

VYĀKARAṆA MAHĀBHĀṢYA OF PATAÑJALI ON PĀṆINI 3.1 (ĀHNIKAS 1 TO 6) (5)*

Stephen Peter THOMPSON

26.1 śabdavairakalahābhrakaṇvameghebhyaḥ karaṇe ||3/1/17||

*aṭāṭṭāśīkākoṭāpoṭāsoṭāpruṣṭāpluṣṭāgrahaṇaṃ kartavyam / aṭā /
aṭāyate // aṭṭā / aṭṭāyate // śīkā / śīkāyate // koṭā / koṭāyate //
poṭā / poṭāyate // soṭā / soṭāyate // pruṣṭā / pruṣṭāyate // pluṣṭā /
pluṣṭāyate //*

Pāṇini 3.1.17: The pratyaya kyaṇ in the sense of making (i.e. of kṛ to make) acts after those words as karman/object of the action viz. śabda (sound), vaira (hostility), kalaha (strife), abhra (cloud), kaṇva (sin) and megha (cloud)”.

Bhāṣya: Specific mention should be made of (the following as having the pratyaya kyaṇ in the sense of making) aṭ aṭṭā śīkā koṭā poṭā soṭā pruṣṭā pluṣṭā. aṭāyate He enters upon a roaming life; aṭṭāyate He is overbearing; śīkāyate It rains in fine drops; koṭāyate He makes a bend or fortress (?); poṭāyate She becomes a hermaphrodite, soṭāyate?; pruṣṭāyate It sprinkles; pluṣṭāyate It burns.

26.5 sudinadurdinābhyāṃ ca ||1||

sudinadurdinābhyāṃ ceti vaktavyam/ sudināyate durdināyate //

Vārttika 1: And (kyaṇ) acts after the words sudina and durdina.

* The preceding parts of the present paper were published in *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saṃbhāṣā*, vols., 23, 24, 25, and 26. In Dr. Thompson's Ph.D. dissertation critical notes are provided in chapter 6, but in the present paper those notes are inserted after the text and translation of the *Mahābhāṣya* on each Pāṇinisūtra for the convenience of the reader. Accordingly, the present reproduction lacks an independent chapter providing those notes.

Bhāṣya: And it should be stated that (*kyañ* acts) after (the words) *sudina* and *durdina*. *sudināyate* It becomes a fine day/ A fine day is brought about. It makes a good day. *durdināyate* It becomes an overcast day, covered with clouds/ It makes a rainy day/ An overcast/ rainy day is brought about/made.

26.6 *nīhārāc ca* //2//

nīhārāc ceti vaktavyam / nīhārāyate //

Vārttika 2: And (*kyañ*) acts after the word *nīhāra*.

Bhāṣya: And it should be stated that (*kyañ*) acts the word *nīhāra*. *Nīhārāyate* "It becomes misty. It causes or makes mist."

Notes on *MahāBhāṣya* on *Pāṇini 3.1.17*

Vārttika Summary

The two *vārttikas* give three more words after which *kyañ* acts in the sense of making, namely *sudina* and *durdina* in the first, and *nīhāra* in the second.

Bhāṣya Summary

Patañjali effectively starts with his own *vārttika*, listing six other words *āṭa* etc. after which *kyañ* acts in the sense of making, followed by the derivative forms. Likewise for the two *vārttikas* he provides the examples.

26.1 *śabda vaira kalaha abhra kaṇva meghaḥ bhyasa, karaṇa ni (kyañ) kā ... ity etebhya karaṇe karoty arthe kyañ pratyayo bhavati*

tr. See text.

śabda m. sound, noise, voice, tone, note *Jñāna Bindo Cp. 2.1*; seven-fold *M.Bh. 12.6858*; eight-fold *Dharmas 35*; ten-fold *M.Bh.14.1418*; word *Ś.Br. 14.7, 2.23, Nir. 1.2.16*; the right word, correct expression, opposed to *apaśabda Pat. 1.1.1* etc.; the sacred syllable 'Om' *Amṛt. Up. 9.30, Naigh. 11, Nir. 1.2, 10.12*.

yaḥkaś ca śabdo vāgevasā śat 14.4.3.10

amara 1.5.7 rūpaṃ śabdo gandharasasparśās ca ca viṣayā amī śapyate ākruśyate

śapa (bhvā° di° u° a° 1000 1138 ākrośe) dan

śāśapibhyāṃ dadanau u° 4.97

śabda kyañ = śabdaṃ karoti śabdāyate (dīrgha 7.4.25)

Vop. 21.10, Nir. 2.9, 11.9 M.Bh. 6.1887

śabdāyamāne paṭahe karṇadārīṇi to make a sound (acc.); cry, yell, bray.

26.1 *vaira* m.f.n. (from *vīra*) hostile, inimical, revengeful, A.V.

10.1.19 n. enmity, hostility, A.V. 12.528 heroism W.

amara 1.7.25 *vairam virodho vidveṣaḥ vīrasya karma dvandvād vun vaira maithunikayoḥ* 4.3.125 *iti nirdeśāt*

'*hāyanānta*' 'yuvādibhyo 'ṇ' 5.1.130 (*yuvāditvād vā uṇ*) (*bhāve karmani*)
vīra vīrayati vīra (*cu° ā° se° 1903 vikrāntau*) ac (*pacādi 3.1.134*)

vairāyate to become hostile, behave like an enemy.

vairāyābhaṇā begin hostilities against *Bhaṭṭ*. 5.75.

kalaha (*am*) n. strife, contention, quarrel, fight M.Bh. 2.17.80, Mn. 4.121 etc.

ardhacā puṃsi ca 2.4.31

amara 2.8.104 *kalahavigrahau*

kalasya hananam 'anyebhyo 'pi drśyate' 3.2.101

vā° iti ṇ

hana (*a° pa° a° 1012 hiṃsāgatyo*) *ḍ* (*ṭe 6.4.143*)

kalahāyate to quarrel, contend

striṭpuruṣo kalahāyete pa 2.4.9 *kā*

tadyathā sahatvadarthe kalahāyato sameyatī velā vilamṇā pañcata 207, 22

ababhra (sometimes spelt *abbhra* according to the derivation *ababhra* 'water-bearer')

abhrāṇi ... ab bharaṇāt (*chām° upa° 2.15.1 śaṃkara*)

n. (rarely, m. A.V. 9.6.47 and 75) cloud, thunder-cloud, rainy weather R.V. 1.79.2 etc. (c.f. Gk. *ombros* Latin *imber*)

na bibharti kiṃcit dumarṃ (*ju° u° a° 1087 dhāraṇapoṣaṇayoḥ*) *ka*

(*tundaśokayoḥ*) 3.2.5 *vā mūlavibhujāditvāt kaḥ*

yadvā āpo bhraśyanti asmāt, 'anyebhyo 'pi' (*vā° 3.2.101*) *iti ḍaḥ*

abhrāyate to create clouds

kaṇva See notes on 3.1.16 *vā° I kaṇvāyate* to make or cause or do mischief.

26.1 *megha* 'sprinkler', a cloud R.V. 1.181.8 etc.

mehati miha (*bhvā° pa° se° 992 secane*) ac 3.1.134

nyaṅkvādīnām ca 7.3.53 (*kaḥ*)

meghāyate to form clouds, become cloudy, (only *meghāyamāna* T.S. 7.5.11.1)

26.2 *aṭā* the act or habit of roaming or wandering about (especially as a religious mendicant) *Ratnak + Nila-k* in S.K.Dr.

aṭa (*bhvā° pa° se° 295 gatau*) *aca* (3.1.134) *ṭāp* (4.1.4)

aṭāyate to become a religious mendicant.

aṭṭā overbearing conduct (?)

aṭṭā (bhvā° ā° se° 273 *atikramaṇahimsanayoḥ*) *ghaṇī*
karmaṇi 3.3.14 *ac* (3.1.134) *tāp*

aṭṭāyatega to be overbearing (?)

śikā only recorded in this *vārttika* as a feminine noun except in *T.P.-3.2.*

śikr se 75 *secane*

śikāyate to rain in fine drops, drizzle, sprinkle.

śikāyisyantu *T.S.* 7.5.11.2.

śikāyanta *V.S.* 22.26.

26.3 *meghāyisyate svāhā meghāyate svāhā*

śikāyisyate svāhā śikāyate svāhā *Tai°* 7.5.11

Tai° prā° 3.5 *prasyendriyā ... puṣpāmeghā prā svā* 3.2. *devā śikā ...*
śuddhā

koṭā with a bend (?), fortress (?), stronghold (?)

kuṭa (tu° pa° se° 1365 *kauṭilye*) *ac* 3.1.134 *tāp* (4.1.4)

kuṭāyate to make a bond, or a stronghold.

poṭā f. a hermaphrodite or a woman with a beard, a female servant or slave *H.* 534 *H.Car.* 18.

amara 2.6.15 *poṭā śrīpūmsalakṣaṇā puṭa tu° pa° se°* 1397 *saṃśleṣaṇe*

poṭāyate poṭayati yu u bhāṣārthā 3.1.134 to make someone a hermaphrodite.

soṭā unknown, only occurs here 3.1.17 *Vā.* 1.

soṭā kyaṇ soṭāyate

puṣṭā burnt or sprinkled.

26.4 *amara* 2.1.99 *praṣṭupluṣṭoṣitā dagdhe*

pruṣu plṣu (bhvā° pa° se° 702, 703 *dāhe*) *kva tāp* 4.1.4

ktah (*niṣṭhā* 3.2.102 *bhūte*)

yasya vibhāṣā 7.2.15 (*na it*)

pruṣṭāyate to make burn, or to make wet or to fill.

pluṣṭā pruṣa tryā° pa° se° 1527 *snehasasevanapūraṇeṣu*

pluṣa kryā° pa° se° 1529 *snehasasevanapūraṇeṣu*

pluṣṭāyate to burn or to fill.

quoted in *Uṇ.* 1.152 formation of *pluṣṭāḥ* rainy season, drop of water.

26.5 *sudina* m.f.(ā) n. clear, bright (as the/a day or morning) *R.V.*

7.11.2 n. a clear or fine or auspicious day *R.V.* 7.18.21

happy time, happiness (*sukha*) *Naigh.* 3.6

amara 1.4.2 *ghastro dināhanī vā tu klībe divasavāsarau*

dīyate kṣīṇam bhavati dīḍa (*di° ā° a°* 1134 *kṣāye*) *nak*

inaṣinajidīḍa (*u°* 3.2)

bāhulakādabhasvaḥ

sudinayate to become a fine day, clear up.

durdina n. a rainy or cloudy day, bad weather, *Kaus.*

m.f.n. cloudy, rainy, dark *M.Bh.* 7.477

durdināyate to become covered with clouds.

3. *nīhāra* m. (once n.) mist, fog, near frost, heavy dew, *R.V. 10.82.7*

amara 1.2.18 avaśyāyas tu nīhāras tuśāras tuhinam himam

nīhiyate hr̥ṇa (bhvā° u° a° 799 haraṇe) ghañ (3.3.19)

upasargasya ghanyamanuṣye bahulam 6.3.122 (dīrghah)

nīhārāyate to become or make mist.

26.9 *sukhādibhyaḥ kartṛvedanāyām ||3||18||*

*kartṛvedanāyām iti kim artham / iha mā bhūt / sukham
vedayate prasādhako devadattasya // kartṛvedanāyām ity
ucyamāne 'py atra prāpnoti / kiṃ kāraṇam / kartur itīyaṃ
kartari ṣaṣṭī / vedanāyām iti cāno bhāve / sa yady evātmano
vedayate 'thāpi parasya kartṛvedanaivāsau bhavati // na
kartṛgrahaṇena vedanābhisambadhyate / kiṃ tarhi / sukhādīny
abhisambadhyante / kartur yāni sukhādīni //*

Pāṇini 3.1.18: The *pratyaya kyañ* acts after the words *sukha* (pleasure) and the rest in the sense of the experience/feeling of the agent.

Bhāṣya: Why (is it said) “When the feeling belongs to the agent”? So that it should be applicable here: “The valet de chambre (the attendant who dresses his master) makes known/*vedayate Devadatta's* happiness”. Even when it is being stated “when the feeling is that of the Agent”, here also (*kyañ*) obtains.

What is the reason? “(The *kartṛ* in the *sūtra* is for) *kartur* (of the agent), so this is *kartari ṣaṣṭī* sixth case (used) in denoting the Agent, and the *pratyaya ana*, in the word *vedanāyām*, (*yuc* [c.f. *Vart.* on 3.3.107] acts) in the sense of state of action (abstract action of the *dhātu*) after *vid* (to know) to form *vedana*, in the sense of feeling perception or knowledge. If he experiences feelings for himself, then too that is applicable as the feeling of agent for another.

It is not with the specific mention of the agent that the feeling is connected. What is it then? *Sukha* (pleasure) and the rest are connected. Those pleasures etc. which pertain to the agent.

Notes on *MahāBhāṣya* on *Pāṇini 3.1.18*

Bhāṣya Summary

Patañjali explains the point of the reference to the agent in the *sūtra* is to exclude the cases where it is not the agent's feeling. Even if we construe 'kartuḥ' as sixth case in the sense of agent, so we might say it applied where feeling of the agent is for another, he construes feeling as connected primarily with *sukha* etc. which pertains to the agent, so there is no question of it applying to the feeling for another.

26.9 *sukha ādi bhyas karṭṛ vedanā ni kā karmagrahaṇam anuvartate sukha ity evam ādibhyaḥ karmabhyo vedanāyām arthe 'nubhave kyañ pratyayo bhavati vedayituṣcetkartuḥ sambandhīni sukhādīni bhavanti*

The mention of *karman* (as *karmanah* 'after the object') follows on (from 3.1.15). The *pratyaya kyañ* acts in the sense of feeling gained in experience after the words *sukha* (pleasure) etc. when the words *sukha* etc. are connected with the agent who perceives or knows (the pleasure etc.).

sukha m.f.n. running swiftly or easily (of cars or chariots) easy *R.V. 1.20.3*

pleasant, agreeable *V.S. 3.50* (rare in *Veda*)

comfortable, happy, prosperous (*sukhini*, *R. 2.42.15*)

n. ease, easiness, comfort, prosperity, pleasure, happiness, joy, delight *Ś.Br. 41.5.74*

Kaus. Up. 2.15

śobhanāni khānyanena khanyate khaṇu (bhvā° u° se° avadārāṇe) ṇa (vā° 3.2.109)

sukha duḥkha (cu° u° se° 1929 1930 tat kritāyām) ac (bhāve 3.3.56)

sukha vedayate sukhāyate He experiences or feels pleasure or happiness, to feel pleased, be at ease or comfortable, *Daś. 130.2 Bhaṭṭ. 5.74*

vedanā (yādāpāḥ 7.3.113, Nērām nadyamñibhyaḥ 7.3.116 yām)

f. pain, torture, agony, *M.Bh. 3.136.38; R. 67.25* etc.; feeling, sensation, *Yajñ. 3.130*; perception, knowledge, (rarely)

vida (a° pa° a° 1064 jñāne) yuca nyāsaśanyo yuca 3.3.107 (striyām)

vā su prakaraṇe ghahiṣandividimya upasaṃkhyānam

bhā kaṇḍvādibhyo yak 3.1.27 vā° 4

2.37.7 asti me kaṇḍūr iti vedanāmātrasya sārñnidhye I have a scratch, when there is mere sensation of an itch.

4. *karṭṛ itīyaṃ kartari ṣaṣṭhī*

The *karṭṛ* in the *sūtra* is for *kartur* 'of the agent' so this is sixth case used in denoting the agent.

karṭṛkarmanāḥ kṛti 2.3.65 (ṣaṣṭhī)

"The sixth case is applicable after a word in denoting the agent and the object when used in conjunction with a word ending in a *kṛt pratyaya*."

kr̥datiḥ 3.1.93

bhavataḥ śāyikā your turn of lying down.

So this is the feeling or experience of the Agent.

kiṃ tarhiṭi. Kai vedanāyāḥ kartāram anatareṇābhāvāt kartṛgrahaṇasāmarthyāt sukhādīni viśeṣyante kartṛgrahaṇam ca “supām sulug” iti saṣṭhīlukā nirdiṣṭam tataś ca vedayitā yadātmasaṃbandhīni sukhādīni vedayate tadā pratyayo nānyadīyasukhādivedane

What is it then? Because of feeling (never) existing without an agent, from the force of the specific mention of *karṭṛ* (agent) the words *sukha* etc. are qualified (by it). And the mention of sixth case is made by sixth case *luk*-elision according to *supām suluk* etc. 7.1.39 (in the *Veda*), and thence the experience of feeling. When he experiences the feeling of pleasure etc. connected with himself then the *pratyaya* (*kyac*) applies, not when it is a feeling belonging to anyone else.

26.15 *namovarivaścitraṇaḥ kyac* //3//19//

namasaḥ kyaci dvitīyānupapattiḥ //1//

namasaḥ kyaci dvitīyā nopapadyate / namasyati devān / kiṃ kāraṇam/ namaḥ śabdena yoge caturthī vidhīyate sā prāpnoti //

Pāṇini 3.1.19: The *pratyaya kyac* in the sense of making, optionally acts after these words, as the *karman*/object of the action viz. *namas* (bow, adoration) *varivas* (room, ease, bliss, honour) and *citra* (wonderful)”.
“Pāṇini 3.1.19: The pratyaya kyac in the sense of making, optionally acts after these words, as the karman/object of the action viz. namas (bow, adoration) varivas (room, ease, bliss, honour) and citra (wonderful)”.

Vārttika 1: There is inapplicability of the second *sup*/case after *namas* when *kyac pratyaya* follows.

Bhāṣya: The second case is not applicable after *namas* when *kyac* follows. Thus *namasyati devān* “He adores or pays homage to the gods”. What is the reason? In connection with the word *namas* the fourth case is ordained (2.3.16 *namas svasti svāha* etc.) and that rule obtains.

26.19 *prakṛtyantaravāt siddham* //2//

Vārttika 2: Because of being a different base/*prakṛti* (the second case is) established.

26.20 *namaḥ śabdena yoge caturthī vidhīyate namasyatiśabdaś cāyam/ nanu ca namasyatiśabde namaḥ śabdo 'sti tena yoge prāpnoti / naiṣa doṣaḥ / arthavato namaḥ śabdasya grahaṇam na ca namasyatiśabde namaḥ śabdo 'rthavān // athavo-papadavibhakteḥ kārakavibhaktir balīyasīti dvitīyā vibhaktir bhaviṣyati /*

Bhāṣya: The fourth case is ordained in connection with the word *namas*, but this is the word *namasyati*. But surely in the word *namasyati* the word *namaḥ* exists. The specific mention of the word *namaḥ*, is for its having meaning in connection with that (second case). There is no fault. The word *namas* having meaning is mentioned (in the rule) but the word *namaḥ* in *namasyati* does not have any separate meaning.

Otherwise (according to *Paribhāṣā* 94) because of a *kāraka vibhakti pratyaya*/case ending being stronger than an *upapada* (subordinate word in construction) *vibhakti pratyaya* the second case will be applicable (not the fourth).

27.1 *kyajādiṣu pratyayārthanirdeśaḥ //3//*

kyajādiṣu pratyayārthanirdeśaḥ kartavyaḥ / namaḥ pūjāyām / varivasah paricaryāyām / citraṅ āścarye / bhāṅdāt samā-cayane / cīvarādarjane paridhāne ca / pucchādudasane vyasane paryasane ceti / kiṃ prayojanam / kriyāvacanatā yathā syāt / naitad asti prayojanam /

27.5 *ācāryapravrttir jñāpayati kriyāvacanāḥ kyajādaya iti yad ayam 'sanādyantā dhātavaḥ' (3.1.32) iti dhātusañjñām śāsti / katham kṛtvā jñāpakam / dhātusañjñāvacana etat prayojanam dhātor (3.1.91) iti tavyadādīnām utpattir yathā syāt /*

Vārttika 3: There (should be) indication of the meaning of the *pratyaya* in relation to *kyac* and the rest.

Bhāṣya: Indication should be made of the meaning of the *pratyaya* in relation to *kyac* and the rest. *kyac* acts after *namas* in the sense of homage/worship; *kyac* acts after *varivas* in the sense of waiting upon; *kyac* acts after *citraṅ* in the sense of wonder/surprise; *kyac* acts after *bhāṅda* (vessel) in the sense of putting/heaping together; *kyac* acts

after *cīvara* (dress/rags of a religious) in the sense of procuring/ acquiring or putting on (clothes); (and) *kyac* acts after *puccha* (tail) meaning throwing up or about, wagging and moving to and fro (of the tail).

What is the purpose? So that there should be expressed mention of activity.

This is not the purpose. The Master's usage makes known that the *pratyayas kyac* and the rest are expressive of verbal activity, as he stated in the rule "*sanādyantā dhātavaḥ* (3.1.32). "Words ending with the (*pratyaya*) *san* and the rest are (called *dhātus*)". Thus he teaches the technical name *dhātu* (for them).

27.8 *satyām api dhātusañjñāyām tavyadādayo na syuḥ kim kāraṇam/ sādhanē tavyadādayo vidhīyante sādhanam ca kriyāyāḥ / kriyābhāvāt sādhanābhāvāḥ / sādhanābhavāt satyām api dhātusañjñāyām tavyadādayo na syuḥ / paśyati tvācāryaḥ kriyāvacaṇāḥ kyajādaya iti tataḥ sanādyantā dhātava iti dhātusañjñām śāsti //*

And if here there were not to be expressed mention of the activity, the expression of the technical name *dhātu* would be pointless. Even when the technical name *dhātu* does exist, *tavyat pratyaya* and the rest would not be (applicable). What is the reason? *Tavyat* and the rest are ordained in the sense of instrument *sādhana* (the means of effecting or accomplishing) and it is *sādhana* (a means) of (accomplishing) the activity. Through the absence of a verb there is (necessarily) absence of means for accomplishing/*sādhana*. Even when the technical name *dhātu* is present, due to the absence of *sādhana*/means for accomplishing, *tavyat* and the rest would not be (applicable).

However the Master sees that *kyac* and the rest express activity, hence he teaches by the *sūtra*: *sanādyantā dhātavaḥ* (3.1.32) ("Words ending with the *pratyaya san* and the rest are called *dhātus*"), the technical term *dhātu*.

27.12 *nanu cedam prayojanam syāt parasādhana utpattiṃ vakṣyāmīti/ na parasādhana utpatyā bhavitavyam / kim kāraṇam / sādhanam iti sambandhiśabdo 'yam / sambandhiśabdās ca punar evam ātmakā yad uta sambandhinam ākṣipanti/ tad yathā / mātari vartitavyam pitari śruśruṣitavyam*

iti / na cocyate svasyāṃ mātari svasmin vā pitarīti / sambandhāc caitad gamyate yā yasya mātā yaś ca yasya piteti / evam ihāpi sambandhād etad gantavyaṃ yasya dhātor yat sādhanam iti /

But surely this would be the purpose (of the *sūtrakāra*) ‘I will state the arising of (the *pratyayas*) *tavyat* and the rest in the sense of means or instruments for accomplishing another (activity).

No, there should not be arising (of a *pratyaya*) in the sense of instrumental for another. What is the reason? The word *sādhana* (means or instrument for accomplishing) is a word expressing relationship. And the words expressing relationship again themselves imply the relationship which (exists). As for example *mātari vartitavyam* “A mother ought to be obeyed”, *pitari śuśrūṣitavyam* “A father should be obeyed”.

And it is not (expressly) said “(attend to or obey) your own mother” or “(obey) your own father” because that is understood from the relationship that (one should obey) ‘whomsoever is one’s mother’ and ‘whomsoever is one’s father’. So here also this is understood from the relationship itself, *tavyat* (etc.) which convey *sādhana* of that *dhātu*, is the *sādhana*/means or instrument for accomplishing the activity (of the *dhātu*).

27.17 *athavā dhātava eva kyajādayaḥ / na caiva hy arthā ādiśyante kriyāvacanatā ca gamyate / kaḥ khalv api pacādīnām kriyāvacanatve yatnaṃ karoti / yenaiva khalv api hetunā pacādayaḥ kriyāvacanās tenaiva kyajādayo ’pi / evam arthaṃ khalv ācāryaś citrayati / kvacid arthānādiśati kvacit na // evam apy arthādeśanaṃ kartavyaṃ katham ime abudhā budhyerann iti // atha vā śakyam arthādeśanamakartum / katham / karaṇa iti vartate karaṇaṃ ca karoteḥ karotiś ca kriyāsāmānye vartate //*

Or otherwise *kyac* and the rest are *dhātus* in fact, but the meanings are not indeed indicated and the expressing of verbal activity is understood.

Indeed who does make (any) effort in expressing the verbal activity (for that matter) of the (*dhātus*) *pac* (to cook) and the rest? By whatever cause or means *pac* and the rest express verbal activity, so indeed by the very same (cause) do *kyac* and the rest. Thus indeed the

Master surprises (us). In some places he shows meanings, some places not. Even then indication of the meaning should be made. How otherwise could the ignorant know the meanings?

Otherwise it is possible not to have to make an (express) indication of the meaning. How? The word *karāṇe* “in the sense of making” follows on (from the *sūtra* ‘*śabda vaira*’ etc. 3.1.17) and is derived from *karoti*/the *dhātu* *kr* (to make). And *karoti dhātu kr* (to make) is used in the sense of the activity in general.

Notes on *MahāBhāṣya* on *Pāṇini* 3.1.19

Vārttika Summary

The *pūrvapakṣa* view is presented in the first *vārttika*, that second case is not valid here after *namas*. *Kātyāyana* counters the view that *namas* ought to govern the fourth case by 2.3.16, by stating that this *namas* is a different *prakṛti* and therefore second case is established for it. The third *vārttika* states that meanings should be given for *kyac* after *namas* etc.

Bhāṣya Summary

On the first *vārttika* *Patañjali* simply explains what is implied by the *vārttika*, that one expects *namas* to govern fourth case, because of seeming to be the same as the *prātipadika* in 2.3.16. He explains on the second *vārttika*, that the word *namas* quoted in 2.3.16 is meaningful in its own right, but *namas* in this *sūtra* has no meaning on its own, only as part of *namasyati*. Or rather we can say according to *Pari. 94 a kāraka vibhakti*, being stronger than an *upapada vibhakti*, second case will necessarily be applicable not fourth.

After giving meanings and examples referred to in the third *vārttika*, he also supplied the meanings for 3.1.20 in reverse order, the *sūtra* itself not being discussed by him nor by *kātyāyana*. The purpose of express mention cannot however be to express verbal activity, since that is known from 3.1.32. In contrast to *tavya* etc. which are *sādhana* always needing a *sādhya* (verbal activity), *kyac* etc. are *sādhya*. As it is understood from the relationship ‘father’, ‘son should obey’ so it is understood that *tavyat* etc. are *sādhana* for accomplishing the activity of the *dhātu*. *Kyac* (ending) words are *dhātus* without meanings indicated. We can, however, say the meaning is *karāṇa* (in the sense of making) or activity in general as this follows from 3.1.17.

26.15 *namas varivasa citraṅ ṅasi kyaca su kāś kā kārake iti vartate ...
ity etebhyo vā kyac pratyayo bhavati.*
namas a bow, obeisance, reverential salutation, adoration (by

gesture or word).

nam (*bhvā° pa° a° 981 prahvatve śabde ca*) *asut* (*u° 4.189*)

namasyati to pay homage, worship, be humble or deferential *R.V. 2.33.8* etc.

varivas n. room, width, space, free scope, ease, comfort, bliss, *R.V. 1.59.5* etc.

vṛ iṭ kvasun vṛñ (*bhvā° u° se° 1254 varāṇe*)

varivasyati to grant room, or space, give relief *R.V. 9.96.3*; to show favour, cherish, wait upon, tend *Bhṛṣ. 18.21*

C.P. Sāyana

citrañ citra (“*anudātānīta ātmanepadam*” *1.3.12*)

m.f.(ā) n. auspicious, excellent, distinguished, bright, clear *R.V. 2.17.8, 7.75.3*; variegated, speckled *Nal. 4.8*; agitated (as sea, opposed to *sama*) *R.V. 3.39.12*; various, different, manifold *Mn. 9.2.48*; strange, wonderful *Rajat. 6.227*, n. anything bright or coloured which strikes the eyes *R.V.*; ornament *R.V. 1.92.13*; bright appearance, wonder *Śak.*; strange, curious *Kāś. Han. 16.52*

amara 1.6.17 cīyate (citra) (bhvā° u° a° 1251) cayane kra

amicimidi (u° 4.164 iti kra)

citrīyate (kyaci ca 7.4.33) āscarma vā° 3 to be surprised, *H. Car. 7, Kathā S.6.50, Bhṛṣ. 18.23*

26.17 *namaḥ śabdena yoge caturtho vidhīyate*

In connection with the word *namas* the fourth case is ordained.

namaḥ svastisvāhāsvadhālamvaṣaḍ yogāc ca 2.3.16 (caturthī)

“The fourth *vibhakti pratyaya* acts in conjunction with the words *namaḥ* (salutation), *svasti* (well-being, may it be well), *svāhā* (hail (to the Gods)), *svadhā* (self power (to the *ātman*)), *alam* (enough, sufficient), and *vaṣat* (exclamation (of holy priest)).

e.g. *namo devebhyaḥ* homage, salutation, adoration to the Gods.

26.19 *Kai. “prakṛtyantaravād iti namasyeti dhātu vyutpādayitum nipāta-namaḥ śabdadrśaśabdāntarāvayāvakaḥ kriyate. paramārthatas tu avidyamānāvayavārtho namasyaśabdah pūjāvācī prakṛtyantaram ity arthaḥ”*

The meaning is that an imaginary irregular part is made within the word, like the word *namas*, to derive the *dhātu namasya*. But in reality ‘being within the base’ the word *namasya* expressing worship is the meaning of a non-existent part (i.e. not existing independently) of the *ya* of *namasya*.

26.20 *nanu ceti Kai. “sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānān nipāta evāyam iti bhāvah”*

The sense is due to the recognition of *ayam* as meaning ‘this alone’, it means this irregular form only (i.e. the *nipātana*)/indeclinable

namas.

26.21 *arthavata iti*

Kai. "namasyaśabdasya samudāyasyaivārthatvād iti bhāvaḥ"

The sense is that this is because of the meaningful nature being only for the word *namasya* as a whole (i.e. *namas* combined with *k-ya-c*).

26.22 *athavā upapadavibhakteḥ kārakavibhakter baliyāsi*

"Or else because of *kāraka vibhakti pratyaya* (case ending) directly instrumental in bringing about the action being stronger than an *upapada* (subordinate word in composition) *vibhakti pratyaya* (the second case will be applicable)."

Nāgeśa on Pari. 94 nanu namaskaroti devān namasyati devān ityādau namaḥ svasti (2.3.16) iti caturthī durvarityata āha ...

Surely it is difficult to avoid the fourth case by *namaḥ svasti* etc. 2.5.16 (after the word *deva* when one wishes to say he adores the Gods) in cases like *namas karoti* or *namasyati devān (Patañjali)* therefore says ...

Accordingly *deva* received, in the phrase '*namasyati devān*' the second *vibhakti pratyaya/ karman* (accusative) by *karmaṇi dvitīyā* 2.3.2 (*anabhihite*).

When the *karman* (object) is not denoted (by the verbal) *vibhakti* termination, the second case *vibhakti pratyaya* is applicable (to the word). Because the *karman* shows that the Gods are the object of the action denoted by *namasyati* and therefore the *kāraka* directly instrumental for the action, and it has not received the *sampradāna/ dative vibhakti pratyaya* which case according to 2.3.16 is governed by the (*upapada*) word *namaḥ* (which is a subordinate accompanying word).

1.4.96.349 *upapadavibhakte prathamā bhaviṣyati bhā°* 2.3.445 2.3.9.448 *vā°* 2.3.19.453 *bhā° vā°* 2 2.3.22.454

Similarly in '*gāḥ svāmī vrajati*' *go* has for the same reason, namely being *kāraka*, (the owner goes to the cows) received the second case termination and not the termination of the sixth or seventh (genitive or locative) which cases according to *P. 2.3.39* are governed by the word *svāmin* as *upapada/subordinate* accompanying word.

26.22 *athaveti kai ...*

By admitting *namasya* as meaningful, choosing the meaning of 'worship by means of making a bow', there is refuting of the other (alternative). However there is scope of application for the fourth case in an example like 'let there be a bow to the Gods.'

Here too in the example 'I make a bow to *Nārāyaṇa*' (the base *namas-karomi* governs accusative by 2.3.2) and in fact is applicable as being *kāraka vibhakti* (and therefore *pradhāna* and not *upapada/ subordinate*, when it would have governed the fourth case by 2.3.16).

27.2 *namasaḥ pūjāyām*

(*kyac* acts) after *namas* in the sense of homage/worship.

yaṃ namasyanti kṛṣṭayaḥ r° 2.36.19

“Thou Agni whom people adore/worship.”

*patnīvanto namasya namasyana RV 1.72.5 padapāṭha patnī vantaḥ
namasyam namasyann iti namasyan*

“(Near him they approached one minded) with their spouses (kneeling) to him as adorable, they paid worship.” The (augmentless) imperfect *namasyan* is doubled to show its distinction in accent from the preceding *namasyam*.

27.2 *varivasah paricaryāyām*

Kyac acts after *varivas* in the sense of waiting upon, attendance, service, devotion, worship.

tan no viśve parivasyantu devāḥ RV 1.122.3

“May all the Gods attend upon us, vouchsafe to us this favour, or serve us.” c.f. use in later literature.

sa prātarutyāya kṛtasandhyāvarivasyaḥ sārāsvataḥ sūktam adhīyati

“Having risen early and performed his *sandhya* devotions, he studies the *sarasvat* hymn.” *Kavyamimansa* (p. 52)

27.2 *kyajādiṣv iti Kai. “karaṇagrahaṇasya vedanāgrahaṇena vyavadhānād anadhikāre svārthe pratyayaprasaṅga iti vacanam”*

There is expression (of the *vārttika* 3) because there is the possibility of the *pratyayas* (*kyac*) being *svārthe* (in the sense of its own base) when there is no governing word due to the word *karaṇa* (making) being separated by the word *Vedanā* (in 3.1.18).

27.2 *varivas varivasa iti Kai. “saparyā sevā paricaryāyām iti pāṭhāntaram”*

Saparyā means service, worship, homage (a different reading). Another reading is in the sense of waiting upon or serving/*paricaryā*.

27.3 *bhāṇḍāt samācayane*

Kyac acts after *bhāṇḍa* (vessel) in the sense of putting or heaping together from 3.1.20 omitted from *M.Bh.* and may have been in a different order.

bhāṇḍactīvapuccha pucchabhāṇḍactīvarān nīna 3.1.20 (karāṇe)

“The *pratyaya nīn* in the sense of making acts after the words *puccha* (tail), *bhāṇḍa* (pot) and *cīvara* (rags), as the *karman*/object of the action.”

bhāṇḍa bhāṇāti bhāṇa (bhvā° pa° se° 447 śabde) ḍa

camantāḍ ḍa u 1.114

prajñādyana 4.4.38

Only with *upasarga sam Kās*.

sambhāṇḍayatilte to collect vessels or utensils *Bhaṭṭ.* 5.62; to gather provisions.

27.3 *cīvarād arjane paridhāne vā*
cīvara cīyate citra (svā° u° a° cayane) vara 1251
 rags of an ascetic
chitvachatvara u° 3.1
saṃcīvarayati te to assume the coarse dress or rags of an ascetic
Anarchar Vop. 21.17

27.3 *pucchād udasane vyasane paryasane*
puccha pucchati puccha pramāde ac (3.1.134)
utpucchayate to raise or cock the tail *Kās.*
paripucchayate to wag the tail.

27.12 *parasādhana iti*
Kai. "śabdāntaravācyāyām kriyāyām yatkarmādikāraṇam tatra
tavyādīnām vṛkṣam paśyetyādau dvitīyādīnām iva svārthikatvād
dravyavācive 'pi kyajādyantānām utpattiḥ syād eveti bhāvah"
 The sense is that when the verbal activity is being expressed by another word, which is *kāraka karman* (object and the rest) there would be in fact, arising there of (forms) ending in *kyac* and the rest even when expressing substance (as distinct from a verb) a thing, because of *tavya* and the rest ending in second case, as it were being *svārthe* (expressing the meaning simply of their own base) in the example: *vṛkṣam paśya* 'see the tree', and the rest.

27.13 *na parasādhana iti Kai. "dvitīyādīnām prātipadikād vidhānāt*
tasya ca dravyavacanatvād vacanaprāmāṇyāt parasādhana
utpattir bhaviṣyati"
 There will be arising of (the *pratyaya kyac* in the sense of) instrumental for another because of second case etc. being ordained after a *prātipadika* and because of its expressing a substance, (this being derived) from the authority of the rule (itself).

tavyādayas tu dhātvantareṣu kriyāvāciṣu svasādhane sāvakāśaḥ
parasādhane notpadyanta ity arthaḥ

The meaning is that *tavya* and the rest do not arise in the sense of instrumental for another, having scope in the sense of their own *kāraka* (meaning) when other *dhātus* express the verbal activity.

27.17 *athaveti*
Kai. "amidhānaśaktisvābhavyād antareṇāpy arthādeśanaṃ viśiṣṭa
kriyāvacanatvasya siddhatvād ity arthaḥ"

The meaning is 'Even without showing the meaning, because of the natural power of expression (and) because the nature of expressing a

particular verbal activity, it is being established as valid.’

27.20 *citrayatīti Kai. “citra vaicitryakaraṇe iti caurādikasya rūpam/ anekam mārgamāśrayatīti arthaḥ”*

The form is a derivation of the tenth class *dhātu citra* in the sense of making variety, manifoldness, diversity. The meaning is he resorts to many paths, diversity, or more than one way.

27.22 ‘*kriyāsāmānya’ iti Kai. “sāmānyena ca viśeṣānām akṣepāt kaścit pratyayaḥ kvacid viśeṣe bhavatīti arthaḥ na ca vedanāgrahaṇena karaṇasya viccheda tayor virodhābhāvāt”*

The meaning is also with a general meaning that because of the giving up of the qualifications (of meaning) some *pratyaya*, is applicable somewhere in a particular/special (sense). And by the mention of *vedanā* (in 3.1.18) there is not a termination or *anuvṛtti* of *karaṇa* because of the absence of conflict/contradiction between them.

27.23 *muṇḍamiśraślakṣṇalavaṇavratavastrahalakalakṛtatūstebhyo
ṇic ||3||21||*

*imau halikalī sta ikārāntau / asti halaśabdaḥ kalaśabdaś
cākarāntaḥ / kayor idaṃ grahaṇam / yāvikārāntau tayor atvaṃ
nipātyate / kiṃ prayojanam /*

Pāṇini 3.1.21: The *pratyaya ṇic* acts in the sense of making/effecting after these words viz. *muṇḍa* (shaved) *miśra* (mixed), *ślakṣṇa* (smooth, soft), *lavaṇa* (salt), *vrata* (will, vow), *vastra* (cloth), *hala* (plough), *kala* (losing die), *kṛta* (service, lucky die) and *tuṣṭa* (dust, hair).

Bhāṣya: These two, *hali* and *kali* (properly) end with the letter *i*, *halih* (plough), *kalih* (losing die). There exist (also) the words *hala* and the word *kala* ending in the letter *a*. Irregular change of the *i* into *a* is mentioned (in the rule) in respect of those two which end in *i*. What is the purpose?

28.1 *Halikalyor atvanipātanaṃ sanvadbhāvapratiśedhārtham ||1||*

Vārttika 1: The putting down as an irregularity, *a* for (the final of) *hali* and *kali* is for the purpose of prohibiting *san-vad-bhāva*.

28.2 *halikalyor atvanipātanam kriyate sanvadbhāvo mā bhūd iti / ajahalat acakalat // naitad asti prayojanam / ikāralope krte 'glopinām neti pratiṣedho bhaviṣyati / vrddhau krtāyām lopastannāglopy aṅgam bhavati // idam iha sampradhāryam / vrddhiḥ kriyatām aglopa iti kim atra kartavyam / paratvād vrddhiḥ / nityo lopaḥ / krtāyām api vrddhau prāpnotyakrtāyām api prāpnoti /*

Bhāṣya: The putting down as an irregularity the (final) *a* for *hali* and *kali* is so that there should not be *san-vid-bhāva a-ja-hala-t* “He ploughed or took hold of the plough”, *a-ca-kala-t* “He took hold of the die called *kali*”.

This is not the purpose. When there is effected the *lopa*/elision of *i*, then will apply the prohibition, “not for those *aṅgas* having *ak* (= *a, i, u, r, ḷ*) vowels *lopa*/elided”. When *vrddhi* is effected (by *aco ñ niti* 7.2.115) there is *lopa*/elision (by *nāviṣṭhavatprātipadikasya* 6.4.155 *Vā. 1* (*ṭi lopa*)) of causative *ṇi* (becomes *ai* by 7.2.115) and then the *aṅga* does not become one with *ak-lopa*/elided. Here this should be reflected on, ‘Let *vrddhi* be effected or *lopa*/elision of *ak* (be effected)’. Which here is to be applied? Because of being subsequent (7.2.115 to the *lopa* rule 6.4.51, by *vipratiṣedhe param kāryam* 1.4.2) *vrddhi* rule (prevails)

28.6 *anityo lopaḥ / anyasya krtāyām vrddhau prāpnoty anyasyā-krtāyām śabdāntarasya ca prāpnuvan vidhir anityo bhavati / vrddhir apy anityā / anyasya krte lope prāpnoty anyasyākrte śabdāntarasya ca prāpnuvan vidhir anityo bhavati / ubhayor anityayoh paratvād vrddhiḥ / vrddhau krtāyām lopaḥ tan-nāglopy aṅgambhavati / atve punaḥ sati vrddhiḥ kriyatām lopa iti yady api paratvād vrddhir vrddhau krtāyām apy ag eva lupyate / tasmāt suṣṭhūcyate halikalyor atvanipātanam sanvadbhāvapratiṣedhārtham iti //*

(No), *lopa* is an invariable (*nitya*) (grammatical operation). When *vrddhi* is effected for one (situation) it obtains, when it is not effected (*lopa* obtains) for another (situation) and obtaining for another word (the operation) is variable/*anitya* when *lopa* is effected for one (word). (*Paribhāṣā* 43:) *śabdāntarasya prāpnuvan vidhir anityo bhavati*, A rule for which a difference of word (form) obtains (when another rule)

obtains is *anitya*. *vrddhi* is also not *nitya*/variable. Even when *lopa* is effected, it obtains for one (rule), and when *lopa* is not effected, it also obtains for another (rule).

śabdāntarasya prāpnuvan vidhir anityo bhavati,

A rule for which a difference of word (form) obtains (due to another rule obtaining at the same time) is *anitya*. Neither is *nitya*, (and because of being subsequent (to the *lopa* rule), the *vrddhi* (rule prevails). When *vrddhi* is effected *lopa* (applies). That *aṅga* (base) becomes a non-*ak lopa aṅga* (because *ai* will have been elided not *ak* (= *a, i, -u, r* or *ḷ*). But when there is the substitution of the letter *a*, the question arises whether to let *vrddhi* be effected (then) *lopa*.

Although because of being subsequent (to the *lopa* rule) *vrddhi* (is effected), even when *vrddhi* is effected (giving *lopa ā* in place of short *a* and therefore still included in the *pratyāhāra ak*), *ak* is in fact elided.

Therefore it is well said “The laying down of *a* irregularly for *hali* and *kali* is for the purpose of prohibiting *san-vad-bhāva* (having operations like that of a word ending in *san*, viz. the *i* in the reduplicative syllable which then would become lengthened).

Notes on *MahaBhāṣya* on *Pāṇini* 3.1.21

Vārttika Summary

Kātyāyana states the reason for *hali* and *kali* having a final *a* in the *sūtra* is to prevent *sanvadbhāva*.

Bhāṣya Summary

Having introduced the *vārttika*, by asking why the *nipātana* forms *hala* and *kala* occur in the *sūtra*, *Patañjali* gives the reduplicated Aorist forms. In his typical pedagogical style, first taking the *pūrvapakṣa* against the *vārttika*, he shows how in fact both the *vrddhi* and the *lopa* rules concerned are *anitya* by (*Pari. 43*) ‘A rule for which a difference of word form obtains when another rule obtains is *anitya*’ and therefore *vrddhi* being the subsequent rule applies first, from which it becomes clear that only *vrddhi* of *a* will allow the needed ‘*aglopa*’ to prevent *sanvadbhāva*. So the *vārttika* is confirmed.

27.23 *muṇḍamiśra kayor idaṃ grahaṇam iti Kai. “kim ikārāntayoḥ kṛtāvayor grahaṇamutākārāntayor eveti praśnaḥ*

The question is whether (there should be) mention in the *sūtra* of

(*hali* and *kali*) ending in *i* effected or ending in *a*?

kiṃ prayojanam iti What is the purpose?

halikalī ity eva kasmāna kriyata ity arthaḥ

The meaning is ‘Why are not (the forms) effected as *hali* and *kali*?’

śabdāntarasya ceti “For which a difference of word (form obtains)”

yady api vṛddhau kṛtāyām api lopasya pravṛttistathāpi vācanikaṃ tasyā nityatvam athavā anyasya pravṛttāv apy anyasya sthānino pravṛtyā lopasyā nityatvam

Even though when *vṛddhi* is effected there is application of *lopa*, still the *anitya* nature of that is expressly mentioned. Or else even when there is application, there is the *anitya* nature of the *lopa* of another original which has not taken place.

27.23 *muṇḍa vrata ... tūstebhyo ṇic*

The *Bhāṣya* makes no comment on *vrata* but *Kāś.* explains *vratāda bhojane tannivṛtau ca payo vratayati vṛṣālān naṃ vratayati*

In the sense ‘due to a vow there is eating and abstaining therefrom’. He drinks hot *payas*/milk after a fast. He avoids *śūdra* food.

Nyāsa payo bhunkte ity artha vṛṣālān naṃ na bhunkte ity arthaḥ vā° 1 sanvadbhāva

sanvallguni caṅ pare ’naglope 7.4.93

“In the reduplicative aorist of the causative stem the reduplicate is like that of the desiderative when the vowel of the *dhātu* is light (i.e. having a short vowel) and followed by only one consonant, and the *dhātu* has not lost its final vowel before the causative *pratyaya ṇi*” (as it would by 6.4.51).

28.3 ... *Kāś. on imau halikalī sta ikārantau kalim grhṇāti kalayati*

He takes hold of the die called *kala* (the losing die).

kṛtaṃ grhṇāti kṛtayati

He seizes the die called *kṛta* (lucky, marked with four dots).

by ... *ato lopa (ārdhadhātuke) 6.4.48*

e.g. *kama ṇiṅ kameṇiṅ 3.1.30*

ata upadhāyā 7.2.16

akāma i at ṇisṛidṛṣṛbhyah kartari caṅ 3.1.40

akāma at ṇeraniṭi (lopaḥ ārdhadhātuke) 6.4.51

acakama at caṅi 6.1.18

acīkamat sanyataḥ 7.4.79 (it) dīrghe laghoḥ 7.4.94

Therefore if ... *kala* or *hala* were considered the base, the undesired forms would be *acīkalat* and *ajīhalat* instead of the proper forms *acakalat* and *ajahalat*, derived so because *hala* and *kala* are ending in *a* and because of ‘*ato lopa*’, will not have *sanvadbhāva*.

28.3 *ikāralope kṛte*

“When *lopa* elision of *i* is effected (then will apply prohibition),” by (*ceḥ 6.4.155*)

Vārttika: naviṣṭhavatprātipadikasya kārya bhavāṭīti vaktavyam

It should be stated that in the presence of *ṇi* the operations for a *prātipadika* are as if it had been *pratyaya iṣṭha* following, namely

1) *pumvadbhāva*) *rabhāva*) *ṭilopaḥ*) *yaṇādirum*

so by 'teḥ' (*ṭilopa*) *ṭi* (final vowel and consonant) is elided.

by 'neraniṭi' (6.4.51 *ārdhadhātuke lopaḥ*)

"There is *lopa* of the *i* of *ṇi* final of an *aṅga* in the presence of an *ārdhadhātuka pratyaya* without *āgama iṭ* (which would have become *ai* by *ato nṇiti* 7.2.115 because in fact *ai* has been elided then the *aṅga* is not one with *ak lopa*, it being outside the scope of *ak*, therefore *sanvadbhāva* would be applicable and the undesired consequences long *ī* in the reduplicative.

28.6 *akṛdyakāra iti dīrghatvam*

Ya when not a *kṛt pratyaya* causes lengthening.

akṛtsārvadhātukyordīrghaḥ 7.4.25 (*yi, kṛiti*)

"A long (vowel) acts in place of the final vowel of an *aṅga* (stem) before a *pratyaya* beginning with *y* having an indicatory *k* or *ṇi* when it is neither a *kṛt* nor *sārvadhātuka pratyaya*."

e.g. *sukhāyate* (3.1.18 *kyañ*) He feels pleasure

similarly *lohitāyate* He is or becomes red, he reddens *M.Bh.* 1.1173 etc.

Hañv. 5825

knīdgrahaṇam anuvartate The specific mention of indicatory *k* and *ṇi* follows on from *ayañ yi kṛiti* 7.4.22 (*ṣṭṛṇ*)

"Before a *pratyaya* beginning with a *y* and having an indicatory *k* or *ṇi* *ay* acts in place of the *i* of *ṣṭṛ*."

śayyate with *yak* "It is slept."

anyasya kṛte lopa iti "When *lopa* is effected for one (word)."

ata upadhāyā ity anenākārasyety arthaḥ

The meaning is by the *sūtra ata upadhāyāḥ* 7.2.116 there is *vṛddhi* in place of the penultimate *a* ...

Kai. "nanu *lopasya sthānivadbhāvāt kathamakārasya prāpnoti naiṣa doṣaḥ prāptau satyāṃ sthānivadbhāvena pratibandhaḥ kriyate pūrvasya vidhau sthānivadbhāvavidhānāt aprāptau tu pūrvavidhyabhāvāt sthānivadbhāva eva na syāt yady api bhinnalakṣaṇā bhinnasvabhāvā ca vṛddhis tathāpi vṛddhiśabdavācyaṭvād abhedamarāśritya śabdāntaraprāptyā-vṛddher nityatvaṃ kathitam tatvatas tu lope kṛte vṛddher aprāptyā-nityatvaṃ vaktavyam nyāyavyutpādanāya tv anyathābhiniham sūtram prātipadikād dhātvartha itī ṇici siddhe prapañcārtham ity āhuḥ na ca tatkarotītyādinā tatra dhātvarthaniyamāḥ kriyate rājānam atikrānta-vānatyaraṅjad ityādāv api ṇico darsanāt muṇḍam karoti mānavakam ityādau sāpekṣebhyo 'pi nijarthavā //*

Surely because of being *lopa* like the original (*sthānivat*), how (can) (*vṛddhi*) of *a* obtain? This is no fault. When it obtains, by reason of being *sthānivat* obstruction is effected i.e. the rule is prevented. Because of the

enjoining of *sthānivadbhāva* when a rule would otherwise operate on the prior letter (1.1.57). However, when it does not obtain, because of the absence of a rule operating on the prior letter, *sthānivat bhāva* in fact would not be applicable, although *vrddhi* has a different effect and a different nature. Still, because of the nature of that to be expressed by the word *vrddhi*, having resorted to non-difference by reason of a difference of word (form) obtaining, the *nitya* nature of *vrddhi* is declared. However, in reality ‘when *lopa* is effected’ should it not be stated there is the nature of *anitya* for *vrddhi* by reason of not obtaining? [Rather] however, for the derivation of the rule it is expressed otherwise. They say when the *sūtra* (*curādibhyo nic 3.1.25*) by which *nic* applies after a *prātipadika* with the sense of *dhātu* is established, it is for application (repetition in a clearer form), and not with (the sense of) ‘he makes or does that etc.’ There, a restriction is being made on the meaning of the *dhātu* from seeing (the example of) *nic* even in such cases as *atyarājat* meaning ‘he overcame the king’. Or else the meaning of *nic* is also (seen) after those words expecting another (word to complete the sense) as in the example ‘he shaves the youth’ etc.

28.12 dhātor ekāco halādeḥ kriyāsamabhihāre yañ ||3||22||

samabhihāra iti ko 'yañ śabdaḥ / samabhipūrvād dharater bhāvasādhano ghañ / samabhiharanaṃ samabhihāraḥ / tad yathā / puṣpābhihāraḥ phalābhihāra iti // viśama upanyāsaḥ / bahvyo hi tāh sumanasas tatra yuktaḥ samabhihāraḥ / iha punar ekā kriyā //

Pāṇini 3.1.22: The *pratyaya yañ* acts after that *dhātu* which has one vowel and begins with a consonant, in the sense of repetition of any act (or intensity of action as represented by the intensive).

Bhāṣya: What is this word *samabhihāre*? *Ghañ pratyaya* acts (after the *dhātu hr*) as the *sādhana*/instrument or means of accomplishing/manifesting the action of the *dhātu hr* preceded by (the *upasargas*) *sam* and *abhi*. *Samabhihāra* (n. the act of seizing upon, taking etc, repetition) is the equivalent to *samabhiharana*.

As for example *puṣpābhihāra* “seizing of flowers” and *phalābhihāra* “the taking of fruits”. This is an unsuitable statement of illustration. For these flowers are many and there in that context the word *samabhihāra* is appropriate. But here the action is one.

- 28.15 *yadyapyekā sāmānyakriyāvayavakriyās tu bahvyaḥ / adhi-
śrayaṇodakāsecanataṇḍulāvapanaidhopakarṣaṇakriyāḥ / tāḥ
kaścītkārtsnyena karoti kaścidakārtsnyena / yaḥ kārtsnyena
karoti sa ucyate / pāpacyata iti /*
- 28.19 *atha dhātugrahaṇaṃ kim artham / iha mā bhūt / prāṭati bhṛśam
iti // ata uttaraṃ paṭhati /*

Although the general activity (of the verb) is one (in meaning) still the verbal activities of its parts are many. (The one action of cooking involves the many) activities: *adhiśrayaṇa*- “the act of putting on the fire”, *udakasecana*- “the pouring out of the water”, *taṇḍulāvapana*- “sowing or placing of the rice”, and *edhopakarṣanaṇa*- “the act of drawing or dragging near the fuel”.

Those (activities) someone (may) perform in their entirety, someone (else) partially. About him who performs the activity in full it is said, *pāpacyate* “He cooks (it) very much”. Or (it means) “he/it cooks again and again/*pāpacyate*”.

Now what is the reason for the specific mention of the word *dhātu*? So that the rule should not be (applicable) here. *pra aṭati bhṛśam* “He roams about very much”, (with the *upasarga pra*, therefore not (just) after the *dhātu*). Then he gives a reply.

- 28.21 *yañvidhau dhātugrahaṇa uktam ///*

*kim uktam / tatra tāvad uktam karmagrahaṇāt sanvidhau
dhātugrahaṇānarthakyaṃ sopasargaṃ karmeti cet karma-
viśeṣakatvād upasargasyānupasargaṃ karma sopasargasya hi
karmatve dhātvadhikāre 'pi sano 'vidhānam akarmakatvād iti /
evam ihāpi kriyāsamabhihāragrahaṇād yañvidhau dhātu-
grahaṇānarthakyaṃ sapasargah kriyāsamabhihāra iti cet
kriyāsamabhihāraviśeṣakatvād upasargasyānupasargah*

- 29.1 *kriyāsamabhihārah sopasargasya hi kriyāsamabhihāratve
dhātvadhikāre 'pi yaño vidhānamakriyāsamabhihāratvād iti //*

Vārttika 1: When there is specific mention of *dhātu* in this *yañ* rule it has (in fact already) been expressed (on 3.1.7 as pointless).

Bhāṣya: In respect of the mention of the word *dhātu* in this rule it has already been stated. What has been expressed/spoken? Just there

(3.1.7) *Vārttika 1-3* it was stated:

(1) Because of the mention of *karman* in the *san* rule, the mention of *dhātu* is pointless. (2) If (we say) the *karman* is ‘together with an *upasarga*’ (that is not true) because *upasarga* is a qualification of *karman* (therefore) *karman* is without an *upasarga*. (3) For if the *karman* is together with an *upasarga*, then there would be no rule for *san* in the context of the governing *sūtra dhātoḥ* because of it not being the *karman*/object.

So here also, because of the specific mention of *kriyāsam-abhihāre* / ‘repetition of the action’, the specific mention of the word *dhātu* is pointless.

If (we say) *kriyā samabhihāre* ‘repetition of the action’ is together with *upasarga* (this is not correct), because the *upasargas* are qualifying *kriyā samabhihāre* ‘repetition of the action’, then (in reality) *kriyā samabhihāre* ‘repetition of the action’ is without an *upasarga*. For if the ‘repetition of the action’ (*kriyā samabhihāra*) is together with an *upasarga*, there is no ordaining of *yañ pratyaya* in the context even of the *dhātu* governing rule/*adhikāra*, because of the *dhātu* not having the character of *kriyā samabhihāra*/repetition of the act.

29.3 *athaikāḥ jhalādigrahaṇam kim artham / iha mā bhūt / jāgati bhṛśam / īkṣate bhṛśam /*

Now what is the purpose of the mention of *ekāc* and *halādi* (which has one vowel and begins with a consonant)? So that the rule should not be applicable here: *jāgar-ti bhṛśam* “He wakes fully or becomes intensely awake”. (*jāgr* has two vowels). *īkṣate bhṛśam* “He looks intensely.”

29.8 *ekāḥ jhalādigrahaṇe ca //2//*

ekāḥ jhalādigrahaṇe cuktam / kim uktam / tatra tāvad uktam karmasamānakartṛgrahaṇānarthakyaṁ cecchābhidhāne pratyayavidhānād karmaṇo hyasamānakartṛkādvānabhidhānam iti/

Vārttika 2: And in relation to specific mention made (in the *sūtra*) of ‘(after that *dhātu* which has) one vowel and begins with a consonant’,

(it has already been stated).

Bhāṣya: And in relation to the specific mention made (in the *sūtra*) of ‘(after that *dhātu* which has) one vowel and begins with a consonant’, it has (already) been stated. What was stated? There (3.1.7 *Vārttika* 6 & 7) it was just stated: ‘And mention of the object/*karman* having the same agent is pointless, because of the ordaining of the *pratyaya* when desire is being expressed or (*san*) is not known to occur after that which is not *karman*/object and which has not the same agent (as that of the wisher of the *karman*)’. Here also (it can be argued in the same way) the mention of *ekāc* and *halādi* is pointless because *yañ* is stated in the sense of *kriyā samabhihāra* and that which is not *ekāc* and not *halādi* does not express (*kriyāsamabhihāra*).

29.7 *ihāpy ekāj jhalādigrahaṇānarthakyaṃ ca kriyāsamabhihāre yañ- vacanād anekāco halāder hy anabhidhānam iti // tac cāvaśyam anabhidhānam āśrayitavyam / kriyamāṇe 'pi hy ekāj jhalādigrahaṇe yatraikāco halādeś cotpadyamānena yañ-ārthasyābhidhānaṃ na bhavati na bhavati tatrotpattiḥ / tad yathā / bhrśaṃ śobhate / bhrśaṃ rocate / yatra cānekāco 'halāder votpadyamānena yañārthasyābhidhānaṃ bhavati bhavati tatrotpattiḥ / tadyathā / aṭātyate arāryate aśāśyate sosūcyate sosūtryate momūtryate //*

And it is essential that the non-ordaining be resorted to. For even when mention is made of having a single vowel and ending in a consonant, where there is no expression of the meaning of *yañ* (intensive) by producing the *pratyaya* after *dhātus* having one vowel and beginning with a consonant, there is no arising (of the *yañ* form), as for example: *bhrśaṃ śobhate*- “He shines intensely”; *bhrśaṃ rocate*- “It is intensely resplendent or likes very much” (both *dhātus* *śubh* and *ruc* having a single vowel and beginning with a consonant).

And where there is ordaining of the meaning of *yañ* together with the producing of the (statement) “having more than one vowel and not beginning with a consonant” (there is arising of *yañ*). *aṭātyate* “He wanders very much” (*dhātu aṭ*); *arāryate* “He wanders about, hastes towards” (*dhātu r*); *aśāśyate* “He reaches or pervades intensely” (*dhātu aś*); *sosūcyate* “He intensely points out” (*dhātu suca*); *sosūtryate* “He intensely strings together or puts in the form of a

sūtra” (*dhātu sūtra*); *momūtryate* “He urinates intensely” (*dhātu mūtra*).

29.14 *ūrṇoteś copasaṅkhyānaṃ //3//*

*ūrṇoteś copasaṅkhyānaṃ kartavyam / prarṇonūyate / atyalpam
idam ucyate ūrṇoter iti /*

Vārttika 3: There (should be) additional enumeration of (the *dhātu*) *ūrṇoti/ūrṇu* (as having the *pratyaya yañ*).

Bhāṣya: Additional enumeration should be made of (the *dhātu*) *ūrṇoti/ūrṇu* (as having the *pratyaya yañ*) as *prarṇonūyate* “He covers completely”. The additional statement of *ūrṇu* is too limited as (only an additional enumeration of the *dhātu*) *ūrṇoti/ūrṇu*.

29.15 *sūcisūtrimūtryatyartyaśūrṇoti*

grahaṇaṃ yañvidhau / anekājahalādyartham /

Vārttika: Specific mention (should be made) of (the *dhātus*) *sūc-i*, *sūtr-i*, *mūtr-i*, *aṭ-i*, *art-i*, *aś-ū* and *ūrṇo-ti* (as being) in the scope of the *yañ* rule for the reason that they are either of more than one vowel or do not begin with a consonant.

29.17 *sūcimūtrimūtryatyartyaśūrṇotīnāṃ grahaṇaṃ kartavyam / kiṃ
prayojanam / yañvidhāvanekājahalādyartham / sosūcyate
sosūtryate momūtryate aṭātyate arāryate aśāśyate prarṇonū-
yate // ūrṇoter na vaktavyam /*

*vācyā ūrṇor ṇuvadbhāvo yañprasiddhiḥ prayojanam /
āmaś ca pratiśedhārtham ekācaś ceḍupagrahāt //*

Bhāṣya: Specific mention should be made of (the *dhātus*) *sūc-i*, *sūtr-i*, *mūtr-i*, *aṭ-i*, *art-i*, *aś-ū* and *ūrṇo-ti*. What is the purpose? For the reason that (although) they are either of more than one vowel or do not begin with a consonant, they are in the scope of the *yañ* rule. *sosūcyate* “He points out intensely”; *sosūtryate* “He intensely strings together in the form of a *sūtra*”; *momūtryate* “He urinates intensely”; *aṭātyate* “He wanders about very much”; *arāryate* “He wanders about, hastes towards”; *aśāśyate* “He pervades intensely”; *prarṇonūyate* “He

covers completely”. *Yañ* should not be stated (as acting after *ūrṇoti* without the *upasarga pra*).

Śloka Vārttika: It should be stated that *ūrṇu* (*dhātu* to cover) be (treated) like (*dhātu*) *nu* (to praise), so that *yañ* (the intensitive *pratyaya*) is established (as applicable after it), also so that *ām* (periphrastic perfect *pratyaya*) be prohibited (and) having one vowel there is prohibition of *iṭ* (augment).

29.22 *kriyāsamabhihāre yaño vipraṭiṣedhena loṭ bhavati //4//*

*kriyāsamabhihāre loṭ yaño bhavati vipraṭiṣedhena kriyā-
samabhihāre yañ bhavatiṭyāvakaśaḥ / dhātur ya ekāj jhalādiḥ
kriyāsamabhihāre vartate 'dhātusambandhaḥ / lolūyate /
loṭo 'vakāśaḥ /*

29.25 *dhātur yo 'nekājahalādiḥ kriyāsamabhihāre vartate dhātu-
sambandhaḥ / sa bhavāñjāgrhi jāgrhīty evāyam jāgarti / sa
bhavāñhasvehasvety evāyam thate /*

Varttika 4: When repetition of the action (is to be expressed), by reason of a conflict of rules of equal strength, *loṭ* (being the later) rule prevails in place of *yañ*.

Bhāṣya: When repetition of the action (is to be expressed), by reason of conflict of rules of equal force (the subsequent one) *loṭ* (imperative) applies in place of *yañ* because preceding it (in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*).

The rule of *yañ* in the sense of repetition of the action has scope when there is a *dhātu* which has one vowel and begins with a consonant and is connected with (another *dhātu*) (e.g.) *lolūyate* “He cuts intensely or repeatedly”.

There is scope for (the operation) of *loṭ* when there is a *dhātu* which has more than one vowel or does not begin with a consonant, which conveys repetition of the action (when) connected with (another) *dhātu*.

sa bhavāñ jāgrhi jāgrhi ityeva ayaṃ jāgarti “Wake up properly, wake up! Thus the (man) awakes”.

sa bhāvan thasva thasvetyevāyam thate “Strive, strive! Thus does he strive”.

30.1 *dhātur ya ekāj jhalādiḥ kriyāsamabhihāre vartate dhātu-sambandhaś ca tasmād ubhayaṃ prāpnoti / sa bhavāṃl lunīhi lunīhīty evāyaṃ lunīti / loḍ bhavati vipratīṣedhena / na tarhīdānīm idaṃ bhavati sa bhavāṃl lolūyasva lolūyasvety evāyaṃ lolūyata iti / bhavati ca /*

That *dhātu* which has one vowel and begins with a consonant, in expressing repetition of the action and which is connected with (another) *dhātu* obtains both (*yañ* and *loṭ pratyayas* acting) after it. (As) *bhavān lunīhi lunīhi ityevāyaṃ lunāti* “Cut repeatedly, cut! Thus he cuts”. *Loṭ* (being a rule subsequent) by reason of there being a conflict of rules of equal force (prevails over the *yañ* rule preceding it). Then now is the following construction available: *sa bhāvān lolūyasva lolūyasva ityevāyaṃ lolūyate* “Cut repeatedly Sir, cut repeatedly! Thus (instructed) he cuts repeatedly. (Yes it is) also applicable (with *yañ*)”.

30.4 *na vā nānārthatvāt kartṛkarmaṇor hi lavidhānaṃ kriyāviśeṣesvārthe yañ //5//*

na vārthe vipratīṣedhena / kiṃ kāraṇam / nānārthatvāt / kā nānārthatā / kartṛkarmaṇor hi lavidhānaṃ / kartṛkarmaṇor hi loḍ vidhīyate kriyāviśeṣe svārthe yañ / tatrāntaraṅgatvād yañā bhavitavyam // na tarhīdānīm idaṃ bhavati / sa bhavāṃl lunīhi lunīhīty evāyaṃ lunāti / bhavati ca / vibhāṣā yañ yadā na yañ tadā loṭ //

Vārttika 5: Or else (there is) not (a conflict of rules) because of difference in meaning. For the ordaining of *la* (tense/mood *pratyaya*) occurs in the sense of *kartṛ*/agent and *karman*/object (whereas) *yañ* (occurs) when a qualification in the verbal activity in the sense of the meaning of its own (*dhātu/prakṛti*/base).

Bhāṣya: Or else there is no purpose in (accepting) a conflict of rules of equal force (requiring the subsequent to overrule the prior). What is the reason? Because of a difference in meaning. What is the nature of the difference in meaning? For the ordaining of *la* (tense/mood *pratyaya*) is in the sense of *kartṛ*/agent and *karman*/object. For (that reason) *loṭ* (imperative) is ordained in the sense of *kartṛ* and *karman*

(whereas) *yañ* (intensive) is ordained as qualifying the verbal activity in the sense of the meaning of its own (*dhātu/prakṛti*) or base i.e. *svārthe*. In that context because of being *antaraṅga* (more inner/a rule whose causes of operation occur earlier in the process of the word's formation), *yañ* should be applicable. Then this, (following usage), is not possible. *sa bhavān lun̄hi lun̄hītyevāyaṃ lun̄ati* Cut, cut! Thus he cuts. Thus (instructed) he cuts repeatedly. Optionally *yañ* is applicable, when *yañ* is not (applied) then *loṭ* acts.

nityaṃ kauṭīlye gatau //3//1//23

lupasadacarajapabhadaśagr̥bhyo bhāvagarhāyām //3//1//24//

30.9 *uttarayor vighraheṇa viśeṣasampratyayān nityagrahaṇānarthakyaṃ* //6//

30.10 *uttarayor yogayor vighraheṇa viśeṣasyāsampratyayān nityagrahaṇam anarthakam / na hi kuṭīlaṃ krāmātīti caṅkramyate iti gamyate // athaitebhyaḥ kriyāsamabhihāre yañā bhavitavyam /*

Vārttika 6: The specific mention of the word *nitya* (invariable) in the rule is pointless in the absence of the specific sense of repetition of the action (conveyed by *yañ*) in the case of the subsequent two rules and the absence of agreement of understanding on the specific meaning by constituent analysis (viz. *kauṭīlye* “crookedness” and *arhāyām* “contempt”).

Bhāṣya: In the two subsequent rules, because of absence of agreement or understanding on the specific meaning by constituent analysis, the specific mention of *nitya*/invariable is pointless. For *kuṭīlam krāmāti* “He goes crookedly” is not understood or known in usage to occur, (only) *caṅkramyate*. Now, when then should *yañ* not be applicable after these in the sense of repetition of the action?

30.12 *kriyāsamabhihāre ca naitebhyaḥ* //7//

kriyāsamabhihāre ca naitebhyo yañā bhavitavyam / bhṛśam japati brāhmaṇaḥ / bhṛśam samidho dahatīty eva //

Vārttika 7: *Yañ* does not obtain after these *dhātus* in the sense of repetition or intensity of the action. *bhr̥śam japati brāhmaṇaḥ* “The *Brāhmaṇa* repeatedly mutters sacred mantras”. *bhr̥śam samidho dahati* “He repeatedly burns fuel”. (i.e. in such cases the ‘original *yañ*’ sense of intensity or repetition can only be expressed by a *vākya*/ sentence or phrase not by the *pratyaya yañ*).

Notes on *MahāBhāṣya* on *Pāṇini* 3.1.22

Vārttika Summary

Kātyāyana’s *pūrvapakṣa* view in this first *vārttika* is as in 3.1.7 *Vā.* 1-3 that the mention of *dhātu* is pointless. Similarly the second *vārttika* is a reiteration of the principle stated on *Vā.* 6-7 that specific mention of one vowel and beginning with a consonant is pointless, because of the meaning intended only being conveyed with such conditions.

The third *vārttika* expands the rule to include *yañ* acting after *ūrṇu* in spite of having more than one vowel and not beginning with a consonant. The next *vārttika* expands the scope further to six more *dhātus sūci* etc. which either have more than one vowel or do not begin with a consonant, with *ūrṇu* also included.

The fourth *vārttika* deals with conflict between *loṭ* and *yañ* expressing repetition of action explaining that *loṭ* prevails because of being the later rule.

The last view is rejected by the fifth *vārttika* stating there is no conflict because of a difference of meaning, *loṭ* is in the sense of *karman* or *kartr*, *yañ* is *svārthe*.

The sixth *vārttika* relates to 3.1.23, and points out that mention of *nitya* is pointless due to absence of the sense of repetition and lack of agreement on specific meaning for the two rules 3.1.23-4.

Finally *yañ* is stated as not acting after the *dhātus* of 3.1.24 in the sense of repetition or intensity.

Bhāṣya Summary

Patañjali begins by explaining the meaning of the word *samabhihāra* formed with the *dhātu hr̥* preceded by *upasargas sam* and *abhi* followed by *ghañ pratyaya* may mean the act of seizing flowers etc., but this is only one of many verbal activities that the one general activity of *hr̥* may convey. So *pac* may involve many activities *adhiśrayana* etc., but he who performs all of them can be said to cook intensely or again and again.

He then introduces the first *vārttika* by saying the mention of *dhātu* is to prevent *yañ* after a *dhātu* together with an *upasarga*. On which, having first quoted what the *vārttika* implies, namely *vā.* 1-3 on 3.1.7, he concludes, similarly because of mention of ‘*kriyāsamabhihāre*’ reference

to *dhātu* is pointless. However, if 'repetition of the action' is taken as together with an *upasarga*, then there can be no ordaining of *yañ* even in context of *dhātu* governing rule, unless there is this mention of *dhātu* in the *sūtra*.

Patañjali introduces the second *vārttika* by giving the example *īkṣate bhr̥śam* to show why mention is made of having one vowel and beginning with a consonant. Discussing the second *vārttika*, having quoted the *pūrvapakṣa vā.* 6-7 on 3.1.7, he says similarly here it may be argued "having one vowel and beginning with a consonant may be pointless since *yañ* in the sense of '*kriyāsamabhihāre*' only acts after such *dhātus*". Moreover since there are examples of the intensive meaning being expressed after such *dhātus* without *yañ*, and cases of *yañ* acting after *dhātus* of more than one vowel and beginning with a vowel, it should be ordained. In other words, the next two *vārttikas* become essential to specify those exceptions, *ūrṇu* with *pra*, *sūci*, etc. for which all the full forms are given. In addition the *śloka vārttika* treats *ūrṇu* like *nu* so that *yañ* may act after it, and so that *ām* of the periphrastic perfect and augment *iṭ* be prohibited.

He agrees with the fourth *vārttika*, there being scope for both *yañ* and *loṭ*. When there is a conflict *loṭ* prevails, being subsequent, but even repetition may also be expressed by *yañ*, in combination with *loṭ*. Similarly on the fifth *vārttika* he makes the modifications based on observed usage, that though *yañ* should apply because of being *antarāṅga* it optionally does and then in its absence *loṭ* acts. He explains the sixth *vārttika* by simply showing that only one usage occurs, with *yañ*. There being no alternative, stating *nitya* is pointless. Finally he shows by the examples on the seventh that repetition or intensity can only be expressed by *vākya* in the case of *dhātus* in 3.1.24.

Kai "iha sabhahihāro nāma mūrtasyānekasyaikakālasya bhavati/ dhātu-vācyā tu kriyāikaiva, yugapadekena dhātunānekasyā anabhidhānāt/ sā ca nivr̥ttabhedā sādhyaikasvabhāvatvād dhātunā pratyāyyate/ adhiśrayaṇā-dīnām ca kramajanyatvād yugapadavasthānābhāvāc ca kriyāsamabhihāro na sambhavaṭītil manyamānaḥ prcchati samabhihāra iti ko 'yam itil

Here in the context of repetition or intensity of action, in fact (*yañ*) is applicable for several forms (but) one time. However, one action alone is to be expressed by the (one) *dhātu*, because of the inability to express the meaning of more than one (action simultaneously by one *dhātu*). And that has ceased from distinctions (of action because of the naturalness of that one to be accomplished, which is made known through/by the *dhātu*. And thinking 'repetition or intensity of the action is not possible', because the act of putting on the fire and the rest have the nature of being produced sequentially, and because of the condition of simultaneous (different actions forming one *dhātu*)."

He asks: "What is this (word) *samabhihāra*?"

itarastadbuddhiparīkṣārthaṃ śabdavyutpattim āha samabhipūrvād itil

The other wishing to test that idea, states the derivation of the word (*ghañ* after *dhātu hr* preceded by *upasarga sam* and *abhi*).

yady apy eketi/ mukhyasya samabhihārasyehāsambhavād gaṇa āśrīyate/ buddhi gocarānekasakalāvayavakriyāsaṃgataḥ paunaḥ punyenānuṣṭīya-mānapradhānakriyāviśayo vetyarthaḥ/

The meaning is, the secondary action is resorted to here because of the impossibility of repetition of the chief/principal action. These many actions with all their parts united in the range of the (one) mind or the sphere of the principal action is being repeated again and again.

28.16 *Kai* “*sādhāraṇī samūharūpā kriyādhātuvācyety arthaḥ/ yathoktam*

The meaning is that the action to be expressed by the *dhātu* is general/common, having the nature of a collection (of activities).

hariṇā As has been stated by *Bhartrhari*

guṇabhūtair avayavaiḥ samūhaḥ kramajanmanām/

buddhyā prakalpitābhedaḥ kriyeti vyapadiśyate// 3.8.4

“What is called action, is a collection of parts produced in sequence and mentally conceived as (one and) identical with the parts which are subordinate to it.”

samūhaś ca tathābhūtaḥ pratibhedaṃ samūhiṣu/

samāpyate tato bhede kālabhedasya sambhavaḥ// 3.8.5

“Such a whole is attributed to each one of the parts. Thus when differentiation takes place, difference of tense/time become possible.”

Kai// “*athavā adhiśrayaṇādīnām tādarthyena pravartanād guṇatvād avayavatvaṃ tasyās ca sādhāraṇatvaṃ ucyate/ tad uktam*

Otherwise because of the actions of putting on the (fire) etc. preceding, by reason of having that as (main) purpose, and their character of being parts arising from the secondary nature (of the actions), their common nature is stated.

As was said (by *Bhartrhari*)

anantaraphalaṃ yasyāḥ kalpate tāṃ kriyāṃ viduḥ/

pradhānabhūtāṃ tādarthyād anyāsāṃ tu tadākhyatā// 3.8.15

“That moment immediately after which the result is produced, has been known to be primary action. The other are also so called because they are intended to produce that very result (*tādarthyāt*).”

28.17 *kārtsnyeti/*

(About him who performs the activity) in full (it is said ...)

e.g. *pac* said to have a main meaning *vicaṭana* ‘separation of grain’ or *vikhattiḥ* ‘softening of the grains’ and the preceding subordinate moments the secondary meaning.

Kai “*viḥṛtyāvayavahitāssākalyenety arthaḥ/*”

The meaning is, uninterrupted by dissimilar or heterogeneous (actions).

atheti/ dhātur eva samabhihāraviśiṣṭakriyāvācī

dyotakastūpasarge na tu vācaka ity arthaḥ/

The meaning is that the *dhātu* alone expresses the action distinguished by repetition. Moreover the *upasarga* is *dyotaka* (illuminating or making clear [the meaning]) not expressing the meaning directly/*kāraka*.

28.19 *prāṭāṭīti/*

Kai. on "dhātūpasargasamudāyasya kriyāviśeṣāvagatihetuvāt tato yadi pratyayaḥ syāt tataḥ sopasargasya dvir vacanam prasajyeta/ prāṭāṭyate iti ceṣyeta/ sanmūtrokṣam vastv ihāpy atidiṣati – yañ vidhāv iti"

If because of the nature of cause (with *ṇi lopa*), there being a conception of the qualification of the action as being for the combination of *dhātu* and *upasarga*, then the *pratyaya yañ* would be (applicable) and the reduplication of *dhātu* together with the *upasarga* would be applicable, (and this is not desired). And what is in fact desired is the form *prāṭāṭyate* (where) just *at* is reduplicated not *pra*.

That matter which was stated in the *san sūtra* (3.1.7) is also extended here (in *Vā. 1*) *yañ vidhi* (referring to *Vā. 1-3*).

29.1 *dhātvaḍhikāre 'pīti/*

"For if the repetition of the action is together with an *upasarga* there is no ordaining of *yañ* in the context given, even of the *dhātu* governing rule."

prapāpacyata ityādaul/ He cooks repeatedly (where *pac* is reduplicated not *pra*). i.e. the *sūtra* is applicable in the relation to the *dhātu* alone (separate from the *upasarga*), *Nāgeśa*.

29.13 *ūrṇoteś ceti/*

"And (additional enumeration of the *dhātu*) *ūrṇu* (as receiving the *pratyaya yañ*)."

yathānyāse siddhyabhāvād vacanam/ kāryāntarasiddhaye 'vaśyam ūrṇoter nuvadbhāvo vācyas tenaiva yaño 'pi siddhim āha 'vācyā' iti/

The expression (of this *vārttika*) is because of an absence of valid (form for *ūrṇu*) when (the *sūtra* is taken) as written. For establishing other operations (than *yañ*) as valid, it is essential that the state of being 'like *dhātu nu*' should be expressed for *dhātu ūrṇu*. By that means in fact the establishment of *yañ* as valid is also achieved. Thus he says *vācyā* (it is to be stated).

(*śloka vārttika*)

'tatra yañi bhāvātideśa āmiṣo tv abhāvātideśas tayor nauter abhāvāt/

There, when the condition (of being like *ṇu*) is extended in the context of *yañ* there is extension (to *ūrṇu* of the absence of the *pratyaya ām* and *āgama*) *iḥ* because of the absence of those two occurring for the *dhātu ṇu*.

29.21 Kai. on *iḍupagrahād iti/*

idugrahaḥ iḍpratiṣedhaḥ/ vibhāṣā guṇe iti pañcamī/ phalasya cātra hetutvaṃ yathādhyayanena vasatīti/ udāharaṇāni prarṇotrūyate prarṇunāva prarṇutaḥ prarṇutavān iti/ yaṇaiva ca kriyāsamabhihārasya dyotitatvān nityaviṣsayor iti kriyāsamabhihāre dve bhavata iti vā dvirvacanaṃ na bhavati/ yadā tu bhṛśārthe 'pi paunaḥ punyaṃ vivakṣyate tadā 'pāpacyate pāpacyate' iti dvir vacanaṃ bhavaty eva/ "Iḍupagraha (means) prohibition of iḍ (augment)." Fifth case by vibhāṣa guṇe 2.3.25 ('optionally the fifth case acts when the noun expresses an attribute/quality which is the cause of an action and is not feminine') and here the nature of cause is for the fruit/effect as 'He stays by reason of his study'. (Because of prohibition of iḍ augment ūrṇu is to be treated like ṇu.)

Examples:

prarṇonūyate 'He covers completely (yaṇ intensive),

prarṇunāva 'He covered' (perfect not formed with *am*),

prarṇutaḥ 'He was covered' (*ka* past participle passive without augment *iḍ*),

prarṇutavān 'He covered' (*ktavatu* p. p. active without augment *iḍ*).

And doubling of the word is optionally not applicable by the *sūtras* '*nitya viṣsayoḥ*' 8.1.4 ('The whole word is repeated when the sense is always and each') and 3.4.2 *kriyāsamabhihāre loḥ loḥo hisvau vā ca tadvamoh* ('When the repetition of the action (or frequency) is indicated, the *pratyaya loḥ* acts after a *dhātu* and the *dhātu* is repeated optionally, and the *pratyayas hi* and *sva* or *ta* and *dhvam* are substitutes of *loḥ*'). (The *vārttika* referred to says) of middle/second person singular because of repetition of the action being made clear (*dyotika*) it is (not directly expressed) by *yaṇ* alone. But when it is desired to express repetition in the sense of intensity also, then only doubling of the verb is applicable. (He cooks intensely/ again and again) *pāpacyate pāpacyate*.

29.26 Kai. on *sa bhavān iti*

"*sāmānyaviśeṣabhavena kriyābhedāśrayo dhātusambandhaḥ*"

The resort to a distinction in verbal activity is by means of the condition of the general activity and the particular activity, so (there is) connection of the *dhātu* (the *loḥ* ending is the general; and the auxiliary because of embracing agent etc., is the particular activity. *Nāgeśa*).

Kai. on sa iti/ "bhṛśārthapaunaḥ punyayoḥ pratipipādayiṣitatvād ekatara-smiṇ yaṇpratyayaḥ/ aparasmimṣ tu loḥ/ loḥaś ca kevalasya samabhihāram abhivyāñktumasāmarthyāttadantasya dvir vacanaṃ pravartate"

The *pratyaya yaṇ* (is applicable) in one of the other (alternatives), because of the nature of seeking to (explain) or treat of intensity or repetition. In the other alternative, however, there is *loḥ*. And doubling proceeds for what ends with that, because of the inability to manifest/reveal repetition

for a solitary *loṭ* ending verb.

30.7 *Kai. on tatretī/*

“There (*yañ* is applicable because of being *antaraṅga*)”

“*loḍbahiraṅga kartradyapekṣaṅād dhātusaṃbandhāpekṣaṅāc ca*”

Loṭ is *bahiraṅga* because of (dependence on) expectation of agent etc. and because of expecting connection with/of forms of *dhātus* (when there is doubling).

Kai. on “vibhāṣā yañ iti/ dhātoḥ karmaṇa ity ato vety anuvartanāt”

Optionally *yañ* because of *vā* following on (from 3.1.7.)

dhātoḥ karmaṇa etc.

Kai. on (nityaṃ kauṭilye) na hīti/

Yañ invariably in the sense of crookedness. For *kuṭīlam krāmāti* is not (known to occur).

caṅkramyata ityasmādhyo ’rthaḥ praṭyate nāsau kuṭīlam krāmātti vākyena śakyah praṭyāyayitum iti tadarthānabhīdhanād eva vākyam na bhaviṣyati/ arthāntare ca kauṭilyamātrapratipādane vākyam nivārayitum aśakyam iti nityagrahaṇam anarthakam ity arthaḥ/

[From the particular essential nature of the word in the two subsequent (rules), it is understood that the two *sūtras* are in fact these *vārttikas*. Therefore the writing of the two *sūtras* beginning with ‘*nityam*’ prior to this is an error of the scribe. (*Nāgeśa on uttarayor iti “padasvarasāt dhātor ekāc iti sūtra eva idaṃ vārttikam iti labhyate/ tenetaḥ pūrvam nityam ityādisutravadvayalekho lekhakapramādāt ...*)]

Udyota: That meaning which is known from the form *caṅkramyate* is not able to be made known by the sentence *kuṭīlam krāmāti*. Thus because of not in fact expressing that meaning the sentence will not be applicable. And the meaning is that ‘because when another meaning is being conveyed as just crookedness (e.g. the path, *Nāgeśa*), it is not possible to avoid a sentence’, so that the mention of *nitya* is pointless.

30.12 *Kai. on kriyāsamabhihāra itī/ vā°7*

“(Yañ does not obtain after these) in the sense of repetition of the action.”

“*takrakaunḍinyanyāyena kauṭilyabhāvagārḥābhyāṃ yañah kriyāsamabhihārād ācchidya svīkrtatvād iti bhāvah/*”

The sense is, by the principle or maxim of buttermilk for *Kaunḍinya* (*M.Bh. on 1.1.47* ‘a special exception to a general rule’, ‘though a *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kaunḍinya* is made a special case (‘*brāhmaṇebhyo dadhi dīyatām takraṃ kaunḍinyāya*’)); due to having *yañ* ‘repetition of the action’ because of its being chosen with the sense of crookedness and contempt.

30.15 *satyāpapāsarūpavīṇātūlaślokaśenālomativacavarmavarṇa-
cūrṇacurādibhyo ṇic* //3/1/25//

satyāpeti kiṃ nipātyate /

Pāṇini 3.1.25: The *pratyaya ṇic* acts after the words *satya* (true, in the form *satyāpa*), *pāśa* (snare), *rūpa* (form), *vīṇā* (lute), *tūla* (cotton), *śloka* (fame, stanza), *senā* (army), *loma* (body hair), *tvaca* (skin), *varma* (coat of mail), *varṇa* (colour, sound), *cūrṇa* (dust, powder) and the *dhātus* beginning with *cur* (to steal)".

Patañjali: Is there 'irregular derivation' of *satyāpa* (true form)?

30.18 *satyasya kṛṇyāpukca* //1//

satyasya kṛṇyāpukca nipātyate ṇic ca / satyaṃ karoti

30.19 *satyāpayati* // atyalpam idam ucyate /

Vārttika 1: There is irregular derivation by adding *ṇic* and *āpuk* (as the *āgama*/augment) of the word *satya* in the sense of the *dhātu kṛṇ* (to make).

Bhāṣya: *Āpuk* is the *āgama* of (the final) of the word *satya* in the sense of *kṛṇ* (to make) and *ṇic* (is the *pratyaya*). *satyaṃ karoti satyāpayati*, "He speaks the truth". Too small a scope is stated.

30.20 *ṇividhāvarthavedasatyānām āpukca* //2//

*ṇividhāvarthavedasatyānām āpukceti vaktavyam / arthāpayati
vedapayati satyāpayati // yady āpuk kriyate ṭilopaḥ prāpnoti /
evam tarhi pukkariṣyate / evam api ṭilopaḥ prāpnoti / evam
tarhy ākkariṣyate / evam apy anākārāntatvāt pug na prāpnoti /
evam tarhy āpuṭkariṣyate //*

Vārttika 2: In the statement of *ṇi* it should be said that *ṇi* and *āpuk* (the *āgama*/augment) are for the final of the words *artha* (aim, wealth), *veda* (knowledge) and *satya* (truth).

Bhāṣya: It should be stated that *ṇic* and *āpuk* (the *āgama*) act for *artha*, *veda* and *satya*. *arthāpayati* "He treats of (or makes) ...

money”, *vedāpayati* “He imparts knowledge/causes to know”, *satyāpatti* “He speaks the truth”.

If *āpuk* is effected (as *āgama* here) *lopa* of the *ṭi* (the part beginning with the *i*, last vowel) obtains (by *teḥ* 6.4.155, *Vā. 1*) (i.e. the whole of *āpuk*).

Then in that case *puk* will be ordained as the *āgama*. Then also *ṭi lopa* obtains. Well then he will make the augment *āk*. Then also *ṭi lopa* obtains. Well then *āk* augment will be made. Then also, because of not ending in long *ā* *puk* does not obtain.

31.1 *athavā punar astv āpug eva / nanu coktaṃ ṭilopaḥ prāpnotīti / āpugvacanasāmarthyān na bhaviṣyati / athavā punar astu pugeva / nanu coktam evam api ṭilopaḥ prāpnotīti / pugvacanasāmarthyān na bhaviṣyati // athavā punar astv āgeva / nanu coktam evam api*

31.5 *ṭilopaḥ prāpnotīti / āgvacanān na bhaviṣyati //*

Otherwise again let it be the augment *āpuk* alone. But surely it was said *lopa* of *ṭi* (last vowel and any consonant that follows) obtains. Because of the force of the *āpuk* rule itself (otherwise the rule will be *vyartham*/pointless) (*lopa* of *ṭi*) will not be applicable. Otherwise, again let there be *puk* augment only. But surely it was stated (before), so also *lopa* elision of *ṭi* obtains. Because of the force of the *puk* rule itself, *lopa* will not be applicable. Otherwise, again let there just be *ak* augment. But surely that was spoken of before. ‘So also *lopa* of *ṭi* obtains’. Because of the force of the rule ordaining augment *āk* itself, (the *lopa* of *ṭi*) will not be applicable.

Notes on *MahāBhāṣya* on *Pāṇini* 3.1.25

Vārttika Summary

In this first *vārttika* *Kātyāyana* points out that the augment *āpuk* has been added to *satya* in the sense of *kr* to obtain *satyāpa*. In the second he adds that *ṇic* also comes after *artha* and *veda* with the augment *āpuk*.

Bhāṣya Summary

On the first *vārttika* *Patañjali* simply adds what is implied, that *satyāpa* is a *nipātana* form. Having given the full forms on the second, he considers variations on *āpuk* augment because *ṭi lopa* of *āpuk* also obtains, but concludes that *lopa* will not apply because of the rule itself. The

alternative is augment *ak* which for the same reason would prevent *lopa*.

30.23 *Kai. on satyāpa/ "evantarhīti"*

"Then in that case (*tuk* will be ordained)."

ācāryamatabhedapradarśanārtho 'nekapakṣopanyāsaḥ/

The mention of more than one point of view, is for the purpose of showing a difference of opinion among the masters (*trayamuni*).

Nāgeśa: Kaiyaṭa says this because by force of the rule alone. In fact everywhere there is prevention of *ṭi* elision, so the mention of various opinions (alone) is pointless.

ṭilopa iti/ ṭi elision (obtains)

Kai. on "nāviṣṭhavadityatideśād iti bhāvah"

The sense is (there is *ṭi lopa* obtaining) because of the extension (of the scope of *P.6.4.155*) '*teḥ*' by *vārttika* "When *ṇi* follows (a *prātipadika* undergoes the changes) as if '*pratyaya iṣṭha*' (followed), one of which is *ṭi lopa*".

akkariṣyat iti/ tatra pararūpe kṛte 'co ṇiṭṭi

Well then he will make the augment *ak*.

vṛddhau kṛtāyām pugāgama iti bhāvah/

(c.f. *ato guṇe 6.1.97*) when the form of the following (is the one substitute).

The sense is that in the context when the *vṛddhi* is effected (for the *a* of *satya*) *aco ṇiṭṭi 7.2.116* (*ṇi* following a vowel having an *it ṇ* becoming *ai*) *p* is the augment of the final (of the base) *satya* etc. (not giving the desired form *satyāpa*)

satya + ak + puk + ṇi + śap + tip = satyā + e + śap + tip = satyāpayati

31.6 *hetumati ca ||31/26||*

katham idaṃ vijñāyate / hetumaty abhidheye nijbhavatīti / āhosviddhetumati yo dhātur vartata iti // yuktaṃ punar idaṃ vicārayitum / nanv anenāsandigdhenā pratyayārthaviśeṣeṇa bhavitavyaṃ yāvatā hetumatīty ucyate / yadi hi prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇaṃ syād dhetumata

31.10 *ity evaṃ brūyāt / naitad asti / bhavantītha hi viśaya-saptabhyo 'pi / tad yathā pramāṇe yat prātipadikaṃ vartate striyām yat prātipadikaṃ vartata iti /*

Pāṇini 3.1.26: The *pratyaya ṇic* acts after a *dhātu* when the sense of *hetumat* (having or proceeding from a cause) is to be expressed, (i.e. the cause which is the prompter/instigator of the agent/independent

one with system within himself).

Bhāṣya: How is this (rule) to be understood? Whether it means “When the sense of having a cause is to be expressed *ṇic* (*pratyaya*) is applicable” or else “to a *dhātu* which conveys the sense of that having a cause (*ṇic* is added)”. It is proper to consider this further. Insofar as it is said “when that having a cause follows” surely with this without doubt it should be qualifying the sense of the *pratyaya*. For if it were a qualification of the meaning of the *prakṛti*/base, the form would in fact be *hetumataḥ* (fifth/ *apādāna* /ablative agreeing with *dhātoḥ*). This is not so. For here (in the grammar) there are examples of *saptamī*/seventh/locative in the sense of ‘with regard to’ or ‘in the sphere of’. As for example, that *prātipadika*/crude base which occurs with regard to lineal measure (has acting after it the *pratyayas* *dvayasac*, *daghnac* and *mātrac* (5.2.37) or that *prātipadika* occurs with regard to feminine nature (has the following *pratyayas* acting after it *strīyām* 4.1.3).

31.11 *evam ihāpi hetumaty abhidheye ṇij bhavati hetumati vā yo dhātur vartata iti jāyate vicāraṇā // ata uttaram pathati /*

So here also, question is raised whether “when the sense of ‘having cause’ is to be expressed *ṇic* (*pratyaya*) is applicable” or (*ṇic* is applicable to) that *dhātu* which occurs with regard to having a cause. Hence (the *Vārttika-kāra*) expresses his reply:

31.13 *hetumatīti kārakopādānaṃ pratyayārthaparigrahārtham yathā tanūkarāṇe takṣaḥ //1//*

hetumatīti kārakam upādīyate / kiṃ prayojanam /

31.14 *pratyayārthaparigrahārtham / evaṃ sati pratyayārthaḥ supari-grhīto bhavati / yathā tanūkarāṇe takṣaḥ (3.1.76) iti tanūkarāṇam upādīyate //*

Vārttika 1: (In the form) *hetumati*, the *kāraka* (instrumental in bringing about the action) is understood for the purpose of understanding the meaning of the *pratyaya*; as for example (in the sutra) *tanūkarāṇe takṣaḥ* 3.1.76 (“The *pratyaya śnu* optionally acts after the *dhātu takṣ* ‘in the sense of’ making thin or paring when a *sārva-*

dhātuka pratyaya follows denoting the agent”.)

Bhāṣya: In the form *hetumati* a *kāraka* is understood. What is the purpose? For understanding the meaning of the *pratyaya* *ñic*. When it is thus present, the meaning of the *pratyaya* is easily understood. As for example (in the *sūtra*) *tanūkarāṇe takṣah* 3.1.76, the word *tanūkarāṇa* (making thin or paring) is employed (to make known the meaning of the *pratyaya* *śnu* after the *dhātu takṣ*).

31.15 *yadi tarhi tadvat prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇam bhavati / prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇam hi tat tatra vijñāyate / tanūkarāṇakriyāyām takṣa iti // astu prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇam / ko doṣaḥ / iha hy uktaḥ karoti preṣitaḥ karotīti ñic prāpnoti / pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇe punaḥ sati naiṣa doṣaḥ / svaśabdenoktatvān na bhaviṣyati //*

31.20 *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇe 'pi sati naiṣa doṣaḥ / yatra nāntareṇa śabdām arthasya gatir bhavati tatra śabdaḥ prayujyate / yatra hy antareṇāpi śabdām arthasya gatir bhavati na tatra śabdaḥ prayujyate //*

If then like that, (*hetumati*) is taken as a qualification of the *prakṛti*/base, this (method) is applicable. For that is understood as a qualification of the meaning of the *prakṛti* prescribed there, ‘(*śnu* acts) after *dhātu takṣ* having the sense of the action of paring’. Let it be a qualification of the meaning of the *prakṛti*. What fault is there? Here *ñic* obtains *uktaḥ karoti* “(He who) was told does”, *preṣitaḥ karoti* “The one who was urged does”. But when the qualification of the meaning of the *pratyaya* is present this is not a fault. Because of having already been expressed by the word itself the *pratyaya* *ñic* will not be applicable.

Even when the qualification is of the meaning of the *prakṛti* there is no fault. When there is no understanding of the meaning without the word, there the word is used. Where even without a word, understanding of meaning exists, there a word is not used.

31.21 *iha tarhi pācayaty odanaṁ devadatto yajñadattenety ubhayoḥ kartror lenābhīdhānaṁ prāpnoti / pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇe punaḥ sati na doṣaḥ / pradhānakartari lādayo bhavantīti pradhānakartā lenābhīdhīyate yaścātrāpradhānaṁ siddhā tatra kartarīty eva trītyā /*

Then here (in the example) — *pācayaty-odanaṃ Devadatto Yajñadattena* — “Devadatta causes Yajñadatta to cook the rice” expression of both the agents by the *la* (tense *pratyaya*) becomes wrongly applicable. When the qualification is of the meaning of the *pratyaya*, again there is no fault. The principal agent is expressed by the *la* (tense *pratyaya*) as (is stated). (The ten tenses or moods which all begin with the letter *l* are applicable in the sense of or in expressing the principal agent. And (to denote him) who is here non-principal/subordinate agent, in the context it is established that the third case alone is employed in the sense of Agent.

31.24 *iha ca gamito grāmaṃ devadatto yajñadattenety avyতিরিক্তো গত্যর্থো ইতি কৃত্বা গত্যর্থানাম ক্তাহ কার্তারিত্তি কার্তারি ক্তাহ প্রাপ্নোতি / iha ca vyatibhedayante vyaticchedayanta ity avyতিরাক্তো হিঁসার্ত্থো ইতি কৃত্বা না গতিহিঁসার্ত্থেভ্যাহ*

32.1 (1.3.15) *iti pratiśedhaḥ prāpnoti // astu tarhi pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇam / yadi pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇam pācayaty odanaṃ devadatto yajñadatteneti prayojye kartari karmasañjñā prāpnoti / bhavati hi tasya tasminn īpsā / iha ca grāmaṃ gamayati grāmāya gamayatīti vyতিরিক্তো গত্যর্থো ইতি কৃত্বা গত্যর্থাকার্মানি দ্বিতীয়া চতুর্থ্যৌ না প্রাপ্নুতাঃ /*

Moreover having formed (the following sentence with a sense of going not different from the causative meaning ‘made to go’ etc.) referred to in the *sūtra gatyartha akarmaka* etc. (3.4.72) *gamito grāmaṃ Devadatto Yajñadattena*- “Devadatta caused Yajnadatta to go to the village”, *ktā*/past participial passive obtains in the sense of Agent because of (the statement) “*Ktā* acts after *dhātus* having the sense of going or movement in denoting the Agent”.

And here in the verbs *vyati bhedayante* “They are bursting (crushing or destroying) forth together on each other simultaneously”. *vyaticchedayante* “They cause each other to be cut”, with meanings of injuring not separated from the causative meaning or that referred to in the *sūtra-1.3.15 gati hiঁসার্ত্থেভ্যাহ* “After *dhātus* having the sense of ‘motion’ or ‘injury’ (when expressing interchange of action) the *ātmanepada vibhakti pratyayas* are not used” because of which, prohibition of the *ātmanepada* obtains.

Then let (the sense be) the qualification of the meaning of the *pratyaya*. If there is qualification of the meaning of the *pratyaya* then

the technical name *karman*/object wrongly applies i.e. obtains in denoting the agent to be employed/caused to act, as *pācayati odanaṃ Devadatto Yajñadattena* “Devadatta causes Yajñadatta to cook rice”. For he (*Devadatta*) has a desire in relation to him (*Yajñadatta*).

And here (in) the sentence *grāmaṃ gamayati* (and) *grāmāya gamayati* “He causes him to go to the village” with the meaning of motion/going separated from that sense expressed in the *sūtra gatyartha karmaṇi dvitīyā caturthyau ceṣṭāyām anadhvani 2.3.12* “In the case of *dhātus* implying motion, the place to which the motion is directed takes the second *vibhakti pratyaya* (accusative) or the fourth (*sampradāna/dative*) case (in denoting *karman*/object, when physical motion is meant, and the object is not a word expressing road)”, the second and fourth cases do not obtain (as alternatives).

32.5 *iha ca edhodakasyopaskārayatīti vyatiriktaḥ karoty artha iti kṛtvā kṛṇaḥ pratiyatne (2.3.53) iti ṣaṣṭī na prāpnoti / iha ca bhedikā devadattasya yajñadattasya kāṣṭhānām iti prayojye kartari ṣaṣṭī na prāpnoti / iha ca abhiṣāvayati pariṣāvayatīti vyatiriktaḥ sunoty artha iti kṛtvopasargāt sunoty ādīnām iti ṣatvaṃ na prāpnoti // naiṣa doṣaḥ / yat tāvad ucyate pācayaty odanaṃ devadatto yajñadatteneti prayojye kartari karmasañjñā prāpnotīti gatibuddhipratyavasānārthaśabdakarmākarmakānām aṅṅītan niyamārthaṃ bhaviṣyati /*

And here (in the sentence) *edhodakasyopaskārayati* “The water makes the wood impart a new quality to the water with a meaning of *karoti/dhātu kṛ* (to make) separated (from that causative sense mentioned in the *sūtra*), (by the *sūtra*) *kṛṇaḥ pratiyatne 2.3.53* “The *karman*/object of the *dhātu kṛ* takes the sixth *vibhakti/case pratyaya*, when it means to impart a new quality or virtue”. The sixth case does not obtain in the sentence *bhedikā Devadattasya Yajñadattasya kāṣṭhānām*. “The act of causing *Yajñadatta* to cut the wood is caused by *Devadatta*”. The sixth *vibhakti/case pratyaya* does not obtain in the sense of the Agent to be prompted or caused/impelled.

And here (in the verbs) *abhi-ṣāvayati* “He causes (him) to press out the *soma*”, *pariṣāvayati* “He causes (him) to press the *soma* from all sides” with the meaning of *sunoti/dhātu su* (to press out *soma*) different (from that expressed by the *sūtra*) *upasarhāt sunoti suvati* etc. This is not a fault with reference to that which is stated (in the

sentence), “Devadatta causes Yajñadatta to cook the rice”/pācayaty odanaṃ Devadatto Yajñadattena, the technical name *karman*/object obtains in the sense of the Agent to be employed (i.e. subordinate agent). I say, for the purpose of restricting the scope of *karman* sañjñā there will be the *sūtra gati-buddhi-pratyavasāna-artha-śabda-karmākarmakānām aṇi kartā sa nau 1.4.52*: “For *dhātus* having the sense of motion, knowledge or information and eating, and for *dhātus* that have sound or some literary work for their *karman*/object and for intransitive *dhātus*, that which was the agent of the *dhātu* in its primitive (non-*ni*/non causal state) is called the *karman* in its causal state (when the *dhātu* takes the *pratyaya nic*)”.

32.11 *eteṣām eva nyantānām yaḥ kartā sa nau karmasañjño bhavati nānyeṣām iti // yad apy ucyata iha ca grāmaṃ gamayati grāmāya gamayatīti vyatirikto gatyartha iti kṛtvā gatyartha-karmaṇi dvitīyācaturthyau na prāpnuta iti nāsāv evaṃ preṣyate gaccha grāmam iti / kathaṃ tarhi / sādhanaviśiṣṭām asau kriyāṃ preṣyate grāmaṃ gaccha grāmāya gaccheti //*

For these (*dhātus*) alone not ending in *ni* that which is the Agent (in the non causal state) has the technical name *karman* applicable to it in the causal state when *ni* follows, but this is not so for any other (*dhātus*). With reference to what was also said (above) *iha ca grāmaṃ gamayati grāmāya gamayati* etc. And here having formed the sentence “He causes him to go to the village” with a meaning of motion not different from that expressed in the *sūtra — gatyartha karmaṇi dvitīyā caturthyau ceṣṭāyām anadhvani* (2.3.12) the second and fourth *vibhakti pratyaya*/cases do not obtain. (I say) that (person) is not impelled (by saying) “Go to the village”. How then? One is impelled to do an action which is distinguished by a *kāraka* (a case relation instrumental in bringing about the action of the verb) ‘*grāmaṃ gaccha*’ (or) *grāmāya gaccha* “go to the village”.

32.15 *yad apy ucyata iha ca edhodakasyopaskārayatīti vyatiriktaḥ karoty artha iti kṛtvā kṛñah pratiyatna iti ṣaṣṭī na prāpnotīti nāsāv evaṃ preṣyata upaskuruṣvaidhodakasyeti / kathaṃ tarhi / sādhanaviśiṣṭām asau kriyā preṣyata edhodakasyopaskuruṣveti //*

With reference to what is also said (as above) and here having formed (the sentence) *edhodakasyopaskārayati* “He caused the preparing of the wood and water for the sacrifice” with the meaning of *karoti/dhātu kṛ* (to make) different from that expressed in the *sūtra* “*kṛñāḥ pratiyatne* (2.3.35)”, the sixth case does not obtain. That (action) is not impelled (as) *apaskuruṣvaidho dakasya* “Prepare the wood and water for the sacrifice”. How then? The action is urged on or caused, distinguished by its instruments (or agents) of the action/ *sādhana* (*kāraka*). *edho dakasyopakariṣva* “Prepare the wood and water”, (with sixth case because, *edhodaka* is the object of *kṛ dhātu* (to make) and not of *kāri* (causative formed with *ṇic*).

32.18 *yad apy ucyata iha ca bhedikā devadattasya yajñadattasya kāṣṭhānām iti prayojye kartari ṣaṣṭī na prāpnotīty uktaṃ tatra kṛdgrahaṇasya prayojanaṃ kartṛbhūtapūrvamātre 'pi ṣaṣṭī yathā syād iti // yad apy ucyata iha cābhiṣāvayati pariṣāvayatīti vyatiriktaḥ sunoty artha iti kṛtvopasargāt sunoty ādīnām iti ṣatvaṃ na prāpnotīti nāsāv evaṃ preṣyate sunvabhīti / kathaṃ tarhi / upasargaviśiṣṭām asau kriyāṃ preṣyate 'bhiṣunviti //*

With reference to this also it is said (as earlier 2.32.6) *iha ca bhedikā* etc. “And here when the subordinate agent (is to be expressed, as for example) *Devadatta* (is) causing *Yajñadatta* to split the logs” the sixth *vibhakti*/case *pratyaya* does not obtain. (I say), it was stated there that the purpose of mentioning *kṛt* (is) so that the sixth case should be applicable even when an agent only in a former time is to be denoted. What also is said is (as earlier 2.32.7) *iha cābhiṣāvayati* etc. And here having formed the verbs *abhiṣāvayati* ‘He causes him to press out the *soma*’ *pariṣāvayati* ‘He causes him to press round the *soma*’, with the meaning of *sunoti/dhātu su* (to press out *soma*) different to that expressed in the *sūtra* *upasargāt sunoti* etc. (8.3.65). The change of *ṣ* for *s* does not obtain, (for) that is not (here) urged on/caused (at this stage) when *upasarga abhi* (is to join with the simple *dhātu*) *sunu*. How then? That act is urged on qualified by *upasarga* (i.e. change of *s* to *ṣ/ṣatya* and has already taken place in the non causal state), (as) *abhi-ṣuṇu* “Do thou press out the *soma*”.

32.23 *yuktaṃ punar idaṃ vicārayitum / nanv anenāsamdigdhena pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇena bhavitavyaṃ yāvatā vyaktaṃ arthā-*

*ntaraṃ gamyate pacati pācayatīti ca / bādhaṃ yuktaṃ / iha
paceḥ kaḥ pradhānārthaḥ / yāsau taṇḍulānāṃ viklittih /
athedānīṃ*

32.25 *tad abhisandhipūrvakaṃ preṣaṇamadhyeṣaṇaṃ vā yatsarvaḥ
pacyarthaḥ syāt /*

It is proper to again consider this matter. Surely the qualifier of the meaning of the *pratyaya* must be without doubt in so far as it is understood that there is obviously a different meaning (when *ṇic* is employed), (as) *pacati* “He cooks” and *pācayati* “He causes (someone) to cook”. Yes indeed it is proper to consider here what is the principal meaning of *paci* (i.e. *dhātu pac*). That (activity) which softens the grains of rice. Now then that which has been intended or aimed at (whether it be) the act of urging/impelling or soliciting/asking, it is proper that all that be (part) of the meaning of *pac-i* (*pac dhātu + ṇic pratyaya*).

32.26 *atha hetumatīti ko matvarthaḥ / hetuḥ kartāsyā hetumān hetu-
matīti //*

Now what is the meaning of (the *pratyaya*) *matup* in *hetumati*? He whose agent is the cause is *hetumān* (having a reason or cause), as in the *sūtra hetumat-i*.

33.1 *hetunirdeśaś ca nimittamātraṃ bhikṣādiṣu darśanāt //2//*

*hetunirdeśaś ca nimittamātraṃ draṣṭavyam / yāvadbhūyān
nimittaṃ kāraṇam iti tāvad dhetur iti / kiṃ prayojanam /
bhikṣādiṣu darśanāt / bhikṣādiṣu hi nijdrśyate /*

Vārttika 2: And the mention of *hetu* is in the sense of ‘mere efficient cause or instrument’ (which is known) because of seeing its usage in connection with the words *bhikṣā* (alms) and the rest mentioned in the *sūtra bhikṣādibhyo ’n 4.2.38*.

Bhāṣya: And the mention of *hetu* should be seen (or understood) in the sense of ‘mere efficient cause or instrument’. To the extent one would say it is the efficient cause or instrument, so too (one may speak of) *hetu* as cause. What is the purpose? Because of seeing

(usage) in connection with *bhikṣā* (alms) and the rest? For in (connection with the words) *bhikṣā* and the rest *ṇic* is seen (after a *dhātu*).

33.3 *bhikṣā vāsayanti / kārīṣo 'gnir adhyāpayatīti // kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ paribhāṣike hetau na sidhyati / evaṃ manyate cetanāvata etad bhavati preṣaṇamadhyeṣaṇaṃ ceti bhikṣās cācetanāḥ / naiṣa doṣaḥ / nāvaśyaṃ sa eva vāsaṃ prayojayati ya āhoṣyatām iti tūṣṇīm apy āsīno yas tat samarthānyācarati so 'pi vāsaṃ prayojayati / bhikṣās cāpi pracurā vyañjanavatyo labhyamānā vāsaṃ prayojayanti / tathā kārīṣo 'gnir nivāta ekānte suprajvalito 'dhyayanaṃ prayojayati //*

As *bhikṣā vāsayanti* “Desire for alms causes them to dwell (in the town etc.)”. *kārīṣo'gnir adhyāpayati* “The cow-dung fire makes (the students) learn (by enabling them to sit in the warm)”. But is not cause admissible in the sense of the conventional technical (sense of) cause (expressed by the *sūtrakāra*)? So (the *sūtrakāra*) thought “this impelling and requesting is possible for one having consciousness, but *bhikṣā* (alms) are without consciousness. This is not a fault. It is not necessarily the very one who causes someone to dwell by saying ‘you may stay’ (in this place). What then? Even one who is sitting silently (and) performs (deeds or actions) which are capable of making someone stay, even he causes dwelling or abiding to take place. And so also alms, foods abundant and full of seasoning (condiments) being obtained, cause (the mendicant recipients) to dwell (nearby). So too the cow-dung burning beautifully in a solitary place, free from wind, causes study (to take place).

33.9 *iha kaścit kañcid āha prechatu mā bhavān anuyuñktām mā bhavān iti / atra ṇic kasmān na bhavati / akartṛtvāt / na hy asau samprati prechati / tūṣṇīm āste kiṃ ca bho vartamānakālāyā eva kriyāyāḥ kartrā bhavitavyaṃ na bhūtabhaviṣyatkalāyāḥ / bhūtabhaviṣyatkalāyā api bhavitavyam /*

Here someone says to someone else, “Ask me a question sir, do. Do engage me sir”. Here, why is there not *ṇic* applicable? Because of the one commanding not being the agent (of the action he commands). For that one does not now ask. He remains silent. And Sir, should he

only be Agent of an action of the present time, (and) not of past and future time? He should also be (Agent of an action) of the past and future time.

- 33.12 *abhisambandhas tatra kriyata imāṃ kriyām akārṣīt imāṃ kriyām kariṣyātīti / iha punar na kaścīd abhisambandhaḥ kriyate na cāsau samprati prcchati tūṣṇīm āste / yadi tarhi kartā nāsti katham tarhi kartṛpratyayena loṭābhidhīyate / atha*
 33.13 *katham asminn aprcchaty ayaṃ pracchir vartate / abhibandhas tatra kriyata imāṃ kriyām kurv iti / kriyāyā bhaveti / evaṃ na ca kartā kartṛpratyayena ca loṭābhidhīyate //*

A connection is made there “He did this action. He will do this action”. But here no one is made connected, and nor does he ask (nor will he ask), he remains silent. If then, there is no agent, how then is he expressed by the agent *pratyaya loṭ* (imperative)? Now then how, when this one is not asking a question does the verb *pracch* operate? A connection is made there “Do this action”. Also then connection is made with the agent. “Be the agent of this action”. And thus the agent is not expressed by the agent *pratyaya loṭ* (imperative).

- 33.17 *athāpi kathañcit kartā syāt / evam api na doṣaḥ / loṭoktatvāt preṣanasya ñic na bhaviṣyati / vidhīyante hy eteṣv artheṣu preṣādiṣu loḍādayaḥ / yatra ca dvitīyaḥ prayojyo 'rtho bhavati bhavati tatra ñic / tad yathā /*
 33.20 *āsaya śāyayeti //*

Now even if somehow there would be an agent, so then too (there is) no fault. Because of ordering/*praiṣa* being expressed already by *loṭ* (imperative), there will not be applicable to the *pratyaya ñic*. For *loṭ* and the rest are ordained in the sense of these (sending/ordering) impelling etc. And where a second impelled agent exists, there is *ñic pratyaya*. As for example “Do thou cause (him) to sit. Do thou cause (him) to lie down or sleep”.

- 33.21 *kṛṣyādiṣu cānutpattiḥ / kṛṣyādiṣu cānutpattir vaktavyā / ekānte tūṣṇīm āsīna ucyate pañcabhir halaiḥ kṛṣātīti / tatra bhavitavyaṃ pañcabhir halaiḥ karṣayātīti //*

Vārttika: And there is non-arising (of *ñic* *pratyaya*) in the formation of *kṛṣ-i* and the rest.

Bhāṣya: And it should be stated that there is non-arising of *ñic* *pratyaya* in (the formation) of *kṛṣ-i* and the rest. By one sitting silently in a lonely/deserted place it is said “He ploughs with five ploughs”. There it should be *pañcabhir halaiḥ karṣayati* “He causes ploughing with five ploughs”.

33.23 *kṛṣyādiṣu cānutpattir nānakriyāṇām kṛṣyarthatvāt //3//*

*kṛṣyādiṣu cānutpattiḥ siddhā / kutaḥ / nānakriyāṇām kṛṣy-
arthatvāt / nānakriṣyāḥ kriṣer arthāḥ / nāvaśyaṃ kṛṣir
vilekhana eva vartate / kiṃ tarhi / pratividhāne 'pi vartate / yad
asau bhaktabījabalīvadaiḥ pratividhānaṃ sa kṛṣyarthah / ātaś
ca pratividhāne*

33.25 *vartate yad aharevāsau na pratividhatte tad ahareva tat karma
na pravartate /*

Varttika 3: And in the case of the (*dhātus*) *kṛṣ-i* and the rest, the non-arising (of *ñic*) is because of the meaning of *kṛṣ-i* (and the rest) having a variety of verbal activities (connected with them).

Bhāṣya: And in relation to (the *dhātus*) *kṛṣ-i* (and the rest) the non-arising of *ñic* is settled. From what cause? “Because of the meaning of *kṛṣ-i* (and the rest) having a variety of verbal activities (connected with them). (For) various are the verbal activities which (comprise) the meanings of *kṛṣ-i*. *Kṛṣ-i* does not necessarily occur only in the sense of ploughing. What then? It also occurs in the sense of disposing and arranging i.e. managing (the activity). When he makes arrangements for eatable grain, seeds and oxen that is (all involved in) the sense of ploughing. And this indeed is for the following reason: even when arrangements exist, the day when no arrangements (of the activities are actually made is) that very day the work does not proceed.

34.1 *yajyādiṣu cāviparyāsaḥ / yajyādiṣu cāviparyāso vaktavyaḥ /
puṣyamitro yajate yājakā yājayantīti / tatra bhavitavyaṃ puṣya-
mitro yājayate yājayakā yajantīti //*

Vārttika: And in the case of the *dhātu yaj* and the rest there is no interchange or transposition (regarding *pada*).

Bhāṣya: And it should be stated that there is no interchange of *pada* in the case of *yaj dhātu* etc. *puṣyamitro yajate* “Prince *Puṣyamitra* sacrifices for himself” (*ātmanepada vibhakti pratyaya te*) *yajakā yājayanti* “The sacrificers perform sacrifices (for others)” (therefore *parasmaipada vibhakti pratyaya anti*). There should be *puṣyamitro yajayate yājakā yajanti* “*Puṣyamitra* causes a sacrifice (to take place for his benefit, for himself) (*ātmanepada*), the offerers of sacrifices (i.e. the professional priests) perform sacrifices for others (*parasmaipada*)”.

34.2 *yajyādiṣu cāviparyāso nānakriyāṇaṃ yajyarthatvāt //4//*

yajyādiṣu cāviparyāsaḥ siddhaḥ / kutaḥ / nānakriyāṇaṃ yajyarthatvāt / nānakriyā yajarthāḥ / nāvaśyam yajihaviṣprakṣepaṇa eva vartate / kiṃ tarhi / tyāge 'pi vartate / aho yajata ity ucyate yaḥ suṣṭu tyāgam karoti / taṃ ca puṣyamitraḥ karoti yājakāḥ prayojayanti //

Vārttika 4: And in the case of the *dhātus yaj* and the rest there is no interchange (of *pada*) because of the meaning of *yaj-i* (and the rest) having a variety of verbal activities (connected with them).

Bhāṣya: And it is established that there is no interchange (of *pada*). For what reason? Because of the meaning of *yaj-i* (and the rest) having a variety of verbal activities (connected with them). (For various verbal activities (comprise) the meaning of *yaj-i* (and the rest). It is not essential that *yaj-i* (= *dhātu yaj*) occurs only in the sense of offering an oblation. What then? It also occurs in the sense of abandoning/giving up or away. As for example *aho yajate* “Ah! He is making (some self) sacrifice”). Thus it is said (of someone) who performs excellently the act of (renunciation or) abandoning. And that, *Puṣyamitra* does (while) the offerers of the oblations/the priests prompt (him to do so).

34.8 *tat karotīty upasaṅkhyānaṃ sūtrayatyādyartham //5//*

tat karotīty upasaṅkhyānaṃ kartavyam / kiṃ prayojanam /

34.10 *sūtrayatyādyartham / sūtram karoti sūtrayati / iha vyākaraṇasya sūtram karoti vyākaraṇam sūtrayatī vākye suṣṭhyutpanne ca pratyaye dviṭyā / kenaitad evam bhavati / yo sau sūtravyākaraṇayor abhisambandhaḥ sa utpanne pratyaye vivartate 'sti ca karoter vyākaraṇena sāmartyam iti krtvā dviṭyā bhaviṣyati /*

Vārttika 5: Additional enumeration (of *ṇic*) in the sense of 'He makes/does that' for the sake of (the forms) *sūtrayati* "He makes or composes a *sūtra*" and the rest.

Bhāṣya: Additional enumeration (of *ṇic*) should be made in the sense of 'he does or makes that'. What is the purpose? For the sake of (the forms) *sūtrayati* "He composes *sūtras* and the rest", *sūtram karoti sūtrayati* (The sentence) 'he makes a *sūtra*' (is expressed by the denominative) *sūtrayati* 'He composes a *sūtra*'.

Here in the sentence *vyākaraṇasya sūtram karoti* 'He composes a *sūtra* of grammar', we have the sixth case for the word *vyākaraṇa*, but here *vyākaraṇam sūtrayati* "He composes a grammatical *sūtra*", when the *pratyaya ṇic* has arisen (to form *sūtrayati*) the word *vyākaraṇa/grammar* (receives) the second case/*sup*. By virtue of what does that thus become applicable? That connection of (the words) *sūtra* and *vyākaraṇa* (in the sentence by means of the sixth case) disappears when the *pratyaya (ṇic)* arises (to form the denominative *sūtrayati*); and having made the (statement) 'there exists mutual connection of meanings/*sāmartyam* of the *dhātu kṛ* (to make) with the word *vyākaraṇa*', the second case (is applicable).

34.14 *ākhyānāt kṛtas tadācaṣṭa iti kṛlukpraktipratyāpattiḥ praktivac ca kārakam //6//*

ākhyānāt krdantāṅ ṇivaktavyas tadācaṣṭa ity etasminn arthe / kṛllukpraktipratyāpattiḥ praktivac ca kārakam bhavatiṭi vaktavyam / kaṃsavadham ācaṣṭe kaṃsam dhātayati / bali-bandham ācaṣṭe baliṃ bandhayati //

Vārttika 6: "(*Ṇic*) *pratyaya* is to act after (a word expressing the name of) a story tale or legend, (ending) in a *kṛt (pratyaya)* when *ṇic* has the sense of 'He relates that', the *kṛt pratyaya* being *luk* elided and (the

word) restored to its original form, as also the *kāraka*/case relationship (should be in its original form i.e. not elided)".

Bhāṣya: *Nic* should be stated after (the name of) a tale/story ending in a *kṛt pratyaya* in the sense of "He tells that". It should be stated that the *kṛt* is *luk* elided, (the base) restored to its original forms and *kāraka*/case ending (relating to verbal activity) becomes as it was in its original state (i.e. with *vibhakti* ending manifest). *Kansa vadham ācaṣṭe* = *Kansaṃ ghātayati* "He tells the story/drama of the killing of *Kansa*" (by *Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa*) (optionally using *nic*). *Bali bandhanam ācaṣṭe* = *balim bandhayati* "He tells the story of the binding or killing of *Bali* (by *Viṣṇu*).

34.19 *ākhyānāc ca pratiṣedhaḥ //7//*

*ākhyānaśabdāc ca pratiṣedho vaktavyaḥ / ākhyānam ācaṣṭa iti//
kim punar yāny etāni sañjñābhūtāny ākhyānāni tata utpatyā
bhavitavyam āhosvit kriyānvākhyānamātrāt / kim cātaḥ / yadi
sañjñābhūtebhyaḥ, iha na prāpnoti rājāgamanam ācaṣṭe
rājānam āgamayāti / atha kriyānvākhyānamātrān na doṣo
bhavati / yathā na doṣas tathāstu //*

Vārttika 7: "Prohibition (of *nic* in the sense of 'He tells that') after (the word) *ākhyāna* (tale)".

Bhāṣya: And it should be stated that there is prohibition (of *nic*) after the word *ākhyāna* (tale). (Therefore only the sentence form without *nic*). *ākhyānam ācaṣṭe* "He tells a tale" But should there be the arising (of *nic*) (only) after these words which have become the names of tales, or after any kind of narration of actions? And what (follows) from that? If (only) after words which have become names of tales, (then) here (*nic*) does not obtain. *rājāgamanam ācaṣṭe* = *rājānam āgamayati* "He tells the story of the coming of the King" (optionally in fact formed with *nic*). Now (then in fact) there is no fault if *nic* (acts) after all narrations of action. Let it be such that there is no fault.

34.25 *drśyarthāyām ca pravṛttau //8//*

drśyarthāyām ca pravṛttau krdantān nijvaktavyas tadācaṣṭa ity

*etasminn arthe / kṛlluk prakṛtipratyāpattiḥ prakṛtivac ca
kārakaṃ bhavatīti / bhṛgaramaṇam ācaṣṭe mṛgān ramayatīti /
dṛśyārthāyām iti kim artham / yadā hi grāme mṛgaramaṇam
ācaṣṭa ity eva tadā bhavatīti //*

Vārttika 8: When the function of the activity of telling (the story etc.) is for the purpose of seeing/visualising (something, *ṇic* acts).

Bhāṣya: And when the function of the activity of telling (the story) is for the purpose of seeing/realising (something), it should be stated that *ṇic* acts in the sense of ‘He tells that’ after a word ending in a *kṛt pratyaya*. (It should be stated that) the *kṛt* being *luk* elided, the base refers to the original form, and the *kāraka/case* relationship to the verbal activity expressed becomes like the original. *mṛgaramaṇam ācaṣṭe = mṛgān ramayati* “He tells of the deer playing (so that they can visualise it)”. Why (say) “for the purpose of seeing”? For (only) when in the village he sees the playing of the deer, then only *ṇic* should not be applicable. Only the expression *mṛgaramaṇam ācaṣṭe* should (then be used).

35.4 *āṅlopaś ca kālāty antasamyoge maryādāyām //9//*

*kālāty antasamyoge maryādāyām kṛdantān ṇivaktavyas
tadācaṣṭa ity etasminn artha āṅlopaś ca / kṛllukprakṛti-
pratyāpattiḥ prakṛtivac ca kārakaṃ bhavatīti / āratrivivāsam
ācaṣṭe rātriṃ vivāsayatīti //*

Vārttika 9: And when expressing a continuous period of time up to a specific limit, (*ṇic pratyaya* acts) and there is *lopa* elision (of the *upasarga*) *āṅ*.

Bhāṣya: It should be stated that *ṇic* acts after a *kṛt pratyaya* ending (word) when expressing a continuous/uninterrupted period of time up to a specific limit, in the sense of “He tells that” and there is *lopa* elision of (the *upasarga*) *āṅ* (as far as etc.). (It should be stated stat) the *kṛt pratyaya* being *luk* elided the base reverts to its original form and the *kāraka/relationship* expressed becomes like the original. *āra-tri-vivāsam ācaṣṭe = rātriṃ vivāsayati* “He tells a tale until daybreak/banishing of night”.

35.8 *citrīkarāṇe prāpi //10//*

*citrīkarāṇe prāpyarthe krdantāṅ nijvaktavyaḥ / kṛllukprakṛti-
pratyāpattiḥ prakṛtivac ca kāraḥ bhavātīti /*

35.10 *ujjayinyāḥ prasthito māhiṣmatyāṃ sūryodgamaṇaṃ sam-
bhāvayate sūryam udgamayātīti //*

Vārttika 10: When there is surprise at reaching (somewhere, *ṇic* is applicable).

Bhāṣya: It should be stated *ṇic* acts in the sense of surprise at reaching (a place). (It should be stated that) the *kṛt pratyaya* being *luk* elided the base reverts to its original form and the *kāraḥ*/case relationship becomes like that of the original form.

*ujjayinyā prasthito māhiṣmatyāṃsūryodgamaṇaṃ sambhāvayate =
sūryam udgamayati*

“He who had set off from Ujjayanī (at sunrise) reaches/arrives at *Mahiṣmatī* (to his amazement that same morning), thus he thinks it is possible!” (optionally *ṇic* is applicable).

35.12 *nakṣatrayoge jñi //11//*

*nakṣatrayoge jñāty arthe krdantāṅ nijvaktavyaḥ / kṛlluk
prakṛtipratyāpattiḥ prakṛtivac ca kāraḥ bhavātīti / puṣpa-
yogaṃ jñāti puṣyena yojayati / maghābhir yojayatīti // tat
tarhīdaṃ bahu vaktavyam /*

Vārttika 11: *ṇic* acts in the sense of knowledge of the conjunction of an asterism/*nakṣatra*.

Bhāṣya: It should be stated that *ṇic* acts after a word ending in a *kṛt pratyaya* in the sense of knowing of the conjunction of an asterism. (It should be stated that) the *kṛt pratyaya* being *luk* elided, the base reverts to its original form and the *kāraḥ*/case becomes like that of the original expression. *puṣyo yogaṃ jñāti = puṣyena yojayati* “He knows the (time of) the conjunction (of the moon) with the asterism *puṣya* (optionally with *ṇic* lit. ‘He causes conjunction with the asterism *puṣya*’). *maghābhir yojayati* “He knows the (time of) the conjunction (of the moon) with the asterism *maghā*”. That much has

surely to be stated.

35.16 *na vā sāmānyakṛtatvād hetuto hy aviśiṣṭam //12//*

*na vā vaktavyam / kiṃ kāraṇam / sāmānyakṛtatvāt / sāmānye-
naivātra ṇibhaviṣyati hetumatīti / kiṃ kāraṇam / hetuto hy
aviśiṣṭam / hetuto hy aviśiṣṭam etad bhavati / tulyā hi hetutā
devadatte cāditye ca / na sidhyati /*

35.20 *svatantraprayojako hetusañjño bhavatīty ucyate na cāsāvādi-
tyaṃ prayojayati /*

Vārttika 12: Or else (this need not be stated) because (the *pratyaya ṇic*) is taught in (the sense of cause) in general. Indeed (whatever is enumerated) is not different from cause.

Bhāṣya: Or else it should not be stated. What is the reason? “Because (the *pratyaya ṇic*) is taught in (the sense of cause) in general. Here *ṇic* will be applicable only in the general sense ‘of that having a cause’. What is the reason? Because that which is mentioned is not distinguished from cause. For this is not different from cause, (thus this *ṇic*) is applicable. For the nature of cause in *Devadatta* and the sun is the same. That is not valid. For it is said that the technical name *hetu* (refers to) the prompter of the independent one. And that (one yonder) does not prompt or direct the Sun.

35.21 *svatantraprayojakatvād aprayojaka iti cen muktasaṃśayena
tulyam //13//*

*yaṃ bhavān svatantraprayojakaṃ muktasaṃśayaṃ nyāyyaṃ
manyate pācayaty odanaṃ devadatto yajñadatteneti tenaitat
tulyam / katham /*

Vārttika 13: If (it is said that) is not the prompter because he is prompter of an independent one, (this statement is equivalent to that made) by one who is free from doubt.

Bhāṣya: This is just like that (*Devadatta*) whom you properly think without doubt (to be) the prompter of the independent, one in the sentence *pācayaty odanaṃ Devadatto Yajñadattena* “Devadatta causes *Yajñadatta* to cook the rice”. This is like that (one who causes the Sun

to rise). How?

35.28 *pravṛttir hy ubhayatrān apekṣya //14/*

35.29 *pravṛttir hy ubhayatrān apekṣyaiva kiñcid bhavati devadatte
cāditye ca / neha kaścit paro 'nugrahītavya iti pravartate /*

36.1 *sarva ime svabhūtyartham pravartante /*

Vārttika 14: For the inclination (to do something) in both cases is irrespective (of anything).

Bhāṣya: The inclination (to do something) occurs in both cases in *Devadatta* and in the Sun irrespective of anything. There is nobody who is inclined to do something for another. All these act or proceed for the sake of their own welfare.

36.1 *ye tāvad ette guruśuśrūṣavo nāmā te 'pi svabhūtyartham eva
pravartante pāralaukikaṃ ca no bhaviṣyatīha ca naḥ pṛīto
gurur adhyāpayiṣyatīti / tathā yad etad dāsakarmakaram
nāmaite 'pi svabhūtyartham eva pravartante bhaktaṃ cailam
ca lapsyāmahe paribhāṣās ca na no bhaviṣyantīti / tathā ya ete
śilpino nāma te 'pi svabhūtyartham /*

36.5 *pravartante vetanaṃ ca lapsyāmahe mitrāṇi ca no bhaviṣyantīti // evam eteṣu sarveṣu svabhūtyartham pravartamāneṣu*

Those who obey/serve their teacher indeed even they (in truth) act for the sake of their own welfare (under the belief) 'and for us there will be (attainment of) the world beyond and the teacher pleased with us will teach us'. Similarly indeed whosoever is a servant doing his (master's) work, they too act for the sake of their own welfare (with the idea) "and we shall obtain food and clothing and there will not be any reproofs for us". Similarly indeed those called artisans, they also act for the sake of their own welfare, (with the idea) "we shall receive wages and for us there will be (many) friends". So thus, in all these (examples) when they are acting for the sake of their own welfare, (then applies the next *vārttika*).

36.7 *kuvartaḥ prayojaka iti cet tulyam //15//*

*yadi kaścit kurvataḥ prayojako nāma bhavati tenaitat tulyam //
yadi tarhi sarva ime svabhūtyarthaṃ pravartante kaḥ
prayojyārthaḥ / yad abhiprāyeṣu sajjante / īdṛṣau vardhrau
kuru īdṛṣau puṭakau kuru / ādityaś cāsyābhiprāye sajjāte /*

Vārttika 15: (This) is equivalent (to saying) that (hetu) is the prompter of one who does something.

Bhāṣya: If something is the prompter of the one who is already doing, really that is equivalent to (saying that he is) the *hetu*. If then all these acts are for the sake of their own welfare what is the sense of *prayojya* “to be prompted”? Since they are intent on (fulfilling his) intentions e.g. “Make two leather bands like this”, “Make two water-cups (from leaves) like this”, (they become *prayojya*). The sun is also intent on fulfilling its purpose.

36.10 eṣa tasyābhiprāya ujjayinyāḥ prasthito māhiṣmatyāṃ sūryodgamanam sambhāvayeyeti taṃ cāsyābhiprāyam ādityo nirvartayati // bhaved iha vartamānakālatā yuktā syāt ujjayinyāḥ prasthito māhiṣmatyāṃ sūryodgamanam sambhāvayate sūryam udgamayātīti tatrasthasya hi tasyāditya udeti / iha tu katham vartamānakālatā kaṃsa ghātayati baliṃ bandhayātīti cirahate kaṃse cirabaddhe ca balau /

This is his intention, that one having set off from *Ujjayanī* (at night) be able amazingly to be at *Mahiṣmatī* at sunrise. *sūryodgamanam sambhāvayate* (or with *nic*) *sūryam udgamayati* (c.f. *Vārttika 10*). Here it may be that the present time would be appropriate in this case: Having set off from *Ujjayanī* he contemplated on the sunrise at *Mahiṣmatī* (optionally with *nic* lit. ‘He causes the sun to rise’, c.f. *Vārttika 10*). For indeed the sun rises for him standing there in that place. But how is it the present time here: “He tells the story of the killing of *Kaṃsa* (c.f. *Vārttika 6*) “He tells the story of the binding of *Bali*” (c.f. *Vārttika 6*) When *Kaṃsa* was killed long ago and *Bali* was bound long ago?

36.15 atrāpi yuktā / katham / ye tāvad ete śobhanikā nāmaite pratyakṣam kaṃsam ghātayanti pratyakṣam ca baliṃ bandhayantīti / citreṣu katham / citreṣv apy udgūrṇā nipatitāś ca

*prahārā drśyante kaṃsakarṣaṇyaś ca / granthikeṣu katham
yatra śabdagrathagaḍumātram lakṣyate / te 'pi hi teṣām
utpattiprabhrtyā vināśādṛddhīrvyācakṣāṇāḥ sato buddhi-
viṣayān prakāśayanti / ātaś ca sato vyāmiśrā hi drśyante /*

Here too it is appropriate. How? Those who indeed are actors (*śobhanika* or *śaubhika*) cause the killing of *Kaṃsa* (i.e. enact it) and causing the binding of *Bali* by re-enacting it before the eyes. How then (is the present time possible when the story is portrayed) in pictures? Also in a picture, blows raised and fallen are seen, and the tormenter of *Kaṃsa* viz. *Kṛṣṇa*. How then in books (is the present time possible) where (the story) seems a mere superfluous excrescence, as an artificial stringing together of words? (*śabda grantha gaḍḍa matram 5.1. śabda gaḍumatram*) For they also express success or prosperity from birth up to final destruction and make clear matters comprehensible by reason. And for this reason they are seen mixed together as being.

*36.19 kecit kaṃsabhaktā bhavanti kecid vāsudevabhaktāḥ / varṇānya-
tvam khalv api puṣyanti / kecid raktamukhā bhavanti kecit
kālamukhāḥ / traikālyam khalv api loke lakṣyate / gaccha
hanyate kaṃsaḥ / gaccha ghāniṣyate kaṃsaḥ / kiṃ gatena
hataḥ kaṃsa iti //*

Some are devotees of *Kaṃsa* some devotees of *Vāsudeva* (*Kṛṣṇa*). Also they display changes of colour indeed. Some having black faces, some having red faces. The 'Three times' (past present and future tenses) indeed are also indicated in the world. "Go, *Kaṃsa* is slain" (present); "Go, *Kaṃsa* will be slain" (future); "What point in going, *Kaṃsa* was slain" (Past).

*iti śrībhagavatpatañjaliviracite vyākaraṇamahābhāṣye
tritīyasyādhyāyasya prathame pāde dvitīyam āhnikam //*

Here ends the second *Āhnika* in the first *pāda* of the third *adhyāya* in the *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya* composed by the blessed Lord *Patañjali*.

Notes on *MahāBhāṣya* on *Pāṇini 3.1.26*

Vārttika Summary

In the first *vārttika* *Kātyāyana* explains the purpose of the seventh case in 'hetumati' as for understanding the meaning of the *pratyaya nic* just 'in the sense of having a cause just as 3.1.76 says 'śnu acts after *dhātu takṣ* 'in the sense of paring ...'

The second *vārttika* states that *hetu* is known to be in the sense of mere efficient cause because of the way it is used in connection with *bhikṣā* etc. However, the next, sub-*vārttika* states the exception that *nic* does not act in this sense after *kṛṣi* etc. The third *vārttika* expresses why, there is not arising of *nic* after *kṛṣi* etc. because of their having a variety of verbal activities connected with them.

The sub-*vārttika* having stated there is no interchange of *pada* in the case of *yaj* etc. in the fourth *vārttika* he explains the reason is because they have a variety of verbal activities connected with them.

The fifth gives an additional sense of *nic* after *sūtra* etc. in the sense of making or doing that. In the sixth, not only another sense is given 'that of he relates that' when *nic* acts after a story ending in a *kṛt*, but that is *luk* and the word restored to its original form and case relationship.

The seventh is a prohibition of *nic* in that sense after the word *akhyāna*. However, the eighth ordains *nic* when the purpose of telling the story is for visualising something.

The ninth *vārttika* ordains *nic* when expressing a continuous period of time up to a specific limit and *lopa* of *an*. The tenth says *nic* acts when there is surprise at reaching somewhere.

In the eleventh we learn that *nic* acts in the sense of knowledge of the conjunction of an asterism.

Or else the twelfth states *nic* is taught in the sense of cause in general. The thirteenth shows that even if it is stated, one is not the prompter because actually the prompter is an independent one, this is in fact a statement of one in truth free from doubt. The fourteenth says, in both cases the inclination to do something is irrespective of anything. Finally in the fifteenth he says this is equivalent to saying *hetu* is prompter of one who does something.

Bhāṣya Summary

Patañjali introduces the first *vārttika* by distinguishing the two possible meanings of *hetumati*; one 'when the sense of having a cause is to be expressed,' by the *pratyaya*; the other based on interpreting seventh case in the sense of 'with regard to'. (*nic* acts after that *dhātu/prakṛti* which occurs 'with regard to having a cause').

Having explained the meaning of the first *vārttika*, he deals with the problem of using 3.1.76 to explain the meaning of seventh case in *hetumati*, that this implies a qualification of the meaning of *prakṛti*.

Even if the qualification of *prakṛti* may be implied, the point is *nic* will not be applicable if the meaning has already been expressed by the *prakṛti*, as *uktaḥ karoti*. The problem of *la* having to express two agents does not occur if *nic* qualifies the *pratyaya*, because *la* expresses principal agent and third case subordinate agent, as *pacayatyodanam devadatto yajñadattena*. Here in fact *karman* does not obtain by 1.4.52 because that *sūtra* restricts its scope to the elements mentioned, thus excluding *pac* etc. Next he points out in relation to 2.3.12 the impelling does not require *nic*, therefore not preventing the choice of second and fourth case, because the impelling is distinguished by a *kāraka*, as *grāmaṃ grāmāya gaccha*. Similarly the objection is that sixth case would not apply as desired by 2.3.35 for *edhodaka*, but in fact it is the object of *kr* and not of *kāri*, which contains the non-causative form within itself, as it were. Again in relation to *bhedika* etc. the purpose of mentioning *kṛt* in 2.3.65 was so that sixth case is applicable even when an agent in a former time is denoted. Lastly in relation to 8.3.65 a change of *s* to *ṣ* is not prevented because the action is urged on after the change caused by the *upasarga* has taken place in the non-causal state.

Patañjali now turns to the meaning of *pac* etc. and concludes it is not only the softening of the grains, but that impelling or asking form part of the meaning *pāci*. The sense of *hetumat* is 'He whose agent is the cause'.

On the second *vārttika* he provides the sentences to illustrate and raises the central issue how *bhikṣā* etc. without consciousness can impel etc. However, just as one sitting silently may impel action by his mere presence so we say *bhikṣā* or *kariso 'gñiḥ* may be said to impel.

Turning to why the imperative does not require *nic*, he points out this is because the one commanding is not the agent, for that is expressed by *loṭ pratyaya*. Ordering etc. already being expressed by *loṭ nic* only applies to express a second impelled agent.

On the sub-*vārttika* he explains there is absence of *nic* exceptionally in spite of the implication that 'He ploughs' means 'He causes ploughing ...'. The fourth *vārttika* having provided the reason for the *kṛṣyādi* exceptions being there, (having a variety of meanings), *Patañjali* states another meaning of *kṛṣi* is 'the managing activities associated with ploughing'.

On the same pattern the next sub-*vārttika* states the fact that there is no interchange of *pada* for *yaj* etc., *Patañjali* giving the necessary example. The fourth *vārttika* then provides the reason, again because of the variety of activities associated with *yaj* etc. So *Patañjali* points out *yaj* can also mean renunciation or abandoning.

The *bhāṣya* on the fifth *vārttika* explains how when the *vākya* requires sixth case for *vyākaraṇasya* etc. but with *nic* second case. This is because there is first *sāmarthyam* between *kr* expressed by *nic* and *vyākaraṇa*.

On the sixth *vārttika* he simply provides the explanatory example.

The *bhāśya* on *vārttika* seven having explained with the example, extends *nic* after all narrations of action not just names of tales.

The *bhāśya* on the eighth apart from explaining that *kṛt luk* etc. occur here too, implies that the visualising evoked in the listener of deer etc., only requires *nic* when what is described is beyond the ordinary range of sight. Still in the context of tales and *kṛt luk* etc., *Patañjali* simply gives the two possible sentences.

In order to express amazement *nic* and the same *kṛt luk* etc. occur, as expressed by the tenth *vārttika* and *bhāśya*. Again on the eleventh, *Patañjali* simply adds that *kṛt luk* etc. occur and provides the examples showing knowledge of conjunction of an asterism.

The *bhāśya* on the twelfth *vārttika*, to illustrate what is meant by causal in general, says that “the cause in *Devadatta* is not different to that in the sun; but no-one ‘prompts the sun’, surely?” The rejoinder on the thirteenth is that the prompters are similar, for the inclination to proceed for their own welfare applies irrespectively. *Patañjali* develops this discussion on the fourteenth *vārttika* illustrating how students, servants, artisans etc., though they serve, all act for the sake of their own welfare. If so then each is intent on its own purpose, *Patañjali* says on the fifteenth. So in the example of one setting out from *Ujjayinī* he apparently causes the sun to arise at *Mahiṣmātī*.

Patañjali turns to the problem of time in the telling of stories etc., in plays, pictures or books. How is the present time possible? In fact all three times are depicted as well as all colours etc. All matters are made comprehensible by reason.

Kaiyata's Pradīpa: on hetumati ca 3.1.26, Bhāśya 31.6.

kr̥trimasya paribhāśikasya prayojakasyeha hetor grahaṇam/

This here is a mention of *hetu* in an artificial and technical (sense) ‘prompter of the action’ (not the ordaining in ordinary popular sense as in the *sūtra tatprayojake hetuś ca 1.4.55*’).

tadīyo vyāpārah preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇa tatsamarthācaraṇalakṣaṇo hetumān iha grhyate/

The word *hetumān* here is understood as such an activity which is characterised by sending, directing or commanding (*preṣaṇa*) solicitation, asking for instruction (*adhyeṣaṇa*) or expressing the capacity/ability (*tat samarthācaraṇa*).

na tu sakalakāraśādhyaṇādyapekṣaḥ prayojakasya hetuvyapadeśo na tu tadarthāvāntarasvasādhyapreṣaṇādyapekṣaḥ/

Surely the designation *hetu* is for the prompter of the action with regard to the causing of cooking etc. to be accomplished by all the *kāraśas*, but not with regard to the action of directing to be accomplished by itself intermediate to that purpose (of cooking etc.).

Pra.: cont. yathā kāṣṭhasya pākāpekṣam karaṇatvaṃ na tu jvalanāpekṣam/

As the instrumentality of wood has regard to the cooking, but not with

regard to the flaming of it.

tadapekṣantu kartṛtvam eval tataś ca pākāder eva hetumadvyapadeśo yukto na tu preṣaṇādeḥ/ naiṣa doṣaḥ/

But with regard to that (flaming) there is only agentship and thence for cooking etc. only the designation *hetumat* (having a cause) is appropriate not for directing sending etc. This is no fault.

nicprakṛtyā dhātunaiva tasyārthasya prakāśitatvāt prayojanābhāvāt tatraivārthe ṅiconutpādāt/

Due to its meaning being manifested by the *dhātu* along with the base by *nic*, and due to the absence of cause there (and) from non-producing of *nic* in that meaning.

Pra.: prayojyo 'pi hetumacchabdena na grhyate tasya dravyatvāt nicaś ca svabhāvataḥ karaṇādhikād vā kriyāvācivitvāt/ tasmāt pariśeṣyātpākādyartha yaḥ preṣaṇādīlakṣaṇo labdhapākādyapekṣahetuvyapadeśahetutvopalakṣitaprayojakasādhyo vyāpāraḥ sa eva grhyate/

That to be used or communicated is also not understood by the word *hetumat*, because of its substantial nature. And from the nature of *nic* being within the province of the governing word *karaṇa* and from its nature of expressing verbal activity. As a consequence of that meaning of *pāka* and the rest, which is characterised by directing or sending etc., that alone is understood as the activity which is to be accomplished by the prompter/ impeller, characterised by the nature of cause (with the designation *hetu*) having regard to the acquired action of cooking etc.

Pra. on 31.7 katham iti/

yadā pacatīty ukte prayojyasādhyā eva vyāpāro gamyate/ na prayojakasādhyo 'pi tadā pratyayārthasya karaṇādhikāropasthāpitasya karaṇasya viśeṣaṇam hetumatīti sampadyate/ tadā tv an ekārthatvād dhātunām tādarthyād vādhiśrayaṇādivat/ prayojakavyāpāro 'pi pacādivācyo bhavati yathā pañcabhir halaiḥ kṛṣatīti tadā prakṛtiviśeṣaṇapakṣo bhavati/ tadā tu nicpratyaayo dyotakah sampadyata iti akṣadvayasya sambhavād doṣadarśanāc ca praśnaḥ/

When it is stated 'He cooks', only the activity which has to be commissioned to be accomplished has not even a purpose to be accomplished, then *hetumati* is produced as a qualification of the cause (sense of making); which has been caused to stand beside the governing rule as '*kāraka*' for the meaning of the *pratyaya* (*nic*). But when due to the many meanings of *dhātus* or having that same meaning, then even the mention of the prompter like that of putting (fuel) on the fire etc. is to be expressed by *dhātu pac* etc. Just as 'He ploughs with five ploughs' (means he causes five teams to plough) then is applicable the view that *hetumati* is a qualification of the base. But then *nic pratyaya* is (only) illuminating meaning. Thus the question arises from this possibility and from perception of a fault.

Pra. on 31.13 hetumata iti

hetumadarthābhidhāyina ity arthaḥ/

“The meaning is ‘expressing’ (*kāraka* relationship).”

Pra: kārakopādānam iti/ mentioning of *kāraka*

kārakaśabdena pratyayārtha ucyate sa hi pratyayaṃ karoti niṣpādayati/

By the word *kāraka* is expressed the meaning of the *pratyaya* (*nic*). For that makes the *pratyaya* (meaningful) or brings about or accomplishes its function of being instrumental in accomplishing the action as directing etc.

Pra. on 31.13 pratyayārtha iti/

“The meaning of the *pratyaya* (*nic*).”

pratyayasyārthaḥ prayojanaṃ sa suṣṭhu parigrhītaḥ paripūrṇo bhavati, vācakatvāt pratyayasya/ prakṛtviśeṣaṇe tu pratyayasyānuvādatvād dyotakatvāt prayojanam aparipūrṇam syād ity arthaḥ/ atha vārtho ’bhidheyam ucyate sa cānvayavyatirekāśrayavyavasthatvād preṣānādīḥ pratyayasyaiva na prakṛter iti suṣṭhu parigrhīto vyavasthāpito bhavati/

The meaning of the *pratyaya* is cause; that is well grasped and accomplished (perfect, a whole) because of the *pratyayas* expressing (the primary meaning directly). The meaning is that ‘however when it, *hetumati*, is a qualification of the *prakṛti* (base), because of its (merely corroborative nature) illuminating or making clear (the meaning of the base, the cause would not be accomplished’. Or else the meaning is said to be that expressed, and that through the nature of resorting to the method of agreement and difference, directing etc. is firmly established as the meaning of the *pratyaya* alone and not of the *prakṛti* (base).

Pra. on 31.15 yathā tanūkarāṇa iti

As for example, *śnu* acts after *dhātu takṣ* in the sense of making thin, paring.

yadā vikaraṇārthāḥ kartrādaya iti pakṣas tadā tanūkarāṇaśabdena kartābhidhīyate tadā sādharmaṇa drṣṭāntaḥ/ yadā tu sārvaadhātukārthāḥ kartrādaya iti pakṣas tadā vaidharmaṇa drṣṭānta iti vyākhyānam/ yathā tanūkarāṇaṃ prakṛtyartha na tathā hetumad vyāpāra ity arthaḥ/

When the point of view is that ‘the meaning of the *vikaraṇa pratyaya* is agent etc.’, then by the word *tanūkarāṇa* the agent is designated (‘what makes attenuated or pares’), then that is an example by (the method of) sameness of nature/homogeneousness. However, when the view is that the *sārvaadhātuka pratyayas* have the meaning of agent etc., then the example is by (the method of) difference or heterogeneity. This is the exposition (here). As *tanūkarāṇa* is the meaning of the base, not so is the activity having a cause/*hetumat* (the meaning of the base). This is the meaning.

Pra. on 31.15 paras tu sādharmaṇa drṣṭāntaṃ sārvaadhātukatvaṃ ca kartādīnāṃ manyamāna āha – yadīti/

However, further thinking on the example by similarity and the *sārvadhātuka* nature of the agent and the rest he says, 'If then like that this is qualification of the meaning of the *prakṛti* base ...

Pra. on 31.15 astv iti/

"Let it be (qualification of the *prakṛti*/base)."

vināpi nicā pañcabhir halaiḥ kṛṣati iti prayojakavyāpārāvagamāt prakṛtyarthatvaṃ hetumata upapadyate/ pacatītyātau dyotako ṇij nāstīti tadapratipattir iti bhāvah/

The sense is, even without *nic* from the understanding of the activity of prompter/causer (in the example) 'He ploughs with five ploughs', it is possible for *hetumat* to be the meaning of the *prakṛti*. However, the fact that "in the case of *pacati* 'He cooks' etc. there is (not applicable) *nic* as (merely) illuminating (the meaning of the base)" it is not ascertained or understood.

2.31.13 *vā° I yathā tanūkarāṇe takṣah/*

There is some doubt as to whether it means 'like *tanūkarāṇa*' or 'unlike *tanūkarāṇa*'. See note on *Pradīpa*.

2.31.18 *Pradīpa on uktaḥ karotīti/*

"(Qualification of *prakṛti* - here *nic* obtains) 'He who was told, does ... '."

2.31.19 *svaśabdenoktatvāt/*

'because already expressed by the word itself'

c.f. *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ*

'There is non-employment of these words already expressed' Vyādi Pari. 51.

31.20 *yatretil/*

"Where (there is no understanding of the meaning without the word)."

Pra.: yasyārthasya dyotanāya ṇij vidhīyate sa yadāśabdāntarāvagato bhavati tadā prayojanābhāvāṇ ṇij na bhavatīty arthaḥ/

The meaning is "that for illuminating whose meaning *nic* is ordained when another word is understood (which is *vācaka* - *Nāgeśa*) then due to the absence of cause *nic* is not applicable."

31.22 *ubhayor iti/*

"expression of both agents (by the *la* tense *pratyaya* becomes wrongly applicable)."

Pra.: dhātuvācyasya vyāpārasya kartari lakāreṇotpattavyam/ yadā ca pacinā dvayor api prayojyaprayojakayor vyāpāro 'bhidhīyate nic-pratyayaḥ kevale svārthikatvāt prayojakavyāpārasya dyotakas tadā

dhātuvācyavyāpārasāmīyāt kartror api sāmīyam iti dvayor apy abhidhānaṃ syāt tataḥ pācayato devadattayajñadattāv iti prasajyetety arthaḥ/

When agent of the activity to be expressed by the *dhātu*, is to be mentioned (produced) by the *la* (tense *pratyaya*), and when the activity of the two, both cause/prompt and that to be caused/prompted is expressed by *dhātu pac*; because of the *svārthika* nature (expressing the meaning of its base) when on its own, *ñic pratyaya* is the (mere) illuminator of the activity of the prompter/causer; then because of the similarity of the action to be expressed by the *dhātu* directly, there is also similarity for the two agents. Thus there would be designation even for both. The meaning is that ‘the form *pācayate-Devadatta-Yajñadattau* (*Devadatta* and *Yajñadatta* both cause to cook) would be wrongly applicable.

2.31.22 *kartror lenābhidhānaṃ prāpnoti/*

expression of both agents obtains (though undesired) by *la*.

la is replaced by *tiñ vibhakti pratyaya/verbal ending*

lasya 3.4.77 *tip tas jhi ... mahiñ* 3.4.78

Here the *ti* of *pacati*

By *laḥ karmani ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ/* 3.4.69

“The ten tenses or mood *pratyayas* called *la* act in denoting *karman/object* and *kartr/agent* and after intransitive *dhātus* denote *bhāva/abstract notion* of the *dhātu* and *kartr* (agent).”

31.23 *pradhānakarteti/*

“The principal agent (is expressed by the *la* (tense *pratyaya*)).”

Pra.: prakṛtyarthopasarjanatvān nyarthasya prādhānyāttasya kartāpi pradhānam iti bhāvaḥ/

The sense is because of the meaning of the *prakṛti* being subordinate (and) the principal nature of the meaning of *ñi* its agent is also principal.

31.24 *gamita iti/*

Yajñadatta caused *Devadatta* to go to the village.

Pra.: prayojakavyāpārasya gamivācyatvāt tasya kartari prayojake ktaḥ prāpnotīty arthaḥ/ prayojyasya tu karmatvāt tatraiva kta iṣyate/ taduktam apradhāne duhādīnāṃ kartuś ca karmaṇa iti/ 1.4.51, 1.335.15 – 16

The meaning is, because of the activity of the prompter having its nature to be expressed by *dhātu gam*, *cta pratyaya* obtains in the sense of its agent, as prompter/causer. However, because of the nature *karman/object* pertains to that to be prompted/caused, there in fact *cta* is desired. That was stated (by *Bhāṣya* on 1.4.51) when ‘it should be stated *la* and the rest are applicable in the sense of subordinate object of *duḥ* (to milk) etc. (*śloka vārttika*) (and further connection with *ñi* causative stem *la* etc. are expressers of the *karman/object* (which was) the *kartr/agent*.’ (on *akathitam ca* 1.4.61)

2.31.24 *kartarīty eva tṛtīyā/*

‘Third case alone is employed in the sense of agent.’

by *kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā* 2.4.3.18

‘In denoting agent (*svatantraḥ kartā* 1.4.54) or instrument (*sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam* 1.4.42) when not otherwise expressed (by the verb ending) ‘*anabhihite*’ 4.3.1 the third *vibhakti pratyaya/case* is employed.’

2.31.25 *avyatirikta gatyarthah/*

Not separated from the (causative) meaning ‘made to go’, obtains in the sense of the agent.

i.e. *gam + nic* which is the base of *gamita* does contain ‘*gam*’ which is not different from or separate from *gam + nic*.

2.31.25 *kartari kataḥ kartari prāpnoti/*

gatyartha akarmakaśliṣaśtīsthā satasajanarūhajīryatibhyāś ca 3.4.72

“The *pratyaya kta* acts in denoting the agent, act and object after verbs of motion, after intransitive *dhātus* and after the *dhātus* implying *sthā* (stand), *ās* (sit), *vas* (dwell), *jan* (be born), *ruh* (mount), and *jī* (grow old);” but in fact by

31.25 *gatibuddhipratyavasānarthaśabdakarmākarmakānām anikartā saṅaul* 1.4.52

“For *dhātus* having the sense of motion, knowledge or information and eating, and for those that have a literary work as object and for intransitive *dhātus* that which was agent in the non-causal state is called *karman* in the causative state when followed by *ni*.”

2.32.3 *tasminn īpsā/*

‘He has a desire related to him’

karturīpsitatamaṃ karma/ 1.4.49

“That which is most desired to be obtained for the benefit of the agent, is the *karman/object* in relation to the action.”

2.32.4 *dviṭyācaturthyau na prāpnotah/*

The second and fourth cases do not obtain.

Pradīpa: The sense is that both the village and the one prompted are *karman/object* of that *dhātu* having the *ni/causative* meaning.

Pra.: *śaṣṭhī na prāpnoti/*

The sense is because of the meaning of *ni/causative* having or expressing the nature of *karman*. However, it is because of resorting to *kr* there is augment *su-ṭ* even when the *pratyaya ni* has arisen and because of the proximity of its form, sixth case is established; for that has not impelled or caused to move.

Pra: *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti* 2.3.65

“The sixth case *pratyaya* acts after a word in denoting the agent and the object when used along with a *kṛt* (*kṛd-atiñ* 3.1.93) *pratyaya*.”

2.32.22 c.f. *bhāvakarmanoḥ* Si. 2679

dvikarmānām prayojyakarmanyanyeṣāṃ nyantānām lādayo matāḥ/
“For other causative *dhātus* with two objects the *la* etc. (tense *pratyayas*) are added in relation to the *prayojya* or ‘subordinate’ object.

See *Bhāṣya* p. 153.2 *prakṛtiviṣeṣanapakṣe yathā prakṛtyabhihite prayojakavyāpāre ṅibhavaty evam uktapreṣitādiśabdābhihite 'pi prāpnoti hetumadviṣeṣaṇatvāt karoty arthasya/ pratyayārtham viṣeṣanapakṣe tūktārthatvān ṅibhāvāḥ/*

As the view of the *hetumat* as qualification of *prakṛti* (base), *ṅic* is applicable when the sense of the activity of prompter is expressed by the *prakṛti*. So when it has already been expressed by the word *preṣita* (impelled) etc. it obtains because of *karoti*'s meaning as a qualification of having a cause/*hetumat*. However, when the view is that *hetumat* is a qualification of the meaning of the *pratyaya*, because the meaning has already been expressed, there is absence of *ṅic*.

Pra. on 31.26 *vyatibhedayanta iti/*

‘They are bursting forth together on each other simultaneously.’
prayojakavyāpārasya vyatīhāro na tu prayojyavyāpārasyeti draṣṭavyam/
Whether it is true, it should be seen (in usage), that the reciprocity is of the activity of the prompters but not of the activity of those prompted.

Pra. on 32.3 *bhavati hīti/*

nyarthasya prādhānyāt tadvyāpāreṇevīpsitatamatvāt prayojyasyety arthāḥ prakṛtyarthaviṣeṣaṇetve tu dvayor api prayojyaprayojakavyāpārāyor ekadhātu vācyatvād dhātuvācyavyāpārāpekṣayā dvayor api kartṛtvāl lenābhidhānam prāpnotīti doṣa uktaḥ/

The meaning is: “Because of the meaning of *ṅi* being principal by reason of its activity (and) because of that prompted having the nature of being that most desired to be obtained (by the agent). However, when there is the application of the qualification of the meaning of *prakṛti* (by *hetumati*) because of the nature of the two, namely the activity of the prompted and the prompter, having to be expressed by one *dhātu*, and because of the nature of agent also (being) for both with regard to the activity to be expected by the *dhātu*, a fault is stated, namely that designation by *la* (a tense *pratyaya*) obtains.”

32.5 *grāmaṃ gamayattī/*

‘He causes (him) to go to the village.’

Pra: *nyarthasyaiva grāmaḥ prayojyaś ca karmeti bhāvāḥ*

The village pertains in fact to that having the meaning of *ni* (because of being principal etc. *Nāgeśa*) and that to be prompted is the *karman*/object.

Pra. on 32.6 *ṣaṣṭhī na prāpnotīti/*

‘The sixth case does not obtain (although desired).’

*nyarthasya karmatvād iti bhāvaḥ suṭ tu karotidhātṽśrayatvān nījutpattāv
api tadrūrapasannidhānāt sidhyaty eveti tannācudat/*

The sense is, because of the meaning of *ni* having the nature of *karman*/object. However, an augment *suṭ* because of resort to (dependence) on the *dhātu kr*, even when *nic* arises, due to its proximity to that, in fact is established as valid. (Thus it did not impel or cause to move.)

32.7 *prayojye kartari iti/*

“(Sixth case does not obtain) in the sense of agent to be prompted or compelled.”

Pra.: tasyā prādhānyād iti bhāvaḥ/

The sense is because of its not being principal *karṭṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā 2.3.18 (anabhihite)* would be applicable.

abhiśāvayatīti/ He causes him to press out (the *soma*).

Pra.: nyarthasyopasargo viśeṣaka iti bhāvaḥ/ The sense is that the *upasarga* is a (qualifying) attribute of the meaning of *ni*.

32.11 *eteṣām eveti/*

“For these (*dhātus*) alone (not ending in *ni* that which is agent in the non-causal state has *karman* applicable in the causal when *ni* follows).”

*Pra.: nyarthasya prādhānyāt tenepsitatamasya prayojyasya siddhā karma-
saṃjñā/ na ca svavyāpārāpekṣayā svātantryāt paratvāt karṭṛsaṃjñā prāp-
notīti yuktaṃ vaktum/ prayojyāpārasyā prādhānyāt pradhānā pradhāna-
vyāpārasaṃnidhau ca pradhānanimittasya kāryasya yuktatvāt/ niyamena
tu pradhānaprayuktakāryavyāvṛttau guṇanimittakāryasadbhāvāt karṭṛ-
tvam bhavaty eva taduktaṃ hariṇā/ guṇakriyāyām svātantryāt preṣaṇe
karmatām gataḥ/ niyamāt karmasaṃjñāyāḥ svadharmenābhidhīyatē/ iti
3.7.127*

“The technical name *karman* is established as valid for that prompted which is most desired to be obtained; therefore because of the meaning of *nic* being principal. And further it is not proper to say that the technical name agent obtains, because of ‘independence’ being subsequent with regard to its own activity.”

... Because of the activity of that to be prompted being non-principal and because of the non-suitability of the effect as cause of the principal in presence of the activity of the principal and the non-principal. However, when by a restriction there is turning away from the principal used operation and because of the existence of an operation which is a subordinate cause, agentship is in fact applicable (i.e. valid).”

That was stated by *Bhartṛhari*: “The agent who becomes the object of the act of prompting is called by his own characteristic (agent), because he retains his independence with regard to his own minor or subordinate action and also because of the restriction of the name (*karman*) (to special cases).”

32.13 *nāsāv iti/*

“That (person) is not (impelled by saying go to the village).”

Pra.: grāmaḥ prakṛtyarthasya karma na tu nyarthasyety arthaḥ/

The meaning is that village is the object/*karman* of the meaning of the *prakṛti* but not of the meaning of *ṇi*.

Nāgeśa: This is essential by reason of the *sakarmaka*/transitive nature of the *dhātu gam*, because of it expecting a *karman* and because of the expectation of a *karman* for that having the meaning of *ṇi* being quietened by reason of the object (being that) to be prompted.

32.14 *sādhnaviśiṣṭām iti/*

“(One impelled to do an action) which is distinguished by a *kāraka*.”

Pra.: grāma karmikāṃ gamanakriyāṃ prayojyaḥ preṣyati – prāpnoty arthaḥ/

The meaning is that ‘That one to be prompted impels the action of going to the village, which it has as its object’ obtains.

Pra. on 32.14 sa ca preṣyate prāpyate/

And that is obtained as ‘one is impelled’:

Nāgeśa questions *Kaiyaṭa*’s interpretation.

Pra. on 32.19 kartṛbhūtapūrvamātreṣṭi/

“So that sixth case be applicable even when an agent only in former time (is to be denoted).”

pradhānacare ’pi kartarīty arthaḥ/

The meaning is even when formerly he was principal agent.

Nāgeśa: “*Kaiyaṭa* says this because the nature of former time is not a possibility.”

32.21 *sunu abhīti/*

“(Change of *ṣ* for *s* does not obtain) when *abhi* is to join with *dhātu su-nu*.”

Pra.: na prayojyavyāpārasyābhimukhyam abhiśabdena dyotyate api tu prayojya vyāpārasyaivety arthaḥ/

The meaning is that ‘by the word *abhi* is not illuminated the presence of the action of the prompter but rather of the activity of that to be prompted only’.

32.23 *yuktaṃ punar iti/*

“It is proper to again to (consider the matter).”

Pra.: sandeha eva vicāranimittam nopapadyate/ anvayavyatirekābhyām bhūyodarśanaviśayābhyām pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇapakṣasyaivopapannatvād iti bhāvah/

The sense is that, doubt alone as the cause of deliberation is not proper, because of the nature of the view of *hetumati* as qualification of the meaning of the *pratyaya* (obtained through the method of ‘similarity and difference’ (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) having as its object of realization of truth seeing more).

32.25 *yāsāv itil*

“That (activity) which (softens grains of rice).”

tadarthatvāt kārakagrāmasya tadanantarac ca phalotpādād iti bhāvah/ taduktam hariṇā – antantaram phalam yasyāḥ kalpate tām kriyām viduḥ/ pradhānabhūtām tādarthiyād anyāsām tu tadākhyātā// iti Vākyapadīya 3.8.15 tatra yathādhiśrayaṇādayas tādarthiyāt pacivācyās tathā preṣaṇādir api dyotakas tu ṇij apeksyate ity arthaḥ/ na ca kāraṇam api tādarthiyāt pacyabhidheyatvaprayaṅgas teṣām akriyārūpatvād dhātoś ca kriyāvācivitvat/ viklittīś ca ’tra phalānantaravyāpāropalakṣaṇam iṣṭakāḥ pacantītyādau tasyā ’sambhavād ity āhuh/

The sense is because of village as *kāraka* having that purpose and immediately after that because of producing the fruit/result. That was stated by *Bhartṛhari* (quoted also on 3.1.22 *Vā. 1*). “That moment immediately after which the result is produced, they know to be the principal or primary action, the others are so called because they have that purpose (of producing the result).” The meaning there is that just as because of activities ‘putting on the fire’ etc. having that purpose (of cooking etc.) are thus to be expressed by the *dhātu pac*, similarly, the activities of impelling etc. also are (merely) illuminating (i.e. secondary) with respect to the *ṇic*. Nor is there the possibility of the *kāraka* having the meaning of the *dhātu pac*, due to being intended for not having that meaning, [both] because of their not having the nature of verbs and because of *dhātus* expressing verbal activity. Here softening (of the rice) is a synecdoche for the result immediately following. They say this because of the impossibility of such statements as ‘the bricks cook’ etc.”

Pra. on 32.25 pacyarthaḥ syād itil

“May (all) be part of the meaning of *pac*.”

sambhāvane liṅ/ sambhāvyaṭe pacyarthatvaṃ preṣaṇādeḥ/ ata eva saṃśayād vicāryaṃ pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇapakṣo bhāṣyakāraṇe sthāpitāḥ taddoṣāṇām parihrtatvāt pakṣāntare doṣāṇām cāparihārāt/ athavā prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣo ’pi sthāpitāḥ, tatpakṣabhāvinām doṣāṇām supariharatvāt/ tathā hi yaduktam dvayoḥ kartror lenābhidhānam prāpnotīti nāyaṃ doṣaḥ prakṛtyā prayojyavyāpāropasarjanasya prayojakavyāpārasyābhidhānāt tasyaiva ṇicā dyotanāt pradhāna eva kartari lo bhaviṣyati nāpradhāne ṇicā ca dyotakena pradhānabhūtagatyarthatvaṃ

niivartitaṃ gamanārūpasya pradhānasyārthasyābhidhānād iti nyantāt prayojakakartari lasyānutpattiḥ/ vyatibhedayanta ity atrāpi hiṃsanā-lakṣaṇaḥ pradhānaṃ dhātvartho na tu hiṃsārūpa ity ātmane pada-niṣedhābhāvaḥ

‘*Liṅ* (optative) in the sense of supposition/assumed. It is (thought) possible for impelling etc. to be part of the meaning of *pac-i*.’ Due to doubt, having considered (finally) the view of *hetumati* as a qualification of the *pratyaya*, it is settled/established by the *Bhāṣyakāra*, because of its faults being refuted and the faults of the other view not being refuted. Or else the view that (*hetumati*) is a qualification of the *prakṛti* is also established, because of the faults attached to that view being well refuted. For so what was said, ‘designation by *la* (tense *pratyaya*) obtains for both agents’. (This) is not a fault, because of the designation of the activity of the prompter of the subordinate activity of that to be prompted; due to its alone illuminating (meaning) together with *ṇic*, *la* will be applicable in relation to the principal agent alone, not to the non-principal, and prevented from having the meaning to go, when formerly principal (agent) with *ṇic* as illuminator, and expressing the meaning of principal as movement. Thus after that ending in a *ṇi* there is not arising of *la* in the sense of causative agent. ‘*Vyati bhedayante*’ – here too the meaning of the *dhātu* is principal, suggesting hurting but not as its nature, there being absence of prohibition of *ātmanepada*.

2.32.27 *atheti/*

“Now (what is the meaning of *matup*)?”

Kaiyaṭa: Although the meaning of sixth case and of seventh case is known with nature of the meaning of *matup*, still when there (is the characteristic of having) many meanings for the word *hetu*, due to not knowing (perceiving) the meanings of *hetu*, a question arises because of *matup* which is characteristic of that (*hetu*) so is this also not perceived/known. But that exists in the sphere of *hetu* only because of (its) meaning.

32.27 *ko hetur iti/*

What is *hetu*?

What cause is the prompter? Now (it is stated as) mere efficient or instrumental cause.

32.24 *hetu karteti/*

‘The sense is that *hetu* is the prompter.’

33.5 *nāvaśyam iti/*

“It is not necessarily (the one who causes someone to stay by saying you may stay).”

The meaning is ‘the activity of the prompter is also the exercise of capacities and because of the dependence on the existence of that for the

accomplishment of the (success of) the action by the one prompted.

33.9 *prcchatu mā bhavān/*

‘Ask me a question, Sir,’

The questioner is the impeller, the prompter of the one to be prompted or commissioned. The question is why is not *nic* applicable in the sense of this activity? There is the possibility of alternatively *loṭ* or *nic*, because of having a single sphere (of application).

33.10 *akarṭṛtvāt/*

(*Nic* is not applicable because of the one commanding) not being the agent.

The meaning is ‘*Hetu* is said to be the prompter of the agent, the independent one (who has the system within himself). And the one to be prompted here is not the agent, so the prompter does not receive the technical name *hetu*.’

33.10 *tūṣṇīm iti/*

“(He remains) silent.”

The meaning is because of being devoid of activity/actionless, he does not even have the nature of being *kāraka* (in relation to the action), whence agentship which is a (mere) special form or (qualification) of that agentship, is in fact being mentioned or understood/held for that, as ‘be thou the agent of the action of questioning!’ Similarly, ‘be thou king (and) fight!’ thus kingship is ordained. However, he who is agent (having one) to be prompted, (whose) action has begun or is a possible action, for that prompter who is *hetu*, there is no *nic* applicable.

kiṃ ca bho iti/

“And, Sir, (should he only be agent at the present time)?”

Another having thought ‘By this one only, agentship for action of the present time was expressed.’

He (then) impels ...

2.33.12 *abhisambandha iti/*

A connection is made there.

He did this action. The meaning is the connection of the agent of the action of the past and future is established in past and future.

33.15 *atha katham iti/*

“Now the how, (when this one is not asking a question, does *prach* operate)?”

i.e. due to the impossibility of using the word when the meaning is not present.

33.15 *abhisambandha iti/*

“A connection (is made there. Do this action.)?”

The sense is that it is through the use of the word, even when the meaning remains in the mind, (the action) not existing outside.

33.17 *na ca karteti/*

“And thus the Agent is not (expressed).”

Because of the very nature of being ordained ... That was stated by *Bhartṛhari*

dravyamātrasya tu praiṣe prcchāder loṭ vidhīyate/
sakriyasya prayogas tu yadā sa viṣayo nicaḥ// 3.7.126

“The imperative (*loṭ*) is ordained after *dhātus* like *prcch*, when just the object is prompted. When the already active object is prompted, it comes within the sphere of *nic* (causative *pratyaya*).”

33.17 *athāpi/*

“Now even if (somehow there be an agent, there is no fault).”

The sense is ‘Even by assenting to the weak position, the rejection of *nic* is expressed ...’

33.18 *loṭoktatvād iti/*

“because already expressed by *loṭ*.”

From the point of view of a single sphere (of application) for *nic* and for *loṭ* etc. when *loṭ* arises, then because of being expressed by that alone, the *nic* for (expressing) impelling will not be applicable.

Bhā. (praiṣasya)

Pra. on 33.19 praiṣātisargaprāptakāleṣu kṛtyāś ca/ 3.3.163

“*Kṛtya pratyayas* and *loṭ* (imperative) act after *dhātus* in the sense of *nic* direction granting permission and proper time (particular time).”

“(By one sitting) in a deserted place it is said ... “

He shows the man’s incapability in respect of ploughing.

33.21 *tūṣṇīm āsīna iti/*

‘Sitting silently’

Expressing the absence of activity. Some one, due to exceeding strength might plough with five ploughs or alternatively to deny that (possibility) it was stated, ‘seated silently in a deserted place’. In that context from understanding that he causes ploughing of the ground by five others with ploughs, when *nic* is present *kṛṣati* (without *nic*) does not obtain (though desired). The meaning is that, non-arising of *nic* has to be stated.

33.25 *pratividhāne ’pi/*

“It also (occurs) in the sense of disposing/managing (the activity).”

The meaning is that, ‘because many meanings of *dhātus* (it is specifically stated that *nic*) occurs in indicating the exercise of that capacity in the

sense of the activity of a prompter after the *dhātu kṛṣ* alone. There is absence of *nic*, because of its meaning being revealed by the *dhātu* alone together with its subordinate accompanying word. And following the options allowed by *vibhāṣopapadena praṭṭyamāne 1.3.77 'ātmanepada pratyayas'* optionally act, when the part of the action occurring to the agent is indicated by the *upapada* (subordinate accompanying word)", there is absence of *ātmanepada*. However, when the *dhātu kṛṣ* occurs in the sense of ploughing (in the causative form), then in fact the form is 'He causes ploughing with five ploughs' using *nic* only.

33.19 *praiṣādiṣu/*

c.f. *praiṣātisargaprāptakāleṣu kṛtyāś ca (loṭ) 3.3.163*

"The *pratyayas* called *kṛtyā* and the *pratyaya loṭ* (imperative) act after *dhātus* in the sense of direction, granting permission and proper (particular time)."

34.1 *pra yajyadiṣv itil/*

"And in the case of *yaj* and the rest (no interchange of *pada*)."

Due to the *dhātu yaj*'s nature of expressing a particular kind of throwing (of oblation), and because of the agentship of the priest in relation to the throwing, and because of the sacrificer's nature as prompting agent, there is a rule to avoid the possibility of *nic* ...

34.3 *nānakriyā itil/*

"Various verbal activities (comprise the meaning of *yaj* and the rest)."

In that context by the resorting to the word *tyāga* (abandoning/donation) it is to be seen that whatever usage is different to that, is in the sense expressing throwing (of an oblation).

34.10 *iha vyākaraṇasyetil/*

"Here (in the sentence) he composes a *sūtra* of grammar/body of rules."

The word *vyākaraṇa* occurs either in the sense of *lakṣya śabda/word* (to that indicated) or *lakṣaṇa* ... (the collection of indications)/*sūtra/rules*. Thus sixth case is for the binding of the differences!

See *vārttika 18 Paś. Paś. vyākaraṇa* (means) *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa* also *vā. 14 sūtre vyākaraṇe ṣaṣṭhyarthe nopapadyate vyākaraṇasya sūtram/*

Bhāṣya: If *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra* (body of rules) then the meaning of the sixth case ending in *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* (the body of the rules of *vyākaraṇa*) cannot be justified. Because what other thing than *sūtra* could *vyākaraṇa* be that to which *sūtra* belongs?

Kaiyaṭa ṣaṣṭhyartha... since both the words *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra* stand for the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* there can be no *vyatireka* (genitive relation indicating separateness between them). But there is no contradiction in using them by

way of general and a particular word.

sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdatayā/

When, however, the word *vyākaraṇa* occurs in the sense of *sūtra* (body of rules it is *lakṣaṇa* in fact, then sixth case is cause of designating a secondary thing as principal (i.e. *sūtra* as whole grammar). When there is the same case relationship *vyākaraṇam sūtram karoti/* ‘He makes a grammar *sūtra*’, then just as *muṇḍayati māṇavakam* ‘He shaves the youth’ is valid, so similarly

vyākaraṇam sūtrayati/ “That (connection of the words *sūtra* and *vyākaraṇa* disappears).”

34.11 *yo sāv iti/*

In a sentence, by the word *sūtra* is expressed the form of the object (called) a *sūtra*/aphorism. However, when *ṇic* arises, because of going beyond the state of substantive it is possible for the word *sūtra* to be expressing the meaning of *karoti/to make*. That was stated ‘a complex formation (involves) designation of the meaning of another word’. And this was expressed by resort to the distinction coming from etymological formation. However, in reality, different from a *dhātu*, *sūtra* is a special kind of verbal noun, expressing verbal activity.

34.14 *ākhyānād iti/*

“After (a word expressing the name of) a story (*ṇic*).”

Ākhyānam is that which is told. Thus the formation is stated, communicated or declared.

prakṛtivad iti/

“(The word) restored to its original form.”

That which was the original form of *kaṅsavadha* and the rest, formed from *ṇic* like that (original too) is the *kāraka* relationship, that *kaṅsa* and the rest (had, should be restored to that original). The meaning is that ‘just as the nature of *karman* (is applicable) for *kaṅsavadha* etc. with regard to the action of telling (a story), so likewise for *kaṅsa* and the rest also, who have the condition of being the object of an unaccomplished (unascertained) tale. Also by extension of the condition of the original for *kaṅsa* and the rest, because of being separated (from *han* etc.). In the case of *kaṅsam aghātāyat* ‘He caused *kaṅsa* to be slain’ and the rest, when there is the technical name *aṅga* for *Hansa* and the rest, separated (from *vadha* etc.), *aṭ* augment and the rest are not applicable for *kaṅsa* and the rest. And because of producing *vat* (like), it is even applicable for resorting to its own original condition.

In the example, ‘He unites that with (knowledge of conjunction of the moon) with *Puṣya*’ there is no *karman* nature for *puṣya*. Or else *prakṛtivat* means occurring (existing) like the original, that is like the *prakṛti*.

Through resorting to ‘extending both ways’, being *kāraka* relation for

that ending in *ni*, somewhere someone is accepted (as agent). By reason of the restoration to the original in the case of 'the coming of the king'/ *rājāgamanam* etc. elision of *n* also ceases and (the proper form) obtained becomes '*rājānam āgamayati*' 'he causes the king to come'.

34.17 *kaṁsavadham itil*

"(He tells the story of) the killing of *Kaṁsa*."

Although here the cessation of the *ādeśa* (substitute) *vadha* is established, because of (the formulation of *Patañjali* on 4.1.36 *vā*. 4) *sanniyoga-siṣṭānām anyatarāpāye 'ubhayoraṇyabhāvaḥ* 'when there is departure of one of the remaining connections (in an operation) there is absence of both', nonetheless, because the cessation is not established as valid, due to the absence of having a remainder from the connection in place of the gutturals in the case of example

puṣyeṇa yogaṁ jānāti puṣyeṇa yojayati/

"He knows the (name of) the connection (of the moon) with the asterism *Puṣya*" (Where in the verbal form of *yuj* the *tālu*/palatal *j* is reverted to in this formation with *ṇic*). So it is stated "restoration to the original state (of *prakṛti*)". See *vā*. 11 in this *sūtra*.

34.29 *kiṁ punar itil*

"But (should there be the arising of *ṇic* only after these words which have become the names of tales ...)?"

The meaning is of tales like *kaṁsavadha* which have had *lopa* elision of *n* etc.

"When the function of the activity of telling the story is for the purpose of seeing/visualising something."

When one situated in a forest, having approached deer playing, relates "in this very place such kinds of deer play", then application of *ṇic* in the context of telling a story is applicable for the purpose of visualising what is to be explained.

dr̥ṣi ik kṛṣyādibhyaḥ vā° 8 dyoti 3.3.108

35.2 *yadā hi grāma itil*

"For (only) when in the village does he see playing of deer."

Because of the impossibility of deer in a village, there is not application of *ṇic* for the purpose of seeing them. And this 'when it is for the purpose of seeing' has to be seen as only having 'playing of deer etc.' as its sphere of application. However, in the context of 'the coming of the king' *rājāgamana* etc., even in the absence of application for the purpose of seeing, *ṇic* is applicable.

35.6 *vā° 9 arātrivivāsam itil*

"He tells a tale until daybreak."

The meaning is 'as long or until the finishing or passing of the night, so

long he tells the tale.”

Nāgeśa: The sense is that ‘*rātri*’ is the continuous period of time and the tale is the *ākhyāna* and the *karman/object*. Because of the intransitive nature of the *dhātu vas, gatibuddhi 1.4.52* etc. applies and therefore the *karman* nature of *rātri* applies when that having a cause/*hetumat* follows.
vā° 10

35.8 *citrīkarāṇa itil*

“(Nic acts) in the sense of surprise (at reaching a place).”

Here *nic* is to be stated when the sense understood obtains as causing surprise or wonder.

prāpītil

“When (there is) suspense at reaching (*nic*).”

by vā° 9 (on 3.3.108) *sampadādibhyaḥ kvip*

u in sense of *bhāva*

similarly *jñi* in vā° 11

35.10 *sambhāvayata itil*

“Thus he thinks it is possible.”

The form of this is derived from the tenth class *bhū ātmanepada*, in this sense of obtainment or attainment.

Dh. P. bhū cu° ā° se° 1945 prāptāv ātmanepadī vā° 11

35.14 *puṣyeṇetil*

“He knows the time of the moon’s conjunction with the *Puṣya* asterism.”

Puṣya is the agent of the action of conjoining for that connects with the moon. In that context, *sūtra ubhayaprāptau karmaṇi 2.3.86 (kṛti ṣaṣṭhi)* applies, whereby “when the agent and the object are denoted by words formed with *kṛt pratyayas* and both are employed in one sentence then the sixth case is only for the *karman/object*”. Due to that restriction, in the absence of sixth case there is a third case compounded as ‘*puṣyayoga*’. In that context because of the extension of ‘being like the original/*prakṛti iva*, the third case is applicable for expressing agent. However, the *la* (tense *pratyaya*) is in fact principal, so is applicable in the sense of (principal/agent not secondary) by extended application.

Pra. on 34.16 sāmānyakṛtatvād itil

“(This need not be stated because *nic*) is taught/formed (in the sense of cause) in general.”

The meaning is because of the correct forms being in fact established by the general rule alone.

35.19 *devadatte cetil*

“(For the nature of the cause) in *Devadatta* and (the sun is the

same).”

The meaning is the nature of cause of the other is the (same) sphere (of application) as that of *Devadatta*.

Pra. on 36.4 *pra paribhāṣā itil* ‘reproofs’
daṇḍanādikāḥ = verbal punishment

36.9 *yadabhiprāyeṣu itil*

“Since (they are) intent on (fulfilling) his intensions.”

That was stated by *Bhartṛhari*

nimittebhyaḥ pravartante sarva eva svabhūtayel

abhiprāyānurodho ’pi svārthasyaiva prasiddhayel 3.7.124

“For various reasons everybody in fact acts for his own welfare. Even conforming to the wish of another is really to fulfill one’s own purpose.”

36.9 *sajjanta itil*

“They are intent on”

Ātmanepada (here) because of *Patañjali*’s so stating it. However, in the *Dhātu Pāṭha śasja* is only *parasmaipada* with *gluṅcu* in the sense of movement.

36.14 *cirahata itil*

“When (*kaṅsa*) was killed long ago ...”

The meaning is, because of the impossibility of the nature of present (time) for the action of a prompter of the (condition of) killer/killing one being sentenced to death; however, when additional enumeration is begun there is no fault, because of the present nature of the story (being told).

2.36.15.4 *śobhanikā itil*

‘actors’ (*K.B.Iyer* ’T of) 12.10.69)

‘Interpreters to the audience of the dumb actors of shadow figures.’

Kaiyaṭa: Due to the female teacher’s explaining for the actors imitating *kaṅsa* and the rest. It is intended to express in the *Bhāṣya* that by the mind of the spectators, the actor imitating *kaṅsa* is understood as *kaṅsa*.

c.f. *K. Arth.* 2.27.25

naṭanartaka plavakaśaubhikācāraṇānām ...

Ś.Br. 13.3.3.7.8 *gandharvāḥ yuvāna śobhanāḥ apsarasa yuvavayāḥ śobhanā*

2.36.16 *kaṅsakarṣaṇya* c.f. V.1 *kanyasya kṛṣṇasya ca śabda gaḍumātram*
c.f. V.1 *gaḍaḍamātram*

36.17 *granthikeṣv itil*

“(How then) in books?”

The meaning is those who relate or recite stories.

36.17 *te 'pīti*

“For they also (explain ... by reason).”

This was stated by *Bhartrhari*

śabdopahitarūpāṃs tu buddher viśayatāṃ gatān/

pratyakṣam iva kaṃsādīn sādhanatvena manyate// 3.7.5

“One thinks of *kaṃsa* and the rest, whose forms are placed before (us, i.e. represented) by words and who became the objects of the mind’s eye, as being of the nature of instruments or means (for accomplishing the action), as though they were present before the eyes (in person).”

London

U.K.