needs and secure food and housing (Racelis and Guevara 2003, 65–67). As described by Seki (2020, 2), this connectedness among the residents, or their sociality, is fostered through their interactions, copresence, and conviviality within a community over a long period. This connectedness is informal and personal and involves dyadic reciprocity and exchanges or their vernacular socialities (ibid.).

Bonding social capital is created when people form social connections and networks based on mutual trust, norms of reciprocity, and common ways of life (Racelis and Guevara 2003; Bhandari and Yasunobu 2009; Claridge 2013). In the case of the ISFs, it develops from the network they build among themselves during the many years of living in the same community. However, the previous studies show that the social capital created within their family and community responds only to short-term needs (Knowles, Pernia, and Racelis 1999, quoted in Racelis and Guevara 2003, 66; Desmond and Travis 2018). They need to have a connection with the city government or they need to be associated with organizations with better networks or resources to respond to bigger issues in their community, such as threats of DIDR.

The previous studies (Berner 1997; Racelis and Guevara 2003; Nakanishi 2006; Seki 2010; Roderos 2013; Ballesteros 2010, quoted in Karaos 2017; Saguin 2020) demonstrate that the urban poor's ability to survive adverse conditions and create measures to respond to their situation depends on their access to social capital. By that, I mean the bonding social capital or either horizontal or egalitarian associations (i.e., family, friends, neighbors) that respond only to their immediate needs, and the bridging social capital or vertical or hierarchical associations (i.e., civil society, local organizations) that give them better chances of surviving, or in this case, of pursuing their preferred housing. For example, Berner (1997, 138) stresses that residents with less social capital, such as renters or people in poorer segments of the community, who are mostly unorganized residents, have little say in their communal matters and are largely excluded from local decision-making. This is true for many urban poor communities, where social connection, access to local power, and financial standing in the community determine who has the dominant voice in the community (Nelson 1979; Das and Walton 2015). In some instances, political patronage or those in better economic positions are assumed to have the

advantage of choosing the better resettlement option (Berner 1997; Seki 2010). It is also vital that community leaders have bonding and bridging social capital to raise with authorities the immediate issues affecting the daily lives of those in the community.

As explained above, the strong relations within the community have been beneficial for the community members, especially those who fall below the poverty line for their daily survival. However, the arguments that highlight strong community relationships cannot fully explain the internal logic of the informal settlers in the Manggahan Floodway regarding their fragmented yet connected housing strategies when they confronted DIDR. The urban poor in the locality opted for different housing opportunities, which did not totally result in conflict among the groups. Furthermore, the leadership of the PO in the community was not comprised only of people who belong to the upper segment of the community or those who have connections to local officials or house owners. The community-elected PO leaders were a mixture of residents who belong to the upper segment and those who belong to the lower segment of house owners and renters. In fact, those who held the highest positions in their PO were renters and did not belong to the upper segment of the community.

This case in the informal settler community along the Manggahan Floodway demonstrates that a strongly connected community cannot always sustain itself when its members confront DIDR. Instead, my examination of the residents' responses to threats of DIDR revealed the importance of both bridging and bonding social capital to facilitate the urban poor's capacity for individual or collective responses to DIDR. They tapped the resources and support available in their community to enable themselves to pursue different housing strategies, survive in their preferred relocation sites, negotiate with housing authorities as well

as local and national governments, and flexibly adapt to different housing strategies according to their family's well-being. This internal logic of the urban poor toward their housing strategies amid the DIDR is a glaring manifestation of their power and agency to decide upon and respond to their condition. According to Seki (2020, 2–3), this connectedness can be explained as the emergent socialities of or the interactions and negotiations between the social or the formal and impersonal mutuality and solidarity and the public sphere, state, and civil society as major players and their vernacular societies. In other words, the internal logic and everyday politics of the urban poor to respond to and pursue their housing strategies amid the DIDR emerged from their flexibility to tap, negotiate, and accommodate their resources and informal practices and from the support acquired through both bridging social capital and bonding social capital.

Locality plays an essential role in fostering local relations and interdependencies, especially in informal settler communities where people are connected through shared informal sector activities of their means for wage earning and subsistence production (Berner 1997, 55). Previous studies show that the several years of residing in the same social space, built-up trust, and social integration serve as the community members' foundation for collective action or mobilize the built-in community-based resources in their locality or social space (Berner 1997; Nakanishi 2006; Shatkin 2007). As clarified in this study, the network established in the locality is essential also because it lays the foundation of the ISFs' sociality. This then enables cohesion among them despite the differences in their resettlement options. This allows them to repair or reestablish relationships after they are divided through resettlement. Despite being tasked with upholding the "civic morality," the PO leaders can then eventually negotiate and reconfigure the community regulations to allow minor offenses to pass in the everyday activities of the residents. The PO leaders' ability to respond to and respect the various expressions of everyday

politics or internal logic of the residents in the community is another important factor that facilitates the success of their housing strategies.

2.3 Heterogeneity by Poverty Range

This section clarifies the material and nonmaterial factors that influence the fragmentation of the urban poor in their housing strategies in the face of DIDR. Previous studies have identified the external factors that determine the urban poor's fragmentation and division in their responses to displacement and resettlement (Constantino-David and Regala-Angangco 1975; Jocano 1975; Berner 1997; Racelis and Guevara 2003; Nakanishi 2006; Seki 2010; Roderos 2013; Ballesteros 2010, quoted in Karaos 2017; Saguin 2020). These factors relate to the poverty range of ISFs within their community; and their differential access to power, particularly in the type and level of support from their partner NGOs and CSOs or local government officials, during their fight to keep their homes when threats of evictions and demolitions hound them as result of neoliberal urban development.

First, to understand the heterogeneity of the urban poor's responses to threats of eviction, one has to understand the poverty range in informal settlements. In one informal settler community, poverty is experienced differently by the urban poor, who comprise both the upper segment of the community and the lower one—the poorest of the poor. However, despite these different income brackets within the community, all of its members are vulnerable to external shocks that can easily push them below poverty (World Bank 2007). The seasonality of their sources of income or jobs (e.g., minimum wage earners or contractual workers) or the unsteady

income levels of those engaged in small or backyard businesses leave them highly vulnerable to episodes of income poverty in the event of external shocks such as disasters or evictions from their homes and resettlements in distant socialized housing where they have to start from scratch again.

According to interviews Racelis (2021) conducted with the urban poor in Metro Manila, they identify the varying poverty levels in their communities as subsistence living or *isang kahig, isang tuka*[2] (one scratch, one peck); *mahirap* (poor); *medyo mahirap* (somewhat poor); and *Maykaya pero kailangan ng diskarte, paraan, swerte, Diyos* (well-off but need to strategize, strategy, luck, God). Despite the different financial circumstances of the urban poor in the informal settlements, they have something in common. They all shared that they considered these communities their homes. The informal settler communities were special to them, as this is where they could eke out a living through multiple coping strategies and establish relationships and local networks with neighbors and their family (Jocano 1975; Berner 1997; Racelis and Guevara 2003, 67).

It is also through these different strata of poverty that the dominant literature on the impact of displacement stresses that the urban poor in informal settlements have been increasingly divided and fragmented due to various and unequal outcomes of displacement under neoliberal urban transformations where urban land use prioritizes privatization and the real estate market. Some earn relatively higher wages than others do, decreasing their looming

[2] A Filipino idiom that expresses extreme poverty in which a person's earnings are enough to buy food for the day. It refers to the way a chicken eats by scratching the soil to find food.

anxieties about affordable housing and daily living expenses. The urban poor who earn less have learned to establish beneficial relationships when they cannot afford alternative housing near their workplaces (Constantino-David and Regala-Angangco 1975; Racelis and Guevara 2003; Ballesteros 2010, quoted in Karaos 2017).[3] It is assumed that those who earn more have more access to better resettlement options, such as the in-city resettlement (Berner 1997; Seki 2010). Thus, the ISFs generally respond to threats of eviction and resettlement according to their financial means for either continuing to live in the city, establishing new lives at the resettlement site, or immediately resettling but eventually returning to the city with their family.

However, as presented in the case of the informal settler community in the Manggahan Floodway, the fragmentation of the residents in their housing strategies was not influenced only by their different strata of poverty. Their reasons for pursuing different resettlement options were influenced by both material and nonmaterial factors. Some ISFs who earned more in their community preferred the off-city resettlement, where the monthly amortization was low, because they wanted to own a house and lot. There were also those who earned less and opted for the in-city resettlement, where the monthly amortization and other fees were high, because they did not want to leave the city and their sources of income. Other residents availed themselves of the off-city relocation to relieve the stress of recurring threats of evictions and the eventual demolitions of their community. Still other residents decided to avail themselves of the off-city relocation for health reasons requiring them to have fresh air. Moreover, as

[3] The cost of land and housing in areas of the city considered prime locations is beyond the means of the urban poor. Unable to afford safe, well-serviced sites, they inhabit congested communities with poor living conditions and substandard housing with inadequate access to safe water and basic sanitation and increased exposure to hazards (Racelis and Guevara 2003, 57; Karaos 2017).

illustrated above, the internal logic and everyday politics of the urban poor concerning their well-being resulted in the heterogeneity of their housing strategies.

2.4 Structural Marginalization, Organized Resistance, and Neoliberal Governmentality

This section presents the dominant literature clarifying the structural marginalization and organized struggles of the urban poor amid the DIDR. This highlights how the neoliberal development of the city disrupts the sociality of the urban poor and further marginalizes them. This also highlights their organized struggle to fight the threats of DIDR and push for their collective housing agenda. However, as presented in the case of the informal settler community along the Manggahan Floodway, not all community members join POs and fight for their housing right in the city. Some voluntarily opt for distant off-city resettlement without fighting. This section presents how the frame of the dominant literature on the structural marginalization and organized struggle of the urban poor is insufficient to understand the multiple and flexible ways the urban poor exercise their agency against DIDR.

In general, regardless of their economic standing in the informal settler communities, their bonding and bridging social capital, or the network built in their locality, the ISFs have to deal with threats of losing their homes anytime because of the neoliberal urban development. In fact, previous studies have presented that the penetration of neoliberalism and technologies, along with the rapid urbanization in Metro Manila since the mid-2000s, has increasingly denied them their right to the city, further pushing them to the margins, eventually evicting them from their homes, and relocating them to distant relocation sites (Racelis and Guevara 2003; Roderos 2013; Arcilla 2018; Ortega 2018; Racelis 2018; Alvarez 2019). An increasing number of the urban poor are occupying prime land for economic development or in the areas considered as

danger zones in the cities. They are considered the cities' frontline workforce, yet they are evicted from their homes in the city and relocated outside of the city to give way to the land development projects, against the backdrop of the city's economic development.

Arcilla (2018, 94) defines the resettlement outside the city as an institutionalization of moral hazards for the urban poor. Although the government provides socialized housing for resettlement, limited options are provided to the affected urban poor. With the national government's socialized housing projects mostly located outside the city, the urban poor are in disadvantaged positions. Advocates for the urban poor's rights claim that this violates their spatial rights (Arcilla 2018; Ortega 2018; Alvarez 2019). The distance of the resettlement site from their sources of income stripped them of the opportunity to earn a decent living to feed their family. They suffer from economic and social displacements at the relocation sites, including loss of livelihood, uprooting from communities, and other harsh conditions. Such hardships force them to return to the cities (Guerrero 1977; Racelis and Guevara 2003). The reports of government and development agencies also highlight the urban poor's difficulties with distant off-city relocation. Thus, the urban poor organizations and civil society push for in-city relocation (DILG 2011; Racelis 2015; World Bank 2016).

Primarily, the displacement of the poor by neoliberalism disrupts their everyday life in the locality and can fragment the long-standing sociality in their informal settler community because of their various housing strategies. As Quetulio-Navarra et al. (2012, 307) note, "involuntary resettlement tears apart the existing social fabric where poor households can draw different forms of survival or sustenance." It also significantly reduces access to basic resources on which communities depend (Terminski 2013). Although the urban poor have resisted the

threat of displacement through assistance from their partner CSOs, their collective action paradoxically tends to lead to their fragmentation because opposing CSOs organize the individuals with different ideologies and strategies (Karaos 1998; Kusaka 2017).

The existing literature has further illustrated that the differences in their access to bridging social capital, such as external support from CSOs and politicians, can contribute to the division among the ISFs within one community and result in unequal opportunities for resettlement (Nelson 1979; Shatkin 2007; Oliver-Smith 2010; Seki 2010). While Berner (1997) stresses the importance of social cohesion and the capacity of the urban poor to assert their housing agenda, they can only do so through membership in local organizations. He presents that the more likely residents to lead their collective actions are the more privileged community members or those well connected with local government officials. At the same time, the renters and poorer segments in the locality are often excluded from local decision-making (ibid., 138).

Further complicating this division among the urban poor, those who opted for a socialized housing unit are required to transform themselves into good and responsible citizens who comply with the government's regulations and to meet their "beneficiary citizenship."[4] This is in exchange for their entitlements to the housing program (Seki 2010; Saguin 2020). Various regulations in the name of civic morality endorsed by neoliberal governmentality have

[4] As defined by Saguin (2020), "beneficiary citizenship" is a form of conditional urban *citizenship* where urban dwellers are granted welfare, entitlements, or recognition in return for their transformation into good, responsible *citizens. However, as they work within the structures of participation in beneficiary citizenship projects, beneficiaries of these state projects also mobilize their beneficiary citizen positions for ends that are different from or that go beyond the intended goals.*

divided the urban poor into those who became good citizens and those who are not (ibid.). The former are rewarded with better housing options and benefits, whereas the latter have no access or have difficulties in accessing government programs.

However, as I observed in the case of the Manggahan Floodway informal settler community and in their resettlement sites, while the poor accept the dictates of neoliberal governmentality, they also negotiate and modify them according to their necessities. The approach of the existing literature mentioned above does not fully explain the more nuanced practices of the poor. It does not fully capture how the urban poor themselves who were expected to uphold the civic morality to transform themselves into good citizens negotiate and appropriate this according to their needs. Thus, the emphasis given on the structural marginalization of the urban poor or their division caused by neoliberal governmentality are insufficient to capture the importance of the poor's agency and their bonding social capital that enables them to actively respond to the conditions in their everyday lives and negotiate the fragmentation through their every day or their organized resistance. It informs a gap to clarify the internal factors that determine the urban poor's diverse coping strategies to displacement and resettlement.

2.5 Everyday Politics and Agency of the Poor to Respond to Displacement and Resettlement

To understand the agentive capacity of the urban poor, first, I would like to highlight the urban poor's high degree of integration and creativity to respond to displacement and resettlement, as emphasized by previous studies on urban poor communities in the Philippines (Jocano 1975; Berner 1997; Racelis and Guevara 2003). As stressed by Berner (1997),

> "…Far from being victims of urban dynamics, the squatters are, in my view, close to the very core of it; far from being overall "depressed areas", urban poor settlements very often show a high degree of social integration and creativity. They have to. Lacking conventional sources of income, squatters have to invent new ones while defending themselves against the constant threat of displacement." (xvi)

To explore the agency of the ISFs that enable their every day and their organized resistance for their well-being, I will use the perspective of the poor's everyday politics. According to Nordstrom and Martin (1992, quoted in Canuday 2009), a possible method of grasping the power in the human agency without abstracting the destructive forces of poverty, wars, and displacement is to decenter the concept of power by placing culture at the center of the analysis of power, particularly within the context through which power can be intelligibly and thickly described (Geertz 1993, quoted in Canuday 2009).

For this study, it locates the power of the ISFs' everyday acts of dealing with poverty and, at the same time, dealing with or resisting threats of evictions from their home and eventual resettlement. It probes their politics and well-being from their point of view and is practiced by the ISFs in dealing with DIDR. This stresses that the way the ISFs have framed their narratives is an act of an agency of the poor rather than a display of their passivity and victimhood (Canuday 2009, 37). For example, the method through which the ISFs narrate the various reasons for choosing different resettlement sites, sharing their coping strategies, or starting a new life after they were relocated manifests their agency to decide on what they think is best for their family's well-being or suitable for their community, as it locates the everyday politics with both bonding and bridging social capitals of the ISFs. Thus, this also sheds light on the

everyday forms of resistance in the mundane tactics and practices of the oppressed and the informal and nonorganizational practices that are not framed by organizations' agendas and ideologies (Scott 1985; Tria Kerkvliet 1990).

This study further clarifies that the everyday politics of the poor can go beyond informality. Their agency facilitates their capacity to tap into the formal arena, as well as into a local and larger network of power relations, as it necessitates for the well-being of their households and community in general (Canuday 2009, 4). Along with the established bonding social capital, this also facilitates their capacity to negotiate the leadership requirement in the community, such that renters and poorer segments are elected PO leaders because of the trust that they can lead the community in pushing for their housing agenda.

To better understand the agency of the poor in the context of everyday politics, it follows frameworks that highlight the agentive capacity of individuals, such as Canuday's (2009) creative power and agentive capacity of displaced individuals and Kusaka's (2007, 2010, 2017) agency of the poor. Both Kusaka's agency of the poor and Canuday's analysis on the creative power and agentive capacity of the *bakwit*, or the conflict-induced displacement in Mindanao, inspired this study to examine the voices of the urban poor in informal settler communities in their response to DIDR, in both everyday life and the negotiation with NGOs and government officials. They both present the urban poor and the *bakwit* in their dynamic portraits as productive and creative people, in contrast to these transfixed images as helpless and powerless. They explain that despite being marginalized and victims of the systems who need emergency assistance in their everyday lives, the urban poor and *bakwit* have been asserting, contesting, complicating, and introducing actions and solutions to what ails their social conditions. Their

internal logic and everyday politics also enable them to negotiate the disciplinary powers of the states and NGOs so they can discipline themselves to uphold the civic morality in their communities and transform themselves into good citizens in exchange for resources (Kusaka 2020, 72). While both studies highlight the informal negotiations with authorities, this ethnographic study explores further by examining how they negotiate with authority and institutions, both informally and formally, to influence a positive outcome for their housing agenda amid experiencing DIDR.

To understand the importance of well-being in their everyday politics, this also follows Racelis and Guevara's (2003) framework on the well-being of the poor. They highlight that, in the study of poverty and well-being, the views of the poor themselves need to be incorporated into it because they are culture specific. It then relates to the question of how the urban poor in informal settlements experience deprivation. In addition, how do they define well-being? This study explores the responses to DIDR in connection to the urban poor's different experiences of poverty, what they consider as good for their family's well-being, their relationship within their community, and the support they receive from their external stakeholders.

Their household's well-being and the bonding social capital they established at the locality (Berner 1997) in their previous community also play an essential role in understanding how the relocated ISFs negotiated the rigid community regulations in the in-city resettlement. By negotiating the minor violations in their house rules and resolving them informally without imposing fines, they recreate the urban informality they practiced in their old community, enabling them to foster relationships and create a new sociality in their resettlement community.

CHAPTER 3: URBAN POOR, INFORMAL SETTLEMENT, AND INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN METRO MANILA

This chapter provides the context on how urban poverty, the rise of informal settlement, and involuntary resettlement measures to address the proliferation of informal settlement in Metro Manila are framed through the development lens and the local and national government's policy approaches. I discuss these development approaches that tackle the housing situation of the urban poor informal settlers and the policy measures to address the housing issues alongside their development agenda— giving priority to the latter and on how informal settlement could not disrupt urban development. This chapter also provides an overview of the Philippines' laws and policies related to involuntary resettlement. It also presents the various socialized housing programs in the Philippines, including the People's Plan, as the government's participatory approach to resettlement of the urban poor in Metro Manila. However, despite the government's policies and programs throughout the years, the proliferation of informal settlement and sustainable socialized housing for the urban poor in Metro Manila remains an issue.

3.1 Images of Informal Settlements

In one workshop I attended with government employees as attendees, the Manggahan Floodway informal settler community was selected for a field visit as part of the program. I was introduced as a student researcher who conducted research in the community. I also provided the participants an overview of the community. The participants were amazed to learn that I did my fieldwork in the informal settler community, and I sometimes stayed late in the community and joined social gatherings. I was asked if I was not worried about my security. The image

they had with informal settlements is chaotic and unsafe, with a high incidence of crime and violence. However, upon their arrival to the community during their field visit, they were surprised that it was far from the image they had in mind. Since it was a weekday, they hardly saw people around. They were informed of the residents' profile; for example, many of the residents were working in nearby business centers as casual workers, and others were public utility vehicle drivers, among others. Somehow, they felt secure, despite the fact that many of the structures and dwellings were not well maintained and some were dilapidated. They also had constructive discussions with the APOAMF leaders on the issues concerning threats of eviction and the resettlement they faced in the Manggahan Floodway community. It was far from their expectation of rowdy PO leaders meeting them during the visit.

The initial contrasting views I had as a researcher and with the government employees present that the informal settlements' representation may differ depending on one's experiences of dealing with the people and on what the agenda or ideology wants to convey. Berner's (1997, 120-25) study of the informal settler community in Metro Manila presents that the residents view their community positively, particularly their social relations and improvements in their community. This was in contrast to the outsiders' perceptions of the community being "depressed" and "miserable" (Pinches 1991, quoted in Berner 1997, 124). On the image of informal settlements being overcrowded, exposed to hazards, and often lacking basic infrastructure and services (World Bank 2014), development organizations and government agencies frame this as an opportunity to lift them out of poverty and remove them from danger zones. This blighted image of informal settlement can also be framed as a hindrance to the development of an area; thus, it needs to be demolished for redevelopment, such as in the case of an informal settlement in Quezon City, Philippines, with about 30,000 residents. This

community is in walking distance to the major transport and shopping hub in the city, attracting low-income workers to reside in the community (Recio, Legacy, and Dovey 2020). The community is to be demolished in order to give way to the development of a new central business district in the city. Ironically, a golf course on state land just across the road of the informal settler community was spared from the demolition. These residents' experiences in the informal settlements in the name of development are resisted by progressive NGOs in the context of human rights violations or by depriving them of their spatial rights in the city (Lozada 2013; Arcilla 2018; Ortega 2018; Saguin 2020).

3.2 Rapid Urbanization, Urban Poverty, and Informal Settlements in Metro Manila through Development Lens

A vast amount of literature has been written on urban poverty, particularly in Asia. Development organizations describe the poverty in the region as "pervasive, severe, and unacknowledged," as it is rising more than the population as a whole (Mathur 2014). Of the 1.2 billion poor in the world, Asia accounts for 62.2 percent of them, comparable with its share in total population (Ibid). Unlike rural poverty, urban poverty is considered complex and multidimensional. It is assessed as being beyond the deficiency of income and expenditure, and it relates to the urban poor's vulnerability on their inadequate access to land and housing, physical infrastructure and services, livelihood resources, health and education facilities, social security networks, and voice and empowerment, among others (Berner 1997; Racelis and Castro Guevara 2003; Mathur 2014; World Bank Group 2017). According to Martine et al. (2008), "despite their numbers, the urban poor's needs are rarely prioritized in urban planning, as priorities tend to center in making the city more functional for economic activity and the needs of the middle and upper class." This results in the urban poor residing in urban margins

just to be closer to their sources of income. This shelter deprivation also results in limited access to basic services such as electricity, water, and sanitation. Many urban poor in informal settler communities and other low-income neighborhoods work in the informal sector. This sector is considered critical to the economy of developing countries. They actually account for as much as two-thirds of urban employment in some countries (ibid.).

Poverty in Metro Manila or the National Capital Region characterizes urban poverty in Asia. It is considered a rapidly urbanized metropolis. It is regarded as one of Asia's most rapidly urbanizing countries, with Metro Manila as the driver of urbanization and with the highest population (ICF 2014). Philippine cities altogether generate 70 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), half of which is generated in Metro Manila alone (World Bank 2016, xiii). With the promises of job creation, this results in a dramatic increase in population, mainly fueled by rural poverty and migration (Calata 2017). It is considered one of the most highly congested in the world, with a density of 14,800 people per square kilometer (Coker 2016, 35). The estimated number of ISFs in Metro Manila is 250,000-600,000—about three million individuals—or 37 percent of the population in the metropolis (Patino 2016; World Bank 2016, xiii).

Despite the promises of economic growth, the cities cannot create sufficient jobs for their growing population (Mabilin 2014). Accordingly, in 2011, 10.9 and 14.4 percent of the urban labor force were unemployed and underemployed, respectively (Urban Poor Resource Center of the Philippines 2011, quoted in Mabilin 2014). The high rate of underemployment and unemployment, high cost of urban land, and unavailability or lack of socialized housing in cities push the people to live along urban peripheries, forming informal settler communities. These people reside illegally in either privately or government-owned properties or within the

considered danger zones such as waterways, rivers, creeks, highways, and so on. A majority of the informal settlements are formed in these danger zones (Table 1). In Metro Manila, around 66,000 ISFs formed settlements in these danger zones (Melodias 2016). The dwellings are characterized by both makeshift and permanent housing, and many are haphazard housing structures (ICF 2014).

Table 1. Distribution of ISFs in the Philippines (as of 2017)

Typology	No. of ISFs
Danger Areas	863,546 (45%)
Privately Owned Land	365, 166 (19%)
Others	249, 045 (13%)
Government-Owned Land	218, 175 (12%)
Areas Earmarked for Government INRA	163, 977 (9%)
Areas for Priority Development	23, 373 (1%)
Protected Forest Areas	15, 711 (1%)
TOTAL	**1, 898, 993**

Source: Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development, 2020, quoted inNavarra. 2021. *People-led Housing: Government as Partner*. Presentation at the Ateneo Sociology Department Webinar (February 2021).

This rise of informal settlements is a glaring manifestation of poverty and inequality amid the economic growth by urbanization (Mathur 2014; Karaos 2017). This also shows how Metro Manila has no comprehensive plan for its urban expansion, even as early as the post-World War II era. Due to its lack of centralized planning, private developers have also been taking

advantage to promote their brand and have created a form of displacement and gentrification constructed around global aspirations and public–private partnerships, resulting in the exclusion of the urban poor (Chapple and Thomas 2021).

The Philippine government, at both local and national levels, undertakes actions to address informal settlements in Metro Manila. However, these did not substantially address the prevailing problem. Meeting the housing needs of informal settlers has been, and remains, a daunting task and challenge for both the government and private housing market (Karaos 2017). According to the World Bank (2016, 2), "It has developed and implemented a number of housing programs to respond to the challenge, ranging from highly centralized government-led approaches to more market-oriented and participatory strategies, but these have not curbed the increasing informality in urban centers."

Socialized housing and resettlement areas are often off-city, which do not have livelihood opportunities in surrounding areas and result in people abandoning their homes and returning to cities (World Bank 2016). According to Calata (2017), due to high density and increased economic activities, the land value of cities is high. Its impact on relocation policies is to make them supply driven. This implies relocation far from the cities, where land values are lower. In Metro Manila, about 330,000 housing units for construction were projected until 2016, mostly in distant sites (DILG 2011). This is not sufficient to accommodate the nearly 550,000 ISFs.

While options for socialized housing within the city centers are available and utilized by many city government units, these are not the dominant and immediate mode of the urban poor's resettlement. The lack of priority over socialized housing in city centers and in-city

resettlement is mostly attributed to decentralization and neoliberal urban governance (Shatkin 2000, 2004; Seki 2010; Mabilin 2014). Under this mode of governance, city governments undertake reforms in their respective cities where urban development is mostly inclusive of increased citizen participation. However, this is not usually the case because of varying economic, social, and political constraints "which do not address the leading cause of the lack of legal access to housing among the low-income group, that is, high cost of urban land due to speculation and development pressure caused by urbanization" (Strassman and Blunt 1994, quoted in Shatkin 2000, 2358).

The capacity of some local government units for relocation sites within their areas is limited due to funding constraints, land administration, and high land prices (Olesen 2009; Melodias 2016). Shatkin (2000) also argues that decentralization reflects the interests of politically powerful groups, including civil society, local political families, and international and domestic business interests. He also identifies the lack of local government capacity and the powerful economic interests at the local level that compete with civil society organizations for influence.

Aside from the economic interests of city governments, informal settlers' evictions are also attributed to the government's development plan in cities. Particularly, with the rapid expansion of urbanization comes the call for urban resilience, especially in developing countries like the Philippines (World Bank 2017a). It taps into the vulnerabilities of cities and calls for efforts to build greater resilience to climate and disaster risks. In Metro Manila, urban resilience influences much of the policy and programs at the national and local levels. The call for urban resilience resulted in the local and national governments' renewed focus on disaster response

and mitigation (Bonagua 2015). This means a planned development of infrastructure initiatives such as rehabilitation of rivers and waterways for flood control projects, road widening, and other better infrastructures to mitigate disasters, such as the OPLAN LIKAS (Bonagua 2015; World Bank 2017b).

While both economic development and urban resilience are beneficial to the majority of the cities' population, on the one hand, they also expose the urban poor residing in affected fringes of cities to varying social and economic risks. The implementation of development projects would result in clearing operations and the displacement of ISFs. It sparks a discussion on who benefits from development projects. Particularly, progress is associated with developing exclusive spaces and gated communities in the cities, whereas ISFs are seen as obstacles to development, yet they are frontline workers for the cities' economies and provide strong voter turnout and political positioning in urban public officials (Chapple and Thomas 2021).

3.3 Philippine Laws and Policy Instruments to Protect Informal Settler Rights in Involuntary Resettlement

Along with the years of urban development in Metro Manila is the development of laws and policy instruments that will address the issues on the proliferation of informal settlements in the metropolis. As early as the period after World War II in the 1950s, until the Martial Law period in the early 1980s, there was no policy regarding the urban poor (Naerssen 1989, 206). Informal settlements were not seen as a structural problem of urban land development but rather as a public nuisance and a violation of laws (Berner 1997, 28). The national government conducted occasional and unsystematic demolitions and relocations. Former President

Ferdinand Marcos's issuance of Presidential Decree 72 in 1975 declared squatting a criminal offense. People who unlawfully encroach on public or private land without the expressed consent of the landowner are punishable by imprisonment or fine (ibid., 29). The same year, the Metro Manila Commission was created to establish administrative conditions for effective moves against the squatter problems and create a more comprehensive housing policy (ibid., 28). The NHA was founded to serve the housing needs of the poorest 30 percent of the population. However, the socialized housing projects built under the NHA were far too high to meet the needs of the target groups (ibid., 29). The agency is in charge of the socialized housing up to the present.

After the Marcos era, and when former President Corazon C. Aquino was elected in 1986, the proliferation of informal settlements was still a problem, and the evictions and demolitions of their homes without well-prepared relocation sites were still a practice (Naerssen 1989, 215; Murphy 1993, quoted in Berner 1997, 33). However, under this new administration, there was a rise of NGOs, CSOs, and allies from the Catholic church and the media to formulate the needs of the urban poor and lobby for them at all levels of government (Berner 1997, 3). In general, grassroots movements and popular NGO initiatives gained political influence under President Corazon Aquino's administration. The influence of grassroots movements and popular NGO initiatives continued and influenced the socialized housing priorities in the administration of his son, former President Benigno Aquino III, from 2010 to 2016.

In 1989, the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) was launched, offering informal settlers the opportunity to buy the land they occupied without compulsory, costly upgrading measures and decongestions that would displace them (Berner 1997). The CMP land was

purchased by state loans that were repaid over a period of 25 years. Many informal settlers accepted the CMP as an opportunity to attain security of tenure at a price within their means (ibid., 34). However, this scheme caused division among community members due to the heterogeneity of poverty within the community. Some informal settlers are extremely poor and cannot afford to pay for the land (ibid.).

In 1991, the Local Government Code was passed. This law granted to the local governments the efficient and effective delivery of basic services, including socialized housing, to its constituent (ICF 2014). This is also the basis for neoliberal governance, which deprives the urban poor of access to lands in the city centers. The lands were allocated for the city's economic growth, and expensive lands for housing were only granted to those who could afford them.

In 1992, the UDHA was enacted as a law that tasked the local government units and the NHA as the primary agency responsible for providing housing to the underprivileged and homeless in order to cooperate with private developers and other concerned agencies in socialized housing (ibid.). One of UDHA's objectives is to elevate the condition of the underprivileged and homeless citizens by making decent housing available to them at an affordable cost, combined with basic services, or through socialized housing and employment opportunities.

Under the UDHA, the Socialized Housing Program was implemented, which served as the primary strategy in providing shelter for the poor. Under the law,

> socialized housing refers to housing programs and projects covering houses and lots or home lots undertaken by the Government or the private sector for the underprivileged and homeless citizens who shall include sites and services development, long-term financing, liberalized terms on interest payments, and such other benefits in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (UDHA; Bonagua 2015:12)

It also stipulates that,

> the socialized housing shall be provided with the following: (i) potable water, (ii) power and electricity and an adequate power distribution system, (iii) sewerage facilities and an efficient and adequate solid waste disposal system; and (iv) access to primary roads and transportation facilities. The provision of other basic services and facilities such as health, education, community, security, recreation, relief, and welfare shall be planned and shall be given priority by the local government units and other concerned agencies. (UDHA)

Under the law, the government addresses the housing needs of low-income informal settlers using three approaches (Karaos 2017). The first is off-city resettlement, which is offered mainly to low-income families in danger zones and sites of government infrastructure projects. The NHA is the shelter agency in charge of developing the resettlement sites. Most of these large-scale housing projects are located outside the city, usually about 30-50 kilometers away from the city. These are generally far from work and livelihood opportunities, educational institutions, and public hospitals (ibid.). Under this socialized housing, a household makes graduated payments for a house and lot that cost about approximately PhP200,000 (approximately USD4,000), starting at a subsidized amount of PhP200 (approximately USD4)

a month in the first 4 years, increasing incrementally to up to PhP1,330 (approximately USD26.60) per month. Awardees have up to 30 years to pay for their house and lot (ibid.).

The second approach is onsite upgrading. Under this approach, the CMP of the Social Housing Financing Corporation lends to legally organized associations of underprivileged and homeless citizens of up to PhP100,000 (approximately USD2,000) per household to purchase and develop a tract of land they have been occupying from a willing owner under the concept of community ownership (Karaos 2017). The community association can also borrow PhP30,000 (approximately USD600) for site development and PhP120,000 (approximately USD2,400) for household construction per household. The group loan is paid monthly for up to 25 years and carries an interest rate of 6 percent per annum (ibid.). This program's primary objective is to assist the residents of blighted or depressed areas in owning the lots they occupy or where they choose to relocate to and eventually improve their neighborhoods and homes.

The third approach is onsite, in-city housing. This is a vertical housing program that is either mid- or low-rise housing. This is the government's response to the call for socialized housing for the underprivileged and homeless within the city. However, land allocation is within the decision of the local government units. It is not usually available as these have been allocated instead to projects that would contribute to the cities' economies. Under this approach, the CMP offers loans for community associations to buy a piece of land in an entirely new site where members intend to relocate, but these projects are very few. Some local government units implement this type of housing project with a partnership with NGOs. Others have their socialized housing projects refinanced by the Social Housing Financing Corporation (Karaos 2017).

Recognizing that the urban poor and underprivileged will shoulder the cost of displacement and involuntary resettlement, the Philippine government passed the Comprehensive Integrated Shelter Financing Act (CISFA) in 1994. This law supported the UDHA in financing the entire low-cost and socialized housing program. It seeks to consolidate all financing agencies to have an integral program for housing provision. It enables the socialized housing program to continue funding support from the state.

Despite this subsidized lending from the government, many urban poor in the informal settlements could not access the financing program or did not have the means to pay for the monthly amortization. Only the more affluent members of the community could benefit from these programs. Housing finance systems that encouraged private developers to build more affordable housing have also failed to cater to the majority of the urban poor in informal settler communities because the prices are beyond the means of these people. Only the lower-middle-income groups could afford them (ICF 2014).

To provide more affordable socialized housing for the urban poor, the national and local governments prioritize their relocation program to distant sites. However, based on the ICF (2014) report, distant relocation is considered a more expensive project. Based on data from 2002 to 2014, the government spent above PhP42 billion (approximately USD840 million) for distant relocation socialized housing programs compared to slum upgrading programs that have cost the government only PhP8 billion (approximately USD160 million) for almost the same number of beneficiaries (ICF 2014). These distant relocation projects implemented under the UDHA also failed to consider the importance of cities, urbanization, and transportation systems,

as well as why people migrate and return to the cities. They fight for their "right to the city" (Melodias 2016).

In 2010, the urban poor groups, with their partner CSOs and NGOs, lobbied with then presidential candidate, former President Aquino III, for their housing rights should he win the presidency. The following points were cited in the covenant he signed with the urban poor: ensuring that there would be no eviction without decent relocation, supporting for area upgrading and in-city resettlement, increasing cooperation with the local government units for full implementation of the UDHA, and implementing a post-Typhoon *Ondoy* rehabilitation program in which new approaches will be explored to address both the housing and livelihood needs of the affected urban families.

When former President Aquino III won the presidency, among the first tasks to the appointed head of the DILG, Secretary Jesse Robredo[5] was to examine the housing issues of the informal settlers in Metro Manila. In the 2011 DILG report to former President Aquino III on the housing issues for informal settlers, it presented that off-city resettlement has proven not to be pro-poor. Among the issues they presented in the initial assessment are the relocatees' economic and social displacement in terms of loss of livelihood, uprooting from communities, and other hardship conditions they faced at the relocation sites. The report also presented a mismatch between skills and a lack of job opportunities at the receiving local government units, resulting in a sharp decline in incomes (DILG 2011). These situations resulted in hardship

[5] Secretary Jesse Robredo passed away in August 2012 in a plane crash on his way back to his hometown in Naga City after an official function in Cebu City in Central Philippines (BBC 2012).

among the families and low performance of the shelter program. This hardship resulted in some families being unable to pay their monthly amortization, and some families decided to migrate back to the cities.

The report recommended densified onsite redevelopment or in-city relocation for the informal settlers. While upfront financial costs for in-city relocation might be more expensive than off-city relocation, attendant social and economic costs would show that the latter is more expensive. This cites, among others, the additional government costs in providing basic services, social costs to informal settlers (e.g., loss of livelihood, hardship costs), and recurrent costs (e.g., costs for daily commute to and from a place of work in the city).

Acting on the DILG report, measures to prioritize in-city relocation that is participatory were in place. This is how the national government's People's Plan was created. It is a community-initiated shelter program that was implemented from 2011 to today. The other measures undertaken for in-city relocation included the housing summit, conducted from 2015 to 2016, that gathered people from the national and local governments, development organizations, NGOs, academe, and urban poor representatives, among others; and legislative measures that institutionalized the People's Plan. While these policy measures and the in-city housing programs were in place, the implementation of such programs was challenging because of the city governments' prioritization for their development programs and gentrification.

3.4 Introduction of Community-Initiated Shelter Program: The People's Plan

The People's Plan was a community-initiated shelter program introduced under the administration of former President Benigno Aquino III to resettle the ISFs in Metro Manila from 2011 to 2016. This was in conjunction with the national government's resettlement program, OPLAN LIKAS (*Lumikas para Iwas Kalamidad at Sakit*; *Evacuate to Prevent Disaster and Disease*), which aims to relocate 120,000 ISFs from dangerous areas along major waterways in Metro Manila. At the same time, this program would allow the government to rehabilitate these waterways. Unlike previous resettlement programs, this new shelter program highlighted the urban poor community organizations' proposals in developing their shelter plan or the People's Plan.

The DILG, under the leadership of then-Secretary Robredo, led the initiative for the community-initiated shelter program. Secretary Robredo pioneered the on-site relocation for the slum upgrading. This follows his resettlement programs in his hometown in Naga City in Bicol Region when he was the city mayor. As the DILG secretary, he envisioned applying these resettlement practices for on-site upgrading of all informal settlements in all cities in Metro Manila through the People's Plan (Melodias 2016). Robredo encouraged the ISFs and PO leaders to submit their People's Plan to DILG for consideration and approval (ibid.). His initiative was unpopular among city mayors in Metro Manila because he would call for cease-and-desist orders whenever the informal settlements were about to be demolished. Some city mayors refused to heed the directive, and eventually, the Secretary's directives resulted in frictions between some DILG personnel and city governments (ibid.).

When Secretary Robredo passed away in 2012, Mar Roxas, who lost in his bid for vice-president position, took over the DILG Secretary position and continued the People's Plan program, although he did not push as intensely as Secretary Robredo had pushed for the program's original objectives. Later in the program's implementation, options for off-city resettlement were opened to ISFs under the People's Plan.

The People's Plan was rooted in CSOs' advocacy for the urban poor sector to increase social housing and in-city relocation funding as well as in the national government's response to the off-city relocation issue. The default resettlement site was off-city, which was not pro-poor because it resulted in hardship for relocated families (DILG 2011; Galuszka 2018). Under this housing approach, the community organizations, CSOs, and government worked together to design the informal settler communities' plan for the proposed resettlement. On the part of the community organizations and their partner CSOs, they conducted community organizing. They oversaw capacity-building trainings to help residents become involved with social preparation, access financing, prepare and implement design and oversee the construction of socialized housing, and handle their resettlement site's estate management. The national and local governments were in charge of establishing a high-density housing program and providing funding, technical and coordination assistance, and letters of support.

The People's Plan was implemented in conjunction with the OPLAN LIKAS resettlement program. This program was the government's response to rehabilitate the Pasig River and waterways in Metro Manila. In 2008, the Supreme Court issued a mandamus (*Metropolitan Development Authority et al. vs. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay*) ordering the Metropolitan Development Authority to conduct an inventory or create a master list of all ISFs residing along

the waterways in Metro Manila and nearby provinces who were contributing to the pollution of the Manila Bay and to conduct a clearing operation on all structures of the identified ISFs.

In 2009, Typhoon Ondoy (internationally named *Ketsana*) caused devastation in Metro Manila, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives and millions of pesos worth of properties. Among the reasons cited by the government for the destruction were that the waterways were not functioning correctly because they were clogged by the structures located along them, including the ISFs' dwellings. The Metro Manila Flood Control Project was implemented to address this problem, with the Department of Public Works and Highways as the lead implementing agency. Under this project, the department (2013) proposed that the urgent measures to undertake included enforcing easement requirements, clearing the priority rivers and waterways of informal settlers and obstructions, and creating a resettlement action plan and a plan for provision of housing options. Eight major waterways were identified to be rehabilitated and cleared of informal settlers, including the Manggahan Floodway (see Table 2).

Table 2. Priority Waterways for Rehabilitation and Numbers of Affected ISFs

Waterways	No. of Affected ISFs
San Juan River	4,217
Manggahan Floodway	2,997
Estero Tripa de Gallina	3,887
Maricaban Creek	1,634
Tullahan River	3,683

Waterways	No. of Affected ISFs
Pasig River	1,434
Estero de Maypajo	1,115
Estero de Sunog Apog	170

Source: Department of Public Works and Highways, 2013.

In conjunction, the government established its OPLAN LIKAS resettlement program according to former President Aquino's covenant with the urban poor that there would be no eviction without decent relocation, and it prioritized in-city resettlement through its People's Plan. The CSOs who supported the community organizations in negotiating the resettlement program with the government considered this prioritization a significant accomplishment in safeguarding the urban poor's interests and lives in implementing the Supreme Court mandamus and the Metro Manila Flood Control Project.

Under its OPLAN LIKAS, the national government allocated PHP50 billion (approximately USD1 billion) for the five-year housing fund for the resettlement of the ISFs in the waterways in Metro Manila, prioritizing the People's Plan for vertical development of multistorey buildings for in-city resettlement. Aside from the People's Plan, the affected ISFs were entitled to the PHP18,000 (approximately USD360) Interim Shelter Fund family assistance to help them with their needs during their initial stays at the relocation sites. In 2013, the government issued a joint memorandum circular, signed by different heads of national government agencies on the policy guidelines, to guide stakeholders in operationalizing and utilizing the PHP50 billion housing fund (Belen and Bonagua 2016).

The policy guidelines stipulated the following:

(1) The hierarchy of affected ISFs' options in relocation and resettlement should be on-site, near-city, and in-city according to the People's Plan. Off-site options should be resorted to in accordance with the People's Plan and only after adequate and genuine consultations or when directly requested by the affected ISFs themselves;

(2) The priority in danger areas should be the ISFs whose structures are on top of the waterways or within the 3-meter easement. In extraordinary cases, the 3-meter easement may be extended by the Department of Public Works and Highways—only when it is necessary, such as for critical flood management measures;

(3) To ensure safe, affordable, decent, and humane relocation as well as to prevent forced eviction, there should be a Relocation Plan included in the People's Plan mechanism and process;

(4) ISFs living in danger areas, especially those in the priority waterways for resettlement, would go through a process of mandatory registration and validation such as biometrics;

(5) The local government units' and private sectors' participation should be highly encouraged;

(6) Housing finance schemes should be made affordable by the Finance and Affordability Committee based on the beneficiaries' affordability analyses. Affordability schemes suggested through People's Plan proposals would be considered;

(7) Housing solutions implemented under this program would be subject to validation, checking, and acceptance by the beneficiaries.

Following these guidelines under the People's Plan, many of the community organizations in affected informal settler communities, with assistance from their partner CSOs, prepared their plans with the hope of giving ISFs a more secure living in the city or in their chosen resettlement areas. In fact, the resettlement study conducted by the Philippine Commission on the Urban Poor (Quetulio-Navarra, 2016) showed that the distance of resettlement sites from the settlers' sources of livelihood gravely affects their economic viability; 40 percent of the respondents had lost their jobs after relocation and there have been an overall decrease in income of 5–7 percent. The overall resettlement has negatively affected resettlers' general well-being immediately after relocation because of the inadequacies in basic services.

However, despite the promises of safe, affordable, and decent resettlement housing and living condition for the ISFs under the People's Plan, it was not fully implemented as envisaged. Bureaucratic red tape, delays in building construction and provision of basic services, and poor coordination with local governments on land inventory resulted in the resettlement program's overall slow implementation. This is reflected in the key findings in the audit report conducted by the Commission on Audit in 2017 on the in-city resettlement housing program. It presented that as of December 2016 (supposedly the end date of the five-year housing program), only 52 percent (8,644 out of 16,748) of the targeted housing units were completed by the National Housing Authority (Commission on Audit [COA], 2017).

Over the years, the Philippine government has issued policies and programs to address informal settlement and sustainable socialized housing programs for the urban poor informal settlers in the country. However, based on the above-mentioned reports, these efforts generally

fail to address the issue despite introducing in-city resettlement and onsite development, aside from the usual distant off-city relocation. The treatment of informal settlers as either a public nuisance or violators of laws and the treatment of informal settlement as a structural problem of urban land development inform the lack of representation of the urban poor's voices. The in-city resettlement through the People's Plan is an effort to address the issue of the urban poor's participation by incorporating their voices and their call for in-city resettlement. However, as presented in the COA report, the project was not fully implemented as envisaged because of administrative and political factors, among others.

Although the socialized housing and resettlement programs were hounded with challenges in their implementation, equally important to examine is how the ISFs' internal logic operates in their responses to these housing programs. Particularly, how did the people experience DIDR and deal with resettlement? As highlighted in this study, the responses of the urban poor to the housing programs raised further questions regarding their active participation throughout the process of planning and implementing resettlement programs and how they are asserting their agency in responding to DIDR while dealing with poverty in their daily lives. Such that it leaves question on why did the resettlement programs work for some urban poor families and not for others?

CHAPTER 4: AGENCY OF THE POOR AND EVERYDAY POLITICS IN INFORMAL SETTLER COMMUNITY ALONG THE MANGGAHAN FLOODWAY

This chapter builds the foundation of the ISFs' internal logic in dealing with everyday politics in their daily lives and in pursuing their housing strategies amid DIDR experiences in the Manggahan Floodway ISF community. This chapter presents the Manggahan Floodway as highlighting the intersection of issues confronted by the urban poor in the city, from dealing with poverty, claiming a space in the urban margins, and confronting threats of eviction and relocation to different resettlement sites—resulting from the government's implementation of the urban development project—to negotiating with local and national government and CSOs to pursue housing strategies according to their families' well-being. First, I presented why I chose the informal settler community along the waterway as my study site. In this space, the poor's agency and their everyday politics are manifested in their daily lives and their dealing with DIDR. Then, I presented how the urban poor practiced their agency by recreating the meaning of space, from a waterway that functions for the metropolis's flood management to a space where they established a community. This is where they dealt with the everyday challenges of residing at the urban margins: managing poverty, residing in houses made of poor-quality materials, facing difficulties accessing basic services, and lacking political participation because of their insecure land tenure. Here, they created relations among neighbors, which formed their bonded social capital. Finally, this space presented their everyday politics in dealing with threats of evictions and resettlement after Typhoon *Ondoy* hit Metro Manila in 2009 through different responses such as availing themselves of the distant relocation site, staying in the community and asserting their right to space through community organization, and changing resettlement options along the way because of different personal reasons

regarding their families' well-being. This chapter sets the stage to answer the first question posed in this study: Why did ISFs in the same informal settler community respond differently to DIDR despite receiving the same eviction threats?

4.1 Site Selection: The Manggahan Floodway as a Nexus of Urban Poor Issues, Everyday Politics, and Agency of the Poor

> *Maayos naman ang pamumuhay namin dito sa floodway. Dito na lumaki ang mga anak ko at dito na din kami nakapag pundar. Me bahay na din kami sa Antipolo pero mas gusto ko pa din dito tumira dahil andito ang mga kakilala ko at dito ako nagsasamba. Nagsimula lang naman ang paghihirap namin pagkatapos ng Ondoy. Kelangan na daw kaming ma evict dahil danger zone eto. Hindi ko na pinapaayos ang bahay ko dito dahil maaaring kahit anong oras papaalisin naman kami. Nag-aavail na din ako ng in-city relocation para malapit lang.* (We live well here in the floodway. My children grew up here, and we have established ourselves here. We now have a house in Antipolo, but I want to stay here because my friends are here and I go to church here. Our struggles started after *Ondoy*. Accordingly, we must be evicted because this area is a danger zone. I no longer have my house repaired because we will be evicted anytime. I also availed myself of the in-city relocation so that it [our new home] will be near. [Marta])

Marta (pseudonym) is a widow in her early sixties with three children. Her family settled in the community in the early 1990s. When they first moved in, their dwelling was only one level. Her husband used to work as a construction worker in a nearby business center while she peddled Yakult (a sweetened probiotic milk beverage) in nearby communities to augment their income. When her husband died in the late 1990s, she became the breadwinner and had to work

as a part-time house helper in a nearby subdivision in addition to peddling Yakult. It helped that they had no monthly amortization or rent payments for their house. When her children started their own families, Marta's family added two levels to their dwelling to allow privacy. Eventually, one of her children managed to buy a property in Antipolo, Rizal (about 20 kilometers away). However, Marta still preferred to stay in the informal settler community or be relocated within the area because she had established a life in the community. She joined the community organization to assert her right to stay in the place.

> *1991 noong simulang manirahan ang pamilya namin sa Floodway hanggang noong umalis kami noong 2009 pagkatapos ng baha dahil sa Typhoon Ondoy. Nagdesisyon kaming mag-asawa na umalis na dahil paulit ulit ang pagbaha at ayaw na din namin ng gulo dahil pinapaalis na kami ng gobyerno. Maayos ang pamumuhay namin doon. Malaki ang bahay namin. Me paupahan kami na mga kwarto at may sari-sari store kami. Noong pagkatapos ng baha, nag-usap usap kaming ilang kapitbahay tungkol sa sitwasyon. Labing dalawa kaming sabay sabay na nagsubmit ng aplikasyon namin sa Calauan*. (My family settled in Floodway 1991 [and stayed] until we left in 2009 after the flooding due to Typhoon *Ondoy*. We decided, as a couple, to leave because of the recurring flooding, and we do not want to deal with trouble because the government is making us leave. We lived well there. Our house was big. We rented some of our rooms, and we had a store. After the flooding, we talked with some neighbors about the situation. There were twelve of us who submitted applications for Calauan [the distant relocation site]. [Cecilia])

Cecilia (pseudonym) is in her mid-fifties and has two children. Although her family lived a comfortable life in the community in the Manggahan Floodway, they decided to avail themselves of a distant relocation site because of the recurring flooding after Typhoon *Ondoy* and to avoid dealing with stress due to threats of eviction from their home.

These contrasting narratives of the residents of the informal settler community along the Manggahan Floodway's east bank road in Metro Manila, Philippines, represent the reasons I chose the community as my primary study site. The Manggahan Floodway served as the space where the poor's agency and their everyday politics manifested in their daily lives and their dealing with DIDR. Upon examining their responses to eviction and resettlement threats, I located the power of the poor through their agency to decide how to respond to these threats according to their well-being, whether through informal and hidden or formal and organized resistance. Bonding social capital has been established in the community, as it has been home to many ISFs for about 30 years.

The Manggahan Floodway is a space where there was a struggle regarding an urban development program that affected the community. As discussed earlier, the waterway is among the priorities for rehabilitation under the flood management program in the metropolis and compliance with the Supreme Court mandamus. Because of the program, the government ordered the immediate demolition of obstructions in the waterways due for rehabilitation. Many of the structures considered as obstructions were the houses of urban poor families living in informal settlements along the waterway. Accordingly, the affected families' resettlement to assigned socialized housing projects in off-city relocation sites was established. Under the People's Plan, their community organization negotiated with the national government for

relocation near their informal settler community. Despite being eligible to apply for in-city resettlement, other residents decided to apply for housing in off-city relocation sites.

I focused my study on one informal settler community along the Manggahan Floodway's east bank road. I selected this community because this was where the urban poor visibly experienced the threats of DIDR during my fieldwork. I have witnessed the way the residents negotiated with the local and national government to delay or stop the demolitions and experienced eviction from their homes, relocation to different resettlement sites, and eventually demolition of all their houses and other community structures in 2017.

I have been conducting my fieldwork in this informal settler community since 2013. This year was among the height of the urban poor's struggle with the local and national governments' eviction and resettlement activities before all remaining residents were evicted in 2017. I conducted follow-up visits to the resettlement communities from 2017 to 2020. Initially, I focused my research on how community members dealt with the reality of flooding in their everyday lives and how they dealt with threats of evictions after their homes were devastated by Typhoon *Ondoy*. I expanded my research to examine these residents' internal logic and everyday politics with their housing strategies, such as choosing their resettlement sites, their individual and collective strategies, their continuous re-working of their bonding and bridging social capital, and their negotiating the rules and regulations with the housing authority and PO leaders to accommodate their practices and daily needs.

I was interested in expanding my academic inquiry on the urban poor's internal logic regarding their housing strategies after observing the complexity of dynamics and relationships

among residents while conducting my ethnography. Most of the residents who undertook actions to resist their homes' demolition eventually pursued different resettlement options (either in-city resettlement, distant off-city resettlement, or on-site development). The community's PO leadership was a mix of house owners and renters and those belonging to the community's upper and lower segments; thus, the PO leadership represented the community's characteristics. The elected leaders were both house owners and renters, and the latter, who belonged to the poorest segment of the community, held the highest positions in the PO. This opposes Berner's (1997) description of the usual leadership composition in the urban poor's local organizations, which reflected that house owners and the residents who are the wealthiest or with wide networks in the city government constituted most of the leadership. As I have observed, in the resettlement process, although some members pursued different collective responses (in-city resettlement or onsite development) they remained in touch with other residents.

4.2 Recreating the Manggahan Floodway as a Space for Settlement and Socioeconomic and Political Issues of Urban Poor

This section presents how the residents of the informal settler community along the east bank road of the Manggahan Floodway recreated the waterway's meaning and function as a flood control waterway to reflect its status as a settlement place for low-income urban poor who needed a place in the city. I present residents' strategies for living their everyday lives in the communities despite their challenges due to poverty and their lack of access to basic services and political participation due to insecure land tenure.

This section also covers how the Manggahan Floodway represented a nexus of issues confronted by informal settler communities along the berm slope. I explain the power struggle these communities' residents confronted in their daily lives. Many residents felt that because of their lack of land rights and lack of access to socioeconomic opportunities, the political exclusion or unequal power relations among them and with local government units and related government agencies led to their spatial isolation and disadvantaged positions regarding access to basic utility services and social protection programs. These residents' location, dwelling quality, and socioeconomic status further magnified their vulnerability to flooding and their difficulty recovering and gaining access to government recovery programs. Because of their insecure land tenure, unequal participation in decision-making processes, and difficulty in being heard, they felt isolated from government programs that seem to benefit the majority while pushing them to further marginalization. These experiences were amplified when the government implemented the flood management program after Typhoon *Ondoy* hit Metro Manila in 2009. Despite these experiences with DIDR, the residents manifested their agency and everyday politics to respond to daily challenges and threats of DIDR through informal (e.g., subtle and informal negotiations on rules and regulations among residents) and formal (e.g., organized actions and negotiations with local and national governments) responses.

4.2.1 The Manggahan Floodway as a Flood Control Waterway

The Manggahan Floodway is a key drainage infrastructure built by the Philippine government in the 1980s (Eva et al. 2010) to address the perennial flooding in Metro Manila. It is an artificial waterway that is 10 kilometers long, 260 meters wide, and equipped with eight

floodgates. This waterway was expected to help reduce the flooding along the Pasig River during the rainy seasons by diverting 70 percent of Marikina's floodwater to Laguna Lake and allowing 30 percent to harmlessly flow into the Pasig River and Manila Bay. Moreover, the floodway reverses its flow direction if the lake's water level is higher than the Marikina River at the Rosario Weir junction. This feature minimizes the risk of flooding along the shores of Laguna de Bay (Zapanta 2011).

Figure 1. The Manggahan Floodway Design



Source: Home Along the Floodway Project.
http://homealongthefloodway.tripod.com/introduction/sitepic.jpg (accessed 20 December 2014).

Figure 2. Map of the Interconnecting Waterways: Marikina River, Pasig River, and Laguna Lake

Source: Community Organizers Multiversity 2013.

The ensuing urbanization in Metro Manila in the 1980s resulted in the increase of the informal settler population along the Manggahan Floodway. In 1994, then-President Fidel V. Ramos signed Presidential Proclamation No. 458 to tackle the housing needs of the informal settlers along the waterway by reserving its embankment for socialized housing (Pasig City, 2014; personal interview, Community Organizers Multiversity).

The Manggahan Floodway traverses three barangays in Pasig City (Sta. Lucia, Maybunga, and Rosario) and the municipalities of Cainta and Taytay in Rizal. This stretch is considered home to many informal settlers (Table 1). However, the study focused on only the informal settler community within the jurisdiction of the Barangay Sta. Lucia stretch of Pasig City or along the waterway's east bank road for the above-mentioned reasons. Although the other informal settler communities within the jurisdictions of Barangays Maybunga and Rosario and the along the waterway's west bank road also experience poverty and eviction and demolition threats, these residents, unlike the community along the east bank road, have continued to keep their homes and are continuously fighting to keep them until today.

4.2.2 The Manggahan Floodway as a Settlement Space for the Urban Poor

> *Natural sa mga tao ang tumira kung saan malapit ang pinagkukuhanan nila ng kabuhayan. Katulad ng mga indigenous people, tumira sila malapit sa ilog dahil malapit ito sa pinagkukunan nila ng pagkain. Ganyan din dito sa Floodway, malapit ito sa pinagtatrabahuan ng mga tao.* (It is natural for people to stay near their sources of income. Like indigenous people, they stay near the river because it is near the sources

> of their food. It is the same here at the floodway: It is near where the people work. [Marilyn])

Marilyn (pseudonym) is 27 years old with one child. Her family rented a room in the informal settler community because it is near her workplace, a business center where she works as a call center agent. The community's rental rates range from PHP2,000 to PHP3,000 (approximately USD40–60), which is lower than the rates in nearby apartments in subdivisions or gated villages that are the same distance from her workplace.

Marilyn's narrative echoes the reasons of other ISFs in the community regarding why they preferred to live there: It is located in the city center, and the cost of living is low. Over the years of living along the waterway, the ISFs established a community. The community characterized the various degrees of poverty and high degree of socioeconomic and political dynamics among residents and with the local and national government, and it established relationships among the residents who lived there for long periods. Before the dwellings in the communities along the Manggahan Floodway's east bank road were demolished, APOAMF estimated that about 3,500 ISFs resided in the berm on both sides of the Manggahan Floodway (see Table 3, fig. 3). The residents claimed that of this number, only about 199 ISFs were considered within a danger zone; these families resided along the lower portion of the berm slope, what locals called the "top of the water." These were the residents that needed to be prioritized in relocation because they were the most vulnerable to flooding. The residents claimed that the rest of the dwellings were relatively far from the water and thus were unaffected by floods.

Table 3. Number of ISFs in the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City (2016)

Barangay	ISFs
Maybunga	1,442
Rosario	536
St. Lucia	1,189
Total	3,286

Source: Alliance of People's Organizations Along the Manggahan Floodway.

Figure 3. Settlement along the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City



Source: Alliance of People's Organizations along the Manggahan Floodway

The Manggahan Floodway became a haven to many low-income workers engaged in either formal or informal sectors of the nearby cities and towns. Many moved to the adjacent floodway bank, preferring exposure to flood risk to living far from their income sources. The adjacent bank has served as a refuge for homeless low-income workers. It has also sheltered jobless *bagong salta* (newcomers) who hailed from rural areas to find paid work opportunities in Metro Manila. Their decisions were influenced by the general perception among the rural migrants that Metro Manila is a land of opportunities, where the good life awaits them in the metropolis.

The poor rural migrants usually ended up in low-paying and temporary jobs in both formal and informal sectors in cities, largely because of their limited educational qualifications

and contacts in the city and their unfamiliarity with urban life. Despite the city's lack of economic opportunities and the challenges they faced there, many residents preferred confronting these challenges over returning to their respective provinces, where there is a lack of job opportunity for them. Rural migrants' incomes are insufficient to afford the high cost of rental accommodation or the soaring property prices in Metro Manila. Driven by poverty and the need to survive, some built their shelters, whereas others rented rooms or dwellings along the Manggahan Floodway. They did this regardless of its status as a danger zone area and an illegal construction along the berm. Moreover, the lack of legal land tenure security exposes the residents, especially those living at the lower portion of the berm, to flood risk during typhoons or continuous heavy monsoon rains. Furthermore, the residents face the everyday risk of being evicted anytime, especially during flooding season.

In general, many of the ISFs in the Manggahan Floodway belonged to the low-income group. They fall under the poverty threshold determined for the National Capital Region of Metro Manila, which was PHP20,344 (approximately USD456.65) per capita per annum in 2013 (National Statistical Coordination Board, 2013; People's Organizations Along the Manggahan Floodway [APOAMF] Socio-economic Survey). Poverty rates were high, and providing for one's family needs required daily struggle due to temporary employment and low income.

The Manggahan Floodway has also attracted settlers because of its proximity to available employment opportunities, such as the business center areas in Pasig City and other nearby cities such as Makati, Mandaluyong, and Quezon City. On the one hand, most men worked as construction workers for nearby projects, company drivers, or family drivers. Others engaged

in the informal economy through vending. Yet others drove public utility vehicles, such as public utility jeepneys, taxis, vans, and tricycles. On the other hand, the women took on part-time employment as all-around domestic help and did laundry for residents of nearby subdivisions. Some provided manicure and pedicure services, whereas others engaged in retail activities and food vending or managing sari-sari stores. However, many women were unemployed and stayed home to manage the household and care for their children.

Many male youths aged 15–17 years old worked either part-time or full-time at manufacturing companies, whereas some female youths worked part-time as house helpers or storekeepers. Most household heads and other family members had few skills and limited educational attainment, limiting their chances for more highly paid employment (the highest educational attainment of most informants was high school).

A rapid assessment of Typhoon *Ondoy*'s social impact in affected urban poor communities, such as the Manggahan Floodway's west bank (Pasig City stretch), noted the lack of livelihood and income-generating opportunities. Conducted by the Institute of Philippine Culture (2010, quoted in Zapanta, 2011), the study affirmed that this deficiency remains a long-term issue for the community. The men engage in mainly irregular and casual employment as wage workers in construction projects and manufacturing companies and driving public vehicles. Others have engaged the informal economy through services such as ambulant vending, street barbering, and driving public vehicles. Meanwhile, women take on part-time employment at manufacturing firms or are engaged in retail activities like food vending, buy-and-sell schemes, dressmaking and crafts, and microlending.

Living along the Manggahan Floodway, said the informants, was of great help to those who worked nearby because of minimal transportation costs. Some walked to work, whereas others paid a minimum jeepney fare of eight pesos (PHP8.00; approximately USD0.16). These options were of great help to them because instead of transportation expenses, their meager household budgets could be used to buy food and afford other daily needs.

The lack of stable income sources has prompted some residents to adapt to a rural way of life in the city by raising poultry and livestock and growing vegetables. Vegetable gardening and poultry raising were also common in the Manggahan Floodway, especially in communities with vacant lots. In summer, some residents planted vegetables such as *kangkong* (water spinach), *gabi* (taro), and *pechay* (Chinese cabbage) in the vacant lots behind their houses. Others raised chicken and ducks in their yards. Informal business enterprises also thrived in the settlement along the berm. There were *talipapa* (wet markets), barber shops, junk shops, bakeries, and *carenderia* (street-side eateries), among others, which provided cheap services and items to residents (see fig. 4).

Figure 4. Examples of Income Sources along the Manggahan Floodway: Wet Market (Left) and Junk Shop (Right)

Source: Author. Informal settler community along the Manggahan Floodway's east bank road, 2013.

The Manggahan Floodway is also considered a home to the residents, especially the first generation of settlers and their children. For the early settlers, this is where they established their homes, their means of living, and their relationships with friends and neighbors. As for the second and third generations of residents, because they grew up in the community and raised their own families here, this is more than a community near sources of income: This is the community carrying their childhood memories.

> *Noong araw wala pang masyadong bahay dito. Malinis pa ang ilog. Nakakalangoy pa kami at mga anak ko dyan. Nakakapangisda din kami. Ngayon hindi na. Medyo nalilinis na lang sya tuwing bumabaha kasi naaagos ang dumi.* (Back in the day, there were few houses here. The river was clean. My kids and I used to swim there. We also got to fish. Today, not anymore. It is cleaned up a bit every time it floods because it washes away the dirt. [Susan])

Susan (pseudonym) is in her early 60s, and her family moved to the community in the early 1990s. They started with a bungalow-type dwelling, and when her children had families of their own, they added two floors to their house. Their home is made of mixed concrete and light materials. Their neighbors, who were construction workers, constructed the additional floors in their dwelling. Some of the home's materials were scrap materials from their neighbors' construction work sites.

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The informal settlers started settling along the Manggahan Floodway in the late 1980s (personal interview). The settlement started at the embankment side, whereas the berm side remained grassy and unoccupied. In the 1990s, the communities along the Manggahan

Floodway started to expand, extending along the berm. According to the informants, those who settled in the 1990s were demolition victims from other cities and municipalities, and the Manggahan Floodway provided them a place to restart their lives. Aside from early settlers' extended families, many informal settlers were contractual workers who worked for nearby companies and on nearby construction projects. They rented or bought dwellings from the earlier occupants. Accordingly, the residents sought permission from the barangay and "caretakers of the land" before building their structures. The informants did not further elaborate on this.

In 2000, the early settlers constructed more stilt houses along the berm slope's low portion and within the waterway. These new dwellings extended as far as to the middle of the waterway. Only improvised and dangerously shaky footbridges connected houses (see fig. 5). Some of these stilt houses were rented out to tenants, most of whom were wage-based workers at nearby construction sites and manufacturing companies, vendors, drivers of public utility vehicles, and domestic helpers in nearby subdivisions.

Figure 5. Part of an Improvised and Dangerously Shaky Footbridge That Connected Waterway Dwellings in the Manggahan Floodway Informal Settler Community

Source: Author. Informal settler community along the Manggahan Floodway's east bank road, 2013.

According to the community's local organization, APOAMF,[6] an estimated 10,000 families resided along the Manggahan Floodway's berm before the heavy flooding in 2009.

4.2.2.1 The Quality of Dwellings as a Symbol of Ways of Life in the Informal Settlement

The dwellings along the lower portion of the berm slope mirrored the lives of the ISFs in the community. Those in the upper strata of poverty had larger homes made of mixed concrete and wooden materials. They were usually in the upper portion of the berms. The dwellings in the lower part, especially the Top of the Water area, utilized either mixed materials, concrete, or light materials (see fig. 6). The sizes of the houses varied from fewer than 25 square meters up to 100 square meters or more. These were occupied by one to three families, or a maximum of more than ten individuals (Pasig-LIAC, n.d.). Even though the dwellings came in different sizes and materials, they characterized the uncertainty of ISFs' stay in the area, as the homes were mostly no longer well maintained. Despite the poor state of their dwellings, ISFs showed their creativity and determination to stay in the community despite the risk of flood and uncertainty due to the threats of eviction and resettlement.

Many male residents were low-skilled workers who worked in construction projects in nearby business centers. Their carpentry skills were helpful, as they had often constructed or repaired their own dwellings or their neighbors' houses. Some also brought home and used scrap materials from the construction sites to build their dwellings.

[6] APOAMF comprises ten local organization members along the Manggahan Floodway's east and west berms (Bonagua, 2016).

Footbridges connected dwellings near the water (see fig. 7). However, these footbridges and homes were dilapidated and no longer repaired. The occupants did not bother repairing them because of the threats of demolition. They added that none of their family members had yet had accidents on the worn and dangerously shaky footbridges because they were all familiar with their structure.

Figure 6. Informal Settlers' Houses Along the Berm of Manggahan Floodway

Source: Lala Zapanta (personal collection Informal settler community along eastbank road of Manggahan Floodway, 2011.

Figure 7. Footbridge Connecting Houses in Manggahan Floodway Informal Settler Community

Source: Author. Informal settler community along eastbank road of Manggahan Floodway, 2013.

4.2.2.2 Challenges in Accessing Basic Utility Services

The lack of legal land tenure and support from the city government limited the residents of the informal settler community when trying to gain access to basic utility services and other social protection programs. The households had limited electricity and water connections. Since they did not have tenure security, the basic utility providers MERALCO (for electricity) and Manila Water (for water) only provided residents with limited services (see fig. 8). Water connections were submetered among households, and APOAMF leaders in each area were assigned to collect payments from the households. According to Inocencio and David (1996), this scheme operates under Manila Water's program to provide water connections to poor communities. Under this scheme, users form groups, register connections, and share usage costs. The households form the groups either by themselves or with the assistance of *barangay* officials or an area association.

APOAMF negotiated with Manila Water for the water connection. They were also in charge of ensuring that every household paid their monthly bills. Each area was given one mother meter, and each household installed submeters. The APOAMF leaders were tasked with collecting the group payment and submitting it to Manila Water. Upon receipt of the bill based on the mother meter, the APOAMF leader ascertained the individual submeter readings and prorated the cost according to usage (Inocencio & David 1996). The monthly water consumption charges for each household ranged from PhP80 to PhP500 (approximately USD1.60 to USD10.00).

All the households in the communities along Manggahan Floodway had access to electricity. Most of them had their own meters, while some, particularly residents that arrived around the 2000s, illegally tapped their electricity from their neighbors' homes. This was because applying for a new connection was a tedious process. Moreover, many of them did not meet the requirements for a new installation, owing to the lack of tenure security.

The residents also experienced significant challenges in restoring their connections to basic utility services after Tropical Storm Ondoy hit in 2009. The APOAMF leaders I talked with shared the difficulties they encountered in restoring their electricity or water connections because they were informal settlers. Through the help of their partner CSO, the CO-Multiversity, they were able to seek an audience with representatives from MERALCO. They underwent a long and tedious process and had several discussions with the electric company and the city government of Pasig before their power connection was restored.

These different experiences—illegally connecting to neighbors' electricity due to a lack of documentation, and the APOAMF's negotiations with MERALCO to reconnect the power supply—presented two instances of the everyday politics of the poor. One was informal and hidden, and the other was formal and organized resistance. The outcomes of both actions satisfied the residents' needs.

Figure 8. Residential Power Meters and Water Connections in Manggahan Floodway Informal Settler Community

Source: Author. Informal settler community along eastbank road of Manggahan Floodway, 2013.

4.2.2.3 Locality and Social Cohesion

Social cohesion among neighbors functioned differently depending on the situation. Relationships among neighbors were built from occasional gatherings such as celebrating family occasions with *videoke* (karaoke with video) sessions and parties in the neighborhood's shared spaces. The men occasionally gathered in some *sari-sari* stores (general stores) for weekend drinking sessions. A *compadre* system was also common in the area, under which residents have godchildren or are the godparents at neighbors' weddings.[7]

Access to bonding and bridging social capital can be observed in the community's daily lives and when they are confronted with threats of eviction and relocation. Relationships

[7] In the weddings in the Philippines, the bride and groom have at least three pairs of godparents (*ninong and ninong*) in their wedding entourage. Usually, the godparents are those close to the couple as they are expected to give them marital advice. Known personalities in the community are also asked to be among the couple's godparents as a way of establishing a network.

neighbors built with each other were helpful in seeking favors related to everyday life and to opportunities for income. These included assistance in watching over their houses when family members were out, repairing neighbors' homes, having access to social services in their locality, having rooms available for visiting relatives and friends, and referring each other to jobs and other income opportunities. This relationship among neighbors was helpful at the height of their fight against forced evictions when they formed their local organization—particularly in deciding who they could trust to lead them in their pressing community issues, regardless of house ownership.

During disasters, neighbors provided short-term and limited assistance to one another. During and after the flooding caused by Typhoon *Ondoy*, they provided temporary shelter to those who had to evacuate homes that were submerged or destroyed by the flood. Others helped with repairs. Their nearby immediate family was their informal safety net most of the time.

4.3 Dealing with Threats of Eviction and Resettlement after Typhoon *Ondoy*

After the devastation brought by Typhoon *Ondoy* in Metro Manila in 2009, the Philippine government prioritized its flood management program in the metropolis. The Manggahan Floodway was identified as a priority for renovation. As a result, the government ordered the immediate demolition of structures obstructing the waterways. These structures were usually the houses of urban poor families in informal settlements along so-called "danger zones," areas within three meters of the banks of waterways, creeks, rivers, and canals. With the demolition

of their houses, the affected families' resettlement to assigned socialized housing projects (usually outside the city) was mandated.

In total, about 1,200 ISFs from the community in the east bank road of Manggahan Floodway were evicted and relocated by the government from 2009 until the demolition of their homes in 2017. The ISFs had different responses to displacement and resettlement. Some families immediately accepted the distant off-city resettlement in Calauan, Laguna and in Tanay, Rizal, while other families initially decided to form a local organization partnering with a CSO to advocate for onsite development. However, they dropped this advocacy two years later. Instead, they pushed for near-site resettlement under vertical socialized housing through the People's Plan. However, some families eventually decided to push for onsite development and partnered with progressive urban poor groups for their advocacy.

Residents shared their reasons for accepting the relocation options: They were immediately offered distant off-city relocation after the typhoon when they faced forced eviction. Some families immediately weighed the material and nonmaterial value of their family's well-being to deal with threats of demolition and eviction. With the loss of their assets, especially their homes, some residents immediately opted for off-city resettlement. They considered this option a long-term solution for their housing problem because they no longer had homes, and the government had offered them affordable socialized housing. This was an opportunity to start anew.

Regarding nonmaterial well-being, some families chose relocation to eliminate the stress caused by the threat of their homes' demolition. The local and national government

pressured them to leave through several eviction notices. They faced sleepless nights, thinking that they could lose their homes at any moment. They no longer wanted to deal with these uncertainties. While these were considerations decided within their family, some also discussed their situations with their neighbors and the APOAMF leaders. Even if they did not join the in-city housing agenda of their community organization, this did not result in antagonism toward them, but rather understanding of their household situation. Ronan (pseudonym), an APOAMF leader in his late 40s, recalled why some families had immediately decided to relocate to Calauan and Tanay:

> *Hindi kami makatulog noon dahil sa takot na baka i-demolish na ang mga bahay namin anumang oras. Marami sa mga nagpa-relocate ayaw sana umalis pero nandoon kasi ang pangamba para sa pamilya nila.*(We could not sleep for fear that our houses would be demolished anytime soon. Many of those who availed of the relocation did not want to leave, but they thought of their family's well-being.)

Despite being members of the local organization that had fought for their right to stay in the city (see fig. 9), other members opted for distant off-city resettlement for different personal reasons. Some of those who opted for the resettlement wanted to own a house and live in a healthy environment away from traffic and pollution. Some residents who had health considerations, mostly the elderly, also opted for resettlement. They had their own safety nets, as most of them also had family members who provided financial support while they settled in the off-city resettlement sites. Still other residents chose distant relocation after comparing the monthly amortizations between the two socialized housing options, upon which they saw that the in-city resettlement was more expensive. There were also nonmembers of the local

organization who applied for in-city resettlement housing units. While the residents who were APOAMF members were the priorities for in-city resettlement, and although there were objections among the APOAMF leaders at first, they eventually supported this option. They were considering the hardships of these families who had to pay high monthly rental rates in apartments after being evicted from their homes in the Manggahan Floodway informal settler community. The APOAMF leaders eventually assisted these residents in their applications on the condition that the residents, should their housing applications be approved, would abide by the house rules in the in-city resettlement.

Figure 9. Sign posted on a resident's front door in Manggahan Floodway informal settler community saying that their household did not avail of the relocation to Tanay, Rizal.

(Text translation: We did not avail to Tanay.)
Source: Author. Informal settler community along eastbank road of Manggahan Floodway, 2013.

During the period in which the residents continued their resistance against threats of demolition while waiting for the construction of the remaining buildings in the in-city resettlement site, APOAMF leaders and residents conducted regular meetings about their situation and their next course of action. The APOAMF leaders facilitated residents' applications for either distant off-city relocation or in-city relocation.

A few of the residents stayed but did not join collective activities. Although they had no conflict with the APOAMF leaders or members, they also had no strong relations with the members in general, they simply residing amicably in the same community. They were simply not on the priority list for in-city resettlement, nor did they seek the APOAMF's assistance to process their applications for their preferred resettlement sites. Instead, they directly coordinated with the National Housing Authority (NHA) regarding their applications for available socialized housing. These residents did not join the collective undertakings either because their work schedules hindered them from attending frequent meetings, they lacked the means to pay for the dues collected for their activities, or their families were certain they would obtain socialized housing at a distant location. While people in this group did not have the strongest relationship with local organization members, their presence in the community was nevertheless acknowledged. Although they were not on the APOAMF priority list, they were still included in the master list of residents submitted by the local organization to the local and national government. Despite being nonmembers of the APOAMF, they were still updated on the national and local government's demolition plans, the planned actions of the local organization, and resettlement options during informal gatherings and discussions by neighbors who were local organization members. An APOAMF leader explained to me that they respected the residents' decisions not join the PO because of different personal circumstances. What was important to them was that the residents in Manggahan Floodway had options for resettlement and they were able to assert, negotiate, and push for their preferred resettlement options.

As presented in this chapter, despite facing the same threat of eviction in the Manggahan Floodway informal settlement community, the informal settlers had several different responses to DIDR. This reveals their internal logic in dealing with everyday politics in their daily lives

and in pursuing their housing strategies amid the experience of DIDR. As presented in this chapter, some of them opted for the off-city resettlement site in pursuit of a quiet life, while others joined the community's collective action and worked hard to receive in-city resettlement units. Some residents also chose not to join the PO due to personal circumstances. Many residents also militantly resisted eviction. As illustrated in this chapter, APOAMF was able to respond and respect these various expressions of everyday politics and the internal logic of the urban poor.

CHAPTER 5: LOCATING THE AGENCY AND EVERYDAY POLITICS OF THE URBAN POOR THROUGH RELOCATION TO DIFFERENT RESETTLEMENT SITES

This chapter examines the internal logic of the urban poor in pursuing different housing strategies amid DIDR according to their household conditions and family's well-being. I illustrate the agency and everyday politics of ISFs along the east bank road of the Manggahan Floodway as they pursued different resettlement options: off-city relocation in Calauan, Laguna or Tanay, Rizal; in-city resettlement through the People's Plan; or on-site development, which was later pursued in 2017, a few months before all structures in their community were demolished. This locates ISFs' power through informal, nonorganizational, and hidden yet collective practices, as well as formal practices to assert their housing agenda by partnering with CSOs and negotiating with local and national government agencies. Through the narratives of the ISFs, I present how they strategized, seized opportunities, continuously reworked bonding and bridging social capital, collaborated and negotiated with positioned social actors to assert their housing agenda, and how they made sense of their new social space and established a new community by recreating urban informality in their respective resettlement sites. I also present how familial well-being and bonding as well as bridging social capital influenced and facilitated residents' settlement decisions. This chapter answers the first and second research questions of my study—why did ISFs have different responses to DIDR despite receiving the same threats of eviction, and why did the community members' antagonism over different strategies and varied outcomes in housing not entirely result in social disintegration?

5.1 Dividing and Connecting for Well-being: Overview of the Resettlement Sites

> *Mahalaga sa amin ang makatira sa isang disenteng bahay na hindi nangangamba na baka ma-demolish na naman. Pero mas mahalaga sa amin kung ito ba ay malapit sa pinagkukunan ng kabuhayan, at kung nakakatulong ba ito sa pamumuhay ng pamilya. Katulad halimbawa, kung meron bang malapit na paaralan, health center, at pamilihan. Kung maaari din sana, kasama din namin sa mabubuong komunidad ang mga kakilala na rin namin upang mas madali ang pag-adjust ng paninirahan namin sa isang bagong komunidad.* (It is important for us to live in a decent house without fear of being demolished again. But it is more important for us that it be near our sources of income, if it can help our family's means of living. For example, if it is near the schools, health center, and market. If it is also possible, in the new community that we will build, we will live together with people we already know, as then we could better adjust to the new community site.[Marco])

Marco (pseudonym), a PO leader in his 50s, lived in the informal settler community since 2009. His family has rented in the community for more than ten years. He used to work as a security guard, but he stopped working when he was elected as an APOAMF leader. His wife supported his leadership obligation to the community. Their family relied on his wife's income as a massage therapist and intermittent support from his sisters abroad. He is one of the leaders who led the community's fight for in-city resettlement. Marco shared that a majority of the community members supported the government's initiative for them to be relocated, but the question was "where to?" He insisted that the ideal relocation site for them would be near their sources of income, accessible to basic services and their children's schools, and that they would like to live together with their existing neighbors.

Marco's narrative reflects how well-being and social capital within the locality and from relatives and friends elsewhere were important factors influencing how the ISFs responded to threats of eviction and relocation. Among the characteristics of the resettlement sites that were important considerations for the people were the distance to the resettlement site, monthly amortization, house sizes, proximity to sources of income, and availability of basic services. As presented by earlier literature, in general, relocated families face difficulties in distant off-city relocation as they are uprooted from their sources of income in the city, and the relocation sites are usually far from where jobs are available (Racelis and Guevara 2003; DILG 2011; Roderos 2013; Racelis 2015, 2018; World Bank 2016; Arcilla 2018; Ortega 2018; Alvarez 2019). The residents would say "from the danger zone to death zone," because they were being moved from a place considered a danger zone (i.e., the waterway) to a place where their families would likely starve.

Ideally, residents did not want to move to a place where hardship would await them due to a lack of employment opportunities and basic services. They compared the pros and cons of possible resettlement options and contrasted those living conditions with their life in their existing community, Manggahan Floodway (see Table 4). However, their structural marginalization forced them to respond and strategize according to what was best for their families, be it for the material or nonmaterial well-being, and tap their available social capital to help them pursue housing options. These responses resulted in different resettlement options for the community members. The process and dynamics of their strategies, assertion of their housing options, different reasons for taking relocation options, and the process of building new communities at the resettlement sites all constitute their agency and everyday politics, which are worth exploring.

Table 4. Resettlement Options for ISFs in the East Bank Road of Manggahan Floodway

Particulars	Informal settler community (East Bank Manggahan Floodway)	In-City (Low-Rise Buildings, People's Plan)	Off-city (Tanay, Rizal)	On-Site Development
Size of House	Varies	24 m^2	40 m^2 (house/lot)	Varies
Monthly Amortization (PhP)	0.00/month for house owners; 600.00-2,000.00 for renters	700.00-1,200.00	P200.00	0.00 and possibility of increased lot allocation
No. of Families in Household	1-3	1-2	1-2	1-3
Additional Community Cost-Sharing	No (except for APOAMF members' pool of funds)	Yes (communal water and electricity, and payment for security guard	No	No
Distance from Sources of Income	Near	Near	Far	Near
Fare from Home to Work (PhP)	20.00/day	20.00/day	100.00/day	20.00/day
Availability of Job/Sources of Income Nearby	Yes	Yes	None, or seldom	Yes
Distance from Schools	Near	Near	Near (public elementary and secondary schools available in the resettlement community)	Near
Additional Local Government Unit Support to Elementary and Secondary Students	Yes (e.g., free uniforms, bags, scholarships)	Yes (e.g., free uniforms, bags, scholarships)	None	Yes (e.g., free uniforms, bags, scholarships)
Local Organization/ Partnership with NGOs	Yes (varies on whether active or not)–APOAMF; Community Organizers Multiversity	Yes (floor and building representatives; APOAMF and COM affiliation)	Yes (homeowners' association)	Yes (Balikwas, KADAMAY)

Source: Alliance of People's Organizations along Manggahan Floodway.

5.2 Examining Well-being, Division, and Cohesion in Distant Off-City Resettlement Sites: Calauan, Laguna and Tanay, Rizal

In this section, I illustrate the internal logic of the urban poor who chose distant off-city relocation due to various household conditions. I also present the different strategies households used to either continue living in their new communities once resettled or when they chose to return to the city. Familial well-being was the prime driver of housing strategies.

The residents who took the distant off-city resettlement option were relocated to socialized row-housing sites in Calauan and Tanay. For both housing programs, like any other row housing program, NHA offered each beneficiary a 40-square-meter house and a lot. Each housing unit cost around PhP205,000 (approximately USD4,000) with a monthly amortization of about PhP200 to 300 (approximately USD4–6) for the first five years (Panganiban-Perez 2018). Below is a summary of the graduated amortization fees (see table 5).

Table 5. Graduated Amortization Fees for Row Houses (distant off-city resettlement)

c Period (Years)	Monthly Amortization (PhP)
1-4	200
5-8	590
9-10	890
11-14	990
15-18	1,090
19-20	1,250
21-22	1,295
23-24	1,310
25-30	1,330

Source: National Housing Authority, quoted in Passion, 2017.

5.2.1 Calauan, Laguna Resettlement Site

In this section, I present the practices of the agency and everyday politics of the ISFs who relocated to the Calauan, Laguna resettlement site. Material and nonmaterial well-being were push factors that influenced residents' decisions to relocate immediately after Typhoon *Ondoy* affected their homes in Manggahan Floodway. I also present here the different strategies residents employed and the challenges they faced upon relocation. These included lack of electricity and water; muddy roads; and the lack of livelihood opportunities, which forced some family members to return to the metro Manila area to work. I describe how social capital was rebuilt at the Calauan resettlement site, and how ISFs formed a new locality and organized themselves to tackle the issues of electricity and water connections in the community.

5.2.1.1 Material and Nonmaterial Well-being as Push Factors for Relocation

A few weeks after Typhoon *Ondoy* devastated many parts of the Metro Manila area in September 2009, the national and city governments of Pasig intensified their efforts to evict of ISFs and demolish structures along the berm of Manggahan Floodway. The socialized housing in Calauan was the first resettlement site the government offered residents. At that time, the resettlement site for ISFs was affected by the national government's program to rehabilitate the Pasig River tributaries.[8] Calauan is about 85 kilometers away from the Manggahan Floodway

[8] The resettlement site was comanaged by NHA and the ABS-CBN *Lingkod Kapamilya* Foundation, an NGO that was also working with the government for the Pasig River Rehabilitation Commission. The Manggahan Floodway is one of the Pasig River's tributaries, so this was initially the assigned resettlement site for the ISFs from the waterway (ADB 2016).

informal settler community, nestled between Laguna Bay and the foothills of Mount Banahaw (see fig. 10).

Figure 10. Distance from Manggahan Floodway to Calauan Resettlement Site



Source: Google Maps.

The ISFs had different responses to the eviction notices and offers for relocation to Calauan. Many of the families immediately resisted eviction, arguing that the resettlement site was too far from their sources of income. They shared that they were able to return to their normal day-to-day lives after the flooding. Some insisted that it only took them a few days to get back to normalcy. Others whose homes were partially destroyed during the flooding had relatives and friends nearby with whom they took shelter while repairing their homes. For those whose homes were destroyed by the flood, their immediate response was to accept the relocation offered by the government. This was a win-win situation for them, as they no longer had homes, and they could own a house without the fear of it being demolished at any time:

Kasama sa natangay ng tubig-baha ang bahay namin noon. Wala ng choice, kesa kung saan-saan pa lilipat, at kesa mag-upa ng bahay doon, mahal na, di mo pa pag-aari. (Our home was swept away by the floodwater. We had no choice—rather than moving from place to place, rather than renting a house there, it's expensive and you do not own it.[Leslie])

Leslie (pseudonym) was a woman in her early 40s who was married with three children. Her husband worked as a stay-in driver for a family in a posh village in Pasig City. He would go home to Calauan once or twice a month. Her family was among the first batch of relocated families in the resettlement site in 2009. She shared that the first few months of their relocation were the hardest, since the resettlement site was not yet conducive for living: they had no means to earn in the area, they had to adjust to the arrangement that her husband would not go home every day, and her children had to stay with their relatives in Manggahan Floodway at first to finish the school year. Currently, she prefers their home at the resettlement site, as it is peaceful there.

Despite being able to bounce back after the flood immediately, other families decided to avail themselves of the relocation program. The threat of eviction and the fear that the flooding would recur were common reasons cited by the residents. Some also shared that the uncertainty of their housing situation at the Manggahan Floodway, along with discussions with their family and former neighbors, convinced them to apply for the socialized housing program. As soon as they accepted the socialized housing units, they had to demolish their homes (or what was left of them). The national and local governments provided assistance when the ISFs moved to the relocation site. The city government of Pasig provided them transportation to the relocation

site, with some grocery package. They were also given financial assistance of PhP15,000 (approximately USD300).

5.2.1.2 Strategizing to Survive and Re/Building of Social Capital at the Resettlement Site

The initial phase of the ISFs' stay at the relocation site was challenging, as shared by the residents. The housing units were bare when they moved in. Some used the financial assistance they received for gradual home improvement. The road was not paved at that time, and it was muddy when they moved in during the rainy season. They did not have electricity or water, so they had to find access to water and electrical connections from the nearby homes of established residents. Some were able to tap into electricity connections that were more expensive (at high rates). They were also able to fetch water from a distant deep well or had to line up for rationed water provided by the local government or housing developer.

Aileen (pseudonym) was in her late 40s, and married with two children. Just a week after they resettled, her husband had to go back to Metro Manila to work, so she was left to do house chores. Her husband rented a room in Metro Manila and comes home once or twice a month:

> *Pagdating namin dito, pare-parehas ang mga sitwasyon na kinaharap namin. Kaya wala kang maaasahang tulong mula sa mga kapitbahay mo. Sariling sikap kayo ng pamilya mo.* (When we arrived here, we were all in the same situation. That's why we did not expect help from our neighbors—you and your family had to work.)

Eventually, access to affordable water and electricity connections became a perennial problem for the residents. About six months after their entry, neighbors started to discuss their lack of basic services and formed groups to raise their issues. In Calauan, CSOs actively supported the relocated families. Thanks to these partnerships, a private water service provider provided access to water in the resettlement site (see fig. 11).

Figure 11. Water Source for the Resettlement Community in Calauan, Laguna

Source: author. Calauan, Laguna resettlement site, 2019.

During the initial phase of relocation, relying on neighbors or building bonding social capital within their community was difficult if not impossible for the ISFs. They were all busy starting new lives in their new location, and everyone had personal circumstances to which they needed to attend. What made relocation even more challenging for many was finding work nearby or keeping their jobs in the new community. Many strategized to keep their homes by allowing one or two members of their households to return to the city for work. Those who returned to Metro Manila for work usually visited their homes at least twice a month. Those who had the means to rent a place in the city did not immediately live in their housing units in Calauan, but stayed elsewhere to earn a living and gradually started renovating their housing

units in Calauan. These families would visit occasionally to check on the renovations. Once the units were conducive to living and they had the means to start a small business (e.g., a *sari-sari* store), they were now ready to settle in their new homes (see figs. 12 and 13).

Figure 12. Flea Market in the Calauan Resettlement Community

Source: Author. Calauan, Laguna resettlement site, 2019.

Figure 13. Neighborhood at the Calauan Resettlement Community

Source: Author. Calauan, Laguna resettlement site, 2019.

Some families who were unable to endure the hardships at the resettlement site and could not find the means to earn an income returned to the city, leaving their units. They informally sold their housing rights, rented out their housing units to acquaintances or friends, or just

abandoned their housing units (see fig. 14). They used the fees from selling the units or from rental income to pay for the monthly amortization. These ISFs who left their housing units in Calauan to return to Metro Manila temporarily rented or stayed with friends or relatives in the informal settlement at the Manggahan Floodway, where their old homes had already been demolished. Those who adjusted to the challenges in their new resettlement community chose to stay, earning a living through *sari-sari* stores or as daily wage laborers in nearby communities.

Figure 14. Abandoned Housing Unit at Calauan Resettlement Site

Source: Author. Calauan, Laguna resettlement site, 2019.

The stories of hardship experienced by relocatees convinced the remaining residents in Manggahan Floodway not to relocate to Calauan. Aside from the difficulties earning money for daily survival, stories of substandard housing units also emerged. Some relocated residents shared that their housing units were destroyed when a typhoon hit the resettlement area. This is where the informal settlers' narrative about distant off-city relocation came about. "From the danger zone to the death zone" refers to the informal settler community as the danger zone and

the distant off-city relocation site as a death zone where they were stripped of their daily earning ability to the point that they would have nothing to feed their families. According to them, the place was also literally a death zone, as the housing construction and materials were allegedly substandard. The relocation also resulted in broken families for some, whose spouses could only occasionally return home to their families in Calauan. These stories of hardship also convinced the PO leaders of the informal settlement to allow the returnees to stay in the community. Still, they ensured that they were no longer on the list of residents they monitored regularly.

In terms of education, some relocated families' children were left in the care of their relatives during the initial relocation phase. They resettled in the middle of the school year, which would have disrupted the children's schooling if they moved with their parents. Most students transferred to schools in Calauan the following school year. Some stayed in Pasig City until they finished elementary or high school, as it was easier for the children to be in that city. Eventually, elementary and high school schools were established within the resettlement community (see fig. 15).

Figure 15. Elementary and High School Buildings in Calauan Resettlement Site

Source: Author 2019.

5.2.1.3 Building of New Locality

In fostering relationships and creating a new locality in their resettlement site, residents shared that it helped that the NHA assigned housing units to former neighbors who lived near each other. Although they did not know many of their neighbors, coming from the same *purok* or neighborhood in their former community created a sense of familiarity. One resident shared she was lucky that her family was assigned to a housing unit near her relatives. This made their adjustment to the community easy to manage because they had their support system near them.

As mandated by the NHA for row houses in resettlement sites, the residents formed their HOA and elected their block leaders. Community activities, such as parties and meetings, were organized, allowing them to become better acquainted with each other. However, many did not see their HOA or community organizing as a strength in their new community. The residents shared that even though they had developed a relationship with their new neighbors, their bond was not as strong as the one in their former locality because they were now more focused on their family's individual needs.

The Pasig City government continued their assistance to the resettled families within 5 years of their relocation. They signed a 5-year memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the receiving LGU, the Municipality of Calauan, Laguna, to provide infrastructure and other facilities needed by them in catering to the needs of the newly resettled communities (Ballesteros and Ancheta 2018, 30-33). This somehow addresses the receiving LGUs' concerns on basic and social services as they have smaller internal revenue allotment. Under the MOA, the relocated families would still be considered residents of Pasig and can still avail their benefits for 5 years. The assistance provided in the Calauan resettlement site includes a school building for the elementary and high school, livelihood caravan, free transportation for the beneficiaries during relocation, PhP15,000 (approximately USD300) financial assistance, and annual Christmas gifts. This was also strategic as relocated ISFs still have family members and friends left in the city as potential voters.

As the Calauan resettlement site was comanaged by ABS-CBN Lingkod Kapamilya Foundation, the nonprofit arm of one of the Philippines' biggest media networks in the Philippines, support from external stakeholders has also poured in. The organization was able to invite the private sector and nongovernment groups to invest in the construction of houses and community facilities. They also convinced other organizations to provide basic health care and livelihood opportunities to supplement the Calauan government's limited resources to support the growing population (ADB 2016). Eventually, in 2011, the local government of Calauan, Laguna issued a moratorium for the relocation in their municipality. They cited the lack of resources as the basis for the moratorium. Their annual budget could not cover the additional residents brought to their area.

Despite their perennial problem with electricity connection and lack of income opportunities in the area, which continued the arrangement of some family members returning to the city to work, the residents I *kwentuhan* (chatted) with shared that they are now happy with their life in the Calauan, Laguna resettlement. The common answers were related to nonmaterial well-being, which was mostly about comfort and peace of mind:

- *"Mas okay dito, may peace of mind"* (It is better here; there is a peace of mind).
- *"Nasanay na rin na malayo, andito na lahat"* (We are now used to being far; we have everything here, facilities-wise).
- *"Magaganda na ang bahay dito, maluwag"* (The houses here are beautiful and spacious).
- *"Komportable dito kahit malayo"* (It is comfortable here, even it is far).
- "*Maganda ang buhay namin dito, walang polusyon dahil probinsya*" (Life is good here; there is no pollution here in the province).

5.2.2 Tanay, Rizal Resettlement Site

This section presents the practices of the agency and everyday politics of the informal settler families who availed themselves of the relocation in the Tanay, Rizal resettlement site. This presents the material and nonmaterial well-being as push factors that influenced their decisions to relocate to this resettlement site. The community organization along the Manggahan Floodway considers this resettlement a product of their negotiations with the NHA and the city government of Pasig to provide them an option for near-city, off-city relocation sites. This also presents the various strategies employed by the residents and the challenges they faced upon relocation. Like the Calauan, Laguna resettlement site, the relocated families

confronted the lack of electricity and water and the lack of livelihood opportunities, which forced some family members to return to Metro Manila to work. This also presents how the bonding social capital is rebuilt in the resettlement site. The section also presents how they formed a new locality and organized themselves to tackle their issues on the electricity and water connections in the community.

5.2.2.1 Material and Nonmaterial Well-Being and Negotiated Resettlement Site as Push Factors for Relocation

While the relocation in Calauan, Laguna was availed by many ISFs because of the immediate need to relocate, the relocation in Tanay, Rizal was considered by the remaining ISFs as a better option than the former, as they have their "voice" in the selection of this distant relocation site. With the report of relocated families having difficulties in the resettlement site in Calauan, Laguna, the community organization of Manggahan Floodway negotiated with the national government for a relocation site that is closer to the city. As a result, later in 2010, the national government offered another resettlement area in Tanay, Rizal, about 35 kilometers away from Manggahan Floodway (see fig. 16). The community organization along the Manggahan Floodway community considered this resettlement site a victory in negotiating with the city and national government for a better resettlement site.

As they were more organized in the mid-2010s, the PO leaders were able to seek audience with the government authority. They conducted site visits to the Calauan resettlement site. Based on their observation of the housing conditions and feedback from many relocated families, they rejected this site for future relocation of the residents from their community

during their presentations to the Pasig City government and congress in 2010. They also started working on their People's Plan. Their proposal for the hierarchy of housing options included on-site, in-city, and near-city. The city government and NHA presented the Tanay resettlement site as the near-city site. The PO leaders and members who conducted a site visit to the Tanay resettlement site agreed that it is nearer to Pasig City than the Calauan resettlement.

Figure 16. Distance of Manggahan Floodway to Tanay, Rizal Resettlement Site



Source: Google Maps.

Just like in the Calauan, Laguna resettlement, the Pasig City government signed a 5-year MOA with the receiving Tanay government for the provision of basic services, such as health centers, an ambulance, garbage collection, and initial deliveries of potable water during the first 5 months of relocation (Ballesteros and Ancheta 2018, 30-33). They also allocated funds for the construction of school buildings for grade school and high school students in the

community, donation of furniture and school supplies, salaries of twenty-six teachers and other personnel, allowance of security personnel, concreting of 320-kilometer access roads, and construction of a security outpost (ibid.;see fig. 17). They also provided the relocated families free transportation during relocation, PhP10,000 livelihood assistance, medical and dental missions, and annual Christmas gifts (ibid., 32). These provisions in the MOA encouraged some ISFs to relocate to the Tanay resettlement site.

Figure 17. Donated School Building in the Tanay Resettlement Site by the City Government of Pasig and Municipality of Tanay Rizal

Source: Author. Tanay, Rizal resettlement site, 2019.

For the first wave of residents who chose the Tanay resettlement site in 2010, their reasons were the same as those who immediately opted for relocation in the Calauan resettlement site. These reasons were both the material and nonmaterial values of well-being. More residents who initially fought for their homes followed suit because their families no longer wanted to deal with the emotional stress caused by continuous threats of demolition and eviction. While they felt their community's fight for their onsite development was on track, their family no longer wanted to be bothered by the stress of dealing with the fear of losing their homes.

> *Hindi kami makatulog noon dahil sa takot na baka i-demolish na ang mga bahay namin anumang oras. Marami sa mga nagpa-relocate ayaw sana umalis pero nandoon kasi ang pangamba para sa pamilya nila.* (We could not sleep for fear that our houses would be demolished anytime soon. Many of those who availed themselves of the relocation did not want to leave, but they thought of their family's well-being. [Ronan])

Ronan (pseudonym), mid-40s, is married with four children and an APOAMF leader. He narrated that they received constant threats of eviction from the local government, wherein they received flyers every day about the eviction notices and a big tarpaulin was displayed in the community about the notice of eviction. While there were negotiations with the national and local government to stop the evictions, the uncertainty of their situation took a toll on some residents' peace of mind, even among families who actively resisted distant relocation.

After weighing the benefits of relocating to Tanay, some families availed themselves of this resettlement option because of the opportunity to own a house and lot with low monthly amortization. Others, such as the elderly, opted for this relocation due to health reasons. They claimed that relocation was preferable because of its placement away from pollution. Many of these families have relatives working elsewhere who provided remittances to them.

> *Ang hangin dito presko, mas maaliwalas dito, crowded doon. Mas gusto ko dito, may lupa ka, pag nabayaran mo, sayo na. Malaki ang gastos doon. Pero may negosyo talaga doon.* (The air here is fresh. It is cozier here; it is crowded there. I like it here better; you own land after you have paid for it, and it is already yours. It costs a lot there. But there is really a business there. [Mario])

Mario (pseudonym), male, early 30s, is a single parent to two children. He availed himself of the relocation in 2013. His house in Manggahan Floodway was destroyed during the flooding in 2009, and after that he and his children stayed with relatives and then rented an apartment in Pasig. He dreamed of owning a house.

For the succeeding relocation to the community, concerns were for their families' material and nonmaterial well-being. The uncertainty of their situation in the resettlement site and the constant threats of evictions were still the main reasons for some. Other residents, upon knowing the high monthly amortization and other costs in the in-city resettlement, including the additional community cost-sharing, have decided to change their housing option. For some, even if they were members of the organization who pushed for the housing agenda under the People's Plan, they had to change their decisions because of these factors.

5.2.2.2 Strategizing to Survive and Re/Building of Social Capital in Resettlement Site

Many relocated families figured out strategies to survive and eventually adapt to their new community. While they had different household stories of survival, what emerged as common themes in the residents' experiences were the difficulties they encountered upon settling into their new community, the adjustments they made to sustain their residence, how they fostered new relationships, and how they created a new locality in the resettlement sites. Their perennial problem was also water and electricity connection. At the initial phase of relocation, they relied on rationed water, sponsored by the city government of Pasig, every morning and afternoon. They had to queue to the water truck in an assigned area. The residents

shared that it was difficult for households with only women or the elderly. Sometimes their male neighbors would offer to help them carry their gallons of water. When they already have a water connection, the water will often flow at midnight.

The living conditions and income concerns are more favorable in Tanay, Rizal. Some residents have managed to continue working in the city and return home to Tanay after work. The availability of direct access to public transportation, such as jeepneys, from Tanay to the business centers in Metro Manila, made this arrangement possible. Other residents chose to work in the community by setting up their businesses (e.g., sari-sari stores, ambulant vending, bakeshops, and tailoring shops) and daily wage labor work (e.g., carpentry, construction work, storekeepers) within the community and nearby communities in the town. Others relied on remittances from their relatives who work abroad or family members working elsewhere in the country (see fig. 18).

Figure 18. Some sources of income in Tanay, Rizal resettlement (Picture 1: street side flea market; Picture 2: beauty salon inside a resident's house)



Source: Author. Tanay, Rizal resettlement site, 2019.

Despite the shorter distance from the original settlement, some family members who work in the city did not go home daily. Unlike in the Calauan resettlement, where their family

members would only go home at least once a month, family members in Tanay, Rizal would go home at least during the weekends. They would stay in a relative or friend's home back in the informal settler community. This saves money and time from the daily commute, as it would take them 3-4 hours of travel from Tanay to Pasig. Some families also have children who continued their studies in Pasig schools. They either stayed in relatives' homes, or the family rented an apartment near the school, and they went home to Tanay on weekends.

Like the Calauan resettlement site residents, many in Tanay maintained contact with the remaining residents of the informal settler community in Manggahan Floodway to either stay updated with their situation or network for available work opportunities. They usually connected through social media or visited their old community whenever in the area. Sometimes they would invite their former neighbors to their new homes for a party or just for random gatherings.

5.2.2.3 Building of New Locality

Like the resettlement in Calauan Laguna, residents have perennial problems with access to affordable water and electricity connections. Their homeowners' association is continually working to address these. Upon their relocation, they had to line up for rationed water provided by the local government unit or developer. About 6 months since their entry, neighbors started to discuss their lack of basic services and formed groups to raise their issues. The residents shared that the local government unit rejected their application for metered water because they were not yet residents of the municipality based on the MOA with the city of Pasig. The developer of the resettlement site provides water at a more expensive rate than the government's

water service provider does, as mentioned by the residents. For electricity, the residents shared that they had difficulty obtaining their certificate of lot allocation from the NHA, which is a requirement for their application for electricity. They had to connect illegally somewhere else, which is also more expensive than if they had their own meter. They shared that it took at least 3 years for some families to receive access to metered electricity, whereas others still had to wait for their metered electricity during my visit in 2019.

While their HOA coordinated efforts for these concerns, they are not as organized as their previous community's organizations. The HOA leaders shared that it was difficult to organize the residents because the HOA's formation was based on the mandate by the NHA and not the relationship and common agenda for their community.

Despite the difficulties they encountered with their early settlement and the perennial problem with water and electricity connections, the families who stayed in the community shared that they were happy with their new home. Among the factors that they enjoy in the community are the quality of the environment, such as fresh air and bigger space, the opportunity to own land after completing the payment of their amortizations, and the more frequent times that their household members working in the city get to go home. Their HOA also conducts social events, such as Christmas parties, and they can attend them for assistance. In addition, neighbors help each other, which some residents appreciated in their new community.

5.3 In-City Resettlement Site through the People's Plan in Pasig City

This section presents the practices of the agency and everyday politics of the informal settler families who availed themselves of the in-city relocation in Pasig City through the People's Plan. This also presents the material and nonmaterial well-being as factors that influenced the residents' decisions to organize, partner with a CSO, and fight for this relocation site. This presents how the residents explicitly and tacitly negotiated the community regulations that aimed to transform them into "good and responsible citizens" and produce new urban informality. This presents their continued negotiations with the housing authority and the local and national government with the issues they confronted in the relocated site, as well as among the residents and their elected building leaders as they adjusted to the new life with rules and regulations, which is something new to them. Lastly, this introduces their strategies to start a new life in their new community.

5.3.1 Material and Nonmaterial Well-Being, and Collective Assertion as Push Factors for Resettlement

The in-city resettlement through the People's Plan is a product of the ISFs' agentive capacity to assert, resist, contest, and negotiate with the authority and institutions, both informally and formally, to influence positive outcomes for their housing agenda in-city. It incorporated their voices from planning their building designs, proposing the list of beneficiaries to NHA, and facilitating the estate management of their new community. Thus, this created a sense of accountability to the community organization that the community will be managed well.

While the success of this housing agenda highlighted the actions undertaken by the ISFs as an organized group and through the assistance of their partner NGOs and CSOs, also worth highlighting was their internal logic, which was the key success factor in their pursuit for in-city resettlement. It is the APOAMF leaders' ability to respond to and respect the various expressions of the everyday politics of their community's residents. An example is how they negotiated their responsibility to uphold the civic morality that the remaining residents who did not avail themselves of distant off-city resettlement were the only ones considered as legitimate residents of the informal settler community. They were expected by the national and local governments to safeguard the community and ensure that the families who were already relocated in distant off-city relocation sites will no longer return as residents of the informal settler community. However, upon hearing the stories of some relocated families who experienced hardship in the resettlement sites, the APOAMF leaders eventually allowed the return of these families to the Manggahan Floodway. To ensure that they will not violate the government requirements on residence in the community, the returning residents were not allowed to construct new houses or enlist themselves in the list of residents who could avail themselves of other resettlement options. They were just allowed to stay with relatives or rent a place in the area. Through this housing arrangement with the returning residents, they were able to comply with the expectations from them to safeguard their community and at the same time accommodate the needs for housing of their former neighbors.

By examining the experiences of the ISFs of the Manggahan Floodway to fight for their right to the city through the in-city resettlement agenda, one could see the uncertainties and fears they experienced due to threats and actual instances of demolitions, prompting them to resist notices of demolition and eviction while continuing with their daily lives. They had apprehensions to relocate and resist relocation to distant resettlement sites because they

believed that this would mean losing their sources of income, losing their access to basic services, and disrupting their children's education. In the APOAMF leaders' visit to the two off-city resettlement communities, among the concerns they heard from the residents in the two communities included a lack of basic services, especially water and electricity, no livelihood and permanent job opportunities in the area, substandard houses, higher transportation costs, and longer travel time to and from their workplaces in the city (see Table 6).

Table 6. Comparison of Fare for the Daily Commute between Distant Relocation Site (Tanay, Rizal) vs. In-city Resettlement

	Distant Resettlement site: Work in the city; family with 3 students	**In-city resettlement site: Work in the city; family with 3 students**
Worker (works 6 days a week)	**(Tanay/Pasig/Tanay)** PhP130.00/day X 6 days X 4 weeks = **PhP3,120.00/Month**	**(Pasig)** PhP76.00/day X 6 days X 4 weeks = **PhP1,824.00/Month**
3 students	**(Resettlement site/school in Tanay/Resettlement site)** PhP40.00/day X 5 days X 4 weeks X 3 students = **PhP2,400.00**	**(Pasig)** PhP14.00/day X 5 days X 4 weeks X 3 students = **PhP840.00**
TOTAL COST	**PhP5,520.00**	**PhP2,664.00**

Source: Alliance of People's Organizations along the Manggahan Floodway.

After hearing about the difficulties experienced by relocated families in the distant off-city resettlement sites, the remaining residents were convinced to fight for their housing rights in the city. As repeatedly mentioned by the ISFs, they only had two options: "danger zone or death zone," referring to the hardship in the resettlement sites that would strip them of their livelihood opportunities. They continued to stay in the Manggahan Floodway informal settlement community, holding on to the possibility of fighting for their homes or at least

obtaining a resettlement site near their homes within the city. However, their lack of knowledge of rights and participation in political decision-making processes prevented them from publicly raising their concerns and housing agenda.

The APOAMF was formed in 2010 with the agenda to stop the demolition of homes and fight for onsite development in the Manggahan Floodway informal settler community. While the residents already started to form an organization in early 2000 to contend previous policies and executive orders that discriminated their rights to the city, they were not organized enough to bring their issues to the national government, and the leaders had not undergone capacity-building trainings to raise a collective voice on their housing issues.

The decisions and actions undertaken by the PO leaders on whom to tap for vertical association or their bridging social capital were crucial to the fate of their housing advocacy. The leaders at that time gained support from various CSOs and NGOs that could help them push their housing agenda for onsite relocation. Initially, there were two external support groups in the area: (1) the Gabriela Women's Partylist and their partner groups, who mostly utilized demonstrations and protests and initially supported the community in the "as is where is" housing agenda, where they advocated for no socialized housing development in the area; and (2) the CO-Multiversity, and partner groups, who advocated for either onsite or in-city development and utilized constructive engagement through capacity building for the PO to engage with various stakeholders.

According to an APOAMF leader, at that time they were asked by the CSOs and NGOs in the area on whom they wanted to collaborate with to promote their advocacy for their housing

rights in the city. They chose CO-Multiversity. According to the APOAMF's elected president, who had led their PO since 2010, until their homes along the east bank road were demolished in 2017, they chose CO-Multiversity because of the below statement:

> *Nakita namin ang pamamaraan ng dalawang organisasyon at napagdesisyunan namin sa komunidad na sa CO-Multiversity na lang makipag alyansa. Sa tingin namin mas epektibo ang pamamaraan nila para maparating ang mga isyu namin sa gobyerno. Me isinagawang leadership trainings sa amin na mga lider para mas lubos naming makilala ang aming mga sarili at sa pamumuno ng aming komunidad.* (We saw the approaches of the two organizations, and we in the community decided to form an alliance with CO-Multiversity. We think that their approach is more effective in bringing our issue to the government. They conducted leadership trainings with the leaders for us to know ourselves better as well as the way we should lead our community.)

CO-Multiversity is an alternative learning center for community organizers, PO leaders, and NGO workers (www.devex.com). It promotes community organizing as a tool for development and empowerment. Among its programs are capability building and the enhancement of community organizers and the PO, as well as enhancing PO and NGO capability in engaging the government, business sector, and international agencies for sustainable policy and program development. Among the known members of the CSO is Dinky Soliman, who was known in the country's civil society sector and who served as the CSO's executive director and later the executive vice president until 2001 (Mislang 2021). She also

served as a cabinet secretary during the whole term of the former President Aquino III administration, heading the Department of Social Work and Development.

Through their capacity-building trainings, CO-Multiversity supported the Manggahan Floodway to help residents reorganize and work to legalize their community's PO. They formed the APOAMF to unify and strengthen their advocacy. The PO is composed of eleven local organization members from three barangays along the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City with around 2,900 ISF members (Bonagua 2015; Maningo 2015). They entered the registry of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010 as a nonprofit or nonstock organization (Bonagua 2015) to legitimize their organization. This gave them more confidence to push their advocacy to various stakeholders. The elected APOAMF leaders were both house owners and renters. However, those who were elected for the highest positions in the APOAMF were not affluent in the community and were even renters. At the height of their struggle to keep their homes, the residents valued the leadership capacity and commitment of the APOAMF leaders regardless of their financial stature or house ownership.

The APOAMF aimed to help ensure that the residents in their informal settler community along the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City would have decent and secure homes and secure sources of income. They engaged with the local and national governments to address issues ranging from the practical needs of the communities (e.g., provision of trash bins and repair of street lights) to long-term strategic objectives (e.g., requesting various government agencies, including the barangay and city governments for meetings or information on plans and their timeframes). The APOAMF members likewise actively participated in and monitored welfare programs in their areas, such as the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps).

In terms of pushing for their housing strategies, the APOAMF leaders mainly undertook a constructive engagement approach with both local and national governments. Through their capacity-building trainings and assistance from CO-Multiversity, they studied their housing rights under the provisions of the UDHA and coordinated with the local and national governments to resist evictions. They submitted their position papers against the demolitions of their homes to the city government of Pasig and national government agencies. They also appeared before the housing committee in Congress for contending the constitutionality of the executive order in 2009 that declared the Manggahan Floodway as a danger zone. Through their knowledge of the UDHA, they were able to stop several demolitions, citing that they violated several provisions of the law, such as not holding the proper consultations before demolition. Through these efforts by the APOAMF to stop the demolitions, the PO leaders shared that the number of residents who availed themselves of off-city resettlement decreased. These efforts somehow gave the residents the assurance that they would not lose their homes in the Manggahan Floodway any time.

5.3.2 Selecting PO Leaders, Negotiating Civic Morality, and Creating Partnerships with CSOs as Weapons to Push for In-City Resettlement

According to the residents, regardless of their house ownership or economic background, they chose their leaders according to how they knew them for their competence and dedication to carry out their housing advocacy. During a focus group discussion I had with the APOAMF leaders in 2013, they shared that regardless of whether they are renters or house owners, they were all of equal footing in pushing for a common agenda to fight for their right to stay in their

community or nearby area. This is in contrast with the observation by Berner (1997) in his study that, usually, the renters and poorer segment of the community have less voice in fighting for the housing agenda of the community. CO-Multiversity supported them in undertaking capacity-building training so they can take a constructive engagement approach to assert their right to their preferred onsite development. They also tapped the support of other urban poor federations to strengthen their advocacy.

The APOAMF joined an urban poor federation that signed an informal contract with former President Benigno Aquino III, then-candidate for the 2010 presidential election, to enter into a promise with the urban poor once he won the election. Highlighted in this was the in-city relocation and relocation to affordable and disaster-resilient sites. It gave the people hope that they would be successful in their advocacy for their housing rights. When former President Aquino III won the 2010 election, his administration fulfilled its promise to the urban poor. A community-initiated shelter option for in-city resettlement, or the People's Plan, was introduced and integrated into its flood management program. Through the APOAMF, the community of the Manggahan Floodway responded to the call for a housing proposal through the People's Plan. They conducted a series of community activities, including an engagement with other CSOs, international development organizations, and government agencies, together with other public discussions, to promote their in-city resettlement agenda. With the assistance of CO-Multiversity, they conducted community workshops to identify and plan for their desired resettlement option. They also called for a congress inquiry to revoke the pronouncement that scrapped an earlier declaration that portions of the Manggahan Floodway are fit for socialized housing. They also tapped the support of a group of architects to help their housing perspective

for onsite development. Leaders conducted regular community consultations regarding their housing plan.

While advocating for their People's Plan, they were also facing constant threats of demolitions and evictions from Pasig City's local government unit. Aside from the flood management program, the government was keen to clear the Manggahan Floodway in compliance with the Supreme Court's mandamus to rehabilitate Manila Bay and the surrounding waterways. While negotiating with the national and city governments to stop the demolitions, they were also engaging with the government for their People's Plan for onsite development. While they successfully negotiated with the national and city governments to postpone the demolitions, their advocacy for onsite development was unlikely to be approved. Both the national and city governments were firm with clearing the houses and rehabilitating the Manggahan Floodway.

The APOAMF restrategized its agenda for in-city resettlement. Instead of pushing for onsite development, APOAMF focused on acquiring two hectares of land located near their community for their resettlement site, which is just across their community. This was proclaimed as land for socialized housing. The Metro Manila Development Authority used this land as their depot. After researching and confirming that the land was indeed proclaimed for socialized housing, they pushed to get it as the site for their in-city resettlement.

They undertook several stakeholders' consultations and engagements with government agencies and congress until the People's Plan for their resettlement in this site was approved. Based on their proposal, the government should allot about PhP400 million (approximately

USD8 million) to construct 15 five-story low-rise buildings (LRBs) and to accommodate 900 ISFs (see fig. 19). The NHA was tasked with managing this resettlement project.

Figure 19. Location Map of the In-city Resettlement

Source: Rivera, Mylene. 2016. *Manggahan Floodway: In-City resettlement for informal settler families*. Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council.

In 2015, two LRBs were completed, and the first batch of 120 families was moved to the resettlement site (see fig. 20). Their PO leaders identified these ISFs as those coming from the *laylayan* (edge) or those most vulnerable to flooding among the residents. Several government officials, including former President Aquino III, visited the site during the inauguration of the LRBs the same year. For the APOAMF, this marked the government's recognition of its success in pursuing its People's Plan.

Figure 20. The first two completed LRBs in the in-city resettlement that housed 120 ISFs from the "Top of the Water"

Source: Author. Manggahan in-city resettlement site, 2019.

5.3.3 Strategizing to Survive and Continuing Negotiations with the Government in Resettlement Site

To ensure that the residents would have the means to pay for their monthly amortization, the APOAMF negotiated with the NHA so that the floors' assignment was based on their capacity to pay (Table 7). When the floor was higher, the housing price of the housing unit was lower. People with disabilities and the elderly were assigned to lower floors.

Table 7. Payment Scheme for the Socialized Housing at the In-city Resettlement

Floors	**M**onthly Payment (PhP)	**Total Unit Price (PhP)**
1st floor	1,000	500,000
2nd floor	900	475,000
3rd floor	800	450,000
4th floor	700	425,000
5th floor	600	400,000

Source: Alliance of People's Organizations Along Manggahan Floodway.

While this seems like a victory for the community, the PO leaders shared that their negotiations with the government did not end there. Throughout the process, they had to assert their inputs in the planning and design of their buildings firmly. They monitored the construction because of delays in the construction and completion of the buildings. They also monitored the list of beneficiaries of the in-city resettlement, ensuring that only the community members from the Manggahan Floodway community were on the list. At the same time, they continuously dealt with the notices of demolition and eviction from the city government until the eviction of all residents in the informal settler community along the east bank road in October 2017.

5.4 Renewing the Agenda for Onsite Development through Balikwas–Kadamay

This section presents the residents' division when some PO leaders and community members renewed their agenda for onsite development. Furthermore, this section illustrates these residents' internal logic to pursue this housing strategy despite going against APOAMF's housing agenda for in-city resettlement. This presented their household conditions, collective responses, and partnership with a radical urban poor organization that facilitated their actions to fight for onsite development. The residents' hope to own the land in their community was the push factor for this housing agenda. Thus, although those who led this housing strategy were house owners with assets to defend, some residents who were renters and those who already had allocated housing units in distant relocation sites were encouraged to join this cause because it gave them hope of retaining their homes in the Manggahan Floodway. Lastly, this section presents the way in which the residents gradually mended broken trust after the housing

agenda for onsite development failed, despite the division and antagonism toward each other because of this housing strategy.

5.4.1 Fighting to Own the Land and Collective Assertion as Push Factors for Pursuing the Housing Agenda

In 2017, the once unspoken issues about the discontinued pursuit of onsite development as a housing strategy was raised and pursued bydisgruntled house owners who wanted to protect their assets in the community. Some of those residents who pursued this housing strategy were APOAMF leaders and members who were displeased when the overall leadership of APOAMF and CO-Multiversity stopped pursuing their advocacy for onsite development and chose near site in-city resettlement instead. According to them, *pinatay nila ang original na laban ng APOAMF* (they killed the original housing agenda of APOAMF). Although the onsite development was a difficult fight, the disgruntled house owners claimed there was an agreement for the PO to pursue onsite development and in-city resettlement; however, they only acted upon the latter. They claimed that the inaction on their onsite development agenda resulted from a lack of concern for the number of properties that would be lost through the demolitions. They stressed that, because most of the APOAMF leaders were renters who had no properties in the area, they did not have the drive to pursue the concerns of affected house owners. Although there were also APOAMF leaders who were house owners and had properties in the community, they chose to support and apply for the in-city resettlement because this was the surest way of keeping a place near the original community.

During my 2018 interview with a PO leader advocating for the renewed onsite development agenda, he stressed that they would have had a chance to succeed if APOAMF

had supported the agenda for onsite development. He said APOAMF was right to pursue near-site development, but it should not have dropped its fight for onsite development. He stressed that there were areas in the Manggahan Floodway community that were suitable for socialized housing, which could have been used to justify pursuing their housing advocacy for onsite development.

5.4.2 Creating Partnership with CSOs as Weapon to Push for Onsite Development

Although they were unable to get the support of APOAMF and CO-Multiversity, the house owners, including some APOAMF leaders, who wanted to pursue onsite development decided to reorganize in 2017. They revived their community organization's old name, BALIKWAS (which literally means "on the opposite side"), in early 2000 to stress that onsite development is their community's original advocacy. The house owners encouraged some residents (house owners and renters) interested in onsite development to join them. They also convinced other less-interested community members to join them, assuring these members of their land rights in the Manggahan Floodway once they won their housing advocacy.

They built new alliances with organizations that helped the urban poor to push for their housing agenda using political activism. They collaborated with Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), an alliance of urban poor organizations that advocates for urban poor rights, including urban housing rights for ISFs. KADAMAY envisions a "society free from all forms of oppression … [and] aims to primarily arouse, organize, mobilize urban poor … to fight for their basic human rights," and it is a member of the left-leaning national alliance Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Arcilla 2020). In 2017, this group was known for occupying

about 6,000 “idle” social housing units for homeless urban poor families in an off-city resettlement site in Pandi, Bulacan, Philippines, about 40 km from Metro Manila (Pasion 2017). Because of the takeover, the government was forced to grant the housing units to the KADAMAY members who occupied them. This alliance with KADAMAY was strategic because the political environment during this period accommodated the housing interests for the homeless urban poor as advocated by the group. BALIKWAS leaders were hoping that their partnership with KADAMAY could strengthen their chance to win their onsite development agenda. They called this new group BALIKWAS–KADAMAY.

Under BALIKWAS–KADAMAY, the house owners pursued their onsite housing agenda through political activism. They primarily conducted street protests and media briefings. They also received support from legislators representing progressive groups, such as Gabriela Women’s Partylist, Kabataan Partylist, Bayan Muna, and Anak Pawis. However, because the local and national governments were firm in clearing the Manggahan Floodway area, the new group struggled to push their housing advocacy (see figs. 21 and 22).

Figure 21. A signage placed in front of the home of a BALIKWAS–KADAMAY resident opposing the demolition of homes in the Manggahan Floodway.



(Text translation: Demolition, Oppose Demolition, Fight, Do Not Allow by BALIKWAS–KADAMAY)
Source: Author. Informal settler community along East Bank Road of the Manggahan Floodway, 2017.

Figure 22. A signage urging the government to award the land in Manggahan Floodway to the residents, as what the BALIKWAS–KADAMAY is advocating.

(Text translation: Distribute land in Floodway)

Source: Author. Informal settler community along East Bank Road of the Manggahan Floodway, 2017.

In August 2017, members of BALIKWAS–KADAMAY staged demonstrations along the informal settler community. This resulted in violent dispersal and the arrest of approximately 40 people, including the elderly and youth. They were charged for illegal assembly, direct assault, and disobedience (Nishimori 2017). NGO legal counsel assisted the arrested members. During the street demonstrations, the APOAMF leaders and members stayed away from the demonstrators so that they were not involved in the trouble or mistakenly identified as supporting the activity. They also closed the gate in the in-city resettlement, and they guarded it to ensure that the demonstrators could not enter the resettlement site. They also issued an announcement that they had nothing to do with the demonstration and condemned the violence that took place (see fig. 23).

Figure 23. A signage setup by APOAMF in the Manggahan Floodway informal settler community to inform everyone that they, along with their partner NGO, had nothing to do with the demonstration in August 2017.



(Text translation: For everyone's information. We are sorry for the incident that happened last Thursday, August 31, 2017, here along the East Bank Road of Floodway Pasig. We would like to inform you that the APOAMF Pasig organization does not belong to and condemns the violence that took place. APOAMF–ULAP Pasig believes in the law and in the principle of an active participation in decisions in finding a comprehensive solution in a peaceful and nonviolent manner for the realization of our urban housing advocacy [People's Plan/in-city housing). In fact, we have already won our LRB housing at the MMDA depot in collaboration with the local and national government).

Source: Author. Informal settler community along East Bank Road of the Manggahan Floodway, 2017.

5.4.3 Mending Broken Trust among Community Members

BALIKWAS–KADAMAY was unsuccessful in pursuing its housing agenda for onsite development, as all the houses and other structures along the Manggahan Floodway on the East Bank Road were demolished in October 2017. Due to this failure, some leaders and members, who already had their housing options in distant off-city resettlement or elsewhere prior to joining the advocacy, remained with these options. Others who had no housing options applied for the socialized housing in Tanay, Rizal, and at the in-city resettlement LRB. According to the NHA, they processed the community members' application, regardless of the members' organizational affiliations as long as they are qualified for socialized housing. On the part of the APOAMF, they first opposed BALIKWAS members applying for housing units in the in-city resettlement, fearing that they would bring their BALIKWAS ideology to their new community. The APOAMF leaders also opposed the applications because of the trust issues with their former neighbors after the conflict at the height of BALIKWAS's activities. Eventually, after several months and years, the emotions gradually dwindled, and some former BALIKWAS members reached out to the APOAMF leaders for help with their former neighbors and relatives. They sought their assistance to apply for housing units in the in-city resettlement. Upon learning of their household conditions, where they rented apartments with high monthly rates and some eventually were evicted because they could no longer afford to pay for their rentals, the APOAMF leaders said that they no longer opposed their applications. They eventually assisted these BALIKWAS members. However, the APOAMF leaders reminded the BALIKWAS members that, once they got into the LRB, they would have to abide by the rules and regulations imposed in the community.

The source of the APOAMF leaders' initial feelings of antagonism toward the APOAMF members who pursued the BALIKWAS housing strategies were drawn deeply from the core of their housing advocacy, which was trust. According to the APOAMF leaders, those who changed their housing agenda broke their trust. It would take time to regain that broken trust. Nevertheless, the leaders are hopeful that everything will be fine in the end. The APOAMF leaders and members who affiliated with BALIKWAS still consider themselves members of APOAMF. They simply tried to pursue APOAMF's original advocacy for onsite development.

The APOAMF leaders' conflict with BALIKWAS–KADAMAY was apparent to BALIKWAS leaders who had no affiliation with APOAMF. There were confrontations that happened between the organizations, with some of the BALIKWAS leaders displaying antagonistic behavior toward the APOAMF leaders. The latter explained that the behavior displayed toward them and their disagreements regarding the housing agenda probably were due to the former's lack of knowledge about APOAMF and what they had done for the community.

5.5 Family's Well-being and Relocation

The relocated ISFs from the Manggahan Floodway informal settler communities had different reasons for choosing their relocation sites. Whatever reasons they had, all indicated the family's well-being as the main consideration for the ISFs to determine their resettlement options. Well-being encompasses their economic, social, physical, emotional, and mental conditions, including the family's condition immediately after the flooding caused by Typhoon

Ondoy; their long-term goals for their family; their sources of income, such as the available financial support; and the emotional and mental impacts of eviction notices on their family.

As presented in the discussion factors for the immediate relocation to off-city resettlement sites, constant governmental pressure, flood damage to their homes, the lack of resources for many of them to rebuild their homes, and the uncertainty of where they live were major considerations for them to avail themselves of the relocation immediately. Furthermore, peace of mind was equally as important as well-being for most ISFs. Beyond an immediate need, this is an important consideration for their long-term plans of staying at the resettlement sites after establishing lives in their new community.

The relocated urban poor's experiences of building social capital in both resettlement sites resonates with Quetulio-Navarra's study (2014, 3; Quetulio-Navarra et al. 2012) about how the building of a social network or social capital in an involuntary resettlement site is essential for survival and sustenance. Quetulio-Navarra presents that social capital is connected to economic well-being, such as finding employment, emotional support (i.e., a sense of belonging and peace of mind), and physical well-being (i.e., asking for support when someone in their family is sick). She stresses that, although ISFs form social ties in the involuntary resettlement, they still primarily rely on their old support systems because of the conviction that they are all poor in the new community (Quetulio-Navarra 2014, 136). The study adds that the gradual building of new relationships with new neighbors is apparent after settling in their new homes. At the start of their stays in the resettlement, ISFs relied on their individual household

means to earn a living and support from family members and friends in their old community with accommodations as some continued to go back and forth to the city.

Learning from the hardship that the relocated residents experienced in the distant off-city resettlement, the advocacy for the in-city resettlement was put in place by the majority of the remaining residents. These residents were able to push for their preferred housing strategy. They negotiated with the local and national governments through the assistance of their partner organization, whose task was to guide them on the possible options and provide them capacity-building training to build their confidence with negotiations.

After the building construction was undertaken and the resident applications to the housing units were in place, the difficulties the ISFs encountered with the constant pressure from the local government for their evictions and house demolitions prompted some to withdraw their applications and pursue the off-city relocation in Tanay instead. Delays in constructing their buildings prolonged the ISFs' difficulties, especially with the ongoing eviction and demolition notices. The higher monthly amortization cost also discouraged some residents from pursuing their applications for the in-city resettlement.

The APOAMF leaders ensured that only qualified residents from the Manggahan Floodway would apply and be awarded the housing units in the in-city resettlement. They were also in charge of ensuring their community members' welfare by negotiating and stopping the eviction and demolition notices, making sure that the members could afford the housing units, and addressing other community issues. The APOAMF leaders also dealt with their own personal problems at home, especially as many of them were renters with lower incomes.

Some house owners pursued the housing agenda for onsite development with the hope of keeping their places in the city, with no additional cost from paying monthly amortization. The hope of owning the land on which they reside also gave hope to other residents who joined this housing agenda. However, the government's keenness to clear the Manggahan Floodway for rehabilitation did not pave the way for the housing agenda.

CHAPTER 6. NEGOTIATING CIVIC MORALITY AND PRODUCING NEW URBAN INFORMALITY IN THE IN-CITY RESETTLEMENT

This chapter illustrates how the relocated ISFs negotiate the civic morality to uphold the community regulations that aimed to transform them into good and responsible citizens and eventually to produce new urban informality as they confronted new challenges in the in-city resettlement, which is a gated community. The chapter examines ISFs' internal logic and everyday politics through their explicit and tacit resistance and negotiations within the rigid rules and regulations of their new community. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes the formal and informal structures (e.g., NHA, city government, national government agencies, CSOs, APOAMF, and building and floor leaders), bonding social capital, and social practices in their everyday lives that are important factors in their resistance and negotiations.

First, to illustrate formal and informal everyday politics, this chapter presents how ISFs resisted and negotiated the terms with the housing authority on their new identity as residents of a gated community, where house rules and regulations are imposed and strictly implemented. Second, this presents how the residents, from elected leaders to community members, negotiated the civic morality to act as decent citizens through their everyday lives. This civic morality was facilitated through the bonding social capital they established as former neighbors in the previous community. These dynamics produce a new urban informality, which takes its roots from their dynamics in their previous community and is an essential factor in building a new locality in their new gated community. Last, this chapter presents how the bonding social capital is necessary for the relocated families to rekindle, gradually, their relationships with former neighbors who joined the advocacy for onsite development. Relationships were

developed through helping some with their applications in the in-city resettlement and accepting them as new residents, with the condition that they must not continue their previous housing advocacy and abide by the rules and regulations in the new community. This chapter answers research question three: Why did the relocated ISFs in in-city housing install strict community rules and regulations that call for "civic morality" but implement them flexibly?

6.1 Negotiating House Rules and Estate Management with the Housing Authority

> *Ang paninirahan sa low rise building ay kakaibang-kakaiba sa dati ninyong tinitirhan. Hindi na pwedeng maglalakad ang mga lalaki ng walang damit pang itaas o di kaya mag videoke ng kahit anong oras nya gustong matapos. Dito, mayroon ng mga patakarang dapat sundin ang bawat residente upang magkaroon kayo ng matiwasay, maayos, at magandang pamayanan.* (Living here is different from where you used to live. The men are no longer allowed to walk around shirtless or to play videoke until anytime you want to end it. Here, there are rules every resident must follow so that you can have a safe, orderly, and beautiful community.)

- Remark from an NHA official during the orientation of new residents on the community house rules upon their entry to the community.

> *Masaya naman kami dito sa LRB. Masarap sa pakiramdam na may respeto kaming natatanggap mula sa mga tao dahil gated na ang komunidad namin. Hindi na kami mangangamba na baka masasagasaan ang mga anak namin sa kalsada. Katapat lang eto sa dati naming komunidad, kaya hindi kami nahihirapan mag-adjust dahil malapit*

lang sa mga trabaho namin. Kailangan lang namin talaga na magtrabaho na talaga dahil mas malaki na ang babayarin. Pero halos ganun din naman, nangungupahan din naman kami nun sa Floodway. Mahirap lang talaga ang adjustment namin na may mga patakaran na sa komunidad.(We are happy here at LRB. It is nice to feel that we now receive respect from people because our community is now gated. We no longer have to fear that our children will meet accidents on the road. It is just across from our previous community, so we do not have a hard time adjusting because it is close to where we work. We just really have to work harder because it costs more here. Nevertheless, it is almost the same, we were also renting back then in the Floodway. It is just really hard for us to adjust that our community now has rules to follow. [Liza])

Liza, 42 years old. Her family was a renter for more than 8 years in the Manggahan Floodway before they were relocated in 2015. Her family was among the first group to be relocated in the in-city resettlement because their homes were nearest to the water and more susceptible to flooding. Her husband works as a jeepney driver, and she works as vegetable vendor in a nearby flea market. She shared that, because their community is now gated, she no longer has to fear that her two children can just go out of their homes anytime, especially when she and her husband are out working.

The above narratives present how the house rules and regulations highlight the objectives of transforming the residents to be good citizens, and changing their ways of life according to the images of residents in gated communities as decent citizens. In Liza's narrative, living in a gated community now means gaining outsiders' respect. Many residents felt discriminated against because the outsiders blamed them for the flooding in the Manggahan Floodway.

Moreover, they felt that was the reason they were evicted from their homes. This is aside from dealing with the outsider's general perceptions of those who reside in informal settlements as rowdy, lacking manners, or lack of discipline. Although the gated community gave them a sense of security and respect from outsiders, they had difficulty adjusting to the house rules that aimed to transform them into decent citizens.

In 2015, upon the relocation of the first 120 residents from "Top of the Water,"[9] who occupied the first two low-rise buildings (LRBs), to the Manggahan in-city resettlement or Manggahan Residences (commonly known among residents as the LRB[10]), the first order of business was the orientation of adults, teens, and children on the house rules and regulations. NHA facilitated the separate orientations, while the APOAMF leaders were tasked to put posters in common areas about the rules and regulations that the residents must observe at all times.

The estate management and establishment of house rules and regulations are within the NHA's mandates. Included provisions of the residents' contracts are the house rules that they needed to follow. These house rules are within NHA's 50-year-old estate management manual. With the continued partnership with CO-Multiversity, APOAMF negotiated with NHA on the

[9] The residents identify the "Top of the Water" as the most flood-prone area in the community, as the dwellings are nearest to the water. The community organization or the APOAMF identified the residents that needed immediate relocation and recommended to the housing authority the first 120 families to be relocated to the first two completed buildings in the in-city resettlement.

[10] During their negotiations for the in-city resettlement, the APOAMF leaders would use the term LRB to refer to their in-city resettlement as they had no formal name for the in-city resettlement yet.

house rules and regulations. Upon reviewing the manual, the APOAMF leaders and NHA officials agreed to revise and amend some provisions, especially the portions on sanctions.

> *Nagkasundo ang APOAMF at NHA na I amend lalo na yung sanctions kasi lahat ng mga rules, pag di nasunod, eviction ang katumbas. Para sa amin, imposible talagang masunod at mangyari. Nag workshop ang mga members at leaders ng mga naunang 120 beneficiaries. Sa pamamagitan ng workshops, nag visioning tungkol sa pangarap naming komunidad. Batay dun sa house rules ng NHA, may tinanggal kami, may na amend, at mayroong na-retain. Doon sa sanctions, bukod sa evictions, naglagay din kami ng community service at penalty para sa minor at major offenses. Isinama namin sya sa kasunduan ng paninirahan.* (APOAMF and NHA have agreed to amend [the estate management manual], especially the sanctions, because all the rules, if not followed, will result in eviction. For us, it is really impossible to be followed and difficult to be followed. We conducted workshops for the members and leaders for the first 120 beneficiaries. Through the workshops, we conducted visioning [workshops] about our dream for the community. Based on the NHA's house rules, we removed some, we amended some, and we retained some. On the sanctions, aside from eviction, we included community service and penalty for minor and major offenses. We included these in the residence agreement. [Rosa])

Rosa (pseudonym), early 40s, married with two children. Her husband works as a security guard who is assigned to a resort somewhere in the Luzon region. He only goes home at least once every three months. For more than seven years, her family rented in the Manggahan Floodway community. She was elected an APOAMF leader in 2010 and was among those who actively

participated and pursued the community's housing agenda for in-city resettlement. Her family was among the first 120 beneficiaries who relocated in 2015, as the house they rented was nearest to the water. When the community elected a new set of leaders in the LRB, she was among the APOAMF leaders elected to lead in the LRB community.

Aside from the house rules, APOAMF and LRB leaders negotiated with NHA on the LRB's estate management. Initially, the housing agency was to contract a third party to manage the community. As a result, an additional monthly payment of PhP2,800 (approximately USD56) will be required for each resident as an assessment fee (e.g., professional fee for property administrator, operational expenses, building, and water maintenance, among others). The residents opposed this, and the APOAMF and LRB leaders conducted dialogues and negotiations with NHA. Initially, they haggled the amount to PhP600 (approximately USD12). However, NHA noted that the professional fee was for the property administrator. The APOAMF and LRB leaders still opposed the fee, citing that they should manage the community because it manifests their success in pursuing their People's Plan housing agenda. They know the people and their needs better than any third party who might manage the community.

They eventually negotiated with NHA for them to manage the community, and the LRB leaders agreed that they would still collect PhP300 (approximately USD6) from the residents as a monthly assessment fee (Table 8). The hired staff will be (e.g., the guard and administrator) residents of the LRB community to provide income, especially for community members who have difficulties paying their monthly fees. The negotiation process with the housing authority strengthened the APOAMF and LRB leaders' sense of ownership to the housing program, accountability to the implementation of their community's estate management, and the

commitment to uphold the civic morality and implement the house rules and regulations. They were determined to prove to NHA that they could manage their community, and that residents would abide by the rules and regulations. They also want to build their community according to their dreams about the LRB community.

Table 8. Breakdown of Monthly Assessment Fees

Item	Amount (PhP)
Tanod (Community security guard) Honorarium	75
Common electricity	90
Administration fee/allowance	35
Operational expenses	30
Building and water maintenance	70

Source: Alliance of People's Organizations along the Manggahan Floodway.

Aside from confronting the issues on house rules, regulations, and assessment fees, the APOAMF and LRB leaders also dealt with building construction and management issues. They continued to negotiate and push for the construction of the remaining buildings, which were overdue, and to address the issues with their sewage treatment plant, which frequently broke down. The defective sewage treatment plant exposes residents to potential health hazards. Furthermore, these were urgent matters with more ISFs temporarily renting places elsewhere while waiting for the completion of their housing units.

6.2 Negotiating House Rules and Regulations and Producing New Urban Informality among Community Members

The house rules, regulations, and inclusion of assessment fees to their monthly amortization were not easily implemented in the LRB, with some residents resisting the measures. Occasionally, misunderstandings among leaders and community members occurred because of this arrangement. The LRB underwent several discussions and negotiations through regular community meetings and informal discussions and arrangements.

The house rules, regulations, assessment payments, and monthly amortizations in the LRB are new to the relocated ISFs. Coming from an informal settler community with few or no house rules at all, abiding by stringent house rules is new and challenging for the residents. The gated community was one of their hopes when they conducted their planning for their in-city resettlement because they wanted to feel secure and have a sense of ownership for what they worked; however, many residents expressed that they found it difficult and challenging to abide with the house rules. In the community orientation they conducted in 2015, one NHA official remarked that the residents should now act as decent citizens because they no longer reside along the waterways. The children were also reminded to follow the rules and remind the adults in their homes always to observe the house rules, as they are now in a gated community.

A pamphlet on the occupancy rules and regulations (see fig. 24) are handed to every unit owner upon their entry to the LRB. The pamphlet contains the rules on the implementation of the LRB's policies and the corresponding penalties. These penalties may be considered minor,

major, or serious offenses. The house rules for decent citizens include men wearing shirts at all times when they go out of their units, observing silence, no littering or placing obstructions in the hallway, no playing videoke after 10 p.m., and others. There is an associated penalty for violating the house rules. Disciplinary actions for minor offenses include a verbal warning, community service, and penalty fee. In contrast, the major offenses result in longer days of community service and higher penalties, and the serious offenses result in eviction from the housing unit.

The LRB's civic morality requires them to be good citizens who abide by the house rules. APOAMF leaders were given the responsibility to monitor the civic morality in their new community of residents being decent citizens because NHA expected them to be good residents. They conducted elections for floor and building leaders to manage their new community better. They expected the same commitment that their previous PO leaders possessed with the daunting tasks. Many of the elected leaders were APOAMF leaders. In their areas, they were tasked to monitor the residents' compliance to the house rules and regulations, including their payments for amortization and assessment fees or communal dues. The leaders regularly called meetings. A youth organization was also formed in the community, which led to youth activities such as dance and sports festivals. The youth organization was also in charge of providing peer support to the children and teenagers. CO-Multiversity continued to provide assistance and guidance on the LRB's estate management.

Figure 24. List of Occupancy Rules and Regulations Handed to Every Housing Unit in the In-City Resettlement.





REQUIREMENTS BAGO ANG MOVE-IN NG AWARDEES

1. Ang awardees ay [illegible]lim na sa mga kinakailangang orientation.
2. Ang awardees ay nakapag-fill up na ng kumpletong application form at naisumite na ang kumpletong dokumento.
3. Lubos na naunawaan ng awardees ang Alituntunin at Patakaran ng Manggahan Residences at kusa siyang lumagda dito.
4. Bago mag move-in sa housing unit, ang awardee ay kailangang may hawak na Entry Pass na may kumpletong lagda.

PANUNTUNAN SA PAGPAPATUPAD NG MGA POLISIYA SA LOW RISE BUILDING / KASAMA ANG KAUKULANG KAPARUSAHAN

➢ **Kahalagahan ng Occupancy Rules and Regulations**

- Ang "Occupancy Rules & Regulations" ay mahalaga para mapanatili ang pantay-pantay na karapatan ng lahat ng residente na matamasa at magamit ang lahat ng pasilidad sa komunidad
- Ito ang magsisilbing gabay para mapanatiling maayos ang kalinisan, kagandahan at katayuan ng buong proyekto at ng bawat yunit na tinitirhan ng mga residente.

MGA PAGLABAG

➢Lahat ng paglabag sa kahit anong nakasaad sa "Occupancy Rules & Regulations" ay magdudulot ng pagkakansela ng Kontrata o pagpapaalis mula sa yunit ng resident o pamilya ng hindi na nangangailangan maghanda ang Property Manager ng "Judicial Action." Ito ay naayon sa PD 1472 at sa pagpapatupad ng Rules and Regulations ukol sa Extrajudicial na pagpapaalis / demolition

MGA PAGLABAG

ITEM	APOAMF / NHA	KATEGORYA NG PAGLABAG
PAGKAKASALA SA TAO/NHA/ICC		
1	Hindi pagbabayad ng buwanang hulog ng yunit/Butaw	MAJOR OFFENSE
2	Pagbebenta/Pagrerenta ng Yunit	SERIOUS OFFENSE
3	Hindi pagsasayos ng listahan ng pamilya nakaukopa sa Yunit (ipinanganak/nanatay)	MINOR OFFENSE
4	Hindi pagpapatuloy sa NHA/ICC para mag-inspect sa Yunit kung may paglabag o mag-sasayos ng pagkumpuni	SERIOUS OFFENSE
MALING GAMIT SA MGA ARI-ARIAN		
5	Pagpukpok, o pagsinsil sa dingding, kisame at sahig	MAJOR OFEENSE
6	Pagsusulat sa gusali	SERIOUS OFFENSE
7	Pagsira ng pasilidades	SERIOUS OFFENSE
8	Walang permiso sa paggawa o security bond	MAJOR OFFENSE
9	Pagpipintura, pagdekora, pagpapalit ng itsura ng kahit aling bahagi sa labas ng gusali	MAJOR OFFENSE
10	Hindi awtorisadong pagpapaskel sa Bulletin Boards	MINOR OFFENSE
11	Hindi pagbibigay ng monthly dues	MAJOR OFFENSE
12	Pagputol ng puno at halaman	MINOR OFFENSE
13	Pagtanggal ng fire extinguisher maliban kung may emergency	SERIOUS OFFENSE

PAGLABAG SA KALIGTASAN, SEGURIDAD, MORALIDAD, KAAYUSAN

14	Mga sagabal, pag-aayos, pagtambak at pagtabi ng kahit ano sa common areas	MINOR OFFENSE
15	Pagburol sa loob ng proyekto sa Common areas	MAJOR OFFENSE
16	Malakas na pagpapatugtog mula sa karaoke, radio, instrument, telebisyon, pagsigaw sa pasilyo, hagdanan at balkonahe	MAJOR OFFENSE
17	Pagsigaw sa pasilyo, hagdanan at foyers	MINOR OFFENSE
18	Pagbalabag ng pinto	MINOR OFFENSE
19	Away o riot lalo na kung may mga pagdaraos sa pamayanan	SERIOUS OFFENSE
20	Sobra ingay o vibrations na nakaka irterfere sa karapatan, comfort at convenience ng ibang yunit owners	MAJOR OFFENSE
21	Asong hindi registrado, walang anti-rabies, walang pagkikilanlan at walang tali	MAJOR OFFENSE
22	Pag-aalaga ng maraming hayop maliban sa lamang sa isda na nasa acquarium	MINOR OFFENSE
23	Pagtatabi ng mga madaling masunog at delikadong materyales	SERIOUS OFFENSE
24	Pagtatapon ng basura kung saan-saan	MAJOR OFFENSE
25	Pagtambak, pagtatapon ng basura, muwebles, o construction materials sa common areas	MAJOR OFFENSE
26	Hindi tamang pagtatapon ng basura at wala sa tamang oras	MAJOR OFFENSE

Source: Alliance of People's Organizations along the Manggahan Floodway, 2018.

It was challenging for the leaders to encourage some of the residents to cooperate with following the LRB's rules and regulations. Although other residents were not difficult to deal with, as they understood the difficulties of the community's process to negotiate with NHA, some community members no longer expressed a desire to be part of an organization because they had already attained their housing agenda. They now wanted to focus on settling into their new homes and paying the monthly amortization and dues. The PO leaders are firm in their stand that everyone should follow house rules, bearing in mind that they successfully received this socialized housing because of their collective effort. The leaders expressed that they also had their own issues at home and were adjusting to the new environment, but their commitment to their community prevailed.

Certain house rules were negotiated between leaders and community members, but these were negotiations within the NHA's terms. Initially, they were not allowed to put up stores in their housing units. Citing the need to continue earning, especially now that they had to pay their monthly amortization, residents were allowed to put up *sari-sari* stores (sundry stores) in their units, with the condition that the stores should be inside their units (figure 25). Other residents who sell garments, make-up, and mobile loading business put signs outside their units (figure 26). Some residents also started selling cooked food and displaying it by their doors (figure 27). Ambulant vending was also allowed in designated areas.

Figure 25. *Sari-sari* store inside a housing unit (by the entrance) in the in-city resettlement.



Source: Author. Manggahan LRB, 2019.

Figure 26. A signage of products sold by a resident (mobile phone e-loading business) in the in-city resettlement.

Source: Author. Manggahan LRB, 2019.

Figure 27. Cooked meal for sale that is displayed inside a housing unit (by the entrance) in the in-city resettlement.

Source: Author. Manggahan LRB, 2019.

Although the NHA initially only allowed five members to stay in one housing unit, the PO leaders negotiated this number to at least ten first-degree family members (i.e., parents and children) per housing unit. They contended that the initial numbers would not work for them, as many of the families had more than three children. Other relatives can have short-term stays if only eight first-degree family members reside in the housing unit. If less than six first-degree family members reside in the unit, they can invite relatives to live with them (with six maximum occupants per unit). These arrangements also help with the payment of financial obligations.

Although sanctions were imposed for violations of house rules set by the NHA, the leaders first negotiated these sanctions between them and the residents. As much as possible, they tried to avoid escalating the issue, which would involve the NHA, because this would affect the resident's unit ownership or result in their eviction. They talked with the residents first about their violations and tried to address these immediately without imposing sanctions. To address issues beyond the capacity of the floor or building leaders and a resident, they would tap the assistance of previous APOAMF leaders, who were close to the resident, to mediate and talk to the members about their issues, such as abiding by house rules. However, serious offenses such as selling or renting their units to outsiders, drug peddling, or drug use are taken seriously by the LRB leaders. Once the leaders brought some youth they caught using drugs to the *barangay* (village). They warned the parents that they would not hesitate to inform NHA about this serious offense should they hear about drug use again among the youth in the LRB.

> *Sa realidad ng kultura na kinagisnan at kinasanayan ng mga residente na galing ng Floodway, hindi maiiwasan na mayroong makakalimot at mayroong hindi makakasunod sa rules and regulations. Mayroon ding iba na gusto lang i-challenge ang*

kapasidad ng mga lider para mag-implement o sinusubukan lang kung talagang magpapataw kami ng parusa. Para sa aming mga lider, may realization sa mga sa mga members na sumalang dito, at may pagbabago sa kanila at may pagtanggap sa mga nagawa nilang violations. At na acknowledge din nila na mga rules to na dapat sundin. Sa aming mga lider, lagi lang naming iniisip na mahirap basagin ang kultura lalo na doon sa mga members na lumaki at nagkaisip sa dati naming pinanggalingan. Masaya na kami na kahit challenging at nakakapagod ang ginagawa namin, worth it dahil naingat talaga ang moral namin bilang indibidwal at organisasyon. Kumpara mo sa kung paano kami tingnan at tratuhin nung gobyerno nung nasa dati kaming komunidad. (With the reality of the cultural background and practice by the residents from Floodway, it is inevitable that some will forget, and some will not follow the rules and regulations. There are others who just want to challenge the capacity of the leaders to implement, or they just try to see if we will actually impose a penalty. For us, leaders, there are realizations to the members who underwent this, and there are changes with them and acceptance to the violations they made. They also acknowledged the rules they have to follow. For us leaders, we always think that it is difficult to break the culture, especially for the members who grew up in where we originate. We are happy that, even though what we do is challenging and tiring, it is worth it because our morale as individuals and as an organization is lifted if you compare to how we were seen and treated by the government in our old community. [Rowena])

Rowena (pseudonym), married with two children. Her family rented in the old community. Since 2012, she has been a PO leader and has actively pursued their housing agenda under APOAMF. She was also elected leader when they moved to the in-city resettlement site. The

leaders elected her to chair the community's grievance committee for community members who violated the rules and regulations.

The residents' agency to pursue organized resistance and tap their urban informality, such as informal dynamics, negotiations, and bonding social capital, constitute their process of building their new community in the LRB. A new urban informality is produced through their informal negotiations in the implementation of house rules, the support given to those who have difficulty with the payment of their monthly dues, the accommodation given to enable them to start businesses within their home, and the mediation of former neighbors or leaders to address issues between residents and leaders.

6.3 Mending Relations after Dividing Housing Agenda

As examined in the previous chapter on different housing strategies among the urban poor in the Manggahan Floodway informal settler community, shared experiences of uncertainties and strong social ties in their locality facilitated residents' reconnection despite their different resettlement choices While there were tensions and issues between the APOAMF members who pursued in-city resettlement and those who changed their housing agenda to onsite development, their ties were not completely severed because of their genuine concern for one another, expressed by offering accommodations and assistance in housing applications in the LRB for those in need.

After their dwellings were demolished in their old community along the Manggahan Floodway in 2017, some BALIKWAS-KADAMAY members could not apply for socialized

housing. They rented apartments in nearby villages, where the monthly rental fees range from PhP6,000-12,000 (approximately USD120-240). Through the help of friends and relatives who were already residents of the LRB, they approached leaders for assistance in applying for housing units in the LRB community. The leaders accommodated these requests, and the members were endorsed to the NHA, subject to the latter's review of their qualifications and approval.

As one LRB leader said about former APOAMF members who changed their housing agenda to onsite development and later applied for in-city resettlement, "*Kahit bigla silang tumiwalag at nag-iba ng housing agenda, kung nangangailangan sila ng tulong, tutulungan namin. Sa huli, kami din naman talaga ang nagmamalasakit sa mga tulad namin*" (While they left and changed their housing agenda, if they will need our help, we will help them. In the end, we are the ones who care for each other).

When tensions concerning the resettlement agenda became relatively calm, the APOAMF leaders eventually accommodated and assisted in the applications for housing units at the LRB. They expressed that it is community members' right to apply for the socialized housing option they deem is in their family's best interest. However, their application and acceptance for housing in the LRB were conditional on them dropping their housing agenda for onsite development. They reminded these residents that in the LRB, their identity is no longer about their affiliations with their former community. They are now residents of the LRB who have to abide by the community's rules, and they have to participate in the community's activities.

CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This dissertation presented a new approach in analyzing the impact and responses of the urban poor to DIDR. While previous literature has clarified the structural marginalization of the urban poor under neoliberalism and their organized struggle against the situation in the city, this study examines their internal logic in response to forced eviction and resettlement. While the urban poor's agentive capacity through their everyday politics practices is recognized, it has often been underemphasized in terms of their power to deal with their conditions amid threats of eviction and resettlement. Those analyses are insufficient to understand deeply the flexible and inconsistent practices of the urban poor within one community regarding their different housing strategies.

While the dominant literature has highlighted the role of development organizations, CSOs, and NGOs in the success of housing strategies and resettlement programs for the urban poor, this study clarified the agency of the poor as the key success factor in their pursuit for their housing strategies amid threats of evictions and eventual resettlement. By using the agency of the poor as an analytical framework and locating it through their practices of everyday politics and notions of well-being, this study illuminated the urban poor's internal logic—informal practices, or non-organizational, hidden, yet collective practices, are actually one of their instruments for assertion of power and well-being. This aligns as well with their organized resistance in taking their issues in a formal arena (e.g., partnering with CSOs and NGOs and collaborating and negotiating with local and national government agencies).

The various responses to threats of eviction and resettlement through individual and collective responses, their capacity to tap local and larger networks of power relations, and their ability to negotiate the "civic morality" in the strictly enforced rules and regulations to accommodate informal practices and sociality show the politicized nature of the urban poor's experience. These diverse responses are influenced by internal dynamics with consideration to the structural limitation—how they make sense of their household condition and respond to it according to their experiences of poverty, value of their family's well-being, access to bonding and bridging social capital, and dynamics among community members. These factors resulted in contrasting responses to threats of eviction and resettlement, whether mundane tactics and practices or organized resistance, which form their everyday politics.

To illustrate the agency of the poor through their practices of everyday politics, which resulted in their heterogeneity of responses to DIDR, I presented residents' experiences in the informal settler community along the east bank road of the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City, the Philippines. The experiences of the informal settler families in said community in dealing with threats of eviction and resettlement sparked my curiosity, as the general descriptions emphasizing the fragmentation of the poor in dealing with DIDR under the city's neoliberal transformation are not applicable, to some extent, to the Manggahan Floodway community.

As presented in the study, first, although the urban informal settlers faced the same eviction threats, they opted for different housing strategies: distant off-city resettlement, in-city resettlement, and onsite development. Some families immediately accepted distant off-city resettlement in Calauan, Laguna, and Tanay, Rizal, while other families initially decided to form a local organization partnering with CO-Multiversity to advocate for onsite development.

However, they dropped this advocacy two years later. Instead, they pushed for in-city resettlement under a vertical socialized housing approach through the People's Plan. Some families who initially opted for in-city resettlement eventually changed their resettlement option to off-city resettlement in Tanay, Rizal. Later, some residents who were unhappy with in-city resettlement eventually decided to push for onsite development and collaborated with progressive urban poor groups, particularly the KADAMAY, for their advocacy.

Second, despite the different responses to threats of eviction and resettlement options and conflicted feelings among some residents due to these differences, the ISFs generally maintained amicable relationships and mutual help, reconstructing social capital beyond antagonism for the success of their housing strategies. Some residents availed themselves of off-city relocation because of the uncertainties of their situation and constant threats of eviction. Some residents were divided when some house owners and renters decided to change their housing strategy from in-city resettlement to push for onsite development. Despite these contrasting responses to threats of eviction, the majority of the residents maintained amicable relationships and provided mutual help. Those residents involved in off-city resettlement who experienced hardships were allowed by APOAMF leaders to return on the condition that they would not build new homes and that their names would be excluded from the master list submitted to the housing authority.

While there were tensions and antagonism between the divided residents who pursued in-city resettlement and those who opted for onsite development, many of them did not completely sever their ties. The hostility was only apparent between the APOAMF leaders and the new BALIKWAS-KADAMAY leaders who had no established relationships with APOAMF. The

APOAMF leaders who supported onsite development but were not visible in meetings and street protests related to this housing agenda still attended meetings and social gatherings for in-city resettlement. While there were no direct confrontations among them, there were unspoken issues of trust, and discussions about their housing agenda were limited when these APOAMF leaders were around. Some residents who initially pursued onsite development were provided assistance with their housing applications for in-city resettlement by APOAMF leaders through the help of former neighbors and relatives, who acted as mediators. Although there was antagonism between them at the height of the housing issues, it took a while before these residents reached out to the APOAMF leaders for help. Despite still having conflicted feelings, the genuine concern for their former neighbors enabled them to provide assistance in housing applications for in-city resettlement to those in need.

Third, while the government and elected in-city resettlement leaders (who were mostly APOAMF leaders) installed and implemented strict rules and regulations premised on "civic morality" to be "decent citizens" in a gated community, the leaders and residents negotiated them to accommodate the gradual change in their way of life from their previous community. When possible, they addressed minor violations by talking with the residents first, and they tried to avoid imposing fines. Through their established bonding social capital with their former neighbors, they were able to negotiate their "civic morality" to accommodate minor violations. At the same time, they ensured that these given favors would not be abused and would not violate government-imposed rules and regulations. By accommodating minor violations, the community-elected building and floor leaders were able to control or avoid heavier violations from the residents.

These different responses and experiences of the ISFs along Manggahan Floodway led me to this academic inquiry on heterogeneity and social relations among the ISFs and the ways these factors influenced their experiences and responses to DIDR at the community level. In particular, related to the internal logic of the urban poor concerning their housing strategies, this study was based on the following questions:

(iv) Why did ISFs have different responses to DIDR despite receiving the same threats of eviction?

(v) Why did the community members' antagonism over different housing strategies and varied outcomes in housing not entirely result in social disintegration?

(vi) Although the relocated ISFs in in-city housing installed and implemented strict community rules and regulations that called for civic morality, why did they mutually negotiate minor violations to accommodate social capital, practices, and ways of life from their previous community?

The analysis of the agency of the poor within the context of their everyday politics, along with the ethnographic and secondary data, has generated the following conclusions and interpretations. The Manggahan Floodway is a nexus for issues confronted by the urban poor in the city concerning dealing with poverty, claiming a space in the urban margins, and confronting threats of eviction and relocation to different resettlement sites because of the government's urban development project. The agency of the poor and their everyday politics are manifested in their daily lives and their dealing with DIDR. The ISFs practice their agency by recreating the meaning of space, from a waterway that functions for the flood management of the metropolis to a space where they established a community and created relationships

among neighbors, which form their bonded social capital. Their everyday politics in dealing with threats of eviction and resettlement after Typhoon *Ondoy* hit Metro Manila in 2009 manifested through their negotiations with government programs and informal practices as well as bonding social capital in pursuing various housing strategies for their families' well-being. These included socialized housing at distant relocation sites, staying in the community and asserting their right to space by forming community organizations, changing resettlement options along the way for various personal reasons, and partnering with CSOs and negotiating with local and national government agencies.

As an answer to the first research question, the study illustrated that despite the same threats of eviction, informal settlers responded differently to DIDR based on the impact of eviction threats to their families' well-being (material and non-material) and their access to bonding and bridging social capital. Some of them opted for off-city resettlement site in pursuit of a quiet life, while others joined the community's collective responses and worked hard to receive an in-city resettlement unit. Some residents militantly resisted eviction. During their relocation or fights for their resettlement options, some community members eventually changed their housing options due to socioeconomic conditions or further marginalization based on the unavailability of resources and the resettlement site's poor living conditions.

The ISFs continued to practice their agency and everyday politics in the resettlement sites, eventually producing new urban informality. As presented in the study, in the early stages of their relocation, families relied on their resources within households for off-city resettlement, as they all experienced difficulties. They were all busy starting new lives in new locations, and

everyone had personal circumstances to attend. What made relocation more challenging for many was finding work nearby or keeping their means of livelihood in the new community.

In both resettlement sites, many strategized to keep their homes by allowing one or two members of their households to return to the city for work. In the Calauan, Laguna resettlement site, those who returned to Metro Manila for work visited their homes at least twice a month. In the Tanay, Rizal resettlement site, as the new community is nearer to Metro Manila, family members who work in the city go home at least once a week or on weekends. Some families who were unable to endure the hardships in off-city resettlement sites and could not find the means to earn a livelihood returned to Metro Manila. They left their housing units behind, either informally selling their housing rights or renting out the housing units to acquaintances, friends, or relatives.

Families who stayed in the in their preferred off-city resettlement sites shared that they were happy with their new homes. The quality of the environment, such as fresh air and bigger spaces, the opportunity to own the land after completing the payments of their amortizations, and the more frequent visits of household members who work in Metro Manila were among the factors that they enjoyed in their new community.

In both off-city resettlement sites, they have maintained contact with the remaining residents of the informal settler community in Manggahan Floodway to update them on their situation or network for available work opportunities. They usually connect through social media or visit their old community whenever they are in the area. Sometimes, they invite their former neighbors to their new homes for parties or informal gatherings.

Residents consider in-city resettlement through the People's Plan in Pasig City a product of the ISFs' agentive capacity to assert, resist, contest, and negotiate with housing authorities and local and national government, both informally and formally, to influence a positive outcome for their housing agenda in the city. While organized resistance is highlighted in this resettlement site, I explored how informal resistance and negotiations through informal structures, networks, and social practices in their everyday lives (Bisht 2014) also play an important part in their resistance to and negotiations of the rigid rules and regulations in their new community. These informal negotiations among residents on house rules and regulations created new urban informality, which is an important component in building a new locality in the resettlement site.

The housing agenda for onsite development was driven by some residents' hope to retain their homes and own the land in their community. The bonding social capital is apparent in how the residents were encouraged to pursue this housing agenda when the opportunity came, despite the uncertainty they face in their collective response, especially those who have not applied for socialized housing yet.

In answer to the second research question, despite the disagreement and antagonism over housing strategies (especially between those who pursued in-city resettlement and onsite development), strong social ties and shared experiences of facing eviction threats forged connections despite the different resettlement decisions. While there were divisions and antagonism between APOAMF leaders and residents who pursued onsite development, the mediation between former neighbors and relatives helped in forging connections. While the

APOAMF leaders were at first against their applications for in-city resettlement, later, those leaders helped some former BALIKWAS members with their unit applications for in-city resettlement, particularly for those who had not completed socialized housing applications after the demolition of their homes in the old community.

The study also illustrated that the ISFs continued to strategize and negotiate with authorities and PO leaders after they were relocated. Their bonding social capital was also an important factor in building a new locality and urban informality in the resettlement sites. The residents who took part in off-city resettlement and experienced hardship were helped by their former neighbors in terms of work opportunities and shelter in the city, and APOAMF leaders allowed them to return with the condition that these residents would not build new homes. Their names would just be excluded from the master list submitted to the housing authority.

The expectations for the relocated families to be good and responsible citizens were apparent in the in-city resettlement. This expectation came both from the housing authority and APOAMF leaders. As the in-city resettlement site is a product of organized resistance and negotiations by the APOAMF, the APOAMF leaders wanted to show to the local and national government that the LRB was a successful People's Plan housing project. Thus, while they were already at the LRB, they continued organizing and negotiating with the NHA on their estate management of their in-city resettlement. Aside from negotiating with institutions, the everyday politics of the relocated ISFs were apparent in the residents' dynamics as they adjusted to their new life in a gated community. Informal resistance and negotiations through informal structures, networks, and social practices in their everyday lives (Bisht 2014) were observed

among LRB leaders and residents. This flexibility and accommodation of their informal practices helped in the residents' gradual adjustment to their new community.

To illustrate the formal and informal forms of their everyday politics, first, I presented how the residents resisted and negotiated the terms of the housing authority regarding their new identity as residents of a gated community, where house rules and regulations are imposed and strictly implemented. Secondly, I discussed how the residents, between elected leaders and community members, negotiated civic morality to act as decent citizens in their everyday life. This was facilitated through the bonding social capital they established as former neighbors in their former community. These dynamics produced a new urban informality rooted in their dynamics in the previous community and were an important factor in building a new locality in their new gated community.

As analyzed in the study, despite the efforts of the state and NGOs to formalize urban spaces and the lives of the poor, the poor who have accepted formalized housing exercise their agency to produce new urban informality. More stringent rules and regulations are imposed in the in-city resettlement compared to the off-city resettlement. The government expects residents in the in-city resettlement to be decent citizens, leaving behind their old ways as residents of an informal settlement. Having worked and fought for this in-city resettlement site, APOAMF leaders expected them to continually support collective activities and be community-abiding residents to show the government that they can independently manage their community. Through their established relationships with their former neighbors, the urban poor can negotiate their civic morality to accommodate small favors from these neighbors. At the same time, they ensure that these given favors will not be abused or violate government-imposed

rules and regulations. By accommodating these small favors, LRB leaders can control or avoid heavier violations from community members and former residents.

Overall, the results suggest that amid limited resources and access to power, it is essential to examine the agency of the urban poor and their everyday politics in informal settlements concerning responses to their situation according to non-material and material values. The relationships they have built in their neighborhoods are essential in building bonding social capital and negotiating the civic morality imposed by the government and their PO leaders. These serve two purposes: to help each other through a minimum level of support and reinforce a civic morality set by PO leaders to comply with the government's expectations.

The experiences of informal settler families along the east bank road of the Manggahan Floodway, Pasig City, the Philippines, can be situated within the broader discussion of DIDR in a community context. The study provided an insight on how the affected urban poor's practice of everyday politics, such as their strategies and assertion of housing agendas for their families' well-being, constitute important elements of their receptions to resettlement.

The study is intended to contribute to the continuous development and ongoing promotion of people-centered involuntary resettlement. As illustrated in the DIDR experiences of the informal settler community along the east bank road of the Manggahan Floodway, it is essential to understand their everyday politics and the ways they undertake both informal and formal responses to threats of eviction and resettlement. First, community members' individual and collective responses present their active participation in the whole DIDR process. This provides a picture of the dynamics before, during, and after they are relocated to resettlement sites.

Second, for APOAMF, the key success factor of their housing strategy for in-city resettlement under the People's Plan is their ability to respond to and respect the various expressions of everyday politics or internal logic of the urban poor. Indeed, their success was recognized by the local and national government through the awarding of near-site in-city resettlement.

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