

## Once More Why a False Sentence Can Generate Verbal Cognition, according to Nyāya

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The question has been discussed.<sup>1</sup> The basic fact has been ignored, however, namely that of all the factors that contribute to verbal knowledge (*śābdabodha*) or knowledge of syntactic relation (*anvaya-bodha*) the most important is *ākāṅkṣā* ‘(syntactic) expectancy’.<sup>2</sup> Thus a sentence such as *vahninā siñcati* ‘(he) sprinkles with fire’ generates verbal knowledge, provided as it is with *ākāṅkṣā*; although, its meaning being contradicted by facts (*bādhitārthaka*), it is ‘incompetent’ (*ayogya*) — as Jagadīśa states.<sup>3</sup>

This I explained, in a note published in 1987, by reference to the distinction between ‘nonsense’ (*Unsinn*) and ‘countersense’ (*Wider-sinn*).<sup>4</sup> The sentence under consideration certainly does not belong to the category of ‘nonsense’. It has a meaning of its own, being provided with syntactic expectancy, and this meaning is understood when the sentence is uttered. Only it is contradicted by facts.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. John Taber, “Mohanty on Śabdapramāṇa”, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 30 (2002), 173 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See Jagadīśa Tarkālamkāra, *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* (ed. Dhunḍhirāj Śāstrī, Kashi Sanskrit Series 109, Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1973), *kārikās* 3, 13.

<sup>3</sup> *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, *vṛtti* on *kārikā* 13. Cf. *vṛtti* on *kārikā* 6.

<sup>4</sup> “Two Notes on the Interpretation of Indian Philosophy”, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* LXVIII (Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar 150th Birth-Anniversary Volume), 305 ff.