

A BUDDHIST CRITIQUE OF SVABHĀVAVĀDA

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In this paper an effort will be made to present the refutation of the *Svabhāvavāda* by the renowned Buddhist scholar Śāntarakṣita in his magnificent work, *Tattvasaṃgraha*. But before we proceed, it will be in place to present the sources and the basic thoughts of *Svabhāvavāda* as well as a brief historical introduction of Śāntarakṣita and his pupil, Kamalaśīla, the famous commentator of *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

1. *Svabhāvavāda* and Its Sources

It is observed that from the dawn of civilization, a deep quest about the creation of this world has impelled man to find the answer. Every religion, sect and philosophy has tried its best to give a proper reply to this very basic question about the agency of this world. Indian tradition is not also an exception of this practice. We find that from the Vedic period, the seers have explained the mystery about the creation of world in their own way. It is very much observed in

* Abstract: In the world of philosophy, metaphysics is recognized as an integral part. It is known to all that almost all schools of Indian philosophy have given much importance to a particular question as to how this world was created. In this regard, each school of Indian philosophy has presented its views and thus various opinions are formed. *Svabhāvavāda* is one of them. Though this system is not discussed elaborately but still it bears some sort of significances. Apart from Indian philosophy, this kind of opinion is also found in Greek philosophy. According to the scholars, probably this system was abolished in the same way as the Cārvāka school was. The difference between these two systems, i.e., *Svabhāvavāda* and Cārvāka, is also not very significant. Very often *Svabhāvavāda* is accepted as a branch of the Cārvāka School.

Following the footsteps of the Cārvāka, *Svabhāvavāda* does not accept the existence of any creator of this world. But they accept the rule of creation which is a contrary idea to the Cārvāka view. If the *Svabhāvavādin* does not accept the effect (*kārya*) as same as the cause (*kāraṇa*), then there will not be much difference between them and the *Vijñānavādins*. But the *Svabhāvavādin* has taken neutral position in this context and naturally there exists difference of opinions between these two systems, i.e., *Vijñānavāda* and *Svabhāvavāda* which is critically analysed by the famous Buddhist scholar Śāntarakṣita in his book *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

Śāntarakṣita was a profound Buddhist scholar of 8th Century, A.D. In his famous text, i.e., *Tattvasaṃgraha*, which is a more encyclopedic treatment of the major philosophic views of that time; Śāntarakṣita refutes the theories of *Svabhāvavāda* in an interesting way. In this paper an effort will be made to present his style of arguments and his pupil Kamalaśīla's way of reasoning in an analytical way along with its critical appreciation. *alam iti*.

Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad where various reasons put forth in favour of the causes of creation. They are time (*kāla*), nature of law (*svabhāva*), destiny (*niyati*), accident (*yadṛcchā*), five elements (*bhūtāni*) etc. In another *mantra* of *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, it is stated that *svabhāva* is the primitive one described by others as *kāla* possessing the divine power.¹ Scholars of Indian philosophy have opined that the power which is inherent in the matters is *svabhāva* (*Svabhāvah padārthānām pratiniyataśaktiḥ*). But a section of philosophers define *svabhāva* as the 'nature of law'. In *Mahābhārata* it is stated that those who only discuss and accept the five elements are *Svabhāvavādin*-s. In the explanation of *Vṛhatsamhitā*, Utpal Bhaṭṭa has commented that the *Lokāyatika*-s have accepted *svabhāva* as the cause of this world; the diversity of this and also for its destruction. Agnicit Puruṣottama has expressed the same view in the context of Cārvāka school.²

In the *Śāntiparva* of *Mahābhārata*, Nīlakanṭha has commented that *svabhāva* is recognized by the Sāṃkhya school. We find that in *Mahābhārata*, this particular philosophical view is mentioned in many places.³ In his commentary of *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, the famous commentator Gaudapāda, has also mentioned that the followers of Sāṃkhya system accept *svabhāva* as a cause. In fact, in the commentary of *Brahmasūtra*, Śāṅkarācārya has also referred it. So from these details, it can be inferred that it was one of the fundamental thoughts of Indian tradition.

Regarding the introduction of this view, the followers of this system answer that there is no such rule that a cause is essential behind every creation. It is very much observed that an effect can be produced without the existence of a cause. Such as, no one can find the reason behind the warmth of fire or coldness of water. If someone asks that who is the agent of this creation then the answer is by the nature of law all these have come into being. *Svabhāvavādin* also accepts that due to this nature of law, i.e., *svabhāva*, all the qualities and varieties of them are formed. *Svabhāvavāda* is mentioned as well as discussed quite explicitly in *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, and *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* also. In the commentaries of *Nyāyakusumāñjali*

1 *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 1.2: *kālasvabhāvo niyatiryadṛcchā bhūtāni yonih puruṣa iti cintyā. samyoga eṣām na tv ātmabhāvād ātmāpy anīśaḥ sukhaduḥkhaheṭoḥ. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 6.1: *svabhāvam eke kavayo vadanti kālam tathānye parimuhyamānaḥ. devasyaiva mahimā tu loke yenedam bhrāmyate brahmacakram.*

2 Chattopadhyaya [1987: 134].

3 *Mahābhārata*, 12.222.27: *svabhāvabhāvino bhāvān.*

and in the *Buddhacarita*, we also find several references of this view.

We can say in brief that the fundamental theory of this system is three-fold. 1) *svabhāva* is the origin behind the varieties of this world. 2) *svabhāva* is the root cause of desire and renunciation. 3) There is no freedom of a man's will as everything is controlled by *svabhāva*. So nothing exists as the responsibility or duty of human being. The debate whether this system accepts cause-effect relationship or not would be taken up shortly.

2. *Svabhāvavāda* (Naturalism) and *Yadṛcchāvāda* (Accidentalism)

It is told earlier that in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, a list of causes of cosmological creation is referred to where both *svabhāva* and *yadṛcchā* were mentioned separately. Some scholars have made these two theories identical, which is basically not true. By the eighth century, there were two different sections in *Svabhāvavāda* system. One of them accepts *svabhāva* as the root cause and the determining factor of this world and refutes the existence of any other creator. This particular section somehow affirms the cause-effect relationship. But the other section denies everything, i.e., creator, universe and the rule of causality. According to them, every produced object (*kārya-dravya*) is created by accident (*yadṛcchā*). Actually the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas have described these two sections as one whereas Guṇaratna and Amalānanda have described them as two different schools.⁴

On the other hand, Śāntarakṣita has divided the *Svabhāvavādin*-s into two sections. In his view the first section of *Svabhāvavādin*-s admits *svabhāva* as the first cause of this universe and denies any origin of it, which denotes that somehow they accept the rule of causality. But the second section completely declines this view. It is their opinion that an effect is originated without the existence of cause. Even it does not depend on the law of nature. So in their view the creation of this varied world is a mere chance. In his commentary, Kamalaśīla has also supported this.

It is quite apparent now that ideologically there is no such disparity between the second section of *Svabhāvavādin* and *Yadṛcchāvādin*. In fact, both of them have tried to disprove the rule of causality. But a section of scholars has generally entitled them as one single

⁴ Bhattacharya [2010: 145].

system. Rejecting this act, others have opined that from an early stage, accidentalism (*yadr̥cchāvāda*) and naturalism (*svabhāvavāda*) were very much distinct by nature. It is lucidly stated in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* as well as in latter philosophical work. Concluding this part, we can say that according to accidentalism, the whole universe is a state of disorder. If any kind of orderliness is noticed, it should be considered as occurred accidentally. On the contrary, the school of naturalism believes that this whole world is controlled by the law of nature. But probably the main difference between these two systems is that naturalism admits *svabhāva* as the controller of causality whereas accidentalism completely denies it.⁵

3. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

According to the scholars of Indian philosophy, Śāntarakṣita was the teacher of the University of Nālandā. There are few historical records of him and according to them he was the son of the king of Zāhor. Śāntarakṣita was brought to Tibet at the instigation of King Trisong Detsen some time before 767 CE. One account says that his first trip was unsuccessful and he spent six years in Nepal before returning to Tibet. He then left for Tibet where he founded the first Buddhist monastery at Sam-yas in 787 CE which was modeled on the Buddhist monastery of Odantapurī and ordained the first monastic there. Tibetan scholars in this institute were trained to translate Buddhist texts from Sanskrit into Tibetan. He stayed at Tibet for the rest of his life (almost 25 years) and did not return to India. Śāntarakṣita died in the first decade of the ninth century. He advised the King to invite the celebrated Buddhist teacher Padmasambhava to Tibet and subdue the Tibetan devils and demi-gods.

The commentary of *Tattvasaṃgraha* was written by Kamalaśīla who was the disciple of Śāntarakṣita. He (713-763 CE) was an Indian Buddhist of Nālandā Mahāvihāra who accompanied Śāntarakṣita to Tibet. It is said that Kamalaśīla was killed by some rivals whom he overpowered in a public debate.⁶

⁵ Chattopadhyaya [1987: 139-143].

⁶ Bhattacharya [2010: 137].

4. *The view of Naturalism (Svabhāvavāda) in Tattvasaṃgraha*

It is accepted by the scholars that *Tattvasaṃgraha* is an outstanding work of Śāntarakṣita. Actually it is like an encyclopedia of thoughts of all Indian systems. In his magnificent work, Śāntarakṣita has made a collection of different views of Indian philosophy. His purpose was to establish his own view, i.e., *Vijñānavāda*, after refuting other views one by one. In the fourth chapter of *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita has presented the views of *Svabhāvavādin*-s in brief and declined them by his own arguments. Here at first we will present the views of *Svabhāvavādin*-s as opponent's views and discuss them in the same way as it is done in *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

In the fourth chapter of *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita has presented the basic concept of *Svabhāvavāda* in three *kārikās*.⁷ In the opening verse, the reference of other philosophers who have accepted that the creation of this world is because of its own nature is found. The author did not maintain the sequence of the opening verse in case of refutation of opponent's view as he found that he has to speak very little to refute *Svabhāvavāda*. Among the three *kārikās*, the first one is most important in respect to the content. Here Śāntarakṣita has clearly stated that the *Svabhāvavādin* admits that the creation of all things is independent of all causes. They even refuse to accept the object to be its own cause. Kamalaśīla has explained this more clearly in his commentary that an object originates neither from his own nor from an outer cause. In fact *Svabhāvavādin* has declined both kinds of causes. According to Kamalaśīla, herein lies the difference between *Svabhāvavādin*-s and *Svatokāraṇavādin*-s. The second system opines that though there is no need to accept any outer cause in the creation of an effect, still it is possible that the effect can be originated from itself. But *Svabhāvavādin* refutes this opinion also.⁸

In case of the refutation of the cause, the *Svabhāvavādin* argues that if a cognizable object is not cognized for some reason then it is accepted as illusory. In reality, whatever is cognized is nothing but

⁷ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter-4, *kārikā* 110-112:
sarvāhetunirāśamsaṃ bhāvānām janma varṇyate /
svabhāvavādībhis te hi nāhuḥ svam api kāraṇam //
rājīvakasarādīnām vaicitryaṃ kaḥ karoti hi /
mayūracandrakādīr vā vicitraḥ kena nirmītaḥ //
yathāiva kaṇṭakādīnām taikṣṇyādikam ahetukam /
kādācitkatayā tadvad duḥkḥādīnām ahetutā //

⁸ Ghosh [1998: 83-84].

effect. But the causes of the effects are always inferred. As there is no constancy of the causes, it is reasonable to accept them as non-existent. To prove this argument furthermore, the *Svabhāvavādin* has presented his reasoning in the next *kārikā* and there he asks: who has made the diversities in the lotus filaments and by whom the variegated wings of the peacock are made?⁹ According to the view of *Svabhāvavādin*, these diversities are perceived and doubtless by any means, and hence, it is nothing but an unnecessary trouble to find other doubtful or non-perceived reasons, such as God etc., behind these creations. It can be further questioned that, as the causes of external objects are not cognized, it is accepted that external objects are originated without any cause. But how can this view be acceptable in case of internal objects?

In the following *kārikā*, the *Svabhāvavādin* says that, though it is not proved by the perception that the internal things are formed without any cause, it can be inferred easily. Such as what happens at certain times in an indefinite way and without following regularity, is definitely known to be without cause. The example of this one is the sharpness of thorns. Similarly, pain and other internal things also occur at a certain time, and hence they will be also recognized as without cause.¹⁰ In addition to it, *Svabhāvavādin* also comments that it is not proper to hold that, when a certain thing's presence or absence is related to that of another thing, the latter will be regarded as the cause of the former. For example, whatever is visually perceived, can also be touched and whatever cannot be touched is also not visually perceived but for this reason touch is never considered as the cause of visual perception. Therefore, the relation between the cause and effect is invalid. So finally it has to be admitted that there is no need to accept any cause behind every effect.

Now this is the view of the opponents, i.e., *Svabhāvavādin*-s as depicted by Śāntarakṣita in *Tattvasaṃgraha*. After placing the opponent's views, Śāntarakṣita has presented his own opinion in this context and by placing them in an interesting way he has also refuted the opponent's arguments one by one.

⁹ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, *kārikā* 111:
rājīvakesarādīnām vaicitryam kaḥ karoti hi /
mayūracandrakādir vā vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ //

¹⁰ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, *kārikā* 112:
yathaiḥ kaṅṭhakādīnām taikṣṇyādikam ahetukam /
kāḍācitkatayā tadvad duḥkhādīnam ahetutā //

5. Refutation of Svabhāvavāda as depicted in Tattvasaṃgraha:

The author of *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita has refuted the view of *Svabhāvavāda* as put forth above before in a critical way. In the two *kārikās* of *Tattvasaṃgraha*, he directly confronts the basic argument of *Svabhāvavādin*-s by saying that it is definitely ascertained through the perception and non-apprehension that the seeds, clay and water and the rest under certain special conditions are the causes of the filaments of the lotuses. The relation between these causes and the filaments etc. are perceived and the absence of the relation is also not cognized. Hence there is no utility to search any other causes for the lotus- filaments apart from those causes mentioned earlier.¹¹

Kamalaśīla explains these two *kārikās* more lucidly in his commentary. There he states that when it is found that a certain thing is produced only when another thing is present and if the previous one is modified due to the modification of the latter, then the latter should be treated as the cause of the former one. For this reason the seed which is swollen due to the moisture, will be regarded as cause because the seed is both positively and negatively concomitant with the lotus-filament. So whatever is stated by the *Svabhāvavādin*-s is inadmissible.

According to Kamalaśīla, the view expressed by the *Svabhāvavādin*-s that the causal relation is fallible is unproven. In the example given by the *Svabhāvavādin*, it was stated that though touch and visual perception is concomitant with each other still touch cannot be admitted as the cause of visual perception. But Kamalaśīla states it as completely invalid. The colour is the cause of both touch and visual perception. The term 'touch' denotes 'the touch of the material substance' and colour also exists by associating with those substances. As a result touch must be regarded as the cause of visual perception. The difference is that the relation between the colour and visual perception is direct while the relation of the colour and touch is indirect. So we can say that while colour is a direct cause to the visual perception, touch is an indirect one.

¹¹ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, *kārikās* 113-114:
sarojakesarādīnām anvayavyatirekavat /
avasthātīśayākrāntam bījapankajalādīkam //
pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām niścītam kāraṇaṃ yadā /
kim ity anyas tadā hetur amīṣām pariṇcchate //

Moreover Kamalaśīla states that the causal relation is not determined completely by the mere negation (*vyatireka*). The negation has to be a very special one in this regard. If it is found that the other reasons are present but due to the absence of one particular agent, the origination of an effect is obstructed, then that particular agent will be regarded as the cause. If it is not followed then such type of hypothetical reasoning may be formed that at a particular date-growing country, someone's mother was married. So it can be said that if the mother's marriage had not been there, date would not be grown. In this kind of argument, by mere negation, mother's marriage would be the cause of the growth of the date. This kind of mere negation in the qualified form is not untrue in the context of touch. If it can be shown that in a particular object possessing the colour and the other qualities, there is no account of visual cognition due to the absence of touch only, then the fallibility will be proved. As it cannot be proved, it must be accepted that there is no exception of causal relation.¹²

Not only the seeds etc. are the causes, but the rest is also considered as the cause of things. Even particular portions of time and place are known as the causes. To explain this, Śāntarakṣita has stated that particular points of place and time are also related as cause to things. If this is not true, then anything would be produced everywhere and at all times. He also comments that in fact things are found to be produced specifically at a particular place and at a particular time and in a particular situation.¹³ In the commentary, Kamalaśīla states that in case of lotus filaments, water can be taken as the particular place because the production happens only there but not any other places like stone etc. Moreover the production happens only at a particular point of time like the summer but not at other point of time like the winter. In reality, if the lotus or other objects exist at all places and at all times, then it will be clear that they are not dependent upon them but it does not happen in reality. On the contrary, it is seen that effects are actually dependent and they appear only at special places and at special times.

¹² *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, the commentary of Kamalaśīla of *kārikās* 113-114.

¹³ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, *kārikās* 115-116:
niyatau deśakālau ca bhāvānam bhavataḥ katham /
yadi taddhetutā naiṣām syus te sarvatra sarvadā //
kvacit kadācit kasminścid bhavanto niyatāḥ punaḥ /
tatsāpekṣā bhavantyete tadanyaparihārataḥ //

But it can be asked furthermore that the effects are not conscious so it is not possible for them to have any wish. So how can it be stated that they have any need for dependence upon these conditions? Śāntarakṣita replies that by the term 'dependent', it means that the effects come into existence at particular places and times and not at others, but there is no scope of any wish or desire in it. Still an objection may be raised that if the effects have dependence on the particular points of time and place then how can it be established that sprouts are the effects of seeds? It is answered in the *kārikā* that this dependence is the character of an effect, *apekṣā kāryatocyate*.¹⁴ Apart from this dependence nothing is stated as *kāryatā* (character of effect). Following a particular manner, the cause is expressed as an effect. To this particular manner, the dependence of the effect is stated as *kāryatā*. It is a perceptible fact that as the effects come into existence in that particular manner, it is proved that effects are produced from the causes.

So ultimately it is proved by perception only that the doctrine of naturalism is not acceptable. The *Svabhāvavādin*-s have argued before that the cause of the internal feelings does not exist as it does not occur at a particular time. By this argument of *Svabhāvavādin*, the opposite of his statement is proved because what has no cause or which is not dependent upon anything cannot happen occasionally, but will happen all the time. Up to this part of the discussion, Śāntarakṣita adopts only perception as a proof to establish his view. Later he has presented his opinion accepting inference as a base of his argument.

Śāntarakṣita comments that, if there is no such means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) by which the existence of the cause is proved, the non-existence of the concerned object is not proved. It has to be proved separately.¹⁵ Here he has made a kind of epistemological discussion almost following the Nyāya tradition. In a particular *kārikā* of his book he states that according to *Svabhāvavāda* whatever is perceived is nothing but the effect while the causes are never seen. So there is no need to accept them. But Śāntarakṣita refutes it by saying

¹⁴ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, *kārikā* 117:
tadapekṣā tathāvṛttir apekṣā kāryatocyate /
pratyakṣā ca tathā vṛttiḥ siddhās teneha hetavaḥ //

¹⁵ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, *kārikā* 119:
mā vā pramāṇasattā bhūd dhetusadbhāvasiddhaye /
tathāpi mānābhāvena naivārthasattvaniścayaḥ //

that, if an object is not perceived properly, it is not justifiable to give any opinion about it. Nobody can say that as he has not seen a particular object (in himself), the object does not exist in him. Even though no one has ever seen the grass and the other things growing in the caves of the Vindhya mountain still it cannot be inferred that those things do not grow there.¹⁶ Finally Śāntarakṣita applies his most effective reasoning to his opponents by asking that in support of his own conclusion, does the *Svabhāvavādin* adopt any kind of reason or not? If the answer is negative then the view of the *Svabhāvavādin* will not be proved. But if the answer is in the positive still the *Svabhāvavādin* will be defeated by his own argument as by adopting such reason as a support, the cause-effect relationship will automatically be proved. Here his arguments will act as the cause which will produce the effect, i.e., his success in the argument.¹⁷ If *Svabhāvavādin* attempts a last try by saying that though his argument is indicative but not productive, still it will be not valid. To Śāntarakṣita, the reason whether it is indicative and productive is nothing but the same.¹⁸

6. Conclusion

In the concluding part of our discussion, we would like to mention that not only the Yogācāra school but other schools of Indian philosophy have also declined this thought, i.e., *Svabhāvavāda* from their own perspective. But it is also true that some of them have supported it by giving proper reasoning. In *Gītābhāṣya*, Madhusūdan Sarasvatī comments that though as a cause of the variety of this world, we accept God or some non-perceptible conditions but

16 *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, *kārikā* 122:
sarvadr̥ṣṭiś ca sandigdḥā svadr̥ṣṭir vyabhicāriṇī /
vindhyaḍri randhradūrvāder adr̥ṣṭāv api sattvataḥ //

17 *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, *kārikās* 123-124:
ahetukatvasiddhyarthaṃ na ced dhetuḥ prayujyate /
na cāpramāṇikī siddhir ataḥ pakṣo na sidhyati //
tatsiddhaye ca hetuś cet prayujyeta tathāpi na /
siddhes taddhetu jānyatvāi pakṣas te samprasidhyati //

18 *Tattvasaṃgraha*, chapter 4, *kārikās* 125-126:
tathā hi jñāpako hetur vaco vā tatprakāśakam /
siddher nimittatām gacchan sādhyajñāpakam ucyate //
ataḥ kāraka evāyam jñāpako hetur ucyate /
sādhyānutpādakattvāt tu kārako na prakāśyate //

ultimately we have to take shelter in naturalism, i.e., *Svabhāvavāda*.¹⁹ It is actually an act of intelligence to accept some perceptible conditions instead of the non-perceptible ones. Even the view of the Sāṃkhya school is also similar with *Svabhāvavāda* as they have denied to accept the role of the *nimittakāraṇa* in the act of creation and accept the role of 'pariṇāmasvabhāva' in the same act. According to some scholars, probably the 'Nirnimittavāda' described in the *Nyāyasūtra* was written keeping such *Svabhāvavāda* in view.²⁰

We find a particular term, i.e., *nisarga* as a synonym of *svabhāva* in some of the texts but between these two, there exist some differences. The term '*nisarga*' means a kind of habit which is produced due to the rigorous practice. On the other hand, the term '*svabhāva*' denotes nature which is not produced from any cause and independent from anything. It is enough to accept a phenomenal cause behind the acts of natural phenomena. It is completely unnecessary to accept any other cause which is out of this perceptual world. We can infer that possibly our ancient realists were much close to adopt the theory of the so-called 'law of nature'. Though it will be historically unreal to think this modern view as a similar one to the *Svabhāvavāda* yet it cannot be refuted completely on the ground that there were not even the hints of this so-called modern theory.²¹

The basic texts of *Svabhāvavāda* are now obsolete. According to this view, as every act of this world is controlled by *Svabhāva*, there will be no responsibility or duty of mankind due to the absence of morality or immorality. As it does not accept the causal relation, there is no scope of scientific thinking or development which is a major fallacy of this system. The causal relation is a real thing and by declining it, *Svabhāvavāda* has made his own opinion unrealistic as well as illogical. For this reason the great stalwart of Indian philosophy, Śāntarākṣita has refuted it by adopting logical and realistic outlook which is presented in this paper in a brief way, *alam iti*.

19 *Gītābhāṣya*, chapter 16, śloka 8: *adr̥ṣṭāṅgīkāre 'pi kvacid gatvā svabhāve paryavasānāt svabhāvīkam eva jagatvaicitryam astu dr̥ṣṭe sambhavatī adr̥ṣṭakalpanānavakāśāt. atah kāma eva prāṇinām kāraṇam nānyad adr̥ṣṭeśvarādī ity āhur iti lokāyatīkadṛṣṭir iyam.*

20 Shastri [1999: 83].

21 Chattopadhyaya [1987: 138-139].

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