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主 論 文 の 要 旨

論文題目

All Roads Lead to Beijing: A World-Systems Analysis of Chinese Hegemony in Pakistan
 (すべての道は北京に通ずーパキスタンにおける中国覇権の世界システム分析)

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論 文 内 容 の 要 旨

This dissertation sought to address current debate surrounding the likelihood of China's Belt and Road initiative and associated development as translating into hegemony replacing the US and global liberal order.

In the first chapter, after detailing the importance of the BRI for worldwide development, including China's, insights for how this effort can translate into hegemonic gains were touched upon before detailing its relationship to our framework of world-systems analysis. Then, after describing world-systems analysis and characteristics compared to dependency theory, hegemony in world-systems analysis is explained as requiring at least one hegemon and one periphery within an interstate system. Thus, the world-systems analysis research objective to address notions of Chinese hegemony would be to determine whether or not the BRI will constitute a world-system with China as its core and hegemon, and the capacities of that system in the context of predominant US hegemony. In our case, the candidate periphery will be Pakistan through CPEC. The reasoning, therefore, is to assess the degree of peripheralization of Pakistan within through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the hegemony of China towards Pakistan, whether the overall dynamics resemble that of a world-system in theory, and to assess the degree of its conformity with scholarship on dual US-China hegemony.

In the second chapter, the BRI is described as the backdrop of China's entry into Pakistan via CPEC, beginning with its conception and immanence. The BRI, is seen to have come to satisfy needs arising from seismic and interrelated external forces and internal forces. External forces include the 2008 financial crisis which led to internal overcapacity in steel and coal reserves rendering them worthy of forging into a foreign infrastructure-based policy. Internally, the BRI has come to address rising wages by boosting exports and imports in order to sustain and satisfy this increase in wages-cum-demand, with an example of the latter being the streamlining of copper imports through investment in developing foreign pits, itself a polluting industry being outsourced through the BRI in response to internal pressure. Similar internal pressure formative of the BRI is the need to secure China's restive west, affordable through increased returns on foreign trade and investment both abroad and in Xinjiang. After this chapter attempted to expand on the possible forces behind and resulting from the BRI's inception and those paving the way for its continuation, and linking these to our theoretical framework arguing one single unified market.

In the third chapter, a review of relevant literature shows how infrastructure can transcend the physical and imprint the values of a donor state onto where the infrastructure is being introduced, the cumbersome nature of hegemony per world-systems analysis, and a scenario of how China and other newly-industrializing countries can usurp hegemony from former-industrialized countries. Following this, the debate on Chinese hegemony was discovered to lead to theses on bifurcation—the hegemonic function of security provider to the US and its military, while economic hegemony to Beijing. Arguments on China not seeking hegemony are debunked before identifying gaps in the literature as not focusing on a particular area, and not accounting for immaterial factors in hegemonic rivalry, which WSA is shown as equipped to do and more.

The fourth chapter identifies and expands on the features of peripheralization (Incorporation, Speci and hegemony (Modi oprandi, economic dominance, military dominance, cultural hegemony, and general interest) per WSA.

The fifth chapter applies the abovementioned indicators of hegemony to the BRI's characteristics, wherein we find ample potential for this apparatus to affect hegemony through Beijing's status as the world's top exporter, the potential of the yuan to disseminate further via oil purchases and BRI contracts, avenues for its legal standards exported and obliged on participant states through a Beijing-based legal apparatus, and being the leader in the infrastructure sector. This latter along with China's dominance in electronics generally and solar photovoltaic technology specifically arguably correspond to the quasi-monopoly core states wield during hegemonic reigns in Kondratieff A phases. Moreover, along with the connectivity of markets and lands through the BRI comes the connectivity between minds as media outlets proliferate across BRI participant-states, run by Beijing-trained journalists. In signs of its *cultural hegemony*, Beijing is also shown to attract growing numbers of foreign students overwhelmingly from BRI participatory states, and has unleashed a language scheme to accelerate and catalyze the acquisition Mandarin in BRI

participant-states. China's *general interest* for potential peripheries is argued to be infrastructure provision and anti-secessionism.

The sixth chapter explores emergent dual US-China hegemony in the case of Pakistan, utilizing features in world-systems analysis to argue Pakistan's peripheralization into a CPEC-bound world-system through showing features of Pakistan-as-periphery becoming more specialized in producing Mandarin-speaking labor, rice, and copper and increasing the latter two exports to China who meanwhile is far less in need of them than Pakistan is need of its technology imports such as semi-conductors, broadcasting equipment, and photovoltaics. We also find evidence of real wages decreasing resulting from institutional decisions to cut CPEC salaries, leading to protests as inflation continues rising. We find the Pakistani army ushering Islamabad into a phase of 'hybrid martial law', and thus evidence of changing modes of governance, but we also find resilient and expanding demand in the United States keeping as the top importer of Pakistani products.

Meanwhile, we have found instances of China-as-hegemon's grafting of its *modi operandi*, achievement of near-absolute economic dominance, command of a military coordinating with Islamabad's charged with securing its interests on Pakistani soil, and a multi-layered media, language acquisition, and education campaign for spreading its geoculture, all coalescing around a *general interest* prioritizing infrastructure and anti-secessionism. These findings refute theses of unipolar and absolute US hegemony in the case of Pakistan. Given the nature of states, furthermore, it is plausible that Pakistan would desire this duality to persist in order to benefit from both, so long as it does not become too dependent on either. This would lead to a complementarity of roles between China and the West. However, as Pakistan does not have the sufficient agency to dictate the allocation of Chinese influence, even with regards to the previously US-centric affairs of security, internal politics and foreign relations, a cooperation wherein the US and China knowingly compliment each other for the betterment of Pakistan does not seem to be manifesting per the mutual need stipulation of interdependent hegemony.

Indeed, regular Pakistanis have reported that they can survive without US economic assistance or transactions, as for them it is clear that China has taken up the job of stabilizing Pakistan. This is reflected in Pakistan's annual budget reports showing that since 2011, financial assistance from China has consistently and greatly exceeded that from the US, reaching 20 times the amount, and with virtually no investment by the latter since the early 2000s. Moreover, China's advances into the role of security guarantor in Pakistan coupled with the enduring hegemony of the US dollar renders the neat splitting of hegemonic duties described in bifurcation theses to be inaccurate in our case. Pakistan's peripheralization instances by China have also meant the latter's geoculture now overlaps with that of the US, with the latter bested in educational popularity.

Despite these hegemonic gains by China and clear losses by the US, China remains unable to carve out CPEC from the wider world-system of transnational capitalism chiefly due to China's own dependence on it, thus dismissing the argument of a solely hegemonic Beijing. Further, China

remains unable to completely defend Pakistan on the international stage. Indeed, while Pakistan has been an exemplary client state for China, the relationship is asymmetrical. However, this does not disregard the clear hegemonic gains and functions China now possesses, leading me to conclude the peripheralization of Pakistan by China, the hegemony of China in Pakistan, and a CPEC world-system operating similarly to a theoretical world-system. This world-system is in overlap, whereby both US and China as hegemonies are operating in the area of Pakistan: China through CPEC and the US through predominant but challenged geoculture (including English still being the second official language) and challenged military hegemony, the dollar, higher exports, institutional cooperation in agriculture, and select advanced technologies.

In conclusion, Pakistan's tumultuous security situation due to internal Baloch enmity and external Indian tension have each pried open the way for Beijing's military to protect its CPEC projects and maintain a balance against New Delhi through increased arms sales, bi- and multilateral military cooperation, technology transfers, and gains in the Pakistan army's competencies to govern. This in addition to internal security projects such as Safer Cities leads to *de facto* security guardianship and adds to critiques of bifurcation theory which argues a relatively clean divide between military hegemony and security guardianship wielded by the US and economic hegemony wielded by China precipitating in the coming decades. Moreover, this finding counters theses of interdependent hegemony by virtue of China not having any mutual need for US presence to stabilize Pakistan through being the largest and most significant economic benefactor and through its partnership with a more assertive Pakistani military extending Islamabad's armed reach deeper into Balochistan as well as Beijing's arms sales to, training, and courting the Pakistani military among other features of hegemony. China's advances on the military and economic fronts are supported and facilitated by successful soft power skirmishes on the Pakistani cultural front with increasing exposure to Chinese (social and traditional) media outlets and Mandarin classes in elementary classrooms taken alongside English, all helping to socialize Pakistanis into specialized laborers and consumers for and of CPEC and Chinese exports.

As these numerous correlations may mean the existence of a CPEC world-system, it is argued that this world-system seems to overlap with the current US-led system; a world-system within a greater world-system, centered around Chinese designs which are impacting production processes through focusing on agriculture and metal extraction at the expense of other sectors, decreasing real wages, and facilitating de-industrialization while still contributing to overall development through increased energy output and better road connectivity. More capital is set to flow into China across Pakistan's borders, chased by its students and those of the developing world, increasingly heading East toward a Mandarin-speaking superpower and way of life.

