GAṄGEŚA ON THE MEANING
OF VERBAL SUFFIXES (3)

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Introduction

The present paper represents the third part of my translation with annotation of the "Verbal Suffix Section" (Ākhyātavāda) of the "Language Chapter" (Śabdakhaṇḍa) of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (*TC*). The purpose of this project is to clarify the philosophy of language belonging to the early stage of Navya-nyāya.[1] This paper deals with the relation between the three tenses and the meaning of the suffixes of finite verbs, and Pāṇini's rule, i.e., *P*.3.4.69, which prescribes that those verbal suffixes denote the agent (*kartṛ*), object (*karman*), or action (*bhāva*). However, Gaṅgeśa represents the Grammarians as articulating only the first two meanings in order to facilitate the comparison between the Grammarians' and Naiyāyikas' views.

From the analysis of the "Verbal Suffix Section" we can understand the similarities between the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā views, in particular the view of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā on *P*.3.4.69. According to Yoshimizu [2006] [2007] [2012], the view of Bhāṭṭa school, represented by its founder Kumārila, differs from that of the later Bhaṭṭa school on *P*.3.4.69. Freschi [2008], who deals with the theory of the suffixes presented by the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, presents the views of Rāmānujācārya, who was active in the 14th or 16th century, based on his *Tantrarahasya*, Śāstraprameyapariccheda.[2] This text also criticizes the views of Kumārila, Maṇḍana Miśra, and

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Pārthasārathi Miśra. Gaṅgeśa criticizes the Prābhākara theory in Part C.5 which is dealt with in Wada [2012: 538].

Text, Commentary, and Contents

In translating the "Verbal Suffix Section", I have used the Sanskrit text included in:

> *Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya*, 4 Volumes, edited with the *Āloka* of Jayadeva Miśra and the *Rahasya* of Mathurānātha, by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa, Vrajajivan Prachyabharati Granthamala 47, Delhi: Chaukhamba Saskrit Pratishtan, 1990.

In this book, the "Verbal Suffix Section" is accompanied by Jayadeva's *Āloka*, and not by the *Rahasya*. I have consulted the *Āloka*.

The argument presented in the "Verbal Suffix Section" can be divided as follows.[3] Numbers in brackets refer to the page and line numbers of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya*, 4th Volume, 2nd Part.

A. Introduction: the presentation of the Nyāya view (pp. 819,1-820,1)

B. The Mīmāṃsā View (pp. 820,1-826,13)

C. The Nyāya Refutation (pp. 826,13-830,8)

D. The View of the Author of the *Ratnakośa* (pp. 830,9-831,13)

E. The Refutation to the Author of the *Ratnakośa* (pp. 831,13-833,1)[4]

F. The Grammarians' Refutation to the Nyāya View (pp. 833,1-834,4)[5]

G. The Nyāya Response to F (pp. 834,4-836,3)

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[3] Here I have slightly revised the division of the Sanskrit text presented in Wada [2006a: 73] [2007a: 415]. Accordingly, when I have referred to the Parts in the section on Basic Concepts in the present paper, I have made use of this revised division of the text.

[4] Since the author of the *Ratnakośa* is a Naiyāyika (D. Bhattacharya [1958: 76-78]), Part E turns out to be a refutation by other Naiyāyikas who hold that a verbal suffix denotes effort. It may not improper to regard Part E as Gaṅgeśa's refutation.

[5] I have hypothetically followed Bhatta [2005: 895] on who the advocate of Part F is. Bhatta [2005: 264-265] groups Parts F and G together and regards the opponents therein as the Grammarians. To be sure, the opponent in Part G is the Grammarian because of the sure sign "*iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ*"; but the opponent in Part F does not indicate a sure sign by which he can be judged to belong to a particular school. Part F discusses the meaning of verbal suffixes and the three tenses, and this issue is not limited exclusively to the Grammarian school. Part F may function as an introduction to the Grammarians' theory.

H. The Nyāya View in Detail (pp. 836,3-846,4)

Part H includes the views of traditional Nyāya[6] and new Nyāya as well as Gaṅgeśa's conclusion.[7] The present paper dealts with Parts F and G.[8]

Basic Concepts[9]

In order to understand the present translation and annotation, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the concept of *'ākhyāta'* (verbal suffix), effort (*yatna*, *prayatna*), the signifying function of a word (*vṛtti*), verbal understanding (*śābdabodha*, *śābdajñāna*), and meaning (*artha*). For lack of space, I will give only a brief explanation of them here.

(a) *ākhyāta*

The word *ākhyāta* has two meanings: the finite verb and the personal ending of the finite verb (*tiN* suffix).[10] Gaṅgeśa's argument with the Mīmāṃsā and Grammarian schools is confined to an analysis of the second of these two meanings. Unless otherwise specified, the suffixes he discusses are those used in the active voice and the present tense. He discusses the meaning of verbal suffixes used in the passive voice in Parts F and G of the "Verbal Suffix Section".

Navya-naiyāyikas including Gaṅgeśa hold that a verbal suffix denotes effort, while Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhaṭṭa School[11] hold that it

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6   It is a problem whether the 'traditional view of Nyāya' dealt with in Part H belongs to the Prācīna-nyāya or not. It may represent the Nyāya view held between the periods of Udayana and Gaṅgeśa. Since I regard Udayana as the founder of Navya-nyāya, the traditional Nyāya is pre-Gaṅgeśa Navya-nyāya. On the founder of Navya-nyāya, see my papers referred to in fn 1.

7   I do not claim that Gaṅgeśa's conclusion completely differs from the traditional and new views. In his conclusion Gaṅgeśa states only a few differences from them. It seems that he accepts whatever points he does not refute regarding those views.

8   The Sanskrit text of the Ākhyātavāda is divided according to the Parts of the translation. The divided texts are provided in the footnotes to those corresponding Parts with the following alterations: *karttṛ* → *kartṛ*, the same treatment for its declensions; *saṅkhyā* → *saṃkhyā*, the same treatment for its declensions; *saṅkhyeya* → *saṃkhyeya*, the same treatment for its declensions; *ākāṅkṣ-* → *ākāṃkṣ-*; *tātparyya* → *tātparya*.

9   This section is a reproduction of Wada [2007a: Basic Concepts] with minor alterations: fn. 17 is added here, and in (a) *ākhyāta* the first and second paragraphs are slightly revised.

10   On these two meanings, see Joshi [1993: 22]. He reports that the *Mīmāṃsā- nyāyaprakāśa* (*MNP*), which was written in the seventeenth century, uses the word in the second sense listed above. But the *TC* shows an earlier use of the word in this sense. On the *tiN* suffixes, see Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (*P*)3.4.78; Abhyankar and Shukla [1977: 197].

11   The view of the Prabhākara School is briefly referred to and refuted at the end of Part C.

denotes a productive operation (*bhāvanā*), whether internal or external.[12] Internal operation, which Navya-naiyāyikas regard as effort, occurs in the soul (*ātman*). External operation, which occurs in the body and things, is perceived by the sense organs. Navya-naiyāyikas generally call this operation action (*kriyā*). The Grammarians (*pāṇinīya*) argue that a verbal suffix denotes an agent.[13] Navya-naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas accept Panini's grammar in general, but when they disagree with the Grammarians, and with each other, they attempt to prove their own views by analyzing common linguistic usage, in this case the usage of the finite verb.

(b) Effort (*yatna, prayatna*)

Effort, which is regarded as the meaning of a finite verbal suffix by Navya-naiyayikas, is one of twenty-four kinds of qualities (*guṇa*), and we know of its existence in the soul through inference. Nyāya holds that knowledge or cognition (*jñāna*) causes desire (*icchā*), which produces effort, which in turn brings about action.[14] To understand the relation among cognition, desire, and effort, let us consider the case in which we quench our thirst with water. First, we must know that water can remove our thirst and recognize that there is some water within our reach. Second, we must have the desire to take and drink some water. If we have no desire, action does not take place. However, due to certain reasons we do not always take action immediately after we have such a desire. For instance, there may be dead insects in the water and so on. Hence, we can infer that there

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[12] The operation of Vedic injunctions is not discussed here. However, since the Mīmāṃsakas' method of interpreting sentences in common usage is based on their exegesis of Vedic sentences, we have to consider this exegesis in order to follow their arguments as presented in the "Verbal Suffix Section". On their exegesis, see Edgerton [1929]. The verbal suffixes of Vedic injunctions denote the word-efficient-force (*śabdībhāvanā*) which resides in the injunctions themselves. On the 'word-efficient- force', see *MNP*, no. 4 and Edgerton [1929: 40].

[13] To be precise, in Pāṇini's grammar a verbal suffix denotes an agent, an object, or — in the case of intransitive roots — action itself. See *P.3.4.69: laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ*. Vasu [1977(1891): 584] translates this *sūtra* as follows: "The tense-affixes called *la* are used in denoting the object and the agent; and after intransitive verbs, they denote the action as well as the agent". This means that when transitive verbs are used in the active voice, the suffixes denote the agent; when these verbs are used in the passive, the suffixes denote the object. On this issue, see also Cardona [1975: 266].

[14] For the causal relationship among these four, Marui [1987: 145-146 and notes 24, 26] gives two Sanskrit references and their explanation. One is from Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali (NKu)* 5.7: *pravṛttiḥ kṛtir evātra sā cecchāto yataś ca sā/ taj jñānaṃ ... //*, and the other from *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* (p. 74,1-4): *pravṛttiparavākyaśravaṇāntaraṃ prayojyasya tattadarthasam-bandhavyāpārānukūlāṃ ceṣṭāṃ paśyaṃs taṭasthaḥ svaceṣṭāyāṃ kṛteḥ kṛtau ca cikīrṣāyāś cikīrṣāyāṃ samānādhikaraṇasamānaviṣayakajñānasyaivāvadhṛtakāraṇabhāva iti prayojyasyāpi tatkāraṇībhūtaṃ jñānam anumāya tasya jñānasya vākyajanyatāpravṛttau janayitavyāyāṃ śabda-vyāpāratvam cāvadhārayati*. For a translation of the former passage, see Cowell [1980: 71] and N. Dravid [1996: 433].

must be an intervening factor which is produced by the preceding desire and which brings about the action of drinking. That factor is effort.

Note that effort can be also designated as resolution (*kṛti*) in the Navya-nyāya discussion on the meaning of a verbal suffix. Udayana states in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (*NKu*) that resolution is nothing more but effort, a statement quoted by Gaṅgeśa in Part B2 of his "Verbal Suffix Section".

(c) The signifying function (*vṛtti*)

Any meaningful linguistic unit, or morpheme, as well as any word possesses the signifying function and thus can mean something. Navya-nyāya accepts only two kinds of signifying function: the denotative function (*śakti*) and the indicative function (*lakṣaṇā*).[15] For instance, when we hear the word '*śaśin*' (the moon) at night, this word first reminds us of the moon in the sky; furthermore it reminds us of a rabbit (*śaśa*). In this case the moon is the direct meaning of the word, and the function pointing to this meaning is called denotative. A rabbit is the indirect meaning of the word, and the function pointing to it is called indicative.

(d) Verbal understanding (*śābdabodha*, *śābdajñāna*)

The concept of verbal understanding is quite often utilized in analyzing the meaning of language units, e.g., a root (*dhātu*), a suffix (*pratyaya*), a nominal base (*prātipadika*), a case-ending (*sUP*), and so on. Since we cannot determine the meaning of an isolated verbal suffix such as –*ti*, we have to deal with a complete word, such as '*pacati*' ([he] cooks). From *pacati* we obtain a verbal understanding which has some content or structure. Gaṅgeśa and his opponents presuppose that all of this understanding is generated only by the word *pacati*; they attempt to find the correspondence between the constituents of the understanding we obtain on hearing *pacati* and the linguistic constituents, such as the verbal suffix, which make up this word.

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[15] Cf. *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (*NSM*), p. 292,3: *vṛttiś ca śaktilakṣaṇānyataraḥ sambandhaḥ*. See also Matilal [1968: 25]. The indicative function is defined as the relation with the denoted object/meaning (*NSM* k. 82ab: *lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhas ... /*). To explain this definition, when word A denotes meaning B and further indicates the meaning C, the indicative function of A reaches C through B. This function also represents the relation between A and C. The relation between A and B is expressed by 'the denoted object' in the definition; the relation between B and C by 'the relation' in the definition.

There are three competing views of verbal understanding which identify different elements in a sentence as being prominent. According to the first view, the meaning of the noun in the nominative case is predominant (*prathamāntārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*); according to the second view, the meaning of the verbal suffix is predominant (*ākhyātārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*); according to the third view the meaning of the root is predominant (*dhātvartha-mukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*).[16] The Nyāya school upholds the first view; the Mīmāṃsā school the second; and the Grammarian school the third.

Take the sentence *caitraḥ pacati* as an example. Let us see what Navya-nyāya regards as the verbal understanding brought about through hearing this sentence. The word *caitra* denotes a person called Caitra; the case-ending *-ḥ* (*sU*) denotes the number of Caitras; the root *pac* denotes the action of cooking (*pāka*); the suffix *-ti* denotes effort. Effort generates the action of cooking. This relation between effort and cooking is not denoted by any meaningful unit of the sentence, but is understood from the juxtaposition of the two units, *pac* and *-ti*. Similarly, the relation of the effort and Caitra is understood; he (i.e., his *ātman*) possesses effort. Finally, the sentence generates the understanding "Caitra is the possessor of effort conducive to cooking" (*pākānukūlaprayatnavān caitaḥ*).[17]

Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, present the following verbal understanding as generated from the same sentence: "There is productive operation conducive to cooking and residing in Caitra" (*caitraniṣṭhā pākānukūlā bhāvanā*). Grammarians give the following analysis: "There is operation conducive to the softening of the cooked substance and occurring in Caitra" (*caitrāśrayakaḥ viklittyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ*). Here I have only briefly illustrated how the three schools analyze verbal understanding.[18]

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[16] Cf. Rao [1969: 4-34]. The expression of verbal understanding may appear to represent its structure, but this is not accepted by some schools of Indian philosophy, i.e., those schools subsumed under the term 'Indian Realism', such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā. This point will be referred to later on under (e).

[17] This type of verbal understanding is presented as Udayana's view in *NKu* p. 531,4: *pākānukūlavartamānaprayatnavān*.

[18] For example, it has not been illustrated how tense and mood are expressed, what the suffix *a* inserted between *pac* and *-ti* denotes, and so forth. For a general illustration of verbal understanding, see Rao [1969: 4-34] and Joshi [1993: 29-36]. Cardona [1975] discusses whether or not paraphrasing and the analysis of verbal understanding decisively serve to assign partial meanings to the constituents of a sentence or word, such as a root and a suffix. Cardona [1975: 272] remarks that the different schools assign meanings in different ways, based on their particular backgrounds, premises, and aims.

(e) Meaning (*artha*)

Finally, I would like to call the reader's attention to the word 'meaning', which appears throughout my translation. This word does not always stand for 'mental representation' in the Indian context. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā hold the view that knowledge or cognition (*jñāna*) has no content in itself (*nirākāravāda*) and that recognizing an object means that a cognitive relation occurs between the cognition and the object (*grāhyagrāhakabhāva*). For example, when for these three schools the meaning of the root *pac* is said to be the action of cooking, this does not refer to the understanding of cooking or the concept of cooking; rather it refers to the physical action of cooking which takes place in the outer world. Even the expression of verbal understanding (*śābdabodha*) does not represent the structure of understanding or cognition itself, but the structure of part of the outer world.

By contrast, the Grammarian school maintains that knowledge has content.[19] For this school the expression of verbal understanding represents the structure of the understanding. This expression also represents the structure of a phenomenon in the outer world as long as the understanding corresponds to this phenomenon. When I am referring to this sense of "meaning" in the course of my translation, I have provided a footnote.

A Translation with Annotation of the Ākhyātavāda
of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*

F. The Grammarians' Refutation to the Nyāya View[20]

F1.1:[21]   [The Naiyāyika will argue:] Just as [we have the usage of] *pacati* ("[He] cooks") at the time of [the existence of] some resolution[22] (*kṛti*) conducive to cooking, so [we] would have [the expressions] *apākṣīt* ("[He] cooked") and *pakṣyati* ("[He] will cook") at the time of [precedent] resolution having vanished and [at the time

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[19]   The Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism also takes this position. Gaṅgeśa does not debate with the followers of this school and other Sākāravādins in the "Verbal Suffix Section".

[20]   On the opponent in this part, see fn 5.

[21]   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 833,1-3: *atha pākānukūlaikakṛtikāle pacatītivat kṛter atyaye 'grimakṛter anutpāde ca madhye 'py apākṣīt pakṣyatīti ca syāt.*

[22]   'Resolution' is the other designation for effort (*yatna*). On this, see text B2 in Wada [2007a: 420-421].

of] future resolution not yet having been generated [respectively], and even in the middle [of cooking].

F1.2:[23]   [The Grammarian will object:] It should not be argued that since like the word *dhruva*[24] (firm) [the verbal suffix] denotes a collection of [instances of] resolution,[25] [we have the expressions] *apākṣīt* ("[He] cooked") and *pakṣyati* ("[He] will cook") at the time of the destruction (*dhvaṃsa*, i.e., posterior absence) and the prior absence (*prāgabhāva*) of the collection [respectively]. If the above view is indeed true, [we] would not use [the expression] *pacati* ("[He] cooks"), because a collection of [instances of] resolution cannot exist at a single time.

F2.1:[26]   [The Naiyāyika will claim: The expressions] of the past and future tenses are determined (*nirūpya*)[27] by the absence of resolution, and at the time of resolution [functioning] the absence of resolution does not exist. This is because in the possessor of [any member of] the class of counterpositives (*pratiyogin*) the absence [of the counterpositive] does not exist.[28]

F2.2:[29]   [To this objection, the Grammarian will answer: That is] not correct. The reason for this is that because prior absence and posterior absence which have particular resolutions for [their] counterpositive can exist even at the time of [the existence of]

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[23]   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 833,3-6: *na ca dhruvapadavat kṛtipracayasya śakyatvāt pracayasya dhvaṃse prāgabhāve vā apākṣīt pakṣayatīti prayoga iti vācyam. evaṃ hi pacatīti na syād eva ekadā kṛtipracayasyāsattvāt.*

[24]   This word stands for a collection or series of the actions of existing. Bhatta [2005: 895], on the other hand, interprets this word as meaning a collection of fixed (*dhruva*) stars.

[25]   The Grammarian anticipates that the Naiyāyika objects that the suffix denotes a collection of resolution, and not one instance of resolutions. This objection presupposes the following: Cooking is not a single action (*kriyā*), but a series of various actions, or operations (*vyāpāra*), such as carrying rice, putting it into a vessel, washing rice, setting fire to the fuel, putting the vessel on the fire, and so forth. Each action requires resolution/effort, so at the time of cooking the suffix –*ti* of *pacati* denotes all instances of resolution for such particular actions producing the result (i.e., softening of rice).

[26]   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 833,6-8: *atha bhūtabhaviṣyatoḥ kṛtyabhāvanirūpyatvaṃ kṛtikāle ca kṛty-abhāvo nāsti pratiyogijātīyavaty abhāvasyāsattvād iti cet.*

[27]   It is not clear here whether this term is used in the technical sense or not. If it is a technical term, the absence of resolution is the describer (*nirūpaka*) of those tenses. On the concept of describer, see Wada [1990: 66-80] [2007b: 31-33].

[28]   This sentence means: When a tense possesses or is related with an instance of resolution, such a tense cannot possess an absence of resolution; so that tense is the present time.

[29]   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 833,8-10: *na, prāgabhāvapradhvaṃsayoḥ kṛtiviśeṣapratiyogitvena kṛti-kāle 'pi sattvāt tayoḥ sakalakṛtipratiyogikatvāsambhavāt.*

resolution, [they] both cannot have all [instances of] resolution for their counterpositive.

F3.1:[30]   [The Naiyāyika will argue:] Resolution inseparable from the result[31] is denoted [by a verbal suffix]. That is why [we have] no usage of *pacati* ("[He] cooks") at the time of 'buying rice'[32] conducive to cooking. Similarly *pacati* ("[He] cooks") at the time of the last resolution,[33] *pakṣyati* ("[He] will cook") at the time of its prior absence, and *apākṣīt* ("[He] cooked") at the time of its destruction are primary usages, and [the usage of] *pacati* ("[He] cooks") before the [last resolution being produced] is really secondary (*gauṇa*).[34]

F3.2:[35]   [The Grammarian will object to the above: This is] not correct. If so, even in the middle [of cooking we] could [utter the expression] *pakṣyati* ("[He] cooks"), since the last resolution has not come into existence during that time. Similarly, if a collection of [instances of] operation is the meaning of a verbal suffix or the meaning of a root, [we could utter the expressions] *pakṣyati* ("[He] will cook") and *apākṣīt* ("[He] cooked") in the middle [of cooking].

G. The Nyāya Response to the Grammarians' View

G1:[36]   [On the above point the Naiyāyika[37]] states: When each [instance of effort] is the ground (*nimitta*) for the usage of the present

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[30]   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, pp. 833,10-834,1: *nanu phalāyogavyavacchinnā kṛtiḥ śakyā ata eva pākā-nukūlataṇḍulakrayakāle pacatīti na prayogaḥ, evaṃ caramakṛtikāle pacati tatprāgabhāvakāle pakṣyati taddhvaṃsakāle cāpākṣīd iti mukhyaprayogaḥ tatpūrvaṃ pacatīti gauṇa eveti cet,*

[31]   'Resolution inseparable from the result' means 'resolution immediately preceding the result'. To be precise, resolution does not directly produce a result such as the softening of rice. A particular instance of resolution preceeds a particular action such as cooking, which directly generates the softening of rice. When the relation between that resolution and that result is not intervened by other resolution or operation, such relation is expressed by 'resolution inseparable from the result'.

[32]   Unless one obtains rice, one cannot cook rice. In this sense an action such as buying rice is one of factors which is conducive to cooking. While one is buying rice, one has not yet possessed resolution to cook rice. In other words, one possesses no resolution to cook immediately preceding the result (i.e., softening of rice). Hence, when one buys rice, we do not say *pacati* ("[He] cooks"]).

[33]   'The last resolution' means the resolution which causes the operation after which the result immediately comes into being, i.e., the resolution inseparable from the result.

[34]   Cooking is not a single action but a series of various actions. (On this, see the footnote to 'a collection of instances of resolution' in F1.2.) When the person cooking has arrived at the last resolution through the resolutions for those continuous actions, we say *pacati* ("[He] cooks") in the primary sense. When the person possesses those resolutions but has not yet arrived at the last resolution, we say *pacan/pacantī* ("[He] is cooking" or "[She] is cooking") in the primary sense.

[35]   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 834,4-11: *na, tarhi madhye 'pi pakṣyatīti syāt tadā caramakṛter anāgatatvāt, evaṃ vyāpārapracayasyākhyātārthatve dhātvarthatve vā madhye pakṣyaty apākṣīd iti syāt.*

[36]   *ucyate. yatrākhyātavācye pracaye ekaikasya varttamānavyavahāranimittatvaṃ tatra tāvatāṃ*

tense in the case that a collection [of the instances] is denoted by the verbal suffix, [we have] the usage [of the past or the future tense] on the basis of the destruction or prior absence of all those [instances of effort]. And something [else] is not the ground for the usage of the present tense, for [that something] does not exist. The reasons for this are that [we know of] similar usage in the case of eating, moving, and so forth of sentient and insentient [agents], that [we] go for searching the ground in the case of the usage being available, and that the above [ground] is similarly accepted even by those [i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas] who hold that the root or the verbal suffix denotes operation conducive to cooking, because no other recourse [to the ground for the usage is left].

G2.1:[38]   The Grammarians will argue the following: It would be all right [what you, the Naiyāyika, have said above]. Since, in the cases of *caitras taṇḍulaṃ pacati* ("Caitra cooks rice") and *caitreṇa pacyate taṇḍulaḥ* ("Rice is cooked by Caitra"), the number, i.e., the meaning of the verbal suffix, is related [to the agent, i.e., Caitra, and the object, i.e., rice, respectively], the agent and the object are also denoted by L-suffixes (*lakāra*)[39] like effort. Therefore, there is the rule that the number [denoted by the verbal suffix] is related with the denoted [meaning, i.e., the agent or the object]. Otherwise, if all implied

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dhvaṃsaiḥ prāgabhāvaiś ca bhūtabhaviṣyadvyavaharaḥ, na tu varttamānavyavaharanimittaṃ kiñcid abhāvāt. cetanācetanayor bhojanagamanādau tathaiva prayogāt prayoge sati nimittā-nusaraṇāt dhātor ākhyātasya vā pākānukūlavyāpāravācakatvavādibhir apy ananyagatikatayā tathaiva svīkārāc ca.

[37]   Bhatta [2005: 898] identifies this Naiyāyika with Gaṅgeśa as in text G2.2; but he gives no reason for his identification. It is not Bhatta's rule to consider that whenever the views of the Naiyāyikas' opponents are refuted, Gaṅgeśa himself refutes them as he composes the whole text of the "Verbal Suffix Section". There must be reasons for his identification. On this I have the following opinion: since the view presented in text G1 is not refuted in Gaṅgeśa's conclusion, we can conjecture that Gaṅgeśa claims G1.

[38]   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, pp. 834,11-835,3: *syād etat caitras taṇḍulaṃ pacati caitreṇa pacyate taṇḍula ity atra kartari karmaṇi cākhyātārthasaṃkhyānvayāt kartṛkarmaṇī api yatna iva lakāravācye tena vācyagāminī saṃkhyeti niyamo bhavati anyathā ākṣiptasaṃkhyeyamātrānvaye niyamo na syād iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ.*

[39]   L-suffixes are personal endings applied to roots in six tenses and four modes: *laṭ* (present indicative), *liṭ* (perfect), *luṭ* (periphrastic future), *lṛṭ* (simple future), *leṭ* (subjunctive mode), *loṭ* (imperative), *laṅ* (imperfect), *liṅ* (optative mode), *luṅ* (aorist), and *lṛṅ* (conditional). These suffixes, applied to roots, are replaced by verbal suffixes. On this, see Abhyankar [1985: 137-138]. On the rule that L-suffixes denote the agent or object, see *P*3.4.69: *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ* "The tense-affixes called 'la' are used in denoting the object and the agent; after intransitive verbs, they denote the action as well as the agent" (Translation by Vasu [1977: 584]). An L-suffix does not denote a particular number to be related with the agent or the object, while a verbal suffix substituted for the suffix denotes such a number. It follows from this that the agent or the object should be denoted by the same verbal suffix as denotes its number. It is a rule that the basic meaning of an L-suffix is succeeded to its substitute, i.e., the verbal suffix. As a result, it is inferred that the meaning of a verbal suffix, i.e., the agent or the object, comes from that of the L-suffix.

[meanings[40]] fit to be counted are related with the number [denoted by the suffix], there would be no rule [of the relation between that number and what is fit to be counted].

G2.2:[41]   [The Naiyāyika[42] will answer:] That is not correct. This is because [we] can formulate the rule that where the number existing in the agent[43] is denoted [by the verbal suffix], the relation of the number with the agent is understood.

G2.3:[44]   [The Grammarian will object:] In what case is the number existing in the agent denoted [by the verbal suffix]?

G.2.4:[45]   [The Naiyāyika will answer: You, Grammarian, also arrive at] the same [position as ours]: In what case is the agent denoted [by the suffix]?

G2.5:[46]   [The Grammarian will argue:] Where the number existing in the agent is understood, [the agent is denoted by the verbal suffix].

G2.6:[47]   [The Naiyāyika will reply: That is] not correct. This is because [your view suffers from the defect of] mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*):[48] when the agent is denoted [by the suffix] the number existing in that [agent] is understood [from the same suffix]; and [reversely] by means of an understanding of the number existing in the agent [from the suffix] the agent is [ascertained to be] denoted [by the same suffix].

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40   On the specific sense of 'meaning', see Introduction: Basic Concepts (e) Meaning (*artha*).

41   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 835,4-5: *tan na. kartṛgatā saṃkhyā yatra vācyā tatra kartrā tadanvayaḥ pratīyata*[1] *iti tadupapatteḥ*. ([1] *TC*, p. 835,5 reads *pratīyate*, which is a mistake for *saṃdhi*.)

42   Bhatta [2005: 898] identifies this Naiyāyika with Gaṅgeśa as in text G1; but he gives no reason for his identification. Since the G1 is not refuted in the following discussion and Gaṅgeśa's conclusion, we can conjecture that Gaṅgeśa claims G2.2.

43   In Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika ontology number is one of 24 qualities (*guṇa*), which exists in substances (*dravya*). 'The number existing in the agent' (*kartṛgatā saṃkhyā*) means the number of the agent.

44   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 835,5-6: *kartṛgataiva saṃkhyā kva vācyeti cet*.

45   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 835,6: *kartā kva vācya iti tulyaṃ*.

46   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 835,6-7: *yatra kartṛgatā saṃkhyā pratīyata iti cet*.

47   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 835,7-8: *na, anyonyāśrayāt kartṛvācyatve tadgatasaṃkhyādhīḥ tadgata-saṃkhyāpratītyā ca tadvācyateti*.

48   According to Matilal [1968: 82], this is one of three varieties of circularity: self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*), mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya, itaretalāśraya*), and cyclical dependence (*cakraka*).

G2.7:[49]   [The Grammarian will argue:] Where the agent is intended to be denoted by the verbal suffix, the agent is denoted [by the same suffix].

G2.8:[50]   [The Naiyāyika will answer: That is] not correct, for it is the same as saying that where the number existing in the agent is intended to be denoted [by the verbal suffix], that [number] is denoted [by the same suffix]. Similarly [in the case of passive voice] the object is not denoted [by the verbal suffix], but [it is] the number existing in that [object that is denoted]. [Pāṇini's rule[51]] that the agent and the object are denoted by L-suffixes means that the numbers existing in them are denoted [by those suffixes].[52]

(to be continued)

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[49]   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, p. 835,9: *yatrākhyātena kartur vivakṣā tatra kartā vācya iti cet.*

[50]   *TC*, Vol. 4/2, pp. 835,10-836,3: *na, yatra kartṛgatasaṃkhyā vivakṣyā tatra sā vācyeti tulyam. evaṃ karmāpi na śakyaṃ kin tu tadgatasaṃkhyaiva, kartṛkarmaṇi lakāravācye ity asyāyam arthaḥ tadgatasaṃkhyā vācyeti.*

[51]   On this rule, see fn 13.

[52]   According to Yoshimizu [2006: 312], Śabara argues in his *Śābarabhāṣya* that L-suffixes denote the number of the agent or the object; Kumārila also ascribes the function of denoting such a number to verbal suffixes in his *Tantravārttika*. Yoshimizu [2006: 304, 308] also points out that Kumarila does not clearly mention that L-suffixes denote resolution.

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