

VYĀKARAṆA MAHĀBHĀṢYA OF PATAÑJALI ON PĀṆINI 3.1 (ĀHNIKAS 1 TO 6) (4)*

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16.1 *supa ātmanaḥ kyac* ||3||8||

*kim arthaś cakāraḥ / svarārthaḥ / cito 'nta udātto bhavattīty
antodāttatvaṃ yathā syāt / naitad asti prayojanam / ekājayam
tatra nārthaḥ svarārthena cakāreṇānubandhena / pratyaya-
svareṇaiva siddham / viśeṣanārthas tarhi / kva viśeṣanā-
rthenārthaḥ / asya cvau kyaci ca*

16.5 (7.4.32-33) *iti / kye ceti hy ucyamāne api kākaḥ syenāyate
atrāpi prasajyeta / naitad asti / tadanubandhakagra-
haṇe 'tadanubandhakasya grahaṇam nety evam etasya na
bhaviṣyati // sāmānyagrahaṇāvighārthas tarhi / kva ca sāmānya-
grahaṇāvighātārthenārthaḥ / naḥ kye (1.4.15) iti //*

Pāṇini 3.1.8: The *pratyaya kyac* acts optionally in the sense of 'wishing for oneself' after a word ending in a *sup/case pratyaya* expressing the *karman/object* (wished) connected with the wisher's self.

Bhāṣya: What is the purpose of the letter *c*? For the purpose of accent. So that by (the rule) '*citah*' (*antaḥ udāttah*) (6.1.163) "There should be final *udāttah* for that having an *it*/indicatory *c*". There should be final *udātta*. This is not the purpose. This (*pratyaya*) has only one vowel. Therefore there is no point in (attaching) an *it* letter *c* for the purpose of accent. By the (standard) *pratyaya* accent (by *ādyudāttaś ca 3.1.3*) the proper accent is established.

* The preceding parts of the present paper were published in *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Sambhāṣā*, vols. 23, 24, and 25. In Dr. Thompson's Ph.D. dissertation critical notes are provided in chapter 6, but in the present paper those notes are inserted after the text and translation of the *Mahābhāṣya* on each Pāṇinisūtra for the convenience of the reader. Accordingly, the present reproduction lacks an independent chapter providing those notes.

Then it is for the purpose of distinguishing. Where is the purpose of that which is meant for distinguishing? (In the *sūtra*) *asya cvau* (7.4.32) (“A long \bar{i} is substituted for the final a or \bar{a} of a nominal stem before the (adverbial *pratyaya*) *cvi* (5.4.50) *abhūta tadbhāve kṛbhvastiyoge sampadyakartari cvi*”) and *kyaci ca* (7.4.33) (“A long vowel \bar{i} is substituted for the final a or \bar{a} of an *aṅga*/nominal stem before the denominative *pratyaya kyac*”).

For if ‘*kye ca*’ is going to be uttered (instead of *kyaci ca*) here also it will wrongly apply in the form *śyenāyate* (from *kyan*) in the sentence — *api kākaḥ śyenāyate* (Does the crow in fact behave like a hawk?) not ‘Does the crow desire a hawk for itself?’ This is not so. (The *paribhāṣa* 82 *tadanubandhakagrahaṇe tadanubandhakasya grahaṇam na*. “When a term with one or more *anubandha*/indicatory letters is employed (in grammar it does) not (denote) that which in addition to those (one or more *anubandhas*) has another *anubandha* attached to it”, will not be applicable in this (form).

Then it is for the purpose of an unobstructed general mention and not a hindrance for the application of the term to others. And where is the meaning (found) of ‘that which is meant for the purpose of unobstructed mention’? (In the *sūtra*) *na kye* (1.4.15) “The word form ending in n is called *pada* when *kya* follows. (i.e. the *pratyayas kyac kyan* and *kyaṣ*”.

16.9 *athātmagrahaṇam kim artham / ātmecchāyām yathā syāt
parecchāyām mā bhūd iti / rājñah putram icchatīti //
kriyamāne 'pi vā ātmagrahaṇe parecchāyām prāpnoti / kiṃ
kāraṇam / ātmana itīyam kartari ṣaṣṭī / iccetyakāro bhāve / sa
yady evātmana icchaty athāpi parasyātmecchāivāsau bhavati //
nātmagrahaṇenecchābhisambadhyate kiṃ tarhi / subantam
abhisambadhyate / ātmano yat subantam iti // yady ātmagra-
haṇam kriyate chandasi parecchāyām na prāpnoti / mā tvā vrkā
aghāyavo vidan / tasmān nārtha ātmagrahaṇena /*

Now what is the purpose of the word *ātman* (being mentioned)? So that (the *pratyaya*) acts in the sense of one’s own desire and should not be applicable in the sense of another’s desire e.g. *rājñah putram icchati* ‘He wants a son for the king’. Certainly, even when there is specific mention of the word *ātman* (for oneself), (the *pratyaya kyac*) obtains in the sense of another’s desire. What is the reason? This word *ātmanah* is

sixth case in the sense of agent (cf. *katṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti* 2.3.65). The word ‘*icchā*’ is (derived with the) letter *a* (of the *pratyaya śa* by 3.3.101) in the sense of state (of the *dhātu iṣ* to desire). Even if he in fact himself desires that (now) there is still his own desire for another.

(This is no fault) *icchā* ‘desire’ is not connected with mention of the word *ātman* (oneself). With what then? (It) is connected to that which ends in a *sup*/case *pratyaya*. Thus (it is connected with that) ending in a *sup*/case ending word (expressing his desire) for himself. If the mention of *ātman* (for oneself) is made in the *chandasa/Veda* (*kyac*) does not obtain in the sense of desire for another (yet, we have the example in *Yaj. 4.34*). *mā tvā vṛkā āghāyavo vidan* “Let not the wolves desirous of evil know of (thy coming)”. Therefore the mention of *ātmanah* (for oneself) has no purpose.

Why is it not applicable here: *rājñāḥ putram icchati* ‘He desires a son for the king’? Because of the absence of syntactical connection. How is there lack of syntactical connection? That which has expectancy (for another word) cannot be syntactically connected. Then also in the *chandasa* this (rule) does not obtain (as above *kyac* does not act in the sense of ‘for another’) *mā tvā vṛka aghāyavo vidan* ‘Let not the malicious wolves know of (thy coming)’.

There is a distinction here. Here, even without the use of the third word, desire for another is understood. How, even without the use of the third word, is desire for another here understood? For those wolves are indeed naturally cruel or malicious. And who can desire evil/bad for himself?

16.15 *iha kasmān na bhavati rājñāḥ putram icchatīti/ asāmarthyāt / katham asāmarthyam / sāpekṣam asamarthaṃ bhavatīti / chandasy api tarhi na prāpnoti / mā tvā vṛkā aghāyavo vidan / asty atra viśeṣaḥ / antareṇāpy atra tṛtīyasya padasya prayogaṃ parecchā gamyate / katham punarantareṇāpy atra tṛtīyasya padasya prayogaṃ parecchā gamyate / te caiva hi vṛkā evam ātmakā hiṃsrāḥ kaś cātmano ’ghameṣitum arhati /*

16.19 *ato ’ntareṇāpy atra tṛtīyasya padasya prayogaṃ parecchā gamyate / yathaiva tarhi cchandasya ghaśabdāt parecchāyāṃ kyāḥ bhavaty evaṃ bhāṣāyāṃ api prāpnoti / agham icchati / tasmād āmagrahaṇaṃ kartavyam / chandasi katham / ācārya-pravṛttir jñāpayati bhavati chandasya ghaśabdāt parecchāyāṃ kyajiti yad ayam aśvāghasyāt (7.4.37) iti kyaci prakṛta*

ṭtvabādhānārtham ākāraṃ śāsti //

Therefore even without the use of a third word, desire for another is understood. Just as indeed in the *chandas* after the word *agha* (bad, dangerous) *kyac* is applicable in the sense of desire for another, so also in the (classical) speech it obtains as *agham icchati* “He desires evil”. Therefore the specific mention of the word *ātman* has to be made.

How (to explain the usage) in the *chandas*? The usage of the master makes known that ‘*kyac* (is applicable) after the word *agha* in the *chandas* in the sense of desire for another, since he states *ā* which cancels *i* when *kyac* follows by the rule *aśvāghasyāt* (7.4.37) “In the *Veda* long *ā* is substituted for the final of *aśva* and *agha* before the denominative *pratyaya kyac*”. Thus he teaches the letter *ā* for the purpose of the annulling of the letter *ī* according to the original *sūtra kyaci ca* (7.4.33) (which ordained long *ī* in the place of the final *a* or *ā* of an *aṅga* before the denominative *pratyaya kyac*).

16.24 *atha subgrahaṇam kim artham / subantād utpattir yathā syāt
prātipadikān mā bhūd iti / naitad asita prayojanam / nāsty atra
viśeṣaḥ subantād utpattau*

17.1 *satyām prātipadikād vā / ayam asti viśeṣaḥ / subantād utpattau
satyām padasañjñā siddhā bhavati prātipadikāt punarutpattau
satyām padasañjñā na prāpnoti / nanu ca prātipadikād apy
utpattau satyām padasañjñā siddhā / katham / ārabhyate naḥ kye
(1.4.15) iti / tac cāvaśyaṃ kartavyaṃ subantād utpattau satyām
niyamārtham / tad eva prātipadikād utpattau satyām vidhy-
artham bhaviṣyati //*

Now what is the purpose of mentioning *sup*? So that there should be production of a *pratyaya* after a *sup*/case ending word and not after a *prātipadika*/crude base. This is not the purpose. There is not here a distinction between the production (of a *pratyaya*) after a *sup*/case ending word and after a *prātipadika*.

This is the distinction: when there occurs production (of a form) after a *sup*/case ending word, the technical name *pada* is established. When there is production (of a form) after *prātipadika*, the technical name *pada* does not obtain. But surely when there occurs production (of *pratyaya*) after a *prātipadika* the technical name *pada* is established. How? (The *sūtra*) *naḥ kye* (1.4.16) “The word form ending in *n* is

called *pada* when *kya* follows (i.e. *kyac*, *kyañ* and *kyaṣ*)”, is formed. And that necessarily should be formed for the purpose of a restriction to when there is production (of a form) after a *sup/case* ending word. That alone will be the purpose of the rule that it will be applicable when there is production (of a *pratyaya*) after a *prātipadika*.

17.9 *idaṃ tarhi prayojanaṃ subantād utpattir yathā syād dhātor mā bhūd iti / etad api nāsti prayojanam / dhātoḥ sanvidhīyate sa bādhako bhaviṣyati / anavakāśā hi vidhayo bādhakā bhavanti sāvakāśaś ca san / ko 'vakāśaḥ / parecchā / na parecchāyām sanā bhavitavyam / kiṃ kāraṇam / samānakartṛkād ity ucyate / yāvac cehātmagrahaṇam tāvat tatra samānakartṛkagrahaṇam / idaṃ tarhi prayojanaṃ subantād utpattir yathā syād vākyān mā bhūd iti /*

This then is the purpose, so that there should be production (of *pratyaya*) after a *sup/case* ending word and should not be after a *dhātu*. This is also not the purpose. *San* is ordained after a *dhātu* (already) and so that will cancel (the alternative). For rules without scope are (capable of) annulling (those with scope) and ‘*san*’ has scope. What scope? Desire for another. *San* should not be (applicable) in the sense of desire for another.

What is the reason? It is stated after that which has ‘the same agent’. For inasmuch as there is specific mention of the word *ātman* so there is mention of *samānakartṛ*/the same agent.

Then this is the purpose: so that production (of a form) should be after a *sup/case* ending word and should not be after a phrase (or sentence).

17.10 *mahāntaṃ putram icchatīti / na vā bhavati mahāputrīyatīti / bhavati yadaitad vākyam bhavati mahān putro mahāputraḥ mahāputram icchati mahāputrīyatīti / yadā tv etad vākyam bhavati mahāntaṃ putram icchatīti tadā na bhavitavyam tadā ca prāpnoti / tadā mā bhūd iti // atha kriyamāṇe 'pi subgrahaṇe kasmād evātra na bhavati / subantaṃ hy etad vākyam / naitat subantam / katham / pratyayagrahaṇe yasmāt sa tadāder grahaṇam bhavattīti // atha yad atra subantaṃ tasmād utpattih*

17.15 *kasmān na bhavati /*

(For example as) *mahāntaṃ putram icchati* — ‘He desires a great son’. Or else is not *mahāputrīyati* possible? It is when this is a sentence (or a phrase) *mahān putraḥ* ‘great son’ (which becomes the *karmadhāraya*) *mahāputraḥ*; *mahāputram icchati* (then becomes compounded as) *mahāputrīyati* “He desires a great son”. But when this sentence occurs as *mahāntaṃ putram icchati* “He desires a great son”, then the (*pratyaya kyac*) is not to be applicable; then it (wrongly) obtains and then it must not be (applicable).

Now, even while specific mention is being made of a *sup*/case ending word, for what reason does it not occur here, as this phrase ends in a *sup*? This is not ending in a *sup*/case ending. How?

Paribhāṣa 23: pratyaya grahaṇe yasmāt sa (vihitas) tadāder grahaṇaṃ bhavati “A *pratyaya* denotes whenever it is employed (in grammar, a word form) which begins with that to which that (*pratyaya*) has been added and ends with (the *pratyaya*) itself”.

Now why does not *kyac* occur after that *subantam*/word ending in a case/*pratyaya*?

17.16 *samānādhikaraṇānām sarvatrāvṛttir ayogād ekena / samānādhikaraṇānām sarvatraiva vṛttir na bhavati / kva sarvatra / samāsavidhau pratyayavidhau ca / samāsavidhau tāvat / ṛddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ / mahat kaṣṭaṃ śrita iti / pratyayavidhau / rddhasyopagor apatyam / mahāntaṃ putram icchatīti //*

Varttika: For words in the same syntactical case relation there is not everywhere integration (compounding) due to not joining with one (word only).

Bhāṣya: Everywhere in fact there is not integration of (words) having the same syntactical relation. Where is ‘everywhere’? In *samāsa* compound rules and *pratyaya* rules. Now just (for example) in relation to *samāsa* rules: *ṛddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ* “The servant of the prosperous/rich king”. *mahatkaṣṭaṃ śritaḥ* “who has resorted to great evil”.

In relation to *pratyaya* rules: *rddhasyopagor apatyam* the son of the prosperous *Upagu*. *mahāntaṃ putram icchati* “he desires a great son”.

17.19 *kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ samānādhikaraṇānām sarvatra vṛttir na*

bhavati / ayogād ekena / na hy atraikena padena yogo bhavati / iha tāvad daddhasya rājñah puruṣa iti ṣaṣṭyantasya subantena sāmārthye sati samāso vidhīyate / yac cātra ṣaṣṭyantam na tasya subantena sāmārthya yasya ca sāmārthyam na tat ṣaṣṭyantam, vākyam tat /

But what is the reason for there not being everywhere compounding of words in the same syntactical case relation? Because there is no joining with one (word only). For here joining with one (word only) is not possible.

Just here in the example: *rddhasya rājñah putraḥ* ‘the servant of the prosperous king’. A *samāsa*/compound is ordained when there exists syntactical relation with a *sup*/case ending word having the sixth case. But that which here has the sixth case does not have syntactical relation with a *sup*/case ending word. And that which has syntactical relation does not have the sixth case ending. That is a sentence (or a phrase).

17.23 *rddhasyopagor apatyam iti ca ṣaṣṭīsamarthād apatyena yogo pratyayo vidhīyate / yac cātra ṣaṣṭīsamartham na tasyāpatyena yogo yasya*

17.25 *cāpatyena yogo na tat ṣaṣṭyantam, vākyam tat // samānādhikaraṇānām ity ucyate 'tha vyadhikaraṇānām katham / rājñah putram icchatīti / evam tarhīdam paṭitavyam saviṣeṣaṇānām sarvatrāvṛttir ayogād ekeneti //*

And (in the example) *rddhasyopagorapatyam* ‘the son of prosperous Upagu’, that *pratyaya* which has the syntactical connection with the sixth case is ordained in connection with ‘offspring’ (i.e. a patronymic *pratyaya*). But that which here is in syntactical relation with the sixth case has no connection with ‘offspring’. And that which has connection with ‘offspring’ does not have a sixth case ending. This is a sentence or phrase.

It is said, “of words having the same syntactical case relation”. Now how is it said “of those having different syntactical case relations” (e.g.) *rājñah putram icchati* “He desires a son for the king”? Then this has to be recited “Everywhere for those words having qualifying words there is no integration because of not connecting with one (word only)”.

18.1 *dvitīyānupapattis tu / dvitīyā tu nopapadyate / mahāntaṃ
putram icchatīti / kiṃ kāraṇam / na putra iṣikarma / yadi putro
neṣikarma na cāvaśyaṃ dvitīyaiva / kiṃ tarhi / sarvā dvitīyā-
dayo vibhaktayaḥ / mahatā putreṇa kṛtam / mahate putrāya dehi
/ mahataḥ putrādānaya / mahataḥ putrasya svam / mahati putre
nidhehi / tasmān naivaṃ śakyaṃ vaktuṃ na putra iṣikarmeti /
putra eveṣikarma tatsāmānādhikaraṇyān mahato dvitīyādayo
bhaviṣyanti /*

Vārttika: However, there is no justification for a second case (*vibhakti*).

Bhāṣya: However, (use of) second case *vibhakti* cannot be justified:
mahāntaṃ putram icchati “He desires a great son”.

What is the reason? The son is not the *karman*/object of (*dhātu*) *iṣ* (to desire) and the second case is not essential ... What then? All the *vibhaktis*/case endings beginning with the second (would not be applicable). “Made by a great son”; “give to a great son”; “bring from the great son”; “the wealth of a great son”; “present it to the great son”.

Therefore it is not possible to say *putra*/son is not the object of *dhātu iṣ* (to desire). ‘*Putra*’ alone is (in fact) the *karman* (object) of *iṣ* (to desire). Because of the same syntactical/case relation also second-case and the rest will be applicable for *mahat*.

18.7 *vṛttis tarhi kasmān na bhavati / saviśeṣaṇānām vṛttir na vṛttasya
vā viśeṣaṇam na prayujyata iti vaktavyam / yadi saviśeṣaṇānām
vṛttir na vṛttasya vā viśeṣaṇam na prayujyata ity ucyate muṇḍa-
yati māṇavakam ity atra vṛttir na prāpnoti / amuṇḍādīnām iti
vaktavyam // tat tarhi vaktavyam saviśeṣaṇānām vṛttir na
vṛttasya vā viśeṣaṇam na prayujyate ’muṇḍādīnām iti / na vaktava-
vyam / vṛttiḥ kasmān na bhavati mahāntaṃ putram icchatīti /
agamakatvāt / iha samānārthena vākyena bhavitavyam pratyayāntena ca /
yaś cehārthā vākyena gamyate mahāntaṃ putram icchatīti nāsau jātucitpratyayāntena gamyate mahāntaṃ putri-
yatīti /*

Then why is there no integration? It should be stated, “There is no integration of (words) which have (other words) qualifying them, nor is

a qualifying word used in conjunction with a compound (word)”.

If then, it is said “there is no compounding of (words) which have (other words) qualifying them, nor is the qualifying (word) used in connection with a compounded word, then here *muṇḍayati māṇavakam* “He shaves the youth”, in this case integration does not obtain. Therefore it should not be stated in the case of *muṇḍa* and the rest (3.1.21).

That then should be stated as “There is not integration (of words) which have (other words) qualifying them, nor is the qualifying of a compound word regular except for *muṇḍa* and the rest”. No, it should not be stated. Then why is integration not possible (in the case of) *mahāntaṃ putram icchati* “He desires a great son”? Because of the inability to communicate the meaning adequately/ *agamakatvāt*.

Here the same meaning by means of a sentence and by means of a *pratyaya* should be possible.

And here that meaning which is understood by means of a sentence as *mahāntaṃ putram icchati* “He desires a great son” is by no means ever understood by a *pratyaya*, as *mahāntaṃ putrāyati* (never occurs).

18.14 *etasmād dhetor brūmo 'gamakatvād iti na brūmo 'paśabdaḥ syād iti / yatra ca gamakatvaṃ bhavati bhavati tatra vrttiḥ / tad yathā / muṇḍayati māṇavakam iti / athāsya kyaj antasya kāni sādhanāni bhavanti / bhāvaḥ kartā ca / atha karma / nāsti karma/ nanu cāyam iṣiḥ sakarmako yasyāyam arthe kyaj vidhīyate / abhīhitam tat karmāntarbhūtam dhātvarthaḥ sampanno na cedānīm anyatkarmāsti yena sakarmakaḥ syāt / katham tarhy ayaṃ sakarmako bhavati aputraṃ putram ivācarati putrīyati māṇavakam iti /*

For this reason we say “there is no integration because of the non-intelligibility/inability to communicate the intended meaning”. We do not say that it would be an incorrect word or language. And where there is the ability to communicate the intended meaning there is compounding. As *muṇḍayati māṇavakam* “He shaves the youth”.

Now then, how many instruments of the action are there for that which ends in *kyac*? The *bhāva*/abstract state of the verb and *kartr*/agent. Then (what about) *karman*/object? There is no *karman*. But surely this *dhātu iṣ* has a *karman* in the sense of which (this *pratyaya*) *kyac pratyaya* is ordained. That *karman* is expressed and has

become part of the meaning of *dhātu*. Also there is now no other *karman* by which it could be transitive/*sakarmaka*. How then does this become transitive *aputram putram ivācarati putrīyati* “Him who is not his son he treats like a son”. *Putrīyati māṇavakam* “He treats the youth like a son”.

18.20 *asty atra viśeṣaḥ / dve atra karmaṇī upamānakarmopameya-karma ca / upamānakarmāntarbhūtam upameyena karmaṇā sakarmako bhavati / tadyathā / api kākaḥ śyenāyata ity atra dvau kartārāv upamānakartā copameyakartā ca / upamānakartāntarbhūta upameyakartā sakartṛko bhavati // ayaṃ tarhi kathaṃ sakarmako bhavati muṇḍayati māṇavakam iti / atrāpi dve karmaṇī sāmānyakarma viśeṣakarma ca / sāmānyakarmāntarbhūtaṃ viśeṣakarmanā*

18.25 *sakarmako bhavati / nanu ca vṛtyaivātra na bhavitavyam / kiṃ kāraṇam /*

Here there is a distinction. For there are two objects/*karman*, the object of comparison and the object to be compared. The object of comparison is inherent and (the verb) is transitive by means of the object to be compared.

As for example: *api kākaḥ śyenāyate* ‘Does the crow behave like a hawk?’ Thus here are two agents: the agent of comparison and the agent to be compared. The agent of comparison is inherent and the (verb is) together with the agent (by means of the agent) to be compared.

Then how does this have an object/*karman*? *muṇḍayati māṇavakam* “He shaves the youth.” Here also there are two objects/*karman*, the general object and the particular object. The general/common *karman* is inherent and (the verb is) transitive with a specific object. Now surely there should be no integration? What is the reason?

18.25 *asāmarthyāt / katham asāmarthyam / sāpekṣam asamarthaṃ bhavatīti / naiva doṣaḥ / nātrobhau karotiyuktau muṇḍo māṇavakaś ca / na hi māṇavakatvaṃ kriyate / yadā cobhau karotiyuktau bhavato na bhavati tadā vṛttiḥ / tad yathā / balīvardaṃ karoti muṇḍaṃ cainaṃ karotīti // kāmam tarhy anenaiva hetunā kyaj api kartavyam / māṇavakaṃ muṇḍam icchatīti nobhāv iṣiyuktāv iti / na kartavyaḥ / ubhāv atreṣiyuktau muṇḍo māṇa-*

vakaś ca / katham /

Because of the absence of syntactical/case relationship. How is there this lack of syntactical relation? That which has expectancy cannot have syntactical connection. The expectancy or requiring (of another word to complete the sense) is *asamartham* (not having the ability to convey the intended meaning). This is not a fault. Here neither *muṇḍa* (shaving) nor *māṇavaka* (youth) are connected with *karoti/kr* (to make). For the quality of youth is not made. And when both are connected with *karoti* (in the sense of making) then there is no integration. As for example *balīvardaṃ karoti, muṇḍam cainaṃ karoti*. “He produces a bull and shaves him”.

Granted, then, by the same reason this *kyac* also is to be employed here in *māṇavakaṃ muṇḍam icchati* “He desires the youth (to be) shaved”, neither is connected with the *dhātu iṣ* (to desire). It is not to be employed. Both *muṇḍa* (shaved) and *māṇavakam* (youth) are connected with the (*dhātu*) *iṣ*. How?

19.2 *na hy asau maunḍyamātreṇa santoṣaṃ karoti māṇavakastham asau maunḍyam icchati / ihāpi tarhi na prāpnoti muṇḍayati māṇavakam iti / atrāpi hy ubhau karotiyuktau muṇḍo māṇavakaś ca / na hy asau maunḍyamātreṇa santoṣaṃ karoti māṇavakastham asau maunḍyaṃ nirvartayati // evaṃ tarhi muṇḍādayo guṇavacanāḥ / guṇavacanāś ca sāpekṣāḥ / vacanāt sāpekṣāṇāṃ vṛttir bhaviṣyati //*

For (this person) does not create satisfaction by merely shaving. This one desires shaving in relation to the youth.

Here also it does not obtain. *muṇḍayati māṇavakam* “He shaves the youth”. Here both *muṇḍa* (shaving) and *māṇavaka* (youth) are connected with *karoti* (make). For that (person) does not create satisfaction by merely shaving. That (person) performs the act of shaving for the youth. Well then the words *muṇḍa* and the rest are expressive of qualities. And words expressive of qualities ‘expect’ (other words to complete the sense). There, because of the express rule, there will be the integration of (some specific) words which expect (other words to complete the sense).

19.6 *atha vā dhātava eva muṇḍādayaḥ / na caiva hy arthā ādiśyante kriyāvacanatā ca gamyate // athavā nedam ubhayaṃ yugapad-*

bhavati vākyam ca pratyayaś ca / yadā vākyam na tadā pratyayaḥ / yadā pratyayaḥ sāmānyena tadā vṛttiḥ / tatrāvaśyaṃ viśeṣārthinā viśeṣo 'nuprayoktavyaḥ / muṇḍayati / kam / māṇavakam iti / muṇḍaviśiṣṭena vā karotinā tam āptum icchati // athavoktam etan nātra vyāpāro 'nugantavya iti / gamakatvād iha vṛttir bhaviṣyati muṇḍayati māṇavakam iti //

Otherwise *muṇḍa* and the rest are in fact *dhātus*. And in fact the meanings are not indicated and the expression of verbal activity is understood. Otherwise the two (a sentence/phrase and denominative *pratyaya*) do not exist at the same time. When there is a sentence, then the *pratyaya kyac* does not apply. When the *pratyaya* applies generally, then there is integration. In that context it is essential that a qualifying (word) should be used with that which wants qualifying, e.g. *muṇḍayati* “He shaves”. Whom? The youth. Or he wants to connect with him by the particular act of shaving.

Otherwise this was stated “Here the activity/(of adding *kyac*) is not to be understood”. Because of causing the meaning to be understood there is integration as *muṇḍayati māṇavakam* “He shaves the youth”.

19.12 *atheha kyacā bhavitavyam iṣṭaḥ putra iṣyate putra iti // kecit tāvad āhur na bhavitavyam iti / kiṃ kāraṇam / svaśabdeno-ktatvād iti // apara āhur bhavitavyam iti / kiṃ kāraṇam / dhātvarthe 'yam kyaj vidhīyate sa ca dhātvarthaḥ kenacid eva śabdena nirdeṣṭavya iti //*

19.15 *iha bhavantas tv āhur na bhavitavyam iti / kiṃ kāraṇam / iha samānārthena vākyena bhavitavyam pratyayāntena ca / yaś cehārtho vākyena gamyata iṣṭaḥ putraḥ iṣyate putra iti nāmau jātucit pratyayāntena gamyate //*

Now here *iṣṭaḥ putraḥ* “a desired son” and *iṣyate putraḥ* “A son is desired”, should *kyac* be applicable? Some just say “it should not be”. What is the reason? Because of the desire of having been (already) expressed by its own (fully inflected) word form. Others say, “it should be applicable”. What is the reason? This *kyac* is ordained in the sense of the *dhātu*. And that *dhātu* meaning should be indicated by some word. The revered one (Your Honour) says “it should not be applicable”. What is the reason? Here the same meaning should be expressed by a sentence and by that which ends in a *pratyaya*. But the

meaning which is here understood, *iṣṭah putraḥ* “a desired son” and *iṣyate putraḥ* “A son is desired”, that is never at all understood by means of the word ending in a *pratyaya* (i.e. a denominative so ending).

19.18 *kyaci māntāvyayapraṭiṣedhaḥ //1//*

kyaci māntāvyayānām praṭiṣedho vaktavyaḥ / iha mā bhūt / idam icchati / kim icchati / uccair icchati / nīcair icchati //

Varttika 1: In respect of *kyac* “a prohibition” should be made of integrating (compounding words) ending in *m* or indeclinables when the *kyac* (*pratyaya*) follows.

Bhāṣya: In respect of *kyac* a prohibition should be stated of (integrating words) ending in *m* or indeclinables when *kyac* (*pratyaya*) follows. (So that) here it should not be applicable *idam icchati* “He desires this”. *kim icchati* “What does he want?” *uccair icchati* “He desires intensely” *nīcair icchati* “He desires humbly/modestly”.

19.21 *gosamānākṣaranāntād ity eke //2//*

gām icchati / gavyati // samānākṣarāt / dadhīyati madhūyati kartrīyati hartrīyati // nāntāt / rājīyati takṣīyati //

Varttika 2: Some (say) (*kyac* is applicable) after the word *go* (cow), words with simple vowels (other than *a*) and those ending in *n*.

- (1) *gām icchati* or *gavyati* He desires a cow. (*kyac* after *go*).
- (2) After words with simple vowels other than *a* (*kyac* acts):
 - dadhīyati* He likes/desires *dadhī*/curds;
 - madhūyati* He likes/desires honey;
 - kartrīyati* He is an agent/likes to be an agent;
 - hartrīyati* He is or desires to be a bearer/bringer.
- (3) After words ending in *n* (*kyac* acts).
 - rājīyati* He is or desires to be a king;
 - takṣīyati* He is or desires to be a woodcutter/carpenter.

NOTES ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA ON PĀṆINI 3.1.8

Kātyāyana's first *vārttika* is of considerable general significance in relation to compounding in *saṃskṛta*; for he states that even though there be the same case relation between words, compounding will not occur if there are more than two words involved.

The next *vārttika* states that, where there are more than two words involved (as in the example *mahāntaṃ putram icchati* ('He desires a great son') the second *vibhakti* is not justified (for *putra*, since on its own it is not the *karman*/object) of *iṣ* (to desire).

The other two *vārttikas* are specific: the first is a prohibition of *kyac* acting after words ending in *m* (like *kim*) and indeclinables. The second ordains *kyac* after the word *go*, words with simple vowels other than *a* and those ending in *n*.

Bhāṣya Summary

Patañjali begins by considering the possible functions of the *it c* of *kyac*. Having shown it is not for accent, nor for distinguishing (because of '*tadanubandha*' – *Pari* 82) but for the unobstructed general mention in '*naḥkṛye*' 1.4.15.

In considering the purpose of '*ātmanah*' in the *sūtra*, having first put the view that it is to express the sense of one's own desire, he then suggests that it ends in the sixth case in the sense of agent, so *icchā* can also express 'one's own desire for another'. However, the retort is, the word *ātman* connects with *sup* not *icchā*. Further if *ātman* is retained, how to explain examples of desire for another in the *Vedic* example of the 'malicious wolves'? Here even without use of a third word it is clear there, desire is for another, since no one desires evil for himself. In classical language the possibility of following this analogy is avoided, by mention of *ātman*, and made known as valid in the *Veda* by specific mention in 7.4.37.

Turning to the purpose of *sup*, Patañjali first shows it is not to prevent *kyac* coming after a *prātipadika*, since 1.4.15 specifically states a restriction, so that the rule will be applicable when there is production after a *prātipadika*. Nor is the purpose to prevent *kyac* after a *dhātu*, since *san* being stated after a *dhātu* bars others, since it has not scope elsewhere in the sense of desire for another. The reference to *ātman*, here implies the same agent there, and meaning for oneself. The last possible purpose, to prevent *kyac* coming after a phrase, serves to introduce the first *vārttika*. By reference to the *Paribhāṣā* '*pratyaya grahane ...*' he explains how a phrase or sentence like 'He desires a great son' cannot be *subantam*.

Patañjali explains where integration of words having the same case relationship is not possible, namely in relation to *samāsa* rules and *pratyaya* rules with example like 'He desires a great son'. He explains that because of there being more than one word to join with, in examples like 'The servant

there being more than one word to join with, in examples like ‘The servant of a prosperous king’, we cannot say there is syntactical relation with a sixth case word, since a phrase or sentence cannot end in a *sup*. Similarly in the example ‘Son of the prosperous *Upagu*’, there can be no syntactical connection between *apatyam* and *rddhasya* because of dissimilar cases. He concludes as introduction to the next *vārttika*, ‘it should be stated compounding is not possible when a qualifying word occurs’.

Patañjali connects the second *vārttika* indirectly with an implied example ‘He desires a great son’, saying the son here is not the *karman*/expressed by second case of *dhātu iṣ*. He rejects this view, because then any of the case endings would be equally applicable. Equally, second case must be applicable for *mahat* etc. because it is in the same case relationship.

He then returns to the previous theme of the cause of non-integration being the qualifying words. This does not have to be qualified by ‘except in the case of *muṇḍa* etc.’ because the real reason for non-integration is inability of that formed with a *pratyaya* to communicate the meaning conveyed by a sentence. The corollary is, that there will be compounding when the ability to convey intended meaning is that there, as ‘He shaves the youth’.

The *bhāṣya* now turns to the *kāraḱas* connected with a *kyajanta* word. *Bhāva* and *karṭṛ* are clear, but how can *iṣ* have *karman* as part of its own meaning and still be transitive requiring another *karman*? The object/*karman* of comparison is inherent in *dhātu iṣ* and it is transitive by means of the object to be compared. Even in the case of *muṇḍayati māṇavakam* two objects exist, the general inherent in the *dhātu* and the specific makes it transitive. So *karoti* being inherent has no connection syntactically with *muṇḍa* and *māṇavaka* specific objects, so *asāmarthyam* is not applicable. However, in expressing ‘He desires the youth (to be) shaved’ they are both connected with the *dhātu iṣ*. Here no integration occurs because there is ‘expectancy’, ‘He desires shaving in relation to the youth’. Only because of the express rule 3.1.21 is integration possible for some specific words which have expectancy. Alternatively, we can say *muṇḍa* etc. are *dhātus* expressing verbal activity (*kr* understood). Or a sentence and denominative *pratyaya* are mutually exclusive alternatives. Adding *kyac* has implied ‘making’. Otherwise we return to the previous view, that there is integration simply because of causing the intended meaning to be understood.

Finally, *Patañjali* considers whether *kyac* should be applicable to express the sentence with the past participle passive of *iṣ* ‘*iṣṭa*’ or the present indicative passive *iṣyate* and concludes the meaning of the sentence could never be expressed by the *pratyaya* and hence not be applicable.

The *bhāṣya* simply provides the suitable examples to illustrate the *vārttika* prohibiting integration of *m* ending words and indeclinables in the context of *kyac*, and likewise for the rule for *kyac* after *go*, words with simple vowels other than *a* and those ending in *n*.

Pratīpa

2.15.1 *supah / sup nāsi*

‘After (a word ending in a) *sup*/case *pratyaya*’

cf. *svaujasamauçchaṣṭābhyāmbhisñebhyāmbhyas nāsibhyāmbhyasñaso-sām nyossup* 4.1.2

yenavidhistadantasya 1.1.72 (*svam rūpam*)

ātmanah // *ātman nāsi*

expressing the *karman*/object wished as connected with his/her own Self.

ata (*bhvā° pa° se° 38 sātatyagamane*) *maniṅ*

sātibhyām maninmanināu uṅ 4.153 *Uṅādi* (etymology of *ātman*)

2.16.1 *kyac suṃ*

Denominative *pratyaya k-ya-c* (*vikaraṇa*) in the sense of desiring for oneself added to nouns to form denominative *dhātus*, e.g. *putrīyati*, He desires a son for himself.

It is also added to nouns that are *upamāna* ‘standards of comparison’ in the sense of similar behaviour, e.g. *putrīyati chātram*, He treats his student like a son.

upamānādācāre 3.1.10

It is also added in the sense of doing/making to the words *namas*, *virivas*, *citra* e.g. *namasyati devān* He makes reverential obeisance to the gods.

namovarivaścitraṇah kyac 3.1.19 (*karṇe*)

kā ‘*karmaṇah*’ *icchāyām vā ity anuvartate* /

“The words *karmaṇah* (after a word expressing the object) and *icchāyām vā* (optionally in the sense of desire) follow on (from 3.1.7)”

inikarmaṇa eṣiturātmāsambandhinaḥ subantadicchāyām arthe vā kyac bhavati /

“The *pratyaya kyac* optionally acts in the sense of desire after a *sup*/case ending word, expressing that (desired) as connected with the wisher’s self.”

cito ’nta udāttaḥ

citah 6.1.163

“A stem formed with a *pratyaya*, *āgama* or *ādeśa* having an indicatory *c* has *udatta* on the final syllable.”

pratyayasvareṇa siddham //

ādyudattaś ca 3.1.3

“A *pratyaya* has initial *udatta*” (unless otherwise stated.)

asya cvau, kyaci ca 7.4.32, 33

7.4.32: “In place of *a* or *ā* final of a *prātipadika* long *ī* before *pratyaya cvi* (the whole of which is elided, signifying ‘become what it was not before’).” e.g. *aśuklam śuklī karoti*. ‘What was not white he makes white.’

7.4.33: “In place of final *a* or *ā* of a *prātipadika* before *Kyac* denominative *pratyaya* long *ī* acts.”

e.g. *putra* (*k*) *ya* (*c*) *tip* – *putrīyati*

He desires a son of his own.

kye ce ti hy ucyamāne api kākaḥ śyenāyate

If the *sūtra* were uttered as *kya ca* without *c* (the form) ‘Does the crow behave like a hawk’ (would be applicable), by
kartuḥ kyañ salopaś ca 3.1.11

“The *pratyaya kyañ* optionally acts in the sense of ‘conduct’ after a word ending in a *sup/case pratyaya* denoting the object of comparison with the Agent and there is *lopa*-elision of the final *s*.”

śyena kyañte (akṛtsārvadhātukayor dīrghaḥ) 7.4.25 śyenāyate

because of the *pratyayas kyañ* and *kyac* having *kya* in common, and this is not desired.

2.16.6 ‘*tadanubandhakagrahaṇe tadanubandhakasya grahaṇa na*’

Only in *M.Bh.* See *pari° 54* ‘*tadanubandhakagrahaṇe tadanubandhakasya*’ “When a term with one or more indicatory letters is employed (in grammar it does) not (denote) that which in addition to those (one or more *anubandhas*) has another *anubandha* attached to it.”

Therefore, *kyac* does not denote *kyañ* (*Vyādi-paribhāṣā pāṭha* from *PS* p.40). This is *Paribhāṣā 49* of *Śakaṭāyana paribhāṣāsūtra* p. 45 *ibid*) and is *paribhāṣā 38* of *Puruṣottamadeva’s Laghuparibhāṣāvṛtti* (pp. 128-129 *ibid.*)

2.16.7 ‘*sāmānyagrahaṇāvidhātārthas tarhi*’//

‘Then it is for the purpose of an unobstructed general mention’ and not a hindrance for the application of the term to others.

sāmānyagrahaṇa avighāta

‘Then preservation of inclusive reference (for two or more terms) by a wording common to those terms, e.g. *nī* for *nīp*, *nīṣ* and *nīn*; *āp* for *ṭāp*, *nāp* and *cāp*.’

cf. ‘athavā avaśyam atra sāmānyagrahaṇāvidhātārthaḥ

kakāro ‘nubandhaḥ kartavyaḥ’ Mā° on 3.1.83 Vā° 7

‘*na kye*’ 1.4.15

“A word ending in *n* is called *pada* when these denominative *pratyayas kyac*, *kyañ* and *kyaś* follow”, e.g. *rājan + kya = rājīyati* He desires a king for himself

na lopaḥ prātipadikāntasya 1.2.7 i.e. kingship for himself

kyaci ca 7.4.33 (ī)

ātmana itīyaṃ kartari ṣaṣṭhī

This word *ātmanaḥ* is sixth case in the sense of agent by the *sūtra*

kartṛkarmanoh kṛti 2.3.65 (ṣaṣṭhī)

‘The sixth case acts after a word, in denoting the agent and the *karman* object, when used along with a word ending with a *kṛt pratyaya*.’

(*kṛdatiḥ 3.1.13*)

2.16.9 *Kai ‘ātmecchāyām iti / atmana iccheti śeṣaṣaṣṭhyā samāso na tu kartṛṣaṣṭhyā subantadvārakaścātmana icchayā sambandho na tu sāksāt / tenāyam arthaḥ — ātmanaḥ subantārthaṃ yadecchati tadā yathā syād iti /*

evaṃ parecchāyām iti vyākhyeyam /

‘Desire for oneself’ is a *śeṣa śaṣṭhī* – compound not agent sixth case, and the reconnection is with the desire of the self occasioned or caused by a *sup* ending word but not evidently (visibly/directly). Therefore, this is the meaning, ‘when he desires a *sup* ending object for himself then let (the *pratyaya kyac*) be applicable’, so when desire is for the sake of another this is to be explained.

ātmana itīyam iti / kriyākāraśambandhasyāntaraṅgatvād iti bhāvaḥ /

The sense is that this is due to the *antaraṅga* nature of the relation between verb and *kāraka* (instrument for accomplishing the action).

Udyota on 2.16.11 (*kartari śaṣṭhī*) ‘*anenaiva sambandhenecchāyām tadanvayāt / paramparāsambandhas tu na śaṣṭhyarthas tad āha kriyākāraśambandhasyeti*

‘By this there is in fact connection, due to the syntactical connection with that in the sense of desire. But traditional connection/genitive has not the sixth case meaning. That he states is as for the connection of the *kāraka*/case relation and the verb.’

MBh 2.16. 11. *icchetyakāro bhāve*

The word *icchā* is (derived with) the letter *a* (of the *pratyaya śa* by 3.3.101) in the sense of the action/state of the *dhātu iṣ* (to desire).

bhāve follows on by *anuvṛtti* from *sthāgāpāpaco bhāve* 3.3.95

śa follows on by *anuvṛtti* from *kṛñāḥ śa ca* 3.3.100

icchā 3.3.101 The form *icchā* is *nipātana*/irregular.

iṣu (*tu° pa° se°* 1351 *icchāyām*) *śa* (*a*)

iṣugamiyamām chaḥ 7.3.77 (*śiti*)

hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk 6.1.71

icchā t̄āp ajādyataṣṭāp 4.1.4

icchā irregularly does not apply *sārvadhātuke yuk* 3.1.67 (*bhāva-karmaṇoḥ*)

Thus ‘*ātmanaḥ icchā*’ the desire of oneself. If the correct analysis is sixth case in the sense of agent, that would include desire of oneself for another.

2.16.12 *nātmagrahaṇena...// icchā* is not connected with mention of the word *ātman*.

2.16.13 *ātmano yatsubantam* (It is connected with that ending in a *sup*/case ending word(what he desires) for himself, e.g. *putra* son)

Kai ‘*ātmagrahaṇopādānasāmarthyāt/*

“By force of including the specific mention of the word *ātman* (it must be connected with the *sup* ending word).”

nahyeṣitāramantareṇecchā bhavattī vyabhicārā’ bhāvādicchāyā viśeṣaṇasya niṣphalatvāt/

“For this is due to the fruitless nature of the qualification of the word *icchā* in the absence of deviation from the rule ‘there is no desire without a desirer/agent of desire’.”

2.16.14 'mā tvā vrkâ aghāyavó vidan/' Yajurveda 4.34

"Let not the malicious wolves know of thy coming"

(and T.S. 1.2.9.1 without vidan)

aghāyavaḥ from aghāyu// m.f.n. intending to injure, malicious, wicked, spiteful (padap. aghayu) from aghay

'āśvādyasyāt' 7.4.37

"In the Veda long ā acts in place of the final of āśva and agha before the denominative pratyaya kyac".

u by kyacchandasi 3.2.170

"The pratyaya u acts in the chandas after dhātus that have received the pratyaya kya in the sense of 'the agent having such a habit'."

pātaṃ no vrkādaghāyoḥ R.V. 1.120.7, 1.27.3, etc.

"Keep us safely from the wicked wolf."

agha// aghi (bhva° ā° se° 109 gatyākṣepe) (gatau gatyārambhe ca) ac nandigrahi pacādibhyo...acaḥ 3.1.134 (āgamaśāstrasyānityatvān na num)

2.16.15 sāpekṣam asamarthaṃ bhavattīl

"That which has expectancy (of another word to complete the sense) cannot be syntactically connected."

This is paribhāṣā 27 cādraparibhāṣāsūtra (P.S. p.47) and paribhāṣā 85 in Hemahainsaganīsaṅgrhīta nyayasāṅgraha (p.110 ibid.) frequently used by Patañjali.

2.16.19 himstrāḥ

"(Naturally) cruel or malicious, injurious, mischievous, hurtful, destructive."

R.V. 10.87 3, 5 only etc. a synonym for aghāyu. Here only in M.Bh.

2.16.23 ītvabādhānārtham//

"For the purpose of barring the long ī"

Which follows on from ī ghrādhbhoḥ 7.4.31 and would have been the ādeśa for the final a or ā of a prātipadika before the denominative pratyaya kyac by kyaci ca 7.4.33 but that is barred by the apavāda sūtra ordaining ā for the final of: āśva (giving āśvāyanto madyan R.V 7.32.23) and of agha (giving aghāyavo etc. as in the text) by āśvāghasyāt 7.4.37.

2.16.24 prātipadikāt [See introduction for more detail]

"After a nominal/crude base."

cf. arthavadadhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam 1.2.45

"Whatever is full of meaning, not a dhātu or a pratyaya is a prātipadika."

kṛtaddhitasamāsāś ca 1.2.46

"And what ends in a kṛt or taddhita pratyaya or has the name samāsa/ compound has also the name prātipadika."

2.16.25 subantād utpattau satyāṃ padasañjñā siddhā//

“When there occurs production (of a form) after a *sup*/case ending word the technical name *pada* is established (as valid).”

cf. ‘*suptiñantaṃ padaṃ*’ 1.4.14

“Whatever ends in a *sup* (noun *pratyaya pratyāhāra*) (*su au jas, am auṣ śas, tā bhyām bhis, ne bhyām bhyas, nasi bhyām bhyas, nas os am, ni os sup*) (4.3.2) or a *tiñ* (verbal *vibhakti pratyaya pratyāhāra*) (*tip tas jhi, sip yas ya, mip vas mas, ta ātām jha, thām āthām dhvam, iṭ vahi mahiñ*)(3.4.78) has the name *pada*.”

2.17.3 *naḥ kye* 1.4.15

e.g. *carman + kāṣ = carmāyate ti* It becomes leather.

akṛtsārvadhātukayor dīrghaḥ 7.4.25

Being called a *pada* the *n* is elided by ‘*na lopah prātipadikāntasya*’ 1.2.7

2.17.6 *dhātoḥ sanvidhīyate* //

San is ordained after a *dhātu*

dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkāḍ icchāyāṃ vā 3.2.7 (*guptijkidbhyaḥ*) *san* 3.1.5

2.17.6 *anavakāśā hi vidyayo bādhakā bhavanti sāvakāśa san* //

‘For rules without scope (of application elsewhere) are annulling (those with scope) and *san* has scope, i.e. rules which have no opportunity of taking effect (without setting aside other rules) supersede those rules.’

2.17.16 *anavakāśa* //

Having no occasion or scope of application.

Used in connection with a rule the whole of whose province of application is covered by a general rule, and hence which becomes technically useless, unless it is allowed to set aside the general rule.

See 5.4.154, 443 and on *Pari*. 64.

See *Paribhāṣā* 95 (*sāvakāśānavakāśayor anavakāśo vidhibalavāt*) of *śākatāyana paribhāṣāsūtra* (p.s.p. 46)

paribhāṣā 76 of *kātantra paribhāṣāsūtra* p. 77 *ibid.*)

paribhāṣā 103 of *Kalāpoparibhāṣā* (p. 80 *ibid.*)

2.17.9 *mahāntaṃ putram iti* // He (desires) a great son

Kai “*yady atra subantasamudāyāt paraḥ kyac pratyayaḥ syāt tadā pratyārthabhidhāne padadvayasya pravartanāt parasparasya samāsā ’bhāvād uttarapadanibandhanam ātvaṃ na syāt*”

If here the *pratyaya kyac* would be applicable after a collection (combination of *sup*/case ending words) then in expressing the meaning of the *pratyaya*, due to the absence of a compound for two words occurring one after the other with each other, the connection being with the subsequent word, there would not be the *ādeśa ā* for *mahat*.

2.17.11 *mahāputram*

‘great son’

sanmahatparamottamotkrṣṭāḥ pūjyamānaiḥ 2.1.61

But when there is no ‘expectancy’ by 2.1.61 “the words *sat* (good), *mahat* (great), *parama* (highest), *uttama* (best), and *utkrṣṭa* (excellent), are compounded with words denoting the person deserving respect and the compound is a *tatpuruṣa*.”

ānmahataḥ samānādhikaraṇajātīyayoḥ 6.3.46

“Long *ā* is *ādeśa* in place (of the final) of *mahat* (great), when a word in the same case follows and when *jātīyar* (5.3.69) follows.”

mahārājaḥ great king; *mahāputraḥ* a great son

2.17.16 *samānādhikaraṇānām iti //*

Kai “*samānādhikaraṇānām padānām madhye ekena padenā* ‘yogāt *samudāyenaiva yogād vṛttir na bhavattīy arthaḥ* /”

“The meaning is that because of not saying ‘joining with one word among the words having the same syntactical relation’, there will not be indeed applicable integration/compounding through joining with a combination.”

sagūṇasya hi putrasyeṣiṇā sambandho na kevalasyeti bhāvaḥ /

“The sense is ‘for the connection is with the desirer of a son with a particular quality (greatness), not alone’ (i.e. a son unqualified by any other word).”

2.17.18 *rddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*

‘servant/man of the prosperous king’

But when joining with one only, *rājñāḥ puruṣo rājapuruṣaḥ* king’s man by ‘*ṣaṣṭhī*’ 2.2.8

“A word ending in the sixth case *pratyaya* is compounded with that which is in construction and the compound is a *tatpuruṣa*.”

mahatkaṣṭam śritāḥ, who has resorted to great evil

but *kaṣṭam śritāḥ* — *kaṣṭaśritāḥ*, ‘who has had recourse (when joining with one only) to evil.’

by *dvitīyā śritāṅgapatitagaṭātīyastaprāptāpannaiḥ* 2.1.24

“A word ending with the second *sup*/case *pratyaya* is compounded with the words *śrita* (who has resorted to), *patita* (who has fallen upon), *gata* (who has gone to), *atyasta* (who has passed), *prāpta* (who has obtained), and *āpanna* (who has reached) and the resulting compound is called *tatpuruṣa*.”

rddhasyopagor apatyam, ‘The son of prosperous *Upagu*’; but without qualification compounding is possible

upagor apatyam aupagavaḥ ‘the offspring of *Upagu*.’

by *prāgdīvyato* ’n 4.1.83

tasyāpatyam 4.1.92

The *pratyaya aṅ* mentioned in 4.1.83 and those which follow it denote the descendant of someone.

How of those being in a different case relation? Characterised by or possessed of different *sup*/case *pratyayas*. (only on three occasions in

M.Bh.)

c.f. *kaḥ prasaṅgo yad vyadhikaraṇānām samāsah syāt /*

“What is the occasion there might be a compound of words having different case relations?”

bhā° 2.1.67

bhā° 2.2.24 vā° 10 bahuvrīhiḥ samānādhikaraṇānām //

“A *bahuvrīhi* (is formed) of words in the same case relation.”

vyadhikaraṇānām mā bhūd iti /

(This is stated) so that it should not be formed of different case relations.

2.18.1 *dvitīyānupapattis tv iti //*

Kai. “yadi kevalasya prātipadikārthasyeṣisambandho neṣyate tadā karmatvā bhāvat kevalāt prātipadikād dvitīyā na prāpnoti / nāpi samudāyāt tasyā ’prātipadikatvāt guṇe ca saṅkhyāyā vivakṣitatvāt.”

“If connection of the desirer with a sole (single) word and conveying simply the sense of the *prātipadika* is not desired, then the second case does not obtain after a single *prātipadika* word because of the absence of the characteristic of *karman*/object, nor even after a combination of words, because of not having the nature of being a *prātipadika* and because, in relating to the secondary objects, numbers are being intended to be expressed.”

2.17.6 *putra eveti /*

Kai. “tasyai vepsitatamatvād guṇānām cepsāprakarṣā ’bhavāt / svayam akarmatve ’pi tatsamānādhikaraṇyanibandhanah vibhaktir ity arthah !”

‘(The object of *iṣ* is applicable) for him (*putra*) alone because of being that most desired to be obtained by the agent.’

c.f. (*karturīpsitatamaṃ karma 1.4.49*) and because of the absence of the pre-eminence of desire to be obtained for the secondary objects. Even when he himself does not have the nature of object, the meaning is that the *vibhakti* conveys the connection with the condition of relating to the same object/grammatical agreement.

2.18.7 *saviśeṣaṇānām vṛttir na bhavati //*

There is no integration/compounding of words having other words qualifying them.

Kai. “ekasyaikādā vyapekṣaikārthābhāvavirodhād itibhāvah !”

‘The sense is that this is because of the conflict of the condition of becoming one (integrated word) with at the same time there existing expectancy of one (other word to complete the meaning).’

P. 3.1.8.2.18.9 muṇḍayati mānavakam, ‘He shaves the youth’.

muṇḍamiśraślakṣṇalavaṇavratavastrahalavalakṛtatūstebhyo ṇic 3.1.21 (karāṇe)

‘The *pratyaya ṇic* in the sense of making acts after these words as the object/*karman* of the action.’

muṇḍa, shaved, bald *Mn. Mbh.*

muḍi (*bhvā° pa° se° 326 khaṇḍane*)

akartari ca kārake sañjñāyām 3.3.29

muḍa e (ṇic) tip 7.3.84

muṇḍayati Hariv. 780.7.1.78

muṇḍam karoti, He makes (him) shaved.

Here, with a compound of words having other words qualifying we have the exception to the general rule.

2.18.11 *agamakatvāt //*

Because of not having the nature of making the meaning intelligible.

(Only in *M.bh.*) non-communicativeness, inability to communicate adequately the intended meaning.

mā° 2.18.11 vrtti kasmān na bhavati agamakatvāt

How then is there no integration?

Because of inability to make the meaning intelligible.

Kai. "laukike prayoge 'numānād api gāvyaḍibhyo gavādy arthapratipattivanmahāntaṃ putram icchatītyādivākyaṛthasya mahāntaṃ putrīyatyādeḥ pratītir nāstīty arthaḥ / siddhānāṃ ca śabdānāṃ saṅkaranirāsāyā 'n-vākhyānaṃ kriyate / na tv aprayuktāpūrvaśabdavyutpādanāya /"

'The meaning is: Also from the inference (made) in relation to popular usage (of words), having ascertained/knowledge of the meaning of 'go' etc. from the words *gāvya* etc., there is not knowledge of the meaning of the sentence *mahāntaṃ putram icchati* (He desires a great son) from the (theoretical irregular form) *mahāntaṃ putrīyati*.

For the purpose of rejecting the mixing together/confusion of established words (with valid forms), the minute explanation is made, but not for deriving unused or unprecedented words.'

2.18.14 *na brūma iti //*

We do not say (it would be incorrect word/*apaśabda*).

Kai. "apaśabdo hi loke prayujyate sādhuśabdasaṃnānāṛthas ca ayaṃ tv aprayuktatvād apaśabdavyapadeśasyāpi na bhājanam ity arthaḥ /"

'For in the world an incorrect word is used and has the same meaning as the correct word, but this (form), because of not being used, does not even partake of the designation of incorrect word.'

cf. Paś. p. mlecche ha vā eṣa madapaśabdaḥ /

2.18.16 *kāni sādhanāni bhavanti / bhāvaḥ kartā ceti //*

"How many instruments for accomplishing the action are there (for that which ends in *kyac*)? The *bhāva* and *kartr*."

Leading straight to the goal (gram), the sense of the instrumental or agent (as expressed by the case of the noun supplementary to the action itself).

Synonymous with *sādhaka* and *kāraka*

cf. sādhanam ca kriyāyāḥ / kriyābhāvāt sādhanābhāvaḥ /

And the *sādhana* is the instrument of activity. From absence of activity, there is absence of any instrument for that activity.

Kai. “*karmā bhāvapratipādanaparam etat / adhikaraṇādaḥ hi lyuḍādayo yathāyogaṃ bhavanti eva / bhāvasya ca lakārādy utpattinimittatayā sādhanavyapadeśaḥ*”

‘The chief object of this, is teaching the absence of *karman* (as a *sādhana*) for *lyuḍ*. (*karaṇādhikaraṇāyoyaś ca 3.3.117*) and the rest (of the *pratyayas*) are in fact applicable in the sense of *adhikarana* and the rest (of the *kāraḥ*). And the designation of *sādhana* for *bhāva* (abstract action/state of *dhātu*) is by reason of its nature of being a cause for the arising of *la* (verbal) *pratyayas* and the rest.’

2.18.17 *abhihitam iti //*

“(That *karman*) is expressed”.

Kai. “*tataś ca jīvaṭṭyādivadicchākyaḥ karmakatvāt karmāṇi lādybhāvaḥ !*”

‘And then because of the *akarmatva* (intransitive) nature of that (verbal form) ending in *kyac* (expressing) desire like ‘he (desires to) live’ and the rest, there is an absence of *la* (verbal *pratyayas*) and the rest in the sense of *karman/object*.’

2.18.18 *na cedānīm iti //*

“And there is now no (other *karman*)”.

Kai. “*niyataviśayā icchāyāḥ kyajantena pratipādanāntasyāś ca vastv-antaraviśayīkaraṇā ’bhāvād iti bhāvaḥ !*”

‘The sense is, because of teaching, ‘with that ending in *kyac* (meaning) desire for a fixed (specified) object and because there is (absence of) making an internal object become an object’.’

2.18.18 *kathaṃ tarhīti //*

“How then (does this becomes transitive)?”

sakarmako bhavati //

Kai. “*atrāpi putrādikarmaṇo ’sty antarbhāva iti praśnaḥ !*”

‘The question is ‘does not here too the object *putra* and the rest become part of the (meaning of the *dhātu*)?’

This device and explanation of *Pat.* is used by *Sāyana* in his commentary on A.V. 3.1.37¹.

2.18.20 *upameya //*

“(The object) is to be compared”

That which is compared, subject of comparison; *Kāś.* uses it as a synonym of *upamitam* found in *upamitaṃ vyāghrādibhiḥ 2.1.56 sāmānyāprayoge*

¹ *amitrasenām maghavann asmān chatrūyatīmabhi, O Indra, be an enemy for us against this hostile army.*

“A case inflected word denoting the subject of comparison is compounded with the words *vyāghra* (tiger) etc. the latter being the standard of comparison and in construction with the former, and the compound is a *tatpuruṣa* provided that any word expressing the *sāmānya* (common characteristic) is not employed”, e.g.
puruṣo 'yaṃ vyāghra iva puruṣavyāghraḥ, ‘a man tiger’ (in strength)

2.18.21 *api kākaḥ śyenāyate* //

“Does the crow behave like a hawk?”

“The *pratyaya kyaṅ* optionally acts in the sense of conduct after a word ending in a *sup*/case *pratyaya* denoting the object of comparison of the agent and there is *lopa* elision of the final *s*.”

śyena kyaṅ śyaiṅ (*bhvā° ā° a° 963 gatau*) *inac* (*uṅa° 2.46*)

śyenā-ya-śyenāyate (*akṛtsārvadhātukayor dīrghaḥ 7.4.25*)

2.18.23 *muṇḍayaṭṭi* //

(How does this have an object) ‘He shaves (the youth)’?

Kai. “*muṇḍagunaṅviśiṣṭadravyakarmaṇo dhātvarthe 'ntarbhāva iti bhāvah!*”

‘The sense is that inherent in the meaning of the *dhātu* is that. For if there is an object to be compared, characterised by the quality (of being that object of the action) of shaving.’

2.18.23 ‘*atrāpi*’ //

“Here too (there are two objects)”

Kai. “*nyanto dhātur dravyamātram antarbhāvayitum saknoti na tu viśeṣaṇam māṇavakādikam iti bhāvah!*”

‘The sense is that a *ṅi* ending *dhātu* can only make implied/inherent a mere thing or object, but not a specific qualification like ‘youth’ etc.’

2.18.25 *nanu ceti* //

“Now surely there should be compounding?”

Kai. “*yady apy etaccoditam ca parihṛtam ca tathāpi gamakatvā'gamakatvaviṣayavibhāgāpadarśanāya punar upanyāsaḥ!*”

Although this question has been urged and refuted, still for knowing the division of sphere between that which is capable of making intelligible the meaning and that which does not, again there is this juxtaposition.

2.18.18 *tad yathā / balīvardam karoti muṇḍam cainam karoti /*

“As for example ‘he produces a bull and shaves it’.”

Kai. “*balīvardam evātmasambandhitvena karoti tam ca muṇḍam krotīti yugapadubhayoḥ karotikarmatve vivakṣite muṇḍayati balīvardam iti prayogo na bhavattī arthaḥ!*”

The sense is, by reason of the nature of the connection with the self, he makes or produces the bull and that he shaves. But when it is intended to express the nature of the object of *dhātu kṛ* simultaneously, in both cases

the usage is not applicable (in the form) *muṇḍayati balīvardam*.

2.19.2 *mauṇḍayam* //

“(This one desires) shaving of the head”, tonsure, baldness
*mauṇḍayam prāṇāntiko daṇḍo brāhmaṇasya vidhīyate / manu 8.379 muṇḍa
ṣyan guṇavacanabrāhmaṇādibhyaḥ karmaṇi ca 5.1.124 (tasya bhāvaḥ)
ṣyan*

“The *pratyaya ṣyan* acts after a word expressive of quality (*guṇavacana*), and after *Brāhmaṇa* or the occupation of something or someone as well as the nature thereof.” e.g. *jaḍasya bhāvaḥ karma vā jāḍyam muṇḍ...mauṇḍayam* coldness, chilliness, stiffness, dullness.

2.19.5 *guṇavacanās ca sāpekṣāḥ* //

“And words expressive of qualities expect (other words to complete the sense).”

See above 5.1.124.

2.19.6 *dhātava iti* //

“(Muṇḍa and the rest) are in fact *dhātus*.”

Kai. “sautrā dhātavo muṇḍādayas tebhyaś curādivatsvārthiko nij ity arthaḥ!”

‘The meaning is that *muṇḍa* and the rest are *sūtra* (formed) *dhātus* and after these act the *pratyaya nic* in the sense of the base/*svārthe* as it does after the *dhātus* beginning with *cur* (Cl. 10) by *sūtra 3.1.21*.’

2.19.6 *nacaiveti* //

“In fact (the meanings) are not (indicated).”

Kai. “yady api kriyā viśeṣābhidhāyitvaṃ muṇḍādīnāṃ naivopāttaṃ tathāpi svābhāvikatvād arthābhidhānasya prayogād eva tad avastīyata ity arthaḥ / yathā kaṇḍvādayo dvidividhās tathā muṇḍādaya iti bhāvaḥ !”

‘Although the expressing of a particular verbal activity is not accepted for *muṇḍa* and the rest, still quite naturally from usage alone of expressing their meanings, that is known. The sense is just as *kaṇḍū* and the rest (3.1.27) are two-fold (both *prātipadikas* and *dhātus*) so likewise are *muṇḍa* and the rest.’

2.19.10 *muṇḍaviśiṣṭeneti* //

“(He wants to connect with him) by the particular act of shaving.”

Kai. “pūrvasmin parihāre karmaviśeṣānapekṣāyāṃ pratyayotpattir ity uktam !”

‘In the previous refutation it was stated that the arising of the *pratyaya* occurred when there was no regard to the *karman* as qualification.’

“asmins tu yathā gāṃ dogdhi paya iti śuddhasya duher gavā pūrvam sambandha, paścāt tu goduhinā payasaḥ, evaṃ śuddhaḥ karotimauṇḍyena sambadhyate, mauṇḍyaviśiṣṭas tu māṇavakenety ucyate / anenaiva nyāyena

māṇavakaṃ muṇḍam icchatīti kyac prāpnotīty āśaṅkayāha...

‘However, in this answer, just as it is said ‘He milks the cow’ (‘*duh*’ governing two *karmans* by *Kārika* on 1.4.51 *akathitaṅca*), first there is connection of pure milking with the cow, but afterwards of the milk with the milker of the cow, so likewise is the pure (action) connected with the causing of shaving. However, it is stated that the (action) distinguished as shaving, is (connected there) with the youth. By this reasoning alone (though undesired) *kyac* obtains to express ‘the desire to shave the youth’ with this in doubt he says:’

2.19.10 *atha veti //*

Kai. “*vyāpāro nārambhaṅīyaḥ prayatnam antareṅāpīṣṭasya siddhatvād ity arthaḥ / kyactvagamakativān na bhavati //*”

‘The activity (of adding *kyac*) is not to be undertaken because of the desired (form) being accomplished without (that) effort. And *kyac* is not applicable because of not being able to make the meaning intelligible.’

taduktam hariṇā

[This is not found in this form in the present text of *Vākyapadīya* but *Nāgeśa* explaining *Kaiyaṭa* quotes *Bhartṛhari*:]

2.19.20 “*sad apīcchākyaçaḥ karma tadācārakyacā hṛtam / vākya-vācyamato’vyakter yathābhyāsaḥ kramādiṣu // nageśa anyatrokta hariṇā sad apīcchākyaçaḥ karma vākya eva prayujyate / prasiddhena kṛtaḥ śabdo bhāvagarhābhīdhāyinā // abhyāse tulyarūpo ’pi na yaṅantaḥ pravartate / iti*”

This is with some variants V.P. 3.14, 72-73.

1. *vṛtaḥ* 2. *rūpatvān na* 3. *prasujyate*

72.B “Therefore, even though the *pratyaya kyac* expressive of desire has an object, it is used only in a sentence.”

putram icchati māṇavakam iti

Helārāja: Thus only he desires a youth as his son.

73. “The word formed with the *pratyaya yaṅ* (P.3.1.23) being reserved for the well-known idea of disapproval of the action; such a word is not used to express repetition because the form would be the same (and so there might be misunderstanding).”

The expressions *lolupyate caḍakramyate jaḍagamyate* formed with *yad* express the idea of disapproval.

(*lupasadacarajapajabhadahadamśagṛbhyo bhāvagarhāyām* 3.1.24)

(*nīyaṃ kauṭilye gatau* 3.1.23)

Or crookedness of the gait.

That is why even though the same *pratyaya* is taught in the sense of repetition of the action it is not used in that sense, because there is a possibility of misunderstanding. To express the idea of repetition the sentence is used, not the complex formation.

punaḥ punaḥ krāmati vṛtti caḍakramyate

(*dhātor ekāco halādeḥ kriyāsamabhihāre yañ 3.1.22*)

2.19.12 *atheheti //*

Now here *kyac* should be applicable.

Kai. “*icchākyajantāt karmaṇi pratyayotpatih prakārantareṇāśaḍkayate !*”

The arising of the *pratyaya* in the sense of *karman* after that ending in *kyac* in the sense of desire is conjectured (as possible) by another way.

“*tathāhi yady atra kyaj bhavati tad ecchāmātrasya kyacābhidhānād avāśyaṃ karmaṇe ’bhidhānasya tadvācinā pratyayenotpattavyam / yathā putrīyātī kartrabhidhānāya tipā !*”

For so, if here *kyac* is applicable because of the expressing by *kyac* of mere desire, it is essential for the expressing of *karman*/object that it be produced by a *pratyaya* expressing that. As for example in the form *putrīyati*, *tip* (= *ti* is to be produced) for expressing the agent (He desires a son for himself).

2.19.13 *svaśabdeneti //*

“Desire already expressed by its own (fully inflected) form.”

Kai. “*iṣṭaśabdasāmānādhikaranyāt putra ity anena nirbhuvateṣikriyāpekṣa-karmabhāvasyārthasya pratipādanād ity arthaḥ / ayam arthaḥ yadā kriyāphalasya karmaṇaḥ prādhānyam pratipipādyiṣitaṃ tadā vākyam eva prayujyate putra iṣṭa ityādi na tu vayajantaḥ tasyā karmakatvāt karmaṇi pratyayānutpādāt !*”

‘The meaning is ‘By reason of the statement expressing the *putra* (as *karman*), because in the sense of the same case relation with the desired word (i.e. because of *putra* the *sup* ending word failing to express the object, *kyac* does not follow) due to the understanding of the meaning of the condition of *karman* with regard to the action of *iṣ* (to desire) being distorted or (as object distorted =) abandoned. This is the meaning, when there is the pre-eminence of the *karman*, as fruit of the action desired to be taught, then a sentence alone is used ‘the desired son’ etc., but not a *kyac* ending word because of its intransitive nature. There is not production of a *pratyaya* in the sense of the *karman*.’

2.19.21 *gausamānākṣareti*

“*Kyac* acts after the word ‘*go*’, words with simple vowels and those ending in *n*.”

Kai. “*akārādayo daśa samānāḥ / tatra ḷvarṇāntasya prātipadikasyā sambhādrkārāntasya saptānāṅgrahaṇam asmin tu nyāse ’vyāptih, vācyatītyādyasiddhiprasaṅgāt / bhāṣyakāreṇa tu matabhedapradarśanāyopanyāsaḥ kṛtaḥ*”

‘The ten beginning with *a* are the same. Amongst them, because of the impossibility of a *prātipadika* in *ḷ* and *r* the reference is for seven (four short and three long). In this written text there is inadequate pervasion or extent of definition (of the scope of the rule), because of the possibility of the forms *vācyati* etc. being valid forms. However, for showing a difference

of opinion by the *Bhāṣyakāra/Patañjali*, this statement is made.’

2.19.22 *gavyati*

‘He desires a cow for himself.’

vānto yi pratyaye 6.1.79

“Those ending in *v* (namely *av* and *āv*) act in place of *o* and *au* before a *pratyaya* beginning with *ya*.”

‘go *kyac* tip’

2.19.24 *kāmyac ca* //

kā° subantāt karmaṇa ātmecchāyām kāmyac pratyayo bhavati /

***kāmyac ca* ||3||19||**

2.19.25 *kimarthaś cakāraḥ / svārthaḥ / cito ’nta udātto bhavātīty antodāttatvaṃ yathā syāt / naitad asti prayojanam* /

2.20.1 *dhātusvareṇāpy etat siddham / kakārasya tarhītsañjñāpari-trāṇārthaḥ āditaś cakāraḥ kartavyaḥ // ata uttaram paṭhati* /

Pāṇini 3.1.9: And the *pratyaya kāmyac* also (acts in the sense of desire for oneself after a word ending in a *sup*/case *pratyaya* expressing the *karman*/object wished).

Bhāṣya: What is the purpose of the letter *c*? For the purpose of accent (so that there should be final *udātta*) by the *sūtra* (*citaḥ antaḥ udāttah*) (6.1.163). This is not the purpose. This is also established by the *dhātu* accent. Then the initial *c* should be made for protecting the letter *k* from being an *it*/indicatory letter. Therefore (the *vārttikakāra*) reads what follows.

2.20.1 *kāmyacaś citkaraṇān arthakyaṃ kasyedarthābhāvāt* ///

kāmyacaś citkaraṇam anarthakam / kakārasya tarhītsañjñā kasmān na bhavati

2.20.5 *idarthābhāvāt / itkāryābhāvād atreṭsañjñā na bhaviṣyati / nanu ca lopa evetkāryam / akāryaṃ lopaḥ / iha hi śabdasya kāryārtho vā bhavaty upadeśaḥ śravaṇārthā vā / kāryaṃ ceha nāsti / kārye ’sati yadi śravaṇam api na syād upadeśo ’narthakaḥ syāt* //

Vārttika 1: It is pointless to form an *it c* for *kāmyac* because there

exists no purpose in the letter *k* being called *it*/indicatory.

Bhāṣya: Forming an *it c* for *kāmyac* is pointless. Then why is not the technical name *it* applicable to the letter *k* (of *kāmyac*)? Because of the absence of purpose for an *it* letter. In the absence of a grammatical operation for an *it* letter the technical name *it* will not be (applicable). But surely *lopa*/elision alone is the (grammatical operation of *it*). *Lopa* is not a grammatical operation. For here the ‘original teaching/*upadeśa*’ is for the purpose of the grammatical operation or for the purpose of hearing.

And here there is no (grammatical operation). If, when there does not exist a grammatical operation hearing also is not there, then the original teaching/*upadeśa* would be useless.

2.20.7 *idaṃ tarhītkāryam /agnicitkāmyati / kitīti guṇapraṭiṣedho yathā syāt / naitad asti prayojanam / sārva dhātukārdhadhātukayor aṅgasya guṇa ucyate dhātoś ca vihitah pratyayah śeṣa ārdhadhātukasamjñā labhate na cāyaṃ dhātor vidhīyate // idaṃ tarhi/ upayaṭkāmyati / kitīti samprasāraṇam yathā syāt / etad api nāsti prayojanam / yajādibhir atra kiṭam viśeṣayisyāmaḥ /*

This then is the grammatical operation of the *it* letter *k*, namely (in the expression) *agnicitkāmyati* “He desires to kindle the *agnicit*/sacrificial fire for himself”; so that when *it k* follows there should be prohibition of *guṇa*. This is not the purpose. When a *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātuka pratyaya* follows, *guṇa* is stated for an *aṅga*, and the *pratyaya* which is remaining (i.e. other than *tiṅ* or *śit*) ordained after a *dhātu* obtains the technical name *ārdhadhātuka* and this (*pratyaya*) is not ordained after a *dhātu*.

Then this is the purpose, *upayaṭkāmyati* “He desires the *upayaṭ* (two additional formulas at an animal sacrifice) for himself. So that when *it k* follows there should be *samprasāraṇam*/vocalisation of the semivowel (of the *y* of *yaj*).

This also is not the purpose. We will specify (that elsewhere) by the word *k-it* (having an indicative *k*) in connection with *yaj* (*dhātu*) and the rest.

2.20.12 *yajādīnām yah kid iti / kaś ca yajādīnām kit / yajādibhyo yo vihita iti // athāpi kathañcid itkāryam syāt / evam api na doṣaḥ / kriyate nyāsa eva dvicakārako nirdeśaḥ / supa ātmanaḥ*

*kyacckāmyac ceti // atha vā chāndasametata / dr̥ṣṭānuvidhiś
chandasi bhavati na cātra samprasāraṇam dr̥śyate /*

(Saying) “And among the *dhātus yaj* and the rest whatever has an indicatory *k ...*” And which of the *pratyayas* for (*dhātus*) *yaj* and the rest have an *it k*? That which is ordained after *yaj* and the rest.

Still now, even if somehow there should be a grammatical operation (for the *it* letter) so also there is no fault. The written/literal text is formed indicating two *c* letters as *supa ātmanaḥ kyacckāmyac ca* (*c* goes by *saṃyogāntasya lopaḥ* 8.2.23).

Otherwise this is a usage peculiar to the *Veda*. It is seen (as an operation) according to rule/order in conformity with what is found in the *chandasa* and here *samprasāraṇam* is not seen.

NOTES ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA ON PĀṆINI 3.1.9

Bhāṣya asks the purpose of the *it c*; *Vārttikakāra* says there is no purpose in *k* being called *it*. *Bhāṣya* suggests the purpose is to prevent *guṇa* in *agnicit-kāmyati* or if not for *samprasāraṇam* of *yaj* in *upayat kāmyati*. There are really two *c*'s or finally it is in conformity with Vedic usage where *samprasāraṇa* does not occur.

Pradīpa

19.24 *ātmanaḥ putram icchati putrakāmyati /*

‘He desires a son of his own.’

pūñ (kryā° u° se° 1481 pavane) ktra

‘*puvo hrasvaś ca*’ *uñ° 4.164*

yadvā punnarakāstrāyate / ‘supi’ 3.2.4 kaḥ

e.g. *vastrakāmyati / kā°*

He desires clothes for himself to represent a garment, *vām. 4.1.9* (in a quotation)

yathā śvo rathakāmyati // kāṭhaka saṃ° 7.5

As the horse longs for a chariot or wishes to be yoked to a chariot;

19.25 *cito ’nta udātto //*

citaḥ 6.1.163

“A stem formed by a *pratyaya*, *āgama* or *ādeśa* having an indicatory *c* has *udātta* on the end syllable.”

Final *udātta* follows on by *anuvṛtti*.

karṣātvato ghano ’nta udāttaḥ 6.1.159

dhātusvareṇa // dhātoḥ 6.1.162

“For a *dhātu* final *udātta* accent.”

e.g. *pacati gopāyati*

āditaś cakārah //

“An initial *c* (should be formed).” by *cuṭū* 1.3.7

an initial *cum* (*c ch j jh ñ tālu*), an initial *ṭum* (*t th ḍ dh ñ mūrdhā*) of a *pratyaya* have the technical name *it* (indicatory letter *anubandha*). The *c* (proposed) would be *iṭ* but without a *k* initial of *kāmyac* would be called *iṭ* by *laśakvataddhite* 1.3.8.

“The initial *la ś* and *ku la śa / kuṃ* (*k kh g gh ñ kaṅṭha*) of all *pratyayas* except *taddhitas*, are called *it*,” and therefore *k* would be elided by *tasya lopah* 1.3.9 *itah*

upamānād ācāre //3/1/10//

adhikaraṇāc ca //1//

20.17 *adhikaraṇāc ceti vaktavyaṃ prāsādīyati kuṭyām kuṭīyati prāsāda ity atrāpi yathā syāt //*

Pāṇini 3.1.10: The *pratyaya kyac* optionally acts in the sense of conduct after a word ending in a *sup/case pratyaya* denoting the object of comparison.

Vārttika 1: And (after a word denoting) location or place (of comparison, *kyac pratyaya* acts).

Bhāṣya: And (*kyac*) should be stated (as coming after a word denoting) the location of comparison. So that here too *kyac* should be applicable. *prāsādīyati kuṭyām* “In a hut, he behaves as if he were in a palace”. *kuṭīyati prāsāde* “He dwells in a palace as if it were a hut, or imagining himself to be in a hut”.

NOTES ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA ON PĀṆINI 3.1.10

This has only one *vārttika* increasing the scope of *kyac* to location of comparison as well as object. *Bhāṣya* gives two appropriate examples: *prāsādīyati kuṭyām*, He imagines himself in a palace when in a hut. *kuṭīyati prāsāde*, He imagines himself in a hut when actually in a palace. Neither appear in any other context (the latter not even in *kāśikā*).

2.20.20 *kartuḥ kyaṅsalopaś ca* //3/1/11//

*salopasanniyogenāyaṃ kyaṅ vidhīyate tena yatraiva salopas
tatraiva syāt / payāyate / iha na syāt / api kākaḥ śyenāyate //*
*naiṣa doṣaḥ / pradhānaśiṣṭaḥ kyaṅ / anvācayaśiṣṭaḥ salopo yatra
ca sakāraṃ paśyasīti / tad yathā / kaścid ukto grāme bhikṣāṃ
cara devadattaṃ cānayeti sa grāme bhikṣāṃ carati yadi
devadattaṃ paśyati tam apyānayati //*

Pāṇini 3.1.11: The *pratyaya kyaṅ* optionally acts in the sense of conduct after a word ending in a *sup/case pratyaya* denoting the *karman/object of comparison* for the agent; and there is *lopa/elision* of the final *s*.

Bhāṣya: The *pratyaya kyaṅ* is ordained in conjunction with *lopa* elision of *s*. Therefore wherever there is *lopa/elision* of *s*, there should the *pratyaya (kyaṅ)* be applicable. *payāyate* “It is fluid” (i.e. it behaves like *payas/water* or milk). Here in *api kākaḥ śyenāyate* “Does the crow behave like a hawk?” (*kyaṅ*) would not be (applicable). This is not the case. *Kyaṅ* is taught as of primary importance, (whereas) elision of *s* is propounded as a rule of secondary importance, being applicable where you see the letter *s* is (actually present). As for example, someone said “Go about begging for alms in the village and bring *Devadatta*”. He goes about begging for alms in the village and if he sees *Devadatta* he brings him also.

2.21.1 *salopo vā* //1//

salopo veti vaktavyam / payāyate payasyate //

Vārttika 1: Optionally *lopa/elision* of *s*.

Bhāṣya: It should be stated that there is optionally *lopa/elision* of *s* (e.g.) *payāyate* or *payasyate* “It is fluid”.

2.21.3 *ojo 'psarasor nityam* //2//

*ojo 'psarasor nityaṃ salopo vaktavyaḥ / ojāyamānaṃ yo ahiṃ
jaghāna / apsarāyate //*

Vārttika 2: There is invariable (elision of *s*) of *ojas* and *apsaras*.

Bhāṣya: It should be stated that there is invariably elision of the *s* of *ojas* and *apsaras*. *ojāyamānaṃ yo ahiṃ jaghāna* (*RgVeda* 2.22.11) “Who has slain the serpent as he showed his strength”. *apsarāyate* “She behaves like an apsara/nymph”.

2.21.6 *apara āha / salopo 'psarasa eva / payasyata ity eva bhavitavyam iti // katham ojāyamānaṃ yo ahiṃ jaghāneti / chāndasaḥ prayogaś chandasi ca dr̥ṣṭam anuvidhīyate //*

Another says, (there is) elision of the *s* of *apsaras* only. (Therefore) *payasyate* “It is fluid”, alone should be its form.

How (do we get the form) *ojāyamānaṃ yo ahiṃ jaghāna* “Who has slain the serpent as he showed his strength”. (This is) a usage peculiar to the *Veda*. And in the *chandas* the operation is ordained in conformity with what is found.

2.21.8 *ācāre galbhaklībahodebhyaḥ kvib vā //3//*

ācāre galbhaklībahodebhyaḥ kvib vā vaktavyaḥ / avagalbhate avagalbhāyate / klība / viklībate viklībāyate / klība / hoḍa / vihoḍate vihoḍāyate // kiṃ prayojanam / kriyāvacanatā yathā syāt / naitad asti prayojanam / dhātava eva galbhādayaḥ / na caiva hy arthā ādiśyante kriyāvacanatā ca gamyate //

Vārttika 3: In the sense of conduct *kvip* optionally acts after (*ava*)*galbha*, *klība* and *hoḍa*.

Bhāṣya: It should be stated that *kvip* optionally acts ‘in the sense of conduct’ after *avagalbha*, *klība* and *hoḍa*. (It should be stated) *avagalbhate* or *avagalbhāyate* “He is brave/valiant”. (Thus) *galbha* (bold). So *klība* (impotent, eunuch). *viklībate* or *viklībāyate* “He behaves like a eunuch”. So *klība*. (Now) *hoḍa* raft? Disrespect? *vihoḍate* or *vihoḍāyate* “He disregards or disrespects”.

So what is the purpose of the *vārttika*? So that the expressing of a (verbal noun) or a verbal activity should be understood. This is not the purpose. *Avagalbha* and the rest are in fact *dhātus*. Also the meanings are not in fact indicated and expressing of the verbal activity is

understood.

2.21.12 *idaṃ tarhi prayojanam/ avagalbhā vikl̥bā vihoḍā / a pratyayāt (3.3.102) ity akāro yathā syāt / mā bhūd evam / guroś ca halaḥ (103) ity evaṃ bhaviṣyati // idaṃ tarhi / avagalbhāñcakre vikl̥bāñcakre vihoḍāñcakre / kāspratyayād ām amantre (3.1.35)*

2.21.15 *ityām yathā syāt /*

This then is the purpose (to form the words) *avagalbhā* (boldness, valour?) *vikl̥bā* (impotence?) and *vihoḍā* (disregard, disrespect). So that there should be the *pratyaya a* (by the *sūtra*) “*apratyayāt 3.3.102*”. “After a *dhātu* that ends in a *pratyaya* there is the *pratyaya a*, the word being feminine”. Thus it should not be applicable. It will be formed by *guroś ca halaḥ 3.3.103*. “The *pratyaya a* acts after a *dhātu* having a *guru* (prosodially heavy vowel), and ending in a consonant in the feminine”. Thus it will be (stated).

This then is the purpose: *avagalbhāñcakre* “He has been bold”. *vikl̥bāñcakre* “He has behaved like a eunuch”. *vihoḍāñcakre* “He has disregarded or shown disrespect” (i.e. to form the periphrastic perfect) so that the *pratyaya ām* should be (applicable) because of the *sūtra kāspratyayādāmamantre liṭi 3.1.35*. “*Ām* is the *pratyaya* of the *dhātu kās* (to cough) and of those *dhātus* that are formed by *pratyayas* (i.e. derivative verbs), when *liṭ* (*pratyaya* conveying the sense of the perfect tense) follows, except in the *mantra/Veda*.”

2.21.16 *apara āha / sarvaprātipadikebhya ācāre kvib vaktavyo 'śvati gardabhatīty evam artham / na tarhīdānīm galbhādyanukramaṇaṃ kartavyam / kartavyaṃ ca / kiṃ prayojanam / ātmanepadārthān anubandhānāsankṣyāmīti / galbha kl̥ba hoḍa //*

Another says “*kvip* should be stated as acting in the sense of conduct after all *dhātus*, for the sake of the forms *aśvati* “He behaves like a horse”. *gardabhati* “He represents or behaves like an ass/donkey”.

Then, should there not now be brought about a methodical enumeration of *galbha* etc.? It should be done. What is the purpose? Thus I will attach indicatory letters for the purpose of (indicating) *ātmanepadam + galbha, kl̥ba, hoḍa*.

NOTES ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA ON PĀṆINI 3.1.11

General Summary

Bhā.: Introduces by illustrating the distinction between the rule of primary importance in the *sūtra kyañ* and the rule of secondary importance, elision of *s*, like begging for alms and bringing *Devadatta* (if there!)

Vā. 1.: Gives optional *lopa* of *s* and *bhāṣya* gives the example of *payas*.

Vā. 2.: Says the elision of *s* of *ojas* and *apsaras* is invalid. *Bhāṣya* introduces a further view that only *s* of *apsaras* is in fact elided. *Ojāyamānam* is Vedic usage.

Vā. 3.: States that *kvip* optionally acts after *galbha*, *klība* and *hoḍa* in the sense of conduct.

Bhā.: *Bhāṣya* explains the purpose of the *vārttika* so that periphrastic perfect can be formed. Another (*vārttika*) says *kvip* should be stated as following all *dhātus* in the sense of conduct. A full enumeration of *galbha* etc. should be made for purpose of indicatory letter indicating *ātmanepada*.

Bhāṣya Summary

2.20.21 *payāyate*

“It is or becomes fluid.”

It behaves like ‘*payas*’

paya (*bhvā° ā° se° 476 gatau*) *asun*

or *pīḍ* (*dī° ā° a° 1141 pāne*)

sarvadhātubhyo 'sun uṇa° 4 183

payasalopa kyañ “*akṛtsārvadhātukyoh*” 7.4.25 (*dirghah*)

2.20.22 *pradhānaśiṣṭaḥ kyañ*

“*Kyañ* is taught or laid down as of primary importance”

anvācayaśiṣṭaḥ salopo. salopa is propounded as a rule or matter of secondary importance

“*pradhānānvācayaśiṣṭayoḥ pradhāne sampratyaya*” *vyādi pari 67*

also cf. *Vardhamāna* in his *svapajñā-tīka* on *GRM (4)*

ca iti anvācaya hetuṣu bhikṣābhāṭa gāṃ cānaya

The two occur together again in *M.Bh.* only at 7.3.118 *vā° 4*

pradhānaśiṣṭabhautvam sanvācayaśiṣṭamatvam yathā kyañi salopah

2.21.1 *klībam* m.f.(ā)n. impotent, emasculated, a eunuch

A.V. 6.138.8/12 8.6.11

klībate klībr̥m (bha° ā° se° 381 aghāṣṭarya) ka igupudhajñāprīkirah

‘in lack of boldness’ *kaḥ 3.1.125*

klībā ya te to behave like a eunuch *Vop. 21.7*

hoḍa m. a raft, float, boat *Trik. 1.2.13* a title of a particular class of *kāyasthas* and of *Śrotriya Brāhmaṇas* in Bengal (*SK.D. Suppl.*)

hoḍa (*bhvā° ā° se° 305 anādare*) *ac 3.1.124*

bhvā° pa° se° 354 gatau

to disregard, disrespect, to go, move (*Vop.*)

prthvādibhya imanijvā 5.1.122 (18 hoḍa)

vihoḍate and *vihoḍatate* Not even recorded in *Lex.*

‘He disregards or goes.’

Kvip Denominative *pratyaya* zero acting after any substantive in the sense behaviour/conduct. (Elsewhere a *krt pratyaya 3.2.61, 76, 77, 87-92, 177-179*)

k laśakvataddhite 1.3.8

it upadeśe ’janunāsika it 1.3.2

v veraprṛkattasya 6.1.67

p halantyam 1.3.3

tasya lopaḥ 1.3.9

3.2.11 vā 2 21.1

2.21.4 ojāyamānaṃ yo ahiṃ jaghāna

ojas ubja (tu pa se 1303 ārjave) asun uṇā 183

ubjebahe balopaś ca uṇā 4.192

ojāya akrtsārvadhātukayor dīrghaḥ 7.4.25

ojāya muk śānac “laṭaḥ śatśānacāvaprathamāsamānādhikarane” 3.2.124

āne muk 7.2.82

ojāyamāna

Other examples of *ojāya* are:

ojāyamānastanvaś ca śumbhate (R.V 140 .6)

“(Agni) proving his might, he decks the glory of his form”

ojāyamānaṃ tuvijāta tavyāna (R.V 3.32.11)

“(O Indra) thou puissant God, more mighty (slewest *Pahi*) showing his strength.” The *vārttika 1* and *2* are found in a semi-*śloka vārttika* in *Kāś.*

ojāso ’psaraso nityaṃ payasas tu vibhāsayā

(*sakārasyesyate lopaḥ śabdaśāstravicakṣaṇaiḥ (jai° sū° 2.1.91)*)

2.21.5 apsarāyate

“She behaves like a nymph.”

The word *apsarā* is found in the *A.V.* in the form *apsarāpati a° 4.37.7* which would give the form here without *s lopa* if *apsarā* were the *prātipadika* form, but it seems to be derived from *apsaras*

adabhyah saranti taratesurana uṇ° 4.237

ap sr (bhvā° pa° a° 935) gatau asun

galbha m.f.n. bold *Vop. 21.7*

galbhāyate to be bold

avagalbhate or *avagalbhāyate* to be brave, valiant, *Pat.*

galbha (bhvā° se° 392 dhāṣṭarye) ac 3.1.34 the boldness

2.21.12 avagalbhā f. boldness, not recorded

viklībā impotence

vihoḍā disregard

'*a pratyayāt*' 3.3.102

Dhātus that end in *a pratyaya* are derivative *dhātus* (e.g. desiderative, causative, intensives and denominatives), all enjoined in this first section of 3.1.5-32. Though taking *pratyayas* they are called *dhātus* by *sanādyantā dhātavaḥ* 3.1.32

It is after these that the *pratyaya a* is used in forming a feminine noun.

2. *guroś ca halaḥ* 3.3.103 (*striyām, a*)

'*guru*' (having) a prosodially heavy vowel is defined *saṃyoge guru* 1.4.11 (*hrasvam*) "When a conjunct consonant follows a short vowel it is termed heavy (*guru*)."

ḍīrgham ca 1.4.12 (*guru*) "And a long vowel is also termed *guru*."

Therefore all three are *guru* (*o* being a *ḍīrgha* vowel)

2.14.3 *avagalbhām cakre*

avagalbha ām liṭ kāspratyayādāmamantre liṭi 3.1.35 *āmaḥ* 2.4.8 (*le, luk*)

"There is *luk* elision in place of that *pratyaya liṭ* (sign of the perfect) coming after *am*."

kr̥nvānuprayujyate liṭi 3.1.40

"After a *dhātu* ending with *ām* the *dhātu kr* is annexed (as auxiliary verb) when *liṭ* follows."

2.21.16 *vā° 3*

aśvati kā aśva ivācarati aśvāyate

Kās. 'Some say *kvip pratyaya* (optionally acts) after all *prātipadikas*/crude bases (and *kyañ* in the alternative) "to behave like a horse"

aśvāyate formed with *kyac* means "to wish for horses".'

aśvāghasyāt 7.4.37 "In the *Vedas* long *ā* acts in place of the final of *aśva* and *agha* before the denominative *pratyaya kyac* (3.2.8)

'*aśvāyanto maghavan*' *R.V.* 7.32.23 "Desiring horse, O *Indra*, (we call on thee)."

aśva aśnute aśū (*svā° ā° se° 1264 vyāptau*) *kvan sañāḥteca aśūmuṣilaṭi uṇa* 1.151

gardabhati To represent an ass *Sāh* 10.21

gardabha gardati garda (*svā° pa° se° 58 śabde*) *abhac*

kṛṣṭlikaligardimyo 'bhac u 3.122

3. *ātmanepadārthānubandhānāsañkṣyamīti anudāttañita ātmanepadam* 1.3.12

"After a *dhātu* having an indicatory *anudātta* vowel (here *a*) or an indicatory *ñ* the *pratyayas* of the *ātmanepada* are to be applied." e.g. *galbhāyate*.

2.21.19 *bhr̥sādibhyo bhuvyacver lopaś ca halaḥ* //3/1/12//

2.21.10 *halo lopaṣanniyogenāyaṃ kyaṅ vidh̥tyate tena yatraiva halo lopaṣ tatraiva praśajyeta / naiṣa doṣaḥ / pradhānaśiṣṭaḥ kyaṅ / anvācayaśiṣṭo halo lopo yatra ca halaṃ paśyasīti //*

Pāṇini 3.1.12: The *pratyaya kyaṅ* in the sense of becoming (what the thing previously was not), acts after the *prātipadikas bhr̥śa* and the rest, which do not end with the *pratyaya cvi* (5.4.50) (*a-bhūta tadbhāve kṛbhvastiyoge sampadyakartari cvi*) and there is *lopa*/elision of the (final) consonant.

Bhāṣya: *Kyaṅ* is ordained in conjunction/simultaneously with the elision of a (final) consonant, therefore wherever there is elision of a (final) consonant there only *kyaṅ* obtains. There is no fault — *kyaṅ* is taught as of primary importance. The elision of a (final) consonant is propounded as a rule or matter of secondary importance, i.e. (only) when you see a (final) consonant (elide it).

2.21.24 *bhr̥śādiṣv abhūtatadbhāvagrahaṇam* //1//

bhr̥śādiṣv abhūtatadbhāvagrahaṇam kartavyam / iha mā bhūt /

2.21.25 *kva divā bhr̥śā bhavanti* //

Vārttika 1: In relation to the words *bhr̥śa* and the rest there should be specific mention of becoming what a thing previously was not before.

Bhāṣya: A mention should be made of (the meaning) “becoming what a thing was not before” in relation to the words *bhr̥śa* etc., (so that) here it should not be (applicable). *kva divā bhr̥śā bhavanti* — “Where do they become strong by day?”

2.22.1 *cvipratiṣedhānarthakyaṃ ca bhavaty arthe kyaṅvacanāt* //2//

cvipratiṣedhaś cānarthakaḥ / kiṃ kāraṇam / bhavaty arthe kyaṅvacanāt / bhavaty arthe hi kyaṅ vidh̥tyate //

Vārttika 2: And the prohibition of *cvi* is meaningless because of the

statement of (ordaining) *kyañ* in the sense of becoming (what the thing was not before).

Bhāṣya: And the prohibition of *cvi* is meaningless. What is the reason? Because of *kyañ* being ordained in the sense of becoming (what it was not before). For *kyañ* is ordained in the sense of becoming (what it was not before).

2.22.3 *bhavatiyoge cvividhānam //3//*

*bhavatinā yoge cvir vidhīyate / yatra cvinoktatvāt tasyārthasya
kyañ na bhaviṣyati // dājantād api tarhi na prāpnoti / paṭapaṭā-
yate / dājapi hi bhavatinā yoge vidhīyate bhavatyarthe kyaṣ /*

Vārttika 3: (There is) ordaining of *cvi* (in the sense of becoming what it was not before) with the *dhātu bhū*.

Bhāṣya: *Cvi* is ordained in conjunction with the *dhātu bhū*. Because of its meaning being expressed together with *cvi*, *kyañ* will not be (applicable) there. Then also after that ending in *dāc*, it (*kyañ*) does not obtain e.g. *paṭapaṭāyate* “He makes a sound (like) *paṭa paṭa* (who did not make it before)”.

For *dāc* (also) is ordained in conjunction with the *dhātu bhū* (and) *kyaṣ* in the sense of becoming (what it was not before).

2.22.8 *dāci vacanaprāmānyāt //4//*

*dāci vacanaprāmānyād bhaviṣyati / kiṃ vacanaprāmānyam /
lohitādiḍājbhyaḥ kyaṣ (3.1.13) iti //*

Vārttika 4: From the authority of (another) rule, when *dāc* follows (there is *kyaṣ*).

Bhāṣya: There will be (applicability of *kyaṣ*) because of the authority of (another rule).

What rule’s authority? *lohitādiḍājbhyaḥ kyaṣ (3.1.13)* “*Kyaṣ* acts after the words *lohita* (red)” etc. and after those that end with the *pratyaya dāc* (when they do not take the *pratyaya cvi*)”.

- 2.22.11 *iha kiñcid akriyamāṇaṃ codyate kiñcic ca kriyamāṇaṃ pratyākhyāyate / sa sūtrabhedah kṛto bhavati // yathānyāsam evāstu / nanu cokatam iha kasmān na bhavati kva divā bhṛśā bhavantīti / nañivayuktam anyasadrśādhikaraṇe tathā hy arthagatiḥ / nañyuktam iva yuktam vā yat kiñcid iha dṛśyate tatrānyasmīns tatsadrśe kāryaṃ vijñāyate tathā hy artho gamyate / abrāhmaṇaṃ ānayety ukte brāhmaṇasadrśa*
- 2.22.15 *āntīyate nāsau loṣṭamānīya kṛtī bhavati / evam ihāpy acvet iti cvipratīśedhād anyasmīn acvyante cvisadrśe kāryaṃ vijñāsyate/ kiṃ cāto 'nyadacvyantaṃ cvisadrśam / abhūtatadbhāvaḥ //*

Here something not being produced is spoken of and something being produced is to be rejected. That makes this division of the *sūtra*.

Let it be according to the text of the *sūtra*, as it is written down. And surely it was said, “Why is not (*kyañ*) applicable here?” *kva divā bhṛśā bhavanti* “Where do they become many day by day” (By the *paribhāṣā* 74) *nañivayuktam anyasadrśādhikaraṇe tathā hyarthagatiḥ* “(An expression) formed by the addition of the (negative) *nañ* or (the particle of comparison) *iva*, to (some word or other) denotes something which is different from and (yet) similar to (what is denoted by the latter) because it is so that (such expressions) are generally understood in that way”.

(To explain), whatever is seen here having the (negative) *nañ* or (the particle of comparison) *iva* (implies that) in respect of that an operation is effected on another similar to that because the meaning is understood (in that way). When it is said “Bring a non-*Brāhman*” one in fact brings (someone) like a *Brāhman*, but he does not accomplish the act after having brought clods of earth.

Thus here also, because of the prohibition ‘not after that (ending in) *cvi*’, the operation will be known in (the context of) some other non-*cvi* ending word (but in fact) like *cvi* (in meaning). And what other than this is not ending in *cvi* but is like *cvi*? That which is becoming what it was not before.

- 2.22.18 *iha kāscit prakṛtayaḥ sopasargāḥ paṭhyante / abhimanas sumanas unmanas durmanas / tatra vicāryate / bhṛśādiṣūpa-sargaḥ pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇaṃ vā syāt / abhibhavatau subhavatau udbhavatau*
- 2.22.19 *durbhavatāv iti / prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇaṃ vā / abhimanas*

*śabdāt / sumanasśabdāt unmanasśabdāt durmanasśabdād iti //
yuktaṃ punar idaṃ vicārayitum / tanu tenāsandigdhenā prakṛty-
arthaviśeṣaṇena bhavitavyaṃ yāvataṃ prākprakṛteḥ paṭhyante /
yadi hi pratya-yārthaviśeṣaṇaṃ syāt prāgbhavate paṭhyeran //
neme śakyāḥ prāgbhavate paṭhitum /*

Here some bases are recited with *upasargas*, *abhi manas* (m.f.n. having the mind directed towards, desirous of, longing for), *su-manas* (m.f.n. good minded, well disposed, benevolent, gracious, favourable, pleasant, agreeable), *unmanas* (m.f.n. excited or disturbed in mind, perplexed, longing or wishing for), *dur-manas* (n. bad disposition, perversity of mind, cf. Greek dus-menes) in bad or low spirits, sad, melancholy.

There, in that context it is doubted whether in the words *bhr̥śa* and the rest the *upasarga* should be optionally qualifying the meaning of the *pratyaya* (thus *abhi*) in the sense of overcoming, conquering or approaching; (*su*) in the sense of being excellent by nature; (*ut*) in the sense of coming up to, reaching, arising or coming forth; (*dur*) in the sense of being bad.

Or else (the *upasargas* serve to) qualify the meaning of the base. Thus, (acting) after the word *abhimanas* (mind directed to, desirous), after the word *sumanas* (good minded), after the word *unmanas* (excited in mind), or after the word *durmanas* (bad disposition).

It is proper to ponder on this further. Surely the (*upasargas*) should be undoubted qualifications of the meaning of the base, inasmuch as (the *upasargas*) are recited before the base. For if they were qualifications of the meaning of the *pratyaya* they would be recited before *bhū*. It is not possible for these to be recited before *bhū*.

2.22.23 *evaṃ viśiṣṭe hi pratya-yārthe bhr̥śādīmātrād utpattiḥ pra-
sajyeta / tasmān naivaṃ śakyaṃ vaktum / na cedevaṃ jāyate
vicāraṇā // kaś cātra viśeṣaḥ /*

For thus when the meaning of the *pratyaya* is specified, the arising of (the *pratyaya*) after the whole of (the group) *bhr̥śa* and the rest would be applicable. Therefore it is not (in fact) possible to speak thus. And if not thus the matter has to be discussed.

And what is the distinction here?

2.23.1 *bhr̥śādiśūpasargaḥ pratya-yārthaviśeṣaṇam iti cet svare doṣaḥ*

//5//

bhrśādiśūpasargaḥ pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇam iti cetsvare doṣo bhavati / abhimanāyate / tinñatiṇaḥ (8.1.28) iti nighātaḥ prasajyate // astu tarhi prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇam /

Vārttika 5: If (we accept the statement) “in the words *bhrśa* and the rest... an *upasarga* qualifies the meaning of the *pratyaya*” (there is) a fault in relation to the accent.

Bhāṣya: If (we say) “in the words *bhrśa* and the rest an *upasarga* qualifies the meaning of the *pratyaya*” then there is a fault in relation to accent e.g. *abhi-manāyate* “He longs for or desires”. Here (by the rule) *tinñatiṇaḥ (8.1.28)* “A finite verb is unaccented when a word precedes it which is not a finite verb” absence of accent would be wrongly applicable.

Then let it be (that) it qualifies the meaning of the base.

2.23.4 *sopasargād iti cedaṭi doṣaḥ //6//*

sopasargād iti cedaṭi doṣo bhavati / svamanāyateti // atyalpam idam ucyate 'ṭi doṣo bhavatīti / adlyabdvirvacaneṣv iti vaktavyam/ atyudāhṛtam / lyapi / sumanāyā / dvirvacane / abhi-bhimanāyiṣate // naiṣa doṣaḥ / avaśyaṃ saṅgrāmayateḥ sopasargād utpattir vaktavyā asaṅgrāmayata śūra ity evam artham / tan niyamārthaṃ bhaviṣyati / saṅgrāmayater eva sopasargān nānyasmātsopasargād iti //

Vārttika 6: If (we accept the statement after the word) ‘together with an *upasarga*’ (there is) a fault when (augment) *aṭ* follows.

Bhāṣya: If (we say) after the words together with an *upasarga* there is a fault when (augment) *aṭ* follows e.g. *svamanāyata* “He became cheerful or happy”. This which is stated viz. “There is a fault when *aṭ* (augment) follows” is too small (a scope).

It should be stated “when there is *aṭ* (augment), *lyap* (*pratyaya*) and reduplication (there is a fault)”. (The fault) “when *aṭ* follows” is already illustrated. The fault when *lyap* follows is e.g. *su-manāya* “Having become cheerful or happy”. When there is reduplication, *abhimi-manāyiṣate* “He desires or longs for ...”

This is not a fault. It is essential that the production of *pratyayas* should be stated after *saṅgrāmayati* in conjunction with or having its

upasarga attached for (explaining the form) *a-saṅ-grāmayata sūrah* “The hero made war/fought”.

It will be for the purpose of the restriction only after *saṅ-grāmayati* with its *upasarga*, not after any other verb with its *upasarga*.

2.23.9 *yadi niyamaḥ kriyate svaro na sidhyati / evaṃ tarhi bhṛśādi-
śūpasargasya parāṅgavadbhāvam vakṣyāmi // yadi parāṅgavad-
bhāva ucyate 'ḍlyabavirvacanāni na sidhyanti / svaravidhāv iti
vakṣyāmi / evaṃ ca kṛtvāstu pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇam api / nanu
coktaṃ bhṛśādiśūpasargaḥ pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇam iti cetsvare
doṣa iti / svare parāṅgavadbhāvena parihṛtam /*

If the restriction is made, then the accent is not valid.

Well then, I will say that in relation to *bhṛśa* and the rest there is the condition of being like a part of that which follows.

If it is said there is the condition of being like a part of that which follows, then (the accent of) those words having *aṭ*, *lyap* or reduplication are not valid.

I will say, “in relation to an accent rule” and having done so let it be also the qualification of the meaning of the *pratyaya*.

But surely it was stated, “if it be a qualification of the *pratyaya* then there will be a fault in relation to accent”. In relation to accent it is avoided by (stating) the condition of being like that which follows.

23.14 *ayaṃ tarhi pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇe sati doṣaḥ kyaṅoktatvāt
tasyārthasyopasargasya prayogo na prāpnoti / kiṃ kāraṇam /
uktārthānām aprayoga iti / tadyathā / api kākaḥ śyenāyata iti
kyaṅoktatvād ārcārthasyāṅaḥ prayogo na bhavati / asty atra
viśeṣaḥ / ekenātra viśiṣṭe pratyayārthe pratyaya utpadyata iha
punar ekena / tatra manāyata ity ukte sandehaḥ syād
amibhavatau subhavatāv udbhavatau durbhavatāv iti / tatrāsan-
dehārtham upasargaḥ prayujyate // yatra tarhy ekena /
utpucchayate / atrāpy anekena / pucchādudasane*

23.20 *pucchād vyasane pucchātparyasana iti //*

This then is a fault, when the qualification of the meaning of the *pratyaya*, because *kyaṅ* has already expressed the meaning, the use of an *upasarga* does not obtain.

What is the reason? “There is not usage (of a *pratyaya* or other

word element) for (the expressing of) those meanings which have already been stated. As for example *api kākah śyenāyate* “Does the crow behave like a hawk?” So here because by *kyañ* has been expressed ‘in the sense of conduct’ there is not applicability of the *upasarga āñ* (in the sense of conduct). There is a distinction. Here, when the meaning of the *pratyaya* is specified or distinguished by one *upsarga* the *pratyaya* arises, but here (it is distinguished) by more than one. There, when it is stated *manāyate* “He is zealous, devoted, thinks or considers” there would be doubt as to whether *kyañ* is added in the sense of *abhi-bhavati* (one who surpasses or overcomes), (*su*) in the sense of *su-bhavati* (being of excellent nature), (*ud*) in the sense of *ud-bhavati* (one who comes up to, reaches. arises or exists), and (*dur*) in the sense of *dur-bhavati* (existing on ill luck).

Therefore for the purpose of avoiding doubt the *upasarga* is to be attached. Then, where (joined) with only one (*upasarga*) the *pratyaya* acts, (e.g.) *utpucchayate* “It raises its tail”. Here also (it acts) with more than one. Thus:

pucchād-ud-asane “after *puccha* (tail) in the sense of raising”.

pucchād-vy-asane “after *puccha* (tail) in the sense of wagging about”.

pucchād-pary-asane “after *puccha* (tail) in the sense of throwing about *nin* acts”.

NOTES ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA ON PĀṆINI 3.1.12

Vārttika Summary

Kātyāyana’s first *vārttika* is an explanatory addition to the *sūtra* specifically stating the implication of mentioning *cvi*, that *kyañ* too acts in the sense of ‘becoming what a thing previously was not after *bhr̥śa* etc.’ Having said this, of course, prohibition of *cvi* in the *sūtra*, he declares meaningless. The next *vārttika* is simply for clarification, since we know *cvi* is ordained in the sense of ‘becoming’ after *bhū* by 5.4.50. Similarly the fourth *vārttika* reiterates that *kyaṣ* is applicable when *ḍac* follows by 3.1.13.

The fifth *vārttika* quotes a current view that in relation to *bhr̥śa* etc., an *upasarga* qualified the *pratyaya* (*kyañ*) and states this will result in the wrong accent. Similarly if it is accepted that they are ‘together with an *upasarga*’, it produces a wrong form in relation to the augment *aḥ*.

Bhāṣya Summary

In the introduction to the first *vārttika*, *Patañjali* applies the distinction he used in the previous *sūtra* treating *kyañ* as of primary importance and consonant elision as of secondary importance. He simply provides an

example from the *Veda* for the *vārttika*. For clarification he simply adds on the second *vārttika* that this means *kyañ* is ordained in the sense of 'becoming...'. He then states the corollary of the third *vārttika*, that because of its meaning being expressed after *bhū* by *cvi*, *kyañ* will not be applicable. He introduces the fourth *vārttika* by showing this implies *kyañ* would not act after *ḍāc*, hence the need for the *vārttika*.

Having quoted the *sūtra* referred to, he advocates no change in the *sūtra*. Instead a most helpful distinction is made on the basis of *paribhāṣā* 74 '*nañ-ivayukta*'... , whereby we understand the addition of negative or the particle of comparison as denoting something different yet similar like 'bring a non-*brāhmaṇa*'. So we may understand *a-cvi* not ending in *cvi*, but like it in meaning 'becoming...'.
 The *bhāṣya* then quotes a list of words from *bhr̥śa gaṇa* with *upasargas*, asking whether these qualify the meaning of the *pratyaya kyañ* or the *prakṛti manas* etc. This doubt prompts the next *vārttika*, upon which *Patañjali* explains, 'there wrongly would be absence of *udātta* accent by 8.1.28, if the *upasarga* qualifies the meaning of the *pratyaya*. So, let the *upasarga* qualify the *prakṛti*.' In which case he implies on the sixth, augment *aṭ* would wrongly precede both *su* and *manas* etc. Moreover the same fault applies when *lyap* and reduplication occur. Then restriction should be made to the one case where it does apply after *sam-grāmayati*. To achieve the correct accent for *bhr̥śa* etc., it will have to be stated there is 'being like a part of what follows', but only in relation to accent rules, otherwise the accent with *aṭ* etc., would be wrong.

The final problem is the function of the *upasarga*. If there cannot be usage of an element for expressing what *kyañ* has already expressed, then *añ* of *syenāyate* cannot express conduct. However, in the case of *abhi* etc. *manas*, the words are indicated with *upasarga* to remove doubt. Elsewhere with *niñ* even where there are several *upasargas* the same operates.

Kāśikā bhr̥śa ity evam ādibhyaḥ prātipadikebhyo 'cviyantebhyo bhuvi bhavaty arthe kyañ pratyayo bhavati, halantānām ca lopaḥ / acveḥ iti pratyekam abhisambadhyate

"The *pratyaya k-ya-ñ* acts in the sense of becoming (what it was not before) after the crude bases/*prātipadika bhr̥śa* and the rest not ending in the *pratyaya cvi* and there is *lopa* elision (of the final) of those (words) ending in a consonant (*hal*)."

The restriction, not (ending in the) *pratyaya cvi*, is to be connected with each (word in the *bhr̥śa gaṇa*).

bhr̥śa m.f.n. strong, vehement, mighty, powerful, *Mn. Mbh.* etc.

bhr̥śate bhr̥śu (*di° pa° se° 1224 adhaḥ patane*) *kaḥ* in falling down (heavily) *antarbhāvitaṇyarthāt igupadha* 3.2.135

bhr̥śāyte to become powerful or strong or vehement *Bhaṭṭ 17-93*
(who was not before)

bhuvi bhū ni m.f.n. becoming, being, casting

bhū (*bhvā° pa° se° 1 sattāyām*) *kvip* (*kartari*)

in existence, being greatness, excellence.

anyebhyo 'pi drśyate 3.2.178 (*kvip*)

a cveḥ a cvi nasi

not after *cvi* actually present, but having that meaning

(*abhūta tadbhāve*) *krbhvastiyoge sampadyakartaricvi* 5.4.50

“The *pratyaya cvi* acts after a word when the agent has attained the new state, expressed by the word, (what the thing previously was not), and when the *dhātus kr* (to make), *bhū* (to be), and *as* (to be) are conjoined with it.”

The whole is *lopa* elided by

cutū 1.3.7, 1.3.2, 6.1.67

tasya lopaḥ 1.3.9

3. “*pradhānaśiṣṭa... anvācayaśiṣṭaḥ*” see 3.1.12; 2..21.21

2.21.25 “*kva diva bhṛśā bhavanti*”

Where do they become strong by day?

cf. naktam daḍṛśre kuhāciddivā tpuḥ R.V. kuhā ciddivēyuh 1.24.10

“Whither by day depart (the constellations) that shine at night (set high in heaven above us)?”

Kai. “*atrābhūtatadbhāva bhāvaḥ*”

“Here there is absence of becoming what the thing was not before ”

2.22.5 *bhavatinā yoge cvir vidhīyate*

“*cvi* is ordained in conjunction with the *dhātu bhū*.”

krbhvastiyoge sampadyakartari cvi 5.1.40

see note on *Pat.* 2.22.5

cvinoktatvād iti

“because of (its meaning) being expressed together with *cvi*.”

Kai. “*cvisahacaritena bhavatinety arthaḥ*”

“The meaning is with *bhū* going with *cvi*.”

2.22.6 *dājantād api*

“After that ending in *dāc* also *kyan* does not obtain.”

avyaktānukaraṇād dvyaj avarārdhāt anitau dāc 5.4.57

“The *pratyaya dāc* acts after the half of the word denoting an imitation of an articulate sound, when that half consists of at least two syllables, and when it is not followed by the (quotation mark) *iti*.”

paṭapaṭat karoti paṭapaṭā karoti

“He makes a sound like *paṭat paṭat*.”

In fact *kyan* will be applicable by *lohitādidājbhyaḥ kyaṣ* 3.1.13 (*bhuvi*)

“The *pratyaya k-ya-ṣ* acts after the words *lohita* and the rest and after these that end with the *pratyaya dāc* (5.4.57) when those words do not receive the *pratyaya cvi* (5.4.50) in the sense of becoming what the thing previously was not.”

paṭapaṭāyate

He makes a sound like *paṭāt* (which he had not made before).

paṭat onomatopoeic (i.e. from imitation of sounds)

paṭat dāc 5.4.57 see *avyaktānukaraṇāt*

paṭat paṭat dāc dāci dve vā° 8; P. 8.1.12

prakāre guṇavacanasya

paṭat paṭa ā dāci krte ṭi lopa (ṭeḥ 6.1.143)

(*t-p-pa*) (*nāmreḍitasyāntasya tu vā* 6.1.99)

paṭapaṭā kyaṣ te

nityam āmreḍite dāci (6.1.100) (*pararūpam*)

“For such a doubled sound imitation word in the presence of *dāc* (= *ā*) in place of the final *t* of the first member and the initial consonant of the second member, the form of the subsequent is the one *ādeśa* for both.”

2.22.8 *vacanaprāmāṇyāt*

‘Due to the authoritative statement of a rule’, an expression frequently used by the *vārttika* to refer to the pre-eminence of a statement made by the *sūtra-kāra* Pāṇini.

2.22.13 “*nañiva yuktam anyasadrśādhikaraṇe tathā hy arythagatiḥ*” *Nāge. Pari 74 nanu bhṛśādhībhyo bhuvyacveḥ* 3.1.12 *ityādau vidhīyamāna kyañ kva dikṣā bhṛśā bhavantiṭy atrāpi syād ata āha*

“One might say that the *pratyaya kyañ* which by 3.1.12 may be added to *bhṛśa* etc., when they do not end with the *pratyaya cvi* to denote the meaning expressed by the *dhātu bhū* may be added to *bhṛśa* also in the phrase *kva divā bhṛśā bhavanti* ‘Where are the (stars that were) visible (by night) in daytime?’ (i.e. *kva divā bhṛśāyante*) because *bhṛśa* in this phrase does not end in *cvi* and is in construction with *bhavanti*.” (The *vārttikakāra* or a previous *paribhāṣā* formulator) says therefore ... (tr. in text) “An expression formed ...” The *bhāṣya* then explains.

2.22.13 *nañiyuktam iva yuktam vā yuktimcid iha drśyate tatrāntyasmimṣ tatsadrśe kāryam*

vijñāyate tathā hy artho gamyate

Nāgeśa glosses on *Pari. 74*

“Whenever we see (in a rule) any term which is formed either by the addition of (the negative *nañ* or by that of *iva* to (some other word) we know that the operation (which is taught in the rule must take effect), in something which differs from (and is at the same time similar to that which is denoted by that other word) because it is in this way that (such terms) are generally understood (in ordinary life).”

2.22.15 *abrāhmaṇamānāyety ukte brāhmaṇa sadrśa āntyate nāsauloṣṭam āntīya kṛtī bhavati* (*abrāhmaṇām ānaya*)

“For when (somebody has been told) ‘fetch a non-*Brāhmaṇa*’ and has thereupon brought a lump of earth, he is not considered to have done

what he ought to have done.”

In ordinary life ‘*abrāhmaṇa*’ denotes the one who though he is not a *Brāhmaṇa* is yet similar to a *Brāhmaṇa*, e.g. a *ksatriya*, but it cannot denote, for example, a lump of earth.

Accordingly *kyañ* can be added by 3.1.12 to *bhr̥śa* etc. only when it does not end with *cvi* and yet is similar to words that end in *cvi*.

cf. also the earlier (?) explanation of *na = iva*.

“*hiraṇyadanto rapaso nasūnuḥ na hi eṣa sūnuḥ*

who has golden teeth is not the inciter of bodily defect for this one is not one who urges the sun

sunurūpo hi eṣa san na sūtuḥ

For (though) being of the form of the inciter he is not the one who urges (sun).”

(*jaimintya upaniṣad brāhmaṇa* 3.3.15)

i.e. when the sense to be expressed is that ‘that which formerly was not *bhr̥śa* becomes or is *bhr̥śa*. In the other cases however, *kva divā* etc. it follows that 3.1.12 cannot be applied. cf.

<i>śloka vārtika</i>	<i>nāma dhātvarthayogī ca</i>
<i>apohavāda 33</i>	<i>nainam nañ pratiṣedhakaḥ</i>
<i>kumārila</i>	<i>vadato brāhmaṇādharma</i>
<i>(abhūtatadbhāva)</i>	<i>anyamātravirodhinau</i>

‘*nañ* having connection with the increasing of the *dhātu* and a noun is not negative in fact, as non-*brāhmin* and non-righteousness of one speaking are not contradictory of (having) different mother. (7)’

2.22.18 *abhi manasa* (*mana* (*di° ā° a°* 1176 *jñāne*) *asun* (*u°* 4.189) (*karāṇe*)
abhimānāya nom-*ā* (opt. *manāyate*)

to long for, desire *Bhaṭṭ* 5.73

sumanas

sumanāya nom. *ā* to become cheerful or happy

unmanas

unmanāyate to become perplexed or excited *Daś* 63.7

durmanas

durmanāyate to become troubled or sad, *Kāś*.

All in the *bhr̥śādi gaṇa*.

tiñatiñ 8.1.28

“A *tiñ* ending word (i.e. a finite verb) is *anudātta* accented (when after a word not ending in a *tiñ* (verbal *pratyaya*).”

e.g. *devadattaḥ pacati*

nighāta iti (caus. of *ni-han*)

a blow, stroke, suppression or absence of accent

A.V. *Prāt* toning down, *anudātta* or grave accent.

Kai. “*manaḥ śabdāt kyañi kṛte manāyata ity asya tiñantasya padasyātiñantāt svādeḥ padād uttaratvāt prakṛtyarthaviśeṣanātve tu sumanāyata ityādi tiñantam śampadyata iti tadvyatiriktapadāntarā ’bhāvān*

nighātābhāvaḥ upasargasya tu dhātvantarbhāvāt tataḥ pūrvamaḍātau prāpnutaḥ kyañante ca tasyānupraveśāt tadvyatiriktapadābhāvāt samāsā 'bhāvāt lopā prasaṅgaḥ kyañantāc ca sani krte sopasargasya dvirvacanaprasaṅgaḥ."

"There is (*anudātta* accent) when *kyañ* is effected after the word *manas* for (the form) *manāyate*, ending in *tiñ* because of following the word *su* and the rest, not ending in *tiñ*. However, when (the *upasarga*) qualifies the base, (the forms) *sumanāyate* etc. become *tiñ* ending and because of the absence of another word different from it there is absence of suppressed accent/*anudātta*. However, because of the *upasarga* being included in the *dhātu* these (wrongly) obtain the augment *aṭ* and *āṭ* before it (instead of directly preceding the *dhātu* itself)."

And because of its entering into a *kyañ* ending (*dhātu*), because of the absence of a *pada*/word separate from it, and because of the absence of a *samāsa* (technical name), there is no possibility/opportunity for *lopa* (of *sup* endings). And when *san* (desiderative) is effected after a *kyañ* ending *dhātu*, there is the possibility (undesired) of reduplication of the *upasarga*."

2.22.23 *sopasargād iti cedaṭi doṣa*

If we accept the statement 'after the word together with an *upasarga*' there is a fault in relation to *aṭ āgama* by *luñlañṅikṣvaḍudāttaḥ 6.4.71 (aṅgasya)*

"*Aṭ* with *udātta* accent acts as the augment of the initial of a verbal *aṅga*/stem, in the presence of the aorist, imperfect and conditional (tense *pratyayas*)."

So here the augment would have to be for the initial of the *upasarga* preceding the *dhātu* not of the *dhātu* itself (which is required) by *ādyantau ṭakitau 1.1.46*

2.23.5 *svamanāyata* "He was or became cheerful."

su aṭ manāya (yañanta) (ta) lañ (imperfect)

If the statement is accepted *aṭ* would here have to augment the initial of *su*.

2.23.6 *lyap kṛt pratyaya ya ādeśa* in place of *ktvā* (indeclinable participle/gerund) when the *dhātu* it follows is preceded by an *upasarga* with which it is compounded, by *samāse 'nañpūrve ktvo lyap 7.1.37*

"In a compound the first member of which is an indeclinable but not *nañ*, *lyap* is *ādeśa* for *ktvā*."

l by *liti 6.1.193*

'*udātta* on the syllable immediately preceding the *pratyaya* having *it l*.'

p by *hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk 6.1.71* augment *t*

sumanāya sumanāya lyap ato lopaḥ 6.4.48 (ārdhadhātuke)

7. *abhi mi manāy iṭ ṣate*

'*sanyañoh*' 6.1.9

"For a non-reduplicate *dhātu* ending in *san* or *yañ* (intensive) *pratyayas*

there is reduplication.” it augment by *ārdhadhātukasyeḍvalādeḥ* 7.2.35
The reduplicate syllable is *mi* because the *dhātu* is to be reduplicated not the *dhātu* and an *upasarga* together; otherwise *abhi* would have had to be reduplicated.

sanyataḥ 7.4.73

“Short *i* is *ādeśa* for *a* of the reduplicate in the desiderative”

sanyaṅoḥ 6.1.9

“(For a non-reduplicate) *dhātu* ending in *san* (desiderative) or *yañ* (intensive) *pratyayas* there is reduplication.”

ato lopaḥ 6.4.48

“The *e* at the end of a stem is elided before an *ārdhadhātuka pratyaya*.”

7. *avaśyaṃ saṃgrāmayate* “It is essential that the form *saṃgrāmayati* be taken as together with its *upasarga*.”

saṃgrāma (*cu° u° a° 1123 yuddhe*) *ñi*

So that this exceptional case be allowed for, where the *upasarga sam* is intended as part of the *dhātu*

a saṃgrāmayata śūraḥ Imperfect *lañ* with *āgama aṭ*

“The hero made war or fought.”

2.23.10 *parāṅgavadbhāvaṃ vaksyāmi*

“The condition of being like a part of that which follows” I will say...

‘treatment of a word as part of another’

cf. *subāmantrite parāṅgavatsvare* 2.1.2

“A word ending in a *sup/case pratyaya*, when followed by a word in the vocative/*āmantrita* (2.3.48) is regarded as if it were a part/*āṅga* of such a vocative word when a rule relating to accent is to be applied.” i.e. a *sup* ending word enters as it were the body of the vocative word, by *āmantritasya ca* 6.1.198

“The first syllable of a vocative has *udātta* accent.”

e.g. *śubhas patī śubhaspatī* ‘of prosperity’ the Lords.

The *udātta* on *patī* now falls on *su* because the two words are considered as a single word.

2.23.15 *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ*

cf. previous note.

kyāñā ktatvād ācārarthasyāḍaḥ

‘because by *kyāñ* has been expressed the sense of conduct (there is not applicability) of *āñ* (in that sense).’

cf. *upamānād ācāre* 3.1.10

“*Kyac* (optionally) acts in the sense of conduct (towards someone) after a word ending in a *sup/case pratyaya* denoting the object of comparison.”

kartuḥ kyāñsalopaś ca 3.1.11

“*Kyāñ* optionally acts in the sense of conduct ... and there is elision of final *s*.”

2.23.19 *utpucchyate*

It raises its tail. *Vop.* 21,17

pucchabhāṇḍacīvarānniṅ 3.1.20 (karane)

“The *pratyaya niṅ* in the sense of making, acts after *puccha* (tail) *bhāṇḍa* (pot) and *cīvara* (rags) as the *karman*/object of the action.”

2.23.19 c.f. also *vibhāṣotpucche*

In the *tatpuruṣa* the word ... *utpuccha* may optionally have *udatta* on the final.

2.23.21 *lohitādidājbhyaḥ kyaṣ ||3/1/13||*

kimarthaḥ kakāraḥ / guṇavrddhipratiṣedhārthaḥ / ŋkitīti / guṇavrddhipratiṣedho yathā syāt / naitad asti prayojanam / sārva-dhātukārdhadhātukayor aṅgasya guṇa ucyate dhātoś ca vihitāḥ pratyayaḥ śeṣa ārdhadhātukasañjñām labhate na cāyaṃ dhātor vidhīyate / lohitādīni prātipadikāni

Pāṇini 3.1.13: The *pratyaya kyaṣ* acts in the sense of becoming (what the thing previously was not) after the words *lohita* etc. and after those that end with the *pratyaya dāc* (5.4.57).

Bhāṣya: What is the purpose of the letter *k* (of *kyaṣ*)? For the purpose of prohibiting *guṇa* and *vrddhi*. So that there should be prohibition of *guṇa* and *vrddhi* when that having an indicatory *k*, *g* or *ṅ* follows.

This is not the purpose. It is stated that when a *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātuka pratyaya* follows *guṇa* acts for the final *ik* (viz. *i u r ḷ* vowel) of an *aṅga*/base. And the remaining *pratyayas* ordained after a *dhātu* receive the technical name *ārdhadhātuka* and this (*pratyaya kyaṣ*) is not ordained after a *dhātu*. The words *lohita* and the rest are *prātipadikas*/crude bases (not *dhātus*).

2.24.1 *sāmānyagrahaṇārthas tarhi / kva sāmānyagrahaṇārthenārthaḥ / naḥ kye (1.4.15) iti / nāyaṃ nāntād vidhīyate // iha tarhi/ yasya halaḥ kyasya vibhāṣā (6.4.49, 50) iti / nāyaṃ halantād vidhīyate// iha tarhi / āpatyasya ca taddhite 'nāti kyacvyoś ca (6.4.151, 152) iti /*

2.24.5 *nāyaṃ āpatyād vidhīyate // iha tarhi / kyāc chandasi (3.2.170) iti yācchandasīty etāvad vaktavyaṃ curānyuḥ turānyuḥ*

bhuraṇyur ity evam artham //

Then it is for the purpose of general mention. Where is there (exhibited some) purpose in a general mention? (In the rule) *naḥ kye (1.4.15)* “The word form ending in *n* is called *pada* when *kya* follows” (i.e. *pratyayaṣ kyac, kyaṅ and kyaṣ*). This (*pratyaya kyaṣ*) is not ordained after (a word) ending in *n*. (Therefore general mention is not the purpose).

Here is the *sūtra* ‘*yasya halaḥ*’ (6.4.49) “When a consonant precedes the final *y* in a verbal stem, this *y* is *lopa*/elided, before an *ārdhadhātuka pratyaya*” (and the *sūtra*) *kyasya vibhāṣā* (6.4.50) “The elision/*lopa* of *y* of the denominative stem *pratyaya kya* is optional when preceded by a consonant and followed by an *ārdhadhātuka pratyaya*”. This (*kyaṣ*) has not been ordained after that ending in a consonant. (Therefore this is not the purpose.)

Here then, *āpatyasya ca taddhite ’nāti* (6.4.151) “The *y* belonging to a patronymic *pratyaya*, preceded by a consonant is *lopa*/elided before a *taddhita pratyaya* when it does not begin with *ā*” and *kyacvyoṣ ca* (6.4.152) (*halaḥ, lopaḥ*) “The *y* belonging to a patronymic *pratyaya* preceded by a consonant is elided before the denominative *pratyaya kya* and the adverbial *pratyaya cvi*”. This (*pratyaya kyaṣ*) is not ordained after a patronymic *pratyaya*. (Therefore this is not the purpose.)

2.24.6 *idaṃ tarhi prayojanam / yattadakṛdyakāra iti dīrghatvaṃ tatra kñidgrahaṇam anuvartate tad ihāpi yathā syāt / lohitāyate / kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam tatra kñidgrahaṇam anuvartate / iha mā bhūt / uruyā dhrṣṇuyeti / yadi kñidgrahaṇam anuvartate pitryam iti pitū rīṅbhāvo na prāpnoti rīṅbhāve kñidgrahaṇam nivartisyate yadi nivartate katham asūyā / vasūyā ca yajāmahe /*

This then is the purpose of that letter *y* which is not a *kṛt pratyaya* causes lengthening. The mention of *kñit* is continued in the statement of *dīrgha* by the rule when a non-*kṛt* letter *y* follows and should be continued in this rule also. (Thus lengthening takes place in) *lohitāyate*.

But what is the reason why the word *kñiti* is specifically mentioned as following on (from the previous *sūtra*)? So that lengthening should not be applicable here *uruyā* (instr. of feminine ind. far, to a distance, *Maitr. S.*) *dhrṣṇuyā* (ind.) boldly, strongly, firmly (*R. V.*).

If the specific word *kñiti* follows on from the previous *sūtra*, then the (form) *pitryam* with the *ādeśa*/substitute *rīṅ* does not obtain. When

there occurs the *ādeśa*/substitute *rīñ* the specific mention of *it k* and *ñ* will cease (to be applicable). If it ceases how do we get the form *asūya* *vasūya ca yajāmahe* (*Rgveda* 1.97.2) “(For a fine field, for pleasant paths), for wealth, we sacrifice to you”?

24.10 *asūyater asūyā vasūyater vasūya / athavā chāndasam etad
dr̥ṣṭānuvidhiś ca cchandasi bhavatīti / yadi cchāmdasatvaṃ
hetunārthaḥ kñidgrahaṇenānuvartamānena / kasmān na bhavati
uruyā dhr̥ṣṇuyeti / chāndasatvāt // athavās tv atra dīrghatvaṃ
chāndasam hrasvatvaṃ bhaviṣyati / tadyathā / upagāyantu māṃ
patnayo garbhiṇyo yuvataya iti //*

From *asūyati* (discontented with) (is derived the form) *asūya* (displeasure, indignation (esp. at the merit or happiness of another), envy and jealousy) (and) from *vasūyati* (“He desires wealth”) is derived *vasūyā* (ind. through desire of wealth).

Otherwise this is peculiar to the *Veda*. And the operation or application of the rule is in accordance with the words seen in use in the *Veda*.

If being peculiar to the *Veda* is the cause, then no purpose is (served) by the mention of *kñit* (from the previous *sūtra*). Why is (*kyas*) not applicable in the case of the forms *uruyā* (far) and *dhr̥ṣṇuyā* (boldly)? Because (they are forms) peculiar to the *Veda*.

Otherwise (in classical literature) let there be lengthening of the vowel here. The shortening will be peculiar to the *Veda*, as for example *upagāyantu māṃ garbhiṇayo yuvatayaḥ* “Let the young pregnant wives sing to me”.

24.15 *atha kimarthaḥ śakāraḥ / viśeṣanārthaḥ / kva viśeṣanārthenā-
rthaḥ / vā kyaṣaḥ (1.3.90) iti / vā yāditi hy ucyamāne pāśyā
ato 'pi prasajyeta / naitad asti prayojanam / parasmaipadam ity
ucyate na cātaḥ parasmaipadam nāpy ātmanepadam paśyāmaḥ /
sāmānyagrahaṇāvighātārthas tarhi bhaviṣyati / kva sāmānya-
grahaṇāvighātārthenārthaḥ / kyāc chandasīti / yācchandastī
evam vaktavyaṃ curāṇyuh turāṇyuh bhurāṇyur ity evam artham /*

Now what is the purpose of the letter *ṣ*? For distinguishing (it from other *pratyayas*). Where is the purpose for the sake of distinguishing served? (In the *sūtra*) *vā kyaṣaḥ* (1.3.90) “The *pratyayas* called

parasmaipada act optionally after the denominative verbs ending in the *pratyaya kyaṣ*”. For if it were simply stating “*vā yāt*” “optionally after *ya*” it would be applicable even after a short *a* of *pāśyā* “A multitude of nooses or ropes, a net”.

This is not the purpose that *parasmaipada* be stated, because here we do not see *parasmaipada* nor even *ātmanepada pratyayas*.

Then it will be for the purpose of common mention or inclusion without hindrance to application (of a particular term to others where it should apply). Where is the purpose for the sake of meaning common mention without hindrance to application (of a particular term to others)? (In the rule) *kyācchandas* (3.2.170) “The *pratyaya u* acts in the *chandas/Veda* after *dhātus* that have taken the denominative *pratyaya kyaṣ* in the sense of the agent having such a habit etc. In fact it should be stated viz. *yācchandasi* “after *ya* in the *Veda* (omitting *k*)”. So the purpose is (for the forms) *curanyuḥ* (thief), *turanyuḥ* (swift), *bhuranyuḥ* (quivering).

2.24.20 *lohitadājbhyaḥ kyaṣvacanam //1//*

*lohitadājbhyaḥ kyaṣ vaktavyaḥ / lohitāyati lohitāyate / paṭa-
paṭāyati paṭapaṭāyate // athānyāni lohitādṛni /*

Vārttika 1: The rule (should be) after *lohita* and after those words ending in the *pratyaya dāc kyaṣ pratyaya* acts.

Bhāṣya: It should be stated after *lohita* and those words ending in *dāc*, *kyaṣ pratyaya* acts.

lohitāyati, lohitāyate “He becomes red”,

paṭapaṭāyati, paṭapaṭāyate “He makes the sound *paṭpaṭ*”,

damadamāyati, damadamāyate “He makes the sound *damadama*”.

Now (what about) the others (in the group) *lohita* and the rest (what of them)?

24.23 *bhṛśādiṣv itarāṇi //2//*

*bhṛśādiṣv itarāṇi paṭhitavyāni / kiṃ prayojanam / nīta ity
ātmanepadaṃ yathā syād iti*

Vārttika 2: The others are to be read in the (*gaṇa*) *bhṛśa* and the rest.

Bhāṣya: The rest are to be read/recited in (the *gaṇa*) *bhṛśa* and the rest. What is the purpose? So that the rule (*anudātta*) *ñita ātmanepadam* (1.3.12) “That having an *it/* indicatory *ñ* (as well as gravely accented *dhātu* in the *Dhātupāṭha* takes) *ātmanepada* (*vibhaktipratyaya* when the fruit accrues to the agent)” should be applicable”.

NOTES ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA ON PĀṆINI 3.1.13

Vārttika Summary

In the first *vārttika* *Kātyāyana* states a restriction on the *sūtra*. *kyāṣ* acts only after the word *lohita* and those words ending in *ḍāc*. The rest he says in the second *vārttika* are found in *bhṛśa* and the rest.

Bhāṣya Summary

Patañjali's introduction to the first *vārttika* begins by showing that *it k* cannot be for prohibiting *guṇa* or *vrddhi* because *lohita* etc. are *prātipadikas* not *dhātus*, nor is it for general mention, since no words end in *n* (1.4.15) or a consonant (6.4.49, 50), or ordained after patronymic (6.4.151-2) nor is *k* needed in ‘*kyācchandasī*’ (3.2.170). Finally, it is stated that the purpose is so that the letter *y* not a *kṛt*, causes lengthening, *knīti* being in *anuvṛtti*, and the various Vedic exceptions being due. (Shortening here being peculiar to the *Veda*.)

In the case of the *it ṣ*, after showing that it cannot be for distinguishing, because neither *ātmane* nor *parasmaipada* are seen in the context of 1.3.90, nor can it be for common mention in 3.2.170, if we accept that applies only to three forms.

On the first *vārttika* he simply provides the implied two *ubhaya pada* examples. Finally on the second *vārttika* he explains why those other than *lohita* are to be read in *bhṛśa gaṇa*. And, being followed by *kyāṣ* having an *it ñ*, *ātmanepada* only would be applicable.

2.23.21 *Kāṣikā* “*lohitādibhyo ḍājantebhyāś ca kyāṣ pratyayo bhavati*”

“The *pratyaya kyāṣ* acts after the words *lohita* and words ending in the *pratyaya ḍāc*.”

lohita m.f. (*ā* or *lohinī*) n. (cf. *rohita*) red, red coloured, reddish

ruha (*bhvā° pa° a°* 859 *bījajanmani prādurbhāve ca*) *itan*

ruhe raś ca lo vā u° 3.94

ḍāc avyaktānukaraṇād dyajavarārdhdhādanitau ḍāc 5.4.57

See 3.1.12 *Vā.* 3 Note

kyāṣ suṃ Denominative *dhātu* forming *pratyaya ya* after which both *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada pratyayas* are added.

lohitāyati lohitāyate kiti ca 1.1.5

2.23.22 *kiti guṇvrddhipratīṣedho*

“And that word element, which otherwise would have caused *guṇa* or *vrddhi* does not do so, when that has an indicatory *k*, *g*, or *ṛ*.”

Thus the *k* of *kyaṣ* would seem to have this function.

2.23.23 *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukyoh (7.3.84) aṅgasya guṇa (ucyate)*

“*Guṇa* from 7.3.82 *miderguṇaḥ* acts in the place of the final *ik* vowel by 1.1.3 *iko guṇavrddhi* of an *aṅga*/stem (6.4.1 *aṅgasya*) before the *sārvadhātuka* 3.4.113 and *ārdhadhātuka* 3.4.114-17 *pratyayas*.”

23. *dhātoḥ ca vihita pratyayaḥ*

cf. 3.1.91 “As far as the end of the third *adhyaya* from 3.1.91 the *pratyayas* are understood to be enjoined after a *dhātu*.”

cf. *śeṣa ārdhadhātukasamjñā labhate*

ārdhadhātukaṃ śeṣaḥ 3.4.114 (tiṅ śit pratyayaḥ dhātoḥ, varjayitvā)

“The remainder, (i.e. the *pratyayas* other than *tiṅ* (verbal *pratyayas*) and those with an indicatory *ś* attached) acting after a *dhātu* are called *ārdhadhātuka*.”

2.24.2 *nāyaṃ nāntād vidhīyate* “This is not ordained after a word ending in *n*.”

Kāś. “na hi paṭhitānām madhye nakārāntaḥ śabdo 'sti”

Kāś. ‘For there is no word among those read (in the *lohitā gaṇa*) which ends in the letter *n*.’

yasya halaḥ 6.4.49

“In place of the syllable *ya* final of an *aṅga* (verbal stem) preceded by a consonant, *lopa* elision acts, in the presence of an *ārdhadhātuka pratyaya*” (Otherwise by the previous *sūtra* ‘*ato lopaḥ*’ 6.4.49 only the final *a* of *ya* would have been *lopa* by *alo 'ntyasya* 5.1.22

e.g. *bebhīdya tumun bebhīditum*

kyasya vibhāṣā 6.4.50

“The *lopa* elision of *kya* in those circumstances is optional.”

i.e. precedence by a consonant and followed by an *ārdhadhātuka pratyaya* *kya* denotes *kyac* and *kyañ* not *kyaṣ*.

2.24.8 *uruyā Maitr. S. 3.7.8* for *uruyā* ind. far, far off; *uruyā*, (Instr. of the fem.) to a distance from *uru ūrṇāñ (a° u° se° 1039 ācchādane)*

(*uṇortanulopas ca*)

ma ha ti hrasvaś ca u° 1.31

ghrṣṇuyā Ind. boldly, strongly, firmly, for *ghrṣṇupssa*

V.S.Prāt. 520; R.V. 4.21.4, etc.

P. 7.1.39

supā suluk pūrvasavarnā ā āt śe yā dā dya yāc ālah 7.1.39

“The following irregular endings act in place of various *sup*/case endings in the *Veda*.

1. *sa* of nom. sg. for *as* of pl.,
2. *luk* elision of *sup* endings,
3. single substitution of homogeneous long vowel,
4. *ā*,
5. *āt*,
6. *e* for nom. pl. ending,
7. *yā*,
8. *ā* (*dā*) with elision of last vowel and consonant,
9. *yā* (*dmā*) with similar elision (*yāc*), and
10. *ā* (*l* accent).

Thus (*yā*) gives *uruyā ghr̥ṣṇuyā* for *uruṇā* and *ghr̥ṣuyā* the regular instrumental (or neuter) forms by *iko* 'ci *vibhaktau* 7.1.73

"*Num* ('*n*') is the *āgama* for a *napuṃsaka*/neuter ending when a *vibhakti* case *pratyaya* follows beginning with a vowel."

2.24.8 *yadi kidgrahaṇam anuvartate pitryam iti pitū rīṇ bhāvo na prāpnoti*
If mention of *kit* follows on then the form *pitryam* by *pituryac ca*
4.3.79 (*ṭhan*) *tata āgataḥ* 4.3.74

"The *pratyaya yat* as well as *ṭhan* act in the sense of come thence after the word."

pitṛ for *pā* (*a° pa° a°* 1056 *rakṣaṇe*) *trṇ* (*u°* 2.95)

piturāgataṃ = pitṛkaṃ pitryam

derived from or relating to a father, paternal, patrimonial, ancestral, with the *ādeśa rī*

'*rīṇa rtaḥ* 7.4.27 (*yi cvau, akṛtsārvadhātukayoḥ*)

"*Rī* is *ādeśa* for the final short *r* of a stem, before a *pratyaya* beginning with *y* when it is not a *kṛt* or a *sārvadhātuka pratyaya* and before the adverbial *pratyaya cvi*."

ī of this being elided by *yasyeti ca* 6.4.148 (*bhasya taddhite lopah*)

"The final *i* and *a* (long and short) of a weak/*bha* stem are *lopa*/elided before a *taddhita pratyaya* and before the feminine *pratyaya ī*."

2.24.10 *sūyā vasūyā ca yajāmahe*

"How do we get the forms *asūyā* and *vasūyā* needing *yak* and *kyac* and therefore an indicatory *k* to prevent *guṇa*?"

sukṣetriyā sugātuyā vasuyā ca yajāmahe r. 1.97.2

"With the desire for a fine field, with the desire for fine paths, and with the desire for wealth we sacrifice (to you, O *Agni*)."

supa ātmanah kyac 3.1.8

"The *pratyaya kyaṣ* acts (optionally) in the sense of desire after a word ending in a *sup pratyaya* expressing the object desired as connected with the desirer himself."

na chandasyayutrasya 7.4.35

"In the *Veda* the rules causing lengthening (7.4.25) or substitution of long *ī* for final vowel of a stem (7.4.73) do not apply except in the case of *putra*."

apratyayāta 3.3.202 (*mātre*)
supāṃ luk 7.1.39 *ṛtīyā luk*

2.24.10 *asūyā* displeasure, indignation (especially at the happiness of another), envy, jealousy.

asūtra kaṇḍvādibhyo yak 3.1.27

asūtra ka° u° se° asūyā

a pratyayāt 3.3.202

ajādyataṣṭāp 4.1.4

asūyā “through desire of wealth” *R.V. 1.197.2*

vasu kyac (*akṛtsārvadhātukayor dīrghaḥ* 7.4.25)

vasa (*bhvā° pa° a° 1005 nivāse*) *u* (*u° 1.10*)

2.24.10 *asūyaterasūyā* (the form) *asūya* (displeasure) (is derived from the denominative *asū va ti* to be discontented with) or from *asave svāhā vasave svāhā — tai° brā°* 3.10.7

“Hail to or (may a blessing rest on) life, hail to wealth” (for *asu* and for *vasu*) by *gheṇiti* 7.3.111 *vasūyate vasūyā* (the form) *vasūya* (through desire of wealth) is derived from *vāsūyati* (denom. to desire for wealth).

sukṣetriyā sugātuyā vasūyā ca yajāmahe — R.V. 1.97.2

See note on *P. vasūyā* long *ū* by 7.4.25 in spite of *na chandasyaputrasya* 7.4.35

Kai. “*yadi rīnrabhāva eva nivartate na tu dīrghavidhāv api tadā asuvasu-śabdābhyām pūrvavadyādeśo kṛte dīrghābhāvād asūyāvasūyete na sidhyati asūyateḥ kaṇḍvādiyagantasyāsūyete vasūyater icchākyaajantasya vasūyety utaram*”

“If only the *ādeśa* is not even in the lengthening rule, then when the substitute *ya* is effected as after *asu* and *vasu*, because of the absence of a long vowel the forms *asūya* and *vasūya* are not established. *Asūya* is formed from *asūyati* from *kaṇḍvādi gaṇa.*”

2.24.13 *upagāyantū mā patnayo garbhīṇayo yuvataya iti*

“Let the young pregnant wives sing to me.”

somasya vai rājño 'rdhamāsasya

rātrayaḥ patnaya āsana Tai Sa 2.5.6.4

“The nights were wives of king *soma* of (one) fortnight ...” and here *patni* is short by reason of vedic usage.

garbhīṇayo bhavanti vai sa 2.1.2.6 ‘They become pregnant.’

From *garbhīṇī* pregnant woman, short *i* by vedic licence.

cf. yunasti 4.1.77

The feminine *pratyaya ti* acts after the *prātipadika* and this receives the name *taddhita pratyaya* and thus debarbs *ṇip* 4.1.5 or *ṇiṣ* 4.1.65

yu (*a° pa° se° 1034 miśraṇe*) *kani*

kaninyuvṛṣi u° 1.156 na lopa 8.2.7

yuvati jas by *jasi ca* 7.3.109

yuvatayaḥ

chāndasaṃ hrasvatvam

Shortening peculiar to the *Veda*

na chandasya putrasya 7.4.35

by *Patañjali* on *ambārthanadyor hrasvaḥ 7.3.107*

'*avaśyaṃ chandasi hrasvatvaṃ vaktavyam*

upagāyantu mām patnayo garbhīṇayo yuvatayaḥ'

cf. garbhāṇikā sthūlamadhya ... K.Artha 2.11.42

'bulging in the middle' (Vol. 3 p. 187)

cf. pravālakam ālakandakam vaivarṇikam ca raktam

coral, outcaste, coloured red

padyarāgam ca karaṇagarbhīṇikāvarjam iti

lotus, and (free from) making an embryo or product, ruby

Kai 'varṇavyasyayena dīrghaḥ kriyata ity arthaḥ'

'The meaning is the lengthening (in the forms *asūya* and *vasūya*) is effected by interchange of letters (short for long).'

by *vyatyayo bahulam 3.1.85 (chandasi)*

"In the *chandas* there is diversely interchange of various *vikaraṇas* and the rest previously ordained."

2.24.14 *vā kyaṣa 1.3.90*

"After the *pratyaya kyaṣ*, *parasmaipada pratyayas* act optionally."

So by this *sūtra 3.1.13 kyaṣ* is ordained and we therefore have *lohitāyati* or *lohitāyate* etc. and

paṭapaṭāyati or *paṭapaṭāyate* etc.

He makes a sound like *paṭ paṭ*.

2.24.16 *pāśyā* "If *vā yāi* (optionally after *ya*) were stated it would be applicable even after the short *a* of *pāśyā*."

in fact derived by

pāśādibhyo yaḥ 4.2.49 (tasya samūhaḥ 4.2.37)

"The *pratyaya ya* acts in the sense of collection thereof after the words *pāśā* etc."

Dh. P. *pāśa (cu° a° se° 1720 bandhane) ghañ (3.3.19)*

pāś ya tāp (4.1.4) pāśayā

2.24.15 *Kai. "naitad astīti"*

"sāmānyavīhitānām ātmanepadaparasmaipadānām

niyamārtham prakaraṇam ity adoṣaḥ"

There is no fault because the matter/production (of *ṣ*) is for the purpose of a restriction to the generally ordained *ātmanepada* and *parasmaipada pratyayas*.

2.24.19 *yācchandasīty evaṃ*

"After *ya* in the *veda* (should be stated)" because these four words are

derived from *yak* without an initial *it k* by 3.1.27.
kaṇḍvādibhyo yak

2.24.20 *lohitāḍājbhya iti*

‘The *pratyaya kyaṣ* acts after the word *lohita* and words ending in *ḍāc*.’
Kai “*ādisabdapratyākhyānam etat apaṭhitasan̄grahārthopyādisabdo na bhavati, tasya vārttikakāraṇe dūṣitatvāt*

“This is a rejection of the word *ādi*(*lohita*) and the rest. The word *ādi* is not applicable also in the sense of an unread complete enumeration or collection, because of its nature being refuted by the *Vārttika-kāra*.”

Kāś ‘*bhr̥śādiṣv itarāṇi*’ *yāni lohitādiṣu paṭhyante tebhyaḥ kyaṣ eva aparipaṭhitebhyas tu kyaṣ eva bhavati*

The rest of *lohit-ādi* will be found in the *bhr̥śādi gaṇa*.

The words quoted in the (group) *lohita* and the rest have *kyaṇ* only after them, (others) not quoted (it being an *ākṛti gaṇa*) have *kyaṣ* only after them. e.g. *varmāyati varmāyate* to become clad with armour.

2.25.1 *kaṣṭāya karmaṇe ||3/1/14||*

*kaṣṭāyeti kiṃ nipātyate / kaṣṭaśabdāc caturthīsamarthāt
karmaṇe ’nārjave kyaṇ nipātyate / kaṣṭāya karmaṇe krāmati
kaṣṭāyate / atyalpam idam ucyate kaṣṭāyeti /*

Pāṇini 3.1.14: The *pratyaya kyaṇ*, in the sense of undertaking moral crookedness, acts after the word *kaṣṭa* (trouble or evil) when the latter has the fourth (*sup/case vibhakti pratyaya*) in construction.

Bhāṣya: Why is the word *kaṣṭa* put down or mentioned as an irregular form? *Kyaṇ* is ‘put down’ or mentioned irregularly in the sense of undertaking moral crookedness after the word *kaṣṭa* which is syntactically connected through the dative *sampradāna*/fourth case. *kaṣṭāya karmaṇe krāmati kaṣṭāyate* “He undertakes to do evil” (He has wicked intentions). The word *kaṣṭāya* speaks very little (about the usage).

2.25.4 *sattrakakṣakaṣṭagahanebhyaḥ kaṇvacikīrṣāyām ||1||*

Vārttika 1: After *sattra kakṣa kaṣṭa kṛcchra* and *gahana* (*kyaṇ* acts) in the sense of *gahana* in the sense of desiring to do evil.

2.25.5 *sattrakakṣakaṣṭagahanebhyaḥ kaṇvacikīrṣāyām iti vaktavyām/
sattrāyate / sattra // kakṣa / kakṣāyate // kakṣa // kaṣṭa /
kaṣṭāyate / kaṣṭa // gahana gahanāyate //*

Bhāṣya: It should be stated that (*kyañ* acts) after *sattra kakṣa kaṣṭa krcchra* and *gahana* in the sense of desiring to do evil. *Sattra* (n. session, great *soma* sacrifice).

sattrāyate “He desires to do evil”

**kakṣa* (m. lurking) *kakṣāyate* “He waits for someone in a hidden place, lies in ambush and intends something wicked”.

**kaṣṭa* (evil) *kaṣṭāyate* “He has wicked intentions”.

**krcchra* (m.n. causing trouble or pain, evil, bad) *krcchrāyate* “He feels pain or has wicked designs” (*Bhatt.* 17.76).

**gahana* (n. abyss, depth, inaccessible place) *gahanāyate* “He lies in wait for someone in a secret place; he has treacherous intentions towards another”.

2.25.7 *apara āha / sattrādibhyaś caturthyantebhyaḥ kramāṇe ’nārjave
kyañvaktavyaḥ / etāny evodāharaṇāni // sattrādibhya iti kim
artham / kuṭilāya krāmāty anuvākāya / caturthyantebhya iti kim
artham / ajaḥ kaṣṭam krāmāti //*

2.25.10 *tat tarhi vaktavyam / na vaktavyam / naitatpratyayānta-
nipātanam / kiṃ tarhi / tādarthya eṣā caturthī / kaṣṭāya yat
prātipadikam / kaṣṭārthe yat prātipadikam iti //*

Another says ‘It should be stated that *kyañ* acts in the sense of undertaking moral crookedness/dishonesty after the words *sattra* etc. ending in the fourth case (in construction)’. Those in fact (just stated) are the examples.

Why (what is the purpose of) “after *sattra*” etc.? (Otherwise it would apply here) *kuṭilāya krāmāty anuvākāya (kuṭilāyanuvākāya krāmāti v.1)* “He proceeds to uneven recitation of a chapter of the *Veda*, (*vedic* text)”.

What is the purpose of (saying) “after (those words) ending in the fourth *sup/case*”? (So that it be not applicable to any other case relation, like the following) *ajaḥ kaṣṭam krāmāti* “The goat steps with difficulty”.

Then that surely should be stated? No, it is not necessary to state it. This is not a *nipātana*/irregular form ending in a *pratyaya*. What then?

This fourth case is employed in the sense of 'for the purpose thereof or being intended for that'. *Kaṣṭāya* in the rule means whatever *prātipadika* (stands) for *kaṣṭa*; (in other words) whatever *prātipadika* is in the sense of *kaṣṭa* (evil).

NOTES ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA ON PĀNINI 3.1.14

Vārttika Summary

Kātyāyana simply expands the scope of the *sūtra* to have *kyan* acting after *sattra* etc.

Bhāṣya Summary

Patañjali explains the irregular form *kaṣṭāya* as indicating that *kyan* acts after *kaṣṭa* in the sense of *sampradāna* 'undertaking to do wickedness'.

On the *vārttika* he provides the implied examples, and also gives an alternative version of the *vārttika*, stating after *sattra* etc. and adding with sense of the fourth case and undertaking moral crookedness, so *kyan* does not apply to other words like *kuṣilāya* or for any other case relation like *kaṣṭam*.

Finally he explains that *kaṣṭāya* is not in fact a *nipātana* but fourth case in the sense of 'being intended for that' (evil).

Kāś. "kyan anuvartate na kyaṣ / kaṣṭaśabdāc caturthīsamarthāt kramaṇe 'rthe 'nārjave kyan pratyayo bhavati"

"*Kyan* follows on by *anuvṛtti* (from 3.1.11) not *kyaṣ*. The *pratyaya kyan* acts in the sense of moral crookedness when meaning 'undertaking (that moral crookedness)', after the word *kaṣṭa* having the same grammatical construction as the fourth case."

Namely *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānaṃ* 1.4.3

"Whom one intends to connect with in the mind by means of the *karman* (be it gift, offering, or sacrifice) that is *sampradāna*/dative/fourth case."

kaṣṭāya kaṣṭa ne ner yaḥ 7.1.13 *supi ca* 7.3.102 (*dīrgho-yañi*)

kaṣati kaṣa (bhvā° pa° se° 695 hiṃsārthāḥ) kta

kticktau ca saṃjñāyām 3.3.174 (*āśiṣi*)

kr̥cchragahanayoḥ kaṣaḥ 7.2.22 (*na iṭ*)

bad R. — ill, evil, wrong — *Mn.* 7.210; miserable *Mn.* 12.75; troublesome *Mn.* 7.186; worst *Mn.* 7.50; dangerous, inaccessible *P.* 7.2.22 who has resorted to evil.

cf. *Kāś* on '*ahīne dvitīyā* 6.2.47 '*kaṣṭaśritah*'

2.25.1 *kramaṇe kramaṇa ni*

m. a step; n. stepping, going, walking, *R.V.* 6.70.3; ifc. transgressing, *Mbh.* 12.16.254; a step *R.V.* 1.155.5 approach or undertaking anything (*Dat.*) *P.* 3.1.14

krāmyatyanena karaṇe lyuṭ
kramu bhvā° pa° se° 673 pādavikṣepe
karaṇādhikaraṇayoś ca 3.3.117 (lyuṭ)

2.25.2 *kaṣṭāyeti kiṃ nipātyata iti*

“Why is the irregular form *kaṣṭāya* laid down?” i.e. fourth case when it should be fifth case.

Kai. “vidhāvanārjavam eva kramaṇam iti viśeṣo na labhyata iti kramaṇa-viśeṣalābhāya nipātanāśrayaṇam”

There is resort to *nipātana* form to obtain the qualification undertaking/*kramaṇa* because the sense *kramaṇa* is not obtained in the rule (without it), only (the sense of) moral crookedness.

2.25.3 *kaṣṭāyate kaṣṭa kyaṅ akṛtsārvadhātukayor dīrghaḥ 7.4.24*
 ‘to have wicked intentions’ *Vop.21.10*

2.25.4 *atyalpam idam ucyate*

common phrase of *Patañjali*. This (expression) *kaṣṭāya* states too little, i.e. the scope of the rule should be wider.

2.25.5 *sattra*

Session, a great soma sacrifice (from thirteen to one hundred days) a house, an assumed form or disguise, liberality, *R.V. 7.33.13*

Amara 3.181 “sattramācchādane yajñe sadādāne vane ’pi ca sīdantyaatra / anena vā”

Dh.P. ṣadlr (Kyā° pa° a° 854 viśaraṇagatyavasādaneṣu)

in dissolution, going and causing to sink, disheartening

sad Ṣṭran (u° 4.159)

sattrāyate sattra kyaṅ

to desire to do evil.

2.25.6 *kakṣa* m. lurking place, hiding place *R.V. 10.28.4*; large wood (?) *R.V. 6.45.31*; dry grass, plant, armpit

kaṣati kaṣyate vā Dh.P. kaṣa bhvā° pa° se° 685 hiṃsārthāḥ

vṛtṭvadihanikaṣibhyaḥ saḥ u° 3.63

kakṣa śyaṅ — kakṣāyate to wait for anyone in a hidden place, lie in ambush, intend anything wicked.

kaṣṭa see above 2.25.1 etc.

kṛcchra m.f.n. causing trouble or pain, painful, *Mbh. 3.1366* etc. *R. 3.74.28* etc.

Amara 1.9.4 “syātkaṣṭam kṛcchramābhīlam”/ kṛntati, kṛtī tu° pa° se° 1435

chedane kṛteśchaḥ krū ca u° 2.21 iti rak chaś ca

kṛcchra kyaṅ kṛcchrāyate to feel pain *Āp.Śr; P. 3.1.18.*

2) to have wicked designs *P. 3.1.14, Bhaṭṭ. 17.76.*

2.25.6 *gahana* m.f.(ā) n. deep, dense, thick, inexplicable *M.Bh. 3.16.235,*

4.5.12; n. an abyss, depth (water *Naigh. 1.12 Nir. 14.11*) *R.V. 10.129* an inaccessible place, impenetrable darkness *R.V. 1.132.6 Ś.Br. 15.7.2.17.*

amara 2.4.1 aṭavaryanyam vipinam gahanam kānanam vanam

gahyate gāhū bhvā° ā° se° 649 vilodane

bahulamanyatrāpi u° 2.78 iti yuc

kr̥cchra gahanayoḥ 7.2.22 iti nirdeśād dhrasvaḥ

gahana kyañ gahanāyate

to lie in wait for someone in a secret place, to have treacherous intentions towards another

2.25.5 *kaṇva* N. of a renowned ṛṣi *R.V. 1.35.10* etc., a peculiar class of evil spirits *A.V. 25.3, 4, 5*; n. sin, evil, comm. on *Un. 1.158.*

kaṇa (cu° u° se° 1716 nimīlane) kvan

aśupruṣikanikhaṭivīśibhyaḥ kvan u° 1.152

2.25.9 *kuṭilāyeti*

Kai duradhyeyatvād anuvākasyānārjavam astīti bhāvah

The sense is that there is crookedness/unevenness of the recitation of the Vedic text because of its nature of being difficult to be studied and learnt

‘*aja iti*’ *Kai. “anārjavayuktam panthānam gacchatīty arthaḥ”*

“The meaning is that (the goat) goes on a path having unevenness.”

2.25.10 *tādarthya eṣa caturthī*

“This fourth case has the sense of ‘being understood intended for that’ or the nature of being for the purpose of another.”

caturthī sampradāne 2.3.13

The fourth case ending acts to express the sense of *sampradāna* (recipient) if not already expressed otherwise.

karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam 1.4.32

“Whom one intends to connect with in the mind by means of the *karman* (be it gift, offering, or sacrifice) that is the *sampradāna*/recipient.”

2.25.10 *caturthīvidhāne tādarthyē upasamkhyānam I Vārttika*

“To the rule *caturthī (sampradāne)* the word *tādarthyē*, in the sense of being intended/for the sake of that, should be added ...”

Bhāṣya example *yūpāya dāru kuṇḍalāya hiraṇyam*

Wood for the sacrificial post. Gold for the earring.

2.25.11 *kaṣṭhāya yad iti ...*

Kai. “kaṣṭakṣaṇārthapratipādanāya yat prātipadikam prayujyate tasmāt kramaṇe ’rthe kyañ bhavatīty arthaḥ kramaṇaviśeṣaś cānārjavam abhidhānaśaktisvābhāvāyāl labhyate vyavasthitavibhāṣāvijñānāc ca pāpādibhyo ’tiprasaṅgā bhāvah”

The sense is ‘That *prātipadika* which is used for teaching the sense indicated by *kaṣṭha* (bad, crookedness) has *kyañ* applicable after it in the

vrtu bhvā° ā° se° 758 vartane
nanu ca ktinā na bhavitavyam
nyāsaśravyo yuc iti yucā bādhitvāt
asmād eva ktin bhaviṣyatīty adōṣa
or by *aca i uṇā° 4.139*

25.12 *caraṇam careti sampādayitvāt kvip*
acting, performance, observance, practice.
cara bhvā° pa° se° 559 gatau bhakṣaṇe ca kvip ca 3.2.76

2.25.13 ‘*udagīrṇasyeti*’ Kai. “*mukhapradeśa ākrṣṭasyety arthaḥ*”
The meaning is (the chewing) of something vomited forth
avagīrṇasyeti drawn into the region of the mouth; swallowed down.
Kai. “*apānapradeśān nisṛṭasyety arthaḥ*” The meaning is (the chewing) of
something gone away from the region of the anus or from that vital air
going downwards and out at the anus.

2.25.14 Kai. “*hanucalana iti hanucalanasahacaritam carvipasya mukha-*
pradeśa ākrṣya yac carvaṇam tatra yathā syād ity arthaḥ”
The meaning is (the chewing) of that chewed, going with movement of the
jaws, having drawn into the region of the mouth, so that chewed there
should be applicable (as the meaning).

2.25.14 *kīṭa iti*
Kai *apānapradeśān nisṛṭam aśrṇāti ity arthaḥ*
The meaning is that ‘the insect eats that which has gone forth from the
region of the anus.’

2.25.15 *anabhighānāt*
Kai *romanthāyata iti kyañantena laukike*
prayoge carvitacarvaṇasyaiva vābhidhānam na tvārthāntarasyarthaḥ
The meaning is that ‘the verb *romanthāyate* ending with *kyañ* in popular
use only has the sense of chewing what has been chewed, not of any other
sense.’

tapasyati see Śa° Brā° 14.6.8.10
yo vā etad akṣaram aviditvā gārgi asmil loke juhōti dadāti tapasyati api
bahūni varṣasahasrāṇi antarān evāsya sa loko bhavati yo vā etad akṣaram
aviditvā gārgī asmāl lokāt praiti sa kṛpaṇaḥ atha ya etad akṣaram gārgi
viditvāsmāl lokāt praiti sa brāhmaṇaḥ

2.25.18 *Bhagavadgītā*
yat karoṣi yad aśnāsi yaj juhoṣi dadāsi yat
yat tapasyati kaunteya tatkuruṣva madarpaṇam 9.27
“Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou sacrificest,
whatever thou givest, in whatever austerity thou engagest, do it as an

offering to me.”

Tai Ār 2.9.1

*ajān ha vai prśrnī m stapasyamāśabrahmasvayambhū
abhyānarṣata, te r ṣayo 'bhavan, tadṛṣṭīnāmṛṣitvam*

quoted by *Yāska* on *Niru° 2.11*

“It is known; because the Self born of *Brahmā* manifested Himself to them while practising austerities, they became seers, that is the characteristic of the seers.”

2.25.21 *bāṣpaṣmābhyām udvamane* ||3/1/16||

phenāc ceti vaktavyam / phenāyate //

Pāṇini 3.1.16: The *pratyaya kyañ* acts in the sense of emitting after the words *bāṣpa* (vapour) and *uṣṇa* (heat) as *karman*/object of the action.

Bhāṣya: And it should be stated that (*kyañ*) also acts after *phena* (foam, froth): *phenāyate* “It foams or froths”.

NOTES ON MAHĀBHĀṢYA ON PĀṆINI 3.1.16

Bhāṣya Summary

Patañjali simply adds ‘*kyañ* also acts after *phena*’ and provides the example *phenāyate*.

2.25.21 *bāṣpa uṣma bhyām udavaman ni*

Kāś. “*karmaṇa iti vartate bāṣpaśabdād uṣmaśabdāc ca karmaṇa udvamane 'rthe kyañ pratyayo bhavati*”

‘After *karman*’, follows on (from 3.1.15).

“The *pratyaya kyañ* acts after the word *bāṣpa* (vapour) and *uṣṇa* (heat) as objects of the action, in the sense of emitting.”

bāṣpa m. tear, tears *M.Bh.*

also *bāṣpa* steam, vapour *R.*

bāṣpa vāyati o vai bhvā° pa° se° 922 poṣaṇe

bhvā a° pa° a° 105° gatigandhanayoḥ

‘*khaṣparthilpaśaṣpa*’ *Uṇ 3.28 (paḥ)*

bāṣparūpaparpatalpāḥ

bāghr (bhvā° ā° se° 5 vilodane) + pa

bāṣpa kyañ = bāṣpāyate to shed tears, weep *Rav.*; to emit vapour or steam

L.

2.25.21 *uṣman* m. heat, glow, vapour, steam, A.V. 6.18.3

uṣati rujati uṣa (*bhvā° pa° se° 623 rujāyām*) *Panini*

'*anyebhyo 'pi drśyate*' 6.2.75

uṣma kyañ uṣmāyate

to emit heat or hot vapour, to steam *H. Car.*

udvamana ñi n. the act of giving out, emitting, shedding (e.g. tears)

tu vama (*bhvā° pa° se° 849 udagirāṇe*) *lyuṭ*

lyuṭ ca 3.3.195

2.25.21 *phena* m. (once n.) foam, froth, scum *R.V. 1.104.3* (*cf. Eng. foam*)

'*sphāyate*' *sphāyī* (*bhvā° ā° se° 487 vrddhau*) *nak* (*the*)

phenamīnau u° 3.3

phenāyate It foams or froths *M.Bh. 6.101 H.Car*

(to be continued)

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