Ph.D. Thesis

Tokyo, Global City of Cinema 1980-1995:
Cultural Infrastructure and the Urban Imaginaries of Globalisation

世界映画都市東京 1980-1995：
グローバル化の文化基盤と都市想像

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DECLARATION

This thesis has been composed solely by myself and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree. Except where states otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

ABSTRACT

This thesis offers a cultural-historical and critical examination of the cinematic constitution of Tokyo as a global city from the 1980s to the mid-1990s. Drawing inspiration from film theory and urban theory in both Japanese and English, it focuses on the development of a global networked society in Tokyo revolving around cinema. In this thesis, cinema is contexualised as a particular ensemble of cultural concepts, artistic and political practices, material infrastructures, and images and texts in the 1980s and 1990s, which facilitated the epistemic shifts and paradigm transitions of globalisation in Tokyo. This method challenges common interpretations of cinema as either an unrestricted cultural producer or a political and economic product. On the one hand, cinema both discursively and materially constituted Tokyo as a global city in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, the changing urban conditions of Tokyo under globalisation also reconfigured popular understandings and the practical scope of cinema. By investigating the symbiotic yet often conflicted relationship between cinema and the city, this thesis emphasises the importance of the cultural aspects of globalisation and explores the political potential of cinema in configuring Tokyo's global landscape. While cinema was instrumentalised to serve the developmental agendas of government officials and big corporations in Tokyo, it also created the material basis and imaginative sources for alternative collective formations among marginalised actors in the city. Thus, this thesis explores the embodied experience of becoming global on the local ground through the lens of cinema, without neglecting the coexisting and often contending forces of other geopolitical scales, including national, regional, and international.

The thesis begins with a review of literature tracing the significance of Tokyo in existing cinema studies and humanities scholarship. The second chapter discusses the deployment of cinema as a specific cultural form to facilitate Tokyo's global city agendas by government officials and their business partners. Chapter Three looks at the structural shift of the local film industry in association with Tokyo's globalised urban conditions, specifically via the emergent screening space of the mini-theatre. The second and third chapters provide the contextual ground for the next two chapters' analysis of the articulation of the global city in particular film works. Chapter Four discusses Wim Wenders' *Tokyo-Ga* (1985) from a networked perspective. Chapter Five looks at grassroots collaborations in Tokyo in the production of diasporic Chinese male images in the films *About Love, Tokyo* (Yanagimachi Mitsuo, 1992) and *Tokyo Skin* (Hanawa Yukinari, 1996). Each of the chapters presents multiple urban locations where cinema was materially and discursively situated.

This thesis contributes to several overlooked material aspects of cinema in the existing scholarship of global cities without neglecting the various urban imaginaries that cinema offers. Adopting a transdisciplinary method, this thesis draws both compatible and conflicted parts from cinema studies and urban studies disciplines to achieve a reflexive understanding of its subject matter. In a broader sense, this thesis articulates the heterogenous reality of Tokyo as a global city via cinema in order to gain insight into what a more equal and interdependent global society might look like.

要旨

　本論文は、1980年代から1990年代半ばにかけた映画都市としての東京の台頭を、文化的、歴史的、および批評的な側面から考察することを目的とする。具体的には、映画研究ならびに都市研究を架橋しながら、この時期、東京においてグローバルネットワーク社会がどのように発展し、そのプロセスの中で映画がいかような役割を果たしたかをあきらかにする。この論文では、「映画」を単に文化的な創造や経済的・政治的な産物といった個々の側面から捉えるかわりに、常に文化的言説、美学・政治的な実践、マテリアルなインフラ、そして、イメージならびにテキストといった複合的な側面を持つアンサンブルとして位置づけ、そうした前提のもとに映画がこの時期の東京におけるグローバル化のパラダイム転換をどのように促進したかを問いかける。これは、一方では、言説ならびにマテリアルな次元で、この時期の東京がグローバル都市として再編成される経緯に映画がどのような役割を果たしたかという問いであり、他方では、グローバル化を背景とするさまざまな都市条件の変容がどのように映画の一般的な理解とその範囲を更新してきたかという問いでもある。映画と都市の相互依存的かつ対立的な関係を調査することで、この論文はグローバル化の文化的側面の重要性を強調し、グローバル・ネットワーク社会と呼ばれる現代にいて映画が果たし得る潜在的な政治性を探求する。とくに映画を研究対象とすることで、グローバル都市東京がいかにローカル、ナショナル、リージョナル、グローバルといった複数のスケールを横断した形で言説として、また、マテリアルな次元で構築されていることを可視化することも本論文の目的だ。そうしたスケールを横断した考察があきらかにするのは、この時期の映画文化が確かに行政や資本を主体とする都市開発の布石となった側面があったとしても、同時に周縁部の都市在住者の想像力の源泉となりえる基盤としても重要な役割を果たしたことだ。

　本論文の構成は、まず第1章で映画研究ならびに人文学の先行研究における東京の位置付けを整理する。次に、第2章で、映画が政府関係者とビジネス界によるグローバル都市のアジェンダを促進するものとして想定された文化として立ち現れた経緯を考察する。第3章では、新興映画上映空間としてのミニシアターの台頭をとりあげ、東京のグローバル化された都市状況を背景とした映画産業の構造変化を検討する。ここまでの章でまとめた背景を踏まえ第4章以降は特定の映画作品の分析に移る。第4章では、ヴィム・ヴェンダース監督の『東京画』（1985）をネットワークの視点から論じる。第5章では、『愛について、東京』（柳町光男、1992）および『Tokyo Skin』（塙幸成、1996）におけるディアスポラ中華系男性像の形成をとりあげ、草の根の協力の舞台として東京を位置付ける。言説ならびに物質的な東京の変容を具体的に分析する場として、以上の各章ではそれぞれ都内の異なるロケーションに着目する。

　本論文は、映画研究者によるグローバル都市への言及において総じて見過ごされがちな物質的な側面に着目することで映画を通した都市の想像をめぐる議論に新たなアプローチを提示する。それには映画研究と都市研究を領域横断的に架橋する作業が伴うが、双方の見解の一致ばかりでなく矛盾にも対峙することで、都市と映画を同時に考える行為の再帰的な理解を試みる。この論文で多様性や異質性を伴うグローバル都市の力学を映画を通じてあきらかにする究極的な目的は、より平等かつ相互依存的なグローバル社会のあり方を探求することにある。

EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. The Japanese film titles are presented first in Japanese, followed by English translation (e.g. *Ainitsuite, Tokyo/About Love, Tokyo*). After the first reference, which accompanies the information of the director's name and production year, only English titles are mentioned.

2. Names of East Asian origin (i.e. Chinese, Japanese and Korean) are written in the order of last name followed by first name, except when a name appears in the opposite order in a foreign publication.

3. Japanese words are Romanised following the Hepburn system, with the long vowels indicated by a macron (e.g. Ozu Yasujirō). But in the case of proper nouns like cities (e.g. Yurakucho) and company names (e.g. Shochiku), macron are not used.

4. Japanese words are written in italics except the words that have already been widely used in English (e.g. yakuza) or proper nouns like cities (e.g. Kamakura) and company names (e.g. Toho).

5. All translations from Japanese to English are my own unless otherwise stated in the notes and bibliographies.

6. Figures with no reference (i.e. Figure 3.7 and Figure 4.7) are created by me.

Introduction

The 42nd annual conference of the Japan Association of Economic Geographers

held in 1995 was themed 'Global City Theory: Tokyo' (*Sekai toshi ron: Tokyo*).

Although the original Japanese title could be translated as either 'world city' or 'global

city,' the discussions during the conference clarified that the focus was primarily on

Tokyo's status from the early 1980s onwards as a 'global city' alongside New York and

London, as popularised by Saskia Sassen's influential book *The Global City*.[1] Drawing

on Sassen, the participants argued that the global city symbolised the social-spatial

apparatus of the recent shifts in global capitalism, meaning that cities like Tokyo now

served the world's economic centres in the regulation of the global financial and service

sectors and were also open to an increasing influx of foreign workers.[2] The significance

of the conference, however, was not in its reiteration of Sassen's insights but the

problematisation of Tokyo's global city status. The conference was held on the heels of

the collapse of Japan's bubble economy in 1992, which signalled the gradual loss of

Tokyo's central position in global finance and perhaps in turn, a looming end of its

status as a global city. Amid this anxiety, many of the participants insisted on the

potential of Tokyo retaining this status through another means: from a 'cultural'

perspective. While the sociologist Machimura Takashi advocated for the reconstitution

of the concept of citizenship for a multicultural population in the global city, the

economist Narita Kōzō emphasised how the global city had made ethnic minorities

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[1] Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
[2] Japan Association of Economic Geographers, *Sekai toshi ron: Tokyo* (Japan Association of Economic Geographers, 1995).

within Japan, like *zainichi* Koreans (Koreans-in-Japan), increasingly visible.[3] In short, global city discourse, specifically that of Tokyo's, was shifting from its original economic framework to the more ambiguous realms of culture.

'The Global City Theory: Tokyo' conference serves as an ideal starting point for my thesis on the constitution of Tokyo as a global city via cinema for several reasons. Firstly, rather than excluding cultural aspects from the economic-centred discourse of globalisation, the conference correctly indicated the two as interdependent and inseparable in terms of constituting the social reality of Tokyo as a 'global city'. Serving as one of the most significant cultural aspects of Tokyo in the 1980s and 90s, cinema will be the main focus for my project's intervention within global city studies. Secondly, from a historiographical perspective, the conference was held at a watershed moment—namely, the mid-1990s—when Tokyo's global city imaginary was beginning to fade (whether this was a temporary suspension or a complete termination, however, remains a subject of debate). In my research, cinema—which I consider to include not only cinematic images, but also cinema infrastructure and filmmaking practices—serves as an effective means to observe and understand the emergence and evolution of Tokyo's global city imaginary. Thirdly, the conference's re-examination of the value and potential of the global city and its insistence on Tokyo being opened to the world echoes the politics and ethics of this thesis, which asserts the progressive and even radical potential of the global city via cinema, especially regarding the disturbance of social hierarchy and power structures in Japanese society.

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[3] Ibid.

Nonetheless, my thesis will not take the same social science approach of the scholars at the conference because I broadly consider their methods insufficient in several aspects. Firstly, the vision of these 'economic geographers' was mostly top-down. When they called for the development of regulatory methods on an official level to solve existing social and cultural problems, they largely neglected the degree of dynamism on a grassroots level. In contrast, cinema provides a concrete ground for us to see the culture of global city being negotiated by various actors, including underprivileged ones, before it took shape. Secondly, 'culture' was primarily conceived of as a means of addressing the social problems in Tokyo that arose or became apparent due to the growing influx of people across borders. Moreover, the 'culture' discussed in the meeting was mainly subordinated to political and economic considerations in solving such social problems. For this project, however, 'culture' is treated as a multifaced object of analysis in its own regard, allowing us to comprehend the development of a global networked society in Tokyo revolving around cinema. This, however, does not imply that official 'cultural' agendas will be neglected. Instead, I will closely examine the formation of 'cinema as culture' in official discourse alongside other film practices to delineate the various cultural facets of the global city. Thirdly, unlike the participants who believed that the global city should be salvaged to achieve economic and political goals, this project is devoted to exploring the cultural mechanism which rendered Tokyo 'global' in the first place. Taking cinema as a substantial object of analysis, this project makes legible the open-ended and contingent dynamics of globalisation. Neither celebrating or denying the changes brought by

globalisation, my emphasis on Tokyo's 'global city' status aims to both delineate and critically engage with the deterritorialised flows of global capitalism per se.

This thesis will investigate the constitution and urban ecology of Tokyo as a global city in the narrowly defined period of globalisation between the early-1980s to the mid-1990s via the complex material and immaterial ensemble of cinema. The symbiotic and interactive relationship between city and cinema are both extremely sophisticated concepts to unpack and serve as the departure point and focus of this project. Instead of subordinating either side for the study of the other, a contextualised and historicised examination of the dynamic interactions between the two will serve the project's innovative engagement with the subject. While existing scholarship has already correctly delineated how the development of cinema and city are inseparable in modern history—since cinema always serves as an important part of a city's urban infrastructure and the city has been vividly represented and creatively constituted via cinema—this research combines the materialist and discursive approaches to rethink their symbiotic relationship in an age of epistemic shifts and paradigm transitions. In other words, the idea of cinema as a complex ensemble of cultural concepts, artistic and political practices, material (infra)structures and specific images and texts may be enabled by and may itself enable the changing material-discursive network of the global city of Tokyo per se. As my opening example suggests, my thesis is mainly fuelled by a cultural-historical investigation into the city-cinema nexus, with its philosophical potential, political edges, and economic logics serving other supporting aspects to enrich the discussion.

Spatial theories serve as both the starting point and a target of intervention for this research, as the highly complex and contested concept of space provides a speculative ground to consider both the symbiotic and interactive relationship between city and cinema and a means of understanding the global city of Tokyo as a heterogenous network constituted by human and non-human agents. Firstly, space is an encompassing term that allows for a variety of intersections between city and cinema. In her recent book about 'filmed space' in Indian cinema, Priya Jaikumar studies the 'different but related varieties of (cinematic and social) space' which includes 'the representational space of a screen and its relation to profilmic spaces…institutional and pre-production contexts from which place-images emerge and to the circuits of their afterlives…the disciplinary, geographical, social, embodied, and geopolitical contexts that give meaning and power to such moving images.'[4] While Jaikumar sums up different kinds of spaces that are activated for or enabled by cinema, for this research, it is the very junctions and gaps between these spaces that are fundamental to my approach to Tokyo as a global city. In other words, I am interested in neither of these spaces alone nor their mere juxtaposition, but rather how spaces are generated and generative via cinema within the new social milieu of globalisation. In this way, my investigation will cut across various spatial systems—social, material, perceptual, imagistic, and especially those in-between—but still see them as integral to a larger urban system called the city. Following Henri Lefebvre's suggestion to unravel 'space as a product,' for which 'our knowledge of it must be expected to reproduce and expound the process of

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[4] Priya Jaikumar, *Where Histories Reside: India as Filmed Space* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), p. 7.

production,'[5] this research can be seen as the self-reflexive iteration of the city based on

its existing spatial complex. My articulation of 'the production of global city Tokyo',

however, aims not to reproduce one dominant and exclusive form of spatial knowledge,

but instead to unfold the intricacy of the city and leave its 'space' open. Thus, the

thesis's emphasis on space does not overlook time. As Lefebvre puts it vividly, 'in the

wake of this fetishization of space in the service of the state, philosophy and practical

activity …[one is] bound to seek a restoration of time.'[6] Although the problematic

relationship between space and time in the Western philosophical tradition needs to be

further delineated (and will be conducted in the literature review chapter), my research

remains focussed on shedding light on the major temporal regime and diversified

temporal experiences of the global city.

Despite the strong influence and many virtues of his spatial theories, this project

also consciously deviates from the Lefebvrean production of spatial tradition which as

Leif Jerram provocatively suggests, tends to elide materiality from space.[7] To bridge

the gap between space as a conventionally 'abstracted' concept and its material aspects

(usually considered as belonging to the notion of 'place'), the idea of mobilities serves

as the key concept for this research's materialist approach to space. Through the lens of

mobilities, space can be both the infrastructure and the subject of movement instead of

simply serving as a backdrop of human activity or the object of human intervention. For

mobilities scholars like John Urry, the so-called 'mobilities turn' echoes Bruno Latour's

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[5] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 36.
[6] Ibid., p.21.
[7] Leif Jerram, 'Space: A Useless Category for Historical Analysis?', *History and Theory*, 52 (2013), p. 411.

critique of humanism, which 'posits a disembodied cogito and especially human subjects able to think and act in some ways independent of their material worlds (Latour 1993; 2004).'[8] Following Urry's line of thought, I thus take the global city of Tokyo as a mobilities system, a complex network in which 'subjects are brought together and serve to develop extraordinary powers only because of the systems that implicate them, and especially of those systems that move them, or their ideas, or their information or various objects.'[9] Nevertheless, to critically engage with Urry's rather deterministic rhetoric, this research is also devoted to exploring how particular mobility systems were 'produced' in the first place. In other words, I believe the production of space and materialist space are largely compatible and complementary instead of contradictory. Rather than aimlessly stacking up spatial analyses, both approaches may serve my specific investigation of both the material conditions of Tokyo and the discourse of Tokyo as a global city. Chapters Two and Three mainly focus more on the process of the spatial constitution of the global city, and Chapters Four and Five will scrutinise the mobility system of the global city and its various flows that involve the movement and encounter of humans and objects. Various mobility systems of the global city, including physical movements via trains and trams and virtual movements via guidebooks and film texts, will thus be presented and discussed in this thesis.

Although space serves an important theoretical framework for my research, my central interest remains located in the junctures and interstices between city and cinema.

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[8] John Urry, *Mobilities* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 45.
[9] Ibid.

Two fundamental questions of this project are thus: 1) how did cinema help to constitute the material condition and discourse of Tokyo as a global city? 2) what roles did cinema serve in the global city's ecological system prior to its malfunction in the mid-1990s? Within the thesis, cinema serves as both a means to study the global city and a subject of investigation per se, mainly because cinema has always already served the constituent parts of the city and vice versa. On the one hand, cinema makes the global city visible and allows it to be perceived and understood by its audiences. More than simply representing the city, by making certain locations, groups of people, architecture, mobilities systems, or even virtual elements of the city more visible or less visible than the others, cinema also undoes and redoes the original economic and political production of the city and places the very idea of the 'global city' under investigation. From this perspective, cinema renders the global city a discourse that can be interpreted, discussed, and reconsidered. In a Foucauldian sense, cinema unveils the power structure of the global city by not only visualising the existing urban reality but also actively and selectively producing realities itself.[10] Methodologically speaking, this research will analyse film texts and their production, specifically in Chapters Four and Five, following this discursive approach. On the other hand, cinema as part of Tokyo's urban infrastructure also endows the global city with meanings—ones that can be either psychological, affective, or haptic. As a form of urban infrastructure, the question of how cinema facilitates 'the flow of goods, people, or ideas and allow for their exchange over space' within and beyond the global city may be specifically

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[10] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 194.

examined by cinema's shape of the speed and direction of people's movements in Tokyo.[11] Nevertheless, cinema is also 'inevitably part of various infrastructural "constellations" involving myriad other nonmedia-related networks.'[12] In this way, it requires us to conceive of cinema as a media object, as Shannon Mattern suggests; one that has been 'shaped across time' and 'networked across space.'[13] Infrastructural thinking enables us to think with the materiality of cinema and the city. Conducting an analysis that thinks with infrastructure, this research examines the distribution and exhibition network of cinema in Tokyo and its interconnection with other non-cinema networks that cut through the global city. There are thus multiple cinemas I am examining in this project, including but not limited to: cinema events that were institutionalised for the city's global reputation (Chapter Two and Four); cinema venues as part of the global city's infrastructure (Chapter Three); a 'world cinema' which provides a particular global imaginary situating Tokyo's position within the world (Chapter Four); and various forms of transnational encounter enabled by and imagined via cinema that put the global city into question (Chapter Five). Throughout my thesis, these aspects are always in negotiation and sometimes in conflict with each other.

A particular juncture between city and cinema that this thesis aims to tackle is scale, something which is implied in the ambivalent notion of the global city. In his recent book, Tiago de Luca critiques the view that the 'globe has an irreducibly spherical shape that denotes spatiality…it generates associations with maritime routes, digital

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[11] Brian Larkin, 'The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 2013 (2013), p. 328.
[12] Shannon Mattern, 'Scaffolding, Hard and Soft: Critical and Generative Infrastructures', in *The Routledge Companion to Media Studies and Digital Humanities*, ed. by Jentery Sayers (Florence: Routledge, 2018), p. 320.
[13] Ibid.

networks and electronic signals spreading over the world's surface, from global imperial expansionism all the way to global finance capital.'[14] For this reason, de Luca prefers terms like earth and planet, which 'resist abstract and anthropocentric connotations by evoking materialities, temporalities and processes above and beyond the human.'[15] I fully agree with de Luca's approach to these totality-generating terms by unveiling their various geo-political trajectories just as much as I share his appreciation of the materials of the world. Nevertheless, I believe the material aspects of the 'globe' that de Luca analyses may have been largely overlooked. The global city serves as a chance for us to resituate the discourse of the globe from a more materialist perspective. It helps to reveal the 'materialities, temporalities and process above and beyond the human' from abstract economic plans and political projects by not naively neglecting the latter and instead repositioning the material aspects as actors—not the decisive centre—of a network. This project will examine the various efforts in deploying cinema to scale Tokyo as either local, national, regional, or international. As Chapter Two and Three examine how different actors' instrumentalising cinema to assert different scales of Tokyo, Chapter Four and Five further explore the capability of cinema in producing scales that are readable to the film audiences, as Mary Ann Doane suggests in her book.[16] Considering cinema's capability of translating and arbitrating between various

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[14] Tiago de Luca, *Planetary Cinema: Film, Media and the Earth* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022), pp. 25-26.
[15] Ibid., p.26.
[16] See Mary Ann Doane, *Bigger Than Life: The Close-Up and Scale in the Cinema* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2021), pp. 17-18. Although my research does not directly look at the specific techniques such as the shot sizes, projection, and screen surfaces in managing the cinematic scales like Doane's project, the specific shot angles and composition of shots will be carefully analysed in the last two chapters.

nested scales as an ideological struggle with particular political incentives,[17] the

different scales of cinema per se—such as Japanese cinema, world cinema and

transnational cinema—will be further investigated by scrutinising how such discourses

are constituted via Tokyo's urban cultural networks.

This project's extensive scope and elastic methodologies, which combine textual

analysis of films with discursive and material analysis of Tokyo's city-cinema nexus,

implies a transdisciplinary approach to a complex research subject. As Sam Griffiths

and Alexander von Lünen suggest, instead of conceiving of the city as a cohesive

system, urban studies scholars ought to instead 'articulate the multidimensional

complexity of urban realities.'[18] This is the reason I position my research in the realm

of transdisciplinary studies instead of more familiar interdisciplinary or

multidisciplinary fields. As Thierry Ramadier persuasively advocates, 'complexity can

be approached only through transdisciplinarity,'[19] since the interdisciplinary approach

tends to merely draw compatible parts from different disciplines to produce largely

simplified knowledge and the multidisciplinary approach mostly juxtaposes disciplinary

differences together without critically engaging with the conflicts between them.[20]

Similarly, Rosi Braidotti conceives transdisciplinarity from a Deleuzian fashion as it

'affects the very structure of thought and enacts a rhizomatic embrace of conceptual

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[17] Neil Smith, 'Geography, Difference and the Politics of Scale', in *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*, eds. by Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham, and Mo Malek (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), pp. 72-76.

[18] Sam Griffiths and Alexander von Lünen, *Spatial Cultures: Towards a New Social Morphology of Cities Past and Present* (London: Routledge, 2016), p. xxii.

[19] Thierry Ramadier, 'Transdisciplinarity and Its Challenges: The Case of Urban Studies', *Futures*, 36 (2004), p. 425.

[20] Ibid., pp.433-435.

diversity in scholarship.'[21] Braidotti's rhizomatic conception of transdisciplinarity, I argue, allows us to further understand the 'conflicts' between different forms of knowledge production which exist in constant interaction and negotiation instead of being essentially separating from each other.

The transdisciplinary approach of this thesis primarily aims to revise the existing cinema studies scholarship on Tokyo as a cinematic city by integrating relevant concepts and analysis from the discipline of urban studies. On one hand, within the conventions of cinema studies, as I will elaborate in detail in Chapter One, the visual representation of Tokyo enables the exploration of both the objective (topography) and subjective (human experience and identity) aspects of the city. On the other hand, the critical employment of urban studies concepts (e.g., 'advertising city' and 'media capital' in Chapter Two, 'cultural imagineering' and 'urban deregulation' in Chapter Four) and analysis (e.g., the study of location and architecture of the mini-theatres in Chapter Three, and the examination of debates surrounding the cultural geographical concept of *kōgai*) enables us to grasp the fragmented urban space on screen from a historicised perspective—that is achieved by making visible the rationale of urban planning and the contingency of local occurrences.

Comparing the city as depicted on screen with the city as materially shaped, however, does not imply that I fully endorse the positivist tendency in urban studies and subordinate the former to the latter. As Patricia Pisters reminds us through Gilles Deleuze, the power of cinema lies not only in its ability to visualise the virtual, but more

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[21] Cosetta Veronese, 'Can the Humanities Become Post-Human? Interview with Rosi Braidotti', *Relations*, 4.1 (2016), p. 98.

importantly in its capacity to bridge the virtual and the actual, allowing us to navigate between various layers of 'reality.'[22] Thus, I am leveraging the divergent approaches to the city in cinema studies and urban studies—rooted fundamentally in different dimensions of reality—as an opportunity to reconsider the dynamic relationship between cinema and the city. Specifically, I am intrigued by the exploration of how and why the urban imaginaries facilitated by cinema have or have not been actualised, and what constitutes the material infrastructure for the actualisation to occur in the first place.

Through a transdisciplinary lens, various dimensions of Tokyo as a cinema-city are examined. In this thesis, the enactment of cultural policies in Tokyo, the reform of cultural institutions, the establishment of international film festivals, the phenomenon of the mini-theatre boom, the emergence of urban female spectatorship, an essay film made by a world-famous auteur and the racialised and sexualised bodies of Chinese immigrants are not always compatible and certainly do not enable a cohesive image of Tokyo as a global city. It is only by carefully examining the gaps and paradoxes that exist between these elements, I argue, that we may achieve a reflexive understanding of the global city's complexity and render knowledge in a fully contextualised and situated manner.

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[22] Patricia Pisters, *The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 3-4.

Chapter Overview

This thesis is organised into seven chapters: an introductory chapter, a literature review chapter, four main chapters, and a conclusion. In this current introductory chapter, I delineate the research questions, theoretical frameworks, transdisciplinary methods, chapter outline, and anticipated contribution of this thesis. The introduction is followed by a literature review that considers the significance of Tokyo in existing cinema studies and humanities scholarship. I not only list the many attempts to understand Tokyo via cinema and vice versa but also scrutinise the respective philosophical, political, and methodological trajectories behind existing studies. I especially pay attention to how Tokyo in the 1980s and 90s has been studied, theorised, and criticised via the lens of cinema and identify the gaps and opportunities for further research.

In Chapter Two, I look at cinema as a particular form of 'culture' shaping Tokyo's global-ness on a discursive and material basis. This is not to deny the prominence of economic and financial activities but to highlight various economic, political, and cultural forces as inseparable and reciprocal. Instead of essentialising the notion of 'culture,' however, this chapter starts with by scrutinising the rise of cultural policy in Japan. Examining how culture has been instrumentalised, specifically via the municipal government's newly established cultural institutions, to resolve a series of local and international issues, I complicate the idea of culture as a (geo-)political problem for government officials in Tokyo. I examine how cinema, as a specific form of culture, was conceived and operated by government officials and their commercial partners— whether this be successfully, ambiguously, or ineffectually—to serve Tokyo's urban

development agendas. For case studies, I firstly highlight the Tokyo International Film Festival (TIFF) as a remarkable cultural event which manifested the global city that the officials envisioned. In particular, I scrutinise the urban site of Shibuya where the 1st TIFF took place to demonstrate the underlying power structures of such a flamboyant international cultural event. Eventually, by comparatively analysing the Japan Foundation's film festival series (with the TIFF), this chapter indicates how cinema was gradually institutionalised throughout the 1980s to serve Tokyo's 'globalised local' cultural agenda.

While government officials emphasised cinema as a key form of culture for the global city, the cinema infrastructure in Tokyo was also undergoing transformation alongside the rise of globalisation in popular discourse. In Chapter Three, I use the mini-theatre—a new type of cinema space popularised in Tokyo in the 1980s—as an anchor to discuss the changes that were brought to Japanese cinema by the idea and practices of globalisation. This chapter highlights the film industry's structural shift as contingent yet highly relevant to the existing *jishu* (autonomous)-commercial film networks in Tokyo. In other words, although globalisation provided a new rhetoric for Japanese film practitioners to reassert the value of cinema and package it anew to audiences in Tokyo, the mini-theatres' success in the 1980s was inseparable from the continuous exploration of a sustainable relationship between the production side and exhibition sites in drawing new audiences into cinema. In the third chapter, I initially delineate the constitution and evolvement of the *jishu*-commercial network via specific film venues in Tokyo since the 1970s. I then move to the mini-theatres' urban strategies, especially locating and guiding, to illustrate the development and fruition of

the local film network's enduring experiments in the 1980s. Eventually, by critically

engaging with certain cinephiles' backlash against the newly emerged urban female

audiences in Tokyo's mini-theatre boom, I demonstrate how the locally-rooted

industrial reconfiguration of cinema was imagined and interpreted via the newly

popularised discourse of globalisation. Comparing the complaints against female

audiences with the criticism towards Tokyo's global city status, showcases how

globalisation acted as a force to unveil the contradictions that existed within the local

realm of cinema.

The first two main chapters provide the contextual ground for the next two chapters

of the thesis that focus on how particular films imagined, confused and disrupted

Tokyo's global city conditions. The fourth chapter examines Wim Wenders' canonical

diary film *Tokyo-Ga* (1985) by historicising the German filmmaker's journey to Tokyo

in 1983. Departing from the often-emphasised postmodernist readings of the film, this

chapter scrutinises the intersections between the globalised local film networks in

Tokyo and the institutions of world cinema to understand Wenders' perception of

Tokyo as 'institutionally mobilised'. Tracing the various urban locations of Wenders'

visit to Ginza, Yurakucho, Hibiya, Kabukicho, and Kamakura, this chapter not only

contextualises the exotic landscape in *Tokyo-Ga* as part of Tokyo's global city agenda

but also critically repositions these sites as the infrastructure of a newly-

metamorphosised 'world cinema' under globalisation. In contrast to Chapter Four's

emphasis on the institutions of world cinema in Tokyo, the fifth chapter turns to the

grassroots film networks in Tokyo and sheds light on the transnational cinema of the

Chinese diasporas. Analysing two independent films made collaboratively by Japanese

and Chinese casts and crews, namely *About Love, Tokyo* (Yanagimachi Mitsuo, 1993) and *Tokyo Skin* (Hanawa Yukinari, 1996), this chapter considers the transformation of the locations and mobility of diasporic Chinese males in Tokyo as symptomatic of the changing social and cultural conditions of Tokyo's global city status and imagination. Using transnational Chinese masculinity in Tokyo to map the limits of the global city respectively in the Arakawa riverbank in Ibaraki and Roppongi along the Yamanote Line nexuses, Chapter Five exposes the fracture in the global city promises made in the 1990s and reapproaches the fall and persistence of its (multi-)cultural agenda— something which also echoes the questions raised by 'economic geographers' in the very beginning of the thesis.

In summary, this project surveys the various facets of Tokyo as a global city via cinema by adopting the transdisciplinary methods of discursive analysis, textual analysis, and studies of materiality. This research fills gaps in urban studies scholarship, which tends to overlook the influence of cinema in the constitution of urban discourse and materiality. It also contributes to cinema studies scholarship by delineating the significance of Tokyo in relation to the changing discourse, infrastructure, and practices of cinema during the 1980s and 1990s. Offering a materialist approach, this research further complements studies of the city-cinema nexus, which tend to prioritise film texts against material space. Although the thesis is divided into four main chapters, with each chapter focusing on one specific dimension of the global city, there are many intersections between the chapters, thereby indicating the intricacy of my subject of research. Each of the chapters, for example, presents various urban locations: some are the representative districts of the global city like Shibuya, Ginza, and Roppongi; others

are less internationally well-known places like Shibamata, Ōmori, and the Arakawa riverbank or even locations outside of Tokyo including Kamakura and Ibaraki. As each of the locations contains its specific set of temporalities and spatialities, one may notice how they are put into various assemblages in different chapters to tell distinctive stories.

In one sense, this thesis aims to serve as a map to navigate its readers through the global city. Nevertheless, instead of providing an official guide that circumscribes spaces and demarcates boundaries to impose power, it enables a self-reflexive cartographic practice that makes visible the various socio-historical trajectories and cultural-political networks embedded in Tokyo's physical and virtual spaces. Just like the many options that one may have when moving within Tokyo, this thesis also gives its readers several options by which to 'move' within the global city that it maps. For instance, one may read the first two main chapters together as the deployment of cinema in the city and move to the last two chapters to see how the city was depicted in cinema; one may also read the second and fourth chapters together to understand the institutionalised cultural sphere of Tokyo and then find alternative routes out of the dominant landscape of the global city in the third and fifth chapters; or one can simply follow certain locations that appear in different chapters to compare how they are differently discussed. Although my thesis departs from and focuses on the discourse and materiality of the global city, it does not aim to assign the city a position. Instead, it highlights how various scales—local, national, regional, international, global—overlap within the physical and imaginary entities of Tokyo. Overall, then, my thesis invites readers to time travel to the global city of Tokyo in the 1980s and 90s by offering

several travel plans. Individual rewards and experiences may vary during the journey,

but that is exactly the goal of this thesis: to tell both the singular and the plural version

of Tokyo's story.

Chapter One - Literature Review: Rethinking the City-Cinema Nexus in the

Context of Globalisation

This chapter traces the significance of Tokyo in the fields of cinema studies and

humanities in general and compares the different approaches to conceiving Tokyo's

relationship with cinema both in anglophone and Japanese scholarship. First, I offer a

glimpse into the many attempts to theorise the intricate interrelations and dynamic

interactions between space and place and the discursive and material dimensions of the

city via the visual media of cinema. I then pay specific attention to studies of the 1980s

and 1990s Tokyo via cinema, examining how the emerging discourse of globalisation

has been taken into consideration by existing research while also shedding light on the

gaps and missed opportunities that have yet to be investigated. As this chapter reviews

the various approaches to the problem of the cinema-city nexus, it illuminates the

potential overlaps and tensions between these perspectives, hinting at a possible

transdisciplinary analysis that leverages the advantages and strengths of each approach.

Tokyo on Screen: Representing the City of Instability

At the beginning of his recent article on the cinema of Tokyo in the 1950s, Alastair

Phillips claims that 'Tokyo is a place that resists any sense of enduring stability.'[23]

Instead of making an arbitrary assertion, what Phillips specifically refers to here is

scholarly discourse that highlights the difficulty of conceiving of the Japanese city in

any uniform and unified fashion. The constitution of such discourse is largely correlated

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[23] Alastair Phillips, 'The City: Tokyo 1958', in *The Japanese Cinema Book*, eds. by Hideaki
Fujiki and Alastair Phillips (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), p. 419.

to the extremely volatile physical status of the city in its modern developmental history. As scholars like Catherine Russell, Phillips, and Yoshimi Shunya have mentioned,[24] the large-scale destruction and the consequent reconstruction projects of landmark events like the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1923, the US firebombing in 1944 and 45, and the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 continue to serve the configuration of Tokyo's unstable position. For Donald Richie, these massive events of destruction and reconstruction have directly caused Tokyo's lack of a uniform urban style both in terms of space (e.g. its lack of historical buildings) and time ('The past style is no longer visible').[25] As Richie suggests, Tokyo's lack of urban style, as a discourse, is always a relative one in comparison to cities like 'Venice, Bruges, Amsterdam, Rome, Paris' that are believed to 'have individual styles' in terms of space or 'New York, Rome, Istanbul' that 'are still knit together by remains of their pasts.'[26]

Of the many attempts to locate the decisive feature of Tokyo in the West, Roland Barthes' approach in *Empire of Signs* is arguably the most influential. Barthes elevated Tokyo's unstable status to a semiotic level by emphasising the cartographic void produced by the socially inaccessible and politically mal-functioning imperial palace which occupies the central position of Tokyo's geography.[27] While people like Richie seem to be more uneasy about the city's rapidly changing urban landscape, Barthes' approach is clearly associated with his grand plan in *Empire of Signs*, which is to address a unique semiotic system via Japan. Since the publication of his book, Barthes'

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[24] Catherine Russell, 'Tokyo, the Movie', *Japan Forum*, 14.2 (2002), p. 212; Phillips, 'The City: Tokyo 1958', p. 419; Yoshimi Shunya, *Tokyo uragaeshi: shakaigaku teki machiaruki gaido* (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2020), p. 19.
[25] Donald Richie, *Tokyo: A View of the City* (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), p. 11.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Roland Barthes, *Empire of Signs* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), pp. 30-32.

semiotic analysis has kindled debates mainly revolving around whether it should be seen as an Orientalist text 'based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between the "Orient" and the "Occident"' thereby further reinforcing 'a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient'.[28] For those participating in the Orientalist debate—whether this be Catherine Russell who considers 'Barthes' observations may be couched in a particular modernist Orientalism that finds difference inscribed in everything Japanese'[29] or Joanne P. Sharp who argues 'Barthes subverts the structure of Orientalism from within'[30]—all agree, however, that Barthes acutely foregrounded (yet also problematically appropriated) the highly discursive nature of Tokyo. Nevertheless, these discursive attributions should not be essentialised as unique to Tokyo. From the 1980s, a growing trend in humanities and social science scholarships deemed the 'spatial turn' emphasised 'an increased awareness of the socially constructed attributes of space, and the open and dynamic nature of spatiality as a constitutive element in the formation of, for example, structures of identity, place, embodiment, relationality and mobility, as well as everyday patterns of social and cultural practice.'[31] In this way, other than the largely totalised concept of the city, the very fundamental idea of 'space' is also activated for deconstruction.

It thus becomes imperative for scholars to find a way to articulate the city of Tokyo as a discourse that is always in flux. According to Phillips, there are generally three

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[28] Diana Knight, 'Barthes and Orientalism', *New Literary History*, 24.3 (1993), p. 617.
[29] Russell, 'Tokyo, the Movie', p. 211.
[30] Joanne P. Sharp, 'Writing Travel/Travelling Writing: Roland Barthes Detours the Orient', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 20 (2020), p. 155.
[31] Richard Koeck and Les Roberts, 'Introduction: Projecting the Urban', in *The City and the Moving Image: Urban Projections*, eds. by Richard Koeck and Les Roberts (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 6.

methods to approaching Tokyo in existing humanities scholarship. The first is the topographical method adopted by scholars like Jinnai Hidenobu. For Jinnai, what is retained throughout Tokyo's developmental history is the continuous reproduction of the city's social sphere around its specific topography—namely the high hills of the 'Yamanote' and low valleys of the 'shitamachi'.[32] The second method tends to prioritise early modern urban experience and identity formation in the modern capital. Besides Henry D. Smith, who is mentioned by Phillips, intellectuals in Japan who led the Tokyo-ron (Tokyo Theory) boom in the 1980s, represented by Maeda Ai and Isoda Kōichi, have similarly emphasised the virtuality embedded in Tokyo's streets and the prolonged influence of Edo to contemporary Tokyo's daily experience and identity,[33] to pin down the 'ongoing, shifting, and flowing temporality of everyday' life in Tokyo.[34] Eventually, the third method integrates the topographical approach with the socio-historical one and considers both spatial and temporal aspects of the city indispensable to constituting Tokyo as a 'modern text'.[35]

The third method has been most creatively adopted by existing cinema studies scholarship in interpreting Tokyo on the filmic screen and further theorising Tokyo's relationship with cinema via the material conditions and imaginations of modernity. Diane Wei Lewis, for instance, discusses how films that depicted the Great Kantō Earthquake exploited 'dissonance between spatial cues and tactile cues in their

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[32] Hidenobu Jinnai, *Tokyo: A Spatial Anthropology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 11.
[33] Maeda Ai, *Gengei no machi: bungaku no toshi o aruku* (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1986); Isoda Kōichi 'Shisō toshite no Tokyo', in *Isoda Kōichi chosakushū* (Tokyo: Ozawa Shoten, 1991), V, pp. 11–87.
[34] Phillips, 'The City: Tokyo 1958', p. 420.
[35] Ibid.

photography of Tokyo's ruins' to construct the affective regime of modernity in the 1920s.[36] Similarly, Misono Ryōko analyses Tokyo in Ozu Yasujirō's films made in the 1930s to delineate the intermeshing of imperial, colonial, and cosmopolitan imaginaries embedded within the cinematic representation of Japan's modern capital.[37] In Wada-Marciano's seminal book which demonstrates the particular condition of the 'Japanese modern' via Japanese cinema in the 1920s and 1930s, she argues that the cinematic representation of Tokyo not only signified Japan's modern transformations, but also played an active role in constituting the experience and perception of modernity for Japan's modern middle-class subjects.[38] For the researchers mentioned above, Tokyo as a 'modern text' contained both a general impression of industrialisation and urbanisation alongside the specific imaginary of the imperial and colonial capital in East Asia.

While more studies focus on how cinematic representation and urban space reciprocally interacted in the constitution of Japan's vernacular modernity in the 1920s and 30s, Phillips' article 'The City: Tokyo 1958' investigates the cinematic representation of Tokyo in a very particular 'transitional year for both the Japanese film industry and the wider culture of the nation as a whole.'[39] Analysing three films released in 1958 which differ greatly in narrative and production background, Phillips suggests that since it is impossible to approach Tokyo in terms of fixity and as a holistic

[36] Diane Wei Lewis, *Powers of the Real: Cinema, Gender, and Emotion in Interwar Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019), p. 11.
[37] Ryōko Misono, 'Suspense and Border Crossing: Ozu Yasujirō's Crime Melodrama', in *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Cinema*, eds. by Joanne Bernardi and Shota T. Ogawa (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2021), pp. 13–30.
[38] Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, *Nippon Modern: Japanese Cinema of the 1920s and 1930s* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), pp. 6-7 & pp. 18-20.
[39] Phillips, 'The City: Tokyo 1958', p. 432.

image, a contextualised and comparative examination of the city on screen may reveal a general tendency of the city's social and cultural conditions while not overlooking the heterogeneous nature of urban experience.[40] Phillips' attempts to articulate and make visible the ever-shifting and elusive urban imaginary of Tokyo via cinema instantiates Catherine Russell's call to see Tokyo as 'a representational process, and an ongoing representational practice'.[41] For Russell who articulates the idea of Tokyo as a 'cinematic city', the cinematic image is thus not merely a reflection of Tokyo's topographical traits and sociohistorical happenings, but a cartographic practice of mapping the city anew via its constitution of new spatial and temporal imaginaries associated with the discourse of Tokyo. In this way, Russell is acute in claiming that cinema has transformed—and has always been transforming—Tokyo into a virtual site that is 'constantly reproducing itself as a discursive system.'[42]

While the ambitions of the cinematic city approach are to use cinema 'to express and to designate the absent, unrepresentable totality' of the city in the way Fredrick Jameson suggests,[43] the tensions between the city on screen and the filmed city remains largely underexplored in terms of its method and scope. In tracing the genealogy of the theory of spatiality, the idea of the cinematic city broadly engages more with what Michel de Certeau calls 'space' rather than 'place'. The conventional rivalry conception of place and space theorised by de Certeau suggests that in contrast to place, 'an

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[40] Ibid.
[41] Russell, 'Tokyo, the Movie', p. 224.
[42] Ibid., p.211.
[43] Fredric Jameson, *The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 10.

instantaneous configuration of positions…an indication of stability,'[44] space 'is composed of intersections of mobile elements' that contain temporal dimensions.[45] Using de Certeau's division to look at the cinematic city approach, cinema is itself a spatial practice that contains a temporal dimension and can bring changes to stagnant urban places. Nevertheless, such clear-cut distinctions between space and place have so far sparked various contentions and become an ideal departure point for scholars to develop their discussions about the spatiality of cinema. In their invigorating piece in defence of 'place' in cinema studies, Elena Gorfinkel and John David Rhodes tactically redirect space as a 'uniform property of cinema' and place 'as a strikingly heterogeneous and specific element recorded by or sensible in a film.'[46] Referring to Stephen Heath's concept of 'narrative space', which is centred on narrative cinema's 'translation of a specific view of a specific place in the world into an abstract unit of narration',[47] Gorfinkel and Rhodes argue narrative cinema tends to abstract the particularity of the world into an ideologically coherent scene, thus space in narrative cinema can be seen as an outcome of homogenisation.[48] Gorfinkel and Rhodes claim that carefully examining profilmic 'place', namely the spatial details on screen that are not necessarily subordinate to the diegetic rule, aids in widening dimensions beyond the film's plot and enables place to be a constructive force for subjectivity and collective formation.[49]

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[44] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 117.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Elena Gorfinkel and John David Rhodes, 'Introduction: The Matter of Places', in *Taking Place: Location and the Moving Image*, eds. by Elena Gorfinkel and John David Rhodes (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), p. xii.
[47] Ibid., p.xiii.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., p.ix.

While Gorfinkel and Rhodes emphasise place over space, Doreen Massey further problematises the convention in Western philosophy that tends to subordinate space (understood here as a more general concept that contains both place and space) to time when discussing forces of potentiality and change.[50] Criticising Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze's division between the *discrete* difference/multiplicity of space when referring to the dimension of separation and *continuous* difference/multiplicity of time when referring to the dimension of continuum,[51] Massey argues space was often merely treated as a static means of separating and fixing temporal change instead of understanding the potential force of change and 'becoming'.[52] For Massey, what is at stake is the conception of space as the 'dimension of a multiplicity of durations' and thus *continuous* multiplicity.[53] Instead of considering spatiality as a site to stabilise the fickle temporality of representation, Massey calls for our attention to recognise the simultaneity of other realities and other possibilities 'equally "present" though with their own histories' in space.[54] In other words, it becomes important to investigate whether space is represented as multivocal and continues to emerge through each and every interaction [55] and if cinema provides the audience with a space for imagining the other realities as equal and coeval instead of merely creating an illusion of totality. If Gorfinkel and Rhodes cling to the term 'place' 'as a tactic…to resist the forces (ideological, material, rhetorical) that have threatened to flatten our notion of the uniqueness, the power, and the political potential of both place and the moving

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[50] Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2005), pp. 20-30.
[51] Ibid., p.21.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid., p.24
[54] Ibid., p.80.
[55] Ibid., p.71.

image,'[56] Massey's emancipation of space suggests an intricate interrelationship between space and place instead of its binary opposition. Following Massey's approach, Malina Guha explores the relationship between migrant figures and the topographies of global cities (specifically of Paris and London) in cinema,[57] which showcases how the challenges of the place-space binary may also open a chance of locating less visible 'others.' In this way, the profilmic place highlighted by Gorfinkel and Rhodes can be more nuancedly understood as the scrutiny of the historicity of the cinematic city, which tends to not discriminate between place, space, and time but instead conceive them as mutually constitutive and co-evolving in a dynamic process.

Cinema in Tokyo: The Practices, Networks, and Infrastructure of Urban Space

While cinematic representation actively (re-)constitutes Tokyo as an ongoing and ever-shifting discourse, in the scholarship of studying Tokyo as a 'modern text,' we can see that the discursive construction of the cinematic city is inseparable from other material aspects such as the cinematic infrastructure in Tokyo and the filmmaking practices that occur within the city. Such aspects have already been pointed out in cinema studies scholarship in general. As Barbara Mennel puts it, citing scholars like Ian Christie and Tom Gunning,[58] cinema delivered the spatio-temporal experience of modernity not only through the moving image but also via its material operations within

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[56] Gorfinkel and Rhodes, 'Introduction: The Matter of Places', p. xii.
[57] Malini Guha, *From Empire to the World: Migrant London and Paris in the Cinema* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015).
[58] Ian Christie, *The Last Machine: Early Cinema and the Birth of the Modern World* (London: BBC–BFI, 1994); Tom Gunning, 'The Birth of Film out of the Spirit of Modernity', in *Masterpieces of Modernist Cinema*, ed. by Ted Perry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp. 13–40.

the city, which included the establishing of movie houses in places where the urban

population could easily access modern entertainment, the setting up of routes to

distribute movies across sites, and the location of human and non-human resources for

filmmaking.[59] In the particular case of Japan, as Peter B. High implies, the arrival of

cinema in Tokyo in 1897 was largely down to the existing middle-class urban

infrastructure in the Kanda area.[60] In a similar vein, Aaron Gerow points out how

cinema not only contributed to but also was regarded as the main cause of Tokyo's new

and threatening version of modern life in the Asakusa district in the 1910s.[61] Looking at

the cases presented by High and Gerow, it is fair to argue that cinema and Tokyo have

intertwined with and constantly transformed and reinforced each other, both materially

and discursively, since the very first days of their encounter. Nevertheless, in

comparison to the arrival of cinema in Kanda's Kinkikan theatre as a provisional

measure for exhibition, the Asakusa district in the early 20th century became partially

built around cinema as a popular mass entertainment. In this way, rather than

generalising their nexus, it becomes necessary for us to briefly review the changing

relationship between cinema and Tokyo in terms of materiality and practices in different

historical moments throughout history.

The industrial structure of the film studios has been considered one of the pivots by

which to unpack the dynamic relationship between cinema and cities in studies of

Japanese modernity. Before the 1920s, besides the prominence of movie theatres in

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[59] Barbara Mennel, *Cities and Cinema* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 6-8.
[60] Peter B. High, 'The Dawn of Cinema in Japan', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 19.1 (1984), pp. 23–57.
[61] Aaron Gerow, *Visions of Japanese Modernity: Articulations of Cinema, Nation, and Spectatorship, 1895-1925* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), pp. 52-65.

Asakusa, film studios' production infrastructure in places like Mukojima (Nikkatsu) and Kamata (Shochiku) has been regarded as proof of Tokyo's status as a national film centre. Daisuke Miyao, for instance, mentions the dominant status of Nikkatsu's Mukojima production facility to the 'Japanese cinema in the second decade of the twentieth century.'[62] Nevertheless, the devastating Kantō earthquake in 1923 led most of the major film studios in Tokyo to instantly relocate their production facilities to the Kansai region in cities like Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe.[63] According to Lewis, in the decade since the earthquake, the Kansai region began to be recognised as the 'new centre of Japanese motion picture production' and 'Kyoto became known as the "Hollywood of Japan."'[64] Instead of overlooking the Kansai region's established cinema infrastructure and film culture before the Kantō earthquake, the disaster did enable a leap for the region's film industry as Sasagawa Keiko indicates.[65] Among the film studios, however, the Shochiku company only temporarily left Tokyo and moved back as soon as 1924, largely in part because the geographical and topographical features of it home in the Kamata area prevented the studio from destruction.[66] For Wada-Marciano, it was Shochiku's resilience which allowed it to surpass Nikkatsu and 'became the most prolific and influential studio for the creation of the "modern" cinema' in Japan. She also asserts that the material connection between Tokyo and 'Shochiku Kamata's brand of *gendaigeki* (contemporary film) is indispensable to grasp the historical basis for the cinema's reciprocal relationship with the cultural modernity

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[62] Daisuke Miyao, *The Aesthetics of Shadow: Lighting and Japanese Cinema* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013), p. 39.
[63] Lewis, *Powers of the Real*, pp. 35-36.
[64] Ibid., p.35.
[65] Sasagawa Keiko, *Kindai ajia no eiga sangyō* (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2018), pp. 158-159.
[66] Lewis, *Powers of the Real*, p. 36.

that fully bloomed in Tokyo during the period.'[67] In this way, what Wada-Marciano emphasises is the persistence of film production and the continuous evolvement of film culture in Tokyo alongside the city's modern urban development, despite the general shift of industrial operation to the Kansai region after the earthquake.

While scholars have delineated Tokyo's central role in film production under the studio system, 'cinema in Tokyo' scholarship really begins to proliferate under the conditions of the post-studio era. If during the pre-war and wartime period, the entire nation (in addition to the colonies of the Japanese Empire) was the target of film distribution, film studios from the 1960s began a decades-long transition towards a more locally based post-studio ecology. It is widely believed that the decline of cinema as a form of mass culture in Japan started in the year 1959: the number of film-viewing audiences had reached its peak at 1.127 billion one year earlier.[68] In addition, 1959 saw the rising popularity of television, cited as a key cause of the slump of cinema in the following decades.[69] As the film studios started to cut their budgets and the scale of their film productions, the film industry's vertical and centralised industrial structure also began to loosen. A younger generation of filmmakers began to emerge within the studios, with the most widely known examples being Oshima Nagisa of Shochiku's 'New Wave' directors, Imamura Shōhei, and Shinoda Masahiro, all of whom would leave to start their own independent film production companies.[70] In the 1960s,

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[67] Wada-Marciano, *Nippon Modern*, p.5 & pp. 18-20.
[68] Satō Tadao, *Japanese Film History III*, trans. by Ying Xiong (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2016), p. 18.
[69] As the film industry faced regression in the 1960s, the audience numbers per year shrunk to only 0.258 billion in 1970. In comparison, television audiences increased by 10 times between 1958 to 1963. See Ibid.
[70] David Desser, *Eros Plus Massacre: An Introduction to the Japanese New Wave Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 9.

numerous independent filmmakers joined leftist youth and avant-garde artists in

participating in political activism. At the same time, less politically-driven and self-

organised *jishu* (autonomous) film groups also proliferated, ranging 'from middle-aged

men to university and high school students.'[71] Despite all these newly emerged actors in

filmmaking, the film studios were far from being irrelevant since they still retained the

mass production of their popular 'program pictures' and held power in film distribution

and exhibition.[72] Now, with all these branches mingling together, the city of Tokyo

became simultaneously a space of coexistence and a site of contestation. As Phillips

highlights, the gaps, connections, and tensions between Ozu Yasujirō's studio

production *Equinox Flower* (*Higanbana*), Imamura Shohei's B-movie *Nishi Ginza*

Station (*Nishi Ginza ekimae*), and the experimental filmmaking group Cinema 58's non-

commercial, nonfiction work *Tokyo 1958*, all made in the watershed year of 1958,

reveal how the various scales of film production in Tokyo may offer different

interpretations of the city.[73] In this way, how film is specifically practiced vis-à-vis

Tokyo needs to be contextualised in order to unravel an increasingly intricate situation

in which everything becomes simultaneously scattered and networked.

Taking the 1960s—a decade known as Japan's 'season of politics'—as an example,

we can see how Tokyo had once again become the centre of film production and film

culture in Japan. The Shinjuku district, and especially its recently established

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[71] Alexander Zahlten, 'Media Models of "Amateur" Film and Manga', in *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Cinema* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2020), p. 162.

[72] According to Donald Richie, program pictures were film series mass-produced by large film studios with the same reoccurring film star, a generic convention, and a linearly developed storyline. See Donald Richie, *A Hundred Years of Japanese Film* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2005), p. 213.

[73] Phillips, 'The City: Tokyo 1958', pp. 419–35.

Kabukicho entertainment street, became the major site where leftist students, independent filmmakers, and avant-garde artists gathered. The assemblage of cinema in Shinjuku during the 1960s was particularly relevant to the instant urban reality of the city. Shinjuku was one of the centres of political activism against the United States–Japan Security Treaty, or *Anpo*,[74] and the turmoil surrounding it inspired filmmakers to adopt a style of direct action in filmmaking. The streets, parks, plaza, and subway station of Shinjuku all became sites where cinema took place: Shinjuku station, which carries the busiest crowds of the city's transportation network,[75] provided both the stage and actors for experimental works like Oshima Nagisa's *Diary of a Shinjuku Thief* (*Shinjuku dorobō nikki*, 1968); the lively cultural scene of Shinjuku station's underground plaza, where thousands of people met 'to sing protest songs, debate politics and agitate against the perceived political order of capitalism and the revival of military state hegemony,'[76] was documented by its participants; and in the bars and restaurants of Kabukicho, filmmakers met artists and activists to discuss their political goals and artistic visions, in the hope their worlds might turn into a film in the next few days.[77] Eventually, it was through the Shinjuku Bunka Theatre of the Art Theatre Guild (the ATG) where these spontaneous movements met and crisscrossed. Starting as a

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[74] A deal made during the US occupation period in Japan, the US-Japan Security Treaty was 'an instrument that allows the United States to maintain military bases on Japanese soil.' The *Anpo* protest was a nationwide movement that continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s to prevent a revision of the treaty that was supposed to expire in 1960. See Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromises after Anpo* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), p. 5.
[75] Yoshimi Shunya, *Toshi no doramatorugi: Tokyo-sakariba no shakai shi* (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1987), pp. 269-270.
[76] Peter Eckersall, 'The Emotional Geography of Shinjuku: The Case of Chikatetsu Hiroba (Underground Plaza, 1970)', *Japanese Studies*, 31.3 (2011), pp. 333-334.
[77] Tamura Masaki and Aoyama Shinji, *Suigan no machi: Goruden-Gai* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinsho, 2007).

distribution company specialising in foreign art-house cinema in 1962 and supported by Toho's subsidiary distribution corporation Toho Towa, the ATG transitioned into an organisation that provided partial finance and production support for filmmakers outside the studios since the mid-1960s.[78] By the end of the 1960s, the ATG's Shinjuku Bunka Theatre and its associated underground venue Sasori-za had further established its status as the central node of the independent film network in Shinjuku. In particular, these venues provided a space for independent filmmakers, avant-garde artists, and leftist youth to gather, exchange ideas, and exhibit their works.[79] In this way, the Shinjuku Bunka Theatre can be seen as the material embodiment of 'cinema in Tokyo' during the 1960s.

If experimental and avant-garde cinema in the 1960s was marked by the 'spatial contiguity between the screen, theatre, and streets,' according to Furuhata Yuriko, urban planning became a major technique for the government to separate the screen and the street in order to regulate people's physical activities and perceptions.[80] One of the most symbolic moments was the demonstrations after the renaming of Shinjuku's 'underground plaza' (*chika hiroba*) to 'underground passage' (*chika tsuro*). This change in nomenclature would effectively render gatherings and demonstrations in the space illegal according to the Japanese Road Traffic Act,[81] depriving Shinjuku actors, audiences, and the place itself from making an appearance in filmmaking. By this time,

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[78] Roland Domenig, 'A Brief History of Independent Cinema in Japan and the Role of the Art Theatre Guild', *MINIKOMI: Austrian Journal of Japanese Studies*, 70 (2005), pp. 6–16.

[79] See Kuzui Kinshirō, *Igon: Art Theatre Shinjuku Bunka*, ed. by Hirasawa Gō (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shinsha, 2008); Kinshirō Kuzui, 'I Think It Was My Life', *MINIKOMI: Austrian Journal of Japanese Studies*, 70 (2005), pp. 49–59.

[80] Yuriko Furuhata, *Cinema of Actuality: Japanese Avant-Garde Filmmaking in the Season of Image Politics*, Kindle (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), Kindle Location: 3492.

[81] Oki Seiko and Suzuki Hitoshi, *1969: Shinjuku West Exit Underground Plaza.* (Tokyo: Shinjuku Shobō, 2014), p. 92.

fukeiron, or landscape theory discourse, articulated by theorists and filmmakers like Matsuda Masao, Adachi Masao, Wakamatsu Kōji, and Oshima Nagisa in the late-1960s, had already took notice of and emphasised the issue of such spatial regulations by the state. These filmmakers responded by creatively utilizing cinema to expose the 'regulatory management of the urban environment and the governmental power of the state.'[82] For the *fukeiron* theorists, Tokyo was a mass-produced image via the newly popular media of television, that represented the homogenised landscape of Japan under state regulation and control. While the *fukeiron* theorists' critique of the interrelation between Tokyo's urban planning and its image remains significant to this day, it did not necessarily exhaust the potential of film practice in Tokyo. Nevertheless, as this thesis aims to further explore the dynamic relationship between the material conditions of Tokyo and the production of its urban images by various actors who held different political and artistic visions, the case of Shinjuku provides a vivid example of showing how the city can be a site of contestation as well as of different film practices—even when some of the practices were not directly about cinema per se.

In summary, the brief case study of the cinema in Shinjuku in the 1960s showcases the coexistence of various intersections that cinema may have with the city in terms of urban infrastructure and practice. On the one hand, cinematic images can stimulate new ways of not only perceiving but also living, moving, and practicing activities in the city. On the other hand, the city can simultaneously be the prerequisite site of happenings and products of cinema, while the management of the city may also directly or indirectly pose changes to how cinema is perceived and practiced. In this sense, drawing

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[82] Furuhata, *Cinema of Actuality*, Kindle Location: 2585-2586.

on a broad set of literature on Shinjuku cinema in the 1960s, from cinema studies to social science, may also help to reveal the material aspects in the forming of the discursive city of Tokyo.

Cinema and Tokyo in the 1980s and 1990s: About and Beyond Globalisation

If the cinematic city approach proposes discursive Tokyo as the embodiment of modern visual culture, then a more on-the-ground investigation of how film is practiced in certain sites of the city may also enable us to see how the city and cinema mutually shape each other on a material level. Though the two approaches hold different research goals, they both call for the importance of studying the city and cinema in a specific, historicised context. This section will thus review how Tokyo of the 1980s and 1990s has so far been approached and studied in cinema studies scholarship to locate the possible gaps and opportunities which this thesis may engage with.

In terms of socio-political context, Tokyo of the 1980s was most famously conceived of as a global city, as defined by Saskia Sassen's *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* written in 1991. In the book, Sassen considers Tokyo as one of the few urban centres across the world where the globalised economy is agglomerated.[83] For Sassen, global cities like Tokyo are not only the control centres in which existing international economic flows are regulated, but more importantly the sites where new networks of finance and production are created and maintained.[84] Sassen's work was a timely observation and response to the global economic transformation largely shaped

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[83] Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 5.
[84] Ibid.

by the privatisation policies conducted by national leaders like Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Nakasone Yasuhiro in the 1980s. The emergence of what we now know as the condition of neoliberalism had largely reconstituted the position of the city vis-à-vis the traditionally stable ideas like nation-state and national identity. As Sassen correctly suggests at the dawn of the 1990s, global cities are the sites where this more complex, multifaceted, and internationally connected world is prefigured.[85] Nevertheless, the condition of Tokyo under the trend of economic globalisation also needs to be specifically examined. As scholars like Roger Goodman have pointed out, the buzzword which set up the narrative of globalisation in the 1980s, namely *kokusaika* (literally internationalisation) in Japanese, needs to be investigated carefully regarding its embedded cultural and political connotations. According to Goodman, there is a 'basic dichotomy in understanding of the term within the society: those who saw internationalisation as based in Japaneseness and those who saw it as a more global concept transcending any idea of national identity.'[86]

In this sense, instead of assuming a unidirectional transformation of the city from Japanese capital to international economic hub it becomes crucial to examine the tension between the national and global when referring to the context of globalisation in the study of Tokyo in the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars in film studies have already discussed such tensions revolving around *kokusaika* mainly through a critique of the cultural and political connotations embedded within the discourse. On the one hand, scholars like Mika Ko choose to emphasise the persistence and transmutation of the

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[85] Ibid., p.88.
[86] Roger Goodman, 'The Concept of Kokusaika and Japanese Educational Reform', *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 5.1 (2007), p. 72.

nation under globalisation. Examining how the Okinawan and *zainichi* Korean (Korean-in-Japan) are represented in Japanese cinema as others within the nation, Ko argues that the popular discourses of multiculturalism and cultural hybridity during *kokusaika* tended to reinforce the idea of Japan as a monoethnic nation.[87] From this perspective, globalisation is seen as a moment of using pluralist discourse to strengthen Japanese uniqueness in terms of race and nationhood. On the other hand, scholars like Tezuka Yoshiharu consider *kokusaika* as an opportunity that 'changed the material and discursive conditions that had underlined the essentialist discourse of Japanese cultural uniqueness and identity'.[88] Like Ko, Tezuka is well aware of Japanese officials' attempts to 'integrate the sense of Japanese particularity' within the new paradigm of the global political economy.[89] Nevertheless, he also argues that such nationalistic projects 'failed almost without exception' especially on its cultural horizon, since what is believed to be 'exceptionally Japanese' has been permanently changed on an infrastructural and practical level.[90] In summary, just like Mouer and Sugimoto suggested long before in the 1980s, the concept of *kokusaika* used by the Nakasone administration was undoubtedly an extension of nationalism associated with the goals of the neoliberal economic establishment, while in actual practice, people may have taken the discourse more idealistically and utilised it for various kind of purposes.[91] Developing from the existing scholarship, this thesis will further scrutinise how cinema

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[87] Mika Ko, *Japanese Cinema and Otherness: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and the Problem of Japaneseness* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 31.
[88] Yoshiharu Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), p. 5.
[89] Ibid., p.77.
[90] Ibid., p.147.
[91] Ross E. Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto, *Images of Japanese Society: A Study in the Structure of Social Reality* (London: KPI, 1986), pp. 382-383.

helped to consolidate or subvert agendas that used globalisation to reinforce the idea of nation.

It is worth mentioning that in both Ko and Tezuka's works, Tokyo was not specifically examined regarding the advance of global city discourse. In comparison to Ko's book, which mostly analyses popular film texts of multicultural representation in Japan, citing the Tokyo International Film Festival and mini-theatres, Tezuka does touch upon Tokyo regarding the emergence of a globalised cinema infrastructure.[92] Nevertheless, since Tezuka mainly sees Tokyo as a site in-between national planning and cosmopolitan practices, the material and discursive aspects of Tokyo as a city with its own locality remain largely overlooked. The idea of locality has certainly become a complicated yet urgent problem in the age of globalisation. As John Durham Peters acutely puts it, 'the global has become a graphic part of our local experience.'[93] While the local is always relational to the global in today's network society which favours flows, there still remains a solid, concrete, and ground rooted aspect of the city. Instead of merely acting against the idea of globalised flow, the meaning of locality which provides 'the material support for the global connection of the local experience', as inspiringly argued by Manuel Castells, is 'to assert the space of places, based on experience, over the logic of the space of flows, based on instrumentality.'[94]

There are several insightful writings that look at the media infrastructure which largely constituted the local specificity of Tokyo during this period. Kitada Akihiro, for

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[92] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, pp. 80-89; pp. 106-108.
[93] John Durham Peters, 'Seeing Bifocally: Media. Place. Culture', in *Culture Power Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology*, eds. by Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (Duke University Press, 1997), p. 82.
[94] Manuel Castells, *Communication Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 33-36.

instance, considers Tokyo in the 1980s as a *kōkoku toshi* or 'advertising city'. Analysing

highly mediatised urban spaces like Shibuya, Kitada conceives the 1980s as a transition

point when advertisement was no longer set up in the city but rather the city itself

turned into a huge space for companies and passengers/consumers to perform the ads

together.[95] If Kitada's articulation largely echoes the Marxist critiques, from Guy

Debord to Jean Baudrillard, of capitalism and its assimilation of human lives in the city

through consumerism, others like Misono Ryōko take a more neutral stance and view

this phenomenon as showcasing Tokyo's advancement toward a media-saturated

information society ahead of others.[96] Despite their different political articulations, both

Kitada and Misono highlight how the material aspects of information technology

changed people's ways of perceiving and interacting with Tokyo in the 1980s and

shaped the city into new scales both virtually and actually. In this way, their analysis

can be an illustrative example of how the globalised city can be grasped on a local level.

Nevertheless, in both Kitada and Misono's projects, the 'antique' media of cinema is

largely neglected, since cinema's appearance on Tokyo's urban surface, as well as

cinema's position vis-à-vis Tokyo's urban discourse, was not as significant as other

visual media like television and advertising. The way this research considers the very

situation of cinema's declining—or rather changing—status with and within the city,

however, merits further examination.

Last, but not least, I wish to explore the writings which critically examine Tokyo's

position within Asian geopolitics via the practice of popular culture, including cinema,

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[95] Kitada Akihiro, *Kōkoku toshi Tokyo: sono tanjō to shi* (Tokyo: Kosaido, 2002).
[96] Ryōko Misono, 'CRITICAL MEDIA IMAGINATION: Nancy Seki's TV Criticism and the Media Space of the 1980s and 1990s', in *Media Theory in Japan*, eds. by Marc Sternberg and Alexander Zahlten (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), pp. 221–249.

under the condition of economic globalisation. In Iwabuchi Kōichi's ground-breaking book that discusses the circulation of Japanese popular culture in Asia (and vice versa) in the 1990s, he proposes a way to look at globalisation not from the point of view of American cultural universalisation but from the ambiguous position that Japan takes in-between the West and Asia.[97] In Iwabuchi's account of how Japan uses popular culture—including cinema—as a means to exploit the region's burgeoning consumer market and redeploy the nation's colonialist visions,[98] he does not specifically examine the role that urban spaces played in the process. Certainly, Iwabuchi is aware of the predominance of cities in configuring the transnational cultural flow in Asia since his fieldwork was conducted entirely in places like Tokyo, Taipei, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur,[99] also noting in his conclusion, 'Asian interconnections being forged by the flows of popular culture are not national ones. They are predominantly between urban spaces, between global cities—Tokyo, Seoul, Hong Kong, Taipei, Shanghai, and so on'.[100]

In comparison, Stephanie DeBoer creatively adopts the framework of 'media capital', a term originally proposed by Michael Curtin to 'articulate the ways in which particular locations of media production are constructed in fluctuating flows of both cultural and economic capital',[101] to examine the role that cities like Tokyo, Taipei, Hong Kong, and Shanghai play in configuring, maintaining, and transforming the

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[97] Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).
[98] Ibid., p.2.
[99] Ibid., p.19.
[100] Ibid., p.200.
[101] Stephanie DeBoer, *Coproducing Asia: Locating Japanese-Chinese Regional Film and Media* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), Kindle Location: 249-250.

contemporary practice and culture of East Asian cinema and media. In her chapter

which specifically looks at Japanese actors' ambition to establish and retain Tokyo as

the media capital centre in Asia in the 1990s, DeBoer investigates multinational film

coproduction projects to understand how the image of Asia has been discursively and

practically negotiated.[102] By criticising Iwabuchi for conflating Japan's desire to play a

central role in Asia with its (lack of) actual hard power in the region, DeBoer offers a

much more nuanced observation of how Tokyo became a site of transnational

negotiation between actors across Asia.[103] While DeBoer's analysis has largely been

beneficial in terms of developing my investigation of Tokyo's global city discourse and

practice, it remains important to signal that the 'media capital' framework also tends to

conceptualise Tokyo as a self-consistent entity for the sake of comparison with other

locations in the region. While such an approach is feasible for DeBoer's project, it falls

short of scrutinising the heterogeneity of the city on a more local level regarding the

coexistence of various cultural and political trajectories embedded within Tokyo's

complex urban geography and landscape.

In conclusion, while this research considers globalisation a crucial socio-political

discourse to investigate when analysing the relationship between Tokyo and cinema in

the 1980s and 90s, the idea of the global city and its interrelation with Tokyo's

cinematic representation during the era should not be taken for granted. On the one

hand, following existing cinematic city scholarship, the construction of the 'global city'

as a discourse will be the main focus when scrutinising Tokyo in cinema. On the other

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[102] Ibid., Kindle Location: 2119-2745.
[103] Ibid.

hand, regarding Tokyo's intertwined and elusive cinema networks—which include but are not limited to film production, circulation, and exhibition—a materialist approach may serve to understand the dynamic interactions between the various actors and the city in the process of constituting Tokyo as a 'global' entity. Eventually, this thesis also aims to contribute to the scholarship bringing postcolonial and capitalist critique into the discussion of globalisation. By presenting a more localised case study of how cinema has been instrumentalised to facilitate the agendas of globalisation and how cinema has been worked by various actors to approve, question, and overcome the idea of 'global city,' this thesis hopes to emancipate Tokyo from its geographical and geopolitical constraints and reclaim its potential as a site of interdependency and heterogeneity.

Chapter Two - Inventing 'Culture' for the Global City: Discourses and Institutional Practices of Cinema in 1980s Tokyo

In June 1985, Shibuya was turned into a global city via cinema: a huge Charles Chaplin painting appeared on the outer wall of the soaring 109 department store building, temporary information booths provided multilingual guidance of the nearby film screens, video monitors outside of Parco Department store kept passers-by updated on filmmakers' talk events, everything on the streets was covered by a red circular logo that span like a 'globe'—all manifesting the arrival of the city's first regularly held international film event: the Tokyo International Film Festival (TIFF). [Figure 2.1]

Figure 2.1: Streets of Shibuya during the 1st TIFF.
From nippon.com. (2023, October, 2).
Retrieved from
www.nippon.com/ja/features/h00327/

Figure 2.2: The first official logo of the TIFF. From Wada Makoto website. (2023, October, 2)
Retrieved from
www.wadamakoto.jp/logo/05.html

The TIFF decorated the local streets of Shibuya to reinvent and rescale it with a global façade. Nevertheless, as the logo of the TIFF implies, the meaning of global-ness promoted by the event remains ambiguous. Designed by the famous illustrator and essayist Wada Makoto, who had made a successful debut as a filmmaker one year earlier with the award-winning film *Mahjong Hōrōki* (*Mahjong Wanderer*, 1984), the official logo of the TIFF was inspired by the phenakistiscope, a cardboard disc with slits that produce the illusion of movement when it spins.[104] With discrete images registering the exaggerated motions of an anthropomorphic figure wearing what appears to be a top hat, the logo invites the audience to imagine the machine in motion and create a form of meta-cinema in the brain—a short loop of someone taking their hat off with one hand and putting it back on with two hands that repeats ad infinitum. [Figure 2.2] The official TIFF catalogue may state that the concept of the logo design goes back 'to the origin of motion pictures,'[105] but if we recognise the top hat as form of Western, male dress code and the anthropomorphic figure's apparent allusion to Charles Chaplin, we should also note both the racial and gendered orientation of the TIFF's internationalism and the committee's endeavour to constitute a sense of global-ness based on Hollywood cinema's international reach. Problematically associating Hollywood's global hegemony with the phenakistiscope as cinema's origin in the official discourse, the organisers might have assumed that such a tribute could generate not only appreciation from the eyes of foreign visitors but also the domestic audience's acknowledgement of Tokyo's international status and strength. Nevertheless, as the Hollywood-centred geopolitical underpinning of

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[104] 'The 1st Tokyo International Film Festival Official Catalogue' (Tokyo kokusai eigasai soshiki iinkai/kōhō iinkai, 1985), p. 37.
[105] Ibid.

the TIFF suggests, although the organisers might have aimed to use the TIFF to facilitate Tokyo's advancement as a global city, the idea of global-ness remained elsewhere, beyond Tokyo per se.

The conundrum of manifesting Tokyo's global city status through international events like the TIFF will be further scrutinised in this chapter. Prioritising the urban landscape of Shibuya in the opening paragraph, I consider the birth of the TIFF a symbol of the reinvention of Tokyo as a global city in the 1980s. In order to unravel the complex process of such a constitution, we need to move beyond its particular time (i.e. 1985) and space (i.e. Shibuya) by carefully examining the relevant happenings before, alongside, and after the establishment of the TIFF as well as illustrating the social and political forces remaining in the background. It requires much human effort—alongside various contingencies—to shape the city in ways that a new globalised urban imaginary might emerge. In this way, the flamboyant urban façade of Shibuya during the TIFF can be seen as the product of multiple initiatives and priorities including the municipal and state officials' political agendas, large corporations' economic strategies, and film practitioners' utilisation of these official sources for their own purposes. As such, this chapter aims to explore how a globalised imaginary of the city—no matter how problematic as suggested by the TIFF's logo—was enacted upon a local urban landscape via film events like the TIFF.

In the 1980s, we see the emergence of 'culture' in Tokyo's official discourse as one of the municipal government's major targets of city planning and administration. On the one hand, 'culture' can be frequently found as a keyword in the city's official meetings and symposia, signalling the increasing importance of culture in the setting of an agenda

for Tokyo policymakers. On the other hand, the establishment of cultural institutions, both public and semi-public, created sites for residents and visitors of Tokyo to comprehend and experience 'culture' that was intentionally curated by officials to symbolise the city's international influence and global standing. At any rate, instead of considering culture as neutral, it is crucial to critically examine how 'culture' was discursively conceptualised and materially presented as part of Tokyo's globalised local identity during the era in order to further understand the (geo)political motives behind these politicised cultural activities and the social impacts they might have created. This chapter will first contextualise the connotation of 'culture' in Tokyo's urban policies and then scrutinise how cinema, responding to the political campaign of 'culturalising' Tokyo, enabled the discursive and material constitution of Tokyo as a 'global city' in the 1980s.

In the first half of this chapter, I investigate the Tokyo Metropolitan Cultural Roundtable (*Tokyo-to bunka kondankai*, Cultural Roundtable hereafter), which was a series of meetings held between 1981 and 1983, that oriented the conception of 'culture' in the city's political agenda and set the bar for Tokyo's urban cultural planning of the era. The Cultural Roundtable meetings provided a set of discourses for Tokyo's cultural administration to refer to—discourses in the Foucauldian sense that what they do is more than designate but also demarcate what is sayable and thinkable as knowledge.[106] More specifically, the presence of the Shochiku studio auteur Yamada Yōji in the Cultural Roundtable and the discussions revolving around his works provide us a critical lens to

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[106] Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. by A.M.Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972).

investigate how cinema was ambiguously conceived by the municipal officials as a useful cultural form. Following the proactive formulation of cinema's role in Tokyo's urban planning, film events initiated by or affiliated with official cultural institutions began to proliferate in the city from the mid-1980s.

The second half of the chapter examines two cultural institutions in Tokyo—the Tokyo International Film Festival and the Japan Foundation—and how their engagement with cinema contributed to the invention of Tokyo's global city status. A close analysis of the founding moment of the TIFF, with an emphasis on the installation of the TIFF in Shibuya, helps to untangle the socio-political factors and various contingencies that made up the grand narrative of globalisation. Ultimately, by studying the largely banal and inconspicuous Japan Foundation film festival series in contrast to the spectacular exhibition of the TIFF in Shibuya, this chapter ends with a suggestion that cinema was becoming reconfigured as part of Tokyo's globalised cultural infrastructure at the end of the 1980s.

Through a careful investigation of official documents on culture and ephemeras like film festival posters and catalogues, this chapter aims to provide a survey of the top-down visions and decisions of the state and city officials in collaboration with big corporations and their utilising cinema to promote Tokyo's international reputation and construct the cultural landscape of a global city. Contextualising official planning as an on-going process of discursive formation rather than a finished outcome, this chapter thus further revives the various insights and critiques regarding the enactment of Tokyo's globalised cultural sphere instead of repeating the dominant discourse of official urban history.

Local Culture as Tokyo's Antidote to the 'Era of Regions'

In the 1980s, 'culture' was reintroduced as a keyword for urban planning and administration by the Tokyo municipal government. Serving as a part of the Governor Suzuki Shunichi's political agendas, the reorganisation of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Citizens Cultural Affairs (*Tokyo-to seikatsu bunka kyoku*) in 1980 had been regarded as a symbol for when the 'growth of cultural administration in Tokyo moved in close parallel to the expansion of the bubble economy.'[107] Simply looking at the Bureau's blatant renaming of the former *tomin seikatsu* (citizens living) into *seikatsu bunka* (everyday life culture), reveals the municipal official's intention of highlighting 'culture' as an essential part of Tokyo citizens' ordinary lives.[108]

Culture has long been an important aspect of Japanese government officials' social regulations. While '*bunka*' stands for the broad expression of culture in Japanese, the idea of '*bunka seisaku*' (cultural policy) contains various political underpinnings regarding different historical contexts. For instance, during the post-World War II era, culture was conceived to be a vital factor for Japan's national restoration. In the famous 'Imperial Rescript on the Construction of a New Japan', also known as the 'Humanity Declaration' in 1946, Hirohito (Shōwa Emperor) declaimed to build a new Japan with an abundance of culture. Following the emperor's instruction, the Minister of Education Maeda Tamon—who started exploring the horizon of cultural diplomacy in the 1930s as the head

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[107] Jordan Sand, *Tokyo Vernacular: Common Spaces, Local Histories, Found Objects* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), p. 19.
[108] *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku* (the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs, 1983), p. 4.

of The Japan Institute (Nihon Bunka Kaikan) at the Rockefeller Centre in Manhattan[109]—

issued a political statement for promoting Japan as a 'peaceful country of culture' (*bunka-teki heiwa kokka*).[110] In the post-war context, culture thus served as an articulation of

Japan's (economic and political) revival, thus insulating the nation's future from its

militant past. In other words, culture in Japan's post-war official discourse was utilised

to consciously demarcate the democratised and 'culturalised' Japan from the violent

Japanese Empire of the Second World War.[111]

Although the political and economic conditions of Japan would undergo tremendous

transformation in the following decades, culture would remain one of the most effective

tools for officials to manipulate Japan's national image. Analysing the popularity of the

Japanese television drama *Oshin* (Hashida Sugako, 1983-1984) in East Asia, Iwabuchi

Koichi, for example, considers visual media as an important form of cultural diplomacy

in the 1980s to promote Japan's soft power in the region.[112] In criticising the historical

revisionist and nationalist agendas embedded within Japan's seemingly neutral and

'odourless' popular culture reveals the problematic nature of the instrumentalised popular

culture in Japan's diplomatic campaigns (e.g., the infamous 'Cool Japan' programme in

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[109] Kae Ishihara, 'A Historical Survey of Film Archiving in Japan', in *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Cinema*, eds. by Joanne Bernardi and Shota T. Ogawa (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2021), p. 289.
[110] Edagawa Akitoshi, *Shinjidai no bunka shinkōron* (Tokyo: Shogakukan Square, 2001), p. 10.
[111] It is worth bringing up here that since the goal of 'building a cultural nation' was set in the 1947 Basic Act on Education, cinema has been exploited by officials to constitute the cultural image of the nation, with the annual Geijutsusai or National Arts Festival established in 1946 by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture as one of the earliest examples of awarding the cultural accomplishment of cinema.
[112] Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

the early 2000s),[113] [114] Iwabuchi reveals the Japanese government's continuous efforts since the end of the war to exploit culture as a means of cleansing its colonialist and imperialist past. In comparison to the notion of 'culture' enunciated by Hirohito to recover Japan's national image from the loss of war, the 'culture' that Japanese government has been promoting since the 1990s targets the oversea markets more out of economic interests while retaining political intentions.

While the two scenarios of proclaiming Japanese culture indicate the continuous yet changing efforts of instrumentalising 'culture' for political and economic uses both nationally and internationally, a more nuanced investigation on the local level as well worth attention. The establishment of the Bureau of Citizens Cultural Affairs in the 1980s Tokyo marks such a moment of applying culture for urban development purposes. Rather than serving conceptually for the grand planning of national image, culture started to be more recognised as a pragmatic tool to solve a series of domestic problems in Japan that were mainly triggered by the increasing gap between Tokyo as the national centre and other regional cities on the margins. Before the mid-1970s, the city planning system in Japan which included 'creating laws, initiating and approving plans, and deciding budgets' was mostly centralised by the Japanese national government located in Tokyo.[115]

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[113] Referring to the idea of 'odourlessness' in the work of Joseph Nye, Ōtsuka Eiji, and Shirahata Yōzaburō, Iwabuchi argues that the removal of recognisable cultural symbols in Japanese consumer and cultural products helped to reconstitute 'Japaneseness' in a positive and affirmative manner, conceal its war-time cruelty, and enable the national culture to be widely welcomed in the world in the 1980s and beyond. See Ibid., pp.32-35.

[114] According to Iwabuchi, 'Cool Japan' was institutionalised in the beginning of the 21st century as Japan's pop-culture based diplomacy, which aimed to capitalise on Japanese media culture's popularity economically and politically in global markets. See Koichi Iwabuchi, 'Pop-Culture Diplomacy in Japan: Soft Power, Nation Branding and the Question of "International Cultural Exchange"', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 21.4 (2015), pp. 419-422.

[115] André Sorensen, 'Changing Governance of Shared Spaces: Machizukuri as Institutional Innovation', in *Living Cities in Japan: Citizens' Movements, Machizukuri and Local Environments*, eds. by André Sorensen and Carolin Funck (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 56-57.

Opposing the top-down regulations from the centralised government in Tokyo to the regions, *chihō no jidai*, literally 'era of regions', emerged as a slogan proposed by economist and politician Nagasu Kazuji in the 1970s to promote self-governance of the regional cities, with a namesake symposium held in 1978 in Yokohama which set the tone for the political and social trends that followed. The main participants of the symposium were officials from the Greater Tokyo Area, including Tokyo, Saitama, Yokohama, Kanagawa, and Kawasaki, while the motive was undoubtedly to explore the political measures towards the existing urban issues of the time.[116] At the symposium, Nagasu— who had just been elected as the Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture in 1975 and would continue his term until 1995—criticised the megacities' rapid economic development and expansion in the 1970s and pointed out the social problems it had caused to the surrounding regions. As megacities like Tokyo and Osaka were facing the crises of overpopulation, deterioration of the environment, and shortages in food and energy supplies,[117] an increasing population and economic gap had developed between these megacities and regional cities and villages.[118] It is crucial to highlight that in his speech, Nagasu called for the rediscovering and promotion of the regions' local cultures as one of the solutions for regional renewal.[119]

The urgency of easing the tension between megacities and local regions as well as solving existing urban problems via culture was also recognised by the national government. In 1978, the newly appointed Japanese Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi promulgated his plan for the National Garden City Initiative (*denen toshi kōsō*) to promote

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[116] Nagasu Kazuji, 'Chihō no jidai o motomete', *Sekai*, October 1978, p. 49.
[117] Ibid., p.50.
[118] Katō Katsumi, *Chihō no jidai, bunka no jidai* (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1979), p. 13.
[119] Nagasu, 'Chihō no jidai o motomete', pp. 58-59.

regional autonomy, facilitate the dynamic exchanges between major cities and rural regions,[120] and construct each region's unique local culture.[121] Despite its multiple dimensions, the National Garden City Initiative is most significant in foregrounding 'culture' as an essential aspect of tackling existing urban problems and envisioning the national future. Although the plan ended abruptly following Ōhira's sudden death in 1980, it nevertheless had already stimulated enthusiastic discussions among technocrats and intellectuals to explore culture's possible roles in public administration.[122] Most importantly, as Katō Katsumi mentions, Ōhira's National Garden City Initiative helped to popularise another term: '*bunka no jidai*' or the 'era of culture'— marked by the '*Bunka no Jidai* Research Group' formed by Ōhira in 1979— in juxtaposition with the preceding the era of regions discourse.[123] 'The era of culture and the era of regions,' as Ashida Tetsurō correctly puts it, 'were considered as twin brothers' at the dawn of the 1980s.[124]

Revisiting the 1970s and 80s expectation of using culture to revive the regions, Ashida acutely points out the ambivalence and irony embedded in the cultural-ised policy discourse. The regional government's constitution of local culture, according to Ashida, had already presupposed Tokyo as the centre from which they would deliberately

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[120] Influenced by English urban planner Ebenezer Howard's Garden City Movement, Ōhira planned to set up 200-300 garden city circles within Japan that would organically interchange the comfort and natural affluence of the countryside with the economic vitality of the city. See Katsumi Takeno, 'Masayoshi Ohira Cabinet as a "National Garden City Initiative" and Land Planning of Post-War Japan's', *Public Policy and Social Governance*, 3 (2015), p. 126.

[121] Katō, *Chihō no jidai, bunka no jidai*, p. 80.

[122] Takeno, 'Masayoshi Ohira Cabinet as a "National Garden City Initiative" and Land Planning of Post-War Japan's', p. 126.

[123] Katō, *Chihō no jidai, bunka no jidai*, p. 11.

[124] Ashida Tetsurō, 'Chihō no jidai to bunka senryaku: sono kyojitsu o megutte', *Konan Women's University Academic Repository*, 43 (2007), p. 39.

distinguish themselves.[125] In this way, the construction of regional cultures across Japan via cultural policy was indeed reconfirmation of Tokyo's central status and led to the enhancement of Tokyo's homogenising power rather than its antithesis.[126] While Ashida's critique remains largely valid and critical, it is crucial to clarify that 'Tokyo' here should be understood as an imagined 'other' by the regional officials, since 'Tokyo' itself was not and never had been an unproblematically stable and cohesive entirety—or 'centre'—in its own right. In other words, while existing research into the era of culture and the era of regions is more interested in examining its influence on the regions, we should equally place Tokyo itself under investigation and question if Tokyo (through Tokyo officials) was merely being passively situated as a target of regional renewal or actively utilising the two political buzzwords 'regions' (*chihō*) and 'culture' (*bunka*) in order to reinvent itself while facing localist challenges.

In contrast to advocating regional development via culture, Tokyo's role seems rather unfavourable under the era of regions discourse. Firstly, the Greater Tokyo Area, or *Kantō* in Japanese, was regarded as a mega stomach that viciously devoured the vitality—in terms of economy, social capital, and population—of other regions in Japan. On a smaller scale, there was also tension between the city of Tokyo and its adjacent prefectures regarding environmental, energy, and other sustainability issues. In both cases, Tokyo's central status was defined not by its positive economic or cultural attributions but rather by its negative influences on the rest of the nation, and the Japanese term *ikkyokushūchū* (literally, 'overconcentration'), that was often brought up regarding the issue, can best

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[125] Ibid., pp.42-44.
[126] Ibid.

summarise the intentions of problematising the very idea of 'centre' per se. Nevertheless, by adopting 'culture' from the era of culture initiative, the Tokyo municipal government had not only successfully navigated itself through the regions' criticism but also reestablished the city as being complementary to—rather than in opposition to— the discourse of the era of regions.

Responding to Ohira's Initiative, Katō's suggestion of culture as a tool for resolving the central-peripheral tension between Tokyo and the regions largely foresaw the Tokyo municipal government's moves in the 1980s. Asking if it is reasonable to conceive Tokyo's culture as the 'central culture' (*chūō bunka*) in contrast to other regional cultures (*chihō bunka*), Katō claims that although most of the public cultural resources were concentrated in Tokyo, the city had yet to give birth to its own local culture.[127] For Katō, since there is no culture that can be equalised to Tokyo's, which could also represent Japan internationally, it is impossible to differentiate Tokyo's culture with that of other regions without clarifying the locality of Tokyo in the first place. [128] On the contrary, this lack of cultural centrality provided a fair means of regional cultures regaining their momentum in the face of Tokyo's economic and political hegemony.[129] It thus became equally important to develop culture in both Tokyo and other regions to enrich the definition of Japanese culture and represent it as national culture on the international arena.[130]

Regardless of the actual condition of Tokyo's local culture before the 1980s, Katō's statement indeed reveals the prevalent understanding of Tokyo's lack of local culture by

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[127] Katō, *Chihō no jidai, bunka no jidai*, pp. 127-129.
[128] Ibid., p.129.
[129] Ibid., pp.130-135.
[130] Ibid.

intellectuals and officials. Moreover, opinions like Kato's also provided the discursive foundation for an eclectic solution regarding the tension between Tokyo and other regions. On one hand, it made culture a rare opportunity for these regions to regain their vitality against the overconcentration of resources in Tokyo, as the regional establishment of public cultural facilities and events would become fashionable in the 1980s and reach its peak in the early 1990s.[131] In retrospect, as scholars have pointed out, the outcome of the region's culturalised policy starting from the 1980s meant that economically oriented cultural planning eventually widened the many gaps between Tokyo and regions and further homogenised the cultural landscape across Japan with similar types of cultural facilities like museums and cultural centres and identical cultural events like music festivals and film festivals being established in most regions.[132] While agreeing with the observations and critiques leveraged by existing scholarship, this thesis is instead more interested in Tokyo officials' conception and practices of 'culture' in the 1980s. I argue that 'culture' would as well enable the officials in Tokyo to further set up economic-oriented development plans into the 1980s. Nevertheless, at the dawn of the 1980s, when facing pressure from regional localist sentiment, Tokyo officials were eager to explore the possible reach of culture in urban policy and invent a discourse for articulating Tokyo's local culture. This is why a series of roundtable meetings became the first imperative for the newly established Bureau of Citizens Cultural Affairs in Tokyo.

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[131] Matsumoto Shigeaki, Koike Yoshikazu, and Tokunaga Takashi, *Chiiki no jiritsuteki sosei to bunkaseisaku no yakuwari*, ed. by Iguchi Mitsugu (Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 2011), pp. 53-54.
[132] Ashida Tetsurō, 'Chihō no jidai to bunka senryaku: sono kyojitsu o megutte', *Konan Women's University Academic Repository*, 43 (2007), pp. 41-42.

Tokyo Metropolitan Cultural Roundtable and the *Kondankai* Policy-making

The Tokyo Metropolitan Cultural Roundtable (the Cultural Roundtable) was initiated by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Citizens Cultural Affairs as a series of regular meetings between September 1981 and February 1983 in order to review the existing cultural sphere of the Tokyo city, brainstorm ways of adorning culture in Tokyo's urban politics, and set up new facilities and institutions to facilitate the city's cultural administration. A total of ten roundtable meetings were held, including an opening talk, a mid-term report, a final submission, and seven theme-specific discussions.[133] Notably, the Tokyo Governor Suzuki himself also participated in the opening talk and gave a keynote speech, which reveals the prominence of the Cultural Roundtable for the municipal authorities.

A simple examination of the results of the Cultural Roundtable, presented in its final report, reveals a rather straightforward message of official interest in conceiving of 'culture' both as a means and a target of regulating the lives of Tokyo citizens in the 1980s. The first part of the report is named exactly after the era of culture, where *bunka* is emphasised and defined by differentiating it from another often-confused term *bunmei*, or 'civilisation'. In the official formulation, *bunmei* is defined as the fundamental form of human society, and in this context was equal to urbanisation as an economic-centred force of modern development.[134] Then, without intentional intervention and navigation, the process of urbanisation could lead to the devastation of human lives—[135] which was

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[133]   The topics include the age of culture; the culture of Tokyo; the culture of Tokyo's streets; about cultural revitalisation policies and recognition system; the international exchange of culture; and about Tokyo's cultural revitalisation policies. See *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*.
[134]   Ibid., p.268.
[135]   Ibid., p.5.

revealed by the urban problems that occurred in the 1970s. Introduced as a counterstrategy, the active and deliberate creation and practice of culture was promoted for its capacity to improve life in the city in humanistic terms.[136] In other words, the report's articulation of culture suggested that it was only by holding on to the value of culture that one might be allowed to retain one's humanity against the highly destructive forces of modern urban development. This discursive differentiation of culture from civilisation, urbanisation, and modernisation enabled municipal officials to justify the top-down regulation and administration of culture as not only ethical but also essential for sustaining human society.

While the administrative purpose might be easy to grasp, it is only by referring back to the context, which was introduced in the last section, that we can see Tokyo officials' deliberate strategy of disengaging the paired 'regions' (*chihō*) from 'culture' (*bunka*) in its contemporaneous discourse. The flipside of essentialising culture as a general human need to counter the violence of economic development is the concealment of regional problems and making invisible of the gaps between Tokyo and other regions, which enabled the Tokyo government to maintain its central status accordingly. In a rather ironic manner, the fashionable term for the regions to further economic agendas in the 1980s was also adopted by the original target of the localist movement—Tokyo. As foreseen by Katō, the invention and development of Tokyo's local culture became the ethical excuse for its municipal government to carry forward further development plans in the 1980s.

Although the final report of the Cultural Roundtable helps to clarify the definition of 'culture' for the Tokyo officials, which serves as a basis for my investigation of cinema's

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[136] Ibid., p.5; p.268.

role within the city's cultural planning and administration, there remains the problem of simply referring to the final report without questioning how it was constituted in the first place. If cultural policy studies in Japan, as a recently-specialised academic discipline,[137] tends to highlight how official organisations like governments consider culture to be an administrative object in order to mobilise and regulate certain collective social practices of cultural production, distribution, and consumption, it also bears the risks of prioritising the organisational volition and overlooking the negotiatory process of cultural policy-making.[138] When a large capital city like Tokyo occupies an intersectional position in-between national (the showcase of the nation), local (the promotion of its local uniqueness), and international (the facilitation of international economic and cultural exchanges), it requires an analytical lens beyond any single political entity's decision and volition to unveil the complicated and sometimes contradictory speculations and intentions behind the final policy outcome.

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[137] According to the first issue of the *Journal of the Japan Association for Cultural Policy Research*, cultural policy did not become a specialised discipline until 2003—and its establishment was largely facilitated and supported by the neoliberal Koizumi Junichirō regime's cultural agenda in the early 2000s. Most of the founding members of the Japan Association for Cultural Policy formerly belonged to the Japan Association for Cultural Economics, a network founded in the mid-1990s to investigate and explore the economic understanding of cultural goods. It is worth noting that many scholars in these two disciplines are also government employees, which reveals the field's academic-official nexus. See Nakagawa Ikuo, 'Bunka seisakugaku e no kitai to tenbō', *Cultural Policy Research : Journal of the Japan Association for Cultural Policy Research*, 1 (2007), pp. 5-8; Aoki Tamotsu, 'Sōritsu taikai kinen kōen nihon no bunka seisaku no shinro to nihon bunka seisaku gakkai e no kitai', *Cultural Policy Research : Journal of the Japan Association for Cultural Policy Research*, 1 (2007), pp. 10-19; and Kurabayashi Yoshimasa, 'Bunka keizai gakkai nihon no ayumi kenkyū no genjō to dōkō', *Journal of Cultural Economics*, 1.1 (1998), pp. 1-6.

[138] Here I mainly refer to sociologist Edagawa Akitoshi's definition of cultural policy. It is worth mentioning that Edagawa's working experience in the Ministry of Education in the early 1980s, and especially as the Director of the Agency for Cultural Affairs' Culture Promotion Office (*chiiki bunka shinkoshitsu*) from 1991 to 1993, puts him on both ends of cultural policy practice and scholarship. An early member of the Japan Association for Cultural Economics who specialised in the realm of local culture and cultural policy, Edagawa's definition will thus provide a departure point for me to further explore the power dynamics of the cultural policy discourse in the 1980s. See Edagawa Akitoshi, *Shinjidai no bunka shinkōron* (Tokyo: Shogakukan Square, 2001), pp. 3-8.

Thus, instead of looking solely at the final report, it becomes crucial to also scrutinise the junctures and gaps between each Cultural Roundtable meeting, namely the process of policy-making and the final report. There is foremost a pragmatic advantage of this method specifically related to my focus on cinema's role in cultural policy. The final report simply lists cinema as a form of culture without providing much elaboration but a careful examination of all the meeting's documents makes it clear that cinema was specifically brought up and discussed in extenso during the meeting process. While the meeting documents may not be fully reliable and 'truthful' since they were selectively edited before publishing, a survey of their contents nevertheless renders policy making an intricate and even heterogeneous process of discursive formation which allows us to imagine other possibilities before the finalisation of a rather rigid and fixed political outcome.

My particular interest in the Cultural Roundtable's articulation of cinema's role in urban planning and administration is also correlated to the specific function of the roundtable, or *kondankai* in the Japanese political system per se. Contextualising the particularity of the roundtable as a specific type of policy-making method in the 1980s and critically historicising its connections to the political conventions of imperial Japan helps to make visible the nuanced position of each participant in the meetings and reveal the tensions and power relations between different actors. In general, *kondankai* serve as a platform for government officials to gather opinions, suggestions, and feedback from non-government professionals regarding the draft, enactment, and practice of government policies. In the case of the Tokyo Metropolitan Cultural Roundtable, in order to contain culture as an administrative target specifically for improving existing urban problems and

facilitating Tokyo's international status, municipal officials set up a *kondankai* to ask for help from cultural practitioners to reify the broad and abstract concept of culture into clear and manageable objects. The organisation committee hence gathered famous intellectuals and cultural specialists from various fields including heads of national museums, college professors, an architect (Tange Kenzō), a novelist (Sawano Hisao), a painter (Hirayama Ikuo), a fashion designer (Mori Hanae), a music composer (Dan Ikuma)—and most importantly for this research—a film director (Yamada Yōji).[139] The composition of the attending personnel suggests the official's intention to locate the idea of urban culture from a broad field of art and cultural practices by incorporating a wide range of specialist opinions into the constitution of its official principle. Moreover, the form of *kondankai* enabled the participants to not only offer their advice to the officials in a unidirectional means, but also exchange thoughts with each other in a more dynamic manner.

Legislatively speaking, from the 1960s the *kondankai* has been defined as a private consultative body (*shiteki shimon kikan*) which only serves as a site of opinion-exchange between government officials who organise the meeting and its participants (that can be both official and non-official actors) and does not require or recommend any specific agenda setting and report writing for the meeting.[140] In other words, the *kondankai* does not directly produce official policy per se. Nevertheless, as Japanese law scholarship notes, *kondankai* has been utilised by officials in the early stage of policy formation process to explore possible options and set up concrete agendas, which indeed holds a

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Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku, p. 285.

[140] Nishikawa Akiko, 'Shingikai tō shiteki shimon kikan no genjō to ronten', *The Reference*, 57.5 (2007), pp.61-63; Tera Yōhei, 'Kokka gyōsei soshiki ni okeru shingikaitō oyobi kondankaitō nitsuite', *Bulletin of the College of Humanities, Ibaraki University. Studies in Social Sciences*, 50 (2010), p. 5.

significant influence on the final form of government policy in actual cases.[141] It is certainly the same case for the Tokyo Metropolitan Cultural Roundtable. Some of the topics brought up during the Cultural Roundtable, like improving Tokyo's urban environment for its citizens to live an everyday life 'culturally', were immediately picked up by the municipal government in its urban beauty (*toshi-bi*) project in the mid-1980s.[142] Other suggestions, like the increase of financial support to public cultural institutions including municipal museums and public multipurpose cultural facilities, were once neglected—partly due to the city's tight budget.[143] Nevertheless, these insights may have also provided a discursive basis for the subsequent establishment of cultural-arts complexes in Tokyo and the increase of cultural financing in Japan in the 1990s.[144] In short, the *kondankai*'s suggestions might not have immediately come into force as policy but would nevertheless play a proactive role in future policy-making.

Although the format of *kondankai* might appear to provide a platform for official and non-official participants to have an equal say in policy-making, the power relationship between officials and non-official participants nevertheless remains largely unequal in most cases. Discussing Japan's cultural policy during the World War II, Peter B. High claims that *kondankai* were often used as a method to nudge the leftist-leaning intellectuals and artists to serve the nation's imperialist and colonialist cultural

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[141] Tera, 'Kokka gyōsei soshiki ni okeru shingikaitō oyobi kondankaitō nitsuite', p. 5.

[142] The *toshi-bi* project aims to harmonize the relationship between nature, artifacts, and human in the urban space of Tokyo. It was conducted by the municipal government through several major aspects: 1) afforesting and cleansing the urban space 2) regulating the outdoor advertisement 3) constructing and preserving cultural regions 4) constructing and reconditioning cultural facilities. See *Tokyo-to toshi-bi kanren jigyō chō* (the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs, 1985); *Tokyo-to toshi-bi suishin shiryōshū* (the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs, 1985).

[143] Edagawa, *Shinjidai no bunka shinkōron*, p. 14.

[144] Noda Kunihiro, *Bunka seisaku no tenkai: aatsu manegimento to sōzō toshi* (Tokyo: Gakugei Publication, 2018), pp. 63-68.

agendas.[145] Specifically, top officials would pretend to listen to the participants' opinions and flatter their talents during *kondankai*, which would give these leftist-leaning intellectuals an illusion of equal partnership with the officials and create a chance in which the government was actually 'gently guiding them through phases of self-criticism toward a deeper appreciation of their mission as spokesmen for the true Japanese essence.'[146] By taming its participants, *kondankai* were utilised by the imperial officials to direct the leftist-leaning intellectuals to voluntarily cooperate with the government and even contribute to the imperialist cultural propaganda system.[147]

Comparing High's critique of the *kondankai* system during the war and the legislative definition and application of *kondankai* in the post-war suggests *kondankai* as a policy-making process which involves dynamic interactions and negotiations between various actors. On the one hand, the *kondankai* system enabled officials and intellectuals/artists to exchange opinions on various social issues and invited the latter to comment on and contribute to the government's political agendas, which suggests a certain degree of agency of the intellectuals and artists in Japan's policy-making process. On the other hand, although the 1980s Japanese political system was quite different from the imperial one, *kondankai* has largely remained as a political strategy to induce intellectuals and artists to cooperate with existing official agendas—not the other way around—with the officials' careful guidance of its participants' incentives and comments. Thus, without overestimating either the power of the officials or the autonomy of the artists and

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[145] Peter B. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years' War, 1931-1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), p. 60.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid., pp.82-91.

intellectuals involved, the *kondankai* served as an ideal site from which to expose the tensions between official and non-official actors and observe how cultural policy in the 1980s Tokyo was formed through a process of contradiction and negotiation.

Although the context of the Cultural Roundtable in the 1980s was already largely different from the imperial *kondankai* in the 1930s that High analyses, the hierarchy between official and non-official participants in the meetings remained obvious. Comparing the meeting records with the mid-term and final reports, it is not hard to see that some of the members (mostly non-official) merely voiced brief opinions while others (mostly government-affiliated) were given ample time to explain their ideas with more frequency and in more detail. Naturally, it was usually the latter's opinions that were adopted and written into the final report. For instance, among all the participants, the Cultural Roundtable chairman and the then chief director of Japan Foundation Hayashi Kentarō was able to deliver most of the keynote speeches and had most of his suggestions highlighted in the final report. Besides Hayashi, technocrats like Adachi Kenji from the Japanese Agency for Cultural Affairs and Mikoshiba Hiromi from the Tokyo municipal government were also obviously more visible and audible than other participants.

In comparison to the significance of government-affiliated actors, other non-official participants like the only female participant of the Cultural Roundtable, fashion designer Mori Hanae, were treated rather indifferently and sometimes even intentionally neglected. Mori's career took off in the 1950s as she took charge of the costume design of some of the most significant film works of the era, including many Nikkatsu *taiyōzoku* (sun-tribe)

and *mukokuseki* (stateless) genre films and several of Ozu Yasujirō works.[148] Her works are regarded as important indicators of the changing gender politics of Japanese film studios in the 1950s.[149] After winding down her film career in the 1960s, Mori started her own fashion brand and gradually earned a reputation in fashion circles of New York and Paris. Considering Mori's prolific career and international reputation, it is not hard to understand why the Bureau had chosen to invite her to attend the Cultural Roundtable. Nevertheless, Mori's suggestions which specifically focus on gender issues like Tokyo's lack of childcare resources,[150] as well as the then emerging phenomenon of juvenile crime,[151] were largely dismissed by other male participants as well as the final report of the Cultural Roundtable. The neglect of Mori's comments can be interpreted on one hand as a result of the male-centred Cultural Roundtable and their disregard of gender issues as part of Tokyo's imperative cultural problems.[152] On the other hand, however, it also reveals the general tendency—which has its origins in the imperial convention—to only superficially seek opinions from non-official actors while selectively adopting suggestions that are compatible to the government agendas.

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[148] *Taiyōzoku*, also known as 'sun tribe', was a late 1950s phenomenon that focused on the problem of juvenile delinquency in novels and films about rebellious youth; *mukokuseki*, or "stateless" in English, was an action film genre created by Nikkatsu studio in the early 1960s. See Donald Richie, *A Hundred Years of Japanese Film* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2005), p. 302 and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, *Japanese Cinema in the Digital Age* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012), pp. 6-7.
[149] Tatsumi Chihiro, 'Sengo no Nikkatsu to eiga ishō: sono dokujisei to jidai hyōshō ni tsuite', *Kyoto University Human and Environmental Studies*, 29 (2020), pp. 39–48.
[150] *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, p. 19.
[151] Ibid., p. 43.
[152] Although gender issues regarding Tokyo's local women's associations (*fujin-kai*) and female laborers were also brought up by other male members during the meetings, the phlegmatic reaction Mori received in the Cultural Roundtable and her absence after the first two meetings indicate the lack of appreciation to her comments on gender issues like mothers and children's positions in Tokyo's cultural geography. Eventually, the presence of the only female participant seems to be dispensable to the final figuration of the city's cultural planning. See Ibid., pp.60-61.

Locating Tokyo's Local Culture via Cinema

Not unlike Mori, film director Yamada Yōji was also largely disregarded at the Cultural Roundtable. The meeting documents make it clear that Yamada had rarely made comments of his own accord in his five meeting appearances. In comparison with Yamada's taciturnity, the other participants nevertheless mentioned him several times and asked for his opinion on cinema's potential contribution to the configuration of Tokyo's culture. During the third meeting, which aimed to locate Tokyo's local culture, the area of Shibamata that was depicted in Yamada's long-running and nationally popular film series *Otoko wa Tsurai yo/It's Tough Being a Man* (1969–1995) was brought up by the then Chairman of *Mainichi Shimbun* (one of the major newspaper publishers) Akamatsu Dairoku. Considered as a *shitamachi* district full of human empathy (*ninjō*), community bonding, and inter-personal communication, Shibamata aroused Akamatsu's nostalgic feelings towards community-based human relations, largely because it represented such a rare case in an overtly 'selfish' city like Tokyo.[153]

Akamatsu had made an intriguing statement because what he referred to was not the actual Shibamata—a working-class neighbourhood in Tokyo's north-eastern Katsushika Ward adjacent to Chiba Prefecture on the opposite bank through the Edogawa River— but the *representation* of Shibamata in Yamada's film series. [Figure 2.3] On the surface, such a statement indicates cinema's potential in evoking affective responses towards the image it creates and further stimulate people's perception and decisions in real life—it may have even made an impact on the official urban planning in the specific scenario of the Cultural Roundtable. Nevertheless, one shall not overlook the temporal aspects of

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[153] Ibid., p.52.

Akamatsu's statement, since words like 'nostalgic' often orient towards a yearning for

something that has already gone, a longing for the past. Moreover, the temporal behind-

ness was used to reinforce a sense of scarcity of the present, which further demarcated an

ethical division between the Tokyo of the now and the past. Akamatsu's statement makes

cinema not only a mirror of the real but also a container of time. By releasing its temporal

imagination, cinema may help to fix the problems of the present and guide us to a better

future. However, without contextualising Akamatsu's statement, it remains unclear what

kind of imagination was released and where it promised to guide us.

Figure 2.3: Still of Shibamata in 1981 film *Tora-san's Promise/Otoko wa tsurai yo: Torajirō
kamifūsen* from *Tora-san's Promise* trailer (0:21).
From YouTube SHOCHIKUch. (2023, October, 2).
Retrieved from www.youtube.com/watch?v=r5QQO39aOlg

The notion of *shitamachi* becomes vital for us to explore the temporal realm of

Tokyo's urban and cultural problems and contextualise cinema's potential. A spatial

concept that is often paired with Yamanote when discussing the urban geography and

topography of Tokyo, *shitamachi* can be literally translated into 'downtown' in English.

Nevertheless, it contains much more nuances when examining the historical emergence

and evolution of *shitamachi* in Japanese discourse. The earlier historical configuration of *shitamachi* in Tokyo can be traced back to the period of the Tokugawa shogunate (1600-1868). A geographically low-lying area located at the centre of Edo city in districts like Nihonbashi, Kyōbashi, and Kanda, the *shitamachi* was originally designated by the shogunal officials as an urban district to settle the average townsmen of the city.[154] On the contrary, the hilly highland of Yamanote was where the shogun and his samurais lived. The topographical division between the *shitamachi* (low) and Yamanote (high) marked the social hierarchy and power structures of Edo, which gave the ruling class a vantage point both geographically and discursively against the plebeian—for the latter, one can simply refer to the common sense shared by the children of Edo who imagined themselves being born 'under the knee of the shogun.'[155] Though *shitamachi* was the centre of Edo's folk life with an abundant culture of shopping and entertainment, it gradually lost its momentum from the late 19th century against the centralised modern development of the Yamanote area. Due to the industrialisation of the *shitamachi* and natural disasters in the 20th century, many locals moved out of these former *shitamachi* areas.[156] Indeed, *shitamachi* as well as Yamanote no longer represent a strictly bounded area, as the city of Tokyo itself expanded immoderately into the 20th century. It has become more of an urban imaginary for one to identify and for the marginalised bodies and minds of Tokyo to carry on the nostalgic and sometimes rebellious sentiments.

During the Cultural Roundtable meetings, there were suggestions to revive the folk culture of Tokyo's past, namely Edo, through establishing community spaces and

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[154] Paul Wiley, 'Moving the Margins of Tokyo', *Urban Studies*, 39.9 (2002), pp. 1534-1536.
[155] Ibid., p.1536.
[156] Ibid., p.1542.

promoting folk ceremonies in places like *shitamchi*.[157] As the historian Jordan Sand puts

it, 'Shitamachi by the 1980s had become the site of frequent evocations of the city's

vernacular past and local character.'[158] For Sand, who also briefly mentions the effort of

the Bureau of Living and Culture in cultural administration, *shitamachi* was considered

by officials as a 'useable past' to mediate the many temporal ruptures of the city's modern

history and to recreate an exotic link for the residents to identify with the space they live

in.[159]

More importantly, it was cinema that could be seen as a useful medium to rescue

such a useable past. In Yamada's *It's Tough Being a Man* series, the protagonist Tora-

san, performed by Atsumi Kiyoshi, recursively leaves Shibamata, travels to another place,

falls in love, returns to Shibamata after a disappointed affair, and falls in love again.

Unlike the lack of a sense of belonging in the indifferent modern capital of Tokyo,[160]

Shibamata in the series is depicted not only as a district brimming with empathy and a

tightly bonded local community but also a home that one could and would always return.

In this way, Sand sees Shibamata in Yamada's film as 'a revered national institution'

which helped to generate a nostalgia for the long gone past and eventually constituted 'a

new archetype of Shitamachi for the national audience'.[161] Retrospectively speaking,

Sand was undoubtedly correct, since recalling the nostalgia through *shitamachi* helped

the Tokyo government to reinvent the city's local cultural atmosphere in its later popular

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[157] *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, pp.63-66; pp.70-72.
[158] Sand, *Tokyo Vernacular*, p. 19.
[159] Ibid., pp.18-23.
[160] *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, p. 51.
[161] Sand, *Tokyo Vernacular*, pp. 20-21.

entertainment (*taishū geinō*) project.[162] Nevertheless, the complex temporality that the imagination of *shitamachi* connotates indeed caused more controversies than it did serving as a thoughtless solution for the Cultural Roundtable meetings, as what it summoned was not a useful past but rather a fractured history.

For many Cultural Roundtable participants, it was impossible to locate Tokyo's local culture solely based on the past due to the intertwined problems of the city's temporal disjunctures, the citizen's lack of a sense of belonging and identification, and Tokyo's ambiguous geopolitical status.[163] For Tokyo natives who were born and raised in the 19th century, Edo was not merely a historical background but a cultural identity that shaped their ways of living and self-recognition. Indeed, as the literature scholar Isoda Kōichi puts, self-identification as a 'child of Edo' (*Edokko* or *Edo no ko*) reveals the rupture within Tokyo's history of modernisation, as the term of Tokyo itself represented a centralised concept just recently invented by the Japanese modern-state.[164] What had largely upset those who identified themselves as Tokyo's locals was the marginalisation and even elimination of their indigenous culture under the name of modern development. For instance, according to Isoda, although the standard Japanese language imposed in the 20th century is often considered to be Tokyo dialect, this variation was actually a modern invention of the rulers to centralise power that was constituted rather differently from the actual folk dialect of Edo.[165] In this way, to reinvent Tokyo's locality from its cultural past also means to display how it was cruelly suppressed and displaced in the first place.

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162 *Tokyo-to taishū geinō shisetsu no kinō ni kansuru chōsa: hōkokusho* (the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs, 1986).
163 *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, pp. 49-53; pp. 66-69.
164 Isoda Kōichi, 'Shisō toshite no Tokyo', in *Isoda Kōichi chosakushū* (Tokyo: Ozawa Shoten, 1991), V, pp. 11-17.
165 Ibid., pp.17-24.

In other words, the past cannot easily serve Tokyo's cultural engineering without awakening a different temporality, a different subjectivity, and a different perception of urban space. These alternative imaginations all bear the risks of undermining the modern History of Tokyo in official discourse.

Yamada was also acutely aware of the many cracks in Tokyo's modern history, which was why he had never felt easy attending these meetings.[166] When talking about Shibamata, Yamada argues that according to his long-term contact with the residents of Shibamata, the people there never truly identified themselves as subjects of Tokyo, even though the area was administratively demarcated as part of the metropolitan city.[167] Furthermore, as the film scholar Richard Torrance correctly indicates, the actual district of Shibamata is in no way a standard *shitamachi* in Edo since the neighbourhood was indeed 'an industrial suburb of Tokyo that owes its economic existence to expansions of the economy in the 1930s and the chaotic growth in small-scale manufacturing in the 1950s and 1960s.'[168] Since Tokyo's urban landscape had been 'destroyed and rebuilt repeatedly since its founding…by the 1970s retained little in the way of building stock that was more than a generation old,'[169] it further widened the rupture between the present and the past spatially. Without suggesting a solution for such ruptures, Yamada raised more questions regarding the heterogeneous localities that existed within Tokyo

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[166] During the first meeting, when introducing himself, Yamada frankly admitted his confusion of the purpose of the Cultural Roundtable, its definition of culture, and why he was invited by the Bureau in the first place. See *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, p. 17.

[167] Ibid., p.70.

[168] Richard Torrance, 'Otoko Wa Tsurai Yo: Nostalgia or Parodic Realism?', in *Word and Image in Japanese Cinema*, eds. by Dennis Washburn and Carole Cavanaugh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 233.

[169] Sand, *Tokyo Vernacular*, p. 1.

and the various ways of self-identification. [170] If the officials were intentionally exploiting cinema's indexical relationship with reality to serve the goal of social management, Yamada rejected such a reductive approach by restoring the practical aspect of film-making and bringing the problems of subjectivity and materiality back to the discussion of cinema.

Despite cinema's ambivalent capability in evoking both the past and exposing the emptiness of the city's contemporary developed landscape, Yamada's case also reveals a common predicament that the Tokyo municipal officials encountered in engineering the city's local culture, or locality in general—namely the residents' lack of identification with Tokyo as their 'home'. Unlike other regions, including the other Japanese megacity, Osaka, there was a pervasive lack of a sense of belonging for the Tokyo residents. The local residents of *shitamachi* were more likely to identify with the old Edo instead of the modernised Tokyo as suggested by Yamada's observation in Shibamata. For the baby boomers who migrated to Tokyo in the post-war, Tokyo was foremost perceived as an opportunity-filled dreamland marked by its excitement and economic affluency. [171] However, Tokyo's rapid changing landscape and uncertain dailiness during the 1960s and 70s—also known as the economic miracle era—were also likely to summon a feeling of isolation and anxiety which may have lead the migrations to mourn for their loss of fixity back at 'home'. [172] Such problems received serious attention from municipal officials on the Cultural Roundtable, as Governor Suzuki himself asked the participants to utilise

[170] *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, p. 70.
[171] Namba Kōji, *Hito wa naze jyōkyōsuru noka* (Tokyo: Nikkei Puremiashiriizu, 2012), pp. 90-137.
[172] Ibid., pp.124-128.

culture for the creation of a Tokyoite (*Tokyo-jin*) identity to contribute to his infamous

'My Town' project.[173] Nevertheless, as the only Kansai born and based participant of the

Cultural Roundtable, the famous anthropologist Umesao Tadao acutely insinuated in a

later meeting that the very top-down planning of the 'My Town' project indeed revealed

the hollowness of the city's cultural agenda.[174]

TIFF, Internationality, and the Invention of Tokyo's Globalised Local Culture

Although the cinematic representation of the anachronistic *shitamachi* was

simultaneously an inspiration and a problem for Tokyo's cultural planning, this did not

mean there was no other ways of conceiving cinema's role in the city's cultural policy

agenda. This is revealed in the Cultural Roundtable's final report, where cinema is only

mentioned alongside other art forms like painting, sculpture, architecture, music,

theatrical performance, and fashion in a sub-column called *kokusaisei*

(internationality).[175] According to this part of the report, 'Tokyo, as both the capital city

of Japan and an international city opening to the world has created a rich international

culture and has come to produce something that attracts international attention … through

various cultural exchanges across borders.'[176] In other words, what the report suggests is

that cinema has been and will continue serving the parts of Tokyo's culture which are

particularly 'international.' Through phrases like 'cultural exchanges across border,' it

becomes apparent that the idea of 'cinema' listed here refers not only to the moving image

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[173] Suzuki's 'my town' project aimed to constitute a recognition of Tokyo-ness and an identity of Tokyoite for Tokyo's mixed population of indigenous and domestic migrants. See *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, pp. 16-17.
[174] Ibid., p.74.
[175] Ibid., p.272.
[176] Ibid.

but also a complete and complicated set of practices which involves transnational movements of humans and objects.

Though only mentioned briefly in the final report, there is a more explicit discussion during the Cultural Roundtable meetings regarding the deployment of a film festival for promoting Tokyo's cultural status on the international stage. In the meeting held in October 1982, the technocrat Adachi Kenji raised Cannes as an example to underline the necessity of establishing a regularly held film festival in Tokyo with the city and the state's joint ventures and the Japan Foundation's organisational assistance.[177] Adachi did not come up with the blueprint for the upcoming TIFF in 1985 all by himself since several months before that meeting, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry had already talked to the then chairman of the Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan (MPPA or *Eiren* in Japanese) ,Okada Shigeru, and developed a draft regarding the founding of the TIFF.[178] Nevertheless, Adachi's comments help to indicate the municipal government's proactive gesture in assigning its position and role in the festival's preparatory stage and associating the film festival within the municipal government's culture agenda.

The 1st TIFF in 1985 has so far been mainly investigated through the lens of nationhood. Examining the 1st TIFF's film programmes, Lance Lomax argues that the establishment of the TIFF marks Japan's attempt to 'restate its historical cinematic dominance' on a global scale which matches the general shift in Japan's approach to

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[177] Ibid., p.188-190.
[178] 'Korekara masatsu okorumai, eizō bunka wa sekai shijō o mezasu-tsūsanshō ga ondo no Tōkyō eigasai', *The Nihon keizai shimbun*, 29 June 1982.

geopolitics in the 1980s following its economic success in the past decades.[179] According to Lomax, such shift in scale is not merely about a change of Japan's targeted film market from regional (as marked by Japan's investment in the Southeast Asian Film Festival from 1950s to 70s) to the Western world.[180] More importantly, it marks a shift of Japan's 'worldview' from 'international' to 'global.'[181] Adopting Tezuka Yoshiharu's differentiation of the two discourses, Lomax claims the TIFF as an example of the new 'global' paradigm for Japanese cinema, since the festival's aim for accessing 'the global community through filmic texts in a controlled location' demonstrates the shift in Japan's geopolitical agenda from winning attention from the West to removing its cultural barriers and further opening up the domestic market to the (mainly Western) world.[182] In other words, if 'internationalisation' was oriented externally to assign Japan's position within a Western dominant world, 'globalisation' marked an attempt to inwardly bring the world into Japan's domestic space.

While agreeing with Lomax's argument on the general discursive transition regarding Japan's self-positioning within the world and its worldview per se, it remains crucial to highlight that the imaginaries of 'international' and 'global' were actually more intertwined than substitutive in the 1980s as shown by the establishment of the TIFF. It is necessary to recall that when Tezuka talks about 'globalisation' in his book, he also points out the intricacy of the Japanese discourse '*kokusaika*' which usually means

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[179] Lance Lomax, 'The World Screen: Japan's Cinematic Reinvention and International Film Festivals', *Journal of Film and Video*, 72.1–2 (2020), p. 56.
[180] Ibid., p.54.
[181] Ibid., p.56.
[182] Ibid.

'internationalisation' in popular understanding.[183] Tezuka cites the political scientist Itoh

Mayumi's critique which suggests the *kokusaika* agenda promoted by the Nakasone

Yasuhiro Cabinet was only superficially open and the ideology of Japanese exclusivism

and cultural essentialism largely remained.[184] This tendency can also be spotted in the

organisation of the 1st TIFF. For instance, the greeting message of the then President of

the TIFF's organising committee, Sejima Ryuzō, articulates the organising committee's

intention in using the TIFF as an opportunity for 'conveying our nation's culture overseas'

(*waga kuni no bunka wo haigai nimo tsutae*)[185]—which clearly fits into Lomax's category

of 'internationalisation' rather than 'globalisation.' Presenting the intention of

'internationalisation' instead of 'globalisation' behind the TIFF's establishment, my point

is not to argue against Lomax's periodisation but instead to highlight the TIFF as a site

being conceived and practiced differently by various stakeholders regarding their

respective goals for the TIFF. I am neither asserting that President Sejima's word should

be taken as the objective truth of the TIFF's whole intention and influence. Indeed, as

Tezuka correctly points out, Itoh's assertion is overtly top-down which has largely

neglected the material conditions that the *kokusaika* campaign enabled for the changes of

people's daily experiences and perception of the 'world' in Japan.[186] In this way, Tezuka

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[183] Yoshiharu Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), p. 10.
[184] Ibid., pp.10-12.
[185] It is worth noting that in the English translation of Sejima's statement, the 'internationalist' statement was concealed and the whole speech was translated with a rather neutral tone that calls for enhancing international cultural exchanges. This suggests that the committee was certainly aware of the different emphasis of 'internationalisation' respectively to the domestic audience and foreign guests. ' The 1st Tokyo International Film Festival Official Catalogue', p. 2.
[186] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 12.

insists globalisation can be an appropriate framework to describe the newly emerged cosmopolitan subjects constituted by the *kokusaika* condition.

While Tezuka's insight of *kokusaika*'s potential remains crucial, I nevertheless depart from his focus on subjectivity and instead look at how the city is organised around the interweaving desires of 'internationalisation' and 'globalisation' to retain the critical approach towards *kokusaika* without overlooking its possibilities. TIFF was originally proposed by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan as a cultural sidebar for the International Exposition of Tsukuba in 1985, with its primary intention to attract foreign investments to the Japanese domestic market.[187] Eventually, the festival was run by the semi-public administrative entity of the Tokyo International Film Culture Promotion Committee that was collaboratively funded and operated by the national government, the city of Tokyo, semi-public organisations like the Japan Foundation, and private companies like the Tokyu Corporation. The four main goals enunciated by the TIFF committee's proposal in 1983 help to further showcase the multifaceted considerations of various actors behind the establishment of the TIFF: 1) to revitalise the Japanese film industry and stimulate the nation's film culture and film technology;[188] 2) to introduce Japan's cinema and visual media to the world and facilitate international exchange; 3) to work as a regular run cultural installation for the vitality of the Shibuya district's culture; 4) to cooperate with the 1985 International Exposition of Tsukuba and

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[187] Takahashi Eiichi, Wakita Takuhiko, and Kawabata Yasuo, 'Eiga, topiku, jānaru: zenyō o akirakanishita Tokyo kokusai eigasai, saidaino nekku, sensā no mondai wa dōnaruka?', *Kinema junpō*, 886, 1984, pp. 170–71.
[188] In this context, the revitalisation of Japan's film industry was referencing the situation that studio-centred film production was facing obstacles regarding sluggish box office revenue. By the end of the 1980s, many studios had eventually gone through an industrial transformation and started to specialize in distribution and/or exhibition which signalled the arrival of the so-called post-studio condition. See Wada-Marciano, *Japanese Cinema in the Digital Age*, pp. 13-14.

to evoke international attention towards the Expo.[189] Even within the state level, the power relations were more intricate than expected—regarding the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's leading role in the organisation of the TIFF, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued it was their job to manage 'international' events, while the Agency for Cultural Affairs claimed 'festivals' were supposed to be organised by them.[190] As national, municipal, industrial and corporate interests became intertwined in the preparation and operation of the TIFF, the city itself may be seen as a reliable anchor for us to untangle the tension between various stakeholders and reconsider the critical potential of the TIFF as an urban cultural project.

In general, the Tokyo government's 'Aiming for a World City of Culture' (*sekai no bunkatoshi o mezashite*)—the title of the section in the Cultural Roundtable's final report where the discussion of cinema's *kokusaisei* or internationality is located[191]—shares many similarities with the national government's reactionary attitudes. The meeting record reveals that the urgency of improving Tokyo's culture internationally was mostly a response to the 'abundance of culture' in Western metropolises like New York and Paris and the UNESCO's growing emphasis in cultural preservation and demonstration.[192] Thus, the municipal officials' attempts at catching up with Western trends was not unlike the Japanese government's reluctant pursuit of internationalisation 'due to external

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[189] Takahashi Eiichi, Wakita Takuhiko, and Kawabata Yasuo, 'Eiga, topiku, jānaru: zenyō o akirakanishita Tokyo kokusai eigasai, saidaino nekku, sensā no mondai wa dōnaruka?', *Kinema junpō*, 886, 1984, p. 170.
[190] 'Tokushu 1: tasaina kikaku de zensekai no chūmoku o atsumeru daiikai Tokyo kokusai eigasai no zenbō jikōiinchō Okada Shigeru-shi (Eiren kaichō/Tōei shacho) intabyū', *Cinema Times*, May 1985, p. 6.
[191] *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, p. 272.
[192] Ibid., p.26-30.

pressure' as Itoh Mayumi suggests.[193] Nevertheless, as this chapter has been insisting so

far, there remains a tension on the local level which sheds light on the complicated power

relations embedded in Tokyo's cultural policy agenda. Rather than being integrated into

an already-established international cultural hub, 'culture' was indeed considered a

shortcoming of Tokyo's 'internationality' during the 1980s since the city's international

activities occurred predominantly in its economic sectors. Among these various issues,

the deficiency and inaccessibility of cultural infrastructure including physical venues and

financial funding was a major problem. First of all, since the Japanese state and the Tokyo

municipal government shared the same physical space of Tokyo, there was a tension

between the two regarding who ought to be responsible for the establishment of new

cultural institutions within the city and who held responsibility for its funding and

operation.[194] In this sense, Tokyo's role should be understood more as a hyphenated

"capital-city" in terms of its cultural administration, as it is both a capital and a city being

planned as well as   regulated and negotiated under the auspices of different

administrative subjects. This complexity of scale can further help us to understand the

urgency of setting up cultural agendas for the municipal officials. Secondly, the overall

high rental price of Tokyo's public venues and the rigid criteria for using them in the first

place were fatal for most of the international cultural exchange programmes and events

that had limited budgets. In contrast, other regional cities like Kyoto and Nagoya were

more affordable and accessible for event organisers.[195] In this way, although Tokyo was

highly advantageous in terms of the concentration of its financial and demographic

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[193] Mayumi Itoh, *Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), p. 180.
[194] *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, pp. 84-86.
[195] Ibid., pp.146-155.

resources, as criticised by the era of regions discourse, its power relations with other regions were indeed more ambiguous rather than hierarchical regarding the issue of culture.

By setting up as a joint venture with the national government and private corporations,[196] the TIFF marks the city's attempt at navigating its way through its existing 'cultural' problems. The TIFF, or more accurately its organisational committee, is often overlooked and worth attention here as a semi-public organisation. The TIFF was organised by the Tokyo Kokusai Eizō Bunka Shinkōkai (Tokyo International Film Culture Promotion Association), which is a type of public interest corporation known as an 'incorporated foundation' or '*zaidan hōjin*' in Japanese. The incorporated foundation can be seen as a 'third sector organisation' which 'emphasises funding channels from both public and private sectors.'[197] Although the public interest corporations were already defined in the Meiji Civil Code of 1898,[198] its proliferation in the 1980s, as Ogawa Akihiro points out, 'must be considered in conjunction with the neoliberal policies of the 1980s and early 1990s'.[199] In other words, the TIFF could be seen as a part of a

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[196] I follow Grimsey and Lewis' definition to use the term joint venture here, which according to them 'take place when the private and public sectors jointly finance, own and operate a facility.' More significantly, they refer to Japan's third sector approach introduced in the mid-1980s as an example of the joint venture. See Darrin Grimsey and Mervyn K. Lewis, *Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure Provision and Project Finance* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 11.

[197] Mary Taeko Yoshimoto, 'Why the Third Sector in Japan Did Not Succeed: A Critical View on Third Sectors as Service Providers', *Public Performance & Management Review*, 30.2 (2006), p. 140.

[198] Akihiro Ogawa, 'The New Prominence of the Civil Sector in Japan', in Akihiro Ogawa, 'The New Prominence of the Civil Sector in Japan', in *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Culture and Society*, eds. by Victoria Lyon Bestor, Theodore C. Bestor, and Akiko Yamagata (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), p. 187.

[199] Ibid., p.193. Although Ogawa mainly refers to the Japanese NPO phenomenon here in his writing, he nevertheless traces the origin of the NPO back to the public interest corporation in the beginning of his article. Indeed, as Takao Yasuo suggests, 'public benefit organisations' like the zaidan hōjin 'are a narrowly defined category of NPO.' See Yasuo Takao, 'The Rise of the "Third Sector" in Japan', *Asian Survey*, 41.2 (2001), p. 294.

much broader political trend of neoliberalism in the 1980s promoted by the Nakasone cabinet. While its coherence regarding the national agenda remains important, what I want to emphasise here is that this kind of public-private joint venture solution was also expedient in terms of the municipal government's desire to tackle its major problems in cultural planning. Forming a collaborative relationship with the national government on one hand and deep-pocketed private companies on the other, a joint ventured film festival circumvented both the administrative and financial issues that the city faced when promoting its international cultural status. In this way, I argue the 1st Tokyo International Film Festival, despite its international orientation and reach, was also an opportunity for the municipal government to reinvent Tokyo's local culture. In the specific context of the early 1980s, the discourse of *kokusaika* provided a convenience for the municipal government to ease local issues while maintaining an economic-centred agenda, which I call the constitution of Tokyo's globalised local culture.

The specific urban history and cultural landscape of Shibuya, where the TIFF was held, helps to further illuminate the implications of the globalised local culture of Tokyo as a collaborative enterprise between the public and the private sector. Although already established as a modern district in the 1930s, Shibuya did not become Tokyo's fashion centre until the mid-1970s. Surrounded by high-class residential areas like Harajuku, Aoyama, and Daikanyama, the convenient geography allowed Shibuya to be jointly developed by the municipal government and large corporations into a trendy shopping street geared towards young people in the 1970s.[200] By the end of the 1970s, however, a

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[200] Yoshimi Shunya, *Toshi no doramatorugi: tokyo-sakariba no shakai shi* (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1987), pp. 295-300.

vast number of disorderly billboards had occupied Shibuya's skyline and made the regulation of this advertising chaos an urban issue for municipal officials. Furthermore, according to the Cultural Roundtable's final report, the outdoor advertisement problem was considered by the municipal officials to be a 'cultural matter' that had a huge impact on Tokyo's urban beauty and citizens' quality of living and therefore something which required government regulation.[201]

Instead of reducing advertising to improve Shibuya's culture, the corporations made 'culture' itself an advertisement for Shibuya. Among all the large corporations, the Japanese holding company Seibu, and especially its subsidiary corporation Saison Group, was widely considered a pioneer in this field. By transforming the Shibuya streets for the purpose of advertisement rather than setting up billboards to occupy the skyline, Seibu incorporated culture as part of their business strategy. Through methods like segmenting space—both the appearance of the streets and the interior of the department store—into different themes, renaming streets in a foreign style and regularly renewing the surface of the urban landscape, Shibuya was constituted as a performance stage, which invited its visitors to continually update their performance in accordance with changes in the streets.[202] In this way, as Yoshimi Shunya notes, Seibu largely contributed to Shibuya's image-building into being 'a street of now' for young people.[203] Echoing this, the sociologist Kitada Akihiro argues that by not only decorating the Shibuya streets with its 'culturalised' (*bunka-ka*) advertisements, but also incorporating the quality of urban streets into the interior space of its department store with facilities like parks and

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[201] *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, p. 276.
[202] Yoshimi Shunya, *Toshi no doramatorugi: tokyo-sakariba no shakai shi* (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1987), pp. 307-309.
[203] Ibid., pp.305-307.

museums, Seibu successfully overcame the dilemma of outdoor advertising through its active exploitation of culture as a business method.[204]

What is even more crucial than Seibu's culturalisation of Shibuya is how the company inspired the internationalisation of its local streets in collaboration with the municipal government. For instance, before Seibu established the landmark Parco department store, the Koen-dori Street where Parco is located was named differently as Kuyakusho-dori. With the consideration of vitalising the commerce of Shibuya, Ward officials utilised the opportunity of Parco's opening to rename the street in 1972, for which the Italian word '*parco*' was directly translated into '*kōen*' in Japanese (or 'park' in English).[205] Similarly, it was according to Seibu's proposal that the ramp adjacent to the Parco Department Store was renamed into 'Spain-zaka' and was further developed into a Southern European-style street.[206] If what Yoshimi emphasizes through Seibu's business strategy is the temporal experience of now-ness created by the ever-changing appearance of Shibuya's landscape, this renaming also suggests how the experience of now must be oriented towards a sense of (mostly Western) foreignness. The sense of foreignness that these businesses promoted in Shibuya colluded with the national politics of *kokusaika* of the Nakasone regime—which encouraged Japanese citizens to consume the goods and culture of the West[207]—and further strengthened the prominence of the area in the state and the city's political agendas.

[204] Kitada Akihiro, *Kōkoku toshi Tokyo: sono tanjō to shi* (Tokyo: Kosaido, 2002), pp. 60-66.
[205] 'Dōri no namae' <https://www.city.shibuya.tokyo.jp/bunka/spot/meisho/street.html> [accessed 26 December 2022].
[206] Ibid.
[207] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 81.

The public-private nexus that constituted Shibuya's internationalised landscape justified why Shibuya was selected to host an international event like the TIFF in the 1980s. The entire layout of streets—predominantly with the infrastructure of department stores—in Shibuya was turned into a giant advertisement hoard to serve its stakeholders and a performance stage to redefine Tokyo's culture as distinctly international: one only needs to refer to all the film-referenced business promotions and commercial events held during the same period in Shibuya. The Shibuya Marui department store's audio-visual-electronics (AVE) sale and Sony's new compact video camera announcing Japan's internationally celebrated technological power,[208] the cosmetic corporation Kanebo's celebration of the final year of the United Nations Decade for Women and the beverage company Takara's use of the Hollywood actor John Travolta as their ambassador to promote the consumption of foreignness in the domestic market were just some of the illustrative examples of what was on display here. [209] Such coexistence of inward/globalisation and outward/internationalisation flows again reconfirms the double-edge of the *kokusaika* discourse as clarified by Tezuka.

The highly significant role that cinema played in the internationalised cultural consumption is apparent in the holding company Tokyu's advertisements which not only organised an 'art and drinking party' with the brewing company Suntory at its Shibuya department store featuring film director Hasegawa Kazuhiko but also invited the veteran filmmaker Shinoda Masahiro to promote the group's new catchphrase: 'people are

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[208] 'The 1st Tokyo International Film Festival Official Catalogue', pp. 10-11.
[209] Ibid., p.81; p.87.

culture' (*hito wa bunka desu*).[210] [211][Figure 2.4 & 2.5] Of course, smaller local businesses

in Shibuya were also mobilised by the TIFF, which can be detected from the presence of

Namiki Sadato, the chairman of Shibuya's local underground shopping street known as

the Shibuchika in the TIFF catalogue. 'Shibuya enjoys extensive popularity as an area of

culture and youth, as well as being fashionable,' read Namiki's greeting message who,

being designated the TIFF Shibuya District Committee chairman, wished the TIFF to

'provide Shibuya with the opportunity of becoming more loved by people as a cultural

centre.'[212]

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[210] Ibid., p.8; p.96; p.106.

[211] Indeed, the Tokyu Corporation was aiming to utilise the TIFF to regain its power in Shibuya which was secondary to Seibu's dominance in the district. It was said that Tokyu's advertising agency had budgeted over 260 million yen for decorations during the 1st TIFF to build Shibuya as a 'cinema city'. Although Seibu was also one of the main sponsors, they gradually withdrew from the TIFF in the late 1980s. After Tokyu's culture-titled complex Bunkamura next to its Shibuya main store came into operation in 1989, it had become the largest sponsor of the TIFF among other holding companies. See Tsuchiya Yoshio, 'Tokyo-hatsu "kyoshō" ga niramu, eigasai ga hajimatta, Shibuya wa shinemashiti ni', *Yomiuri Shimbun Evening*, 31 May 1985, p. 22; 'Tokyu Agency, Shibuya zentai o kōkoku baitai ka—gaitō sōshoku. ibento riyō', *Nikkei sangyo shimbun*, December 1984, p. 5; 'The 3rd Tokyo International Film Festival Official Catalogue' (Tokyo kokusai eigasai soshiki iinkai/kōhō iinkai, 1989), pp. 101-105.

[212] 'The 1st Tokyo International Film Festival Official Catalogue', p. 5.

Figure 2.4: the TIFF-themed drinking party at Tokyu Department Store. From 'The 1st Tokyo International Film Festival Official Catalogue' (Tokyo Kokusai Eigasai Soshiki Iinkai/kōhō iinkai, 1985), p. 106.

Figure 2.5: Tokyu's cultural campaign featuring filmmaker Shinoda Masahiro. From 'The 1st Tokyo International Film Festival Official Catalogue' (Tokyo Kokusai Eigasai Soshiki Iinkai/kōhō iinkai, 1985), p. 8.

Yoshimi Shunya suggests that the streets of Shibuya in the 1980s were dominated by the logic of screens since its major promotor Seibu had learned its business strategy from the model of Disneyland.[213] As Seibu and other department stores turned Shibuya into a theme park, symbols overwhelmed people's perception of reality and made the city a simulacrum—according to Yoshimi who borrowed Jean Baudrillard's idea to criticise the deceptive consumerist reality that the capital had created through its urban development and visual culture.[214] While Shibuya's spectacular landscape during the TIFF can be criticised in a similar vein, it might as well exemplify Tezuka Yoshiharu's idea of the

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[213] Yoshimi Shunya, *Shikaku-toshi no chiseigaku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2016). pp. 307-309; pp. 325-326.
[214] Ibid., p.323.

cosmopolitan subject. As Tezuka has convincingly framed the cosmopolitanism that emerged in the 1980s Japan into different types to tease out the intricate relationships between subjectivity, economic globalisation, the geopolitics of neoliberal capitalism and the coexistence of progressive and conservative politics triggered by these phenomena,[215] we can also speculate about the positive opportunities created by the TIFF for various progressive transnational encounters in Shibuya. While such topics are beyond this chapter's concern, I will return to and further scrutinise both critical positions in the following chapters.

The Japan Foundation film festival series and the transmutation of institutional cinema practices in the global city

If the establishment of the TIFF in 1985 was a symbolic event in terms of how Tokyo's globalised local culture was constituted within a public-private nexus, it also represented a more general transition on an institutional level regarding the influence of *kokusaika* on culture. When discussing the constitution of Tokyo's status as a global city of culture during the Cultural Roundtable meetings, many mentioned the necessity of improving the city's cultural infrastructure, which included the building of public venues and halls, the organisation of international symposia and talks, the enhancement of facilities and amenities for foreign tourists and increasing cultural exchanges with people from both developed and developing countries.[216] Cultural institutions were the primary agencies that facilitated the development and operation of this infrastructure. Among

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[215] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, pp. 13-24.
[216] *Tokyo-to bunka kondankai gijiroku*, pp. 139-170.

several existing institutions, the Japan Foundation was considered a go-to actor to channel the state, the city and private companies in the practice of culture, especially cinema, in Tokyo; something which recalls Adachi's suggestion of asking the Japan Foundation to assist with the organisation of the TIFF during the Cultural Roundtable.[217]

The Japan Foundation was founded as a special corporation (*tokushu hōjin*) in 1972 within the specific Cold War context to 'deepen Japan-US relations, to avoid "communications gaps" and cultural misunderstandings in the future'.[218] Although the Japan Foundation mainly served to facilitate peaceful cultural exchanges at an intellectual level, as Utpal Vyas points out, the institution was 'inevitably, as a state agency… [conceived] to promote Japanese language and culture, ideas and information, and to enable smooth relations between countries for the furtherance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan's foreign policies and Japan's general international relations.'[219] These diplomatic concerns are visible in the 'cultural film' (*bunka eiga*) programmes that the Japan Foundation has promoted since its establishment in the 1970s. Simply browsing the works categorised as 'cultural film' by the Japan Foundation, it is not hard to notice that the contents are mostly about Japanese traditional arts and folk practices like *jōruri* (puppet theatre), *awa* dance, Japanese gardens, Kyoto sweets, and so on.[220] The Japan Foundation's diplomatic function can be seen as succeeding from its predecessor in the imperial context, namely the Society for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai) established in 1934. Though their institutional structures differ greatly

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[217] Ibid., pp.188-190.
[218] Utpal Vyas, 'The Japan Foundation in China: An Agent of Japan's Soft Power?', *Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies*, 2008 <http://japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/2008/Vyas.html>.
[219] Ibid.
[220] 'Kokusai kōryū kikin no jigyō jisseki', *Kokusai kōryū*, 1, 1974, pp. 62–63.

according to their respective social and political contexts, the two institutions serve similar functions in prioritising the preservation and circulation of films that showcase a positive image of Japan and benefit the nation's official interests.[221]

While scholars like Vyas mainly look at the Japan Foundation as a cultural institution for promoting Japanese national culture, I argue we should not overlook the organisation's junctures to local governments and private corporations.[222] Compared to incorporated foundations like the TIFF, a special corporation is a national-level organisation which is legally considered to be a public entity and hence should be excluded from the third sector,[223] the Japan Foundation has been similarly receiving fundings both from public and private sources and operating independently from governmental oversight. It is no coincidence that the Japan Foundation was founded during the same year that Tanaka Kakuei announced and published his infamous *Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago* (*Nippon Retto Kaizō-Ron*) in 1972, as the latter 'advocated the idea that the government and private sector should cooperate to realise public interests and profit-maximisation for firms' and had also largely influenced Japan's neoliberal policies in the 1980s and beyond.[224] In this way, even though the Japan Foundation should be unmistakably defined as a national and public corporation, it largely shared similar operations to the TIFF, which served not one but multiple stakeholders with various goals.

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[221] Kae Ishihara, 'A Historical Survey of Film Archiving in Japan', p. 289.
[222] I use the past tense here since, following the Japanese administrative reform in the late 1990s, the title of the Japan Foundation changed from special corporation (*tokushu hōjin*) to independent administrative agency (*dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin*).
[223] Yoshimoto, 'Why the Third Sector in Japan Did Not Succeed', p. 143.
[224] Ibid., p.140.

This approach is notably visible within the context of the 1980s when the Japan Foundation's film-related practices were discreetly transformed to fit not only the nation but also Tokyo city and other private actors' needs of *kokusaika*. If the Japan Foundation's cultural film programmes before the 1980s mainly treated cinema as a secondary medium to record, store, and represent an overtly nationalistic form of 'Japanese aesthetics' and 'Japanese culture,' following Tezuka's differentiation, its operations were also largely 'international' since the Japan Foundation was mainly organising film screenings overseas to showcase Japan's cultural uniqueness in a bid at 'winning attention from the West.'[225] Nevertheless, during the 1980s, there was a general shift towards the globalisation model of 'opening up to the world' in the Japan Foundation's operations, which can be best recognised from the organisation's domestic-oriented 'film festival' series. Spearheaded by the South Asian Film Festival in 1982, the Japan Foundation has since organised or assisted region-titled film festivals throughout the 1980s including the African Film Festival in 1984, the Latin American Film Festival in 1988, and the ASEAN Film Week in 1989 before the eventual institutionalisation of a film sector within the Japan Foundation's organisation in the 1990s. Unlike the TIFF, where the desires of internationalisation and globalisation were intricately entwined, the Japan Foundation film festival series in the 1980s were predominantly 'global' since they mainly targeted domestic audiences in Japan.

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[225] It is worth mentioning, however, that experimental filmmakers including Iimura Takahiko and Matsumoto Toshio also frequently collaborated with the Japan Foundation during the 1970s, including the former's Japanese Experimental Film exhibitions in New York sponsored by the Japan Foundation. While it suggests a certain degree of film artists' autonomy and the heterogeneity of the Japan Foundation's film practice, they remained largely foreign-oriented. In this way, they might have shared a similar intention to frame Iimura as a representative of Japan as to the cultural film programmes. See Iimura Takahiko, 'Eizō sakuhin no kokusai kōryū', *Kokusai kōryū*, 26, 1981, pp. 51–55.

Before probing into the details of the Japan Foundation film festival series, it is crucial to clarify that although these events were all named 'film festivals' (*eigasai*) in Japanese, we should carefully differentiate them from the more prevalent model of film festivals like the TIFF. If the latter followed the international film festival codes regulated by the FIAFP (International Federation of Film Producers Associations), which specifically leant towards the European centres of Cannes, Berlin, and Venice and has been periodically held in a fixed location,[226] then the Japan Foundation film festivals discussed here did most likely not fall under this definition, being one-off domestic film events organised by Japanese film practitioners with funding from the Japan Foundation. Nevertheless, the Japan Foundation film festivals serve as a vivid example of what Skadi Loist terms 'film festival circuits,' which emphasise the 'versatile, contingent, and relational' feature of heterogeneous film festival networks outside of the dominant structure of world cinema.[227] The heterogeneous film festival networks of the Japan Foundation were not totally separated from the European centre but rather entangled and constantly in a process of negotiation with the dominant structure. The programming of the Japan Foundation's film screening events and the programmers' outreach to international film industries and circles, as well as its prefiguration of Japan's domestic film festival environment, should all be taken as precedents for the nation's future film festival programming such as the TIFF's Asian Best Film Week or *Ajia Shūsaku Shūkan*, and international reception, especially the international reputation of Japanese auteurs in

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[226] Marijke de Valck, 'Introduction: What Is a Film Festival? How to Study Festivals and Why You Should', in *Film Festivals: History, Theory, Method, Practice*, eds. by Marijke de Valck, Brendan Kredell, and Skadi Loist (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 1–12.

[227] Skadi Loist, 'The Film Festival Circuit: Networks, Hierarchies, and Circulation', in *Film Festivals: History, Theory, Method, Practice*, eds. by Marijke de Valck, Brendan Kredell, and Skadi Loist (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 60.

the 1990s. In this way, this section can also contribute to the discussion of Japanese film festival studies by unveiling some early signs and efforts in configuring Japan's, particularly Tokyo's, film festival circuits from film practitioners in Japan. To keep the differentiation between the Japan Foundation's film festivals with the main international film festival model in mind, in this section, I will nevertheless use film events interchangeably with film festivals when talking about these screenings and activities.

Figure 2.6: the 1982 South Asian Film Festival.
From 'Minami Ajia No Eiga o Mite: Kokusai Kōryu Kikin Eigasai' (Kokusai kōryū kikin shichōgakubu, 1983).

Figure 2.7: the 1984 African Film Festival. From 'The Japan Foundation African Film Festival '(Kokusai kōryū kikin, 1984).

The Japan Foundation film festival series made Tokyo 'global' by providing audiences in Japan with a new perception of the 'world' that closely resembles Dudley

Andrew's periodisation of 'world cinema.'[228] For Andrew, the history of world cinema can be divided into five stages and he labels the period between 1968 and 1989 as the 'world cinema phase.' The main difference between this stage and its previous 'federated phase' is the major film festivals' active exploration of films from countries that were not included within the world cinema map before.[229] In other words, the worldview of the world cinema phase serves to explore cinemas from places which were not familiar to or even heard of by the film personnel and audiences in the centre. Part of the zeitgeist, the Japan Foundation film festivals mainly chose to exhibit films from countries that were not usually familiar to Japanese audiences. For instance, the 1982 South Asian Film Festival (*kokusai kōryū kikin eigasai: minami ajia no meisaku o motomete*), was launched in October to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the Japan Foundation and introduced 11 films from 5 South Asian countries—including India, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. [Figure 2.6] Since films from these countries were barely screened in Japan, there was a satisfaction of exploring the unknown for its programmers.[230] Moreover, the Japan Foundation had further sent the winners of the SAFF's film review competition to five South Asian countries,[231] which reveals how the attraction of the event was indeed about encountering 'new worlds,' both visually and physically. In this way, the region-titled film festivals held by the Japan Foundation also shared the major problems of the 'world cinema phase' as Andrew suggests, namely in its tendency for 'exploiting a

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[228] Dudley Andrew, 'Time Zones and Jetlag: The Flows and Phases of World Cinema', in *World Cinemas, Transnational Perspectives*, eds. by Natasa Ďurovičová and Kathleen E. Newman (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 75-80.

[229] Ibid., p.76.

[230] 'Minami ajia no eiga o mite: kokusai kōryu kikin eigasai' (Kokusai kōryū kikin shichōgakubu, 1983), pp. 4-5.

[231] Ibid., p.3.

graphic version of orientalism' and celebrating an essentialist notion of 'authenticity' belonging to each nation.[232]

By comparing the Japan Foundation film festival series with Andrew's periodisation, there is both a sense of belatedness and contemporaneity revealed by the emergence of the Japan Foundation film series in the 1980s. On one hand, one may say Japan chose to embrace the 'world' much later than the European centre, since it only started to explore the other possibilities of the world's cinema as an active agent a decade after. On the other hand, however, Japan was itself considered a part of the world cinema system, and it was not until the 1980s that it found itself mainly following the European centre and introducing world cinema accordingly. In this way, the belatedness of Japan should be considered as part of the world cinema structure. This can be understood through Kawakita Kashiko's presence in the Japan Foundation film festival series' organisation. One of the most important film distributors and cultural diplomats in Japanese history, Kawakita served as the chairwoman for the 1982 SAFF's organising committee. Like many of her contemporaries, Europe was the centre of Kawakita's activities throughout her career,[233] and she was devoted to both introducing European art-house films to Japan

[232] Andrew, 'Time Zones and Jetlag: The Flows and Phases of World Cinema', pp. 77-78.
[233] Together with her husband Kawakita Nagamasa, who served as the vice-president of the China Film Company (Chūka Den'ei studio) in Shanghai, Kawakita Kashiko also stayed in China for several years to facilitate the Japanese Empire's propagandist agenda during WWII. It is said that unlike the Manchukuo Film Association, commonly known as Man'ei, which more strictly followed the Empire's policy, the Kawakitas' China Film Company instead 'specialised in the selection of Chinese-made films deemed acceptable to both Japan and China before distributing them to and screening them at Japanese-occupied territories within China as well as in Japan proper' thus 'did not function in the same capacity as Man'ei by producing propaganda films reflecting Japan's continental policy'. See Yoshiko Yamaguchi and Sakuya Fujiwara, *Fragrant Orchid: The Story of My Early Life*, trans. by Chia-ning Chang (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015), p. 188; Kae Ishihara, 'A Historical Survey of Film Archiving in Japan', in *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Cinema*, eds. by Joanne Bernardi and Shota T. Ogawa (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2021), p. 289; Kawakita Kashiko and Satō Tadao, *Eiga ga sekai o musubu* (Tokyo: Sohjusha, 1991), p. 53.

and exporting Japanese auteurs to the major international film festivals in Europe.[234]

When reading Kawakita's welcome message in the 1982 SAFF's catalogue, it is not hard to notice that her interest in South Asian cinema was still largely driven by the increasing reputation of the region within European-centred international film festival circles. According to Kawakita, Japan urgently needed to see the potential of its neighbours when the Western world began to increasingly recognise the significance of 'Asian' films.[235] Thus, Kawakita's fear of missing out on the South Asian cinema boom was largely congruent with the nation and city government's concern of *kokusaika* and catching up with trends in the West.

Nevertheless, echoing Tezuka's critiques of the potential of *kokusaika* as a form of globalisation, the Japan Foundation's film events had also made visible and promoted cosmopolitan practices across borders, something which can be spotted in the changing configuration of film programming throughout the series. The 1984 African Film Festival, which introduced 10 films from 9 African countries including Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Ethiopia [Figure 2.7], marks a watershed moment when younger generations like Satō Tadao and Shirai Yoshio—both renowned Japanese film critics—are seen taking over the role of main programmer from Kawakita.[236] In comparison to the older generation of programmers, Satō and Shirai's generation—who were stirred and ultimately disappointed by Japan's political scene during the 1960s—were more self-reflexive and frank in criticising the

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[234] Kawakita and Satō, *Eiga ga sekai o musubu*, p. 316.
[235] ' A Panorama of South Asian Films: Japan Foundation South Asian Film Festival '(Kokusai kōryū kikin, 1982), p. 1.
[236] Satō worked as an associate programmer below Kawakita in the 1982 SAFF, so 'took over' also has a literal meaning.

politics of their film selection and the geopolitics of their organisation per se. For instance, in the film festival catalogue, Satō would soberly reflect on the fact that most of their selected films were funded or supported by European money and circulated in the major international film festival circle: an aspect which he criticises as a tendency of cultural colonialism.[237] Instead of antagonising the hegemonic order, however, Satō and Shirai chose to actively utilise the opportunities and fundings provided by the Japan Foundation to both reach out to the European film festival circles to gather information as well as travel to these African countries to do research and build networks with the local filmmakers.[238] These trips further enabled them to depart from simply acquiring award-winning films according to the international film festival's standards but also allowed them to include less well-known works in the AFF's programme, which led Shirai to believe that the event had the potential to be a great opportunity to break free from European and American perspectives on North Africa.[239] Besides, Satō also considered sidebar events like symposia and interviews as a platform to critically engage with cinema's political and aesthetic potential. This made the Japan Foundation film festival series less about diplomatic exchanges but more of a localised survey of the global social, cultural, and political issues of its own time.

Although the Japan Foundation film festivals had opened some space for actors like Satō and Shirai to move beyond the institution's political agenda, they were inevitably restricted to government policies, especially when they needed propagation. In 1989, the Japan Foundation supported the Tokyo International Film Culture Promotion Committee

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[237] 'The Japan Foundation African Film Festival '(Kokusai kōryū kikin, 1984), pp. 2-3.
[238] Satō Tadao, 'Burakku afurika no eiga', *Kokusai kōryū*, 39, 1984, p. 1.
[239] Shirai Yoshio, 'Shōgeki-teki datta kita-Afurika eiga no tabi', *Kokusai kōryū*, 39, 1984, p. 1.

to hold the ASEAN Film Week in Tokyo. The event introduced 9 films from 5 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—to Tokyo, together with sidebar events like after-talks. Commissioned as a part of the then Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru's Japan·ASEAN Comprehensive Exchange Plan (nihon·ASEAN sōgō kōryū keikaku), the ASEAN Film Week was mentioned and complimented by Takeshita in his Jakarta speech in 1989 which highlighted the event's prominence within the government's diplomatic blueprint.[240] As an extension of the two free world blocs' alliance since 1977, the Plan further dialogued with the specific context of 1980s Japan. According to Machimura Takashi, Japan's opening to foreign talents, students, and laborers had gone through four stages in the 1980s. From 1986 till the end of the decade the 'third wave' mainly focused on importing Southeast Asian and South Asian immigrant laborers into Japan working under the country's bubble prosperity.[241] In this way, the diplomatic project of the Japan-ASEAN project was also realised more pragmatically under the Takeshita regime to solve the country's labour shortage caused by a low birth rate. Regarding the geopolitics embedded within the ASEAN Film Week, the renowned film auteur Ōshima Nagisa threw a poignant question to the event's main programmer Satō Tadao.[242] Complaining that a film event should not be titled with a word of obvious political leaning like 'ASEAN'— or any overt 'political language' (seiji yōgo)—[243] Ōshima criticises the event for being

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[240] ' Takeshita Noboru naikaku sōri daijin no ASEAN shokoku hōmon ni okeru seisaku ensetsu: tomoni kangae tomoni ayumu-hihon to ASEAN '(Gaikō seisho 33 gō, p.308-317, 1989) <https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/exdpm/19890505.S1J.html>.
[241] Takashi Machimura, *Sekai toshi Tokyo no kōzō tenkan: toshi risutorakuchuaringu no shakaigaku* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), pp. 242-245.
[242] ' Nihon eiga ga shinni kokusaiteki ni naru tame niwa...', *Kokusai kōryū*, 49, 1989, pp. 2–19.
[243] Ibid., p.19.

obviously driven by the US-led free world narrative, since the Association itself was promoted by the United States and other capitalist countries to confront the communist blocs in Asia. In response to Oshima's critique, Satō had to admit that there were restrictions on programming and organising film events under the terms imposed by state-level cultural institutions.[244] It is fair to imagine that Satō chose to keep silent on some critical matters that may have been unwelcome or even prohibited by the authorities.

Comparisons between the African Film Festival and the ASEAN Film Week reveal a need to neither undervalue the agency of cosmopolitan actors nor overlook the power of officials in film festivals organised by cultural institutions like the Japan Foundation. Rather, one should view such events as a complicated process of negotiation. Nevertheless, it remains important to redirect the analytical focus back to the site where these events are held. As these film festivals were creating chances for transnational encounters which might not serve official agendas, Tokyo was where these heterogenous flows specifically converged. Taking the 1982 South Asian Film Festival as an example, among the 21 cities in Japan across the Northeast (Sapporo in Hokkaido) to the Southwest (Kagoshima in Kyūshū) where the event was held, the longest running programme schedule and main programmes were set in Tokyo, including the exclusive symposia with South Asian filmmakers.[245] Like the 1982 SAFF, other events in the Japan Foundation's film festival series during the era were all mainly held in Tokyo. From a geographical perspective, the whole of the 1980s Japan Foundation film festival series was held in the great Ginza area in venues like the Shinbashi Yakult Hall and the Yūrakuchō Culture

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[244] Ibid.
[245] ' Kokusai kōryū kikin sōritsu jūshūnen kinen jigyō no oshirase', *Kokusai kōryū*, 33, 1982, p. 65.

Hall. As the area historically served as the site of high-class theatres,[246] it is also where the headquarters of prominent film companies like Tōhō and Tōei are located. Thus, new international film events still very much relied upon the existing industrial structure of Japanese cinema. Furthermore, these events were also associated with other existing private film institutions like the experimental filmmaker Teshigahara Hiroshi's Sōgetsu-kai and documentary producer Ushiyama Junichi's Japan Film Culture Centre (Nihon Eizō Karucha Senta),[247] an aspect which unveils a complex local network of large film companies and other smaller actors underlying the globalised cinema landscape of Tokyo. In this way, the general tendency in the 1980s was to reinforce Tokyo as the centre of cinema in Japan. In other words, it was only in Tokyo where the actual 'exchanges' were happening, and other regions were mostly waiting for the 'internationality' of cinema to trickle down from the top—which seems to match the municipal officials' blueprint revealed in the Cultural Roundtable.

In the meantime, the Japan Foundation's use of existing facilities, personnel, and networks of the cinema industry in Tokyo also reveals the lack of a specialised sectors within public cultural institutions to organise these kind of film events in Japan. It would not be until the end of the decade that the Japan Foundation eventually built its own infrastructure for film exhibition. As a result of the ASEAN Culture Centre's establishment within the Japan Foundation in 1989, the more freewheeling mode of organising film events through recruiting freelancer programmers like Satō was replaced

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[246] Jasper Sharp, *Historical Dictionary of Japanese Cinema* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2011), p. xxiv.
[247] Aki Nishikawa and Ikuko Takasaki, 'A Quarter Century of Screening Asian Films: Interview with Ishizaka Kenji', *What's Next from Southeast Asia: Old Masters, Masters, and the Young Blood*, 2018, p. 18.

with a more institutionalised method.[248] The ASEAN Culture Centre would take over the programming of Japan Foundation's film screening events with its own recruited, full-time programmers like Ishizaka Kenji—who later became the programme director of the TIFF's Asian Future and CROSSCUT ASIA sections. More importantly, the Japan Foundation would establish an office in Shibuya in 1989 to house the ASEAN Culture Centre, marking a shift of spatial politics that paralleled the changes in programming methods. In their curator Ishizaka's words: "the Japan Foundation managed to change its image by establishing an event hall and engaging in various types of cultural activities, as well as creating a space in Shibuya, the centre of youth culture."[249] This move can be seen as the Japan Foundation's deliberate adaptation to the globalised cultural sphere already established in the Shibuya districts. The ASEAN Culture Centre would keep introducing 'world cinema' through events like the Thai Film Festival (1990), the Malaysia Film Week (1990), the Philippine Film Festival (1991), the Southeast Asia Film Festival (1992), and the Indonesia Film Festival (1993) in the following years before it moved on to adapt the recent post-Cold War geopolitics and changed its name into the Asia Centre in 1994.[250]

Coda

This chapter has examined the emergence of cultural policy in the 1980s as a blanket solution to tackle various domestic and international issues for the Japanese and

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[248] Ibid., p.19.
[249] Ibid., p.18.
[250] The Asia Centre of the Japan Foundation today, however, is not the original Centre from 1994. The first Asia Centre disbanded in 2004 and the new one was re-established in 2014. The geopolitical scope of the two Asia Centres is different according to Ishizaka Kenji. See Ibid., p.24.

Tokyo governments. While there is already abundant research investigating culture's definition in the national government's ambitious yet ambiguous *kokusaika* policy, I turned my focus to the municipal level and highlighted the urgency for the Tokyo officials to administer cultural policies in order to ease domestic tensions led by the rise of regionalism and to establish the city's international status within an increasingly permeable and free-flowing globalised world. Examining the discursive constitution of culture in the municipal government's important Cultural Roundtable, I have teased out the specific social and political imagination behind the officials' grand blueprint of fabricating the city's unique local culture. Furthermore, through historicising the *kondankai* format, I offered a critical perspective on the nuanced power relations involved in the official configuration of 'culture.'

Considering cinema as a site of contestation and cooperation, the transdisciplinary approach of this chapter helps to highlight the limitations of exploiting 'cinema as culture' in urban planning. During the Cultural Roundtable, cinema was bifurcated as a representational media and a cultural practice, with both aspects stimulating some discussions regarding cinema's potential in terms of Tokyo's cultural policy. On the one hand, cinema's capacity to visualise an 'authentic' past was exploited to reinvent Tokyo's local essence, namely its inheritance of the folk culture of Edo. On the other hand, cinema's capability of facilitating capital and human exchanges across the border was maximised through the deployment of film festivals of various scales. While both features of cinema had played crucial roles in the configuration of Tokyo's cultural landscape in the 1980s, there were also ambiguities and ambivalences in cinema's service to Tokyo's official agenda. On the representational side, the unfolding of a

different temporality further problematised the city's economic and development centred history and reality. On the practical side, film festivals helped to reveal the deficiency and inaccessibility of cultural infrastructure in the city in comparison with both the city's domestic and international counterparts. Since Tokyo's cultural problems were exposed via cinema, it also created spaces for actors, including private corporations and cosmopolitan individuals, to realise their own economic and political purposes and provided opportunities for unexpected encounters and assemblages in a newly reconfigured, globalised network of cinema.

Following the celebration of spectacular international events like the TIFF and the normalisation of global film events like the Japan Foundation's film festival series by the end of the 1980s, cinema was fully institutionalised as a practice of Tokyo's globalised locality. *Bunka no jidai* was embodied in the city materially in a grandiose manner, but the original promise of reducing the economic and demographic gaps between centre and periphery and solving the demerits of urbanisation were largely untouched. Capital and human resources were still largely concentrated in Tokyo, but instead under the fancy title of cultural development. Instead of a more equal future, the official promotion and regulation of film culture in Tokyo not only maintained the city's central status within Japan, but also further expanded it into an enormous organ of global capitalism. The official visions of 'culture' thrived and failed simultaneously. This, however, also created the discursive and material basis for a more progressive and egalitarian 'culture' to emerge, something that will be discussed in the third chapter.

Chapter Three - The Reconfiguration of Cinema Infrastructure in the Global City:

From the *Jishu* Commercial Nexus to the Mini-theatre Boom

While cinema was instrumentalised as part of Tokyo's globalised local culture for officials to advance an economic and political agenda under the banner of *kokusaika*, the globalisation of Tokyo via cinema also occurred in much more concrete form. The mini-theatre, or *mini shiata* in Japanese, was a new type of cinematic space that emerged at the dawn of the 1980s across Japan but especially as an urban phenomenon in Tokyo. These venues played an important role in making globalisation an everyday experience since they enormously expanded the range of films that audiences in Japan could watch. Nevertheless, the purpose of this chapter is not to reinforce the resonance between the mini-theatre and the official *kokusaika* agenda. On the contrary, I consider mini-theatres a vital opportunity for us to revise the meaning of the global city and re-envision the progressive possibilities of globalisation to both the city and the people within. Departing from Chapter Two's analysis of the municipal government's cultural policy-making and the implantation of international film festivals in Tokyo, which mainly focused on the interactions between government officials and private corporations, this chapter uses mini-theatres as an anchor to study the changing cinema infrastructure in Tokyo that was co-constituted by grassroots film personnel and their commercial partners. Carefully scrutinising both the material aspects (the location and placement of the venues as well as the mobility systems when commuting to these venues) and discursive aspects (how these venues were imagined and discussed in relation to Tokyo's film culture and how they were compared with other types of exhibition spaces) of the mini-theatres, this

chapter also aims to contribute to studies of the transformation of Japanese cinema's industrial infrastructure towards the so-called 'post-studio condition.'

'Post-studio' is a discourse which refers to the transformation of the Japanese film industry since the decline of the relatively stable studio system from the 1960s. It is often believed that the end of the 1980s marked the moment of the eventual collapse of the studio system, and the full advancement of a 'post-studio era.'[251] However, scholars who analyse Japanese cinema in the post-studio condition do not merely suggest the change from studio to post-studio as a linear transitional process, but rather utilise the 'disordered' post-studio condition as a chance to rethink the method of conducting studies of the film industry. If conventional film industry studies tend to analyse the rise and fall of prominent film studios like Toho and Shochiku by investigating cinema as a clearly segmented process from production, distribution, exhibition to reception, then recent scholarship suggests these sections be scrutinised together as complex and networked practices which cannot be easily isolated from each other.[252] *Kōgyō* (興行) is the term used by Yoshimi Shunya to specify this new approach towards cinema as a networked system without omitting the agency of industrial personnel. It is difficult to find an English counterpart for the term *kōgyō* since it contains a variety of meanings and connotations regarding film as industrial practice. As a noun, it can be less problematically translated as a word that refers to the box-office performance of a movie. Nevertheless, since the discourse of *kōgyō* is more essentially correlated to the methods of mobilising (as many) audience members to watch the movie (as possible), it usually

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[251] Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, *Japanese Cinema in the Digital Age* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012), pp. 12-15.

[252] Yoshimi Shunya, 'Miruhito, tsukuruhito, kakeruhito', in *Nihon eiga wa ikiteiru: daisanken miruhito, tsukuruhito, kakeruhito* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), pp. 1-2.

connotates a broader range of meanings across the production, distribution, exhibition, and promotion practices of the industrial side of cinema. As Yoshimi correctly points out, it is necessary to consider *kōgyō* with *tōsei* (regulation) and *undō* (movement) as an inseparable triad,[253] since *tōsei* indicates the top-down strategies from companies and officials to ensure a movie is received 'appropriately' by a large enough audience and *undō* suggests the bottom-up tactics which create an alternative to the conceived methods of filmmaking, distribution, and screening.[254] As I will elaborate on later, mini-theatres implied a renewed model for film *kōgyō* in the post-studio condition and allow us to see both the nexus between the top-down regulations and the bottom-up movements and the mesh of industrial intention with the reception of audiences.

Tezuka Yoshiharu is one of the scholars who considers the Japanese film industry as a complex network when it comes to unravelling the intricate interrelations and dynamic interactions between various actors in the 1980s and 90s. In Tezuka's work, he not only delineates the increasing interests from non-film companies to profit from cinema, but also highlights the agency of cosmopolitan individuals within the globalisation process of film finance.[255] If there is a tendency in Yoshimi's model to simplify *tōsei* and *undō* as a dichotomy of facilitating *kōgyō*, then Tezuka's work helps to complicate the tension within the *tōsei* side per se. Thus, although this chapter necessarily has *kōgyō* in mind when analysing mini-theatres, it thinks relationally rather than hierarchically. Regarding the shifting industrial structures vis-à-vis the changing socio-political situation, I

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[253] Ibid., p.2.

[254] By 'appropriately,' I refer to both Yoshimi's suggestions of cinema as a tool of education and propaganda for official actors and a consumer goods for the profit-chasing companies. See Ibid.

[255] Yoshiharu Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), pp. 75-80.

prioritise Tokyo as a site where manifestos were declared, networks were built, and practices were conducted to examine the divergent flows within the Japanese film industry without neglecting their interactions. I am interested in asking what globalisation brought to the new understandings of film *kōgyō* and how film personnel adjusted their business strategies to stimulate and facilitate the new needs of filmgoing—especially through the spaces of the mini-theatres.

To adopt the city as an analytical site, this chapter further scrutinises the material aspects that took part in facilitating the transformation of the Japanese film industry. In both Yoshimi and Tezuka's discussions, human actors remain the central force that rendered changes. In comparison, scholars like Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano have acutely suggested the advancement of digital technology as a nonnegligible actor in the transformation of Japanese cinema.[256] Departing from Wada-Marciano who mainly focuses on the 'hard' technologies of the digital camera, computer graphic software, VHS, DVD, DLP and satellite distribution,[257] this chapter chooses to interpret the more low-key actor of the mini-theatres both as a direct actor of enabling changes and an indirect infrastructure of facilitating the transformation. Furthermore, in considering mini-theatres as a direct actor, their location, architecture, and spatiality in general become crucial aspects of my analysis. Mini-theatres as an infrastructure additionally 'enable the movement of other matter,' so besides being things themselves mini-theatres are also 'the relation between things.'[258] In this way, my analysis of the material aspects of the mini-theatres also looks beyond the venues per se and takes serious account of the matter

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[256] Wada-Marciano, *Japanese Cinema in the Digital Age*, pp. 19-22.
[257] Ibid.
[258] Brian Larkin, 'The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 2013 (2013), p. 329.

moved around by mini-theatres. In particular, I will examine the associations between the mini-theatres and the trendy information technology of cultural maps and guidebooks, especially by foregrounding how the former serves as an urban infrastructure to mobilise the constitution of the latter's cultural cartographies and how the latter further mobilises the audiences' physical access and mental connection to the former. In this way, I consider mini-theatres, alongside information technology, as important parts of Tokyo's mobilities and sensory systems, which provided the crucial material conditions for the everyday experience of the global city and was responsible for the constitution of a new filmgoing subject in the era of globalisation.

This chapter starts with a brief introduction of mini-theatres. Firstly, I review the mini-theatres innovative distribution and exhibition methods, something already highlighted in existing scholarship. Subsequently, I revisit the specific urban phenomenon of the 'mini-theatre boom' that occurred in Tokyo, which so far has been positioned as a signal of globalisation in the 1980s. Diverging from these conventional approaches, I re-position mini-theatres in Tokyo in correlation with the local film networks in the city to rethink the 'mini-theatre boom' not only as the product of sudden changes brought about by globalised capital but also as the extension of grassroots efforts in exploring alternative methods of film *kōgyō*. Paying additional attention to the material spaces of film screening in relation to the city of Tokyo, I examine the various experiments that Japanese film personnel performed in the 1970s to attract audiences into the cinema. Through an examination of these precursors, I aim to reassess the mini-theatre phenomenon not merely as a business strategy invented in the 1980s to remonetise the declining media of cinema but more as the crystallisation of discussions and debates regarding revitalising

cinema's political and artistic potential. Tracing the prehistory of the mini-theatre enables this project to frame the mini-theatre boom in the 1980s Tokyo as an example of what I call localised globality. While the second chapter reveals how locality was constructed for the purpose of advancing economic agendas of globalisation, the mini-theatre boom showcases how globalisation discourse was tactically utilised to empower fringe film communities and actors of the local. In the second part of this chapter, I dig into the specific assemblage of the localised globality embodied by the mini-theatre boom in Tokyo. First, I delineate the junctures between grassroots film personnel and commercial corporations including Tokyu and Seibu via mini-theatres to highlight the configuration of a proliferated cinema network in Tokyo. Second, I scrutinise the materiality of the mini-theatre boom to shed light on the physical aspects of the global city, alongside the frequently mentioned globalised film culture in Tokyo as a discourse. Last but not the least, I critically engage with the newly emerged urban and young female audiences of the mini-theatre boom to rethink the potential and limitations of the global city through the lens of gender politics. Conducting a discursive analysis of cinema's changing definition among cinephile communities during the mini-theatre boom, I consider the pervasive misogynist sentiment towards young female audiences as a symptom of the backlash against the city's globalisation agendas. Nevertheless, the physical and affective moviegoing experiences initiated by the mini-theatre boom enabled the rise of a politicised female spectatorship, who consciously navigated themselves through the male-dominant city of Tokyo via the globalised culture of cinema.

In general, this chapter approaches mini-theatres as particular sites where the globalised flow of cinema was spatialised and transnational encounters facilitated. Thus,

it also aims to reassign the significations of Tokyo's global city status, especially in considering how cinema as an urban network was reconfigured and animated by the condition of globalisation. Expanding on the purpose of the second chapter, this chapter aims to further complicate the meanings and shapes of cinema of the global city. As to the structure of the entire thesis, the complement of Tokyo's cinema infrastructure and industrial conditions will pave the way for the case studies I provide in the second half of my project.

Rethinking the Local Routes of Mini-theatres' Globalised Film Culture

In discussions of film culture in Tokyo during the 1980s, the prolific Japanese film critic Yomota Inuhiko has stated that, 'during this decade, in Tokyo, it was possible to watch films ranging from experimental European art-house fare to films from previously unfamiliar Asian countries, far exceeding what could be seen even in Paris or New York. For these ten years, Tokyo was transformed into a film centre where it was possible to see the greatest variety of films in the world.'[259] Though Yomota's boasting about Tokyo's worldwide central status for cinema might be overexaggerated, he is definitely accurate in his observation that film selections in Tokyo were unprecedentedly diverse and prolific in the 1980s. Similarly, Tezuka Yoshiharu has used statistics and data to prove that throughout the 1980s, foreign films imported into Japan doubled in number from 200-250 in the early 1980s to over 500 in 1989, stating that 'the increase in film imports diversified Japanese film culture, rather than homogenising it.'[260] By

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[259] Inuhiko Yomota, *What Is Japanese Cinema?: A History*, trans. by Philip Kaffen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), pp. 165-166.
[260] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 76.

'diversification,' Tezuka refers to the proliferation of foreign films as a rather autonomous move made by Japanese independent distributors 'who were driven by the "pull" of globalisation, rather than by the Hollywood majors who propelled the "push".'[261] In this way, Tezuka correctly complicates globalisation not as a political and economic determined project but a cosmopolitan cultural form on local ground—though the two are almost always tightly entwined with one another in actual practice. Mini-theatres have been considered a key factor in Japanese cinema's globalisation. In the 1980s, mini-theatres rose as a new type of film venue that operated differently from both the major studio-owned movie theatres and the minor repertory cinemas of *meigaza*.[262] If there was a 'diversified' film culture in Japan stimulated by globalisation, then it was certainly in the mini-theatres—alongside film festivals mentioned in the second chapter—where most of these films were screened. The film festivals and mini-theatres were highly reciprocal in terms of distribution and promotion of relatively minor titles from non-Hollywood cinema.[263] Nevertheless, in comparison with the film events which were only held occasionally as spectacular 'festivals,' it was the mini-theatres which provided the much more ordinary daily experience of the globalised film culture to audiences in Japan.

Before mini-theatres became a 'boom' in the 1980s, cinema venues were mainly controlled by large film studios like Toho, Toei, and Shochiku as part of the studio's vertical distribution structure. This structure was marked by the studios' total control of the film production, distribution, and exhibition process, wherein a film studio would

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[261] Ibid.
[262] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 83; Jiang Jieun, 'Nihon ni okeru shimin eigakan no taitō to tenkai', *Eizōgaku*, 71 (2003), p. 12.
[263] *Mini shiata o yoroshiku*, eds. by Hiroo Ōtaka and Mariko Inaba (Tokyo: Kosaido, 1989), pp. 31-32.

usually ask its own employees to produce a film, distribute it to its owned theatres, then screen the film to the audience.[264] Facing the downturn of Japanese cinema in box-office performance and audience reception since the 1960s, large studios had been gradually ceasing their efforts in film production.[265] As a part of the chain effect, the number of film screens in Japan also dropped significantly from its peak of 7457 screens in 1960 to merely around 2000 in the 1980s.[266] Facing such a despairing situation, a small film venue opened in Tokyo's Shinjuku district in the neighbourhood of Kabukicho in 1981. The Cinema Square Tokyu stimulated a new filmgoing culture and largely reconfigured the shape of cinemas in Japan. Calling it the first mini-theatre, Tezuka highlights how Cinema Square Tokyu trail blazed a viable business model for other venues to follow.[267]

In terms of distribution and exhibition methods, Cinema Square Tokyu's ground-breaking single cinema roadshow system (*tankan rōdo shō seido*) subverted the film studio's old synchronised showing system. Unlike the studio style of distribution and exhibition, the single cinema road show system allowed a particular mini-theatre to be the only place for watching a particular newly released film due to the fact that each mini-theatre was associated with a particular independent distribution company. As a business strategy, the single cinema roadshow system 'was designed to add scarcity value to the cinema-going experience.'[268] Nevertheless, we should not neglect the fact that since cinema in general was in decline, the single cinema road show system was a reasonably safe measure in response to the uncertainty about a film's box office success. Besides, the

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[264] Wada-Marciano, *Japanese Cinema in the Digital Age*, p. 13.
[265] Ibid.
[266] "Statistics of number of film screens in Japan", Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan, Inc. http://www.eiren.org/toukei/data.html Access Date: 26 Nov, 2022.
[267] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 83.
[268] Ibid., p.84.

single cinema roadshow system was accompanied by changes in the film venues' operation. A more general phenomenon that occurred during this time was that the role of theatre managers (*shihainin*) was foregrounded and became increasingly important, since film selection and programming were necessary to guarantee the success of the single cinema roadshow system. Within the specific case of the Cinema Square Tokyu, it also proved the profitability and feasibility of the limited seat system (*teiin irekae sei*)—which meant each film ticket is corresponded to a particular seat and is valid for only one movie—in replacement of the first-come first-served and freely entering and leaving system usually adopted by *meigaza*. [Figure 3.1] The success of Cinema Square Tokyu is believed to have had led to the proliferation of small-size exhibition venues recognised as 'mini-theatres' in the 1980s,[269] and the phenomenon was especially prominent in Tokyo where it was known as the 'mini-theatre boom.'

Figure 3.1: The entrance of Cinema Square Tokyu.
From JPN-WORLD.com (2023, October, 2).
Retrived from jpn-world.com/goldenroadtheatre/eigakanmeguri/tokyu-cinemasquare.html

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[269] *Mini shiata o yoroshiku*, p. 28.

Tezuka's analysis of Cinema Square Tokyu remains crucial in terms of conceiving the specific role that mini-theatres played in transforming the industrial structure of Japanese cinema, especially in conjunction with the globalisation of Japanese film finance centralised in Tokyo. Nevertheless, since Tezuka's focus is on the actors who ran the globalised film business, such as Hara Masato from the distribution company Herald Ace,[270] mini-theatres mainly served as an instrument for the human actors to achieve their business goals, with the heterogeneity of the venues remaining largely unexplored. Departing from Tezuka's constructive introduction, this chapter approaches mini-theatres instead from the networked perspective of film *kōgyō* in order to further investigate the dynamic relationship between cinema and the discursive and material constitution of Tokyo as a global city.

Despite being the sites of screening the increasingly proliferated and diversified foreign films, mini-theatres also enable us to see the nuanced interrelations and dynamic interactions between local film productions and economic globalisation. According to one of Japan's most persistent mini-theatre critics and film journalist Ōtaka Hiroo, the proliferation of mini-theatres in the 1980s, and especially the independent film distribution methods it was associated with, largely empowered the impoverished independent filmmakers in Japan. Instead of relying on privileged film studios like Toho or Toei to distribute their films, individuals were able to distribute films directly to mini-theatres on their own behalf. One noteworthy example recalled by Ōtaka was the box-office miracle of the 1987 documentary film *Yuki yukite shingun*/*The Emperor's Naked Army Marches On* directed by Hara Kazuo. After failing to reach a distribution agreement

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[270] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, pp. 80-89.

with major film studios,[271] Hara decided to distribute the film by himself under the banner of his Shisso Production company to EUROSPACE in Shibuya—a mini-theatre whose manager was interested in screening Hara's work.[272] The single cinema roadshow of *The Emperor's Naked Army Marches On* at EUROSPACE became an unexpected hit and it helped to spread the film's reputation nationwide after of which the film was eventually exhibited in another 70 movie theatres across Japan.[273]

As the case of *The Emperor's Naked Army Marches On* suggests, the mini-theatres' ground-breaking distribution and exhibition methods indeed interplayed much with the problems within the domestic film industry per se. If the objective of cultural consumption marked by mini-theatres was 'consuming difference and transforming the self into the other, rather than with demonstrating to which group they already belonged,' something which Tezuka compares to the consumption of designer products from Channel, Gucci, and Prada,[274] then how do we grasp the local films productions that were also distributed and well received via the same venues? Did these films simply follow the same logic of difference consumption? Or could this be a chance for us to rethink the cultural facets of globalisation? The concept of *kōgyō* becomes crucial to unravel these questions since it allows us to rethink film practitioners, film venues, and audiences as a dynamic network, with each of the actors having its own agency in a film's success or failure. Investigating the trajectory of *jishu* film practices precedes the mini-theatre boom,

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[271] The film had initially reached an agreement with the major distributor Toei but was eventually rejected because of its anti-rightist messages and Toei's convention in distributing right-leaning yakuza films. See Yamashiro Shingo, *Ichigon iutaroka: shingo no nihon eiga daikaizō* (Tokyo: Kosaido Publishing, 1993), pp. 88-89.
[272] *Mini shiata o yoroshiku*, p. 87.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 81.

and it unveils the local routes of the globalised phenomenon of the mini-theatre boom in Tokyo as well as enabling us to see the various interactions and interrelations between human and non-human actors including the screening spaces and the city of Tokyo.

The Spatial Problems of *Jishu* Film in the 1970s

In general, *jishu* film or *jishu eiga* in Japanese can be defined as the films that are produced using individual capital or personally-raised funds.[275] Although there were already small gauge films and home movies made by individuals or small groups in the first half of the 20th century, *jishu* film practices began to proliferate mostly in the late 1960s after the release of Eastman Kodak's Super 8 mm film format.[276] In the context of the 1960s and 70s, *jishu* film was specifically a peer-to-peer culture outside of the major commercial structure of the film studios marked by its autonomous and amateur traits. Since *jishu* films were mainly circulated within the amateur film network and exhibited in places like school film clubs or fan circles during the time, it is also commonly believed that the *jishu* films were produced without any intention of commercial circulation.[277]

Before the emergence of the mini-theatres, the considerations of circulating *jishu* films in a much broader and popular setting—though not necessarily commercial—were already discussed by the Japanese new leftist intellectuals who found the political potential in this seemingly introverted and apolitical cultural movement.[278] Matsuda

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[275] Japan Community Cinema Center, *Film Exhibition Yearbook 2019*, eds. by Iwasaki Yūko and Ogawa Mayu (Japan Community Cinema Center, 2020), p. 222.
[276] Ibid.
[277] Ibid.
[278] According to Alexander Zahlten, Matsuda first found the *jishu* film a symptom of the 'introverted generation' and a sign of 'the decline of political engagement' before he re-evaluated its potential in the mid-1970s. See Alexander Zahlten, 'Media Models of "Amateur" Film and Manga', in *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Cinema* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2020), p. 157.

Masao's 1976 article 'Wakai sedai no eiga shisō' ('The Film-Thought of the Young Generation'), published in the Japanese movie magazine *Scenario*, is considered as an important piece of revealing the new left's growing interests in *jishu* film. According to Alexander Zahlten, this article indicates the film critic and theorist Matsuda's retreat from the explicit leftist politics that was proved to have 'failed' in the 1960s and a conversion to the promotion of a new leftist media model focused 'less…on communal immediacy and more on self-organising mobilisation through embodied media (and mediated) practice.'[279] Politically speaking, Matsuda's vision was to establish a new 'collective principle,' or *shūdan genri* in Japanese, via the *jishu* film network, as he states below:

> What is now essential is the establishment of a new collective principle in the entire circuit of film projection (*en'ei*) and viewing (*kan'ei*). Although it was not directly addressed, throughout the process of the Cinema Expressway's emergence and differentiation, there exists numerous self-production (*jishu seisaku*) and self-screening (*jishu jōei*) groups. However, hardly any of these groups have elevated their natural emergence to the level of conscious collective principles…therefore, in the late 1970s, we are once again facing a critical juncture where we must revitalise and re-live in our pursuit to establish a new collective principle that we should all share.[280]

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[279] Ibid.
[280] Matsuda Masao, 'Wakai sedai no eiga shisō', *Scenario*, 32.12 (1976), p. 49.

The collective principle which Matsuda refers to here is less a pragmatic matter of self-organising film production and exhibition than a guiding principle which can reunite the scattered *jishu* groups into a collective for a particular political purpose. Nevertheless, for this thesis, the crucial aspect of Matsuda's quote is not about the missing content of *jishu* film's collective principle—since ultimately Matsuda's 'specific hopes for a political practice through [*jishu*] networks were presumably disappointed'[281]—but the spatial conditions which enabled the new leftists to explore the collective principle in the first place.

As the cited paragraph indicates, Matsuda's thoughts were directly inspired by the unfinished experiment of the Cinema Expressway, a weekly *jishu* screening group held in the Asia Cultural Centre (ACC) in the Kanda area of Tokyo from November 1975 until June 1976.[282] For Matsuda, the Cinema Expressway provided a transversal model of film production-distribution-exhibition that connected authors with audiences via film criticism.[283] Nevertheless, before a collective principle could be fully established, the Cinema Expressway's experiments were suddenly interrupted by the shutdown of its venue, the ACC.[284] In this way, the screening space of the ACC itself also played a vital role, alongside the filmmakers and film critics, in achieving *jishu* film's political vision and collective potential, something which deserves more analysis than the void in existing scholarship would suggest.

Established by another new left critic Tsumura Takashi, the ACC was envisioned as an all-inclusive and transversal space which crosscuts the cultural and political topics in

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[281] Zahlten, 'Media Models of "Amateur" Film and Manga', p. 164.
[282] Ibid., p.158.
[283] Matsuda, 'Wakai sedai no eiga shisō', p. 48.
[284] Ibid.

operation.[285] Known as one of the most influential figures of the Japanese new left in the 1970s, Tsumura's political vision during the time fits well with the introspective media model of the *jishu* film as he drew inspiration from French theory 'to formulate a critique of burgeoning discourses of authenticity and self-expression.'[286] As someone who had travelled to the People's Republic of China in his youth and constantly engaged with Maoist thoughts in writings,[287] Tsumura's transnational routes enabled him to form a critique of the heterogeneity within Japanese society. As Tsumura suggests in another article, it is the vagabonds, homeless people, and ethnic minority groups who own the creative capability to re-form a revolutionary collective based on the marginal position they take within the urban centre of Tokyo.[288] This indicates that the politics of the Asia Cultural Centre was not located in an imagined and exotic outside called Asia. Instead, the potential of emancipation had always been immanent to Japan's domestic space per se. In other words, what Tsumura envisioned through the ACC, as suggested by the venue's title, was the mobilisation of 'Asia' within Japan for revolutionary purposes. Since the *zainichi* Korean subjects were specifically highlighted in Tsumura's theorisation,[289] it also implies that the Asia within Japan was not a fantasy but a concrete engagement with the legacy of imperialism.

As Matsuda claims, the political vision of Tsumura's ACC had largely influenced the Cinema Expressway's exploration of *jishu* film's collective principle.[290] In a more

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[285] Ibid.
[286] Jeremy Woosley, 'After the New Left: On Tsumura Takashi's Early Writings and Proto-"Contemporary Thought" in Japan', *Modern Intellectual History*, 2022, pp. 1–23.
[287] Suga Hidemi, 'Tsumura Takashi: shintai no seijisei, seiji no shintaisei', in *Left Alone: chizoku suru nyu-left no '68 kakumei'* (Tokyo: Akashishoten, 2005), pp. 237-244.
[288] Tsumura Takashi, 'Hisabetsu taishū ni totte no Tokyo: mō hitotsu no Tokyo-to ron', *Gendai no me*, 16.7 (1975), pp. 144–51.
[289] Ibid.
[290] Matsuda, 'Wakai sedai no eiga shisō', p. 48.

practical account, the ACC not only enabled fellow *jishu* filmmakers who already knew

each other to regularly meet, but also provided a site for them to meet other amateurs who

shared the similar passions. As Matsuda straightforwardly distinguished the *jishu* film

practices of the Cinema Expressway in the ACC from the self-proclaimed

'cinematheques' and *meigaza* that solely pursued replaying classic films from the

canon,[291] it becomes clear that the all-inclusive and transversal spatial model of the ACC

provided a solid foundation for the new left's ambition of establishing a new political

objective. Thus, for Matsuda, the shutdown of the ACC was a pity since it interrupted the

Cinema Expressway's experiments in mobilising new auteurs and new audiences for the

sake of a new cinema[292]—that is, a new collective principle based on mutual mobilisation

and creation.

The experiment of the Cinema Expressway and Matsuda's conception of *jishu* film's

collective principle should be seen as a bottom-up movement (as for Yoshimi's *undō*)

which preceded the mini-theatre's alternative *kōgyō* method in the 1980s. Despite the

Cinema Expressway's transversal mode of production-distribution-exhibition clearly

moving away from the studios' vertical system, it was, nevertheless, not without its

fissures. The main problem comes clearly into focus when comparing two articles in the

same issue of *Scenario* where Matsuda's piece was published. One article written by

Ōkubo Kenichi, a member of the Cinema Expressway, suggests that both the group's

orientation and final achievement was to create a space for fellow filmmakers to meet and

exchange ideas.[293] While it was no problem for the group to envision a (re)productive

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[291] Ibid.
[292] Ibid.
[293] Ōkubo Kenichi, 'Bokura no eiga wa doko made kitaka', *Scenario*, 32.12 (1976), pp. 50-51.

network centred around filmmaking practices and mutual critiques (*hihyō*),[294] this

reveals a general tendency in *jishu* film circles to overlook the potential of film reception

and the agency of film audiences. Such a tendency was further problematised by another

article written by Yanagimachi Mitsuo, who had just received harsh backlash from the

jishu film circle regarding the commercial screening of his film *Godspeed You! Black*

Emperor (1976). The film was independently produced by Yanagimachi and initially

screened via the *jishu* film network for two months. Nevertheless, due to Toei's strong

interest in the film, Yanagimachi decided to sell the rights of exclusive screening to the

film company and terminated the *jishu* screenings. As one can imagine, Yanagimachi was

criticised by some members of the *jishu* film circle for submitting to companies with a

large capital base. In the article, Yanagimachi tries to justify his move as tactical and

defend his critical stance against capitalism. For Yanagimachi, it was more than a

daydream for the *jishu* filmmakers to totally retreat from capitalist modes of production

and distribution.[295] Yanagimachi thus called for a flexible mode of film distribution and

exhibition for the popularisation (*fukyū*) of *jishu* films, instead of insisting on the

uniformity between *jishu* production, distribution, and exhibition.[296] Regardless of

Yanagimachi's article being a self-defence against criticism aimed at him, the article also

reveals a bifurcation within the *jishu* film community regarding the politics of film

consumption. In the mid-1970s, although *jishu* film has been established as a self-

sustainable model of film *kōgyō* in small scale, it had yet to figure out an unambiguous

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[294] Ibid.

[295] Yanagimachi Mitsuo, 'Sōzō to hihyō no dainamizumu o', *Scenario*, 32.12 (1976), p. 65.

[296] Ibid.

position in-between mobilising more audiences and (not) working with the capitalist agents.

Despite the conflicts in political ideas, a spatial cause of the *jishu* film's dilemma was the lack of public support and resources for film screening, especially in Tokyo. *Jishu* filmmakers faced a common conundrum of securing a venue to screen their films, especially for a relatively larger audience, to say nothing of the suspension of the Cinema Expressway following the closing of the ACC. In *Cine Front* magazine established in 1976 and aimed at both facilitating the connections and exchanges between filmmakers and nurturing new audiences, the film critic Yamada Kazuo talked about the much stricter regulations on film screenings outside of the conventional cinemas since 1975. According to Yamada, restrictions backed by the old Entertainment Facilities Act (*kōgyōjōhō*) and Fire Service Act (*shōbōhō*) and promoted by conservative politicians began to be applied to community centres (*kōminkan*) and public lecture halls (*kōdō*), which led to the admonition, regulation, and suspension of *jishu* screenings in these public facilities.[297] The common distrust towards leftist movements and ideologies among general citizens following the radical left's failure in the early 1970s became a convenient excuse for deploying these rules, for which Yamada argued the restriction of *jishu* screening revealed the suppression of democracy in Japanese society.[298] It is worth noting that of all the restrictions of public facilities mentioned by Yamada, Tokyo faced the most stringent. As a metropolitan city, Tokyo's public halls and venues had always been booked by television studios for programme shooting or by foreign talents for stage performance,

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[297] Yamada Kazuo, 'Kankyaku ni jiyū o! eigakai ni minshushugi o!', *Cine-front*, 3 (1976), p. 16.
[298] Ibid.

and in parallel, the usage fee of these venues increased tremendously throughout the decade.[299] In such cases, Tokyo's international status further became an obstacle for sustaining the local practices of *jishu* screening.

Thus, although there were tensions between *jishu* screening groups and film companies-initiated distribution associations, for the sake of preserving and promoting film culture, *jishu* groups still actively cooperated with major studios for the acquisition of film content and the guarantee of screening venues. From the major studios' perspective, *jishu* film circles could also help them to promote film culture in general—although mostly outside of Tokyo. As a significant example, the influential Eiren Conference organised by members of large studios like Shochiku, Nikkatsu, and Toei in 1976 considered the mobilisation of film exhibition in regional areas to be an urgent issue if they were to recover the receding film market in the mid-1970s. The *jishu* film circles were therefore one of the major targets of the film studios' call for unification under the banner of 'nationwide unified action' (*zenkoku tōitsu kōdō*).[300] In this way, the 1970s saw a more decentralised approach to organising *jishu* film screenings. It is crucial to clarify that by using the term 'decentralisation', I am not arguing for the actual shift of Tokyo's central position for film *kōgyō,* since it remained the city with the most movie theatres and screening events. Also, as film scholars like Tanaka Shimpei and Jiang Jieun correctly tease out, there has long been *jishu* film culture outside of Tokyo in regional cities like Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, and Nagoya.[301] Nevertheless, by framing it as a tendency,

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[299] Ibid., p.17.

[300] Zenkoku eiren iinkai, 'Nihon eiga no sōzōteki kaika no tameni', *Cine-front*, 3 (1976), p. 14.

[301] Tanaka Shimpei, '1970 nendai kōhan no kansai ni okeru jishujōei ni tsuite', *Geijutsu: Osaka geijutsu daigaku kiyō*, 40 (2017), pp. 87–97; Jiang, 'Nihon ni okeru shimin eigakan no taitō to tenkai', pp. 5–26.

I want to highlight the increasing awareness among film practitioners across *jishu* circles and major studios regarding the benefits of promoting film culture in regional cities.

Using the 1970s *jishu* film as an anchor, this section has investigated a variety of issues revolving around the nexus of film *kōgyō*, screening spaces, and the city of Tokyo. Firstly, there were various gaps between the filmmakers, screening spaces, and audiences, which prevented the *jishu* film to become a sustainable model of film *kōgyō*, if not on a small scale. Secondly, although the relationship between *jishu* filmmakers and commercial film companies remained rather ambiguous, since the mid-1970s both sides were beginning to explore the possibilities of cooperating with each other. Thirdly, while Tokyo remained an important site of exploring the new political possibilities of cinema, it became more prevalent for *jishu* filmmakers, alongside film studios, to seek opportunities in the regional areas. It was an uncertain time for both the cinema and the city. Nevertheless, as Gotō Kazuo—another member of the Cinema Expressway— proclaimed in 1977, '*jishu* filmmakers are not aiming to make *jishu* films but "new films"…and for the sake of making new films, they need more than "*jishu* film audiences".'[302] There would soon be a new ensemble of film *kōgyō* recentralised in Tokyo involving *jishu* filmmakers, film studios, new commercial partners, new film venues, and of course, new film audiences.

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[302] Gotō Kazuo, 'Konton no jidai no naka de no henbō to kanōsei', *Kinema junpō*, 1542, 1978, p. 96.

The Off Theatre, Owned Theatre, and Mixed Space Experiments in Tokyo

The changes that occurred at the end of the 1970s provided the foundations for the breakthrough in film *kōgyō* marked by the mini-theatres of the coming decades. For the filmmaker Takabayashi Yōichi, 1979 marked the year when *jishu* film was popularised. Referring to the information company Pia's 'Off Theater Film Festival '79' and Studio 200's 'Anticipating the Films of the '80s: A Retrospective of the Non-Theater Cinema in the 1970s' ('80 nendai eiga e no taidō: 70 nendai non shiata shinema no kaiko'), Ōmori claims that '*jishu* film today is in a more abundant environment which allows it to extend from an enclosed place only for film enthusiasts to a much broader public space.'[303] [Figure 3.2 & 3.3] Similarly, when talking about the trends of *jishu* film from 1977 to 1980, Matsuda Masao has highlighted the founding of Image Forum in Shinjuku Yotsuya by Kawanaka Nobuhiro, Yamanaka Takashi, and others for preserving the stronghold of the *jishu* film movement, besides waiting to be seen by the majors through Pia's film festival.[304]

In defining these changes as part of the institutionalisation of *jishu* films, Zahlten has highlighted commercial companies' increasing interest in exploiting *jishu* film's potential.[305] Nevertheless, since Zahlten considers institutionalisation as encompassing all kinds of practices, which includes the major studios' hiring of *jishu* filmmakers, the studio-owned cinemas' screening of *jishu* films, the specialised film festivals hosted by the Pia, and the less commercial Image Forum,[306] he has largely overlooked the

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[303] Takabayashi Yōichi, 'Kojin-teki shiza o motte pabulikku na basho e', *Kinema junpō*, 1594, 1980, p. 99.
[304] Matsuda Masao, 'Jishueiga no dōkō', *Kinema junpō*, 1627, 1981, pp. 277-278.
[305] Zahlten, 'Media Models of "Amateur" Film and Manga', pp. 164-166.
[306] Ibid.

interactions between these institutions and the heterogeneity within each institution per se by foregrounding the binary opposition between the 'self-organising *jishu*' and more 'centralised institutions'. Moreover, as the case of Yanagimachi suggests, there have always been voices within *jishu* film circles that conceived of *jishu* film's relationship with commercial actors in more flexible ways. Instead of seeing *jishu* film's institutionalisation as a jump from autonomous status to a more restricted one, the new networks that emerged at the end of the 1970s can also be re-evaluated in terms of the continuous process of the *jishu* filmmaker's negotiation with personnel within and outside the film industry. This section thus departs from *jishu* film as having a predefined set of practices and turns to the spaces where 'institutionalisation' actually happened. Instead of solely viewing Pia and Studio 200's film festivals, and from the point of view of commercial actors incorporating *jishu* film, I aim to rethink their potential through sites of encounter which allow different assemblages of film *kōgyō*. A spatial analysis enables us to further compare the two commercial company-led programmes with the non-mainstream institution, Image Forum. Analysing how film *kōgyō* experimented with different spatial models helps to delineate the dynamic interactions between various actors across *jishu* scenes and commercial businesses and sheds further light on the changing configuration of the Japanese film industry at the dawn of the age of globalisation.

Figure 3.2: Off Theater Film Festival '79.
From Pia Film Festival online. (2023,
October, 2).
Retrieved from
www.pff.jp/jp/festival/archives/1979/

Figure 2.3: Anticipating the Films of the '80s.
From *Studio 200 katsudōshi: 1979-1991*, ed.
by Studio 200 (Tokyo: Seibuhyakkaten,
1991), p. 5.

   In 1976, Pia started to work with actors from the existing film distribution and

exhibition network including local theatres and cultural institutions in Tokyo to hold

screening events of *jishu* films under the title of 'Pia Cinema Boutique' or PCB.[307]

Besides the aperiodic exhibition cycle of the PCB, the *Jishu Eiga Seisaku-ten* or *Jishu-*

Produced Film Exhibition held in 1977 as part of the art festival '1st Pia Exhibition' is

often seen as the archetype of the PFF. Held on the site of Toei's Oizumi studio, the *Jishu*

Eiga Seisaku-ten was an overnight screening featuring works shot by Japanese and

foreign filmmakers in their 20s.[308] In comparison with the *Jishu Eiga Seisaku-ten*'s all-

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[307] Kakeo Yoshio, *Pia no jidai* (Tokyo: Kinema Junpō Sha, 2011), pp. 105-110.
[308] Ibid., pp.110-122.

around interest and retrospective attributes, it would not be until 1978 that the 'Off Theater Film Festival' was finally founded as an independent film festival with the public recruitment of exhibition films and an award given for the best film. In 1979, the Off Theater Film Festival was further developed into an annual film festival with a competition department and judging system for *jishu* entries, as well as a foreign invitation section.[309] The system of the 1979 Off Theater Film Festival would be adopted further into the 1980s after the festival's eventual change of its name into the well-known Pia Film Festival or PFF in 1981.

Off Theater Film Festival's name change was apt as it signalled a conclusion to the various experiments that Pia had conducted in the late 1970s in establishing a sustainable mode for film *kōgyō*. On the one hand, this name was largely correlated to the condition of *jishu* films that the event aimed to promote which usually screened in a venue outside of commercial theatres. On the other hand, as a magazine that mainly sold information about art and cultural events in the city, 'off theatre' to Pia further illustrated a new model of the filmgoing experience that began not from the physical site of the theatre but the virtual site of information. Although these two connotations of 'off theatre' may have slightly offset each other, it was the exhibition space that eventually integrated these conflicting visions. From the borrowing of Toei's Oizumi studio for the 1977 *Jishu Eiga Seisaku-ten* to the use of Toei's Shinjuku theatre and hall and *meigaza* theatres like Ikebukuro Bungeiza for the Off Theater Film Festivals, Pia actively channelled *jishu* filmmakers into the existing distribution and exhibition networks of Japanese cinema. Pia's intermediary role had become even more consolidated after its attempt to spread the

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[309] Ibid., pp.144-148.

Off Theater Film Festival from Tokyo to other regional cities including Sapporo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka in 1979 through Toei's distribution network and cinema chains.[310]

In this way, although 'off theatre' may sound anti-establishment, it was indeed as Zahlten suggests that Pia helped to channel *jishu* filmmakers with the major players of the commercial film industry. This is more vividly described by Matsuda in 1981, who mentions how Pia became the site where *jishu* filmmakers waited to be 'hooked' (*ippontsuri*) by the majors although they know they are disposable (*tsukaisute*) afterward.[311] In this sense, the 'off theatre' can be seen as a space constituted and operated by Pia in-between the existing major and minor (*jishu*) spaces of Japanese cinema. By establishing itself as an indispensable intermediary agent, Pia maintained the very existence of this off theatre space, not to mention its smooth operation over time. Without Pia and its regular film festivals, the *jishu* filmmakers might literally have had their connections to the major film industry cut 'off'. Nevertheless, even with Pia's off theatre platform, *jishu* filmmakers were not guaranteed to reach the mainstream since the film festival was at most an ephemeral site that was turned 'off' for most of the year, leaving those unselected *jishu* filmmakers in the vacuum of an 'off' space.

For Matsuda, Image Forum certainly provided a much-preferred model over Pia. With a rather complex pre-history,[312] Image Forum was established in Yotsuya in 1977 with the venue named 'IF Cinematheque'. Besides providing a regular space for *jishu*

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[310] According to the venues of the 1979 Off Theater Film Festival on the Pia Film Festival Website. See https://pff.jp/jp/festival/archives/1979/ Access Date: 11th Jan. 2023.

[311] Matsuda, 'Jishueiga no dōkō', p. 278.

[312] As Zahlten mentions: 'The pre-history of Image Forum is quite complex, beginning in 1979 with the founding of the Japan Underground Center by Satō Jūshin, and with involvement by Kawanaka. This was re-formed as the Underground Center in 1971, and in 1972, it commenced screenings under the name of Underground Cinematheque in a space borrowed from Terayama Shūji's Tenjō Sajiki theater troupe. It changed screening venues and renamed itself Image Forum in 1977.' See Zahlten, 'Media Models of "Amateur" Film and Manga', p. 167.

film screening, Matsuda saw the affiliated film school (*eizō kenkyūsho*) of Image Forum carrying the potential to not only nurture the next generation of film talents but also create its own network for audience mobilisation.[313] In other words, Image Forum can be seen as a space that continued Matsuda's experiments of collective principle from the Cinema Expressway in ACC—an 'owned space' for filmmakers outside of the commercial system. By articulating it as an 'owned space' here, I do not suggest the vision of Image Forum was in anyway exclusive to the 'others.' On the contrary, by actively integrating non-commercial contents like the documentary films of Ogawa Productions and experimental video images into one space, Image Forum ensured a possible screening space for a variety of filmmakers and artists outside of the commercial system. As the meaning of *jishu* further diffused in the 1980s with its integration into the commercial film infrastructure, Image Forum, it is said, carried the political vision of the 1970s' *jishu* film forward. Nevertheless, due to its relatively autonomous status and small size of its venue, Image Forum's influence was rather limited in the beginning, which led it to actively seek alliances within the commercial structure to reach a larger audience base in the 1980s.

Among its many collaborators, Studio 200 was considered a faithful ally of Image Forum in the 1980s. Nevertheless, in contrast to the well-recognised Pia and Image Forum, Studio 200 largely remains underdiscussed in film studies scholarship. Belonging to the Seibu Ryūtsū Group (whose name was later changed to the Seibu Saison Group in 1984), Studio 200 was a multi-purpose hall set up on the 8th floor of the Ikebukuro Seibu Department Store in 1979. Although the Seibu Ryūtsū Group was known for its 'cultural

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[313] Matsuda, 'Jishueiga no dōkō', p. 277.

strategy' (*bunka senryaku*) and had already set up its Saison Museum of Art in the same department store in 1973, Studio 200 essentially marked a different model of cultural business for Seibu. Seibu had intentionally set up Studio 200 as a fringe space. In terms of location, unlike the luxurious two-story Saison Museum of Art on the top of the department store, Studio 200, named for its 200-seat capacity, was hidden inside the labyrinth of shopping venues. Aiming to utilise the space to promote 'underground' and 'avant-garde' arts and culture, Seibu deliberately positioned Studio 200 in the margins to make it a place 'known to those in the know' (*shiruhitozoshiru*).[314] Studio 200 can thus be seen as a necessary complement to the Seibu department store's cultural strategy since it enabled the exhibition of content that did not fit the style of the Saison Museum of Art or the canon of fine arts. [Figure 3.4]

Figure 3.4: Entrance, Interior, and Planform of Studio 200.
From Studio 200 katsudōshi: 1979-1991, ed.
by Studio 200 (Tokyo: Seibuhyakkaten, 1991), p. 24.

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[314] *Studio 200 katsudōshi: 1979-1991*, ed. by Studio 200 (Tokyo: Seibuhyakkaten, 1991), p. 2.

Beyond its wide reach in terms of music, dance, stage play, performance art, and other contemporary art formats, cinema remained one of the most important businesses for Studio 200. The opening event of Studio 200 was a film programme held between November 30th, 1979 to January 30th, 1980 entitled 'Anticipating the Films of the '80s: A Retrospective of the Non-Theater Cinema in the 1970s,' curated by the renowned experimental filmmaker Matsumoto Toshio and Seibu Department Store Cultural Department staff Arai Ikumi.[315] In the programme, Matsumoto selected a variety of films made in the 1970s outside of the commercial cinema system. These were mainly experimental, documentary, animation, and *jishu* films, which included works from famous auteurs like Terayama Shūji, Hagiwara Sakumi, Tsuchimoto Noriaki, Ogawa Shinsuke, Tanaami Keiichi, Hara Kazuo, Ōmori Kazuki, Suzuki Shirōyasu, Idemitsu Mako, and so on. Alongside its opening film event, it was also partly due to the success of Studio 200 that encouraged Seibu to later open its mini-theatres like Cine Vivant in the 1980s.[316]

Although considered an inspiration to Seibu's film production and mini-theatre businesses, Studio 200 served more as the prototype of what I call a 'mixed space.' A mixed space involved an adaptable venue that allowed for the short-term screening of films although it also served more than a movie theatre. Unlike the multi-purpose hall serving as a more general type of event venue, Studio 200 was specifically correlated as a mixed space with private businesses like the Seibu Ryūtsū Group and the business strategy of integrating cinema into a multi-media model of consumption. The mixed space

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[315] Ibid., pp.26-27.
[316] Ibid., p.4.

represented a site that positioned various art forms alongside each other while simultaneously demonstrating each art-as-medium's specificity and flattening their cultural hierarchy for consumption. Specifically speaking, Studio 200 as a mixed space had made cinema adaptable to not only 'other spaces' like the department store but also 'other arts' as it would regularly reappear at the site before switching over to another art programme.

To conceive Studio 200 as a mixed space is important because it served as a new and even unwelcome model of film practice vis-à-vis the existing industrial structure of Japanese cinema at the dawn of the 1980s. The exteriority of Studio 200 to the declining film industry was mentioned by Matsumoto regarding the obstruction he received when programming the event. Matsumoto's original programming concept was to revisit the overall condition of Japanese cinema in the 1970s for the sake of imagining the trend of the upcoming 1980s, so both commercial and non-commercial films were included in his plan.[317] Nevertheless, due to the opposition of local Ikebukuro theatres, commercial productions were eventually excluded from the final version.[318] While Matsumoto claims that he understands the already struggling local exhibitors' worries about the large capital stealing their audience, the exclusionism of the Japanese film industry left him with 'regretful trauma' regarding the imperfect retrospective exhibition in Studio 200.[319] As Matsumoto writes: 'if the event in Studio 200 could attract more audience to the Ikebukuro area and increase people's interests in cinema, it would have been a win-win situation for both parties.'[320] This incident reminds us that although commercial

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[317] Ibid., p.26.
[318] Ibid., p.27.
[319] Ibid.
[320] Ibid.

facilities-oriented film exhibition would soon become pervasive and help reconfigure the infrastructure of film *kōgyō* in the 1980s, it would continue to generate debates regarding the politics of cinema under the burgeoning consumerist landscape of Tokyo in the following decades, something I elaborate on in the following sections.

Studio 200's affiliation with *jishu* film marked the increasing interest and power of non-film businesses in the film industry in the 1980s. Besides the objection of existing film studios and companies, some *jishu* filmmakers were indeed actively embracing the new space and opportunities given by non-film companies like Seibu. If we see 'Anticipating the Films of the 80's' as a moment of encounter, then it indeed constituted a network between *jishu* filmmakers and Seibu. Almost all filmmakers selected by the event were resummoned later by Studio 200 and held a solo exhibition in the venue. Moreover, since the co-founder of Image Forum, Kawanaka Nobuhiro, was also one of the participants of 'Anticipating the Films of the 80's,' the two institutions started to build an intimate relationship afterward and collaborated on many events in the 1980s. One of the most significant collaborations between Studio 200 and Image Forum was the 'Jikken Eigasai' ('Experimental Film Festival'), held five times between 1981 to 1985. [Figure 3.5] The Jikken Eigasai was not exclusively for the exhibition of up-and-coming Japanese filmmakers like IKIF, Kurokawa Yoshinobu, and Katō Itaru, but also invited foreign filmmakers like Jonas Mekas and Jochen Coldewey to Japan and thereby created a space for transnational encounter and exchange.[321] For Nakajima Takashi, another co-founder of Image Forum, since Studio 200 had never asked too much by way of financial return and almost always guaranteed a reliable source of film screening, Seibu was thus

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[321] Ibid., p.56.

considered 'a strong ally above all else' for the *jishu* filmmakers of the 1980s.[322] It is fair

to argue that companies like Seibu helped further popularise important figures in the *jishu*

scene and consolidate their status in the Japanese film industry. Furthermore, Studio 200's

recruitment of people like Matsumoto as a freelancer programmer also prefigures the

emergence of specialised film programming as an exhibition mode.

Figure 3.5: Poster of the 1st Jikken Eigasai in Studio 200 organised by the Image Forum.
From *Studio 200 katsudōshi: 1979-1991*, ed.
by Studio 200 (Tokyo: Seibuhyakkaten, 1991), p. 2.

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[322] Ibid.

Comparing the off theatre of Pia, owned theatre of Image Forum, and mixed space of Studio 200 allows us to not only see the various experiments regarding film screening as an exhibition method but also as a source of inspiration and new opportunities to filmmakers. If the off theatre offered filmmakers—especially young people who found it impossible to be hired by major studios and would therefore stay 'free' (to freelance) in the 1980s—a chance at being recognised by the majors, it was devoted to constituting a safe space for these cinematic wanderers before they had a chance to succeed. In terms of their position vis-à-vis the existing industrial structure of Japanese cinema, the off theatre of Pia was associated with powerful actors like Toei from the very beginning of its film business while the owned theatre of Image Forum existed in a position of non-interference to the establishment. In contrast, the mixed space represented by Studio 200 was seen as an unexpected 'intruder' from the outside and was believed to be a threat to the existing industrial actors in the beginning, due to their attempts to integrate cinema into the larger consumerist infrastructure of the department stores. While these virtual or actual spaces continued to function in the 1980s, they often converged with each other and then diverged in different directions. For instance, in 1982, one year after Image Forum built up its alliance relationship with Studio 200, the Pia Film Festival started to use Seibu's mixed space 'Parco Space Part 3' in Shibuya as their annual screening venue and this collaboration was maintained for another 6 years. Meanwhile, important figures of the *jishu* film network like Matsuda Masao, Kawanaka Nobuhiro, and Ōkubo Kenichi continued to serve as judges of the PFF in the 1980s. Mapping out these overlapping and intersecting paths helps to prove that the spaces I examined in this section are not mutually

exclusive—on the contrary, they worked together to prefigure the cinematic landscape of Japanese cinema represented by mini-theatres in the 1980s.

It seems like the problems regarding film *kōgyō* that the *jishu* filmmaker were concerned about in the 1970s were directed into different directions by the burgeoning of new institutions and actors both inside and outside of the film industry at the end of the century. Taking the long view, it is crucial to emphasise that these innovative spaces were all developed in Tokyo. While not attempting to overlook the film screening movements and experiments across the nation at the same period, it is fair to argue that, especially for the commercial companies like Seibu outside of the film industry, Tokyo's status as Japan's economic centre made it the most reasonable option. Eventually, it was the mini-theatre boom that explicitly enunciated the changes occurring in the Japanese film industry as a result of a distinctive urban phenomenon located in Tokyo.

Locating and Guiding the Mini-theatre Boom

The mini-theatre boom was not only a phenomenon that occurred in Tokyo but also a constitutive part of Tokyo's status as a global city. Nevertheless, unlike globalisation's role to showcase Tokyo's central status both domestically and internationally, as discussed in the second chapter, cinema's role in the mini-theatre boom belongs to what I call localised globality. Practically speaking, localised globality marks how local filmmakers, including the *jishu* filmmakers discussed in the previous sections, utilised the economic and political conditions of globalisation for their convenience and aptly searched for new methods by which cinema could thrive. Nevertheless, in a more general sense, localised globality was about how the consciousness of the global was constituted

via local networks of film *kōgyō* for local film personnel—which includes audiences. In other words, it should be seen simultaneously as both a collective 'doing' and a collective 'imagining' that carried forward the potential of cinema at a time when the idea of the 'world' itself was changing. Since my analysis of localised globality is contextualised to the phenomenon of the mini-theatre boom in Tokyo, the following sections will focus on the dynamic interactions between human actors, cinema spaces, information technologies, and the city to tease out how cinema specifically configured the global city.

It is crucial to first clarify the specificity and significance of the mini-theatre boom in relation to the more encompassing definition of the mini-theatre. Although small film venues that were later recognised as mini-theatres started to emerge in local cities like Nagoya and Yamagata, these theatres were mostly crowdfunded by local cinephile groups or financially supported by local civic organisations.[323] In comparison, the pioneering Cinema Square Tokyu in Tokyo was established by Tokyu Recreation—a subsidiary of the financially powerful Tokyu corporation. Similarly, Tokyu's business rival Seibu, following the success of its mixed spaces like Studio 200 and Parco Part 3, also opened specialised film venues like the Cine Vivant in Roppongi, Cine Saison in Shibuya, and Theatre Seiyu in Ginza. At the same time, conventional film companies like Shochiku and Toho also joined the trend and set up their own mini-theatres after sensing Tokyu and Seibu's strategic movements. In this way, mini-theatres in Tokyo were facing an increasingly saturated market and the high pressure of competition and differentiation. Mini-theatres emerged in Tokyo as a cultural phenomenon, marking its scale as a 'boom' which could be distinguished from less intensive conditions in regional areas.

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[323] Jiang, 'Nihon ni okeru shimin eigakan no taitō to tenkai', pp. 5–26.

The mini-theatre boom should be seen as an urban phenomenon for various reasons, with the most prominent being the venue's interdependency with its geographical location within the city. While all the movie theatres in the past occupied a certain location in the city, the mini-theatre boom marked the beginning of the deliberate marketing of the theatre's location as a form of cultural consumption. The mini-theatre managers played a huge role in the operation of their venues by adopting a niche marketing strategy. Besides common strategies like membership and pre- or post-screening events, location was reckoned to be a crucial part of a mini-theatre's cultural identity. The most common situation involved constituting the mini-theatre's identity according to the established cultural status of its location, which explains why Shibuya became the place where most of the film venues clustered in the 1980s. As discussed in Chapter Two, Shibuya had already established its position as an urban cultural centre for youth, with Seibu and Tokyu playing a rather conspicuous role in planning the region's cultural-commercial landscape. The venues in Shibuya like Cinema Rise, EUROSPACE, and Parco Space Part 3 were often articulated as 'young', [324] 'cultural', [325] and 'full of unexpected excitement' [326] to correlate with the overall impression of Shibuya in the popular imagination. The managers of the mini-theatre in Shibuya were intentionally targeting the demographic structure of Shibuya when promoting their businesses, with some the managers even articulating their familiarity with the local streets. For instance, the manager of Cinema Rise, Rai Mitsuhiro, when discussing the theatre's operation in

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[324] 'Tokushu: eigakan no nai machi niwa sumitakunai', *Tokyo jin*, 25, 1989, p. 120.
[325] 'Ima, Tokyo wa eiga gurume no paradaisu: seikai no meisaku no hōko mini shiata gaido', *Screen*, 586, 1986, p. 93.
[326] Ibid.

Shibuya would recall his own experience as a university student, in which he would often spend time in local record shops and jazz cafes.[327]

   As a result, the mini-theatres' location would further be recognised as an imperative part of the venue's film programming and screenings per se. For instance, the specialised screening of avant-garde and experimental films in Kichijoji's Baus Theater would be a perfect complement to the street's unusually inclusive cultural atmosphere, with an emphasis on Kichijoji's capability to ingest and resurrect unpopular cultural content.[328] In the Roppongi area, no film theatres existed before the 1980s and it was not until 1981 when Haiyuza, a venue that normally served as a theatrical performance stage, started to exhibit films at night under the guise of 'Cinema Ten.' Retrospectively, the Haiyuza Cinema Ten is now widely acknowledged as having pioneered the late-night screening model in Japan.[329] According to its manager, Yoshida Eiko, the late show model was a rather pragmatic decision implemented in the wake of the nightlife boom in Roppongi in the late 1970s.[330] As a result, Yoshida dedicated herself to selecting films that could match the 'mature sensibility' (*otona no kansei*) of the Roppongi streets.[331] Discursively speaking, Yoshida's articulation constituted a synergy between the mini-theatre's location, the films that the mini-theatre screened, and the mini-theatre's audience. In other words, the urban location of the movie theatre was considered no less important than the films screened for a comprehensive filmgoing experience.

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[327] Rai Mitsuhiro, *'mikkusu karucha" ga ikizuku miryoku o wakamonoigai nimo apirushite ikitai* <https://www.shibuyabunka.com/keyperson.php?id=1> [accessed 20 January 2023].
[328] Ibid., p.95.
[329] Ōmori Sawako, 'Mini shiata saihō: dai 1 kai' <https://cinemore.jp/jp/news-feature/1350/article_p2.html#ap2_1> [accessed 20 January 2023].
[330] Ibid.
[331] 'Tokushu: ima, kininaru mini shiata', *Kinema junpō*, 892, 1984, p. 42.

If Haiyuza Cinema Ten was more of a timely experiment which fortunately aligned with the trends initiated by Cinema Square Tokyu—since it originally followed a *meigaza* model that mainly exhibited classical and notable older films and did not expect its transition to a mini-theatre later[332]—the Cine Vivant which opened in 1983 suggests that the synergy between urban location, theatrical space, film content, and filmgoing experiences was also carefully fabricated as part of its business strategy. The Cine Vivant was established on the underground floor of Seibu's newly opened audio-visual centre WAVE in Roppongi. Initially there was a lot of doubt about whether the WAVE building's unusual appearance would blend in well with the glittering landscape of Roppongi, with its dark grey architecture and no windows on its façade.[333] [Figure 3.6 & Figure 3.7] As the film critic Umemoto Yōichi argues, it was often believed that the mismatch between the luxurious and fashionable atmosphere of Roppongi and the dark and death-like experience of film-viewing in the conventional *meigaza* was the cause of cinema's absence in the area.[334] To overcome the popular perception of cinema's mismatch to Roppongi, Cine Vivant inventively set up a bar area in the lobby, decorated its interior in bright tones, and upgraded hardware like its chairs and screens.[335] In terms of the content of the films, however, Cine Vivant chose to adhere to the guiding style of WAVE and mainly exhibited art house films from Europe—something not necessarily perceived as Roppongi-esque in the popular imagination.[336] Nevertheless, by discursively

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[332] Ibid.

[333] Ōmori Sawako, 'Mini shiata saihō: dai 4 kai' <https://cinemore.jp/jp/news-feature/1357/article_p2.html> [accessed 20 January 2023].

[334] 'Tokushu: eigakan no nai machi niwa sumitakunai', p. 114.

[335] Ibid.

[336] 'Ima, Tokyo wa eiga gurume no paradaisu: seikai no meisaku no hōko mini shiata gaido', p. 94.

articulating themselves as pioneers of a fashionable lifestyle, Cine Vivant repackaged art films from filmmakers like Jean-Luc Godard and Éric Rohmer to refresh the very connotation of fashion in Roppongi. [337] [338] In this way, Cine Vivant successfully overcame the imagined mismatch between cinema and its urban location and largely reshaped Roppongi's cultural status in popular perception.

Figure 3.6: Exterior of the WAVE building. From Ushinawareta toki o motomete. (2023, October, 2) Retrieved from datarat.seesaa.net/article/482709138.html

Figure 3.7: Opening Advertisement of WAVE featuring Cine Vivant. From WaveTokyo online. (2023, October, 2) Retrived from wavetokyo.com/about/

For large companies like Seibu, cinema served as an integrated part of its cultural city campaign and mini-theatres found a way to fit in with the corporation's other urban development projects. The mini-theatre Kineca Ōmori was built in conjunction with the

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[337] 'Tokushu: ima, kininaru mini shiata', pp. 43-44.
[338] 'Tokushu: eigakan no nai machi niwa sumitakunai', p. 114.

opening of the Seiyu department store in Ōmori station as part of Seibu's redevelopment project of the area.[339] In order to attract more customers to the rather unpopular Ōmori area, the manager of the Kineca Ōmori strategically mapped Ōmori as being next to Kamata, where 'Japanese cinema was invented.'[340] [341] In contrast to Ōmori's marginal position on Tokyo's cultural geography, such discursive cartography tended to reposition Ōmori in the centre of Japanese film history. More importantly, Kamata and Ōmori were indeed connected by the Keihin-Tōhoku Line, which further induced people's mobility through the railway and also possibly contributed to Seibu's businesses near the area around the station.

As the case of Cine Vivant and Kineca Ōmori implies, mini-theatres were not simply confined by their geographical location. Rather, mini-theatres redefined the space itself by constituting new urban discourses and bringing corresponding cultural experiences. Besides tangible architecture such as cultural venues (i.e. WAVE) and shopping facilities (i.e. Seiyu Ōmori), the mini-theatre also actuated imaginaries on a more symbolic level by stimulating Tokyo's new urban cultural cartography. During the mini-theatre boom, traditional movie magazines like *Kinema Junpō* and Kindaieigasha's *Screen*, as well as urban magazines like the Tokyo municipal government sponsored *Tokyo jin* all edited special programmes introducing mini-theatres in Tokyo, often with titles clearly marked as 'guides' (*gaido* or *annai*).[342] While each of these magazines had its own focus depending on the theme of the publication, there was one common aspect shared by all

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[339] 'Tokushu: ima, kininaru mini shiata', p. 44.
[340] Kamata is believed to be a 'film's street' where the very first Shochiku studio was located.
[341] 'Tokushu: ima, kininaru mini shiata', p. 43.
[342] See 'Tokushu: ima, kininaru mini shiata', p.40-44; 'Ima, Tokyo wa eiga gurume no paradaisu: seikai no meisaku no hōko mini shiata gaido', pp. 92–95; Okami Kei, 'Shinsen Tokyo meisho annai [sono 17]: eigakan 20 sen', *Tokyo jin*, 1989, pp. 115–24.

of them—namely the emphasis on the venues' interconnectedness to their urban locations and the mini-theatre's contribution to the vibrant cultural scene of Tokyo. These guides not only explained mini-theatres with verbal signs but also visually generated impressions of mini-theatre with photos and maps. For instance, *Screen*'s 'mini-theatre guide,'[343] written and published in 1986, presents each mini-theatre with an external view of its venue and an internal picture of the lobby and film screen. More significantly, it juxtaposes multiple venues around the Shibuya station area together and visually displays this spatial cohesiveness through a map. [Figure 3.8] In this way, these magazines further constituted the space of the mini-theatre not only as separate cultural facilities but also as an integral part of Shibuya's urbanity per se. While existing scholarship usually frames the phenomenon of the mini-theatre boom in the 1980s as evidence of cultural diversification under Japan's globalisation policy and discourse, I argue the very definition of 'boom' itself indicates that diversity must also be imagined through a totality—namely the urban culture of Tokyo in its very specific context. Although the dialectic between diversity and totality is also worth exploring, what I am more interested in here is the means that helped to bridge the two very contradictory concepts together and make it a more concordant scheme.

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[343] 'Ima, Tokyo wa eiga gurume no paradaisu: seikai no meisaku no hōko mini shiata gaido', pp. 92–95.

スペース・パート3

新宿→

渋谷駅

東口

北口
(ハチ公口)

南口

東急プラザ

スタジオ109

シネセゾン渋谷

シネマライズ渋谷

ユーロスペース

Figure 3.8: A map of mini-theatres near the Shibuya station published on the movie magazine.
From 'Ima, Tokyo wa eiga gurume no paradaisu: seikai no meisaku no hōko mini shiata gaido',
Screen, 586, 1986, p. 92.

In comparison to the rather ephemeral 'guides' of mini-theatres in popular magazines, it was information media like listings magazines (*jōhōshi*) and cultural guidebooks (*gaido*) that methodically mapped out mini-theatres and aggregated all these scattered dots into a more consolidated system of 'Tokyo culture.' Among the publications, Pia's monthly magazine *Pia* and annual mook *Pia Map Bunko* (subtitled *Culture Map of Tokyo Area*) were the most prominent. According to Mark Player, Pia started to publish its monthly entertainment listing magazine *Pia* 'that provided information on various film screenings, theatre and concert events in Tokyo' from 1972 and it 'soon became a point of centralisation for Tokyo youth culture, informing people about the hundreds of shows and screenings happening around the city each month.'[344] As mentioned earlier, the establishment and development of Pia's cinema business was deeply intertwined with its involvement in *jishu* film screenings in the 1970s. Pia's founder Yanai Hiroshi was known as a cinephile who not only loved to watch films but

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[344] Mark Player, 'UtoPia: An Early History of Pia and Its Role in Japan's "Self-Made" Film Culture', *Japan Forum*, 0.0 (2021), p. 3.

also wrote film reviews and actively participated in his university's film clubs.[345] As a youngster from Fukushima prefecture who migrated to Tokyo in his 20s, Yanai underwent cultural shock in Tokyo due to the vast amounts of film venues scattered across the city and felt unsatisfied with his inability to find information about film screenings.[346] To solve this problem, Yanai claimed that he came up with the idea of publishing a monthly magazine that could inform people about the ongoing and upcoming cultural events in Tokyo.[347] In this way, Yanai's dissatisfaction and anxiety in a monstrous metropolis with numerous and unregulated flows can be seen as the trigger for Pia's birth as an information magazine—a sentiment shared by most of the film lovers of his time.

While *Pia* provided information on cultural activities to its readers and started to become quite popular in the 1970s, the invention of its 'Pia map' further elevated its utility as urban informational media. In 1978, *Pia* magazine started to offer 'detailed diagrams of venue locations' to 'point people in the direction of the myriad venues that hosted these events.'[348] The Pia map was conceived to be interesting and different from normal maps that were considered 'tasteless and dry' (*mumikansō*).[349] The designer of the Pia map, the famous cartographer Morishita Nobuo, wanted the user to be able to find their destination without too much effort, so cultural facilities were sorted into different categories and marked with respective colours.[350] Despite the map's strength in directing people's attention, it also engendered an effective mechanism to facilitate people's bodily

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[345] Kakeo, *Pia no jidai*, pp. 24-41.
[346] Ibid., p.37-38.
[347] Ibid., p.45-48.
[348] Player, 'UtoPia', p. 3.
[349] Kakeo, *Pia no jidai*, p. 129.
[350] Miyokawa Ritsuko, 'Pia MAP o muitemiru'. <https://www.j-cast.co.jp/morishita/> [accessed 24 January 2023].

experience. Each Pia map was a magnified map of a certain urban district of Tokyo that was always centred around major railway stations.[351] In this way, it anticipated users would initially move via public transportation like subways and trains followed by walking or biking. The specific mobility introduced by the Pia map tended to induce people to experience cultural districts through a certain mode of entering, moving, and leaving. Thus, it should be regarded as a means which helped to regulate people's bodily experience in the city, which in turn could further generate a sense of shared cultural perception in each urban district.

While maps in the *Pia* magazine were released in separate volumes, from 1982, all the scattered cultural maps would be bound together into an annual *Pia Map Bunko* book and it was cinema again that played a prominent role in Pia's comprehensive cultural cartography of Tokyo.[352] To use the 1986 *Pia Map Bunko* as an example—the year by when mini-theatre was largely fixed as a new *kōgyō* method in the film industry and popularised as a daily cultural practice in Tokyo—Pia now encompassed cultural maps of multiple scales including a broad index of cultural areas in Tokyo and Yokohama, subway maps and schedules, more amplified surveys of cultural spots in popular districts like Shinjuku and Shibuya, and the detailed introduction of many cultural facilities.[353] [Figure 3.9] Mini-theatres were integrated into the general category of cinema and were observably marked on the maps by a unique film projector icon.[354] This was important because, unlike large theatres from major film companies, most mini-theatres were

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[351] Ibid.
[352] Kakeo, *Pia no jidai*, p. 130.
[353] *Pia map bunko '86: culture map of Tokyo area*, ed. by Ryūji Morita (Tokyo: PIA CORPORATION, 1986).
[354] Ibid., p.2.

positioned in complex facilities, as the case of Cine Vivant implies. In this way, it was the maps that helped to visualise these physically unobtrusive spaces. More significantly, since movie theatres were prioritised in the index sheet which was clearly marked with the phone number of each facility,[355] cinema was further hierarchised as a priority among all cultural activities in Tokyo. [Figure 3.10] Pia's magazines and mooks would be later remembered by cinephiles as the most useful sources to stay up to date on ongoing and upcoming cultural event trends in Tokyo in the 1980s.[356] Moreover, the maps Pia presented became the most convenient vehicle for people to move accordingly in the gigantic city of Tokyo.

Figure 3.9: Pia's cultural map of Shibuya, where blue was used to mark cultural spots, including movie theatres.
From *Pia Map Bunko '86: Culture Map of Tokyo Area*, ed. by Ryūji Morita (Tokyo: PIA CORPORATION, 1986), pp. 26-27.

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[355] Ibid., pp.140-159.
[356] Kakeo, *Pia no jidai*, pp. 10-11.

エリア別 INDEX

このINDEXでは、本文地図中の"ぴあ情報"をエリア別に紹介。名称、電話番号、地図上の位置（地図下のアルファベ...ットに対応）の順で表記してあります。"マスコミ関連情報""古書店街案内"も収録。併せてご利用下さい。
●ぴあ情報オリジナルマーク　映画館／定期上映館(地図中は)／ホール・劇場／レンタルスペース...は／寄席・大衆演劇／能楽堂／スポット／オーディオ・ショールーム／画廊／美術館(地図中は)／...ネショップ／フィルムレンタル／機材スタジオレンタル／図書館／博物館／チケット／ビデオ...

ぴあ情報リスト

●新宿東口● P 22・23

名称	電話番号	位置
歌舞伎町シネマ1	03(209)5032	B
歌舞伎町シネマ2	03(209)4974	B
歌舞伎町松竹	03(209)4338	B
歌舞伎町東映	03(209)3030	B
歌舞伎町日活	03(209)3040	B
シネマスクエアとうきゅう	03(232)9274	B
昭和館地下	03(352)2472	C
新宿アカデミー	03(202)0141	B
新宿オスカー劇場	03(202)0141	B
新宿オデヲン座	03(202)5657	B
新宿グランドオデヲン座	03(202)0141	B
新宿京王1	03(356)3518	E
新宿京王2	03(356)3518	E
新宿国際劇場	03(352)4314	C
新宿国際名画座	03(352)4314	C
新宿コマ東宝	03(202)8100	B
新宿ジョイシネマ	03(209)6180	B
新宿松竹	03(354)2414	D
新宿昭和館	03(352)2471	C
新宿スカラ座	03(351)3127	E
新宿東映	03(351)3060	E
新宿東映パラス	03(351)3061	E
新宿東映ホール1	03(351)3022	E
新宿東映ホール2	03(351)3060	E
新宿東急	03(200)1981	B
新宿にっかつ	03(350)6695	C
新宿ピカデリー	03(352)1771	D
新宿ビレッジ1	03(351)3128	E
新宿ビレッジ2	03(351)3129	E
新宿文化シネマ1	03(354)2097	E
新宿文化シネマ2	03(354)2098	E
新宿プラザ	03(200)9141	B
新宿ミラノ座	03(202)1189	B
新宿武蔵野館	03(354)5670	C
新宿名画座	03(209)2131	A
新宿ロマン	03(351)3674	E
新宿ローヤル劇場	03(352)7004	C
テアトル新宿	03(352)1846	E
名画座ミラノ	03(200)0888	B
アチック フォーラム（民族文化研究所）	03(341)2865	I
アートシアター新宿	03(350)6630	G
カフェテアトロ新宿モリエール	03(354)6568	D
紀伊國屋ホール	03(354)0131	C
コメディシアター	03(356)7555	C
シアター・アプル	03(209)0222	B
THEATER/TOPS	03(333)4090	C

名称	電話番号	位置
シアター・ビックヒル	03(205)1769	E
シアター・POO	03(341)8992	C
新宿コマ劇場	03(202)0131	B
新宿文化センター	03(350)1141	G
スペース・デン	03(208)7498	G
タイニイ・アリス	03(356)6860	E
東京厚生年金会館	03(356)1111	I
イベントプラザ	03(349)5611	A
貸スタジオ船越	03(209)2754	B
STUDIO ALTA	03(350)5500	B
日本テレビ スペース4	03(203)6111	F
末広亭	03(351)2974	E
Sun Road	03(352)4346	B
ACB（アシベ）	03(205)0901	C
イベントハウスヘッドパワー	03(354)7727	H
ウィッシュボン	03(200)1173	B
キャロルハウス	03(209)3346	C
ザ・カーニバル	03(200)1261	B
J	03(354)0335	I
J&BL SUNSET	03(200)7414	A
シャンパーニュ	03(354)8539	H
新宿G7	03(341)0480	C
新宿PIT-INN	03(354)2024	D
G7-2	03(350)0505	C
JAM	03(232)8169	F
セントラルパーク	03(200)6588	B
New York Antiknock	03(354)3843	D
パフォーマンスクラブKON	03(354)7558	G
モーツァルトサロン	03(356)6580	E
リバティベル	03(209)0706	C
ルイード	03(354)5391	C
ダイナミックオーディオ新宿店	03(232)0311	D
アートギャラリー	03(354)1111	C
アート・ギャラリーせ・らーる	03(205)2673	A
伊勢丹美術画廊	03(352)1111	D
E・W・GALLERY	03(356)2111	B
エポックサロン	03(354)1111	C
小田急グランドギャラリー	03(342)1111	A
小田急美術画廊	03(342)1111	A
オリンパスギャラリー	03(209)8621	E
柿傳ギャラリー	03(352)5118	C
紀伊國屋画廊	03(354)0131	C
ギャラリーアペア	03(350)1616	D
ぎゃらりー玄海	03(352)3105	E
ギャラリー新宿高野	03(352)8893	D
ギャラリー612	03(354)5001	G
ギャルリ・アルカンシェル	03(356)2111	A
京王百貨店5階ギャラリー	03(342)2111	A
ケニヤ画廊	03(209)1609	D
光悦洞	03(352)6093	H

140－141

Figure 3.10: Movies theatres are primarily positioned on Pia's cultural information list. From *Pia Map Bunko '86: Culture Map of Tokyo Area*, ed. by Ryūji Morita (Tokyo: PIA CORPORATION, 1986), p. 140.

Relocating the Politics of Japanese Cinema via the Female Audiences in the Global City

With the infrastructure of Japanese cinema being refurbished by the mini-theatre boom, these newly emerging small-size film venues further embodied the increasingly fashionable discourse of globalisation in a material form. In a 1986 'Mini-theatre Guide' published by Japanese movie magazine *Screen*, the narrative begins with a comparison of global scale:

> I heard a young film lover from New York say, "Tokyo's movie theatres are the most interesting now." According to the person, despite watching major blockbusters and popular films in roadshow theatres in sync with the US release calendar, films that cannot be seen at cinematheques in Paris and New York, as well as hidden masterpieces from emerging countries, are all available in Tokyo.
>
> It is at the mini-theatre that one can watch these non-major productions. The venue of the mini-theatre is small but clean, comfortable, and conscientious, and its line-up reached a high level even by global standards. Moreover, the films independently released at mini-theatres will eventually spread to other theatres in the local regions. In other words, it is fair to claim that mini-theatres are the source of film culture today.
>
> So, for those of you who are planning to use your summer vacation to enjoy a movie feast in Tokyo, let us introduce you to some of the most unique mini-theatres in town. In addition, for those who want to fill up on

food before and after the movie, we will introduce you to some restaurants

as well. Let's start with the Shibuya area, where the whole town is trying

to make it Tokyo's film centre.[357]

The article clearly suggests that the mini-theatre boom enabled Tokyo's global city status on a cultural level. In the first paragraph, the author positions Tokyo on the world map with two other mega-cities—New York and Paris–and suggests Tokyo's superiority over them in terms of film viewing. According to the article, it is not blockbusters—of course, something still needs to be calibrated according to US standards—which makes Tokyo's film culture better, but the aggregation of films across major and minor scenes from various countries. Thus, Tokyo's global city status was directly constituted by the mini-theatre, venues where niche distinctions were most significantly articulated. According to the second paragraph, mini-theatres achieved this 'global standard' not only from their film 'line-up' but also by the high quality of their ('clean, comfortable') facilities and ('conscientious') service. In addition, the global-scale cultural significance of the mini-theatre boom reconfirmed Tokyo as a national film centre for the author—that cinema of global quality was expected to 'trickle-down' from Tokyo to the local regions. In this way, it also discursively fabricated a symbiosis between the mini-theatre, Tokyo, and a global standard—if the mini-theatre carries the most cutting-edge film culture of the world, it must also be a mini-theatre in Tokyo. It was within such an inter/national nexus that Tokyo's central position in Japanese film culture was double-guaranteed. In sum, the

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[357] 'Ima, Tokyo wa eiga gurume no paradaisu: seikai no meisaku no hōko mini shiata gaido', p. 92.

mini-theatres were discursively constructed as an indispensable component of Tokyo's identity as a global city, with the globalisation discourse further generating a cultural imaginary on a domestic level. Recalling Yomota's statements, which bragged about Tokyo's status as a film centre mentioned earlier, the *Screen* article should not be seen as being an unusual account but rather part of a general discursive trend regarding the prominence of Tokyo mini-theatres in the 1980s.

Besides articulating Tokyo's global city status via the mini-theatres, the short introductory piece by the *Screen* also symptomatically implies the geopolitical and economic aspects of globalisation per se. In terms of geopolitics, it is worth noting that Tokyo's pride of becoming the global centre of film is indeed ensured through the eyes and words of the other. It is necessary, for example, for the article to start with a quote from an unknown youngster from New York—where 'globality' and 'centrality' were believed to truly reside. In this way, the mini-theatre boom discourse reconfirmed the ambiguous position that Tokyo occupied—or at least was imagined to occupy—within globalisation, as mentioned in previous chapters. In terms of economics, it is specifically in the final paragraph where the mini-theatre's function as part of a larger consumption network is named. The original text uses the term '*eiga gurume*' wherein *eiga* stands for cinema in Japanese, and *gurume* is a loanword from the French term *gourmet*. The appetising word selected by the editor serves not only as a metaphor but also as an allusion to the actual hospitality services that the magazine aimed to promote. When introducing each mini-theatre, *Screen* magazine would also list ethnic restaurants that provided non-Japanese cuisine in the surrounding areas. For instance, when recommending the Cinema Rise theatre in Shibuya, the author highlights a delicious Southeast Asian food restaurant

located in the same building.[358] Similarly, restaurants that sold Mediterranean cuisine and

spareribs are mentioned when introducing Cine Saison in Shibuya and Cinema Ten in

Roppongi.[359] The juxtaposition of cinema and food thereby implies the ideal mode of

consuming Tokyo's globalised culture. The emphasis on foreign cuisine instead of

Japanese restaurants further implies filmgoing was seen as an integral part of the full

menu of foreignness consumption. Since many mini-theatres specialised in foreign film

screenings—Seibu's Kineca Kinshicho, which was solely dedicated to Soviet cinema at

a certain period, being an extreme example—the mini-theatre's business model fitted

perfectly with other businesses that sold foreign services and monetised the

multiculturalist imaginary of economic globalisation. *Screen*'s article was not an isolated

case either since dating spots, fashion shops, and high-class restaurants were often

promoted alongside mini-theatres in cultural guidebooks of the era to promote a chic and

multicultural lifestyle in the increasingly global city of Tokyo.[360] [Figure 3.11]

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[358] Ibid.
[359] Ibid., pp.93-94.
[360] *Shutoken ibento supesugaido: hōru gekijō, mini shiata, sutajiamu* (Tokyo: CBS Sony
Shuppan, 1989), pp. 136-152.

Figure 3.11: After event spots and waiting spots including dating spots, fashion shops, and fancy restaurants are promoted on mini-theatre guides.
From *Shutoken ibento supesugaido: hōru gekijō, mini shiata, sutajiamu* (Tokyo: CBS Sony Shuppan, 1989), pp. 142-143.

In comparison to the underlying geopolitics of globalisation, increasing economic power and its concomitant liberation of cultural diversity were more sonorous in 1980s mini-theatre discourse. Nevertheless, there was also a politics of the economic aspect of globalisation. Analysing the emerging discourse of multiculturalism in 1980s' Japan, Mika Ko borrows Tessa Morris-Suzuki's concept of 'cosmetic multiculturalism' to argue that 'diversity of culture is enjoyed on a superficial level and used as a means to exemplify Japan's generosity and capacity to accommodate "other" cultures. "Cosmetic" multiculturalism nonetheless neglects the political and economic rights of the bearers of these "other" culture. Other cultures, in this respect, become commodities, or objects of

consumption.'[361] In this way, Ko argues that cosmetic multiculturalism does not challenge right-wing leaning Japanese nationalism but happily coexists with it.[362] While Ko investigates the superficial appropriation of ethnic minority images of *zainichi* Koreans and Okinawans in Japanese cinema to criticise cosmetic multiculturalism, I want to problematise the very use of the word 'cosmetic' itself. Despite the connotation of superficiality, 'cosmetic' is a word with a strongly gendered odour as it often is associated with the highly feminised discourse of the beauty industry.[363] While I do not wish to undermine Ko's intended use of the term, I do want to claim that it is more than a coincidence that a highly feminised imagination is summoned when discussing the problems of 'commodity' and 'objects of consumption.' If cosmetic multiculturalism is a fair criticism of the superficial acceptance of cultural diversity in Japan and Japanese cinema, it is also largely interrelated to the rise of women as filmgoing subjects during the mini-theatre boom.

In Tezuka Yoshiharu's account, mini-theatres in Tokyo during the 1980s were strategically targeted at the specific group of young and urban female office workers known as 'Office Ladies' (OL).[364] Similarly, Colleen Laird describes mini-theatres as 'fashionable movie theatres (*osharena eigakan*)' for the urban female population in Tokyo.[365] The material aspects of the mini-theatre, including comfortable chairs, bright lobbies, and clean restrooms, were considered by both Tezuka and Laird to be attractive

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[361] Mika Ko, *Japanese Cinema and Otherness: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and the Problem of Japaneseness* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 27.

[362] Ibid., p.26.

[363] Geoffrey Jones, *Beauty Imagined: A History of the Global Beauty Industry*, trans. by Keiichi Enatsu and Yoshihiro Yamanaka (Tokyo: Chuokeizaisha, 2011), pp. 4-8.

[364] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 82.

[365] Colleen A. Laird, 'Sea Change: Japan's New Wave of Female Film Directors' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Oregon, 2012), p. 194.

to OL audiences who were fond of places that were neat and tidy.[366] Moreover, the mini-theatres' specialised programming of foreign films was also regarded as appealing to these OLs, since foreignness was considered to be fashionable for these urban consumers.[367] While one should not deny the actual increase of female audiences in the 1980s via the mini-theatre boom, it is crucial to highlight that both Tezuka and Laird draw their conclusions by referring to either the comments of prominent critics like Ōtaka Hiroo and Kawamoto Saburō or the reminiscences of mini-theatre practitioners like Hara Masato. Although these actors often use an objective and observational tone to describe the emergence of the female audience, they also sometimes reveal the constructed nature of this spectatorship by talking about how mini-theatres' were consciously inventing film experiences for young female audiences.[368] While it is largely true that the mini-theatres had female audiences in mind when formulating their business strategies, both the upgrade of the theatre's interior and the multicultural line-up of the films screened served a much broader demographic than just the targeted female audience. Moreover, even if the mini-theatres imagined that women would enjoy films because of their customised services, this cannot prove that female audiences came to mini-theatres solely for these—and for all the same—reasons. The last part of this chapter thus shifts to another imperative node of the mini-theatre boom's *kōgyō* network—namely, the audience—and re-examines its discursive constitution and material ensemble. By positing female audiences within the urban setting of Tokyo, I aim to tease out the new cinema infrastructure's affects on different generations of filmgoers in the global city.

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[366] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 83; Laird, 'Sea Change', p. 194.
[367] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, pp. 84-85; Laird, 'Sea Change', pp. 194-195.
[368] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 85; *Mini shiata o yoroshiku*, pp. 60-73.

The correlation between mini-theatres' upgraded facilities and the increase of female film audiences has so far been overexaggerated. It was not only women who objectively benefitted from or subjectively enjoyed the tidy environment and diversified line-up of the mini-theatres. For instance, Kusakabe Kyūshirō, the famous film producer who won Short Film Golden Bear Award at the 1976 Berlinale, recommended mini-theatres twice in the academic publication *Geinō* before it fully took shape as a 'boom'. In 1982, when the popular media had yet to pay much attention to mini-theatres, Kusakabe had already keenly captured the strength of the mini-theatre against the conventional movie theatre in Tokyo. As a male, Kusakabe also regarded conventional theatres' uncomfortable seats and rowdy staff as unbearable.[369] For Kusakabe, it was the lackadaisical attitude of these existing actors that led to the decline of Japanese cinema.[370] In contrast, Kusakabe praised Iwanami Hall for its progressive programming of niche movies.[371] Then, in a follow-up article written two years later, Kusakabe further complimented Cine Vivant and Kineca Ōmori for improving the film viewing environment along with their programming of cinema from Eastern Europe and the Third World.[372] The polished facilities and diversified programming of mini-theatres impressed Kusakabe, as a male and a film professional, more than just the imagined female or amateur OL of the later discourse. While Kusakabe did mention his observation of a growing attendance rate in mini-theatres,[373] he did not underscore the dominant presence of female audiences. In

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[369] Kusakabe Kyūshirō, 'Mini shiata to eiga jinkō', *Geinō*, 283, 1982, p. 59.
[370] Ibid.
[371] Ibid, pp. 59-60.
[372] Kusakabe Kyūshirō, 'GW to mini shiata no koto', *Geinō*, 304, 1984, p. 53.
[373] Kusakabe, 'Mini shiata to eiga jinkō', pp. 59–60; Kusakabe, 'GW to mini shiata no koto', p. 53.

other words, in the early records of mini-theatres written by Kusakabe, the space had yet to be enunciated as being targeted to female patrons.

From the mid-1980s, the nature of the female audience started to be underlined in articles about mini-theatres. An early document regarding the significance of female audiences was made by Cinema Square Tokyu's manager Kosaka Mamoru. In an interview with *Kinema Junpō*, Kosaka declares that on average, around 65 percent of their audience was female, and in extreme cases, the number even rose to 80 percent.[374] Explaining this new filmgoing demographic in Tokyo, Kosaka claims most of them were OL in their late 20s.[375] It is important to clarify that in Kosaka's account, this lively female scene was a unique feature (*tokushoku*) of Cinema Square Tokyu instead of being a shared aspect of all mini-theatres.[376] In comparison with interviews with other mini-theatre managers in the same special, it makes it clear that although all mini-theatres aimed to attract new audiences as part of their *kōgyō* practice, it was mostly the urban younger generation, who did not have any filmgoing habit, that they mainly aimed to reach.[377] Instead of gender, age and generational experience were thus the more important subjects for mini-theatres, at least in the beginning of the mini-theatre boom. While Cinema Square Tokyu's success in attracting young female audiences might serve as a useful model for the other venues to follow, it also reveals the very constructed nature of the mini-theatres' gender narrative for *kōgyō* purposes.

Cinema Square Tokyu is an interesting case that warrants further analysis before moving on to the next topics. For Kosaka, the female audiences who came to Cinema

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[374] See 'Tokushu: ima, kininaru mini shiata', p. 42.
[375] Ibid.
[376] Ibid.
[377] Ibid., p.40-44.

Square Tokyu were well-off individuals with a clear sense of purpose because they were willing to take a risk and visit Shinjuku's Kabukichō to watch movies.[378] A famous red-light district, Kabukichō in the early 1980s was infamously known as a dangerous place especially for young females due to a series of murder cases against women which had recently occurred in the area. In his book, Tezuka borrows two key terms from Ōtaka—namely '*abunasa*' and '*fasshionsei*'—to explain the success of mini-theatres among the female audiences in the 1980s. Translating the former into 'edginess and subversiveness' and the latter into 'fashionableness,'[379] Tezuka concludes mini-theatres 'provided a culturally safe and "fashionable" space for young women to consume otherness that otherwise could have been seen as too 'subversive' within the context of the dominant Japanese culture.'[380] Nevertheless, referring to the early discussions of the Cinema Square Tokyu, it becomes crucial to also translate the Japanese term *abunasa* into its literal meaning of 'danger.' Instead of simply consuming the subversive film contents from a safe position in a fashionable venue, female audiences had taken actual risks—both physically and mentally—when visiting a place like the Cinema Square Tokyu. For Kosaka, it was the very contradiction between the female-unfriendly image of Kabukichō and the vitality of women in filmgoing that showed him their enthusiasm for and commitment to cinema. In other words, the gaps between the gendered urbanity of the Kabukichō and the increasing visibility of female audiences also served an important contrast in the constitution of the mini-theatre boom's gendered narrative. It is worth highlighting that information media like the mini-theatre guides were an effective tool in

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[378] Ibid., p.42.
[379] Tezuka, *Japanese Cinema Goes Global*, p. 84.
[380] Ibid., p.85.

mobilising mini-theatre audiences and navigate them through some of the risky areas like Kabukichō. For instance, a mini-theatre guide would provide recommendations for shortcuts from Shinjuku station to the movie theatre to avoid danger on the main road when promoting the Cinema Square Tokyu to its readers.[381] In such cases, information media became an integral part of cinema's overall mobility system and was intended to mediate the movements of the filmgoing bodies within and in-between different urban locations.

The gendered narrative of the mini-theatre boom has been correctly historicised with the safety measures of movie theatres in Japan. Mini-theatres served as a 'safer' space for female audiences in Japan especially when film venues were widely recognised as masculine spaces before the 1980s. In the post-war context, Laird's reference to Ushida Ayami indicates the frequent occurrence of sexual harassment and molestation (*chikan*) incidents in the studio movie theatres in the 1950s and 60s.[382] Entering the 1970s, the rise of the *pinku eiga* (pink film) genre came along with the emergence of the pink theatre. These soft-core pornographic films included works that ranged from Nikkatsu studio's branded Roman Porno genre to other independently produced 'guerrilla-style' works.[383] Although the content of pink films were not exclusive to women—as some of the works that celebrated the sexual liberation of women became quite popular among female audiences[384]—the venue of pink theatres and its 'orchestration of male filmic gaze (both by creator and spectator)' were considered undesirable by many female customers.[385] In

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[381] 'Ima, Tokyo wa eiga gurume no paradaisu: seikai no meisaku no hōko mini shiata gaido', p. 95.
[382] Laird, 'Sea Change', pp.177-178.
[383] Ibid., p.180.
[384] Ibid., pp.180-181.
[385] Ibid., p.182.

this way, these popular pink theatres served largely as a 'men-only environment' in the 1970s.[386]

The gender narrative of the mini-theatre boom was induced by the changing material conditions of movie theatres. While upgrades to comfortable chairs and luxurious lobbies were usually considered selling points to female customers, similar to the case of Kusakabe mentioned earlier, they were neither exclusive perks to women nor did they impress the OL demographic alone. Neither adopting a material-determinist discourse nor totally disregarding material change, I argue that it is more productive to associate the changing material condition of mini-theatres with the affective experiences they generated to different filmgoing subjects. The brightness of the lobby area, the cleanliness of the seats and venue, as well as the visibility of female staff in the cinema (which I will elaborate on later), could all intensify a sense of reassurance and reliability to the female audience. To frame it as an affective experience, I am referring to Brian Massumi's widely recognised conception of 'affect' as autonomous agency that escapes confinement in a particular body but can nevertheless be intensified through certain settings.[387] In other words, mini-theatres themselves did not contain the affects of reassurance and reliability, but they did provide an atmosphere to facilitate affective flow and stimulate the subjects' bodily experiences. Thinking through the concept of affect helps us to see other experiences mini-theatres might have brought to female audiences other than the 'superficial' consumption of its luxurious and fashionable atmosphere.

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[386] Jasper Sharp, *Behind the Pink Curtain: The Complete History of Japanese Sex Cinema* (Surrey: Fab Pr, 2008), p. 29.
[387] Brian Massumi, 'The Autonomy of Affect', *Cultural Critique*, 31 (1995), pp. 83–109.

Although there is little evidence on the emerging female audience's affective experience in mini-theatres, there are many articles available which reveal an older and predominantly male generation of cinephile's frustration towards this newly popularised type of venue. In an article written in 1986, Machii Dai articulates his distaste for mini-theatres by describing the unpleasant affective experience he endured in these venues. For Machii, mini-theatres like Cinema Square Tokyu and Cine Vivant give fans like him 'uncomfortable feelings' (*igokochi ga warui*) because of the strict rules they imposed on their audiences.[388] While the mini-theatres' luxurious interior and tidy environment made Machii feel 'servile' (*hikutsu*), seeing audiences eating hamburgers rapidly outside the venue to obey the mini-theatres' 'no food policy' gave Machii a 'bleak feeling' (*samuzamutoshita kibun*).[389] According to Sara Ahmed's critique of Teresa Brennan's so-called 'outside in' model, affect is not just about 'the atmosphere "getting into the individual".'[390] Instead, the feelings that one carries when entering a certain space will affect what impressions one receives in that space, so there is also a subjective aspect of affective experience.[391] In other words, although all the audiences shared the same screening space of the mini-theatre, their affective experience might differ according to their mood and emotion when entering the room, as well as their existing memories and knowledge about cinema per se. In this way, Machii's affective response to the mini-theatres might point out the gaps between different filmgoing subjects in the 1980s.

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[388] Machii Dai, 'Shinema fan ni sasagu: B kyū eigakan no tanoshimigata', in *Seikimatsu daitokyo yūran* (Tokyo: Bungei shunshū, 1987), p. 185.

[389] Ibid., p.186.

[390] Sara Ahmed, 'Multiculturalism and the Promise of Happiness', *New Formations*, 63 (2007), p. 125.

[391] Ibid., pp.125-126.

Machii's distaste for mini-theatres was commonly shared by some other older-generation cinephiles in Japan—largely because of the changes that mini-theatres brought to the viewing experiences in cinema. The rule that received the most backlash was the introduction of *teiin irekae sei* or limited seat system, an exhibition system that sets a capacity limit for each screening and asks the audience to buy a ticket for each film. For the older generation of cinephiles who experienced film viewing via freely entering and exiting the screening room without designated seats, and with just one ticket for the entire day's screenings, *teiin irekae sei* completely overturned their understanding of cinema per se. The frustration against this new rule was often articulated as a direct bodily experience of feeling restricted and manipulated. For instance, the *teiin irekae sei* in Cine Vivant asked audiences to queue in order before entering the venue, which triggered the famous film columnist Nakano Midori's anger enough to call it 'an extreme, Soviet-style, bureaucracy.'[392] Likewise, the introduction of a no food policy in venues like Cinema Square Tokyu and Cine Vivant also caused people to lament about the loss of the comfortable experience of eating fried squid or ice cream in their seats and feeling fully immersed in the screening space.[393] Movie theatres gave older-generation cinephiles a sense of liberation and freedom, especially through the very dark setting it provided, and the rise of the mini-theatre model was considered as destroying cinema's potential. In the article 'Darkness has disappeared from cinema' ('*eigakan kara kurayami ga kieta*'), the critic Mutō Yasushi considers the introduction of Japan's Fire Service Act in 1961 as a historical transition point which forbade total darkness in movie theatres since the

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[392] 'Bokura wa eigakan de sodatta', *Tokyo jin*, 25, 1989, p. 63.
[393] See 'Bokura wa eigakan de sodatta', p. 60. & Mutō Yasushi, 'Eigakan kara kurayami ga kieta', *Tokyo jin*, 25, 1989, p. 82.

installation of emergency exit signals became mandatory.[394] Positioning mini-theatres on the extension line, Mutō considers both the *teiin irekae sei* and no food policy as part of the restricting process of cinema alongside the very brightness of mini-theatres' lobbies per se.[395] In other words, in Mutō's account, the brightness of mini-theatres is regarded as a form of surveillance and policing which sabotaged cinema's potential to liberate the viewing subjects. In a similar vein, Machii also blamed the bright and well-regulated mini-theatres for the destruction of cinema's 'liberation district' (*kaihōku*)-like atmosphere.[396] Both of Mutō and Machii's accounts reveal how the affective experiences stimulated by cinema's changing material conditions were further theorised into intellectual discourse to indicate the politics of cinema.

The liberation that these older-generation cinephiles longed for was interrelated to the socio-political transformation of Japanese society. By equating the unrestricted atmosphere of cinema and its darkness to liberation and freedom, these cinephiles were indeed mourning a film culture that was vanishing alongside a vanishing political era. In Japan's post-war history, cinema had always served as the frontline of activism and political agitation. During the 1960s Anti-*Anpo* movements,[397] cinemas like the Art Theatre Shinjuku Bunka were used by students and intellectuals as a venue for expressing political opinions and organising demonstrations.[398] Then, with the rise of television at

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[394] Mutō, 'Eigakan kara kurayami ga kieta', p. 81.
[395] Ibid., pp.82-84.
[396] Machii, 'Shinema fan ni sasagu: B kyū eigakan no tanoshimigata', p. 188.
[397] *Anpo* is a Japanese abbreviation of the US-Japan Security Treaty. It is "a nationwide movement that ostensibly sought to prevent revision of… 'Anpo'…the instrument that allows the United States to maintain military bases on Japanese soil." See Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromises after Anpo* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), p. 5.
[398] Roland Domenig, 'About the Interrelation between Cinema Space and Urban Space? : The Art Theatre Shinjuku Bunka and the Culture of Shinjuku', *New Vistas: Japanese Studies for the Next Generation*, 2016, pp. 35–46.

the end of the 1960s as a form of state-controlled media, represented by the national live broadcasting of radical leftist scandals like the Asama-Sansō incident and the Japanese Red Army's aircraft hijackings, it became a common belief among Japanese filmmakers to consider the diminishing of Japan's political activism and the slow death of the nation's democracy alongside the decline of cinema.[399] While leftists like Matsuda Masao started to look for new media models to revitalise cinema's politics, there was a pervasive 'sense of failure' (*zasetsu-kan*) among left-leaning students and intellectuals,[400] which pushed some to convert to conservative ideologies and others to retreat to an isolated status.

For those who survived, it was the dark space of pink theatres and *meigazas* that ensured a haven for healing and preserved a political potential for the future. For instance, in Mutō's account, cinema was supposed to be a space that could stimulate critical thinking on social issues, largely because the darkness of cinema could set people free from ideological manipulation and moral possessions and allow the audience to laugh, react, and exchange emotions and thoughts freewheelingly.[401] In this way, by restricting people from behaving in certain ways, mini-theatres distained cinema's political potential and transformed it into a horrendous surveillance machine. As a vivid example, Mutō describes himself being shocked by some female audiences who asked the staff in the conventional theatre Miyuki-za whether they were allowed to eat and drink in the venue.[402] From Mutō's point of view, this new generation of audiences might have already internalised the rules invented by the police—namely, the mini-theatres—and

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[399] Yuriko Furuhata, *Cinema of Actuality: Japanese Avant-Garde Filmmaking in the Season of Image Politics*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), Kindle Location: 3479-3480.
[400] Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, p. 263.
[401] 'Bokura wa eigakan de sodatta', p. 63.
[402] Mutō, 'Eigakan kara kurayami ga kieta', pp. 82-83.

started to self-police their own bodies. Moreover, since most of these rules were invented by mini-theatres owned by large corporations like Tokyu and Seibu, they became easy targets for critics like Machii who made the obvious criticism that mini-theatres were a regulatory tool of big capital (*dai shihon*).[403]

While criticising the reactionary model of the mini-theatre, these critics often articulated their criticisms with a problematically gendered tone. Besides Mutō's observation of female audiences' internalisation of mini-theatre rules, other comments were overtly misogynous in content. In Machii's account, he attacks women for only going to mini-theatres to consume fashionable (*oshare*) experiences rather than the content of the film itself.[404] When narrating his experience in Cinema Square Tokyu, Machii mentions a mean-looking (*ijiwarui*) female staff member patrolling the venue to inspect if people had brought food inside[405]—despite the poor woman simply doing her job. For Machii, the mini-theatre was a feminised space where female audiences pretended to watch films and policewomen monitored people's behaviour. This led to his complaints about cinema's transition from an 'obscene and lively' (*waizatsu de niginigishii*) space into a 'healthy place where young women can enter without resistance' (*wakai josei ga teikōnaku ireru kenzen-na basho*).[406] Similarly, in the discussion about Tokyo's film culture in *Tokyo jin* magazine, manga artist Takahashi Haruo and broadcast writer Takada Fumio ridicule Nakano Midori's account of being sexually harassed in a

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[403] Machii, 'Shinema fan ni sasagu: B kyū eigakan no tanoshimigata', pp. 185-186.
[404] Ibid., p.185.
[405] Ibid., p.186.
[406] Ibid., p.188.

conventional theatre—[407] with Takada even openly joking about his own *chikan* (public molestation) behaviour in movie theatres.[408]

The many fractures of different moviegoing subjects' affective experiences regarding the material condition and screening rules of mini-theatres can be useful in rethinking the mini-theatre boom as a cultural phenomenon of the global city in general. The critique of female mini-theatre audiences reveals an increasingly pervasive anxiety toward the proliferation of cultural consumption in Tokyo in the 1980s. A common critique that reappeared at the time criticised the endless accumulation of information in Tokyo and the inability to utilise these sources to produce an original cultural identity of the city.[409] In a similar vein, the renowned film critic Yomota Inuhiko also criticised the proliferation of information media like *Pia* for manipulating their material to facilitate consumerism and brainwash young people.[410] According to these critiques, the lack of 'criticality' or *hihyōsei* marks the fundamental differences between Tokyo and other global cities in the West like New York and Paris. Without digging too much into the intellectual debates on this issue, what I want to highlight is the simultaneous emergence of young and urban female customers as the imagined subject of this consumerist phenomenon. In the case of the mini-theatre boom, a similar kind of anxiety of not being able to critically engage with the proliferated film contents might have been transferred to these recently visible young female audiences and further turned into a prevalent prejudice against these apparently 'brainless' consumers.

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[407] 'Bokura wa eigakan de sodatta', p. 63.

[408] Using Takada's own words: 'because I have paid for the tickets, it would be a loss if I only watch a film.' See Ibid.

[409] See Kasuya Kazuki, 'Suminikui kara omoshiroi Tokyo', *Tokyo jin*, 1, 1986, pp. 32–43. & Honma Nagayo, 'Gaijin datte tokyojin', *Tokyo jin*, 1, 1986, pp. 134–141.

[410] Yomota Inuhiko, 'Itsumademoaru to omouna eigakan', *Tokyo jin*, 25, 1989, p. 73.

From the cases above, we can see that the intricate political imaginations embedded within Tokyo's mini-theatre boom clearly revolved around the rise of a young and urban female audience. The mini-theatres' reinvention of exhibition methods displeased some older-generation cinephiles on an affective level with direct and indirect restrictions and regulations on their bodies, which triggered criticism toward this newly established exhibition model. While their critiques remained legitimate to a certain extent, these comments were often articulated in a highly misogynous manner. In some of these cases, the bodies of the emerging urban female audience as well as the presence of women staff served as a sign of cinema's degeneration. While criticising big capital for exploiting cinema and obliterating its political potential, these older-generation critiques indeed conspired with the enemy they spat on and discursively co-constituted a silly and pretentious consumerist subject of the young woman in film culture. Although widely considered a symptom of economic globalisation's full-blown consumerism, the mini-theatre boom nonetheless made women more visible in both the popular imagination and actual practices of cinema.[411]

Coda

In this chapter, I have used the mini-theatre as an anchor to delineate the reconfiguration of the Japanese film industry in the 1980s Tokyo and especially to highlight how local filmgoing experiences in Tokyo were transformed with the ongoing process of globalisation. Starting from an investigation of the tensions embedded within

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[411] Alongside the female audiences, we see many urban and young female mini-theatre managers like Cinema Ten's Yoshida Eiko and Cinema Square Tokyu's Ueki Chiaki were given voices in popular media like *Kinema junpō*, alongside veterans like Iwanami Hall's Takano Etsuko.

the Japanese film industry since the 1970s—specifically the *jishu* filmmakers' *kōgyō* experiments and commercial companies' growing interest in the film business—I have considered the mini-theatre boom in the 1980s Tokyo as a charged encounter of globalised economy with various local desires. As the mini-theatres extended the spectrum of Tokyo's film culture, they further enabled a new spatial model of cinema based on the characterisation of the theatre's location. Founded on the logic of differentiation, mini-theatres' promotion of each urban area's unique qualities mirrored its audiences' consumption of foreignness on movie screens in a burgeoning global consumerist society. Regarding the mini-theatre boom as a superficial multiculturalist phenomenon, the emerging urban, young, and white-collar female audiences were accused of downgrading the artistic and political potentials of cinema per se. Nevertheless, by re-examining the discursive formation and material condition of the mini-theatre boom's gender narrative, I argue that the affective gaps between different generations of filmgoers must be taken seriously as a part of the embodied cultural experiences of the global city. By tracing a genealogy from the *jishu* movement to the emergence of female audiences, this chapter reconsiders Tokyo's globalised film culture as a heterogeneous configuration with local routes—owing to the complex interplay of various human and non-human actors over time—rather than a linear outcome of 'external' influence.

By way of conclusion, I want to refer to the thoughts of Kishino Reiko, who started her independent film distribution career in the early 1990s, on the potential of mini-theatres. Although it is difficult to define mini-theatres in standard terms since each venue practiced film programming and screening in various ways, the most prominent virtue of

mini-theatres remained exactly in its flexibility and responsiveness to different situations—to 'be water'.[412] The watery metaphor suggested by Kishino seems to embody the rise of an increasingly dense network within the Japanese film industry and a more permeable mechanism for the production and circulation of cinema. In some cases, like that of Seibu's, the mini-theatre was used as a gateway for large corporations to enter the film business and establish a full-scale film sector involving exhibition, distribution, and production. In other cases, it provided significant levels of autonomy to filmmakers and production groups and therefore, for people like director Hara Kazuo, a chance to screen their work to a relatively large and diversified group of audiences. The mini-theatre boom, in this way, should be seen as simultaneously a moment of deterritorialisation stimulated by Tokyo's thriving economy and a stage in the reconstitution of networks in the Japanese film industry as it not only re-lit capital's interest in the film business, but also channelled actors across production (independent filmmakers), distribution (existing film companies and newly emerged indie distribution companies), and exhibition (movie theatres and information media) together.

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[412] Kishino Reiko, 'Mini shiata no "teichaku"?', *Jōhō geinō*, 124, 1996, p. 50.

Chapter Four - Touring the 'World Centre': Institutionalised Mobility in the

Making of *Tokyo-Ga*

Halfway through his sentimental journey in *Tokyo-Ga* (1985), Wim Wenders takes

a trip to Shinjuku's Kabukicho, a famous busy nightlife street in Tokyo, at night of

course. As he sets up his camera in one of Kabukicho's alleys, Wenders narrates:

> Shinjuku, a section of Tokyo with one bar after another. In Ozu's films,
>
> many such alleys appear, in which his abandoned or lonely fathers drown
>
> their sorrows. I set up my camera and filmed like I always do. And then a
>
> second time. The same alley, the same camera position, but using
>
> another focal length: the 50mm, a lens with a very slight telephoto effect,
>
> the one Ozu always used for each and every shot. Another image
>
> presented itself, one that no longer belonged to me.[413]

The comparison between the two shots of the same alley is stunning. By switching the

camera lens to Ozu's favourite style, Wenders' shot is replaced by an Ozu-esque mise-

en-scène. [Figure 4.2] In her review of *Tokyo-Ga*, Catherine Russell highlights this

scene and suggests that the film 'is exemplary of the way that [Wenders] maps his own

auteurist persona onto that of another director's personality.'[414] Yet, for Russell, there

is still a decisive contrast between the two directors: while the studio-based Ozu is

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[413] *Tokyo-Ga*, dir. by Wim Wenders, 1985.
[414] Catherine Russell, 'Review: Late Spring', *Cinéaste*, 32.2 (2007), p. 67.

'controlled and precise, Wenders is aleatory, wandering, and contingent,' which makes the latter's 'framing [of Tokyo] far more mobile than Ozu's geometric designs.'[415]

There is no doubt that the first-person-narrated diary and essay film *Tokyo-Ga* is more freewheeling than Ozu's films in some respects, which is tightly associated with the subjective aspects of the genre. Since 'an essay is neither fiction nor fact, but a personal investigation involving both the passion and intellect of the author,'[416] the form enables 'filmmakers [to] explore their own lives and sensibilities … represented, or misrepresented, by a variety of means.'[417] Following such critiques of the subjective aspects of diary and essay films, Olivier Delers and Martin Sulzer-Reichel, for instance, argue that '*Tokyo-Ga* is not about recording reality but about how the act of recording images is deeply connected to the act of seeing, to the impression…and of remembering...'[418] Similar to Delers and Sulzer-Reichel's focus on Wenders' own subjectivity—namely the German auteur's sight, feeling, and memory—scholars have pointed out how Wenders uses this film to articulate and mediate the temporal gaps between the Tokyo in his cinephilic memory and the Tokyo he visited in the 1980s.[419]

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[415] Ibid., p.66.

[416] Louis D. Giannetti, *Godard and Others : Essays on Film Form* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975), p. 26.

[417] Bill Nichols, *Introduction to Documentary: Third Edition* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), pp. 78-79.

[418] Oliver Delers and Martin Sulzer-Reichel, 'Introduction: New Perspectives on Wim Wenders as Filmmaker and Visual Artist', in *Wim Wenders: Making Films That Matter*, eds. by Oliver Delers and Martin Sulzer-Reichel (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), p. 13.

[419] For instance, Darrell Varga considers *Tokyo-Ga* 'evokes nostalgia for the permanence of place and identity'; and William Baker suggests how the film represents 'distance between cinematic and everyday experience has grown too wide' in 'an increasingly vibrant, visual world'. See Darrell Varga, 'The Diary Films of Wim Wenders', *Quarterly Review of Film and Video*, 26.1 (2008), p. 24; and William Baker, 'Blandness and "Just Seeing" in the Films of Wim Wenders', in *Wim Wenders: Making Films That Matter*, eds. by Oliver Delers and Martin Sulzer-Reichel (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), pp. 164-165.

Though it remains productive to analyse how Wenders works as a 'mediator between the real city and its filmic images,' Nora M. Alter suggests that the city itself also plays a crucial role in mediating 'between these images and the imagined identity of the artist.'[420] This nuanced materialist approach, however, has been largely overlooked in existing discussions of *Tokyo-Ga*. While scholars like Russell have already correctly teased out how Wenders subjectively frames the alley shot mentioned earlier as it pays homage to Ozu, it remains unclear why the shot is framed in Shinjuku's Kabukicho instead of Ueno—especially since the latter was more likely to be depicted in Ozu's films than the former. In *Tokyo Story* (Ozu Yasujirō, 1953), quoted directly in *Tokyo-Ga*, the 'pillow shot' of the nightlife alley belongs to a sequence where the old couple Shūkichi (Ryū Chishū) and Tomi (Higashiyama Chieko) tour the Ueno district. Passing through the Kan'ei-ji First Cemetery and standing on the Ryodaishi Bridge, Shūkichi and Tomi look down at the streets. This becomes one of the few sequences in *Tokyo Story* in which audiences can recognise the actual urban landscape of Tokyo, partly due to Ozu's excessive obsession with indoor settings.[421] While it is not certain if the alley scene in *Tokyo Story* was shot on location or in a studio set, the spatial sequence suggests that Ozu's alley is located around the Ueno district instead of Shinjuku. [Figure 4.1] Besides Ozu's own preference for the area, Ueno has always been a popular spot for mass culture and plebeian consumption throughout Japanese modern history, a reasonable location for an older gentleman like

[420] Nora M. Alter, 'Global Politics, Cinematographic Space: Wenders's Tokyo-Ga and Notebooks on Cities and Clothes', in *Projecting History: German Nonfiction Cinema, 1967–2000* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), p. 107.
[421] Saitō Tamio, '*Tokyo Monogatari* no rokechi shūhen o tansaku', *Soundtrack of Ozu* <https://soundtrack-of-ozu.info/topics/2616> [accessed 20 April 2022].

Shūkichi to gather with his friends. In contrast, although Shinjuku had already gained popularity in the 1930s as a modern subcentre of the city, its famous Kabukicho area was only fully established as a pleasure quarter in the 1950s as part of the region's post-war rehabilitation plan.[422] Thus, the urban historical point of view helps to explain why Ozu's alley scene was unlikely to have been, and in reality never was, set in Kabukicho.

Figure 4.1: An Alley.
Still from Ozu, *Tokyo Story*
(67:11).

Figure 4.2: Another Alley.
Still from Wenders, *Tokyo-Ga*
(36:46).

 By foregrounding the spatial gap in *Tokyo-Ga*'s alley scene, my intention is not to disregard Wenders merely as an ignorant tourist and claim the cultural authenticity of Ozu's Tokyo. On the contrary, I believe Wenders' (mis)position of the Ozu-esque alley can tell us more about Tokyo's status during the time of filming *Tokyo-Ga*. This chapter takes the urban spaces represented in *Tokyo-Ga* not merely as the background of an international auteur's subjective interpretation but as a prerequisite of the film's spatial configuration and a constituent part of the filmmaker's urban experience and perception. In other words, I do not presume image to be the outcome of the filmmaker's 'view'— whether through production or post-production—but, rather, I consider the dynamic

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[422] Takeoka Tōru, *Ikinobiru toshi: Shinjuku Kabukichō no shakaigaku* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2017), pp. 55-58.

interactions between the city and the filmmaker before, during, and after the moments of filming.

In conventional studio productions, location scouting is often undergone to decide where a scene is taken place. Taking *Tokyo Story* again as an example, although most of the scenes were shot in the studio sets, as Alastair Phillips points out in his close reading of the film, the spatial representation of the film is highly influenced by the location scouting process for which Ozu and his cameraman Atsuda Yūharu travelled to various places within and near Tokyo before the actual shooting.[423] Thus, besides the scenes that were shot on actual urban locations, the spatial arrangements of other studio scenes are also inseparable with the exploration of the actual city of Tokyo. In a similar vein, this study aims to analyse the city that may or may not be directly represented in *Tokyo-Ga* in order to rethink the film as a particular type of transnational encounter with the global city. Additionally, I am fully aware of the different production processes between a fictional work like *Tokyo Story* and an essay film like *Tokyo-Ga*. Unlike films made within studio systems, which usually involve a much more complicated operational process, the production of essay films implies greater freedom on the part of the film auteur, one that is more personal, expressive, and self-reflexive[424]—especially since the plot of *Tokyo-Ga* was mainly derived from Wenders' diary essay written after his trip in April 1983.[425] However, essay films should not be misunderstood to be entirely unconstrained in terms of production. This chapter aims to reveal how the trip that

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[423] Alastair Phillips, *Tokyo Story* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022), pp. 30-31.
[424] Laura Rascaroli, 'The Essay Film: Problems, Definitions, Textual Commitments', *Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media*, 49.2 (2008), pp. 24–47.
[425] Wim Wenders, 'Tokyo-Ga', in *On Film, Wim Wenders: Essays and Conversation* (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), pp. 219–24.

Wenders made, the people he encountered, the places he visited, and the scenes that he decided to include in the final cut of *Tokyo-Ga* are all connected to a broader network of the global city—with cinema as one of its significant nodes. Analysing the film from a networked approach, this chapter neither exaggerates nor overlooks the film director's agency, but instead highlights the dynamic encounters and exchanges between various subjects and objects in the formation of the images of Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga*.

This chapter delineates how Tokyo was rendered 'global' via cinema in the 1980s by unpacking the tension between the urban representation of Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga*, the actual happenings of Wenders' visit, and the various spatial-temporal imaginations embedded within the film's shooting locations. The first section examines the cinematic representation of Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga*, reviewing how urban spaces are represented and how the film stimulates a postmodern critique of 1980s Tokyo that was integral to its global city discourse. Nevertheless, by further scrutinising the material conditions of Wenders' visit per se, I present *Tokyo-Ga*'s spatial representation as a networked effort constituted by not only the filmmaker's subjectivity but also various institutions that seek to promote the city's international cultural status. Introducing the concept of institutionalised mobility, the rest of the chapter examines the complex power structure embedded within the network that constituted *Tokyo-Ga* and further highlights cinema's correlation with Tokyo's global city agendas in the 1980s. From the shot of Yurakucho to scenes of Kamakura which appear in *Tokyo-Ga*, I chart the coexistence of temporal and spatial trajectories on multiple scales regarding Tokyo's global city agenda. Eventually, in the last section, I return to Wenders' reflexive relationship with the

contemporaneous institution of world cinema to rethink the production of Tokyo's

images on a global scale.

Beyond Simulacra: Rethinking the Representation of Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga*

Not unlike the style of other diary films, *Tokyo-Ga* depicts a filmmaker—played

and narrated by Wim Wenders himself—who travels to Tokyo and seeks to retrieve the

traces of the city from his favourite movie, *Tokyo Story,* made by Ozu Yasujirō.

Throughout the trip, Wenders encounters a variety of spectacles in Japanese society that

simultaneously fascinate and annoy him. In a contemplative tone, Wenders in the

voiceover talks about his thoughts of the image culture in the contemporary world and

mourns for the loss of the Tokyo represented in Ozu's films. During his trip, Wenders

visits Ozu's cemetery in Kamakura and meets some of the old film crew of the deceased

filmmaker. From these conversations, Wenders seems to develop a profound

understanding of Ozu's works. The trip continues and ends with Wenders' admiration

of Ozu's aura but mixed-feelings towards the urbanity and visual culture of

contemporary Tokyo.

Tokyo is represented in *Tokyo-Ga* as a giant simulacrum, to use Jean Baudrillard's

words. In his seminal article 'Simulacra and Simulations' first published in 1981, the

French philosopher claims that the world is occupied by simulacra which only appear to

be one thing without having its true essence.[426] According to Baudrillard, the overload

of simulacra has turned contemporary life into a hyperreality, for which not only the

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[426] Jean Baudrillard, 'Simulacra and Simulations', in *Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings 2nd Edition*, ed. by Mark Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 166–84.

distinction between the real and its copy has vanished but also the differences between reality and representation collapses.[427] Regardless of whether Wenders had read Baudrillard's article before making *Tokyo-Ga*, but he does share a similar critique towards the contagion of copies and the loss of essence in his depiction of Tokyo in the 1980s. According to Nora Alter, Wenders' highlighting of the mass media image, fake objects (of food), and ritual gestures of golf practices in *Tokyo-Ga* all imply the 'loss of an unmediated vision or meaning of reality.'[428] While it is easy to grasp *Tokyo-Ga* from the postmodern critique of simulacra, as Nora Alter points out how the film should not be taken merely at its face value 'as images of reality.'[429] If, as an image production, *Tokyo-Ga* also 'contributes to this multiplication of images and feeds off them,' it is worth examining how Wenders as a filmmaker 'aestheticised, spectacularised, and distorted' the images to constitute his version of 'real Tokyo'.[430] For my research, I pay specific attention to how urban space is represented in *Tokyo-Ga* in order to delineate a more nuanced understanding of the city in the film.

Tokyo as a simulacrum is constituted by the view of Wenders via camera. The view decides how and where the city is unfolded. In an early sequence, the act of viewing is clearly foregrounded. The sequence begins with Wenders standing inside of a subway station where ordinary Tokyo citizens are commuting. The camera plays the role of our protagonist's eyes, which swiftly shifts between different subjects including a clerk who is checking the train tickets, people lining up to take the escalator, and one little boy who refuses to walk in the middle of the underground passage. As the voiceover

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[427] Ibid., pp.171-172.
[428] Alter, 'Global Politics, Cinematographic Space', pp. 112-116.
[429] Ibid., p.116.
[430] Ibid.

narrates, it is only the little boy who unintentionally breaks the harmony of the city's ordinary rhythm that makes Wenders feel familiar and intimate. According to Shambhavi Prakash, who analyses the sequence from a Lefebvrean rhythm analysis perspective, the scene indicates 'how the rhythms of the urban space impinge themselves upon the body of the individual.'[431] From such perspective, Wenders clearly uses a Lefebvrean eye to observe the city since he prefers the abrupt break of the homogeneous social order pre-conceived by the officials who designed and designated the subway space for a specific purpose. In the next scene, our protagonist steps into the subway train and looks around the passenger car. Wenders' view stays only briefly on the passengers but is mostly attracted by the symbols and signs, including a poster advertising a Picasso Exhibition, a comic book, and the neon signs in the window. In contrast to the little boy who is familiar, intimate, and 'real,' these signs and symbols are strange and spectacular simulacra. Nevertheless, the contrast also exposes the constructed nature of Wenders' Tokyo per se, since it is his view which decides what is counted as a part of the city.

Besides where the camera is positioned and towards what, editing is another constitutive component of the view. In one scene, Wenders stands outside of a French restaurant in Ginza and stares at the fake food samples through the window. In this next scene, the camera cuts to the inside of a wax factory, where workers are busy making fake food models. [Figure 4.3 & 4.4] From the surface, Wenders first introduces a simulacrum that disseminates Japanese society, namely the food with only appearance

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[431] Shambhavi Prakash, 'Temporal Structures and Rhythms in Wenders' *Tokyo-Ga* (1985) and Ottinger's *The Korean Wedding Chest* (2009)', in *East Asian-German Cinema: The Transnational Screen, 1919 to the Present*, ed. by Joanne Miyang Cho (New York: Routledge, 2022), p. 244.

and no essence, and then explores how the simulacra are produced in a materialist way. Nevertheless, by juxtaposing the two scenes via editing, Wenders constructs an oversimplified association with the production and consumption of simulacra without touching upon the most crucial part of the circulation of these artificial objects. In this way, the editing renders the food model a material symbol rather than the material per se. Considering how Wenders arranges the order of the scenes by presenting the spectacles to first preoccupy the narrative, the materiality is always already foreshadowed by symbols and signs. Thus, the editing further emphasises Tokyo from a symbolic perspective rather than a materialist one—which happens to be the very element *Tokyo-Ga* sets out to criticise.

Figure 4.3: Fake food in a restaurant showcase. Still from Wenders, *Tokyo-Ga* (45:19).

Figure 4.4: Fake food being made in a wax factory.
Still from Wenders, *Tokyo-Ga* (50:20).

To reveal how Tokyo as a simulacrum is fabricated by filmmaking techniques in *Tokyo-Ga*, I do not suggest Wenders has weaved an illusion out of nowhere. In contrast, it becomes crucial to not take the film's representation at face value and accepting its view on Tokyo, but to ask what are the discursive and material factors which enable and stimulate such depictions. On the discursive level, one apparent socio-political factor

was Wenders' anxiety towards the dissemination of American universalism through popular culture. In one scene, Wenders visits the newly opened Tokyo Disneyland[432]— the site serves as a symbol of reality being totally subsumed by a capitalist imaginary in Baudrillardian theory.[433] Frustrated by the overarching hyperreality, Wenders turns his car away when reaching the outskirts of the amusement park. Nevertheless, in the next scene, Wenders shows a group of young Japanese *yankees* in Yoyogi Park who dress up in denim jackets and jeans while dancing to American pop songs. Through juxtaposing the two scenes, Wenders seems to imply that most of Japanese society has been assimilated into the simulacra of an Americanised popular culture. As we have already seen in the first two main chapters, Wenders' political position here is analogous to the common criticism towards capitalism and cultural consumption in a time when globalisation was often conceived as Americanisation. In other words, even though *Tokyo-Ga* indeed fabricates a biased urban representation of Tokyo, it also conveys a pervasively existing discourse regarding Tokyo as a global city in the 1980s.

Instead of repeating what has already been discussed in the previous chapters, the material aspects of Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga* should be further investigated here. There have been some discussions in existing scholarship which takes a materialist approach to *Tokyo-Ga*. Considering Wenders as a person who travels frequently, Simone Malaguti takes a transcultural studies approach and examines how travel to different places had indeed affected Wenders' way of perceiving and producing the world.[434] By

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[432] The Tokyo Disneyland was opened on April 15th, 1983, coincidentally the same period to Wenders' visit.
[433] Baudrillard, 'Simulacra and Simulations', pp. 171-172.
[434] Simone Malaguti, 'Multitrack and Transcultural Narratives in Wim Wenders's Works', in *Wim Wenders: Making Films That Matter*, eds. by Oliver Delers and Martin Sulzer-Reichel (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), p. 122.

specifically analysing *Tokyo-Ga*, Shambhavi Prakash studies the rhythm and speed of

urban images in the film and acutely points out the film's correlation to the accelerating

media environment of the city in the 1980s.[435] Both Malaguti and Prakash involve a

materialist aspect in their analysis: for Malaguti, the materiality of travelling and its

affect to the filmmaker is highlighted; for Prakash, an examination of the material

condition of Tokyo's media infrastructure becomes necessary. Nevertheless, Malaguti's

research retains a focus on the auteur himself rather than the city, while Prakash's

analysis prioritises the temporal analysis and eventually reinforces the socio-political

criticism of simulacra. Thus, the potential of urban space has been largely neglected by

both studies. How can we rethink the images of Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga* beyond

representation? My approach will first look at the material conditions for Wenders'

encounter with different sites of the city, then highlight the other ways of understanding

the urban images besides the auteur's interpretation. As Doreen Massey suggests,

because the city is multivocal and continues to emerge through each and every

interaction,[436] it becomes crucial to tease out the multiple realities that exist coevally

within *Tokyo-Ga*.

Wenders' Trip to Tokyo and Institutionalised Mobility

   Cinema was a mobility system which allowed Wenders to travel to Tokyo in 1983.

Although Japan's promotion of its tourism industry has a long and complex history, in

the particular context of the 1980s, the strong yen led by the rapid economic growth of

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[435] Prakash, 'Temporal Structures and Rhythms in Wenders' *Tokyo-Ga* (1985) and Ottinger's *The Korean Wedding Chest* (2009)', pp. 239–261.
[436] Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2005), p.71.

the country had largely stifled the inbound tourism of Tokyo.[437] If Wenders, alongside

his fellow German filmmakers Werner Herzog and Helma Sanders-Brahms, had not

been invited by the 1st German Film Festival: Deutscher Film in Japan '83, *Tokyo-Ga*

would never have been made into the same film that we see today. In Chapter Two, I

discussed how international film festivals emerged in the early 1980s as a way to

promote Tokyo's cultural status for government officials. Although Wenders had

already visited Tokyo in 1977 through another film event called 'West Germany New

Films Festival' (Nishi doitsu shinsaku eigasai),[438] as the word '1st' in the event's title

suggests, it marked the intention of the organisers to start a sustaining and sustainable

exchange programme between Japan and Germany (which both here and in all instances

below refers to the Federal Republic of Germany or West Germany) via cinema.

Held between April 9th to 22nd in Tokyo and May 14th to 27th in Osaka, the 1st

German Film Festival was organised by the German Film Export Union (*doitsu eiga*

yushutsu kyōkai), German Federal Film Board (*Filmförderungsanstalt*), and Daiei

International Film Company.[439] Besides film screenings, which have been explained in

Chapter Two, additional programmes like symposia and after-screening talks were

exclusively held in the global city of Tokyo.[440] Wenders' schedule for the event

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[437] Carolin Funck and Malcolm Cooper, *Japanese Tourism: Spaces, Places and Structures* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), p. 167.

[438] Besides film screenings, Wenders also attended a symposium with fellow German filmmakers Herbert Achternbusch and Werner Herzog, Japanese filmmakers Hasegawa Kazuhiko, Matsumoto Toshio, Terayama Shūji, and film critic Kawarabata Yasushi in Shinbashi's Yakult Hall.

[439] *Deutshcher Film in Japan '83* (Dai 1 kai Doitsu eigasai jikkō iinkai, 1983).

[440] Alongside the three film directors who had travelled from Germany, Daiei invited Japan's most famous German studies scholar Iwabuchi Tatsuji and most prolific film subtitle translator Okaeda Shinji to contribute articles to the event's pamphlet. At the same time, cultural celebrities like Terayama Shūji, Ishido Toshirō, and Ebisawa Bin were invited to the after talks of the film screenings.

included the opening party on the 8th, a talk session for his film *Der Stand der Dinge*/*The State of Things* (1982) on April 9th in Shibuya's Tokyu Meigaza theatre, and the symposia held respectively on April the 6th in Tokyu Meigaza theatre and on the 9th in Akasaka's Goethe-Institut.[441] Although serving the major occasion of Wenders' visit, the film event has rarely been mentioned.[442] Wenders himself also disregards the event as relevant to the making of *Tokyo-Ga*.[443] Indeed, as mentioned by film critic Watanabe Minoru in the magazine *Kinema Junpō*, Wenders was upset when he was suddenly called onto the stage in one of the symposia to share his career and filmmaking experiences with the audience,[444] which may allude to Wenders' indifference and even distaste for such events. Nevertheless, since the event was the reason that brought Wenders to Tokyo and provided a two-week long window for him to make *Tokyo-Ga*, it is crucial to scrutinise the event and its discursive influences on Wenders' trip. More specifically, the 1st German Film Festival should be seen as not only having initiated and partly regulated where and how the filmmaker saw Tokyo, but also how it imposed a political vision which interacted with Wenders' subjective interpretation.

The 1st German Film Festival was an official international cultural exchange programme since many of the agents involved were state-level cultural institutions and

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[441] Watanabe Minoru, 'Shinpojiumu rupo: 60 nendai kara 80 nendai made no Doitsu eiga no genchō', *Kinema junpō*, 861, 1983, p. 105.

[442] There are scholars like Alter who briefly mention this event in her book under a very vague description of" Japanese-German Film Week", but no one has explored the details of the event. See Alter, 'Global Politics, Cinematographic Space', p. 107.

[443] In a recent talk event in Lisbon, Wenders claimed that it was due to the postponing of the post-production of *Paris, Texas* that he suddenly decided to go to Tokyo and shoot a film about Ozu. See LEFFEST'19 Tokyo Ga - Masterclass com Wim Wenders, 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3RlIGIhUoX4>. Accessed on April 7th, 2022.

[444] Watanabe, 'Shinpojiumu rupo', p. 106.

diplomatic organs. On the German side, besides its Film Export Union and Federal Film Board, the German Embassy in Japan, the Goethe-Institut, and the German Tourism Promotion Committee in Japan were all involved. On the Japanese side, although the private film company Daiei acted as the representative, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs backed the event alongside commercial partners like Tokyu (who mainly provided film venues) and Asahi—a common private-public nexus that has been analysed in Chapter Two. As one may easily expect, each party held its own agenda in exploiting the economic and political values of an international cultural exchange programme. For the Germans, film export trade was the major concern behind the film event. Reading the film festival's pamphlet, one can easily recognise the German exporter's frank acknowledgment of 'the importance and value of the Japanese film market to the German film industry.'[445] Cinema as a cultural product was juxtaposed with other export goods that were packaged as part of German culture. On the last pages of the pamphlet, for example, we see how the German beer brand Löwenbräu was introduced to the Japanese consumers through Asahi as the local agent, alongside an advertisement from the German wine company Pieroth Wein's subsidiary corporation Pieroth Japan. [Figure 4.6] Export products are thereby being culturalised as a way of consuming German culture, especially since the section before the advertisements contributed to a propagandist piece called 'Beautiful Germany' (*utsukushiki doitsu*) that introduces the population, geography, cultural events, history, and even currency of Germany.[446] [Figure 4.5] The German Tourism Promotion Committee and Lufthansa's

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[445] Ibid.
[446] *Deutshcher Film in Japan ʼ83*, pp. 60-65.

involvement makes the 1st German Film Festival more than a local event, as the 'beautiful Germany' article clearly aims to attract international travellers to Germany. If *kokusaika* is often highlighted as a national policy of the Nakasone government, the 1st German Film Festival suggests the shared interests of German officials with the consumption power of Japanese consumers. In other words, the Japanese government's encouragement of international tourism 'to announce to the rest of the world that Japan had become a normal advanced industrialised country' colluded perfectly with the capitalists' greed for a strong Japanese yen.[447] In this sense, the 1st German Film Festival can be seen as a typical film event under the auspices of economic globalisation.

Figure 4.5: the 'Beautiful Germany' campaign.
From *Deutshcher Film in Japan '83* (Dai 1 kai Doitsu eigasai jikkō iinkai, 1983), p. 60

Figure 4.6: advertisement of Tokuma's media-mix business
From *Deutshcher Film in Japan '83* (Dai 1 kai Doitsu eigasai jikkō iinkai, 1983), pp. 66-67

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[447] Funck and Cooper, *Japanese Tourism*, p. 143.

Besides the international scale of the 1st German Film Festival, there was also a

local Japanese media network embedded in the organisation of this event. In 1974,

Tokuma Yasuyoshi, the head of a major publisher Tokuma Shoten, more famously

known as the early sponsor and first chairman of Studio Ghibli, took over the

bankrupted Daiei Film Studio. Tokuma ambitiously restructured the company to fit the

general tendency of Japanese cinema's post-studio mediatisation. According to

Alexander Zahlten, Tokuma adopted the media-mix strategy which 'mined the same

synergies as Kadokawa between film production, video production and distribution,

print media, and music.'[448] Although the 1st German Film Festival was mostly a film

event, Tokuma also exploited the chance of hosting the event to promote his own

media-mix business. On the same pamphlet pages as the German beer advertisements,

Tokuma promoted the media 'crossover' business of his Animage brand, something

which covered cinema, magazines, books, comics, records, tapes, and fancy goods in

the brand's strategy.[449] [450] [Figure 4.6]

In an interview with the film journalist Saitō Morihiko, Tokuma Yasuyoshi

emphasises the particularity of his media-mix strategy—which he carefully

differentiates as the Tokuma-*ryū* or 'Tokuma-school' in English. If media-mix indicates

'a package of print media, film, and music marketed by a single company to the widest

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[448] Alexander Zahlten, *The End of Japanese Cinema: Industrial Genres, National Times, and Media Ecologies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), Kindle Location: 2959-2960.
[449] Although a typical media-mix strategy, media 'crossover' was specifically used in Tokuma's ad here. See *Deutshcher Film in Japan '83*, p. 66.
[450] Originally founded as Tokuma Shoten's anime-specialised magazine in 1978, Animage was developed into a media-mix brand in the 1980s and played a huge role in the establishment of Tokuma's media-mix campaign. For instance, Animage is most famously known for its leading role in the production of Miyazaki Hayao's animation film *Kaze no tani no Naushika/Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind* (1984), for which the manga version was also serialised on the *Animage* magazine. See Ogata Hideo, *Ano hata o ute* (Tokyo: Oakla Publishing, 2004), pp. 168-197.

possible audience, with each product advertising the others,'[451] one ought to also pay

attention to the various cultural and political trajectories behind the seemingly common

business model. For Kadokawa, its media-mix was deeply interwoven with Japan's

interrelations with 'the West' and specifically the United States. As Zahlten suggests,

the company's vision of global business was essentially associated with the 'modern

and affluent future' that it promised.[452] In the case of Tokuma's Daiei, however, its

media-mix strategy fundamentally correlated to a national past, namely the media

experience of defeat in the World War II. Working as a social journalist for the *Yomiuri*

Shimbun during the war, Tokuma realised at a young age that the proliferation of

media—print, audio, and visual—had complex interconnections.[453] During the moment

of Japan's defeat, Tokuma acutely sensed the media-mix machine being fully mobilised

by the state in creating the grand narrative of a national and historical event.[454]

Witnessing how media had fabricated the Japanese nation's historical transition,

Tokuma sought to reshape the grand narrative to regain Japan's international status in

the post-war. Tokuma succeeded in his ambitions largely from Nagata Masaichi, the

charismatic former chairman of Daiei who not only brought Kurosawa Akira,

Mizoguchi Kenji, and Kinugasa Teinosuke to the European film festival circuit and

Academy Awards, but also led the cultural Cold War in Asia through projects like the

Federation of Motion Picture Producers in Asia (FPA) and the Asian Film Festival

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[451] Zahlten, *The End of Japanese Cinema*, Kindle Location: 2183-2184.
[452] Ibid., Kindle Location: 2838.
[453] '20 shūnen o mukaeta taikun-Tokuma Yasuyoshi Daiei shachō intabyū', *Kinema junpō*, 1102, 1993, pp. 111-112.
[454] Ibid.

(AFF).[455] Like Nagata, who initiated a regional 'free world' alliance for gaining the

nation's international reputation and momentum, Tokuma's media practices in the

1980s should also be positioned on the extension line of Japan's wartime ambition and

post-war rehabilitation. As Tokuma constantly mentions his admiration of Nagata and

even invited the retired Nagata to produce New Daiei's first film *Kimi yo fundo no kawa*

o watare/*You Must Cross the River of Wrath* (Satō Junya, 1976), he also speaks for how

cinema can be a convenient tool for leveraging Japan's influence and power within the

ever-changing realm of international politics.[456] In this way, the 1st German Film

Festival can be seen as part of Daiei's media-mix strategy in the 1980s with a

geopolitical ambition transmuted since the war. From this perspective, the local media

network in Japan was also globally articulated, which explains why Tokuma's Daiei

shared a similar interest with Kadokawa in expanding its international influence through

transnationally coproduced large-scale film projects in the 1980s and 90s.[457]

Another Japanese actor worth mentioning is Tokyu Recreation, the company which

kicked off the mini-theatre boom in Tokyo. Tokyu provided its Shibuya Tokyu

Meigaza, which was located inside the landmark building of Shibuya Tokyu Bunka

Kaikan, to the 1st German Film Festival which indicates the general transformation of

film businesses outside of the conventional studio system in Japan's post-studio

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[455] Sangjoon Lee, 'The Asia Foundation's Motion-Picture Project and the Cultural Cold War in Asia', *Film History: An International Journal*, 29.2 (2017), pp. 108–37.

[456] '20 shūnen o mukaeta taikun-Tokuma Yasuyoshi Daiei shachō intabyū', p. 115.

[457] Like Kadokawa, Tokuma was also known for his passion for mega-scale international coproduction projects, which was benefitted from the economic prosperity of the era. Nevertheless, unlike Kadokawa Haruki's addiction to Hollywood, Tokuma mainly turned to its Eastern Asian neighbours like China and South Korea for collaborations. Especially after the release of the first Japan-PRC coproduced blockbuster *Mikan no taikyoku*/*The Go Masters* (Satō Junya/Duan Jishun) in 1982, Daiei started to actively purchase and distribute Chinese and Korean films in the domestic market of Japan.

environment. In comparison with Daiei, Tokyu's role was more straightforwardly relevant to the city per se. To host an international cultural exchange event like the 1st German Film Festival in Shibuya, the city undertook the task of manifesting the nation's unique economic and cultural advancement to the global community in a time when international travel was rather limited. For all the guests, including Wenders, Shibuya was the specific part of the city they were invited to visit. Nevertheless, instead of being a neutral encounter, Shibuya was largely cultivated and utilised by the government officials and commercial corporations for the sake of what the geographer Brenda Yeoh called 'cultural imagineering.'[458] Although different from the carefully planned mega-projects in the late 1990s and 21st century that Yeoh observed, Shibuya carried a similar national narrative to articulate contemporary Japan.[459] Furthermore, Shibuya became the site where 'networks between policy-makers and mobile urban elites and professionals' are made[460]—in the case of *Tokyo-Ga*, the actors were cultural diplomats from both Japan and Germany, corporation leaders involved in film businesses, and renowned German and Japanese filmmakers.

Scrutinising the official and commercial actors behind the 1st German Film Festival, reveals how Wenders' trip was never neutral and freewheeling but shrouded by various kinds of economic and political intentions and visions. The Germany's economic plans, the international ambition of Daiei's media business, and the culturally imagineered landscape of Shibuya collectively constituted the milieu of a global city for Wenders' visit. The case of the 1st German Film Festival exemplifies a condition of

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[458] Brenda S. A. Yeoh, 'The Global Cultural City? Spatial Imagineering and Politics in the (Multi)Cultural Marketplaces of South-East Asia', *Urban Studies*, 42.5/6 (2005), pp. 946-958.
[459] Ibid., pp.950-951.
[460] Ibid., p.947.

what I call 'institutionalised mobility.' This concept aims to emphasise that in official

trips, travellers are simultaneously regulated and mobilised by various institutionalised

actors and factors. Firstly, institutionalised mobility suggests the actors from institutions

have various degrees of physical interventions in the traveller's trip—including places

of living and visiting, routes of travel, people to meet, and the overall schedule.

Secondly, institutionalised mobility circumscribes a material basis of the traveller's

imagination. In Wenders' case, this should also be considered a constitutive cultural

imaginary that affected *Tokyo-Ga*'s cinematic representation, which imposed how the

filmmaker encountered and perceived the city. By introducing the idea of

institutionalised mobility, my purpose is not to suggest that the institutions are all-

encompassing and omnipotent. In the particular case of *Tokyo-Ga*, the various

institutions behind the 1st German Film Festival certainly had no direct involvement in

the film's production. Nevertheless, thinking through the concept of institutionalised

mobility enables us to imagine and understand seemingly subjective and private works

as a collective and networked product. In other words, the eventual representation of

Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga* can be regarded as a consequence of the negotiation between the

filmmaker and the various human and non-human actors via, instead of by,

institutionalised mobility. Thus, the concept helps to highlight the power dynamics

between various actors regarding the cultural and socio-political implications of the city

rather than suggesting a dominant position of either party. Especially considering how

Wenders' subjectivity is often emphasised in the study of the diary and essay film of

Tokyo-Ga, I suggest the notion of institutionalised mobility to be extremely useful in

complicating our analysis and seeing other actors' subtle impacts on the film's urban representation.

Ginza, Yurakucho and Hibiya: Infrastructural Placement, Urban Deregulation and Material Reality

To study the correlations between the production of urban images in *Tokyo-Ga* and the institutionalised mobility which affected Wenders' trip, it is necessary to firstly investigate the urban sites represented in the film from a geographical and cartographical perspective. Since every film 'bears an implicit relation with cartography,'[461] the locations that Wenders visited and later included in the film are worth examining to unveil the complicated negotiations between the filmmaker and the various forces that moved him around the city. I am fully aware that cinematic space should not be reduced to discrete locations, especially considering that temporal structure and experiences are usually elided from two-dimensional maps. Nevertheless, by highlighting the sites which appear in the film, this section aims to visualise the locations which are more noticeable than the others in *Tokyo-Ga,* with the temporality of the spaces carefully unpacked in later sections. [Figure 4.7]

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[461] Tom Conley, *Cartographic Cinema* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 1.

Figure 4.7: Sites within Tokyo which appear in *Tokyo-Ga*.

The map presented here visualises the locations within Tokyo where Wenders

filmed *Tokyo-Ga*. Despite certain indoor scenes like the pachinko parlour and the wax

factory which have unclear locations, most of *Tokyo-Ga*'s scenes are in Tokyo's

recognisable urban districts like Ginza, Yurakucho, Hibiya, Shibuya, and Shinjuku.

While some indoor sites like the golf course near Korakuen and the department store in

Ikebukuro are rather spread out on the map (in purple colour), the outdoor scenes are

concentrated in the Shibuya and the Ginza regions (in pink colour). If the indoor scenes

were rather carefully selected and staged by the filmmaker to fulfil Wenders' needs of

seeking spectacle, for a work that was shot in a two-week time span with rather limited

recording resources,[462] the outdoor shots may imply the places which give the

filmmaker a more general impression about Tokyo.

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[462] Wenders talks about how he and his cameraman had to carefully choose where and what to
shoot in Tokyo since the celluloid film they had was limited during their visit. See LEFFEST'19
Tokyo Ga - Masterclass com Wim Wenders, 2019
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3RlIGIhUoX4>.

More than coincidentally, the prominent presence of Shibuya and Ginza in *Tokyo-Ga* is related to the spatial regulation of institutionalised mobility. While Shibuya was the place where the 1st German Film Festival was held, a cluster of empty shots around the Ginza, Yurakucho, and Hibiya area reveals the historically established urban infrastructure of Tokyo in hosting guests from foreign countries. For instance, the French Renaissance styled architecture Rokumeikan, commissioned by Japanese Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru and designed by British architect Josiah Conder in the late 19th century, was built in Hibiya to 'entertain and impress foreign diplomats and guests' for the Japanese officials to negotiate economic and political deals with Western colonial powers.[463] Around the same time, the Imperial Hotel was also built in the same district to host foreign guests. According to Fujita Kuniko, these 'Western influenced buildings' manifested the association between state power and the landscape of Tokyo.[464] Lying in the heart of Tokyo, the Imperial Palace, Ginza, Yurakucho, and Hibiya had served as Tokyo's 'commercial districts and traditional cultural centres' since modernisation.[465] Even when economic and cultural powers later spread to subcentres like Shibuya, 'the heart of Tokyo … [had] no rivalry in the high concentration of political, cultural, and economic powers.'[466] Following Fujita's approach, we might see Wenders and other German guests' visit as a typical manifestation of how state power enacted over international cultural exchange programmes through Tokyo's urban space. Nevertheless, regarding the representation of

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[463] Kuniko Fujita, 'The Landscape of Tokyo Power', *International Journal of Urban Sciences*, 19.1 (2015), 82–92. p. 86.
[464] Ibid.
[465] Ibid., p.85.
[466] Ibid., pp.85-86.

these areas in *Tokyo-Ga*, the situation might, in fact, be more nuanced. On one hand, it

suggests how institutionalised mobility was tightly attached to the existing geographical

hierarchy of the city. It is fair to speculate that the Ginza-Yurakucho-Hibiya area was

where Wenders and other German guests were hosted by the event organisers during

their trip and, in this way, his impression about Tokyo was directed by a historically

persisting force which intended to articulate Japan's economic and cultural superiority

over the city's geography and urban infrastructure. However, since the empty shots of

Ginza, Yurakucho, and Hibiya are mostly depicted as strange, cold, and distant in

Tokyo-Ga, this implies that the same forces which planned to impress foreign guests

might also be perceived critically against themselves.

While the empty shots of the Ginza, Yurakucho, and Hibiya can be seen as

examples of how foreign guests are 'placed' in certain areas by institutions according to

the historically established urban infrastructure of the city, cinema further contains the

power to orient the spectator towards the city's material reality and evade the intention

of human actors. For instance, in the first landscape shot of *Tokyo-Ga*, we see a

panoramic view of the bullet train cutting through the urban landscape of tall buildings

and broad traffic lanes of the Yurakucho station area. It is worth noting that in the

middle-left part of the frame, we can clearly observe a high-rise building under

construction. Since this scene is positioned right after a low-angle empty shot showing

the bullet train passing through the platform of the airport,[467] the shot creates a

narrative sequence which suggests a foreign newcomer's initial encounter with the city

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[467] The bullet train Wenders shot, the Shinkansen Type 0, stopped neither at the Narita Airport
(where most of the international flights arrived) nor Yurakucho, so we know it was a fictional
sequence carefully constituted by the filmmaker in post-production.

of Tokyo. Within the diegetic structure, this scene suggests that Tokyo is

technologically advanced but at the same time distant to the protagonist (which is

articulated by the 'unhuman' scope of the panoramic shot) and can therefore be seen in

terms of the negotiation between state power and the auteur's agency. Nevertheless,

outside of the diegetic order, the scene also presents an object-oriented reality that was

not fully actualised during the moment of shooting. More specifically, the scene

captures the construction of the Yurakucho Mullion Building which would become the

area's new landmark. [Figure 4.8] Accidentally recorded by Wenders' camera, the scene

marks a transitional moment for both Tokyo and its cinema's 'global' turn in the

1980s—but its meanings and implications can only be realised retrospectively.

Figure 4.8: Yurakucho Panorama.
Still from Wenders, *Tokyo-Ga* (07:52).

The scene additionally captures the material reality of the Yurakucho area's

'deregulation' process during the 1980s. According to André Sorensen, deregulation

was an economic agenda pushed together by the neoliberal Nakasone state government,

the conservative Suzuki municipal administration, and ambitious real estate companies

to redevelop Tokyo's central streets, like Ginza, by increasing 'the ratio of building

volume to lot size, [rezoning] residential zones to commercial, and [weakening] various

restrictions on urban fringe land development.'[468] This deregulation showcased how

globalisation impacted the urban changes of Tokyo, since its key rationale 'was to

enhance Japan's international economic competitiveness' and cast Tokyo's international

status in an increasingly globalising world.[469]

While 'deregulation' is a discourse coined by urban scholars to articulate the

historical happenings during globalisation and make sense of its various economic,

political, and social outcomes, it is cinema which directly captures the material reality

of the 'deregulation' process. Furthermore, the same cinematic materiality can engender

other meanings to the reality, including a cultural one that has been largely overlooked

by the urban scholars. As a gateway to the Ginza area, Yurakucho is also known as the

'street of cinema' where movie theatres and headquarters of large film companies

including Toho and Nikkatsu congregated. Spatially speaking, before the building of the

new Yurakucho Mullion Building, the same location was occupied by Nihon Gekijō and

the former Asahi Shimbun headquarters.[470] Literally the 'Theatre of Japan', the Nihon

Gekijō or Nichigeki established in 1933 and later fully owned and managed by Toho,

was a symbol of Yurakucho's privileged cultural status and a mark of the prime of

Japanese cinema under the studio system. As the construction of the Yurakucho Mullion

Building, as a replacement of the Nichigeki, is captured by *Tokyo-Ga*, the film thus

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[468] Sorensen, André, 'Building World City Tokyo: Globalization and Conflict over Urban Space', *The Annals of Regional Science*, 37 (2003), p. 526.
[469] Ibid., pp.525-526.
[470] Takeiri Eijirō, 'Umarekawaru Yūrakuchō, Hibiya eigagai', *Kinema junpō*, 893, 1984, p. 76.

presents the material reality of how Yurakucho underwent urban changes to retain its predominant position as a hub for Japanese film culture and capital.

Departing from the specialised venue for film screenings and theatre and musical performances of the Nichigeki, the Mullion Building assimilated cinemas as a part of its 'commercial complex' (*fukugō shōgyō shisetsu*) thereby providing a new and sustainable model for film culture. Moreover, in order to 'succeed' in terms of Yurakucho film culture, the Mullion Building intentionally integrated three movie theatres and one multi-purpose hall into the same building—[471] including the Toho Cinemas Nichigeki owned by Toho, the Marunouchi Piccadilly owned by Shochiku, the Marunouchi Louvre owned by Tokyu, and the Asahi Hall owned by the Asahi Shimbun. Although it was not unusual for theatres owned by different film studios to be set near each other before the 1980s, the integration of theatres owned by rivals into the same architecture and even the same floor was ground-breaking. The mesh of conventional film companies like Toho and Shochiku, corporations new to the film business like Tokyu, and the media outreach of Asahi Shimbun further implied a new network of film business was forming. This new spatial composition also stimulated changes in distribution and exhibition methods as the companies competed for audiences.[472] Shochiku and Toho competitively introduced the most cutting-edge visual and sound technologies into their theatres, with the latter even automating its ticket system entirely.[473] The attempts to differentiate themselves from their competitors, as already mentioned in Chapter Three, should be seen as partly driven by the new spatiality of

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[471] Ibid.
[472] Ibid., pp.76-77.
[473] Ibid., p.77.

cinema in the city. In *Tokyo-Ga*, with the skeletons of the Mullion Building under construction, these structural changes are presented in a simultaneously material and virtual manner.

The Yurakucho scene in *Tokyo-Ga* captures the material reality of Tokyo's transition into a global city, both in terms of the city centre areas' deregulation process and the structural changes of Japanese cinema in adapting to this new reality. It was foremost the institutionalised mobility which physically placed the filmmakers into certain areas of the city. Moreover, institutionalised mobility acted as a force that regulated Wenders' routes of travelling and constituted his bodily experience and perception of the city. Nevertheless, the institutional forces were also largely circumscribed by existing urban infrastructure. When the filmmaker casually pointed his camera at the space where he was placed, the reality unfolded itself despite the intentions of human actors. In this way, the Yurakucho scene serves as an extreme example in which the filmmaker was largely unaware of the reality he was capturing and presenting—since the reality had only just started to emerge.

Reviving Tokyo in the Cultural Landscape of Kamakura

If the Yurakucho scene indicates a material reality of the global city's future that was only just being actualised, then the Kamakura scenes in *Tokyo-Ga* are more about how human actors' negotiate with the global city's virtual past(s) in a complex ensemble of images, materials, and discourses. It is widely recognised that although the film is titled after a city, *Tokyo-Ga* is intrinsically a film about the past. The film begins with a direct quote from the opening scene of Ozu Yasujiro's *Tokyo Story*: the old

couple Shūkichi and Tomi are packing up their luggage and ready to depart from Onomichi City in Hiroshima to Tokyo. The next scene is the interior of an airplane, a POV shot of Wenders who is as well on his trip to Tokyo. The juxtaposition of the two departures creates an analogy: as the old couple is looking for a reunion with their children who work in Tokyo, the filmmaker wants to return to an imaginary city that once appeared in Ozu's film—or at least to see if there is 'anything left unchanged'. What they share is the same expectation of recovering something in their memory, whether it be from imaginary or real experience, before the trip even starts. A pre-existing expectation does not necessarily make the trip temporal and it is only in discontinuity—in other words, failing to recover—that the past and present are divided, and time becomes visible. Tokyo symbolises the same unpleasant present time in *Tokyo Story* and *Tokyo-Ga*. For the former, Tokyo marks a space where traditional familial ties are dissolving, especially evident in how the old couple receives an indifferent welcome from their busy children.[474] For the latter, not only is there rarely anything Ozu-esque left in Tokyo, but there is also now the threatening milieu of capitalist and consumerist reality.

In comparison with Tokyo, Kamakura becomes an interesting site to further scrutinise the imagination of space-time in *Tokyo-Ga*. It is telling when a film titled 'Tokyo' takes the camera outside of its geographical territory—Kamakura must have contained something important enough to justify Wenders making the detour. If we look at the film's narrative, it is not hard to argue that Kamakura fulfilled Wenders' need to

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[474] Keiko McDonald, 'Ozu's Tokyo Story: Simple Means for Complex Ends', *The Journal of the Association of Teachers of Japanese*, 17.1 (1982), p. 20.

recover Ozu's Tokyo in a belated and dislocated manner. Through talking to Ozu's beloved actor Ryū Chishū and listening to him emotionally recall the good old days of working with the master, the narrative voice of Wenders expresses satisfaction in making the trip and finally finding some connection to Ozu. In a later scene, the two visit Ozu's grave together where Wenders chews the cud as he peers at the kanji '*mu*' (nothingness) on Ozu's tombstone. Serving as the site where these scenes were shot, Kamakura is the location that conveys the image that Wenders was initially looking for. From a geographical perspective, the distance between the city of Tokyo and Kamakura also visualises the temporal gap between the Tokyo Wenders was visiting and the Tokyo that Wenders would like to return to—distance, in this very specific scenario, marks an anachronistic otherness.

The Kamakura sequence begins with Ryū's interview, with scenes constituted mostly by medium shots of his talking head coupled with some empty shots. These empty shots are composed of 1) a long shot of a traditional Japanese style house (where they conducted the interview) lying peacefully in the nature and surrounded by cherry blossoms and other trees; 2) close-ups and medium shots of rain dropping down the eaves of the house from different angles; 3) a medium shot of the outside view when one looks from the house—again, cherry blossoms and other trees. [Figure 4.9] In comparison with the fast-paced Tokyo city scenes, the tempo of this part is much slower with its use of long, still shots. This delivers a sense of the 'real' in terms of its depiction of nature, human expressions, and intersubjective intimacy (between Ryū and Ozu and also between Wenders and Ryū/Ozu through Wenders' voiceover) especially when the sequence is preceded by two of the kaleidoscopic television screen scenes.

The montage thus creates a double comparison between artifact (television) vs. nature and fast vs. slow, which alludes to a dichotomy between present-day Tokyo vs. past Kamakura. The distinctive rhythm of the Kamakura sequence has led Shambhavi Prakash, borrowing the term from Hartmut Rosa, to call it an '"oases of deceleration" as places or social niches that seem "anachronistic in comparison with the surrounding temporally dynamic social systems."'[475] Kamakura, in this sense, does serve as the oasis for Wenders to recover a past of slowness and ordinariness that he initially sought from his trip.

Figure 4.9: outlook of the Kawakita villa in Kamakura in *Tokyo-Ga.*
Still from Wenders, *Tokyo-Ga* (21:59).

Such dichotomy was nevertheless artificial. The Japanese film critic Satō Tadao acutely points out that what Wenders was seeking was, 'a quiet, clean, geometrically

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[475] Prakash, 'Temporal Structures and Rhythms in Wenders' *Tokyo-Ga* (1985) and Ottinger's *The Korean Wedding Chest* (2009)', p. 249.

well-managed Tokyo,' which was no more than a stereotype since Ozu's depiction of the post-war Tokyo itself was, as usually commented by the Japanese critics of the time as, 'inconceivable.'[476] For Satō, post-war Tokyo would have been more similar to the city in Kurosawa Akira's *Stray Dog* (1949), already full of noise, turmoil, disorder, black markets, and a populist energy.[477] While Satō might have made the same mistake in trying to reduce the space of Tokyo into a rather fixed representation—I do not necessarily agree with the comparison of whether Kurosawa or Ozu's Tokyo is more 'authentic'—he is definitely correct in pointing out the lack of understanding about Tokyo's urban historical context and the Orientalist tendency within Wenders' imagination and depictions. By contrasting Kamakura with Tokyo, *Tokyo-Ga* risks rendering both cities enclosed in an ideal and fixed representation. In this way, *Tokyo-Ga*'s Tokyo-Kamakura dichotomy demonstrates Doreen Massey's critique of the Western philosophical tradition which tends to represent space as a unitary and discrete entity, something previously explained in the Literature Review.[478]

(1) The Kawakita Villa

Although the representation of Kamakura in *Tokyo-Ga* is highly nostalgic and even Orientalist, we should not simply accuse the filmmaker of intentionally constituting such an image. It is crucial to highlight that although not specified within the film, Wenders' interview with Ryū was conducted in the Kawakita Villa. Since Wenders' does not pay any special tributes to the owner of the villa Kawakita Kashiko in the

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[476] Satō Tadao, 'Wim Wender, "Tokyo-Ga"', *Eizōgaku*, 37 (1988), p. 112.
[477] Ibid., p.113.
[478] Massey, *For Space*, pp. 20-30.

closing credits, we do not know the specific arrangement of the set. We can fairly

speculate that it was either the coordinators from the Shochiku company (whom

Wenders contacted to interview Ryū and Atsuda) or Madame Kawakita herself (it is

well-known that the Kawakitas liked to use the villa to host foreign filmmakers) who

invited Wenders to shoot in the villa.[479] Nevertheless, prioritising the encounter

between Wenders and the villa provides us an anchor to further investigate how the final

representation of Kamakura in *Tokyo-Ga* is configured in negotiating the complex

discursive and material ensemble of Kamakura's modern landscape.

The development of Kamakura in Japan's modern history was essentially also a

Tokyo story. Though having already served as a place of historic interest before the

Meiji Restoration, it was only after the development of sea-bathing resorts in the late

1880s that the tiny coastal town located in Tokyo's adjacent Kanagawa Prefecture

gained considerable domestic attention.[480] The major visitors to Kamakura at that time

were tourists from Tokyo, and the reason for such demographic distribution was

because of the appropriate distance between the two locations. The establishment of

railway infrastructure including the construction of the Kamakura Station by the

Japanese National Railway (*kanei tetsudō*) in 1889 and the extension of the Enoshima

Electric Railway (*Enoshima dentetsu*) to Kamakura in the early 1900s had made it

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[479] It is important to mention that Wenders' encounter with Ozu and attachment to Ozu's Tokyo was originally correlated to the Kawakita' cultural lobbying in the Western countries in the post-war—as Abigail Deveney keenly expatiates in her thesis about the post-war promotion and distribution of Ozu in the West. See Abigail Deveney, 'Influential Storytelling at Its Finest: Why the Postwar West Took Notice of Yasujirō Ozu's Tokyo Story', *Japanese Society and Culture*, 3 (2021), Article 2.

[480] Tamai Tatsuya, 'Chiiki imeji no rekishi-teki hensen to anime seichijunrei: Kamakura o chūshin toshite', *CATS Library*, 7. Current Issues in Contents Tourism: Aspects of Tourism in an Information-Based Society (2012), pp. 122-124.

possible for Tokyo residents to do a day trip to Kamakura.[481] In other words, it was

mostly the convenient distance of Kamakura to the modern national centre of Tokyo—

enhanced by the new mode of mobility of the railway—that established the city into one

of the most famous domestic travel destinations in the Kantō region in the late 19th and

early 20th century. It is important to add that around the same period Kamakura had

also earned popularity among foreigners, and the reasons were related to both the Meiji

government's travelling restrictions for foreign residences in Tokyo and the abundant

cultural resources in the area.[482] Meanwhile, Kamakura officials and business owners

were also actively setting travelling courses and providing English guidance to foreign

tourists.[483] In this way, a globalised mobility was already integral to the modernisation

process of Kamakura as early as the late 19th century.

   The distance between Kamakura and Tokyo is crucial in terms of conceiving the

relationship between the two cities. The form of the day trip enabled both an upper-class

elite and middle- and even lower-class workers in Tokyo to temporally leave their jobs

(probably on the weekends) and enjoy a short stay outside of the fast-paced

metropolitan city. While the upper class might enjoy more of the luxurious modern

resorts and hotels in the coastal area, commoners could afford to visit historical sites

like temples and Shinto shrines downtown. In this way, although Kamakura had

developed through the establishment of modern tourist sectors, it still maintained the

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[481] Ōya Yumiko, 'Enoden no kaigyō', in *Shōnan no tanjō* (Fujisawa: Fujisawa-shi kyōiku iinkai, 2005), pp. 70–85.

[482] Kokaze Hidemasa, 'Yokohama kyoryūchi to Enoshima', in *Shōnan no tanjō* (Fujisawa: Fujisawa-shi kyōiku iinkai, 2005), pp. 6-7.

[483] Iikubo Hideki, 'Gaikokujin kankōkyaku to Kamakura/Enoshima', in *Shōnan no tanjō* (Fujisawa: Fujisawa-shi kyōiku iinkai, 2005), pp. 152–75.

image of a pre-modern site in the popular imagination.[484] Moreover, since Kamakura

city was located in another prefecture and it took people in Tokyo some hours to arrive,

it guaranteed a differentiation to the urbanity of Tokyo for the travellers to identify

with—both in terms of discourse (the geographical knowledge shared by society) and

physical experience (bodily and mental perceptions of the individual). If we compare

the nuanced distance between Kamakura and Tokyo to the spatial representation of the

two places in *Tokyo-Ga*, it is fair to argue that the historical constitution of Kamakura as

a satellite resort of Tokyo prefigured the city's unique temporality captured by *Tokyo-Ga*.

Among all the Kamakura travellers, one prominent class were intellectuals,

including writers and artists, largely due to the abundant historical sites and cultural

resources in the region. Between the Taisho era in 1912 and the end of WWII in 1945,

many bought villas in Kamakura and thereby formed a unique and recognisable

demographic famously known as the *Kamakura bunshi.* This comprised important

figures such as Akutagawa Ryūnosuke, Kawabata Yasunari, and Shiga Naoya (a good

friend of Ozu). The formation of the intellectual class in Kamakura was directly

stimulated by the urban problems of Tokyo. Following the rapid development of Tokyo

in the early 20th century, urban problems including overpopulation, shortages of

accommodation and food, and the deterioration of the natural environment began to

emerge.[485] For many urban upper and middle-class citizens of Tokyo, the purchase of a

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[484] Tamai, 'Chiiki imeji no rekishi-teki hensen to anime seichijunrei', p. 124.
[485] Fujiya Yōetsu, 'Ofuna denen toshi o manabu foranmu', in *Maboroshi no denen toshi kara Shochiku eiga toshi e: Taishō/Shōwa no Ofuna-cho no kioku kara*, ed. by Kamakura-shi chuo toshokan kindai shiryō shūshūshitsu (Kamakura: Kamakura-shi Chuo Toshokan Kindai Shiryō Shūshūshitsu, 2005), p. 81.

residence in Kamakura was a viable option. Again, it was mainly due to the convenient transportation between Kamakura and Tokyo—with both the railways and the well-established car lane infrastructure—which allowed residents to easily commute between the two cities.[486] The intelligentsia enjoyed both Kamakura's modern seaside resorts and cultural historical sites, but more importantly, they also helped to discursively consolidate Kamakura's urban image as an artistic locale abundant with nature and abound in its preservation of Japanese tradition.

The Kawakitas bought their Kamakura residence in 1931 consisting of land and a two-story wooden architecture originally constructed by a Buddhist monk.[487] Since the establishment of Kamakura's cultural image in popular discourse, it is fair to assume that the Kawakitas' purchase of their real estate was also influenced by the trends of the time. In 1951, the Kawakitas extended the villa based on the original architecture, which gave the residence a rather outlandish look.[488] In 1961, shortly after the famous Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō's death, the Kawakitas moved his house from Nerima Ward of Tokyo to their Kamakura property.[489] Looking retrospectively at the rise of Kamakura's reputation from the 1910s, we can see that the Kawakitas' activities in their Kamakura property were historically consistent with the cultural image of the region.

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[486] Tamai, 'Chiiki imeji no rekishi-teki hensen to anime seichijunrei', p. 126.
[487] Yoshida Kōichi, *Kamakura kindai kenchiku no rekishi sanpo* (Tokyo: Minatonohito, 2017), p. 73.
[488] Ibid.
[489] *Kamakura-shi keikan jūyō kenchikubutsu-tō shitei chōsa hōkokusho*, ed. by Kamakura-shi toshi keikanka (Kamakura: Kamakura-shi toshi keikanka, 2013), p. 138.

As the Kawakitas often used their Kamakura villa to treat foreign guests, including big names like Alain Delon, Marie Laforêt, and François Truffaut,[490] it is arguable that they were fully aware of the cultural value of their Kamakura property in indulging the foreign others' tastes and expectations about Japanese culture. Moreover, since the Kawakitas would also invite important Japanese actors including the Commissioner for Cultural Affairs and the novelist Kon Hidemi as well as famous actress and filmmaker Tanaka Kinuyo to parties with their foreign guests in the villa,[491] the space was intentionally utilised by the Kawakitas as a place for international social interaction. In other words, the villa should be seen as a place with specific social and cultural functions, which could potentially enhance the connection between high-class and high culture Japanese actors and prominent guests from foreign countries.

Due to the specific conventions of the Kamakura villa for the Kawakitas, we should understand its representation in *Tokyo-Ga* as not simply a self-assertive selection but a decision configured by various factors. While not wishing to arbitrarily accuse the Japanese actors who prepared the interview of intentionally selling a stereotypical Japanese image to the foreign visitor, whether these actors be Shochiku or Madame Kawakita, it is fair to argue that the landscape of the villa as a cinematic stage contributed to the final production of the Orientalist gaze in *Tokyo-Ga*. Not only was the architecture of the villa carefully constructed in a Japanese style but the environment—the garden and the trees—was also arranged with a certain Japanese aesthetic code, timely enhanced by the cherry blossom season when the film was shot. Moreover, it is

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[490] Kamakura City Kawakita Film Museum, 'Kyū kitakawa-tei ni tsuite' <https://kamakura-kawakita.org/about_museum/exkwkhouse/> [accessed 22 February 2023].
[491] Ibid.

also crucial to take the underlying sociohistorical causes which enabled the formation of the Kawakita villa's particular materiality into account when analysing its cinematic representation. Thus, instead of considering the stage as natural and neutral, we ought to think about the constitution of Kamakura's urban image as high-cultural, artistic, and traditional throughout the modern history of its development. As we analysed above, this was a complex modernised process that involved both trans-regional (between Tokyo and Kamakura) and trans-national (from modern transportation to the presence of foreign tourism) practices and imaginaries. To think of the coexistence of various human and nonhuman actors in the constitution of the space in *Tokyo-Ga* unveils the complex power structure embedded within the seemingly mundane cinematic landscape per se. Instead of prioritising either party's agency or agenda, this spatial constitution can be seen as a final product after these negotiations. Through such an approach, the urban space in the Kawakita sequence can be seen as 'the sphere of multiplicity, the product of social relations, and those relations are real material practices, and always ongoing' as Massey suggests, for which the notion of space 'can never be closed, there will always be loose ends, always relations with the beyond, always potential elements of chance.'[492]

(2) Northern Kamakura and Ofuna

Besides the staging of the Kawakita villa, the scene of Wenders visiting Ozu's cemetery reveals slightly more nuanced material and discursive ensembles relevant to the network and historical (trans)formation of Japanese cinema per se. The cemetery

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[492] Massey, *For Space*, p. 95.

that Wenders and Ryū visit is located in the Engaku-ji Temple in the Northern

Kamakura region. Just as the selection of the Kawakita villa must be seen in correlation

to the development of the city's cultural image, so Ozu's burial in this location was not

out of some random decision, but largely due to the historical development of the area

in relation to Japanese cinema.

In 1936, five years after the Kawakitas bought their property near Kamakura station,

the prominent Japanese film studio Shochiku moved their studio to the Ofuna area in

Kamakura city, not too far away from the cemetery where Ozu is buried. Established by

the Shirai brothers in 1895, Shochiku opened their first large film studio in Tokyo's

Kamata district in 1920. Although the studio suffered greatly from the Kantō

Earthquake in 1923 and shortly moved its operation to Kyoto, Shochiku continued to

produce films in Kamata that featured the modern lives of Tokyo's urban petit

bourgeoisie. With the help of these films, Shochiku soon rose to become one of the

most prolific and popular film studios in Japan. Nevertheless, facing the rise of the

Toho studio led by the industrial giant Kobayashi Ichizō and continuous pressure from

the long-term rival Nikkatsu, Shochiku eventually decided to move their studio to

another location in order to improve the efficiency and quality of film production.[493]

One of the most vital reasons for Shochiku's relocation was the emergence of sound

films, or talkies, that replaced the prominence of silent movies. Since the Kamata Studio

was located in an industrial area of the fast-developing Tokyo city, the loud noises made

by Kamata's local factories had been causing problems for sound recording in

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[493] Kobayashi Kyūzō, *Nihon eiga o tsukutta otoko: Kido Shiro ten* (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsuōraisha, 1999), p. 124.

Shochiku's film production.[494] In contrast, Ofuna was located in the countryside with lots of spare land and few residents.[495] They were also able to greatly expand their space with the size of the Ofuna studio around a hundred thousand square metres, five times that of the Kamata studio.[496] In order to improve production, Shochiku established eight simultaneously operating stages alongside administrative offices, film-developing labs, dining halls, sound recording studios, shower rooms, and warehouses for a total of 49 buildings.[497] Since the studio was located just near Ofuna station, studio employees could conveniently commute between their workplace and their homes in Tokyo.

The establishment of the Ofuna studio benefitted crucially from, and was even made possible by, a bankrupted real estate project named 'Ofuna Denen Toshi', literally 'Ofuna Garden City Project' in English. The project was initiated by one of the largest landlords in Tokyo city, the Watanabe family, in the 1920s. In terms of conception, like the National Garden City Initiative that the Ōhira regime was trying to promote in the late 1970s, the Ofuna Garden City Project claimed to be an experiment in solving the declining living conditions brought about by the urban development of Tokyo city.[498] The convenient geographical location—close to both the urban centre of Tokyo and the major port city of Yokohama, as well as other resort and cultural spots in the area—and the transportation, pleasant rural environment, and cheap land prices of Ofuna were the

[494] Ibid., pp.124-125.
[495] Masumoto Kinen, *Shōchiku eiga no eikō to hōkai* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1988), pp. 34-35.
[496] Kobayashi, *Nihon eiga o tsukutta otoko*, p. 127.
[497] Ibid.
[498] Fujiya, 'Ofuna denen toshi o manabu foranmu', pp. 81-82.

main reasons why it was selected to be the planned site of the garden city.[499]

Kamakura's reputation of being a villa area for hosting upper-class elites and

intellectuals was considered a further attraction. Though the commercial project

eventually failed due to the deteriorating financial position of the Watanabe family

during the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927, the land around the Ofuna station area was

already emptied and certain infrastructures like water supply and sewerage systems

were partly constructed.[500] When Shochiku was trying to find a new location for their

studio, Ofuna became a ready-to-use option. Shochiku's takeover of the land was also a

relief for local residents and officials, who made much effort to help with the

completion of the Ofuna studio.[501] Indeed, twenty thousand square meters of land were

gifted to the Shochiku studio by local officials with the wish for the film company to

help with Ofuna's development.[502]

The genealogy of Ofuna's urban development enables us to better grasp the

continuities of space throughout history. As a part of the Kamakura region, the urban

development of the Ofuna area can be seen in correlation with urban problems in the

modern centre of Tokyo. While Ofuna fits the broad Kamakura region's general course

of development, the area nevertheless contains a very particular trajectory. After

Shochiku studio moved their studio to the Ofuna area, many of the studio's employees,

including Tanaka Kinuyo, decided to move to the nearby region.[503] Relocated Shochiku

[499] *Maboroshi no denen toshi kara Shochiku eiga toshi e: Taishō/Shōwa no Ofuna-cho no kioku kara*, ed. by Kamakura-shi chuo toshokan kindai shiryō shūshūshitsu (Kamakura: Kamakura-shi Chuo Toshokan Kindai Shiryō Shūshūshitsu, 2005), pp. 34-35.
[500] Ibid., p.76-77.
[501] Kobayashi, *Nihon eiga o tsukutta otoko*, p. 128.
[502] *Maboroshi no denen toshi kara Shochiku eiga toshi e*, p. 68.
[503] Kobayashi, *Nihon eiga o tsukutta otoko*, p. 128.

personnel further mingled with the existing intellectual class in the region and thereby

constituted a unique social network in Kamakura. Although Ozu only moved to

Kamakura after the war in 1951, he had already been familiar with the area and held a

long-term residence in the Ofuna studio. More significantly, Ozu was also a member of

the local social network called the Kamakura-kai (or Kamakura Circle), which was

constituted by Shochiku personnel and local intellectuals and artists, together with the

Kawakitas. [Figure 4.10] In this way, the simple representation of Ozu's cemetery in

Engaku-ji Temple involves more connections to the development of the location in

relation to the historical transition of Japanese cinema.

Figure 4.10: A group photo of the Kamakura-kai. Ozu is the fifth person from the left in the
front row, and to his right are Tanaka Kinuyo and Kawakita Kashiko.
From Yasujirō Ozu, *Zen-nikki Ozu Yasujirō*, ed. by Masumi Tanaka (Tokyo: Film Art, Inc.,
1993).

When Wenders visited Ozu's grave in 1983, the golden era of the Ofuna studio was

already long gone. Nonetheless, Wenders' voiceover emotional recollections about the

end of cinema's good old days on his train from Kamakura back to Tokyo may be seen

as an affective response triggered by the film history embedded within Kamakura's

urban space per se. As Wenders tries to mourn the loss of Ozu's auteurist talent

expressed in Ryū's (and also Atsuta's) reminiscences and criticises contemporary visual

culture's excess, he is also mourning a different material and discursive assemblage of

cinema that had then been rapidly fading away. When Ryū tells Wenders that he simply

followed Ozu's instructions on the set and found himself too clumsy and in awe of

being in the presence of Ozu's great talent, and when Atsuta talks about his long

apprenticeship and minimal agency in the process of film production, it reminds us why

the institution of Shochiku and the Japanese studio system per se were overthrown by

the younger generation of filmmakers in the 1960s. It was precisely the rebellious

youngsters from the Shochiku studio like Ōshima Nagisa and Yoshida Yoshishige

(Yoshida Kijū) who were unsatisfied with the studio's assistant-director system and

conservative strategies that accelerated the decline of the studio system.[504] Since

relevant individuals like Ryū and Atsuta had already internalised these eroding

institutions, *Tokyo-Ga* further helped to conceal this historical course with its

romanticised representation of Kamakura. Nevertheless, by unveiling the artificiality of

the space through an investigation of Kamakura's modern history, we find the artificial

and romanticised façade—namely the Japanese style architecture, sakura trees, bamboo

forest, and tatami floor—itself as a faithful bearer of the bygone history. A political

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[504] David Desser, *Eros Plus Massacre: An Introduction to the Japanese New Wave Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 44-45.

scheme that was simultaneously being challenged and reinforced, what the space of

Kamakura embedded was the very metamorphosis of Japanese cinema.

Instead of seeing Wenders' Tokyo-Kamakura dichotomy as an auteurist decision,

this section argues it is also crucial to notice and emphasise the role that other human

and non-human actor played in determining the filmmaker's perception. If what

Wenders experienced in Tokyo was largely mobilised by the contemporaneous

institutions of globalised economy and cultural consumption, then what affected

Wenders in Kamakura were the institutions of a different temporality. As the

institutions of Tokyo bragged about the city's prosperous present and bright future,

featuring the city's dazzling visual culture and endless urban redevelopment, the

institutions of Kamakura insisted their city remain rooted in the past. Nevertheless, the

alternative temporal constitution of Kamakura does not mean that it was not susceptible

to change. We have already discussed the emergence of its reputation as a modern resort

spot in the late 19th century, but Kamakura was further popularised as a youth cultural

centre in the post-war, along with the popularisation of *taiyōzoku* culture and rise of the

geo-cultural concept of the Shōnan region.[505] Nevertheless, in terms of the articulation

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[505] Although the geographical definition of Shōnan was already coined in the 17th century, it
was really post-war popular culture that consolidated the concept in popular discourse. The
taiyōzoku culture was a post-war cultural phenomenon derived from Ishihara Shintarō's novel
Taiyō no kisetsu (*Season of the Sun*) published in 1955 and reached its peak in the mid-1950s
with the release of a series of *taiyōzoku* movies. Since the *taiyōzoku* culture often set its location
in the beach areas of Kanagawa prefecture, it also popularised the geo-cultural concept of
Shōnan in post-war youth culture. The construction of Shōnan in popular discourse was largely
correlated to *taiyōzoku* culture, with the prioritisation of the sea, beaches, vacations, and a
hedonist lifestyle. Kamakura was both geographically and geo-culturally constituted as part of
Shōnan, as it was featured in two of the most prominent *taiyōzoku* works, *Taiyō no
kisetsu*/*Season of the Sun* (Furukawa Takumi, 1956) and *Kurutta kajitsu*/*Crazed Fruit* (Nakahira
Kō, 1956). Since its post-war popularisation, Shōnan has also been actively promoted by local
officials in cultural branding. Although the *taiyōzoku* boom ended in the 1960s, much of the
Shōnan image remains today in popular culture. See Masubuchi Toshiyuki, *Shōnan no tanjō:
ongaku to pop karucha ga hatashita yakuwari* (Tokyo: Rittor Music, 2019), pp. 12-23; pp. 115-
119.

of its urbanity, Kamakura has been carefully differentiated from other Shōnan cities by its local officials as a historical town that preserved Japan's cultural heritages and tradition.[506] In other words, since Kamakura was intentionally regulated as a city of the past, the temporal disjuncture between Kamakura and Tokyo that Wenders experienced in real-time was also largely developed by official urban planning agendas. Furthermore, by representing Kamakura as different from Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga*, the film further contributed to the constitution and regulation of Kamakura's unique temporality in popular discourse.

In this way, the Kamakura sequence of *Tokyo-Ga* reveals the coexistence of various trends of institutional forces in mobilising the filmmaker's mobility as well as the film's spatial representation and urban critique. Although the constitution of Kamakura's spatiality and temporality present it as different or even in contrast with Tokyo, the urban development and image-making of the two cities were tightly interrelated and mutually influenced. Sandwiched in between the varying institutional forces, Wenders chose to side with one of them and criticise the another. The irony resides not only in that his trip and criticisms were made possible by the very forces he criticised, but also in his neglect of the symbiotic relationship between the various forces. In other words, Kamakura in the past was not an alternative to futurist Tokyo but a part and parcel of it, and vice versa.

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[506] Ibid., pp.16-17; pp.119-125.

Rescuing the City and Regaining the Power of the Cinematic Image from the Institutionalised Mobility of World Cinema

Reapproaching the urban spaces in *Tokyo-Ga* via institutionalised mobility enables us to see the interconnections and dynamism between the cinematic representations of a global city and the various material and discursive factors which rendered the transformation of Japanese cinema in the 1980s. This allows us to return to Wenders himself and reconsider the filmmaker's agency in the creation of a global city for the globally-scaled film culture of world cinema in the 1980s. In the former sections, we have discussed how institutions with certain economic and political purposes mobilised the filmmaker to see particular parts of Tokyo in certain ways and partly constituted the filmmaker's positive and critical responses. Nevertheless, the image of the city in *Tokyo-Ga* also fed into the institutional assemblage of world cinema of its era, which simultaneously consolidated and disturbed the scale and boundary of the 'world' in cinema and even the concept of 'world cinema' per se.

In order to envision the filmmaker's agency within the institutionalised network of global image-making, the dilemma embedded within the idea of film auteurship in world cinema may be seen as a useful starting point. Thomas Elsaesser's idea of 'double occupancy' is useful here to demonstrate the common pitfall that filmmakers encountered in the European film festival-centred world cinema system. As Elsaesser suggests:

> [Festivals] pride themselves on their internationalism, of transcending
> the boundaries of national cinema by providing an open forum for the

world's films and filmmakers. But this openness can be a trap: it is an

open invitation to self-conscious ethnicity and re-tribalization, it quickly

shows its affinity or even collusion with cultural tourism, with fusion-

food-world-music-ethnic-cuisine Third Worldism in the capitals of the

first world, and more generally, with a post-colonial and subaltern sign-

economy, covering over and effacing the new economy of downsizing,

outsourcing, and the relentless search for cheap labour on the part of

multi-national companies. Because the cinema (as part of the creative

industries) is not exempt from these pressures, but cannot avow them

openly, there is a tendency of films within the festival circuit—whether

from Asia, Africa, or Europe—to respond and to comply, by gestures

that amount to a kind of 'self-exoticizing' or 'auto-orientalism': that is, a

tendency to present to the world (of the festivals) a picture of the self, a

narrative of one's nation or community, that reproduces or anticipates

what one believes the other expects to see. It is the old trap of the

colonial ethnographer, of the eager multi-culturalist who welcomes the

stranger and is open to otherness, but preferably on one's own terms and

within one's own comfort zone.[507]

Although the situation in the 1980s was not fully identical to the film festival network

of the 21st century that Elsaesser describes, his argument enables us to consider the

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[507] Thomas Elsaesser, 'The Global Author: Control, Creative Constraints, and Performative Self-Contradiction', in *The Global Auteur: The Politics of Authorship in 21st Century Cinema*, eds. by Seung-hoon Jeong and Jeremi Szaniawski (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), Kindle Location: 743-754.

making of *Tokyo-Ga* as the prefiguration of a pluralist and orientalist world image in an increasingly institutionalised cinema world. The institutionalised mobility of the 1st German Film Festival suggests such international film programmes were not only deeply intertwined with the nation and large corporations' geopolitical and economic agenda, but also relevant to the creation of the world as an image through the prospects of travelling that they offered to filmmakers. Furthermore, it became simultaneously a force regulating the filmmaker's political vision and aesthetic perception—a 'servant of two masters' as Elsaesser suggests. Especially considering how in the 1980s international travel to Japan was not yet fully popularised and celluloid remained a scarce and more professional material, offers like the 1st German Film Festival can be seen as a precious opportunity for a contingent project like *Tokyo-Ga*. It was a privilege for famous auteurs to travel around Tokyo by taxi, spend a two-week vacation in Shibuya and Ginza, and interview people like Ryū and Atsuda in the Kawakita Villa— these doors were not essentially open for individuals without global status and institutional connections.

Regarding its worship to Ozu, *Tokyo-Ga* as a cultural product had partly consolidated the institutional order of world cinema, since the narrative of film both derives from and reinforces the existing film canon of its time. Although Wenders also points his camera at ordinary people including pedestrians, labourers, youngsters, and salarymen, these people are mostly being observed by Wenders' camera rather than being approached by Wenders himself. It is only with people from the film industry whom Wenders exchanges conversation with and sometimes humbly listens. The interviews with Ryū and Astuda add more details to Ozu's greatness and reconfirm the

Japanese auteur's status within the existing world cinema system. Moreover, by presenting himself as a modest student of Ozu, the film further strengthened Wenders' bond with various film-related actors in Japan and increased the German filmmaker's cultural capital within the world cinema network. In this sense, I only partly agree with Alter's argument that *Tokyo-Ga* is 'a film about films rather than a film about reality.'[508] In my opinion, *Tokyo-Ga* is both a film about films and a film about reality. Nevertheless, the reality here is specifically of how world cinema operates globally and in the local context of Japan. In other words, the film is simultaneously configured by the network of world cinema and produced for world cinema.

Moreover, *Tokyo-Ga* also creates an effect in its reality that is related to the perception of Tokyo's urban status. The film's emphasis on Tokyo's advanced technology and postmodern landscape contributes to the spectacle—a rather robotic, cold, and alienated picture about Tokyo that was distributed via the world cinema network around the globe. Although Wenders' intention might be critical, the way that *Tokyo-Ga* treats the city's images colludes with the target of its criticism. The scene where Wenders meets fellow director Werner Herzog on top of the Tokyo Tower vividly exemplifies this argument. As Alastair Phillips describes, the scene depicts the two filmmakers as they 'look down at the world below while musing on the lack of any authentic pictures left in the vast city stretched out in front of them.'[509] Nevertheless, both their points of view and their understanding of what they are seeing are problematic. In terms of the former, as Phillips acutely points out, it is 'a shame the two

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[508] Alter, 'Global Politics, Cinematographic Space', p. 117.
[509] Phillips, *Tokyo Story*, pp. 95-96.

men never follow the example of Ozu and Atsuta Yūharu and wander the streets, lanes and alleyways of Tokyo at length on foot' but instead take an elevated vantage point from which to observe the city.[510] As for the latter, the scene reveals the ultimate ambivalence of what Tom Gunning calls 'modern vision.' Specifically, the two men's theorisation of what they are seeing extends 'the powers of sight into a visionary insight that stitches the globe together…what Heidegger called the "world picture" in which the world is reduced to an exchangeable and objectifying image, expressive of man's dominance over nature and his fellow man.'[511]

The crux of this lies in the two men's lack of awareness of the very material conditions which prefigure their view. Firstly, they fail to question the artificial object of the Tokyo Tower per se and ironically justify the view it creates as a valid and representative vision of Tokyo's urbanity. Secondly, since the film depicts Wenders and Herzog's encounter more as an accident and never clarifies the occasion of their trip— that is, how they were both invited on the occasion of the 1st German Film Festival— this helps to conceal the existence of world cinema's institutionalised mobility. These two points therefore reveal how Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga* is perceived from a doubled vantage point: if the height of the Tokyo Tower marks its verticality, then mobility demarcates a horizontal line. This becomes even more explicit when Wenders mentions that Herzog is leaving Tokyo soon for Australia—to play a role in Paul Cox's film *Man of Flowers* (1983)—which thus reveals how the world that is made flat by the institutionalised mobility of world cinema. The introduction of the horizontal dimension

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[510] Ibid.
[511] Tom Gunning, 'Shooting into Outer Space: Reframing Modern Vision', in *Fantastic Voyages of the Cinematic Imagination: Georges Méliès's Trip to the Moon*, ed. by Matthew Solomon (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), pp. 98-99.

suggests a similar ambivalence to the worldview of modern vision, something which cannot be resolved by simply standing on and looking from the streets but requires a reflexive gesture towards one's own negotiation with the institutionalised mobility per se.[512] Neither being critical of the Tokyo Tower as a material object nor being reflexive about their own trip to the Tokyo Tower, the scene thereby eventually legitimises the central role of the Tower in Tokyo's actual and imaginary landscape and reinforces the global city vision promoted by both government officials and world cinema networks in the 1980s.

Although there is a lack of reflexivity about his trip in general, there are still moments of doubt and uncertainty in *Tokyo-Ga* which open up a space for us to reconsider Wenders' agency in the midst of his institutionally mobilised trip. In her seminal book on the subject, Laura Rascaroli foregrounds the communication between the filmmaker and the audience as the most important aspect of the essay film,[513] taking a page from Adorno and Deleuze's philosophical ideas to highlight 'how the essay film thinks.' According to Rascaroli, essay films presents a disjuncture of the cinematic experience worth investigating, a reflexive gesture for the filmmakers and an intellectual engagement for the audiences.[514] If institutionalised mobility already proposes a certain world vision to the filmmaker, Rascaroli's claim urges us to examine

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[512] Indeed, Wenders did suggest his different point of view towards the urban image of the city in comparison with Herzog after their conversation on the Tokyo Tower. Darrell Varga summarized the nuance between the two as follow: "Herzog's lament is consistent with the conservative German philosophical tradition which situates transcendence in nature, and considers the built world as unredeemable—what Heidegger calls the gap between Earth and World. Wenders himself is not so sure. He prefers to examine the quotidian down below." See Varga, 'The Diary Films of Wim Wenders', p. 23.

[513] Laura Rascaroli, *The Personal Camera: Subjective Cinema and the Essay Film.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 32-43.

[514] Laura Rascaroli, 'Introduction—Openings: Thinking Cinema', in *How the Essay Film Thinks* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 1–22.

if there are moments when the filmmaker's (in)sight clashes with the institutions' agenda and creates a gap for us to get a glimpse of a different world. To explore such ruptures, the filmmaker's material (body) and discursive (voiceover) presence becomes crucial again.

The scene in which Wenders meets Chris Marker in a bar named after the latter's 1962 film *La Jetée* marks such a moment of self-reflexivity and constitutes a different worldliness for Tokyo. [Figure 4.11] In the scene, it is apparent that Marker—who travelled to Japan as early as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and frequently revisited after 1978[515]—has already developed many personal connections with the local streets and people of Tokyo. Thus, it is not surprising that Wenders, who rarely talks about his own position in the entire film,[516] frankly admits that the images in Marker's *Sans Soleil* (1983) are 'inaccessible to the camera of a foreigner' like him. It is true that in *Sans Soleil*, Markers shows us the heterogeneity of Tokyo by travelling to the Sanya district where lots of day labourers, tramps, and ethnic minority groups live in addition to the Sanritsuka region where a civil conflict against the Japanese government persists. Nevertheless, what more directly stimulates Wenders' self-reflexivity might be the intimacy between Marker and the bartender of La Jetée. Such intimacy presents a sharp contrast to an earlier scene in which Wenders is rejected by the workers at the fake-food factory when he attempts to film them having lunch. This further suggests that self-reflexivity might not be a technical decision made by the filmmaker, but is something stimulated by the affective encounter of a particular condition in a specific location.

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[515] Colin MacCabe, 'An Interview with Chris Marker–October 2010', *Critical Quarterly*, 55.3 (2013), pp. 84–87.
[516] This particularly refers to Wenders' reference to his positionality vis-à-vis the city of Tokyo that he travels around instead of the urban imaginary appears in Ozu's film.

Figure 4.11: Bar La Jetée as an intimate space.
Still from Wenders, *Tokyo-Ga* (63:48).

If Tokyo Tower is an artificial object promoted onto an imaginary world order, the bar La Jetée suggests a relocation of the abstract world back into the concrete local streets. On one hand, the bar is by no means free from the institutions of world cinema, since the matter of which films could be watched and enjoyed by audiences in Tokyo was still largely mobilised by the European-centred film canon and the powerful distributors of art cinema in Japan. On the other hand, however, the grassroots practice localises the imaginary 'cinematic world' of *La Jetée* as a chance of creating new social space and transnational bonding. In such cases, it is the power of cinematic images via the audiences' agency, instead of institutions and auteurs, which configures both the shape of the Tokyo city and the ideal of the world. It is this which thus frees Tokyo from the economic and political agendas of the 1980s without taking back the empowering imagination of the world enabled by cinema, making the city truly 'global.'

Coda

Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, how can we conceive Wenders' (mis)positioning of Ozu's Tokyo alley in Kabukicho after studying *Tokyo-Ga* from a networked and materialist approach? From institutions' mobilisation of Wenders' trip to and in Tokyo to the persistence and transformation of Tokyo's urban infrastructure, it becomes clear that despite the effects of contingency, the shooting location of Kabukicho fits more properly than Ozu's Ueno into the urban assemblage of Tokyo as a global city in the 1980s. If Wenders had gone to Tokyo on a different occasion, with a different purpose, and had been brought by a different group of people, *Tokyo-Ga* would have become a totally different work in which Tokyo would have been imagined, understood, and conceived of differently. Nevertheless, how Tokyo is represented in *Tokyo-Ga* indicates the reality that was prioritised by the actors that constructed the global city. Nonetheless, other possibilities still exist in the banal shots of the urban landscape, in the staged natural scenery, and in the intervals of different cinematic spaces. Thus, rather than being a problem of authenticity, the gap between Wenders' and Ozu's Tokyo reveals the tension between the many actual and virtual dimensions of Tokyo in situ. Through a transdisciplinary approach, this chapter has attempted to juxtapose these dimensions to make the incompatible spatial and temporal facets of the city visible— especially for those aspects which render the top-down globalisation agendas paradoxical.

In this chapter, I have studied the urban realities of the 1980s Tokyo in *Tokyo-Ga* via institutionalised mobility and its networked infrastructure and personnel. On one hand, this chapter can be read as an extension of the second chapter, which investigates the complexity of cinema networks in Tokyo constituted by the increasing economic

activities across borders. On the other hand, I also present *Tokyo-Ga* as an exceptional case since it involved a much more intricate mesh of subjectivity and materiality that helped to constitute the unique spatial and temporal imaginaries of Tokyo as a global city. Moreover, this chapter has analysed *Tokyo-Ga* to rethink the 'introverted' film genre of the diary and essay film from a more materialist approach and suggested that the city can be a productive site to reveal the superimposition of various institutional trajectories over cinema. As this chapter experimentally puts it, the mutual reinforcement between world cinema and the global city through physical and perceptual interaction is something worth further investigation. At the same time, we may see how filmmakers, as well as their cinematic images, work as negotiatory actors that may reveal and even create ruptures within institutional regulatory forces and enable audiences to think beyond representation.

Chapter Five - Drifting Around the Fringe: Diasporic Chinese Men in the

Declining Global City

Descending from the high-rise Tokyo Tower, we now return to the streets to dive into the global city's undercurrents. The discourse of the global city emerged together with the increasing visibility of diasporic subjects in Tokyo. As observed by Aaron Gerow, various Japanese filmmakers—notably Yamamoto Masashi, Hayashi Kaizō, Iwai Shunji, and Sai Yōichi—began to portray the lives of diasporic subjects with greater frequency in the 1990s, which included not only recent foreign migrants but also ethnic minorities within Japan in general.[517] As Hamid Naficy argues, beyond globalisation's showy demonstration of capital circulation lies 'the fragmentation of nation-states and other social formations, and the scattering, often violent and involuntary, of an increasing number of people from their homelands—all of which are driven by divergence, not convergence.'[518] To locate such experience of fragmentation and divergence, scholars like Naficy turn to the displaced subject both outside and inside of the film screen to further complicate our understanding of cinema as a form of transnational practice in the age of globalisation. Moving away from the previous chapter's subject of a film auteur's encounter with the global city facilitated by the institutions of world cinema, this chapter turns to the displaced subjects of diasporic Chinese men and their encounter with Tokyo via the more local network of Japanese cinema.

This chapter will scrutinise two Japanese films, *Ainitsuite, Tokyo*/*About Love, Tokyo* (Yanagimachi Mitsuo, 1993) and *Tokyo Skin* (Hanawa Yukinari, 1996), both of which

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[517] Aaron Gerow, 'Recognizing "Others" in a New Japanese Cinema', *The Japan Foundation Newsletter*, 39.2 (2002), pp. 2-3.

[518] Hamid Naficy, *An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 42.

specifically depict diasporic Chinese men's urban experiences in Tokyo. In both films, the rather broad and often generalised phenomenon of globalised displacement in transnational migration is not only specific to the urban experiences of male Chinese migrants, but also conditioned within the specific local settings of Tokyo. Instead of depicting Tokyo as a vague and fuzzy background, both films choose to emphasise the city's essential role in setting the characters in motion, (dis)orienting their life purpose, and affecting their identification with both their host and home societies. By the same token, the characters' perspectives also serve a simultaneously othered yet integral part of the city's global attribution per se, which helps to refresh our perception of Tokyo in an increasingly mobile and divergent era. Moreover, considering both films involve collaborations between local film networks in Japan and the newly arrived male Chinese migrants as film cast and crew members sheds further light on the transnational transformation of Japanese cinema. In this sense, analysing these two films allows us to reapproach the global city of Tokyo—as both discursive and material space—through the lens of the marginalised subjects of foreign migrants. On a similar note, the films open a speculative space for us to reimagine Tokyo's possible role in the constitution of diasporic Chinese masculinity in Japan in the era of globalisation.

The representation of *zainichi* Koreans, or Koreans-in-Japan, is one of the most thoroughly discussed subjects in existing scholarship of diasporic communities in Japanese cinema. Centred around the colonial, post-colonial, and Cold War trauma experienced by *zainichi* Koreans, scholars have investigated these subjects in several

ways including the formation and consumption of ethnic images in popular culture,[519] the progressive and conservative aspects of *zainichi* filmmaking in Japan,[520] and the application of a multifaceted diaspora discourse to account for *zainichi* identities and identification in cinema.[521] Despite these issues, it is worth mentioning that since there has been a long and complicated history of both representing *zainichi* Koreans and *zainichi* filmmaking in Japan,[522] the subject is less usually associated with the discourse of globalisation. Although the changing conditions of Japanese cinema in the 1980s, such as the transformation of cinema infrastructure marked by the mini-theatre boom, also influenced *zainichi* cinema in many ways,[523] it is necessary to call for a different set of interpretative frameworks to unpack the diasporic experience in Tokyo as a global city. From a sociological perspective, since the increase of foreign migrants in Tokyo was in part stimulated by the Japanese state's newly issued policies aimed at attracting overseas laborers and international students to the country to enhance Japan's global status,[524] the subject of recently arrived Chinese migrants becomes an ideal means to investigate the experience of fragmentation and divergence in this global city.

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[519] See Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, *Japanese Cinema in the Digital Age* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012), pp. 114-130.

[520] See Mika Ko, *Japanese Cinema and Otherness: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and the Problem of Japaneseness* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 136-170.

[521] See Shota T. Ogawa, 'A Long Way Home: The Rhetoric of Family and Familiarity in Yang Yong-Hi's Pyongyang Trilogy', *Journal of Japanese and Korean Cinema*, 9.1 (2017), pp. 30–46.

[522] Oliver Dew, *Zainichi Cinema: Korean-in-Japan Film Culture* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

[523] For instance, Dew discusses Oguri Kōhei's *For Kayako* (1984) as an example of a new Zainichi 'art-house' film enabled by the emergence of a new assemblage of 'bubble-era capital, cineaste taste formations, independent theatre talent, and local ethnic support associations' in the global era. See Ibid., p.77-83.

[524] Machimura Takashi, *Sekai toshi Tokyo no kōzō tenkan: toshi risutorakuchuaringu no shakaigaku* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), pp. 242-245.

Despite its wide recognition as a social phenomenon and its visual representation in cinema from the late 1980s to 1990s in Japan, the new Chinese migrants remain largely underdiscussed in existing film studies scholarship. To clarify, there are different generations of Chinese who immigrated to Japan before the 1980s, and the identity of 'Chinese' itself is increasingly complex with various nuanced positions. Diasporic Chinese subjects who I analyse in this chapter are specifically those who moved from the PRC to Japan in the mid-1980s. Socio-politically speaking, these 'new overseas Chinese' (in Japanese *shin kakyō*) were mobilised by both the Japanese state's international student policy to advance its globalisation agenda and the PRC's loosening of emigration restrictions to facilitate its 'reform and opening-up' (*gaige kaifang*) plan.[525] Since this group of Chinese diaspora in Japan was configured by both the host and home countries' economic and political agendas, their encounter with contemporary Tokyo was arguably stimulated by the same forces that constituted Tokyo's global city agenda—something which will be comprehensively scrutinised in this chapter.

While this chapter focuses on the experiences of the new oversea Chinese in Tokyo, I am fully aware of the coexistence of other major migrant groups like Filipinos and *Nikkei* South Americans who were also mobilised by the same forces of globalisation during their move to Japan. The global city is a place for the coming together of many different ethnic groups, which according to Ien Ang, productively 'brings out the intrinsic contradiction locked into the concept of diaspora… [that it] depends on the maintenance of an apparently natural essential identity to secure its imagined status as a coherent

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[525] Gracia Liu-Farrer, 'Becoming New Overseas Chinese: Transnational Practices and Identity Construction Among the Chinese Migrants in Japan', in *Living Intersections: Transnational Migrant Identifications in Asia*, eds. by Caroline Plüss and Kowk-bun Chan (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), pp. 167–90.

community.'[526] The films I examine in this chapter talk back to Ang's argument as they both depict Tokyo as a space of hybridity that tends to confront the boundaries embedded in the discourse of diaspora.[527] In this way, the concept of Tokyo as a global city enables us to imagine the interconnectedness of subjects from different ethnic backgrounds and problematises the essentialism in diaspora discourse per se. Nevertheless, as Ang also suggests, such unsettling of identities does not imply that the boundaries are erased.[528] Instead of idealising the global city as a place of eliminating difference, this chapter argues that it becomes crucial to investigate the dynamic relationship between urban experiences and diasporic identities in order to understand how the latter are questioned, deconstructed, and reconstructed via the representation of the former in cinema.

The relationship between diasporas and cities has been significant. In urban studies, scholars have left a rich legacy that has examined the proliferating concentration of ethnic groups in certain parts of the city that were stimulated by economic globalisation in the late 20th century, highlighting the investigation of urban spaces like ethnic enclaves.[529] While it is true that we see the increasing aggregation of ethnic groups in certain parts of the city, as Liam Kennedy correctly points out, there is also a tendency to specifically render ethnicity or race legible through the cultural representation of space.[530] In other words, what the study of space in cultural productions like cinema can offer in the understanding of diaspora groups is the delineation of how space may be discursively

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[526] Ien Ang, 'Together-in-difference: Beyond Diaspora, into Hybridity', *Asian Studies Review*, 27.2 (2003), p. 149.
[527] Ibid.
[528] Ibid.
[529] Shenjing He and Kun Wang, 'Enclave Urbanism', in *The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Urban and Regional Studies* (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2019), pp. 1–5.
[530] Liam Kennedy, *Race and Urban Space in Contemporary American Culture* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), p. 2.

constituted through the imagination of ethnicity and how diasporic identity is simultaneously enabled and restricted through the production of space in popular culture. Analysing '[a] wide range of films featuring new migrants interacting within multi-ethnic urban neighbourhoods' made in post-Cold War Europe, Dina Iordanova coins the term 'cinema of the metropolitan multicultural margin' to critique the nexus of cinematic representation of diasporas, new spatialisation of global cities, and post-colonial discourses.[531] Although Iordanova's discussion is specific to the European context, I draw on her observation that films serve to complicate the social scientific discourse of 'transitology' in which the central question was how Eastern European diasporas would transition from state socialism to market capitalism.[532] Moreover, Iordanova expands on Ang's theorisation of how the dynamic interplay between diasporic identities and the spatiality of global cities fosters a 'truly transnational and cosmopolitan imagination,'[533] an idea that resonates with my intention to reconsider the two films produced within the Japanese film industry through the lens of transnationalism.

Discussing the representation of Chinese diasporas in Japan, Timothy Yun Hui Tsu points out how they have been historically imagined through particular sites like the black market, Chinatown, and Shinjuku's Kabukicho.[534] Among these three sites, discourse revolving around their connection to the Kabukicho neighbourhood emerged specifically after the influx of new overseas Chinese migrants arrived in the mid-1980s and a more

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[531] Dina Iordanova, 'Migration and Cinematic Process in Post-Cold War Europe', in *European Cinema in Motion: Migrant and Diasporic Film in Contemporary Europe*, eds. by Daniela Berghahn and Claudia Sternberg (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 50–75.

[532] Ibid., pp.52-56.

[533] Ibid., p.59.

[534] Timothy Yun Hui Tsu, 'Black Market, Chinatown, and Kabukicho: Postwar Japanese Constructs of "Overseas Chinese"', *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, 19.1 (2011), pp. 133–57.

concrete image was constituted in the 1990s through popular novels and cinemas that represented Chinese as engaging in criminal activities. [535] While the production of Kabukicho as an ethnic space has already been studied through significant texts like Hase Seishū's novel *Fuyajō/Sleepless Town* (1996) and its film version directed by Lee Chi-Ngai (1998),[536] other spaces that were not as 'dominant' in popular reception have been largely neglected. If we situate ourselves back in the context of the 1990s, a time when Kabukicho was not yet fixed as the hegemonic site of representation for the Chinese in Japan, there were other spaces that were no less significant in imagining the newly visible Chinese subjects. To rescue such less popular imaginaries, I argue, is to shed light on the heterogeneous spatial formations of diasporic Chinese images in Japan. In this way, we can move beyond a narrow and stereotypical Chinese image in Japan which is solely associated with Kabukicho and can navigate the many possibilities of diasporic experiences and identities in Japan.

The stories of *About Love, Tokyo* and *Tokyo Skin* are set respectively in Tokyo's Arakawa and Roppongi areas, spaces which are vastly different from each other in terms of geography, the trajectory of urban development, and the popular imagination. While it is crucial to examine the distinctive depiction of each site, what is shared by both films is their featuring of male, mainland Chinese protagonists wandering at the margins of urban sites and trying to break through the liminal conditions caused by their migrant status, diasporic identities, and urban lives in Tokyo. Such spatial experiences for Chinese diasporas in Japan, as I will further elaborate in my analysis, holds both similarities with

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[535] Ibid., p.144.
[536] See Tsu, 'Black Market, Chinatown, and Kabukicho', pp. 133–57. & Kwai-Cheung Lo, 'There Is No Such Thing as Asia: Racial Particularities in the "Asian" Films of Hong Kong and Japan', *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture*, 17.1 (2005), pp. 133–58.

and distinctions from the prominent discourse marked by Kabukicho. While both films attempt to spatialise their Chinese subjects, they depict these male, mainland Chinese characters not as fixed to certain sites but instead as highly mobile subjects who hold the potential to transgress various physical and imaginary boundaries of Japanese society and understandings of Chinese ethnicity. In this way, we should carefully scrutinise how the Chinese characters navigate Tokyo's landscape in these films to further grasp the dynamic relationship between urban spaces and the imaginary of Chinese diasporas in the city. In this chapter, mobility will be treated as a discursive construct formulated in part by the cinematic imaginary specifically associated with the gender of Chinese diasporas. On the one hand, it is crucial to ask who is imagined through mobility and what are the intentions, expectations, and critiques behind such imaginaries—regarding both the Chinese migrants in Japan and the city of Tokyo. On the other hand, it becomes important to analyse why the highly mobile Chinese protagonists of the two films are essentially male and share some common traits of masculinity. This leaves us to further explore how a diasporic Chinese identity is dominantly imagined and negotiated through masculinity in relation to the perception of Tokyo's global urbanity but without neglecting the gendered critique of masculinity per se (for instance, I will address the roles that female migrant subjects play in facilitating the masculinised mobility in the analysis of both films).

The first section of this chapter will analyse the Arakawa riverbank portrayed in *About Love, Tokyo* and investigate the globalised image of Tokyo that the film tries to deliver. Investigating the Tokyo spaces depicted in the film through the Japanese discourse of *kōgai* (the outskirts of a city), I explore the liminal experience of the diasporic Chinese protagonists in the film as well as its political potential and limits. By

examining how the Chinese male protagonist of the film navigates himself through his liminal situation, I argue the film works through the question of Chinese masculinity in Japan to suggest a certain method of surviving in the global city. Using transnational Chinese masculinity in Japan as an anchor, I move to the second film, *Tokyo Skin*. Analysing the space of Roppongi depicted in the second film through the lens of multiculturalism, I develop a method to understand the changing perception of globalisation's cultural facet in 1990s Japan. Eventually, scrutinising how both ethnicity and gender are articulated in *Tokyo Skin*'s scenes along the city's Yamanote Line, this chapter delineates the fractured landscape of the global city at its transition point in the mid-1990s.

Reimagining Tokyo through the Arakawa Riverbank

Directed by Yanagimachi Mitsuo, *About Love, Tokyo* is a 1993 Japanese fiction film centred on a love triangle between the Chinese student-labourer Fang Chun/Hojun (Wu Xiaodong), the Japanese-born Chinese Airin (Okasaka Asuka), and the Japanese Pachinko owner and former yakuza Endō (Fujioka Hiroshi). The film begins with a scene showing Fang and his Chinese roommate Zhang, both international students studying in Tokyo's language school, working in a local abattoir and killing cattle. In his spare time, Fang hangs out with his Chinese friends in Tokyo's local pachinko parlours and cheats to earn money. One day, Fang saves the waitress Airin from her racist boss in a Japanese restaurant. The two soon fall in love and start to develop a romantic relationship. Subsequently, however, Fang is caught by Endō when cheating in the latter's pachinko parlour and is threatened to be repatriated back to China. In order to stay in Japan, Fang

introduces Airin to the married Endō as a mistress. In exchange, Endō continues to let

Fang win money on his pachinko machines. Nevertheless, Airin and Fang continue their

sexual relationship due to Endō's impotence. After Endō discovers Fang and Airin's

betrayal, the two men get into a huge fight. Eventually, both Endō and Airin disappear,

and the Pachinko parlour is shut down. Only Fang remains in Tokyo, where he decides

to restart his life as an escort in a host club. The story of *About Love, Tokyo* is multi-

layered and reveals the various aspects of Tokyo's contemporary urban life. With its

abundant content and critical potential, spatial analysis can be an appropriate and

productive approach to consider this film because not only does space remain significant

throughout the film's narrative, but because this aspect of the film was also recognised

by film critics and the director himself as an important aspect of the movie.[537] While

there are many spaces worthy of analysis in the film, I will start with the more prominent

and problematic representation of 'Tokyo' itself, which is proactively indicated in the

movie's title.

In her review of *About Love, Tokyo* in *Kinema Junpō*, the film critic Tanaka Chiseko

wrote: 'I am very interested in the film's repetitive representation of Tokyo's *kōgai*

riverbank and pachinko parlour because they do not seem very Tokyo to me.'[538] Leaving

the complicated term *kōgai* aside for now, the riverbank that Tanaka mentions here refers

to scenes shot on location at the Arakawa riverbank, or *Arakawa dote* in Japanese, a long

bank track along the Arakawa River, a water source in Saitama Prefecture that runs from

the north and then cuts down to south-eastern Tokyo before eventually emptying into the

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[537] 'Ainitsuite Tokyo: satsuei genba hōmon. chūkoku kara no shūgakusei tachi no ai to jinsei o kaku, Yanagimachi Mitsuo kantoku no yashinsaku', *Kinema junpō*, 1081, 1992, pp. 87–90.
[538] Tanaka Chiseko, 'Yanagi sakuhin no hiiro tachi: sono keifū o saguru', *Kinema junpō*, 1084, 1992, p. 137.

Tokyo Bay. The Arakawa riverbank had already been represented in popular media before its appearance in *About Love, Tokyo*, among which the most famous instance was the popular Japanese television drama, *San-nen B-gumi Kinpachi-sensei/Kinpachi-sensei* (TBS, 1979-2011). The drama series was mainly set in the Horikiri area of the Kita-Senjū district, also adjacent to the Arakawa River. The Arakawa riverbank serves as a vital, open, and problem-solving space in *Kinpachi-sensei*, a drama that humorously engages with the Japanese education system and issues of adolescent growth[539] that contrasts with the closed and problem-triggering space of the classroom. Indeed, the opening theme song of the first season of *Kinpachi-sensei* begins with the beloved middle school teacher Sakamoto Kinpachi (Takeda Tetsuya) standing on the grass field of the Arakawa riverbank, blissfully surrounded by his students. As the theme song continues, we see more students playing baseball, jogging, or simply strolling on the riverbank, with a big smile on their faces. As the theme song indicates, Kinpachi's virtue as a teacher, promoted by the drama series, is not based on his boundless knowledge of academic subjects but more about how he guides his students to overcome the confusions of adolescence so they may live happily within the open-air local community.

Since the Arakawa riverbank in *Kinpachi-sensei* has already been widely recognised by Japanese audiences as a symbol of harmonious *shitamachi* life in Tokyo,[540] how should we understand Tanaka's critique of the riverbank's lack of 'Tokyoness' in *About*

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[539] Wang Lingwei, 'Orunatibu-na chūgakusei mondai no kōchiku katei', *Masu conmunikeshon kenkyū*, 99 (2021), pp. 79–96.

[540] After the series ended in 2011, many audiences started to visit its shooting location in Horikiri and posted their experiences on the Internet. In 2018, *Kinpachi-sensei* was also headlined by the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as an attraction to promote the Kita-Senjū area. See https://www.ktr.mlit.go.jp/ktr_content/content/000680111.pdf.

Love, Tokyo? The answer could be simple: the riverbank in *About Love, Tokyo* is different from the one in *Kinpachi-sensei*. Geographically speaking, since the riverbank also passes through different wards of Tokyo along the Arakawa River, each site indeed contains largely different landscapes and views. Nevertheless, since the riverbank remains materially consistent across locations due to its practical purpose in the real world—to keep the river flowing in the right direction and protect the land from flooding—some visual elements of the riverbank in *About Love, Tokyo*, including the cement road and grass field, are also depicted in *Kinpachi-sensei*. In this way, what truly distinguishes the spatiality of the riverbank is how it is visually represented, and especially vis-à-vis other spaces depicted in the same work. For instance, the peaceful and welcoming *shitamachi* life in *Kinpachi-sensei* cannot solely be achieved by the portrayal of the riverbank—it requires depictions of the densely-packed single-family houses, the warm local cafeteria, and the friendly neighbours on the streets to make the worldview complete and consistent with itself.

While there is neither depiction of the surrounding areas around the riverbank nor clear signs to indicate where the riverbank is exactly located, we can still place the spatiality of the riverbank vis-à-vis the film's main stage set in the northern part of the Tokyo city—with recognisable scenes showing Fang and his Chinese friends living in a two-storey house in a *shitamachi* neighbourhood, hanging out around Ōtsuka station, and riding on the Arakawa tram. The urbanity of the area is depicted through its remarkable rhythm and speed, which is most significantly highlighted through the space of the Arakawa tram. After a scene where Fang saves Airin from her racist boss, the newly acquainted pair takes the Arakawa tram back. Unlike the often crowded and

suffocating image of the Tokyo subway cars packed with figures such as salarymen, the

tram is depicted as unhurried and spacious, giving Fang and Airin the space to

communicate with each other freely. [Figure 5.1] With the relaxing atmosphere of the

tram accompanied by the soothing string music on the soundtrack, Fang and Airin start

to exchange the Chinese and Japanese ways of saying numbers. The negotiation of their

cultural differences marks an opportunity for the two to develop a more intimate

relationship, as we see in the next scene when Fang invites Airin to attend a party in his

dormitory as his girlfriend. In this way, the Arakawa tram, and the slow speed and

relaxed rhythm it represents, becomes an enabler of the romantic relationship between

people of different cultural backgrounds.

Figure 5.1: Fang and Airin talking on the spacious and slow-moving Arakawa tram.
Still from Yanagimachi, *About Love, Tokyo* (22:45).

The Arakawa tram holds a unique position within Tokyo's transportation network,

according to Yoshimi Shunya, especially since the major changes in the city's

transportation system in 1964 for the Olympics Games. Unlike the other tram lines that were abolished to improve the city's traffic efficiency, the Arakawa tram remained due to the difficulties of setting up bus stops along its route and because of residents' strong wishes.[541] In this way, the tram represents the persistence of a local temporality in the face of a national agenda of urban development triggered by international events. Considering the preservation of the tram and its unique temporality important, Yoshimi argues that the slow mobility (13-14 km/h) of the Arakawa tram, in contrast to the high mobility of the cars and fast trains (40 km/h and above), marks a chance for one to view and experience Tokyo from a speed which symbolises the city in the early phase of its modernity between the 1880s and 1930s.[542] Associating the transnational romance with the unique speed of the tram, the film echoes Yoshimi in conceiving Tokyo's urbanity in the north in terms of a particular temporality with its own virtue, instead of considering it as something lagging or subsidiary to the more developed areas in the south like Ginza, Shibuya, and Shinjuku.

Nevertheless, there is also a gap between Yanagimachi's northern Tokyo and Yoshimi's, which can be further comprehended by analysing the space where the diasporic Chinese live. Unlike Yoshimi who sees Tokyo's 'slow-life' as something worth preserving and promoting, Yanagimachi conceives his characters as being rather involuntarily positioned or even trapped in the old town of the city. In the film, the Chinese diasporas cluster in a two-storey wooden house with other South Asian migrants, suggesting that their residence in the less-developed *shitamachi* is more of an economic

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[541] Yoshimi Shunya, *Tokyo uragaeshi: shakaigaku teki machiaruki gaido* (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2020), p. 37.
[542] Ibid., p.33-38.

choice than a cultural one. The house, or dormitory in practice, in the *shitamachi* neighbourhood always marks a barrier for the migrants' social mobility in Yanagimachi's oeuvre. A similar space appears in Yanagimachi's early work *Jūkyūsai no chizu/A 19-Year-Old's Map* (1979), a film that depicts a young boy Masaru (Honma Yūji), who migrates to Tokyo from a rural region in the hope of developing a career in the city but finds himself failing his university entrance exams and being trapped in a small dormitory in Ōji—also a stop on the Arakawa tram line—with poor working class workers. In both films, the *shitamachi* neighbourhood is not conceived as a symbol of nostalgic local life, worth cherishing and preserving, but rather as a bleak reality that restricts the poor migrants on the margins of the city. The marginal positioning of the Chinese diasporas partly explains why the film delivers a sense of urbanity was hard to be perceived as Tokyo's, even when some of the sites in the northern part of the city would be largely recognisable to Japanese audiences.

The marginal position of the film's Chinese characters in the city also implies their rather marginalised social position in Japanese society, something which can be easily located through their jobs, daily activities, and state of their mental health. For instance, the opening scene of the film shows two men working in an abattoir. The abattoir is depicted as a brutal and violent space, as we see the two men's job is to use a captive bolt on the animal's forehead to euthanize them and then dismember the animal's body. [Figure 5.2] It is only when the two men go to the manager's office to get their wages and exchange some words with him that audiences realize the two workers are indeed part-time labourers from China. When the Japanese manager asks if the two—our protagonist Fang and his roommate Zhang—are going to send the money back to their

families in Beijing, with a clearly disdainful attitude, the Chinese talk back by stating

that they came to Japan to study and they only work because Japan is too expensive for

them to live. The abattoir scene is closely tied to the actual condition of new overseas

Chinese in Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s. In reality, the decrease in birth rate and

the growing gap between rich and poor had left a huge blank in Japan's low-income job

market, which pushed the Japanese government to loosen its borders to introduce

foreign labourers into the country.[543] Unlike some South American *Nikkei* groups and

Southeast Asian workers who came to Japan in the late-1980s as simply labourers,

many Chinese entered Japan with an international student visa, as mentioned in this

chapter's introduction. Nevertheless, due to the PRC's restricted foreign currency

exchange policy and the huge gap in purchasing power between the Chinese and

Japanese currencies, many Chinese students found themselves unable to afford the cost

of living in Japan and were forced to 'immediately begin working at multiple part-time

jobs in order to survive.'[544] In this way, many new overseas Chinese in the late-1980s

and 1990s studied and worked at the same time as student-labourers in Japan.

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[543] Machimura Takashi, *Toshi ni kike* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing, 2020), p. 78.
[544] Gracia Liu-Farrer, *Labour Migration from China to Japan: International Students, Transnational Migrants* (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), p. 74.

Figure 5.2: Cattle being dismembered in the abattoir after being euthanized by the labourers. Still from Yanagimachi, *About Love, Tokyo* (2:58).

However, the film is not entirely accurate in its depiction of the actual historical situation and I do not want to argue that the film is a flawless and faithful reflection of reality. Moreover, to simply conceive of an ethnic group as marginalised might also serve as a form of discrimination against them since it tends to neglect the degree of heterogeneity within the overall group. Nevertheless, I find this Japanese filmmaker's interest in the Chinese migrants living in the margins to be worth examining, especially regarding how a space is discursively constituted to imagine ethnicity. The constitution of a space through a presumed stereotype and the marginality of a race, ethnicity, or social group is of course problematic. For instance, the exotic representation of the abattoir became a problem after the film's release. In the DVD version of the film, the distributor specially inserted an apologetic statement before the film's opening, claiming that the abattoir scenes are unaware of the history of the working space, which further stigmatises

the occupation and discriminate the people who work there—many of them from historically outcast groups in Japan, or *burakumin*. The DVD version I am analysing here presents a censored version of the film which removes some of the abattoir scenes deemed more discriminatory against *burakumin*. On the one hand, such an incident reminds us that the ethics of spatial representation needs to be taken care of with caution, as it is important to respect the history and heterogeneity of a space in imagining its association with a particular ethnic group. On the other hand, however, the cinematic interplay between the working space of the abattoir, Chinese migrant workers and *burakumin* also helps to reveal the very constructed nature of identity per se. While *burakumin* is usually regarded as a term to describe a specific group of people within Japan that have been marginalised and discriminated since the pre-Meiji caste system, in recent research, Kobayakawa Akira has traced the discursive emergence of the term *buraku* and argues that the term *burakumin* should be seen as a modern construction, since their status 'derives from the emergence of early capitalist transformations of Japanese society and the nature of work.'[545] In this way, although *About Love, Tokyo* might be unaware of the historical specificity of the abattoir as a working space, the juxtaposition of Chinese migrant workers and *burakumin* workers does uncover a shared social position via space defined not by a predetermined ethnic identity, but by the capitalist structure of labour.

Moreover, with the abattoir scenes obviously echoing Masaru's experience of restricted social mobility in *A 19-Year-Old's Map*, it becomes clear that Yanagimachi was interested not only in the material condition of the Chinese diasporas, but also the

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[545] Akira Kobayakawa, 'Japan's Modernization and Discrimination: What Are Buraku and Burakumin?', *Critical Sociology*, 47.1 (2021), p. 127.

individual's feeling of being marginalised in the Japanese society and restricted from moving up the social ladder. This is shown by the different attitudes of Fang and Zhang in responding to the manager of abattoir. While Fang responds in a rather calm nature to the manager's words, Zhang is obviously offended and tries to differentiate him from the other workers in the abattoir by prioritising his student status. *About Love, Tokyo* therefore does not try to represent the Chinese diasporas in Japan as a homogeneous entirety, but instead pays close attention to how individuals from the diasporic group perceive and react respectively to their daily experiences in the global city.

In summary, the depiction of the abattoir indicates that the film's intention was not to essentialise the characters simply as marginal but to show marginality as a dynamic constitution of one's social status, material condition, cultural identity, and the individual's self-awareness and expectations. Thus, the reason Tokyo as portrayed in *About Love, Tokyo* may have seemed unfamiliar was not solely due to the unusual depiction of urban spaces but more a case of the fresh assemblage of marginality per se. Nevertheless, it remains important to further investigate whether the film simply widened the presumed perceptual gap between the Japanese/'us' and Chinese/'others', or sought to actively utilise the space opened by the Chinese diaspora's subject position to criticise the stereotypes in Japanese society.

Thinking Diasporic Experience via Liminal *Kōgai* Space

Mapping *About Love, Tokyo*'s nuanced articulation of Tokyo through the subject position of its diasporic Chinese protagonists, it becomes crucial to ask what the film's intention was in conceiving such a spatiality for the diasporic subjects, and what vision it

might have stimulated in terms of reimagining the politics of the global city. It is important to notice that in her critique, Tanaka uses the Japanese word *kōgai* to describe the riverbank, as well as the space of the pachinko parlour. The term *kōgai,* literally translating to the outskirts of the city, needs to be further scrutinised as a discourse in its Japanese context. Miura Atsushi is one of the most prominent scholars in Japan who uses *kōgai* to indicate the expansion of Tokyo's living sphere into its nearby prefectures in the 1960s and beyond.[546] In Miura's account, the new *kōgai* towns emerged in the 1970s to solve the needs of the rapidly growing salarymen-centred households in Tokyo and symbolised Japan's nuclear family structure in the post-war in a way comparable to the United States' emerging suburbia space in the post-war.[547] The discursive formation of *kōgai* as middle-class suburbia can be found in films made in the same period. For instance, according to Tanaka Shimpei, *kōgai* in the 1963 film *Shitamachi no taiyō*/*The Sunshine Girl* (Yamada Yōji) symbolised the affluent middle-class life dreamt of by the workers in Tokyo's *shitamachi*.[548]

Nevertheless, as Tanaka also mentions, the discourse of *kōgai* has constantly been in flux throughout Japan's post-war history, which suggests the imaginaries embedded within the space also vary in different times.[549] Instead of symbolising affluent middle-class life in the suburbs, the pachinko parlour in *About Love, Tokyo* might be closer to the 'fast-*fūdo*' *kōgai* space coined by Miura in the 2000s. Miura develops the concept of 'fast-*fūdo*' (fast climate) to indicate how the development of new *kōgai* towns in local cities

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[546] Miura Atsushi, *Kazoku to kōgai no shakaigaku: daiyon yamanote-kata raifusutairu no kenkyū* (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūsho, 1995), pp. 13-22.
[547] Ibid., p.82.
[548] Tanaka Shimpei, 'Kōgai eiga kennkyū: komyuniti no yukue', *Geijutsu: Osaka geijutsu daigaku kiyō*, 34 (2011), pp. 64-65.
[549] Ibid., p.65.

has homogenised suburban landscapes across Japan and destroyed the history, tradition, value, and lifestyle of local communities in the same way that its homophone, 'fast food' has done in other sectors.[550] Miura particularly mentions that the scenery along the main road of these new towns is always occupied by the same line-up of fast food restaurants, discount shops, and pachinko parlours, which he considers 'unpleasant to even look at'.[551] The pachinko parlour that Endō owns in the film can be seen as one such 'fast-*fūdo*' space, since it looks identical to any other pachinko parlour across Japan, marked by the large parking lot outside of its massive main building in contrast to the desolate scenery of the surrounding area. Simply by looking at the architecture and its surroundings, there is no way one could tell where the parlour is located and nothing that makes it distinct, which suggests the homogenised nature of the space.

Although *About Love, Tokyo* was shot a decade earlier before Miura's concept was coined, Yanagimachi was clearly aware of the problem of suburban homogenisation represented by the *kōgai* space due to his own migrant background. Yanagimachi was born and raised in Ibaraki, a prefecture adjacent to Tokyo that turned into one of the metropolis' satellite towns following *kōgai* development. At the age of eighteen, Yanagimachi left his hometown and moved to Tokyo. In an interview, the director frankly acknowledges that when he returned to his hometown years later, life in the region had thoroughly collapsed because of suburban development.[552] In this way, we can imagine Yanagimachi was both aware and critical of the homogenisation process of *kōgai* development. Nevertheless, it is necessary to clarify that the *kōgai* space in *About Love,*

[550] Miura Atsushi, 'Kyōhi shakai kata no machizukuri: toshi to nōson no hakyoku o koete', *Ie to machinami*, 50 (2004), pp. 48–51.
[551] Ibid., p.48.
[552] 'Ainitsuite Tokyo: satsuei genba hōmon', p. 62.

Tokyo still needs to be distinguished from Miura's neologism of 'fast-*fūdo*'—since the latter contains much of Miura's own agenda of promoting local rehabilitation and should also be approached from a discursive perspective. Moreover, Fang's subject position as a diasporic student-labourer from the PRC should not be confused with Miura's since the sociologist's subjects are always assumed to be Japanese natives with domestic 'origins.'

Departing from Miura's theorisation, the sociologist Wakabayashi Mikio's approach may be a more productive way to conceive of the *kōgai* space in *About Love, Tokyo*. Unlike Miura's political, economy-oriented studies, Wakabayashi refers to his own experience of being born and raised in a gentrified *kōgai* town to emphasise the various perceptual and emotional realms contained by the space, as well as the different meanings and possibilities of *kōgai* for various subjects to emerge.[553] Following Wakabayashi's suggestion, we can see the *kōgai* in *About Love, Tokyo* as a space of subjective formation, where the diasporic subject is not represented as being fixed by the space but being transformed through various spatial encounters. Considering the dynamic relationship between subjectivity and space, the *kōgai* here can be translated into a space of liminality instead of suburbia. The concept of liminality was first coined in anthropological studies to describe the transitional stage of a ritual and it has since been used more broadly to indicate the state of transition or in-betweenness, a threshold where individuals, groups, or societies are temporarily isolated from social norms or the dominant order.[554] The concept implies the subjective perception of one's position within the world, the relative positionality of 'in-between', without neglecting the material space that one shares with

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[553] Wakabayashi Mikio, 'Toshi to kōgai no shakaigaku', in *Kōgai to gendaishakai* (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2000), pp. 18-30.

[554] Bjørn Thomassen, 'The Uses and Meanings of Liminality', *International Political Anthropology*, 2.1 (2009), pp. 5–28.

others in the 'ritual'. In other words, it can be useful to not only examine one's subject position but also the inter-subjective experience via space and the spatial formation of one's subjectivity. Moreover, the discourse of *kōgai* implies a tautology of liminality, since the *kōgai* space is always discursively 'non-categorical' and its position is constantly shifting with the changing relationship between the city and rural areas.[555] In other words, *kōgai* itself is only imaginable as a liminal space 'in-between' and permanently 'in transition,' that doubles via the ever-shifting subjectivity of the human agents.

The Arakawa riverbank's liminal status is most significantly represented by the highway bridges above the ground of the riverbank. Throughout the film, we see the highway bridges being deliberately prioritised in the centre of the riverbank's *mise-en-scène*, with the protagonists riding, making love, and quarrelling beneath them. The overwhelming presence of the highway bridges suggests a specific space of in-betweenness, a gateway of both entering and leaving the city. In other words, the very material existence of the highway bridges already implies an end of the space as Tokyo city as well as a transitional channel to another place. [Figure 5.3] In *About Love, Tokyo*, the riverbank serves as a thematic space for Fang, who enjoys going to the site with his bicycle and resting on the grass field. It also serves a purpose in the film's narrative, seeing how every time Fang visits the riverbank, he is going through some life-changing events. The riverbank itself serves a symbol of liminality in-between different decisive moments of Fang's life in Tokyo. Furthermore, the spatiality of the riverbank shows how Fang is being pushed and pulled by two forces: a quiet, slow, and

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[555] Tanaka Shimpei, 'Kōgai eiga kennkyū', p. 63.

relaxing force on the ground, marked by the grass fields, and a risky, fast, and intense force above his head marked by the highway bridges. Together, the *kōgai* riverbank reveals Fang's position in Tokyo not simply as a marginal one but more specifically a liminal one—the former suggesting a rather static position at the margins, while the latter indicates a dynamic process that is always in-between different forces and in transition towards a yet unknown direction.

Figure 5.3: Zhou and Airin riding bicycles on the riverbank
and overshadowed by the highway bridges.
Still from Yanagimachi, *About Love, Tokyo* (32:38).

In his monograph about liminality, the anthropologist Bjørn Thomassen suggests liminality has three overlapping layers, namely an individual level, group level, and society level, and each of these layers may persist for a short while (moment), a long while (period), or enduringly (epoch) in relation to the human subject.[556] Approaching

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[556] Bjørn Thomassen, *Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014), pp. 89-90.

About Love, Tokyo from Thomassen's theory, we may investigate how Fang's nationality (society), diasporic identity (group), and personal conditions (individual) enact the transformation of his subjectivity in Tokyo. As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, China was going through the process of 'reform and opening-up' under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, as the former socialist regime actively adjusted itself to embrace the dominant capitalist order of the world and marketise the country's economy. The encouragement for studying abroad that sends Fang to Tokyo reflects the nation's new political orientation. Although the film does not overly emphasise how Fang's nationality influences his life in Tokyo, there is a scene that depicts Fang writing a letter and sending some money back to his parents in Beijing. In the letter, Fang tells his parents that his life and study in Tokyo are all fine and he has saved some money from part-time jobs. Although not a large sum in Japan, Fang writes, the money is adequate to purchase many things in China, so he asks his parents to buy a video recorder with the money. As this scene may correctly indicate the actual economic gap between China and Japan in the early 1990s, it also reveals how overseas individuals like Fang played an important societal role in the PRC's transition into a market economy through not only remittances of foreign capital but also, more importantly, the ideology and know-how of capitalist consumption. In this way, we can see how the social transition of Chinese society and the life decision and experience of individuals—both the overseas Fang and his parents in Beijing who receive the money and may or may not choose to buy a video deck—are mutually constituted in a liminal manner.

Nevertheless, we also need to understand that no matter how wonderful the life in Tokyo might sound in his letter, Fang is the one who mediates all these experiences,

especially through his concealing of all the negative facets of capitalist society which elides the many economic, ideological, and cultural gaps between his host and home country and creates a promising picture of China's globalisation for his parents and people. In this way, Fang's diasporic identity remains the central point by which to examine his liminal experience in Tokyo. Indeed, according to Thomassen's theory, diasporas are essentially a liminal group since most of them will forever remain 'betwixt and between old and new culture' and "lived at the edge of 'normal structure'".[557] The uncomfortable and even painful feelings of living in-between and at the edge are articulated by the scenes of Zhang's farewell party. Unlike Fang, who seems to be rather flexible in dealing with all the happenings in Tokyo, Zhang is upset with his position as student-labourer and decides to return to his home country. In the farewell party, the film depicts all the Chinese diasporas, together with their South Asian roommates, gathering in the living room and sharing food with each other. Saying farewell to Zhang with various kinds of emotions, the Chinese start to chorus a popular diasporic song *Guxiang De Yun* (*Hometown Clouds*) by the famous singer Fei Xiang (English name Kris Phillips)—a Taiwan-born Chinese American who rose to national fame in the PRC in the 1980s. The lyrics call for diasporic Chinese to return to their homeland, showcasing a liminal experience supposedly shared by the Chinese diasporas. Nevertheless, it creates an affective state of liminality that is inter-subjective as the South Asian migrants in the same space are apparently also moved by the Chinese diaspora's chorus. We can see this scene as a manifestation of what Victor Turner calls 'spontaneous *communitas*', a state of liminality where people "place a high value on personal honesty, openness, and lack of

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[557] Ibid., p.90.

pretension' and 'relate directly to another person… in the here-and-now'.[558] While we should not blindly accept that the shared liminal experience can always create inter-subjective bonding as Thomassen correctly reminds us,[559] it can still be useful to conceive a common ground shared by individuals based on their shared experience instead of simply an imagined identity. Since the South Asian migrants are clearly not familiar with either the Chinese pop song or Fei Xiang, it is the spontaneous *communitas* generated by the migrant ritual that affects all the participants regardless of their cultural knowledge.

Moreover, the idea of *communitas* enables us to think beyond the narrative of the film to consider how the diasporic Chinese images were produced in a particularly collaborative manner. Although Yanagimachi's depictions of Chinese diasporas' lives in Tokyo are clearly related to his own interests, instead of arbitrarily based on imposing his thoughts onto the characters, he conducted abundant research that included interviews with the Chinese diasporas during the scriptwriting stage when making *About Love, Tokyo*.[560] Even with these early efforts, the film does not try to depict migration and diasporic experience as 'knowledge.' Instead, the filmmaker largely integrated his own personal experience of migration into the plot. For instance, the highway bridges over the riverbank were directly linked to Yanagimachi's hometown in Ibaraki.[561] Although this might be perceived as the director has imposing his will onto the Chinese diasporas in the film, I argue that diasporic identity has been de-essentialised throughout the process as

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[558] Victor Turner, *From Ritual to Theater: The Human Seriousness of Play* (New York: PAJ Publications, 1982), pp. 47-48.
[559] Thomassen, *Liminality and the Modern*, pp. 83-84.
[560] 'Ainitsuite Tokyo: satsuei genba hōmon', pp. 87–90.
[561] Ibid., p.88.

not merely attached to one's origins but based on the shared experience of movement. In this case, the liminal spatiality of the riverbank generates a *communitas* shared by the filmmaker and his characters. Moreover, since the farewell party scene was indeed mostly decorated and designed by the diasporic Chinese actors of the film,[562] it further suggests that the production process of the film was full of collaborations and negotiations.

While both national and diasporic identities are vital aspects of Fang's liminal experience in Tokyo, the film's main story is still about the love triangle between Fang, Airin, and Endō. On one hand, it is through these melodramatic sequences that we can further understand how space and identity are enacted upon one's feeling of liminality in their everyday life. On the other hand, as we frame the possible juncture between the Japanese filmmaker and the diasporic Chinese actors and characters in the film, the development of Fang's story and his final transition at the end of the story can also help to reveal the many gaps embedded within Yanagimachi's depiction of diasporic Chinese lives in Tokyo. While the previous sections focused on the in-between aspect of liminality in the, the following analysis will be more focused on how 'transition' is conceived and represented in *About Love, Tokyo*.

Navigating the Global City with Flexible Mobility

On an individual level, Fang's liminal situation is caused by his love triangle with the female protagonist Airin and the retired-yakuza Endō. Fang's encounter with Endō represents a liminal moment, a sudden event that heavily affects one's life, according to

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[562] 'Kimura Tekeo Interview', *Kinema junpō*, 1085, 1992, p. 102.

Thomassen,[563] as he is caught by Endō in the latter's pachinko parlour while having an affair. Endō confiscates Fang's passport and threatens to deport Fang back to China if the Chinese man cannot pay back his loss. Passports signify a lifeline for liminal groups like migrants, and Fang is willing to give up anything for its return. When Fang realises Endō's actual target is Airin, he sells his girlfriend to the Japanese man in exchange for returning his passport and some money. In a decisive scene that marks Fang's betrayal, the Chinese man invites Airin to hang out with him on Endō's yacht. In order to gain his life in Tokyo back from Endō—as the rich and powerful Japanese man offers to not only return the passport but also provide the cheat code for his pachinko machines to Fang—Fang gets off the yacht halfway and leaves Airin alone with Endō.

As the yacht scene suggests, one's social status is intrinsically correlated to how one moves in the city. The Tokyo cruise on the river, in contrast to Fang's usual position of sitting on the riverbank and looking towards the river, marks the enormous gap between the two men's social status. In contrast to Endō's ways of moving in the film, either by Mercedes or yacht, Fang mostly relies on his bicycle for transportation, which in turns is a tempting symbol of stereotypical Chinese backwardness, used to emphasise the temporal gap between Japan and China in the early 1990s. If Japan's economic and political power in the age of globalisation is marked by its dominant automobile industry, especially highlighted by the increasing interest in the organisational model of 'Toyotism' in replace of 'Fordism',[564] China until the early 2000s was still largely recognised as the

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563 Bjørn Thomassen, *Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014), p. 90.
564 Knuth Dohse, Ulrich Jürgens, and Thomas Malsch, 'From "Fordism" to "Toyotism"? The Social Organization of the Labor Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry', *Politics & Society*, 14.2 (1985), pp. 115–46.

'kingdom of the bicycle' or *jitensha ōkoku* in Japanese. For instance, in his study of the representation of bicycles in 1930s and 40s Chinese cinema, Shirai Keisuke opens the article with a stunning question: 'is the image of China being associated with bicycles now taken for granted?'[565] Instead of the answer, it is the question itself that serves as proof that even in 2002, when Shirai's article was published, the association between bicycles and China was still largely essentialised in Japan's popular discourse—although according to Paul Smethurst 'the rapid increase in motorised transport' no longer made China 'the kingdom of the bicycle' in the 1990s.[566] Analysing Fang's bicycle through this line of thought, the diaspora's mobility in the film might be interpreted in terms of a biased view towards Chinese people.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to highlight that although the film portrays Fang as an individual limited by his migrant status and economic situation, it does not aim to depict him as being completely limited and unable to take an active role in life. Fang's mobility can be investigated through how he navigates through Tokyo's urban spaces, including the liminal ones. Instead of being totally confined by the Arakawa riverbank, Fang considers the space his playground, as we see him bringing not only Airin but also his other Chinese friends to the space—also with his bicycle. Though the bicycle is a rather slow mode of moving and can be used to indicate Fang's strained economic condition, we also see the bicycle taking Fang across various urban and *kōgai* spaces rather nimbly, and sometimes even transgressively, as marked by a scene where Fang sneaks Airin out from the Endō's villa with his bicycle. [Figure 5.4] In this way, the

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[565] Shirai Keisuke, 'Modan wa jidensha ni notte: chūkoku eiga no naka no jidensha', *Bunkyo University, Bulletin of The Faculty of Language and Literature*, 15.2 (2002), p. 54.
[566] Paul Smethurst, *The Bicycle - Towards a Global History* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 141.

bicycle is actually no longer a sign of Fang's economic weakness, but rather a flexible

vehicle for navigating different spaces within the city including those outside Tokyo's

kōgai.

Figure 5.4: Fang sneaking Airin out from Endō's villa with his bicycle.
Still from Yanagimachi, *About Love, Tokyo* (72:55).

What is the Japanese director's intention in constructing Fang's mobility in flexible

terms and with the potential of transgression? I suggest that Yanagimachi argues for

flexibility as essential to survival in the age of globalisation, especially for a migrant like

Fang. Flexibility firstly represents one's adaptability to any kind of challenge in a fast-

changing world, which usually requires one to give up something in exchange. Before

Fang gives up his lover for his immigrant status, he firstly tries to pay money back to

Endō by selling his body. Fang contacts one of his Chinese friends who works as a male

escort in a host club and asks how much he can get if he sells his body for sexual services.

Hearing the friend say 30,000-yen, Fang is apparently irritated. Nevertheless, when the friend tells Fang he is only worth 20,000-yen, Fang finally accepts the offer. Comparing the value of his body with his friend's marks Fang's acceptance of the alienated rules of capitalism. In the next scene, we see Fang with a middle-aged Japanese woman in a love hotel. While the woman is completely naked, Fang wears a bath towel around his waist to cover his genitals. When the woman asks Fang to take off his towel and give her a dance, Fang seems to be disgusted and refuses to do so. Nevertheless, we soon realise it may have been a bargaining trick, since Fang immediately takes off his towel and starts dancing after the woman puts an extra 20,000 yen on the table. As this scene suggests, Fang is not only flexible in giving up his body for money, but he soon learns how to adapt to the rules of the market.

As the prostitution scene suggests, sexuality plays a crucial role in Fang's mobility. The precondition for Fang to offer sexual services is his capability to have sex, which should be further politicised in contrast to Endō's sexual impotence. Although Endō is depicted as a powerful man with a masculine appearance, refined clothing, and substantial wealth, he is also deeply troubled by his erectile dysfunction. Not only is his wife having an affair with a staff member in the pachinko parlour, but Endō is also unable to achieve a normal erection even with his desire for Airin. Airin thus constantly sneaks away from Endō's luxurious villa to Fang's shabby room to have sex with the Chinese man. In this way, sexual capacity becomes a fulcrum for reversing the power relations between Endō and Fang. If we approach the film's depiction of sexuality from Iwabuchi Koichi's critique of Japan's 'Asian fever' in the 1990s, we can unravel the plot from a geopolitical perspective. According to Iwabuchi, part of Japan's interest in Asian popular culture has

long been based on an imagined temporal gap which assumes Japan to be more advanced in terms of modernisation than its Asian neighbours.[567] In the 1990s, however, when the Japanese economy began facing decline, the less-developed Asia symbolised a new source of vitality. Iwabuchi thus claims that consuming this energetic and vital Asian culture became a necessary step in the process of Japan regaining its own once promising future.[568] While the impotent Japanese man and the virile Chinese man can be seen as symbolic of Iwabuchi's critique, the film itself is not associated with the popular Asian cultural products which Iwabuchi speaks about. In contrast, it ironically mocks Japan's wish to regain vitality from Asia, which is marked by Endō's consumption of Chinese medicine in the film every time he tries to have sex with Airin—although this always ends up in failure.

While the contrast between Endō and Fang's sexual capability can be approached in terms of geopolitics, *About Love, Tokyo* does not essentialise Fang's virility and mobility as necessarily a trait of his PRC nationality or Chinese ethnicity. For instance, one of Fang's roommates Li, who comes to Japan with his wife, is largely trapped by his life in Tokyo. The film shows Li, who is unwilling to find a part-time job besides studying, relying totally on his wife for finances. As Li's wife begins to work as a female escort in the hostess club to support the family, Li feels deeply ashamed and starts to quarrel with his wife. The ending of the film depicts Li unable to bear it anymore and choosing to kill his wife. Though both are Chinese migrants, Li is essentially different from Fang in terms of how they treat their heterosexual partner's sex work. Unlike Fang, who is willing to

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[567] Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 158-167.
[568] Ibid., pp.173-177.

sacrifice Airin as his cash cow to gain benefits from Endō, Li's collapse is not only caused by his wife's sexual relationship with her Japanese guests but also led by the fact that she is the one who is feeding the family—including their child in China. In other words, it is the subversion of gender power in the heteronormative nuclear family which ultimately leads to the tragedy. The wife's power is directly linked to her mobility to transgress the boundaries of the family space, as we see the final straw that breaks the camel's back for Li being triggered by his wife always going out to the city to work and not coming back home before midnight. The image of the wife, with her elaborate makeup, dressed in a glamorous outfit, and constantly being away from home, contrasts strongly with the image of Li, who is always sloppy and stays in his room eating instant noodles by himself.

Taking both Endō and Li's stories under consideration, the film's depiction of Fang's mobility in Tokyo is ultimately about gender, or more specifically a 'way out' for masculinity at a time when capitalism resoundingly declares its victory while all the existing social structures face disintegration under the fluidity of globalisation. As *About Love, Tokyo* suggests, both the macho masculinity of Endō and the stay-at-home masculinity of Li fail completely, and only the flexible and adaptable Fang survives. Nevertheless, Yanagimachi is hardly celebrating the triumph of this type of masculinity represented by Fang, and the scene that marks the end of Fang's relationship with Airin—again, set in the liminal space of the Arakawa riverbank—proves this point. After a passionate sexual engagement on the grass field, Fang and Airin sit down towards the river and the Chinese man starts to sing a Shanghainese folk song, *Mo Li Hua* (*Jasmin Flower*). The song reminds the Japan-born Chinese Airin of her hometown in Shanghai, where she has always wanted to visit, and the woman finally realises Fang is only using

her to make money. It is Airin who proposes to end their toxic relationship to chase her dreams while Fang tries to salvage the relationship by stating that dreams do not make money but only cause loss. Rain starts to fall on the riverbank and cover the lovers' bodies, a symbol of the end of a liminal stage for both. As we see in the scenes after, Airin disappears from Tokyo while Fang decides to remain, surviving as a male escort in the host club after losing Airin, who was his source of income. The last scene on the riverbank shows Fang, always previously riding his bicycle away from the cityscape in the background, now confidently riding towards the city, implying that the Chinese migrant has started to accept the reality of the global city despite the persistence of his liminal feelings. [Figure 5.5]

Figure 5.5: Fang leaving the Arakawa riverbank and riding towards the city.
Still from Yanagimachi, *About Love, Tokyo* (108:55).

An overarching look at *About Love, Tokyo* also reveals how Yanagimachi is clearly critical of capitalism's alienation of individuals, as well as how he utilises the recently 'converted' socialist subject to showcase how thoroughly money may change a person. Focusing on unconventional spaces like the *kōgai* and *shitamachi* suggests Yanagimachi is aware of the heterogeneity of the city and the coevalness of the various subjects living in contemporary Tokyo. However, by portraying Fang's eventual integration into Tokyo, the city is eventually reduced to a space of global capitalism. Since all the Chinese migrants in the film either fail to survive or are assimilated by the system, it is fair to argue that Yanagimachi is ultimately pessimistic about any positive changes migration may bring to Japanese society. Yanagimachi sees the Chinese diasporas' fate as the same as that of his hometown in Ibaraki: pure and hopeful but eventually homogenised by capitalism.

From Arakawa to Roppongi: The Fixing of Diasporic Chinese Masculinity in Tokyo

Intentionally or not, Fang's transition into a money-oriented hustler in *About Love, Tokyo* feeds into the discursive formation of a new and problematic type of Chinese masculinity in Japan, one which would become more frequently represented in popular media and thus more widely recognised by audiences in Japan. In the 1990s, there was an increasing number of Japanese films that depicted the newly arrived overseas Chinese men as unruly and even criminal, and the most popular genre for them to appear were yakuza films (gang films), most of which used Tokyo's Kabukicho neighbourhood in Shinjuku as its stage. In yakuza films like *Shinjuku kuroshakai: chaina mafia*

sensō/*Shinjuku Triad Society* (Miike Takashi, 1995) and *Fuyajō*/*Sleepless Town* (Lee Chi-Ngai, 1998), Chinese are depicted as not simply individual criminals but full-on organised gangs who incite conflict with local Japanese yakuza groups and fight over the territory in Kabukicho. Although there was certainly an actual influx of Chinese migrants, both legal and illegal, into the Kabukicho area, which caused several violent clashes with the local police and Japanese yakuza,[569] the stereotype of Chinese-in-Japan as criminals was mostly constituted by the Japanese media in the 1990s. According to Andrew Rankin, the number of crimes committed by foreign migrants in Japan was 'extremely small' in comparison with other countries, and the Chinese mafia who made it to the news headlines were also mostly from 'small street gangs' rather than the massive, violent, crime syndicates portrayed in most popular media.[570]

For Rankin, the 'public discussion of organised crimes…by Asian nationals in particular, is increasingly tinged with racist innuendo or irrationally linked to war history.'[571] A large part of this discrimination was directly projected onto Chinese men, which in turn gradually developed into a stereotype of Chinese masculinity in Japan. Just as the representation of Fang as sexually charged correlated with the pervasive feeling of economic stagnation in 1990s Japan, Jamie Coates reminds us that the imagining of China and Chinese men in terms of 'a form of vibrancy that was lost during Japan's accelerated modernisation' emerged as early as the immediate post-war period.[572] Nevertheless,

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[569] Tsu, 'Black Market, Chinatown, and Kabukicho', pp. 143-148.
[570] Andrew Rankin, 'Recent Trends in Organized Crime in Japan: Yakuza vs the Police, & Foreign Crime Gangs ~ Part 2', *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 10.7 (2012), pp. 10-11.
[571] Ibid., p.9.
[572] Jamie Coates, 'Persona, Politics, and Chinese Masculinity in Japan: The Case of Li Xiaomu', in *The Cosmopolitan Dream: Transnational Chinese Masculinities in a Global Age*, eds. by Derek Hird and Geng Song (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019), p. 130.

following the surge of Chinese migration to Japan from the late-1980s, Chinese virility started to become a symbol of menace—Fang's cheating at pachinko can be seen as an example of Chinese men not 'playing by the rules' of Japan.[573] As Japan further lost its economic advantages in the 1990s after the burst of its economic bubble, the question of a vital and vibrant Chinese masculinity became simultaneously desired and threatening, with Chinese men perceived as both 'scapegoats and objects of admiration' in Japanese society.[574] The violent, greedy, yet vigorous and proactive Chinese gangsters depicted in yakuza films can be seen as a perfect illustration of such tendencies.

To further consider the discourse of Chinese masculinity in Japan we may now move to another film made in the 1990s which also depicts the life of a diasporic Chinese male in Tokyo: *Tokyo Skin,* by the Japanese director Hanawa Yukinari which premiered in 1996, four years after the release of *About Love, Tokyo*. In terms of production, circulation, and exhibition, the two films barely share any similarities.[575] While *About Love, Tokyo* was funded by companies like Pioneer LDC and distributed by the famous *Kinema Junpō* magazine—probably because of Yanagimachi's renowned reputation in international film festival circles—*Tokyo Skin* was produced and distributed solely by Hanawa's own independent company, Only Hearts. Nevertheless, it is significant that both films are interested in how one Chinese man lives and sees Tokyo, and how both films choose to localise the diasporic Chinese experience in a particular part of the contemporary Tokyo cityscape. Unlike *About Love, Tokyo,* which positions its subject in the rather

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[573] Ibid., p.131.
[574] Ibid.
[575] The only similarity might be that both films have received a certain degree of recognition internationally. For instance, *About Love, Tokyo* was exhibited in Venice and won an award in Three Continents Festival, and *Tokyo Skin* was selected by Rotterdam.

marginalised space of *shitamachi* and *kōgai*, *Tokyo Skin* portrays the life of a Chinese

man in one of the most economically advanced parts of the city, Roppongi. While the

positions that the two Chinese protagonists take in Tokyo might seem to be comprised of

two extremes, there are many continuities in terms of the two films' imaginaries. In many

ways, Zhou in *Tokyo Skin* can even be seen as a future version of Fang, if we recall the

open ending of *About Love Tokyo* which features the Chinese man navigating himself out

of the liminal space and integrating into Tokyo's 'degenerate' life. While Fang is still a

young man learning about life in a capitalist society, Zhou is already thirty and is

acquainted with the rules of the concrete jungle and adept in exploiting others for benefits.

It is a fortunate coincidence that, compared to Fang, who only stays in Tokyo for one year

in 1992, Zhou is depicted as a person who has already lived in the metropolis for five

years by 1996. The timelines of the two men's lives in Tokyo therefore match perfectly.

The two films combined exemplify the desire for Chinese virility and the anxiety about

containing its excess as two sides of the same coin in the world Japanese cinema in the

1990s. Thus, although the two films are independent projects and should not be easily

equated, juxtaposing the two characters helps to open much more space to further explore

Tokyo vis-à-vis the nuanced representation of diasporic Chinese masculinity.

The protagonist of *Tokyo Skin* is Zhou, played by the diasporic Chinese actor Xiu

Jian, a thirty-year-old Chinese migrant who has already lived in Tokyo for five years.

Zhou owns a private agency called 'Zhou's consulting office for foreigners' with two of

his Chinese friends. Their agency claims to handle all legal and illegal problems for its

customers, such as making fake passports, selling stolen brand goods, and organising

sham marriages. However, they usually just deceive their clients for money instead of

actually solving their problems. At the same time, Zhou is a playboy who is famous in Roppongi's local nightclub scene, always bringing home a different woman. The main story takes off when Zhou bumps into the mysterious Japanese woman Kyōko (Takahashi Mika), who is searching for her runaway Chinese boyfriend Kaimeng. After taking advantage of Kyōko who is desperately in need of help several times, Zhou falls in love with the woman and decides to sincerely help her to find Kaimeng. However, the investigation only leads to the skeletons of Kyōko's past and the eventual break-up of Zhou and Kyōko's relationship. After his Chinese business partner absconds with the company's money, the film ends with Zhou reaching a low point in his life, wandering aimlessly in the streets of Roppongi at night.

It is worth clarifying first that in terms of genre, *Tokyo Skin* shares its theme with many other films made in the 1990s which portray how people from different countries and ethnic backgrounds coexist in Japanese society. Although Zhou's story serves as the main thread of the film, *Tokyo Skin* adopts a multiple narrative strategy by also presenting the stories of a Japanese painter (Yukio Yamato) who returns from New York to get back with his ex-girlfriend Yōko (KOKO), a Pakistani labourer (Ali Ahmed) who gets scammed by his fellow-countryman, and a delinquent Japanese high-schooler (Kanai Asami) who likes to hang out with foreigners in Roppongi. These stories develop mostly in parallel with Zhou's, without the characters necessarily encountering each other, and together they compose a vivid scene of Roppongi's multicultural nightlife from various subject positions. In this way, the movie belongs to a larger corpus of Japanese films made in the late-1980s to early 1990s that portray Japan as a multicultural society—

especially considering how Hanawa served as a long-time associate director for Hayashi Kaizō, a director well known for his portrayal of multi-ethnic subjects in Japan.

For Mika Ko, so-called multicultural films produced in the era, represented by Iwai Shunji's internationally renowned *Suwarôteiru/Swallowtail Butterfly* (1996), are only multicultural on the surface since they only celebrate and entertain 'superficial cultural diversity' to maintain 'Japan's superior position' and use "'the others' to confirm … Japanese national identity."[576] Approaching multicultural films from Ko's perspective reveals how this genre can be seen as the other side of the same coin for yakuza films. Both tend to express pervasive sentiments of anxiety, fear, and even hatred towards the increase of foreign migrants in Japan and serve as a backlash against the dissolution of national borders and the acceleration of transnational flows brought on by globalisation. From a sociological perspective, as Kura Shinichi suggests through his study of the neoconservative magazine *SAPIO*, before the fixation of the Chinese's criminal image in popular discourse in 1993, the magazine mostly associated Chinese migrants with the term *konjū*, or 'mixed-living' in English.[577] The idea of *konjū*, according to Kura, suggests an exploration and expectation of Japanese nationals living harmoniously with other ethnic groups.[578] Nevertheless, *konjū*'s ideal blueprint of multicultural mixed-living is still based on the expectation of integrating non-Japanese people into a dominant Japanese society, something which presumes there is no degree of heterogeneity within Japanese society per se. The yakuza genre, thus, can be seen as a radical form of

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[576] Ko, *Japanese Cinema and Otherness*, p. 37.
[577] Kura Shinichi, 'Hoshukei opinion-shi ni okeru gaikokujin gensetsu (1): 1990 nendai zenhan made no sasshi Sapio o chūshin ni', *Bulletin of Miyazaki Municipal University Faculty of Humanities*, 2006, pp. 113–28.
[578] Ibid., pp.119-120.

multiculturalism—since many indeed depict conflicts between various ethnic groups—after the shattering of its dream of coexistence in the mid-1990s. Ko's analysis of Miike Takashi's multicultural yakuza films that are 'based more on cynicism and pessimism than on cosmetic multiculturalism' reveals such a tendency.[579] Due to various reasons including the increasingly anxious atmosphere of the society led by the burst of Japan's bubble economy, the idealised notion of *konjū* was largely replaced by the idea of blatant conflict in yakuza images—as the latter tended to articulate the impossibility of living peacefully with others. In this way, the changing imagination of multiculturalism echoed 'vital-criminal' Chinese masculinity in Japanese perceptions. As the good/*konjū*/vital and bad/yakuza/criminal take turns in leading the imaginary of the others in popular discourse, the multiculturalist spectrum needs to be further explored to unpack the limits of the global city. Considering the critique of multicultural films in existing scholarship as a departure point, this chapter will now explore how the particular urban imaginary and characters in *Tokyo Skin* might be said to reinforce or disturb such structures.

The Shifting imagination of Roppongi's Multicultural Vibrancy

It seems to be intuitive for a film attempting to portray the multicultural landscape of Tokyo to set its story in the alleys of Roppongi. According to Roman A. Cybriwsky, 'for most of the second half of the twentieth century, Roppongi was one of the favourite places to play in Tokyo…in an international atmosphere at that, at least as international as Tokyo had to offer'.[580] Studying the urban history of Roppongi and especially its development

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[579] Ko, *Japanese Cinema and Otherness*, p. 62.
[580] Roman Adrian Cybriwsky, *Roppongi Crossing: The Demise of a Tokyo Nightclub District and the Reshaping of a Global City* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2011), p. 1.

in the post-war, Cybriwsky argues that Roppongi has been playing a huge role in Tokyo's global city transformation and promotion. Located in the Southwestern part of Tokyo, Roppongi belongs to the historically more prestigious region of Yamanote. During the U.S. occupation era, some foreigner-oriented restaurants and bars were established in Roppongi, and it became a gathering spot for young people interested in immersing themselves in foreign culture. Nevertheless, it wasn't until the opening of the Hibiya subway line in 1964 that Roppongi became 'one of the city's premier entertainment districts.'[581] With the rapid development of night entertainment such as nightclubs, dancing halls, and live music venues, as well as the sex industry including strip clubs and host clubs, [582] Roppongi became one of the main nightlife centres of Tokyo during the bubble economy era. Moreover, since the cluster of international restaurants and entertainment in the district, marked by the opening of Tokyo's first Hard Rock Café in 1983,[583] Roppongi also turned into a nightly gathering spot for foreigners visiting or living in Tokyo.

Although Roppongi had been a popular nightlife district since the post-war, it was not commonly associated with cinema until the 1980s—as mentioned in Chapter Three, there were not even any film venues in the Roppongi district until the mini-theatre boom. Similarly, Roppongi's role in films was also rather minor in comparison to other urban centres in Tokyo like Shinjuku or the Ginza. Nevertheless, since the 1980s, Roppongi became more visible in Japanese cinema in order to represent the luxurious, vibrant, and multicultural landscape of the global city. For instance, the 1989 film *Tokyo Banana Boys*,

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[581] Ibid., p.91.
[582] Ibid., pp.91-98.
[583] Ibid., p.92.

directed by Sai Yōichi and Ōshima Nagisa's associate director Narita Yūsuke, opens with a display of the night life in Roppongi, featuring the performance of a foreigner-composed rock band in a night club, as well as documentary-style shots of foreigners wandering the Roppongi streets. However, as the story progresses, we see two Japanese punks—the protagonists of the film—trying to save a white American woman from Roppongi's local yakuza group, but eventually finding out that the women's purpose in Japan is to sell cocaine. The setting reveals that Roppongi's image as an international nightlife street is also highly associated with a feeling of unsteadiness and even potential criminality. Nevertheless, in the comedic-action world of *Tokyo Banana Boys*, the two Japanese punks take on the role of vigilantes who know how to negotiate the conflict between the local police, yakuza leaders, and foreigners. The audiences would leave cinema feeling safe since the Japanese men have taken care of all the problems and sent the troublemakers either into jail (the yakuza) or back to their country (the American drug dealer). In this way, though a certain kind of risk brought by globalisation is already prefigured in *Tokyo Banana Boys*, it remains largely subsidiary to Roppongi's vibrancy and serves at most as an adventurous spice to add flavour to the story.

Following the burst of the bubble economy, however, the visibility of foreigners in Roppongi, just like everywhere else, started to be regarded as more and more out of Japanese control and further transformed into a reason for Japanese society's degeneration.[584] Since *Tokyo Skin* was released in 1996, its depiction of Roppongi was apparently more dangerous and obscener than the vibrant vibe in *Tokyo Banana Boys*. The opening sequence of *Tokyo Skin* starts with a panoramic view of the symbolic Tokyo

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[584] Ibid., p.100.

Tower and the busy night streets of Roppongi, which seems to represent a mundane urban image of Tokyo. However, the camera then immediately walks the audiences into an underground club in a dark backstreet. Unlike the bright and extravagant disco hall with live band in *Tokyo Banana Boys*, the underground club in *Tokyo Skin* is portrayed as dirty, noisy, and smelly, as we see the hand-held camera shake unsteadily and the shots fast cut between the SM performance on stage, smiling faces of the drag queens, a tattooist tattooing a teenage girl, and the protagonist Zhou having sex with a woman in the toilet. The nightlife street of Roppongi in *Tokyo Skin* is still in some ways vibrant, but this vibrancy can no longer be contained and spills over into the risk of crime and decadence.

The shifting dynamism of the 'vital-criminal' spectrum is also embodied in the Chinese protagonist Zhou. Although Zhou is involved in various illegal activities, what seems alarming is not how much damage he would cost society: after all, Zhou is at most a scammer in contrast to the cruel gangsters in yakuza films. The real problem lies in how Zhou is virile to an extent that no one can constrain him. Zhou's uncontainable virility is best represented by his hyper-mobility in navigating the city, which is marked by his occupation as an underworld *yorozuya*, or jack-of-all-trades in English: the job requires one to be familiar to a great extent with the city. In the film, we see Zhou constantly entering, sometimes trespassing on, various public and private spaces, including backstreets, clubs, and apartments. Unlike Fang, whose actions are rather limited to the *shitamachi* and *kōgai* spaces of northern Tokyo, Zhou in *Tokyo Skin* is always on the move—to the extent that Zhou is portrayed as being more familiar with Tokyo than any of the Japanese characters in the story. The main story of the film portrays a Japanese woman, Kyōko, asking Zhou to find her missing Chinese boyfriend

Kaimeng in the metropolis. During the search, Zhou brings Kyōko to various places in the city, including Roppongi underground clubs and dormitories where migrants gather. [Figure 5.6] To Kyōko, and some local audiences who may identify themselves with Kyōko's position, these are parts of the city they may have never visited or even known about before.

Figure 5.6: Zhou bringing Kyōko to a dormitory to find her missing boyfriend.
Still from Hanawa, *Tokyo Skin* (35:46).

There is a progressive aspect of Zhou's hyper-mobility, which transgresses the common conception of Japan as a homogenised society and the belief that Japanese have more knowledge of Japan, due to his comprehension and command of Tokyo's urban space. Navigating us through Roppongi's underworld and indiscriminately making contact with his customers of various national and ethnic backgrounds as well as gender orientations, may also help to make visible marginalised subjects including what

Cybriwsky calls the 'immigrant proletariat' in Roppongi—the low-wage and illegal workers from less-developed countries like China, Southeast Asia, and Africa hardly represented in Japanese visual culture.[585] Nevertheless, Zhou's mobility is still built upon his role as a scammer who enters the clubs to sell fake products and goes to people's apartments to collect debts. In this way, Zhou still largely reinforces the stereotypical form of Chinese masculinity in Japan as simultaneously admired (for his virility) and condemned (for breaking laws).

Comparing Zhou's position and mobility in Tokyo with Fang's further reveals how the imagining of the Chinese diasporas in Japan has shifted towards the negative end of the multiculturalism spectrum. Firstly, the relocation of the Chinese protagonists, from the rather marginal *shitamachi* and *kōgai* to the more central busy streets of Roppongi, implies the gaining of visibility of the Chinese diasporas in public discourse and the popular imagination. This visibility is, however, perceived mostly as a threat to society, as we see the illegal businesses Zhou is involved in are larger in scale and more collectively organised than Fang's small-time cheating. The more criminalised representation of Chinese diasporas in Japan also indicates, I argue, an increasing disillusionment with globalisation and the transnational mobility it has brought to Japanese society. Considering Roppongi as a district that has been celebrated for its international and multicultural urbanity, the view of its imagined fall into chaos and criminal activities marks a more pervasive pessimism in Japanese society regarding globalisation.

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[585] Ibid., pp.131-137.

Transcending the Global City on the Yamanote Train Line

The perception of globalisation in Japan during the 1980s and 1990s, as indicated by the films discussed in this chapter, can be understood in terms of a spectrum running between a celebration of its vibrant multiculturalism and the condemnation of the dangers brought by globalised flows, as visualised in the following graph. [Figure 5.7] As the graph shows, the 1990s marked a shift towards the right end of the spectrum. Nevertheless, it is also by self-reflexively engaging with the pervasive pessimism in Japanese society through the space of the Yamanote Line, one of the busiest train lines in the Tokyo area, that allows *Tokyo Skin* to transcend the problematic system of globalisation per se—if only momentarily.


Figure 5.7: The changing perception of globalisation.

The Yamanote Line is a circular railway line that connects most of Tokyo's urban centres, including Yurakucho, Shinagawa, Shibuya, Shinjuku, Ikebukuro, and Ueno.

Jennifer Coates has examined the prominent role of the Yamanote Line in contemporary image culture by analysing its role in Hou Hsiao-Hsien's *Kōhī jikō/Café Lumiere* (2003) and Hanadō Junji's *Anata wo wasurenai/26 Years Diary* (2007). According to Coates, the circular construction of the Yamanote Line 'constitutes a blockage in the context of the historical design of Japanese cities to favour flow…and so the Yamanote line becomes a static holding space in which film protagonists contemplate and work through personal challenges or traumas. From the art-house to the blockbuster, recent films have employed the Yamanote line as a metaphor for blockage and transformation.'[586] Scrutinising her cases and exploring various potentials of the Yamanote space, Coates eventually invites her readers to use 'the codes of the Yamanote motif' to think about issues that include Japanese national identity, Japan's imperial history and its relation with its ex-colonies, as well as how Japan is imagined within East Asia.[587]

Tokyo Skin features a recurring image of the Yamanote Line, which in many ways echoes Coates' analysis. There is a total of four Yamanote Line scenes throughout the film: one in the beginning, two in the middle, and one at the end of the film. Since the visual composition of the last Yamanote Line scene is largely different from the first three, we shall leave it for later discussion. On the surface, the Yamanote Line serves as more of a non-diegetic space in the film, since the first three scenes of the train are all composed by fixed middle shots of the train's silver and green body, the handheld shots of the train's inside, and the scenery shots which look from the inside of the train to the city on the outside. [Figure 5.8] Nevertheless, there is also a narrative function for the

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[586] Jennifer Coates, 'Circular Thinking: The Yamanote Line on Film', *Japan Forum*, 30.2 (2018), p. 226.
[587] Ibid., p.237.

Yamanote Line scenes, indeed they are even crucial to the story's development since they only appear when a plot-twist occurs. In the first Yamanote Line scene, Zhou has just fled from a failed drug deal and talks reflexively about his own position in the megapolis of Tokyo. This early scene serves as an introduction to the main character and his position in Japanese society to the audience. The second Yamanote Line scene appears right after Zhou receives the job request from Kyōko, which marks the start of the film's main story and a major transition point in Zhou's life in Tokyo. Between the second and third Yamanote Line scene, Zhou's relationship with Kyōko transforms from his simply taking advantage of the woman to his development of an honest willingness to search for her missing boyfriend. The third Yamanote Line scene, thus, suggests a major change of the protagonists' relationship from deception to love: the scene that immediately follows is of the two sleeping naked with each other. What also changes are Zhou's life goals, as we see him considering leaving the private agency and starting a larger company to smuggle stolen cars from Tokyo to Shanghai. Although the visual representation of the fourth Yamanote Line scene is distinctive, it also serves as a turning point of the story. The scene happens after Zhou and Kyōko's affair suddenly ceases, as the Chinese man finds out the woman has been lying to him, and dovetails with the shattering of Zhou's dream of starting the car business, as his Chinese partner in the agency steals all the money and disappears.

Figure 5.8: The Yamanote Line in *Tokyo Skin*.
Still from Hanawa, *Tokyo Skin* (44:55).

Despite its obvious function in facilitating the story's development, there is also a more nuanced diegetic aspect of the Yamanote Line embedded in the film's soundscape. The Yamanote Line scenes all contain Zhou's babbling about his life in Tokyo in the voiceovers, accompanied by discordant jazz music in the background. Although the contents of Zhou's monologue are not in direct relevance to the empty shots, if we consider how he often talks about his thoughts on the city of Tokyo per se, we can understand how this might induce audiences to see the scenes as viewed from Zhou's subject position. In this way, we can see how Zhou uses the Yamanote Line as a space of contemplation in order to reflect on how his urban life in Tokyo affects his subjectivity. Moreover, Zhou's contemplation on the Yamanote Line reveals how the space of the train serves simultaneously to facilitate and interrupt Tokyo's globalised urbanity. For instance, in the third Yamanote Line scene, Zhou directly talks about his thoughts on the circular structure of the train. Ranting about the train as an 'endless shithole that sucks all of one's

thoughts', Zhou is clearly overwhelmed by the endless loop of happenings and troubles occurring in Tokyo. In this scene in particular, Zhou is searching for a person in the enormous city of Tokyo, turning the Yamanote Line into an embodiment of Tokyo's suffocating temporality under globalisation: a never-ending loop, a constant cycle that rotates at a fast pace, leading people onwards forever.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to highlight that we should not simply take Zhou's words at face value. In contrast, it is the very behaviour of contemplation which suggests the transcendental potential of the Yamanote Line. Although Zhou complains about the train's embodiment of the city's oppressive urbanity, considering he is always busy moving around the city and dealing with all kinds of businesses, the Yamanote Line provides a rare chance for him to temporarily withdraw from all the pragmatic affairs and think reflexively about the situation he is in. In this way, it echoes Coates' discussion of the train as a blockage to the city's ever-flowing urbanity and becomes what Miriam Hansen calls a "'reflexive horizon' that 'reflects, rejects, transmutes or negotiates' issues in everyday life."[588] It is with its ushering in of such a comforting status that the Yamanote Line provides a busy Tokyo subject like Zhou an opportunity to transcend the high speed and turbulent flow of the global city—by thinking the city in terms that are usually 'unthinkable' when one lives in it.

The final Yamanote Line scene is especially significant considering how it attempts to blatantly articulate the transcendent potential of the train. Unlike the previous scenes that are composed of empty shots of the train juxtaposed with the urban landscape, the

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[588] Miriam Hansen, 'The Mass Production of the Senses: Classical Cinema as Vernacular Modernism', in *Reinventing Film Studies*, eds. by Christine Gledhill and Linda Williams (London: Arnold Press, 2000), pp. 341-342.

last Yamanote Line scene foregrounds the six main characters of different nationalities, ethnicities, and genders. Accompanied by dissonant background music and Zhou's murmuring in the voiceover track, the frame fast-cuts between medium shots of each character sitting on the train with a hollow facial expression and shots of Tokyo's prismatic urban landscape. [Figure 5.9] Considering how the length of the shots of each character and the cityscape are almost the same, the scene also seems to induce audiences to perceive the space as one of momentary equality. Of course, it does not naively suggest that the Yamanote Line is a utopian space that flattens the national, ethnic, or gender gaps between different subjects. In fact, what connects the passengers together, as indicated by the juxtaposition of these images, are their shared positions in the city and the city per se. The scenes appear at the end of the movie when each of the six characters is facing serious problems in his/her life and has yet to figure out what to do next. The loop of the Yamanote Line thus symbolises the threshold the characters are facing at the present moment. In other words, what truly connects them is their shared disillusionment of their lives in Tokyo, for which the Yamanote Line simultaneously serves as an integral part of the problem and a temporary suspension before one is forced to go back to face their problems again.

Figure 5.9: Zhou sitting on the Yamanote Line with a hollow facial expression.
Still from Hanawa, *Tokyo Skin* (81:38).

Eventually, the Yamanote Line serves as a space for Zhou to negotiate his transnational Chinese masculinity in Japan, something which echoes Coates' articulation of how the Yamanote Line has opened a space for both the protagonist and viewers 'to consider what it means to be Japanese, or to be Other in Japan.'[589] This is marked by Zhou's recitation of Confucius quotes in his contemplation. If we take Zhou literally, these words can be seen as a philosophical reference for Zhou to understand his life, especially the problems he is facing in Tokyo. Since these quotes either warn one about the risks of chasing fortune or instruct people to learn from their predicament instead of blaming others for it, they serve as a placebo to Zhou's anxiety. Nevertheless, we should not neglect that referring to Confucius also allows Zhou to perform a particular form of Chinese masculinity in a transnational context. As Louie Kam suggests, considering ideal

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[589] Jennifer Coates, 'Circular Thinking: The Yamanote Line on Film', *Japan Forum*, 30.2 (2018), p. 237.

Chinese masculinity throughout history requires a man to be both scholarly/*wen* and martial/*wu*, 'Confucius as the god of *wen* has been a potent symbol for sustaining Chinese notions of the ideal gentleman for millennia.'[590] By referring to the code of Chinese masculinity, Zhou is able to reorient his life in Tokyo, which suggests that returning to one's ethnic origins is a viable solution to dealing with the complexities of life in the global city. Moreover, considering how this ideal form of Chinese masculinity has also been introduced to and practiced in Japan due to its shared history with China,[591] it seems that emphasising the scholarly facet of his personality enables the Yamanote Line scenes to counterbalance the overly martial aspect of Zhou as a scammer. Despite Zhou always lying and cheating others throughout the film, the Yamanote Line scenes offer a stark contrast, revealing to the Japanese audiences a rare chance to listen to Zhou's inner voice and grasp his true self. Unlike the moments of transcendence suggested by the pre-identity experience of simply riding the circular Yamanote Line, Zhou's return to the ideal form of Chinese masculinity helps to ease Japan's anxiety of transnational flows and fulfils the multiculturalist needs of consuming 'others' and 'other cultures.' In other words, it is by proving him to be safe and manageable that Zhou, and Chinese men in Japan in general, seem to become relatable to Japanese audiences.

The flip side of the reinforcement of hegemonic forms of Chinese masculinity in Japan is that Zhou quotes local Chinese proverbs in his monologue almost at random and falsely ascribes Confucius' authorship to these words. For instance, in the first Yamanote Line scene, Zhou states that: "Confucius once said, 'human beings die in pursuit of wealth,

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[590] Kam Louie, 'Chinese, Japanese and Global Masculine Identities', in *Asian Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of Manhood in China and Japan*, eds. by Kam Louie and Morris Low (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 5.
[591] Coates, 'Persona, Politics, and Chinese Masculinity in Japan', p. 130.

and birds die in pursuit of food' (*ren wei cai si, niao wei shi wang*)." However, instead of a particular line of Confucian philosophy, the sentence is merely a widely circulated Chinese folk adage. In this way, Zhou's sincere 'scholarly' monologue on the Yamanote Line is revealed to be no more truthful than his jokes and lies. While such mistake fits well with Zhou's social status as a hooligan on the streets, it further indicates the impossibility of claiming cultural authenticity by simply regarding one's national or ethnic background. In other words, by mistaking one's 'own culture', Zhou's monologue mocks the superficial celebration of multiculturalism and temporarily transcends the organised logic of the global city based on diversity. Zhou's negotiation with the hegemonic form of Chinese masculinity in Japan is imperfectly perfect. Indeed, it is by revealing the very fractured nature of Chinese masculinity as a discourse in the transnational context that he reveals how globalisation itself is a fissured, multivocal and complex instead of being smooth and univocally flat.

The articulation of Zhou's subject position is largely correlated to the diasporic Chinese actor Xiu Jian's negotiation with his own Chinese masculinity in the Japanese film industry. Coming to Japan in 1986 via a student visa, Xiu himself is a new overseas Chinese who obtained work in the Japanese film industry. After acting in some of Hayashi Kaizō's films such as *Nijisseiki shōnen dokuhon*/*Circus Boys* (1989) and *Jipangu*/*Zipang* (1990), *Tokyo Skin* marks the beginning of Xiu's transition into a film producer in Japan. Serving as the co-scriptwriter of the film, Xiu decided most of the lines for the character Zhou, including his monologues on the Yamanote Line.[592] If we pay attention to Xiu's performance, it becomes clear that he has deliberately portrayed Zhou as a typical

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[592] Katō Chiyo, 'Interview: Xiu Jian', *Cine-front*, 234 (1996), p. 37.

Beijingese hooligan like one of the popular *liumang* figures in contemporary Chinese cinema,[593] marked by Zhou's heavy Beijing accent and passive-aggressive attitude. In other words, Xiu has brought much nuance to the characterisation of Zhou as a Chinese diaspora of Beijing origin, which further justifies Zhou's false Confucius quotes in line with the hooligan's image.

To portray Zhou with a same local background as himself, helps Xiu to articulate his own masculinity through the character—for instance, in the interview with film magazine *Cine-Front*, Xiu claims that Zhou's character is mostly shaped according to his own experience in Tokyo.[594] In this way, Xiu successfully demonstrates his deep understanding of Tokyo's locality through Zhou, and the 'self-conscious re-embedding in a non-Chinese locality which allowed him to demonstrate his ability to transcend his Chineseness.'[595] Using this as a starting point allows Xiu to move away from his character and further enunciate himself as a cosmopolitan filmmaker who is not only familiar with Chinese cinema but also knows world cinema well.[596] In this way, by actively 'co-opting and adopting hegemonic masculinities' across cultural milieus,[597] Xiu is able to discursively constitute Zhou as a cultural creator in the Japanese film industry, which allows new possibilities of diasporic identities to emerge. Indeed, from the 2000s and beyond, Xiu has been involved in various China-Japan film coproduction projects as

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[593] The character of Zhou reminds us of the *liumang* characters of the phenomenal Chinese writer Wang Shuo, who hold the satirical gesture against the political, social, and cultural hypocrisy in society. See Yusheng Yao, 'The Elite Class Background of Wang Shuo and His Hooligan Characters', *Modern China*, 30.4 (2004), pp. 434-439.

[594] Katō, 'Interview: Xiu Jian', p. 36.

[595] Coates, 'Persona, Politics, and Chinese Masculinity in Japan', p. 134.

[596] Katō, 'Interview: Xiu Jian', p. 39.

[597] Coates, 'Persona, Politics, and Chinese Masculinity in Japan' p. 145.

a producer, and further mobilised many other Chinese diasporas in Japan to become involve in transnational film production.

Coda

Looking from *shitamachi* and *kōgai* to Roppongi and the Yamanote Line, and from the characters of Fang to Zhou allows us to understand the shifting meaning of Tokyo as a global city in the 1990s via the changing imaginary of diasporic Chinese masculinities in Japanese cinema. While the change of the character's position from the margins of the city to the city centre suggests the increasing of visibility of the Chinese diasporas in Japan, the diasporic characters continue to be imagined as shadows of globalisation: in *About Love, Tokyo*, the Chinese diasporas are used to navigate audiences through the global city's fractured urban landscape and in *Tokyo Skin*, the Chinese character is portrayed to highlight the disillusionment against the failing promise of a globalised economy. While both films are critical of the global city's capitalist system and superficial celebration of multiculturalism, by prioritising the degeneration of Chinese characters in Tokyo, they also largely collude with the increasingly xenophobic sentiment in Japanese society against migrants and ethnic minorities.

Nevertheless, from the two films analysed in this chapter, we may also develop a more nuanced understanding on the production of Tokyo's global city image as a collaborative process between the Japanese filmmakers and the diasporic subjects who were displaced by globalisation. In comparison to the discussion of the transnational flow enabled by the institutionalised mobility of world cinema, the two films analysed in this chapter suggests a genuine grassroots assemblage which involves the diasporic

Chinese community in the creation of the global city's cinematic image. In *About Love, Tokyo*, the diasporic Chinese actors contribute to the arrangement and decoration of the spaces where they live as migrants, which enables Yanagimachi to critique the homogenised landscape of the global city. In *Tokyo Skin*, Tokyo becomes the site for the Chinese actor Xiu Jian to negotiate his diasporic identity, in accordance with the shifting perception of globalisation towards pessimism marked by the never-ending Yamanote Line. The transnational filmmaking involved in the two cases represent a localised globality which does not submit to but rather criticises the dominant order of global capitalism. In this way, the two works analysed in this chapter are worth considering as examples of Japanese transnational cinema since the imaginaries and practices of the global city they suggest contest, and even temporarily transcend, the dominant order of globalisation and its capitalist ideology. Even if they operate within it, they nonetheless open up a space for us to imagine the various connections beyond the city's physical borders and its ethnic divisions.

Conclusion

The 1995 'Global City Theory: Tokyo' conference mentioned at the beginning of this thesis served as an indication that Tokyo's 'global city' imaginary was in crisis and in dire need of salvaging, but it was only two days after the conference that this vision received a heavy blow from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. On May 31st, the newly elected Tokyo governor Aoshima Yukio announced the cancellation of the 'World City Expo '96', an international event to be held in Tokyo and proposed and prepared ambitiously for more than ten years by former governor, Suzuki Shunichi. [Figure C.1] The World City Expo '96 was envisioned to be held in the Tokyo Waterfront Sub-Centre (*Tokyo rinkai fuku toshin*), a broad area that extends across the reclaimed islands in Tokyo Bay. As one of Suzuki's major development projects during his 16-year tenure as governor, the Tokyo Waterfront Sub-Centre marked a capstone of the development of 'global city Tokyo' which included 'information/media industries, an exhibition hall, residential units, education facilities and a shopping and leisure complex.'[598] Correspondingly, the World City Expo was conceived to be a showcase of the Tokyo Waterfront Sub-centre's success and a means to display Tokyo's superior global city status worldwide.[599] Nevertheless, since the burst of Japan's economic bubble in the early 1990s, there was a growing scepticism among Tokyo residents regarding both the Waterfront Sub-Centre development and the World City Expo itself. Riding with the tide, the populist politician Aoshima fulfilled his promise made during the election to abolish the World City Expo soon after his inauguration. Economists

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[598] Asato Saito, 'Global City Formation in a Capitalist Developmental State: Tokyo and the Waterfront Sub-Centre Project', *Urban Studies*, 40.2 (2003), p. 293.
[599] Kawashima Yūsuke, 'Hitsuzen demo gūzen demo naku: 1995 nen sekai toshi hakurankai chūshi no seijigakuteki bunseki', *Nagoya daigaku hoseironshū*, 269 (2017), p. 312.

recognized that the cancellation of the World City Expo in 1995 marked 'a symbol of

the suspension of Tokyo's global city development.'[600] Eventually, in 1996, the

grandiose world fair imagined by government officials was replaced by the gloomy and

disoriented city we see in *Tokyo Skin*.

Figure C.1: The mascot of the World City Expo '96, Tokyo Taishi, standing with Governor Suzuki Shunichi. From Tokyo City Official X (Twitter) account. (2023, October, 21). Retrieved from https://twitter.com/tocho_koho/status/1327453723749072896

However, this does not mean that the idea of the global city was completely

terminated, either socioeconomically or culturally. In terms of socioeconomics, as

economists and political scientists have taught us, the 'retreat from global city'

campaign of the Aoshima administration was mostly superficial. Aoshima, the

writer/lyricist/scriptwriter/actor/filmmaker/singer-turned-politician and renowned 'Man

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[600] Ibid.

of Culture,'[601] was merely fulfilling one of the many promises he had made during his election campaign and the investment made by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in the development of the Tokyo Waterfront Sub-centre remained steady. Unlike what Aoshima had promised to his voters, there were only 'minor modifications' and 'the main framework of the revised plan largely remained as it was before.'[602] In terms of fiscal policy, the Aoshima administration had largely continued the Suzuki administration's neoliberal policy and further reduced public financial support to 'unsuitable policy areas' including welfare, environment, and emergency management.[603] In this way, the Aoshima administration had indeed further accelerated Tokyo's transformation towards the 'global city' of Sassen's model, for which the relatively low level of class division in Tokyo was broadened to a more polarised structure.[604] Thus, for economists like Kawashima Yūsuke, the silence of the global city campaign during the Aoshima years actually proves the culmination of Tokyo's superior global city status both domestically and internationally instead of the other way around.[605]

What about the cultural aspects of the global city Tokyo after 1995, especially regarding the realm of cinema? Although the periodisation of my thesis implies there

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[601] Nobuo Sasaki, 'A Study of the Political Leadership of Tokyo Metropolitan Governors: In Search of the Ideal of Decentralization in Japan', *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 64.2 (1998), p. 252.

[602] Saito, 'Global City Formation in a Capitalist Developmental State', p. 299.

[603] Ueno Junko, 'Tokyo-to no sekaitoshi-ka senryaku to seiji kaikaku: kaihatsu shugi kokka ga neoriberaru-ka suru toki', *The Annals of Japan Association for Urban Sociology*, 28 (2010), pp. 207-208.

[604] Ibid., p. 202.

[605] According to Kawashima, the gap between Tokyo and its domestic competitors like Osaka and Kanagawa Prefecture widened during the 1990s in terms of Global Cities Index. This suggests that Tokyo no longer needed to worry about other Japanese cities becoming more 'global' than itself. See Kawashima, 'Hitsuzen demo gūzen demo naku', pp. 319-323.

was an interruption, I do not suggest that the imagination of globalisation had suddenly vanished. The fatigued everydayness represented in *Tokyo Skin* might exemplify what Arjun Appadurai famously states in his book published in the same year of the Japanese film's release: the perception and imagination of globalisation was 'no longer mere fantasy…no longer simple escape…no longer elite pastime…and no longer mere contemplation…the imagination has become an organised field of social practices, a form of work…and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility.'[606] This entire thesis has been dedicated to revealing how cinema simultaneously provided the material infrastructure of such a global perception and served the global imagination per se.

In Chapter Two and Chapter Three, I delineated how the material base of Tokyo as a global city was constituted upon two distinct yet interrelated cinema networks. On the one hand, there was the international film festival network represented by the Tokyo International Film Festival and the Japan Foundation film exhibitions, which were largely stimulated by the Tokyo Municipal Government's urban agendas and enabled by private enterprises' interests in cultural businesses. On the other hand, the film practitioners in Tokyo had seized the opportunities made possible by globalisation to develop a reciprocal relationship with corporations that had just entered the film business and establish an alternative *kōgyō* mode with mini-theatres. While the first network indicates how 'cinema as culture' can be the Trojan horse by which to facilitate the proliferated transnational economic and political activities in strengthening Tokyo's

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[606] Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 31.

domestic and international status, the second network suggests the possibilities opened up by the same forces that empowered socially underprivileged subjects (*jishu* filmmakers in the film industry and female audiences in the exhibition space).

In Chapter Four and Chapter Five, I investigated the representations of the global city that were both produced by and circulated within the two networks. In *Tokyo-Ga*, Wim Wenders ambiguously criticises and reinforces Tokyo's global city status since his perception of the city has largely been mobilised by the institutions of world cinema. I argued that the true critical potential of the film regarding the process of globalisation is located not in Wenders' speculative editing and voiceover but in the film's unornamented exhibition of Tokyo and Kamakura's urban landscape per se. In comparison, the two films analysed in Chapter Five provide other vectors for the fast-developing global city. Instead of the marching forward of global capitalism, *About Love, Tokyo* reminds us of the various speeds and directions embedded within the heterogenous space of Tokyo, while *Tokyo Skin* imagines the impasse of development through the ever-looping Yamanote Line. The two films' depiction of the global city of Tokyo via the bodies of their diasporic Chinese male protagonists are symptomatic of the gradual shift of globalisation's cultural imaginary in Japanese society. Nevertheless, they also provoke thoughts about transnational collaborations that are more equal and unbounded from capitalist logic—something which can also be found in the context of the two films' production.

This research has demonstrated how cinema was deployed to constitute the various scales of the global city of Tokyo. Of particular importance has been its goal of translating the local in global city discourse via cinema to fill in the blank of existing

globalisation studies which tend to focus more on the national. Instead of omitting the persistent function of the nation, my use of local as an anchor to investigate globalisation has helped to shed light on the often-neglected intranational heterogeneity of an increasingly international environment. While cinema had already been a means of scaling before the 1980s, in terms of international network building, transnational film practices, and imaginary constitution, the cinema in and of the global city indicates the increase of intervention from actors who were peripheral to the network. This includes local governments, companies that were not involved in film business, independent film practitioners, and potential film audiences. Although the major purpose of this research was to provide a concrete example of the material and discursive conditioning of a particular city, one may further interpret such a new assemblage of cinema in Tokyo from an ideological perspective, especially in relation to the transformation of Cold-War geopolitics and the acceleration of neoliberal capitalism.

The thesis has also explored how a number of urban spaces in Tokyo were reproduced to become compatible with the global city discourse, specifically via the facilitation of people's physical and imaginary reactions in certain instances of mobility. Alongside the more blatant examples of international film festivals, cultural institutions, and commercial facilities, there were also ordinary yet crucial factors including guidebooks, interpersonal networks, and urban infrastructure. In this sense, the mobilities approach became useful to offset the commonly human-centred investigation of both cinema and globalisation. Especially in the last two chapters, it enables us to see how the spatial imaginary of a global city is never simply constructed out of nowhere

but always mediated in relation to an existing material reality. However, instead of arguing that all human interactions and cultural imaginaries are always determined, my thesis has explored the rather contingent formation of certain mobility systems and the dynamic forces that flow and even spill over them. In this way, my research renders the global city as not a mass-producing machine but a metabolic ecological system, which continues to exist and thrive according to an ever-continuing set of changes.

Alongside the thesis' primary investigation of the cultural history of Tokyo in the era of globalisation via cinema, it also undertakes a more fundamental examination of the relationship between cinema and the city through a transdisciplinary lens. In Chapter One, the existing approach to the cinema-city nexus is dissected to suggest the necessity of integrating textual analysis of the city in cinema with the actual city, which materially and discursively incorporates cinema as part of its urban infrastructure and cultural landscape. In Chapter Two, an investigation is conducted into how urban planning can enable new practices and perceptions of cinema. Chapter Three explores how new material infrastructure has provided the basis for the continuation of previous film experiments and the emergence of new film culture. Chapter Four demonstrates the complex interplay between the virtual (as depicted in Ozu's Tokyo) and the actual (the city in the process of deregulation) for a new reality to emerge. In Chapter Five, attention is given to how cinema can provide a concrete anchor to navigate the changing position of the subject within the city and the transformation of the city itself. By adopting theories and analyses from urban studies that may not necessarily align with urban space as represented in film texts, this thesis illustrates how the cinema-city should always be problematised and complexified, rather than reconciled and

generalised, to emancipate the tremendous potential embedded in their nexus. By presenting a transdisciplinary examination of Tokyo, this thesis aims to advocate for the nuanced examination of the cinema-city relationship in other specific contexts and contribute to the broader discussion in cinema and urban studies.

A short answer to the questions raised in my introductory chapter verified by this thesis is that culture, and particularly cinema, was not subordinate to the material and discursive constitution of the global city of Tokyo in the 1980s and 90s. On the contrary, cinema was one of the important forces which drove the material construction and discursive formation of Tokyo as a 'global' location. This thesis has examined how cinema made Tokyo more 'global' in terms of both structural conditions and popular perceptions throughout the early 1980s until mid-1990s by teasing out the many interweaving agencies in the making of Tokyo's de facto heterogenous 'global' reality.

In this sense, although this project stops at the moment of the global city's official 'suspension', it leaves many hints on the continuation and transmutation of the global imagination of Tokyo after 1995. The cultural institutions and infrastructure of cinema in Tokyo would largely retain these functions into the 21st century. Though there would be various structural changes on both policy and business levels regarding cinema's role in Tokyo's cultural constitution, something which lies beyond the research scope of this thesis, cinema has remained a crucial material basis of Tokyo's global culture. The meaning of the global city has naturally shifted under the infamous Ishihara Shintarō administration, who expected the ideal new Tokyoites to be 'be liberal but morally

conservative, individualist but harmony-oriented and globalist but still nationalist.'[607] It

thus remains extremely important for future scholars to further analyse how cinema

might have facilitated or disturbed the so-called 'reglobalisation' agendas of Ishihara.

Moreover, as this thesis has been devoted to exploring, the cultural aspects of a global

city are not simply dictated by powerful stakeholders like the state, municipal officials

or big companies and nor are they idealistically decided by grassroots practices. Instead,

it is a complex negotiation of both. In this way, by way of conclusion, I therefore hope

that there will be further exploration of the tensions existing between these various

actors in order to further liberate the many cultural spaces coexisting within this

complex city of multiple scales.

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[607] Takashi Machimura, 'Narrating a "Global City" for "New Tokyoites": Economic Crisis and Urban "Boosterism" in Tokyo', in *Japan and Britain in the Contemporary World: Responses to Common Issues*, eds. by Hugo Dobson and Glenn D. Hook (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 208.

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