

55). The many Sanskrit passages throughout the book have been carefully selected for their relevance. In typical 'Vienna school' style, following the example of Oberhammer's predecessor Erich Frauwallner, the German translations, with a strict use of parentheses and square brackets, are so accurate that a reader who is somewhat familiar with this kind of writing can often correctly guess the wording of the original Sanskrit (always faithfully provided in lengthy footnotes). An eight-page index of quoted passages is given at the very end of the book.

The book contains a concise bibliography of relevant literature, which does not mention the most recent edition of Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya*, brought out by the Academy of Sanskrit Research in Melkote, which perhaps has not been taken as the basis for the Vedāntic discussions in this study because earlier studies in the series appeared before this edition was produced and hence were based on the University of Poona edition by R.D. Karmarkar.

In its discussion of eschatology, the book briefly touches upon a number of metaphysical, historical and hermeneutical questions that merit further study. One hopes that such examples of research as are still being given by members of this now retiring generation of scholars will inspire younger researchers to realize that without such basic and meticulous research, the study of the immensely rich tradition of Indian philosophical and religious thought in all its diversity is doomed to be superficial, perhaps meaninglessly so. In order to properly evaluate such Indian contributions to philosophy for their historical and perhaps also wider contemporary worth, one must take them seriously, which means that one must go to the sources and actively and critically recreate in thought the inner dynamics of these world-views. The present reviewer hopes that Prof. Oberhammer will continue giving such examples to a world of scholarship where philological solidness is in danger of losing its central position.

Universität München
Germany

Robert ZYDENBOS

Stephen H. Phillips and N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya, *Gaṅgeśa on the Upādhi: The "Inferential Undercutting Condition"*, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2002, x + 160 Pp. Sanskrit Glossary and Bibliography. Rs. 250. (Hardback)

The present book represents a great achievement in the study of the Navya-nyāya theory of inference: it offers a translation and explanation of the "Undercutting Condition Section" (Upādhiprakaraṇa) of the "Inference Chapter" (Anumāna-khaṇḍa) of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (TC) along with an introduction of 30 pages. Thirty-six years have passed since E. Frauwallner first translated the same text into German: *Die Lehre von der zusätzlichen Bestimmung (upādhi) in*

Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi (Wien: Kommissionsverlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1970), and Phillips and Tatacharya, the authors of the book, have devoted more space to the logical explanation of Gaṅgeśa's section than has Frauwallner. This book makes a significant contribution to the research on the concept of *upādhi* in Navya-nyāya.

It is true from a historical viewpoint that the term *upādhi* conveys various meanings; but the *upādhi* which Gaṅgeśa's "Undercutting Condition Section" deals with is that which functions as blocking inferential process. Naiyāyikas often employed *upādhi* to define invariable concomitance or pervasion (*vyāpti*), which is the logical ground for the validity of an inference. For example, Udayana (11th c.) defined invariable concomitance as relation lacking an *upādhi*. In his *TC*, Gaṅgeśa (14th c.), who is responsible for consolidating the Navya-nyāya system, presents two provisional definitions (numbers twelve and thirteen) in terms of the absence of an *upādhi*. Since an *upādhi* prevents a person from inferring correctly, a clear understanding of the function of the *upādhi* with reference to a particular inference depends upon an understanding of the relationship among the *upādhi*, the probans (*hetu*, "prover" in Phillips' wording), and the probandum (*sādhya*) of that inference. Thus, we have to make many efforts to discern whether a given *upādhi* is appropriate or not, if the inference is much complicated. In this sense, the concept of *upādhi* may be more formidable than that of invariable concomitance in Navya-nyāya. This may be the reason few scholars have dealt with this concept and Gaṅgeśa's "Undercutting Condition Section" in the last thirty-six years. Phillips mentions these scholars in the Introduction to the book (pp. 27-29). Also to be included is H. Kitagawa, who discussed the Navya-nyāya concept of *upādhi* in his papers "On *Upādhi*" (*Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 4/1, 1965) and "On '*Upādhi*': Continued" (*Indian and Buddhist Studies: A Volume in Honor of Prof. Dr. Ensho Kanakura*, Kyoto: Heirakujishoten, 1966).

The Preface and Acknowledgments of the present book tell us in what way the two authors contributed to the present book: Phillips calls the translation a joint effort though he points out that he alone is responsible for the English phrasing of the translation and is the 'voice' of the comments following the sections of translation. Tatacharya provided Phillips with a running Sanskrit commentary on the text, drawing particularly on Rucidatta's commentary, which Phillips tape-recorded and used as the basis for the translation (p. ix). This combination of traditional and modern approaches is particularly useful in analyzing a Sanskrit text whose tradition is still alive in India.

A specific goal of this book, as stated in the Introduction to the book (p. 1), is to help the non-Indologist and non-specialist read this difficult Section. Hence, Phillips quite often avoids *literal* translation, which might be understandable only to Indologists. I believe that this method of translation helps to attract more non-Indologist and non-specialist readers and furnishes a basis for the comparative study of logic or for the placement of Indian logic within a wider perspective.

Phillips' Introduction succeeds in helping the readers understand the concept of *upādhi* in Navya-nyāya. He does not intend to present a historical sketch of this

concept, but he briefly explains two meanings of the term *upādhi*: the epistemological and the ontological (pp. 24-26). Both are well known: an epistemological *upādhi* is, for example, a red flower which causes us to perceive transparent crystal placed near the flower as red, and an ontological *upādhi* is a property which is possessed by any entity of the seven categories of Vaiśeṣika (substance [*dravya*], quality [*guṇa*], action [*karman*], universal [*sāmānya, jāti*], particular [*viśeṣa*], inherence [*samavāya*], and absence [*abhāva*]) and which cannot be classified as any of these seven. Given these meanings and having examined past renderings of the term *upādhi*, Phillips attempts to arrive at a proper rendering of the term and suggests “undercutting condition”. Because this term is used in various contexts in Indian philosophy, it is not easy to give it a single rendering, but I think that when we analyze the function of the *upādhi* used by Gaṅgeśa or Navya-nyāya in the discussion of inference theory, Phillips’ rendering is a good one.

While reading Phillips’ description of past renderings of the term, I encountered the following expression: “... The translations *zusätzlichen Bestimmung* or ‘additional condition’ (Frauwallner, 1970, and Vattanky, 1984) and ‘associate condition’ (Matilal, 1998) are not in this way sensitive. And they are to be faulted precisely on the grounds that they suggest that by ‘adding’ the *upādhi*, by finding an inferential subject exhibiting the *upādhi* together with original prover, an original probandum would be secured (see again Figure D, above). On this reading, the *upādhi* is an inferential corrector as well as a defeater. But this reading is wrong.” (p. 27) As long as we are observing a Navya-nyāya *upādhi*, his statement holds good. However, if we examine the usage of this term in early texts, such as Vācaspati’s *Nyāyavārttikatātkaryaṭkā*, we find a case/cases in which it is difficult to determine in which sense the term is employed, as an inferential corrector or a defeater. In this regard I do not have better suggestion for rendering the term, but I would like to say that the historical perspective tells us that the situation surrounding the concept of *upādhi* is not as simple as Phillips states.

In discussing the *upādhi* in his Introduction, Phillips does not seem to depend much on the concept of the *dharma-dharmin* (property and property-possessor) relation. It is this relation that most starkly brings out the difference between Indian and western logic or philosophy. When we render the terms *vyāpaka* and *vyāpti*, which are often regarded as corresponding to the western logical terms “subsume” and “subsumption”, as “pervade” and “pervasion”, we should be careful. To say that *x* pervades *y* means that the possessor/locus (*dharmin*) of *x* subsumes the possessor/locus (*dharmin*) of *y*, and not that *x* subsumes *y*. If this significant difference between “pervade” and “subsume” had been taken into account in the introduction, Phillips could have avoided writing incorrect sentences such as “(1) U pervades the probandum S (i.e., anything that is an S is a U), and ...” (p. 14). This should have been written as “(1) U pervades the probandum S (i.e., anything that possesses an S possesses a U), and ...” or “(1) U pervades the probandum S (i.e., anything that is the possessor/locus of an S is the possessor/locus of a U), and ...”

On the other hand, there are places where Phillips shows a proper reading of the notations, e.g., p. 10 as follows:

“The three-part statement form:

(part one: Sa) An inferential subject *a* is qualified by S a probandum

(part two: since Ha) since that same subject *a* is qualified by H a prover

(part two: since Ha) since that same subject *a* is qualified by H a prover.”

Here he shows an awareness of the *dharma-dharmin* relation. Elsewhere (p. 12) is another proper expression of the basic inference pattern in which this relation is presupposed.

Let me continue discussing the matter of the *dharma-dharmin* relation a little more. Since Gaṅgeśa uses “*vyāpaka*” (to pervade, pervading, pervader) in the first provisional definition of an *upādhi*, the *dharma-dharmin* relation functions as a fundamental presupposition of the definition. I would translate this definition (p. 35: *sādhyatvābhimatavyāpakatve sati sādhanatvābhimatāvvyāpakaḥ*) as “that which fails to pervade what is considered the probans (*sādhana*, *hetu*) while pervading what is considered the probandum (*sādhya*)”. Phillips translates this definition as “something that while pervading (occurrence of) what is considered a probandum fails to pervade (occurrence of) what is considered its prover”. He inserts the words “(occurrence of)” in his translation, which suggests his awareness of that relation, but he does not make this insertion in the translation of the following definitions (pp. 60, 71, etc.). Furthermore, I would like to illustrate a case in which the verb “pervade(s)” is not used coherently though it is a rendering of the technical term “*vyāpaka*”, etc.: “Thus the *upādhi* pervades the probandum.” (p. 57) and “... it (= the property regarded as the *upādhi* in question, Wada) pervades all loci of fire ...” (p. 58); the former expression, in which the verb “pervades” is used as a rendering of the technical term, is appropriate, while the latter expression, with reference to which it is fire and not all loci of fire that the property pervades since “pervades” is a technical term, is not appropriate. If Phillips had explained this technical term in terms of the *dharma-dharmin* relation somewhere in the Introduction (for example, on p. 11), he could have avoided the latter expression. He seems to want to avoid making the readers conscious of the relation, which may be his device for reducing the readers’ burden of understanding this peculiar relation in each case.

Overall the logical formulae provided in discussing the *upādhi*, I believe, are of great help if we do not put much emphasis on the *dharma-dharmin* relation. However, with regard to how to read the formulae I would like to mention one point. Phillips uses formulae such as “ $(x)(Sx \rightarrow Ux)$ ”, which he reads it as “if something is an S, then it is a U” (p. 15). This reading implies that an S (= *sādhya*) can be a U (= *upādhi*), but S and U are completely distinct entities. The formula should be read as “if something is the locus/possessor of an S, then it is the locus/possessor of a U. Therefore, if we interpret capital letters such as S, H, and U used in the formulae as meaning “is the locus/possessor of S, H, and U”, then the formulae are correct.

After the Introduction comes the section entitled “The Undercutting Condition” including the translation of the Gaṅgeśa’s “Undercutting Condition

Section” and comments thereon (pp. 35-141), which represents the main contribution of the present book. I believe that the comments on the divided texts of that section are reliable. If the readers first read the comments and then proceed to the translation of the text, they will better understand the translation and grasp the main points of the text. In places Phillips has corrected Frauwallner’s interpretation of the Sanskrit text (see p. 154, n. 12).

It is good that Phillips refers to both the Tripati and Calcutta editions of the *TC: Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya*, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, edited by N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya with the *Prakāśa* of Rucidattamiśra and the *Tarkacūdāmaṇi* on the *Prakāśa* of Dharmarājādhvarin, Tripati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 1999 and *Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya*, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, edited by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa with extracts from the Commentaries of Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa and Jayadeva Miśra, Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1884-1901. Both editions are fundamental in presenting the Sanskrit texts.

In presenting the Sanskrit text of the “Undercutting Condition”, Phillips makes use of hyphens to divide long Sanskrit compounds, but I have a negative view of this. In the text a hyphen is inserted between two words forming a compound as a rule, but it is also inserted between the negative prefix “a-“ and the word immediately following it (for example, p. 52). As this prefix, according to Pāṇini’s grammar, forms a compound (*samāsa*), it can be treated as a word. If Phillips follows this system, his use of a hyphen with reference to the prefix “a-” is rational, but he should not use a hyphen between a word and the suffix “-vaṛ” following it. This suffix is either a substitution for the secondary suffix (*taddhita*) named *matUP*, which conveys the meaning of possession, or the secondary suffix (*taddhita*) named *vatI*, which conveys the meaning of similarity in Pāṇini’s system, and this suffix does not behave like a word in the system. Therefore, a hyphen should not be used with reference to “-vaṛ”.

In addition, when the abstract suffix “-iva” or “-ta” comes at the end of a compound, the hyphen/hyphens used in the compound causes a problem in interpreting the compound. For example, “*sādhyā-vyāpaka-viśeṣaṇa-śūnyatvam*” (p. 47,1) should not be interpreted as a compound of four words connected by three hyphens. Instead, it should be interpreted as “*sādhyavyāpakaviśeṣaṇa-śūnya*” plus “*tvam*”. In this case, from a semantic point of view, a hyphen should be inserted only before “*tvam*”. It is not an easy task to follow a coherent rule of hyphen usage in a Sanskrit text, and thus I would suggest not using them if one is pursuing exactness. However, it is also true that if Phillips did not use hyphens, he would encounter the problem of how to print and adjust long compounds in the limited space of a page. Perhaps we should recommend that hyphens be used only for convenience sake.

In his translation, Phillips numbers the provisional and conclusive definitions of an *upādhi*, which helps the readers follow the stream of argument. If he had prepared a summary of the whole Sanskrit text, it would have helped more. He may have thought that the text was so short that a summary was not needed. In fact, the text is not long, but the argument is complicated.

The present book is lacking an index, which I would have found very useful.

That no index was prepared is understandable because renderings of important technical terms with reference to the *upādhi* discussion appear on almost every page. But some kind of an index, such as that of proper names or *upādhis*, would have been helpful.

Following the translation and comments is a glossary of proper names and terms (pp. 143-152), which is helpful in coining new renderings of the terms.

In the Notes to the Introduction, Phillips states that “A striking feature of Nyāya realism is its postulation of absences”, and he expounds four varieties of absence (p. 154, n. 9). These varieties are presented by Kumārila (7th c.), and thus simple postulation of absence is common to Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, and even to Vedānta (see, for example, Chapter 6 of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarāja). However, I would say “A striking feature of Nyāya realism is its frequent use of absence in analysis and definitions.” Phillips may have used “postulation” in his above statement with a specific meaning.

The following are simple mistakes.

Page 46, line 4 from bottom: “*vipakṣā-vyārttaka*” → “*vipakṣā-vyāvartaka*”

Page 48, line 17-18: “..., none can occur on the *vipakṣa*, things that are known to be ‘other than the probandum at issue’” → “... , none can occur on the *vipakṣa*, things that are known to be ‘other than the possessor/locus of the probandum at issue’” or “... , none can occur on the *vipakṣa*, things that are known to lack the probandum at issue”

Page 48, line 3 from bottom to Page 49, line 6: This expression is the same as the preceding one (p. 48,11-3 from bottom) and redundant.

Page 113, line 14 from bottom: “... we not not claim” → “... we do not claim”

Page 131, line 8: “a lake” → “lakeness” or “any property that occurs only in a lake” (?). A lake is an example in which it is discussed whether the *upādhi* (wet fuel) or the *hetu* (fire) occurs or not, so a lake cannot be an *upādhi*.

Page 134, line 7 from bottom: “*kṣity-ādhikam*” → “*kṣity-ādikam*”

It may be proper to say that we should overlook the above-mentioned problems, because the present book is geared towards the non-specialist as well as specialist. Despite these problems, this book is highly recommended to those who are interested in Navya-nyāya, because of its lucid explanation of the Navya-nyāya concept of *upādhi*, its reliable translation, and clear comments following the translation. Furthermore, this book will certainly be of great interest to students of logic, and in particular the comparative study of logic.

In 2004 Phillips and Tatacharya published a translation of the “Perception Chapter” (Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa) of the *TC: Epistemology of Perception: Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi: Jewel of Reflection on the Truth (about Epistemology): The Perception Chapter (pratyakṣakhaṇḍa)* (New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies), which is also a great achievement and will certainly advance our research on Navya-nyāya as well as the *TC* to a great extent. I look forward to seeing both authors continue their work on translating the remaining chapters of the *TC*. We can say that the vigorous collaboration between these two scholars

BOOK REVIEW

has brought us to a new phase of research on Navya-nyāya.

* I wish to thank Dr. Charles Pain for correcting my English.

Nagoya University

Toshihiro WADA
