

Toshihiro Wada, *The Analytical Method of Navya-Nyāya*, Gonda Indological Series XIV, Groningen: Egbert-Forsten, the Netherlands, 2007, viii + 220 Pp. € 85. (Hardback)

The technical innovations of the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system have influenced Sanskrit intellectual practices for nearly a millennium. Yet, despite the fact that work in fields as diverse as literary theory (*alaṅkāraśāstra*), social/political theory (*dharmasāstra*), epistemology (*nyāya*), and philosophical theology (*vedānta*) has drawn upon these innovations, very few scholars have been well versed enough in them to fully appreciate the past 500-700 years of what is rightly considered by Sanskrit intellectuals themselves to be “cutting-edge work” in these fields. As a result, our understanding of late pre-modern and early modern Sanskrit thought is superficial, at best. One of the reasons for this superficiality has been the difficulty of learning how to think with Sanskrit intellectuals in the “new” (*navya*) idiom developed within the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system, and the closely related challenge of understanding why Navya-Naiyāyikas, among others, thought their innovations were in fact *innovations*. Within the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system, for example, many innovations followed a definitional turn in Sanskrit philosophy, and were developed in the specific context of formulating better and better definitions of inference-warranting relations and descriptions of mental content. The precision and attention to detail in these definitions and descriptions is astonishing, but all too often has been dismissed as being of little historical or philosophical significance.

Fortunately, Toshihiro Wada’s recent work helps to correct this unfortunate state of affairs and related misconceptions about the historical and philosophical significance of the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system. In *The Analytical Method of Navya-Nyāya*, Wada builds upon his earlier work on Navya-Nyāya definitions of inference-warranting relations, more specifically, his 1990 publication, *Invariable Concomitance in Navya-Nyāya*, and the nearly two-dozen articles that he has published since then (for a list, see, pp. 194-7). In his first book, Wada focused his attention on a comparative analysis of Gaṅgeśa (ca. 14th century) and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi’s (ca. 1510) “conclusive definitions” (*siddhāntalakṣaṇa*) of invariable concomitance. In his most recent book, Wada discusses Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha Tarkālaṅkāra’s (ca. 1540-1600) analysis of the definitions of the “Lion” and “Tiger” (*siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa*), and provides a very interesting and insightful analysis of Śāśadhara’s (ca. 1275-1325, p. 4) “conclusive” definitions.

The importance of this rather technical topic, and the innovative techniques that were developed to discuss it, should not be underestimated. As Ingalls mentioned over 50 years ago (in his justifiably famous, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*), there are literally hundreds of manuscripts of commentaries and super-commentaries on Navya-Nyāya definitions of invariable concomitance alone, the overwhelming majority of which have never been studied. It is also clear that the techniques developed within the Navya-Nyāya knowledge system have influenced nearly every branch of Sanskrit learning, thus extending its

significance, and that of Wada's work, far beyond the primary source materials themselves. If we are to ever understand late pre-modern and early modern Sanskrit thought or intellectual culture, we will have to come to an understanding of the work of Navya-Nyāya intellectuals. And as the Sanskrit intellectual tradition itself seems to suggest, the Navya-Nyāya analysis of inference-warranting relations may very well be the best place to start.

Wada divides *The Analytical Method of Navya Nyāya*, into two parts. Part I (pp. 1-89) consists of 5 substantive chapters, plus an introduction in which Wada very helpfully provides a chapter by chapter outline of the entire work and a summary of the central arguments in each chapter. Part I concludes with a short summary/conclusion. Part II (pp. 91-184) contains an edition (with variants), annotated translation, and commentary, which is both explanatory and "visual", on the so-called "Lion" and "Tiger" definitions of invariable concomitance from Mathurānātha's *Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇarahasya*, which is itself a commentary on the relevant section of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. The book concludes with a bibliography of primary and secondary sources (p. 185-198) and a very useful index (pp. 199-220). It is also worth noting that the book is beautifully produced by the publishers, Egbert Forsten, and contains relatively few typographical errors.

In chapter 1 (pp. 9-23), Wada surveys the history of scholarship on the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system, both on the question of what distinguishes the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system from the older *Prācīna*-Nyāya knowledge-system and the closely related question of who should be considered its "founder". Wada argues that what distinguishes the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system from *Prācīna*-Nyāya is that it places relationality, and therefore relations themselves at the center of its philosophy, and analyzes almost every topic of philosophical significance in terms of it. As mentioned above, this is particularly evident in their treatment of both inference-warranting relations and mental content. Once it is noticed that relations have a privileged position in Navya-Nyāya, Wada argues that Udayana (fl. 1025) must be considered its "founder". This philosophical and historical claim is more specific, and therefore more interesting and important, than those made by many of the scholars surveyed by Wada. Wada's two theses, about the centrality of relations and the importance of Udayana, are defended in chapter 2. Unlike the previous scholars whose work he surveys, Wada attends to both of these theses explicitly, and makes his argument by critically engaging almost all of the previous scholarship in English, French, German, and Japanese.

In chapter 2 (pp. 24-35), Wada defends his claim that Udayana ought to be considered the founder of the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system since it was Udayana who first put relations at the center of his account of reality or, as Wada (following Tachikawa) puts it, at the center of his description of the "structure of the world". Wada defends this thesis on the basis of Tachikawa's 1981 study of Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvṛti* and *Kiraṇāvṛti*, *The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism*, by showing that Udayana uses the "relational" concepts of: (1) "Inhering in" (*samaveta*) — that is, the concept that a property is located through inherence in its property possessor (*dharmisamavetadharmā*); (2) "that in which things

inhere” (*samavetavat*); and/or (3) “sharing a locus/being co-located with” in his definitions of each of the six kinds of positive things that make up reality i.e., substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*), actions (*karma*), universals/generic terms (*sāmānyajāti*), particulars (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*). Wada suggests that since these fundamental building blocks of reality are defined through relations and relational concepts, relationality is at the center of Udayana’s account of the structure of the world, and therefore his thought. Wada further suggests that this is unprecedented in Sanskrit philosophy prior to Udayana and therefore concludes that Udayana should be considered the founder of the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system.

In the second part of this chapter, Wada supports his argument for the centrality of relations in Navya-Nyāya by briefly discussing some of the technical innovations that later Navya-Nyāya philosophers appealed to, to further refine the ways in which relations were understood, analyzed, and discussed. More specifically, Wada discusses the concepts of ‘delimiter’/‘delimited’ (*avacchedaka/avacchinna*) and ‘describer’/‘described’ (*nirūpaka/nirūpita*). In so doing, he not only introduces his readers to the diagrams that he makes such effective use of in his earlier work, but also gives them a sense of the philosophical significance of these innovative concepts, and thus prepares them for understanding the more complex diagrams that he uses to discuss the definitions of invariable concomitance that he considers in chapters 4 and 5, and the far more complex diagrams that he uses as a visual commentary to his translation in Part II. In the second part of this chapter, Wada explains how relations are central to Navya-Nyāya by discussing the concepts referred to above. Very briefly, consider the statement: “All potters make pots”, and suppose that it has three basic components: All potters, the pot(s) that they make, and causality. As Wada explains, the relation ‘being a cause of’, is understood in Navya-Nyāya as being a property that is located in everything that is a cause of something e.g., potters, bakers, fire, etc. Such a property is often referred to as a “relational abstract”. To specify that in the case at hand what is relevant is this property in so far as it is located in potters, the scope of the property needs to be limited, restricted, or, more technically, “delimited”. As Wada explains, this is one of the functions of a delimiting property or “delimiter” (*avacchedaka*). In this case, the relevant property is ‘being a potter’. Notice that both the delimiting property (‘being a potter’) and the delimited property (‘being a cause of’) are located in potters i.e., in each and every potter. The use of a delimiter thus specifies that the relevant relational abstract i.e., ‘being a cause of’, is restricted by a delimiting property i.e., ‘being a potter’, to share a locus with it. The relational abstract, and therefore the ‘being a cause of’ relation, is thereby specified as that which is located in all (and not just some) potters. In Wada’s terminology, the relation is identified through specifying the “quantity of its *relata*.” The use of the delimiting property ‘being a potter’, however, is insufficient for restricting the scope of the relational abstract expressed in the above sentence, since, in addition to making pots, potters could also be makers of other things e.g., they could bake cookies, start fires, or, as Wada says, have children. In order to specify that what is relevant here is that

they make pots, the scope of the relational abstract needs to be further restricted by what is called a describing property, or “describer” (*nirūpaka*). In this case, the relevant property could be ‘being a pot’. In describing the relational abstract ‘being a cause of’ with the property ‘being a pot’, its scope is restricted to ‘being a cause of pots’. Thus, when the relational abstract is both delimited (*avacchinna*) by the property ‘being a potter’ and described (*nirūpita*) by the property ‘being a pot’, its scope is restricted in such a way that it becomes clear that what is being expressed is that the relational abstract in question, ‘being a cause of,’ is one that is located in potters, and that it relates to pots, thus expressing that ‘All potters make pots’. This is, of course, a very simple case that makes use of just two Navya-Nyāya concepts. To explain the far more complex cases discussed by Navya-Nyāya philosophers, Wada makes use of an ingenious system of diagrams, the history of which he gives in chapter 3. Wada’s simpler diagrams, such as those used to represent statements like the one above, may contain as few as four boxes and three connecting lines (see Figure 2.7, p. 34), while his more complex diagrams, such as those used in Part II, may have over a dozen boxes and connecting lines (see, for example, Figure 2.41, p. 159).

Wada’s response to the challenge of trying to explain the technical innovations in Navya-Nyāya philosophers’ definitions of inference-warranting relations is to develop a system of diagrams to visually represent the structure of their definitions. These diagrams provide a sophisticated and accessible method of comparing various definitional strategies, identifying what specific Navya-Nyāya philosophers took to be problems, and understanding how they thought these problems could be resolved. According to Wada, as early as 1965, the late Hidenori Kitagawa used diagrams to represent Navya-Nyāya concepts and thus should be considered the first scholar to do so. In this, he was followed by Goekoop in 1967. Wada’s system of diagrams, however, is based on that of Tachikawa who, in the early 1970’s, was the first to “officially” make use of the kinds of diagrams used by Wada. Y. Miyasaka, who was familiar with the earlier system of diagrams, expanded its scope by devising new ways of representing key concepts such as delimitor, describer, and counterpositive (*pratiyogin*). He was also the first to recognize that the idea of something’s “being located in” needed to encompass not only the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), but also that of contact (*saṃyoga*) and the “self-linking relation” (*svarūpasambandha*), a relation that is taken to be identical to one of its *relata*. Wada’s system, which he developed in the 1980’s, is an improved and conceptually more precise version of Miyasaka’s. An especially helpful feature of Wada’s discussion of the history of his diagrams is the candor with which he discusses the limitations of such systems, which are nevertheless the most effective way that I know of to communicate the technical innovations of Navya-Nyāya to non-specialists. Versions of the Kitagawa-Tachikawa-Miyasaka-Wada system have also been used by scholars such as V.N. Jha and, in a modified form, Achyutananda Dash.

Having provided a basic understanding of his system of diagrams in chapters 2 and 3, Wada applies them with great success throughout the remainder of the book. In fact, to understand Wada’s arguments in the remainder of the book is, for

the most part, to understand his diagrams. What is notable about Wada's diagrams is that he does not use them to literally and slavishly represent the letter of the definitions of invariable concomitance that he considers, but rather as analytical tools to represent the conceptual connections between their various components. This allows him to easily show when the specific wording of an often complex definition is philosophically significant and when it is not, and to easily compare the approaches taken by different philosophers.

In chapter 4, for example, Wada compares Śāśadhara's analysis, in the *Nyāyasiddhāntatīpa*, of three definitions of invariable concomitance with Gaṅgeśa's analysis of similar definitions in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Wada's analysis helps us to see the kinds of problems that these philosophers and their successors faced when trying to define such relations. In what follows, I want to focus on three of these problems, which I will refer to as the "one, some, all problem", the "problem of universally located properties", and the "circularity problem". Versions of these problems are also important to Wada's discussion of the far more complex definitions of the Lion and Tiger in chapter 5 and Part II. This is not to say that these three problems are the only problems, but only that they seem to recur in the texts that Wada considers in this book. It is also important to note that Wada's discussion in chapter 4 is embedded in a broader, and teleological, historical argument that seeks to demonstrate Śāśadhara's influence on Gaṅgeśa, by showing in detail how Gaṅgeśa "improves upon" Śāśadhara's work. Wada takes a similar approach to his discussion of Gaṅgeśa's treatment of the definitions of the Lion and Tiger in comparison with that of his "commentator", and clear temporal successor, Mathurānātha. Attention to Wada's discussion of Śāśadhara and Gaṅgeśa thus serves as an important introduction to his far more complex discussion in the remainder of the book, a discussion which, unfortunately, I will not be able to discuss in any detail in this review. I will also refrain from commenting on Wada's commitment to teleological historical arguments and, more specifically, his argument about Śāśadhara's influence on Gaṅgeśa. Instead, I want to focus on Wada's discussion of Śāśadhara's definitions, in so far as it can function as a window to his more detailed analysis of Mathurānātha.

The first definition that Wada considers in chapter 4 is one of Śāśadhara's three "conclusive definitions of invariable concomitance", by which Wada means only that these definitions are not explicitly criticized by Śāśadhara himself (p. 48). Wada's comparison of Śāśadhara's first conclusive definition, which is itself a modification of Śāśadhara's 9th definition (out of 17), with Gaṅgeśa's improved version of it, illustrates a version of what I referred to above as the "one, some, all problem". In this first definition (see Figure 4.1, p. 49), Śāśadhara says that there is invariable concomitance between a reason property (Wada uses the term, "probans", *hetu*) and a target property (Wada uses the term, "probandum", *sādhya*) when a reason property has as its target a property which is not the counterpositive of a constant absence which both occurs throughout the locus of the absence and shares a locus with [the reason property] (*sādhanaśamānādhikarānavyāpyavṛtītyantābhāvāpratīyogisādhyakatvam*). In contrast, Gaṅgeśa

śa says (see Figure 4.4, p. 53) that there is invariable concomitance between a proposed reason property, x , and a target property, y , when, x is co-located with a property y which is not qualified by the delimiter of the counterpositive-ness [i.e., the property ‘being a counterpositive’] of the constant absence which does not share a locus with its counterpositive but does share a locus with property x (*pratiyogyasamānādhikaraṇayatsamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvapratiyogitāvaccchedakāvachinnaṃ yan na bhavati tena samaṃ tasya sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ vyāptih*). As Wada points out, the expression “a constant absence which occurs throughout the locus of the absence”, in Śāśadhara’s definition, and the expression “a constant absence which does not share a locus with its counterpositive” are equivalent, in the sense that they simply state that the absence and its counterpositive cannot share a locus. There are, therefore, only two relevant differences in these definitions: (1) Gaṅgeśa’s use of the variables x and y , instead of the terms “reason property” and “target property”, and (2) Gaṅgeśa’s use of a “delimiter”. Let us consider the second difference first.

As Wada sees it, Gaṅgeśa’s decision to include the concept of a “delimiter of the counterpositive-ness etc.” in his conclusive definition is based on a problem that he notices in Śāśadhara’s version of it. To illustrate this problem, Wada considers the standard example of inferring that there is fire (target property) on a mountain (the site of the inference) from noticing the presence of smoke (the reason property) on that mountain. It is important to note that in both Śāśadhara and Gaṅgeśa’s definitions, the locus that the purported reason property/property ‘ x ’ is supposed to share with its target is any smoke-possessing locus other than the site e.g., a kitchen, altar, etc. Suppose that the locus in question is a kitchen. Given Śāśadhara’s definition, the counterpositive loci of the constant absence of the fire that is located in the kitchen would be instances of non-kitchen fire, such as mountain-fires. If the locus in question were an altar, the counterpositive would be instances of non-altar fire, such as kitchen-fires. The problem with this definition is that a compound locus of *all* such loci would have as its counterpositive (of the constant absence of the fire that is located there) the set of *all* fires, including mountain-fires. This is a problem since another element of Śāśadhara’s definition requires that the target property be different from this counterpositive, which is not the case here. What Śāśadhara’s definition does not specify is that the counterpositive needs to be restricted to site-fire i.e., mountain-fire, which is, by definition, different from the fire that is located in the loci in question. As a result, this definition fails to apply to a case where it should, and thus suffers from the defect of “under-application” (*avyāpti*). By introducing the concept of a delimiter into his definition, however, Gaṅgeśa is able to restrict this counterpositive to mountain-fire, through specifying that there needs to be a delimiter to the counterpositive-ness of this counterpositive, namely, the property, ‘being mountain-fire.’ With such a delimiter, Gaṅgeśa is able to overcome the defect of under-application by restricting the counterpositive loci to instances of mountain-fire, rather than the unrestricted loci of all fire. As Wada also explains, Gaṅgeśa’s definition solves the “circularity problem” too. By using the variables ‘ x ’ and ‘ y ’, instead of the terms “reason property” and “target property”, Gaṅgeśa

is able to avoid the charge that since a reason property is, by definition, one that is invariably concomitant with a target property, it cannot be used in a non-circular definition of “invariable concomitance”.

Wada’s discussion of Śāśadhara’s second and third definitions illustrates the second problem that I mentioned above, the problem of “universally located properties”, in addition to the two just discussed. According to Śāśadhara’s second definition, invariable concomitance is a reason property’s having as a locus, the locus of a target property which is not the counterpositive of the mutual absence that shares loci with/of the reason property (*sādhanaśamānādhikarāṇānyonābhāvāpratiyogisādhyaśvatkatvam*, see Figure 4.7, p. 58). According to the third definition, which is a revised version of the second, invariable concomitance is a reason property’s being located with a target property whose locus is not the delimitor of the counterpositive-ness of the mutual absence which shares a locus with what is taken to be the reason property (*sādhanaśvābhimatasamānādhikarāṇānyonābhāvāpratiyogitānavacchedakasādhyaśvatkatvam*, see Figure 4.9, p. 62).

In his analysis, Wada first points out that in the second definition, the phrase “loci with/of the reason property” cannot be interpreted as “all loci of the reason property”, since if it were so interpreted the definition would not cover target properties which are universally located (*kevalānvayin*). Consider the following: Suppose that what is meant is “all loci of the reason property” and not just some loci. Given this interpretation, the counterpositive of the mutual absence that is located there would be those loci that are different from the loci in which the reason property is present i.e., all non-reason-property-possessing loci. Notice that when the relevant target property is a universally located one (e.g., the property ‘being nameable’, *abhidheyatva*), its reason property has to be universally located too (e.g., the property ‘being knowable’, *prameyatva*). On the “all” interpretation, however, there cannot be non-reason-property possessing loci for universally located reason properties. In other words, there cannot be a counterpositive to the mutual absence that is supposed to be located with all of the loci of the reason property. Since the definition requires there to be such a locus, however, on the “all” interpretation, it fails to apply to universally located target properties. As a result, it suffers from the fault of under-application. Given that Śāśadhara claims, explicitly, that his definition is supposed to apply to cases where the target property is universally located, Wada rightly concludes that the “all” interpretation cannot be what Śāśadhara had in mind. What is important about this observation is that it cannot be simply read off from the text itself, but rather is hard won, in the sense that it is only by carefully understanding Śāśadhara’s argument that one can come to it. Wada’s analysis of Śāśadhara, Gaṅgeśa, and Mathurānātha is full of such “hard won” insights.

As Wada notes, Gaṅgeśa discusses a definition that is similar to Śāśadhara’s second definition, but does not point to the ambiguity just discussed or the problem of “universally located properties”. Instead, Gaṅgeśa argues that this definition (his definition #10/21) suffers from another version of the “one, some, all problem” and, as a result, does not apply to even the well-known inference of

fire from smoke. Suppose that the phrase in question refers to *some* but not all of the loci of a reason property, as is clearly Śāśadhara's intent (e.g., suppose that one of these loci is a kitchen, a locus in which smoke is present). In this case, loci other than these some (e.g., loci other than a kitchen, such as an altar, etc.) would be counterpositive to the mutual absence that is located in the loci of the reason property. It is important to note that the word "not" in the second definition means "different from" and that, as a result, "not the counterpositive" refers to at least some loci that are "different from the counterpositive". A problem with this definition, however, is that, as stated, it could very well be the case that one of these loci *is* a counterpositive of the mutual absence that is located in the same locus as the reason property (e.g., a red hot bar of iron, a locus in which fire but not smoke is located), instead of *not* being such a counterpositive, as is required by the definition (see Figure 4.10, and the analysis on p. 59). As stated, the definition does not rule this out. In such a case, however, there would be a locus of the reason property that is different from those of the target property, and the definition would therefore fail, as in the inference of fire from smoke. While interpreting the "loci with/of the reason property" as *some* loci solves the problem of "universally located properties", it generates a new one, as Gaṅgeśa notices. In his analysis of this definition, Wada cites the locus of a lake (see his analysis on pp. 63-65), a locus in which neither the reason property nor the target property are present, instead of the locus of a red-hot bar of iron, which is a locus in which the target property is present but the reason property is not.

Śāśadhara too recognizes this basic problem, and revises his definition in such a way as to solve it. In the voice of an opponent, Śāśadhara explains that definition three is just a revised version of definition two, but does not explain this any further. Wada's analysis fills this explanatory gap. For example, Wada asks us to notice that in this third definition Śāśadhara replaces the phrase "not the counterpositive of" with the phrase "not a *delimiter* of the counterpositive-ness of" (the mutual absence that shares a locus with the reason property). What this change specifies is that the counterpositive of that mutual absence must be *all* of the loci that are different from the loci of the target property (see Figure 4.11, p. 65). In the case of a valid inference, this set of loci includes all of the loci that are different from the loci of the reason property. In specifying this counterpositive in this way, the specific problem with definition two is solved, since it rules out the possibility that a reason property like smoke will be present in a locus without its target. In his discussion of Śāśadhara's third definition, Wada also points out that Śāśadhara seems to be aware that it suffers from a version of the "circularity" problem, since the phrase "*taken to be* the reason property" is used in it (pp. 63, 66, 66n.3). Wada suggests that it is because of this problem that Śāśadhara later shows that the terms "reason property" and "target property" can be replaced with variables (see Figure 4.13, p. 67), as in Gaṅgeśa's conclusive definition. Again, what is so important about Wada's analysis is that it goes far beyond simply reporting what Śāśadhara says. Wada uses his understanding of the definitions of invariable concomitance to uncover both the logic of Śāśadhara's text and its implicit argument, thus making it possible to see the kinds of philosophical

problems that Śāśadhara was struggling with.

In the remainder of the book (chapter 5 and Part II), Wada turns his attention to Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha's discussion of the definitions of the Lion and Tiger. In chapter 5, Wada provides a translation and diagrammatic account of Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha's conclusions regarding these two definitions (see Figure 5.4, p. 75 and Figure 5.8, p. 81). In Part II, which begins with a very helpful summary/outline of Mathurānātha's text, he provides an excellent annotated translation of, and, in the form of diagrams, visual commentary on Mathurānātha's work. With the help of Wada's very detailed analysis, it is clear that many of the issues that were discussed above also inform Mathurānātha's discussion, but that now additional concepts e.g., delimiting relations (*avacchedakasambandha*), partially pervading/incompletely occurring properties (*avyapyavṛtti*), etc. and new innovative techniques are used to resolve them. These additional concepts and innovative techniques are extremely important for understanding this period in the history of the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system. Wada's analysis of them is especially noteworthy in that it goes far beyond a simple translation of Mathurānātha's text and report on its contents: It is full of original insights, and will be indispensable for anyone interested in understanding not only Mathurānātha's work but also early modern discussions of invariable concomitance and inferential reasoning more broadly.

The contributions of Wada's work are especially evident in this part of the book. Through his use of diagrams, for example, Wada makes a very important methodological contribution to the study of the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system. In my view, Wada's diagrams make it possible, even for non-specialists, to discover and understand the significance of the technical innovations of Navya-Nyāya philosophers, and see why in fact they were innovations. Secondly, and in part through his use of these diagrams, Wada shows that the work of Navya-Nyāya intellectuals was far from invariant, by demonstrating how Navya-Nyāya intellectuals creatively responded to, and sought to improve upon, the work of their predecessors. Wada's work thus serves as an example of how the nearly millennium long history of the Navya-Nyāya knowledge-system can be studied, historically. Finally, Wada's work makes it possible to better appreciate the philosophical issues that were at stake for Navya-Nyāya philosophers in discussing issues that for too many scholars have appeared to be nothing more than insignificant hair-splitting. In contributing in such diverse ways, Wada's book takes the very difficult first steps towards enabling us to understand what Navya-Nyāya intellectuals themselves took their work to be about. And in so doing, it enables us to begin to understand late pre-modern and early modern Sanskrit thought, which has been otherwise inaccessible to so many.

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