

(一) 獨逸ヨリ聯合國ガ購入セル商品ノ支拂金ノ一部獲得

(1) 占領地域ノ境界ニ於ケル獨逸關稅ノ賠償委員會ヘノ支拂並ニ占領地域ト獨逸領土トノ間ノ關稅壁設置後關稅ノ徵收

(2) 獨逸ハ右通牒ニシタル爲聯合軍ハ三月八日上記ノ制裁的措置ヲトレリ。

倫敦賠償支拂案決定後ノ賠償支拂保證問題

一九二一年五月獨逸ハ倫敦賠償支拂案ヲ承認セリ。同案ニ  
カル保證措置ハ左ノ如シ。

(1) 獨逸ノ爲スベキ支拂ノ擔保トシテ提供セラルル資金ヲ監督スル爲保證委員會ヲ設ク。〔第七條〕

(2) 提供セラルベキ資金ハ左ノ如シ。

(1) 獨逸ノ海陸關稅收入及特ニ一切ノ輸出入稅收入

(2) 獨逸輸出額ノ二割五分ノ徵收金收入

(1) 直接又ハ間接稅收入、又ハ其ノ他ノ收入ニシテ前記(1)又(2)ニ追加シ又ハ之ニ代ルベキモノトシテ獨逸ガ提議シ保證委員會ガ承認シタルモノ〔第七條〕

(一) 一九二一年八月獨逸ハ支那ヲ履行シタルニ依リ、聯合國ハライ  
ン關稅壁ヲ撤去シ且三都市ヨリ徹兵セリ。

(二) 一九二一年十二月第一回モラトリアム一九二二年七月第二回モ  
ラトリアム請求後倫敦ニ最高會議ヲ開催シタルモ支那猶豫ノ保  
證トシテ佛蘭西ガルール及ライン地方ニ於ケル錫山、森林、工  
場等ノ引渡シノ如キ所謂「生產的保證」ヲ要求シ英國ガ之ニ反對  
シル爲會議ハ決裂セリ。

(三) 同年八月獨逸支那猶豫ニ對スル白耳義案ノ實行ニ際シテハ六ヶ  
月期限ノ大藏省證參ニ對シライヒスバンクガ保證ヲ與ヘリ。  
同年十二月ノ倫敦首相會議及一九二三年一月ノ巴里首相會議ニ  
於テ「貨物貿易ハ一生產的保證」ヲ固シタル爲會議ハ決裂セリ。

(四) 一九二三年一月佛白軍ハルール占領ヲ斷行セリ。

(五) ウズベキニ於テハ賠償引渡シ馬克貨ニテライヒスバンクニ押込マ  
タル爲、賠償引渡シノ基礎トナルベキ賠償財源ニ關シテ特定課  
組組織ヲ作ルト共ニライヒスバンクヲ改造シ賠償支拂ノ保證措置

(二) 全ヲ契シタリ。

(三) 常財源

(四) 常豫算

(五) 通債券

(六) 交來ノ國有鐵道ヲ株式會社ニ變更シ第一支拂當權ヲ有スル

(七) 右債券ハ年利五分減債基金一分トシ全部賠償支拂ニ充當セリ。

(八) 運輸稅

(九) 道總收入ノ約六割ヲ課シ

(十) 債券拂當權ニ支拂其ノ後ハ大藏大臣ヲ經テ支拂ヘリ。

(十一) 工業債券

(十二) 獨逸ノ工業資本ヲ抵當トシテ五十億馬克ノ債券ヲ發行セリ。

(十三) 右債券ハ年利五分減債基金一分トシ全部賠償支拂ニ充當セリ。

(十四) 財源

換算上、支出ニ關シテヘ租稅收入、麥酒稅、煙草稅、砂糖稅及火  
酒專賣收入ヲ賠償支拂ノ擔保トセリ。

(三) ライヒスバンクノ改造

金準備ニ基ク發行券ヲ發行シ以テ通貨ク安定ヲ圖ル爲ライヒスバ  
ンクヲ改造シテ政府ヨリ獨立ゼンダリ。

ソグ案ニ於ケル賠償支拂保證措置

ウズ案ニ於テ企テラレタル獨逸財政ニ對スル監督ハ大部分之ヲ除  
シ賠償財源ヲ鐵道ト豫算ノ二ツニ限定セリ。

鐵道財源

日本ヤング案ニ於テハ鐵道債券ヲ發行シ之ニ伴フ外國人ノ鐵道經營  
參加ヲ廢止シ鐵道會社ニ對シテ直接稅ヲ賦課ゼリ。

國必要アリ場合ニ限り運輸稅ヲ子含メテ毎年六億六千萬ライヒス

馬克ヲ徵收ス。

國右全額ハ所謂無條件年金ニシテ鐵道會社ヨリ割賦ノ方法ニテ直

接國際決済銀行ニ拂込ム。

換算財源

同租稅ニ依ル保庫財源ハ原則トシテ廢止ゼリ。

(3) 稟稅收入、煙草稅、麥酒稅及火酒專賣收入ヲ副保障ニ充當セリ。

〔(1) 賠償履行、過大  
〔(2) 賠償支拂案不履行ノ原因  
〔(3) 賠償履行滯滯ノ原因  
〔(4) 倫敦賠償支拂案不履行ノ原因〕〕

(1) 國富ト、比較

(1) 佛蘭西人デニブアヘ戰前ノ獨逸國富ヲ三千八百五十七億金馬克  
戰後ニ於ケル減退ヲ約一割ト計算セリ。右ニ當レバ一千三百  
二十億金馬克ノ賠償額ハ國富ノ約三八%ナリ。

(2) ヘルツリツヒヘ戰前ノ獨逸國富ヲ二千億金馬克ト計算セリ。右ニ  
支拂案決定前ノ獨逸國富ヲ二千億金馬克ト計算セリ。右ニ  
依レバ一千三百二十億金馬克ノ賠償額ハ國富ノ六六%ナリ。

(2) 國民所得トノ比較

(1) 倫敦賠償支拂案ニ依ル奉支拂額約三十三億金馬克ハ戰前ノ  
國民所得額百三十亜億金馬克ノ約八%ナリ。  
(2) モーリツツ・エルサスノ計算ニ依レバ一九二一年中頃ノ國  
民所得ハ百九十五億金馬克ニシテ年支拂額約三十三億金馬  
克ハ國民所得ノ約一七%ナリ。

政ノ窮乏

(2) 財政支出ハ休戦條約ニ依ル支出、復員費用、失業救濟、革命政權ノ浪費、戰時中進積セル國債元利ノ償還、物價騰貴ニ然ルニ租稅收入ハ断乎タル財政改革ノ疎暗、增稅ノ速度ニアインフレーションノ速度ニ遅タルコト、納稅サボタージ不足額ハ内國債特ニ流動公債（主トシテ大藏省證券）ノ發行依ツテ賄ヒ其ノ結果ライヒスバング券ノ膨脹ヲ誘致セリ。

白爲

(1)

(2)

左ノ如キ事情ハ爲替相場ノ下落ノ因トナリ果トナリテ爲替入手要輸出工業地帶タルアルサス。ローヌ、シレジヤ地方等喪失セルコト。

獨逸ノ如ク輸入原料ニ依リ輸出製品ヲ生産スル國ニアリテハ爲替相場ノ下落モ輸出増加ヲ左程刺激セザルコト。

國內市場ノ需求的需要ガ強烈ナリシ爲輸出ニ原因ナル時  
量ガ減少セルコト

大戰中ストックが凋渴セル爲香相場下落ニモ拘らず絕對的必  
需品ノ輸入ヲ行ヒシコト

紙幣馬克ノ所持者ハ價值激落通貿ノ一投資方法トシテ海外物資  
購入ヲ行ヒシコト

既内ニ於ケル通貿増殘ノ結果外國扁香手形ヲ入手セシモノハ零  
易ニ之ヲ他ニ譲渡セザリシコト

償意忠ノ免除

賀ト風訓ニ依リテ平和條約ハ獨逸ハ最初ヨリ之ヲ完全ニ  
行スル意思ナカリシ力又ハ援助謀易ナリシコトハ左ノ事例ニ依  
テモ明カナリ。

ツ二ルサイ立條約「清君主義」者ハ清二回倫敦最後通牒受諾  
除獨逸ハ第一回ノ威撃ヲ完了シ條約ニ對スル忠貞サチ示スベキ  
アリト主張セルモクスル論者ハ最初ノ數回ノ忠實ナル履行ニ據  
テ賠償額ノ逕減セラムベキコト子明侍セルモノナリ。

(2) 履行主導「反對論者へ第一回ノ賦拂履行ニ依リ第回倫敦最後通牒ノ要求ガ緩和セラルルト信ズルハ幻想ニシテ、獨逸經濟ノ再建ニ不可缺ナル資金ヲ賠償金ナル底シ井戸ニ抛リ込ム必要セリト主張シ、政府ノ財政安定策助ケズ、ヴエルサイユ條約義務履行ニ協力セズ。

(3) ヴエルサイユ條約破棄ヲ網領セルヒトヲアノ運動ガ國民ノ支持ヲ受ケタルコト。

ドーズ素履行ノ眞相

左表ニ依リ明カニシテ商品、勞務ノ輸出超過ヲ件ハザル謂ハバ  
カラクリ」、支拂履行ナリ

賠償支拂(1) 輸入超過(2)  
(1)+(2)

資本輸入(4)

輸出超過(5)  
(4)+(5)

一九二四年  
一九二五年

一〇・三  
一〇

一一・八  
二・五

三・五  
一・四

一一・四  
一・四

一

	一九二六年	一九二七年	一九二八年	一九二九年	一九三〇年
ニヤング 世界恐慌ト資本逃避	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一
案不履行ノ原因	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一
一九二九年十月紐青ノ株式暴落ニ始マル世界恐慌結果ドウズ	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一
五ヶ月間ニ堆積セル外財ハ急遽ニ回収シラルル共ニ貿易國外逃避モ激化シ國際收支ノ不均衡ハ賠償支拂チ不可能ナラ	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一
メフリバーモラトリアムノ直接動機トナレリ。	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一
チスノ政權獲得ハ賠償履行ニ完全ニ終止符ヲ打テリ。	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一
ラーヴエルサイユ體制ノ打破、賠償不履行ヲストリガントセルヒト	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一
ノナ・ラーヴエルサイユ體制ノ打破、賠償不履行ヲストリガントセルヒト	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一	一一一

(ハーバード「國際貿易論」)

(1)

(A) 賠償問題概要  
（レバレー・シヨン）ノ概念

(1) 賠償（レバレー・シヨン）ナル語ハ、第一次大戰後聯合諸國ノ政治家ノ選定ニ係リ。戰敗國民ニシテ要求セラレタル現金及實物ヲ以テスル支拂ヲ表現ス。

(2) 可能ア右ノ要求ニハ一部分ハ物財ノ單純ナル償還ノ概念ガ、一部分ハ加ヘラレタル損害ノ補償ナル概念ガ混融トナリタリ。

(B) 賠償ノ對象

(1) 米國大統領ウイルソンハ當初ニ於テハ獨逸ニ對シ撤兵ト領土ノ變更ヲ要求シタルニ止リ、英國ノロイド・ジョーデモ亦戰爭賠償ヲ獲得シテ軍事行動ノ費用ヲ轉嫁セントスル試ミヲ否認シタリ。

(2) 廉價休戦會議ニ於テハ破壊セラレタル財產ノ單ナル償還要求ニ代り、獨逸ノ攻撃ニ於ケルノ市民及兵ノ財產ガ受ケタル損害ノ全部ニ就テ補償ヲ要求スルコトトナレリ。

(4) 体戦條約ニ於テヘ物財ノ復舊、財及設備ノ引張並ニ加ヘラレタル損害ノ賠償ヲ要求スルコトニ決定セラレタリ。又年賦年拂ニ付テモ右限度内ニ於テ行ハルルコトトナリ。

(5) 巴里平和會議ニ於テヘ民ノ復興ヲ超エ軍ナル損害ノミナラズ直接戦費ヲ毛含スルユトトナレリ。右ハ臺灣尚域時心地及後心地盛ナリシ為ニ裏ニ聯合國政治家ノ唱ヘタル要求ニ追隨スルニ至レル結果ナリ。

(6) 其ノ後敍上ノ載實ハ別シキ争論ヲ經テ賠償範囲ヨリ除カレタリ。然レ共体戦條件受諾ノ際獨逸ノ承認シタル「市民ニ加ヘラレタル直接危害ノ賠償」ナル概念ヨリハ離レ、戦争年金及住居手當ノ資本還元須了損害ノ範疇ニ趣ヘラルコトニナリ。

(7) 要スルニ聯合國側名思成ハ戰勝ナル概念及戰禍賠償ノ保障ナル概念ニ依リ支配セラレル戰爭犯罪及賠償ノ本來の概念ニ依ルモノトハ認メラレズ。事實ニ於テ戰爭犯罪ニ算スル凡テ同題ハ賠償問題トハ無關係ノ取扱ナ受ケタリ。

(3)

實物賠償ノ事属性

(1) 聯合國洞逸ニ對シ賠償支拂ヲ要求スルモ反面此等ノ賠償

支拂特ニ實物賠償ノ支拂ヲ喜バヌ矛盾存シタリ。  
之ハ實物引渡ニ關スル商議、各種ノ賠償恢復法、聯合國ノ  
戰後關稅等ヲ史實ノ物語ルトコロニシテ、此等ハ獨逸トシ  
テ唯一ノ而モ永遠ニ可能ナル支拂形態（即チ財ヤサーピス  
ヲ以テスル支拂ノ履行）ヲ阻害セントスル債權國ノ不斷ノ  
努力ト認メラル。

(2)

(3) 斯カル矛盾ハ負債國及主要債權國ガ共ニ高度ノ產業ヲ營ミ  
等シタ一一般内ナル種類ノ財貨ノ生産ヲナセル事實ニ由來ス  
從ツテユ。一言スシザイアノ如キ英國ニアリハ實物可  
渡ニ依リ何等ノ不利益ヲ感ゼズル實情ニアリタリ。

(2)

(1) 戰勝諸國ノ賠償問題取扱ノ態度

一九二三年末迄  
賠償問題ハ專等政治的及軍事的問題ト認聯シテ取扱ヘレタ  
リ。

(2)

(1) 當初ハ戰時慘惡ニ戰争ノ現實ニ對スル盲目及蠱納ナル復讐心ニ依リ支配セラル。  
(2) 後ニハ逼迫セル核算上ノ必要ニ依リ又賠償取立ヲ猶逸戦同力ノ永久的剝奪手段トセラル。

一九三四年以後

前ニ比シヨリ聲明ナル分別ガ支配的トナリダリ。  
下ウズ委員會ニ於テハ現在ノ經濟事情ガ標準トセサレ、  
合理的ナル現下ノ對策ガ案出セラル。(「外資局特別情報  
第六十六號及第八十三號參照」)  
シング案ニ於テハ先づ數年間ノ經濟之進歩ヲ明文化シ、  
可及的多クノ賠償問題ヲ私的國際金融ノ領域ニ移シ、更  
ニ賠償問題ヲシテ常ニ政治ヨリ隔絶セル地位ニ置カント  
アル試ミ行ハル。  
右試ミノ失敗原因ハヤンダ案自身ノ缺點ニモアルベキモ、  
直接的ナルモノハ世界恐慌ニシテ其ノ主タル部分ハ賠償  
ノ領域外ニアリカルモノト認メラル。

(3) 賠償支拂ト其ノ他の債務トノ關係

(4) 獨逸ニ對スル賠償賦課の實際ニ於テ當初ヨリ債權國相互間  
聯合諸國ノ米國ニ對スル債務額ト密接ニシテ關聯ヲ有シ  
來サリ。

此ノ關聯ハ夙ニ一九二〇年ニ強調セラン又一九二二年ニ於  
ケニアバルフオアノ覺書ノ基礎トナリ。

(5) 賠償責任國ヲ全體トシテ觀シトキハ其ノ米國ニ對スル純支  
拂の事實上賠償受取額中ヨリ日行喰シカ自多シ國內資源乎以  
テスルモ非ズ。從テ或ル一端ノ支拂ヌタシテ他ノ一端  
支拂マサニ得ルヤキ否キ之ニ基シ疑問ナリ。

(6) 併シ米國政府ハ決算的ニ財政的ニモ此ノ關聯ヲ認メサル  
立場ニ終始シテ所以テ裏態ハ尙停頓狀態トナレリ。

賠償支拂ノ總實質的負擔

(7) 賠償支拂ノ總實質的負擔ノ測定ハ極ムテ困難ナリ。

(8) 獨逸ノ戰後インフレーション及崩壊ノ一主要原因ハ賠償關係ニアリタルモ賠償ノ負擔ノモ乎分離スルコトハ不可能ナリ。

(3)

一九二八年一二九年當時ノ獨逸ノ狀態ヨリスレバ左ノ如ニ葉觀材料ヲ認ラル。

(1) 賠償賦課ヘ獨逸總行政費ノ一二。四%ヲ占メ推定國民所得ノ三・四%ヲ吸收シタルニ過ギズ。獨逸ニトリ耐ヘ難キ程苦酷ナリト思考セラヒズ。

(2) 當時ノ獨逸國民ノ租稅負擔ヘ賠償ヲ支拂ヒツツアルニ拘ラズ主要賠償受領諸國ニ比シ實質的ニ稍重ハ程慶ニ過ギズ。

(4)

(1) 賠償ヘ獨逸ヲシテ危險手齊ス程苦酷ナリ國內的過勞ニ陷ハシニ至ル。寧口反對ニ獨逸ノ政治及民生不態ハ一九一三年ノ水準處ハソレ以上ニフリタリ。

(2) 然レ共尙次ノ如キ悲觀的ナル材料ヲモ考慮スルヲ要ス。

(3) 獨逸ハ其メ財貨ヲ外國市場ニ押シツケント不斷ノ努力ヲナシテ之ノ結果、世界貿易ノ水準ヲ歪曲シ獨逸及海外ニ於ケル物價ト生活水準トヲ壓迫スルニ至レリ。

(4) 國際金融的ニ觀テ獨逸ノ賠償支拂ガ眞實ノ輸出餘剰ヲ生ゲシメルコトニ依テ行ハレズ海外ヨリ支拂額以上ヲ借入

(5)

ルルコトニ依テ行ハレタリ。（一九二四年乃至一九三〇年ニ於ケル獨逸ノ外國ヨリノ借入レ額ヘ總額約百八十億馬克ニシニ賠償支拂額ヘ百十億馬克以下ナリ）。

(6) 繼上ノ借入ニ依リ一九二四年以後、外觀上ノ恢復ガ可能ナリ。獨逸ハ暗償支拂ノ對外的ナル能力ヲ得ルト共ニ國內的ナル力ヲモ得ルニ至リタルガ、借入額ガ支拂額ヲ超過シタル事實ハ獨逸ヲ左ノ如キ事情ニ置キタルモノト認メラル。

(7) 事實ニ於テ暗償ニ關スル眞ノ引渡問題ニ直面セシメラレルニ至ラズ。

(8) 輸入ニ比較シテ通常ノ商品輸出（實物引渡トハ別ニ）ヲ増加セシムルガ獨國內的再調整ヲ行フ必要ヲ感ズルニ至ラズ。

(9) 幷シ借入額ノ約四〇%ガ短期的性質ノセノナリシ爲、國際金融上ノ地位ハ極メテ不安定ナル狀態ニアリ。之ハ一九三一年ノ夏ニ明瞭ニ現ハレタリ。

(10) 自是觀之世界不況ノ併發ナクバ獨逸ヲ懲ラク常態ニ復シタルモノト考ヘラル。但シ右ハ暗償ガ不況ノ根本原因ナラズトノ觀點ニ立ツ場合ニノミ妥當ナリ。

## 結

## 論

(1) 聯合諸國ガ戰爭犯罪トハ別ニ獨逸賠償ヲ要求シタルハ、獨逸ガ一八七一年佛西ヨリ賠償ヲ要求シタルト同様當然ノコトナリ。

(2) 然レ共嘗初決定セラレタル額ト方法ニ依リ賠償ヲ強要セシトシタルハ獨逸ノ支拂能力ノ關係ヨリ觀ルモ又債權國自身ノ利益ヨリ觀ルモ適當ト語メ得ズ。第一次大戰後ノ獨逸賠償ノ歴史カラ得ラシタル永遠ノ教訓トモ謂フベキモノハ次ノ如シ。

(3) 要求額ガ負債國ノ經濟的及政治的能力ト合理的ナル關係ヲ有スベキコト。

(4) 負債國自身ガ經濟的及政治的健康ノ保持ヲ許サルベキコト。(5) 支拂ガ債券發行又ハ其ノ他ノ方法ニ依リ政治的問題トシテデナクシテ經濟的問題トシテ取扱ハルベキコト。

近代ノ國際貿易及國際金融ニ立脚シテ故北セール等國ヨリ長期ニ亘り繼續的ニ要求継チ獲得スルコトハ、上ノ條件ヲ満足シテ甫メテ可能ナリ。

内獨逸賠償負擔トインフレーショントノ關係ニ關スル見解

(a) チユロニノ見解

(b) ヴエルサイユ條約ニ依テ獨逸ニ課セラレ  
ル負擔ガ一九二〇一二年度ノ同國財政赤字ノ一大要因ナリシコトハ勿論

ナリ。然レドモ此ノ負擔ハ財政赤字ノ唯一ノ原因ニモ非ズ。又最モ重要ナル原因ニモ非ズ。

(a) 財政赤字計數トヴエルサイユ條約下獨逸國庫負擔總額トノ比較左ノ如シ。即チ條約負擔ハ赤字總額ノ三分ノ一二過ギズ。

流动公債增加  
合計

ヴエルサイユ條約  
ニ依ル負擔

一九二二年	六〇五三。六	六五三。八
一九二一年	三六七五。六	二四四二。八
一九二〇年	一九一〇。〇	一五四〇。一
一九一九年	一九一〇。〇	一八七一〇。〇
一九一八年	一九一〇。〇	一八七一〇。〇

(單位百萬金マルク)

- (1) 條約調印以處セル一九一八年十一月乃至一九一九年六月ニ於ケル獨逸國庫ノ赤字ハ新ニ百億金マルクニ達シアリ。
- (2) ヴエルサイユ條約ニ依ル賃構ナカリシ場合マルクノ下落チ見ザリシヤ否ヤ疑問ナリ。
- (3) 大戰終結當時ニ於ケル獨逸ノ公債ハ長短合シテ約七百五十億金マルクナリ。
- (4) 右ニ對スル利拂ノ全部ヘ之ヲ租稅ニ依ルコト不可能ナリ。從テ紙幣増發ニ依ラゼルチ得ザリシモノトセバ、ヴエルサイユ負擔ナクトモマルクハ下落シタルベシ。
- (5) 右ノ利拂ノ爲ニ獨逸政府ガ一方ニ於テ歳出ノ節減、他方ニ於テ增稅ノ實行ニ成功シ得タリトセバマルクノ崩壊ナルベキ此ノ二種可能ナリトセバヴエルサイユ條約ノ負擔アリタル場合ニ於テモ可能ナルベキ筈ナリ。
- (6) 一九二一年八月末迄ニ於テハ年賦金ノ外貨支拂トマルクノ下落トハ殆ンド關係ナシ。

(4)

四蓋シ此ノ期間ニ於ケル外貨拂ノ殆ンド全部ハ獨逸並ニ同盟國ノ戰前ノ債權債務決済ニ充當セラレタルモノナシ子以テ日。

マルクノ崩壊ヲ早メタルハ獨逸ガ一九二一年五月ノ倫敦最後通牒ニ基ク義務ヲ果サントシタルガ爲ナリトノ見解ハ疑問ナリ。

(1) 一九二一年八月三十一日ニ獨逸ガ支拂ヒタル十億金マルクガ獨逸爲替ニ與ヘタル影響ヲ重大ナルハ明ナリ。

(2) 依然レドモ一九二一年秋ノマルク下落ノ原因ハ國際聯盟委員會ガ上部シレジア割譲ヲ決議シタルガ爲ニ生ジタル恐慌ノ影響大ナリト謂フベシ。獨逸ノ政治家ハ有力新聞ハ上部シレジアノ割譲ハ獨逸ノ經濟的破滅ナト公言シ居リタル爲獨逸民衆ハ右ノ割譲問題ヲ實際以上ニ重要視シタリ。斯テ十月十七日ノ獨逸爲替市場ハ恐慌狀態ニ陥リタリ。

(3) 一九二一年九月獨逸取引所ニ現ハレタル激烈ナルマーケット暴擊ニ就テハ事情不明ナルモ、政府ガ短期間ニ多額ノ外國爲替ヲ手當スペキ必要ニ迫ラレ居ルヲ奇貨トスル投機者流ニ對シテ當時大藏大臣ハ公然ト之ヲ非難シタル事實アリ?

(1) マルク下落ハ東南アルク所居者ニ懲戒チ惹起シ。マルク下落ニ拍車セリ。

銀行ガ顧客ニ信用チ與ベテ外國為替商人ヲ可能ナラシメタ  
ルハマルク下落ノ一因ナリ。

外賓ニ依ル賠償金支拂ガ一九二二年七月ナ以テ停止セラレ  
タルモモ拘ラズ。再為替商ハ下落シ續ケタル事實ハ表モ無敵  
ナリシハ一九二三年七月十五日乃至八月三十一日ナリ。ハ  
條約ニ基ク支拂テ以テハ説明シ得ズ。

(2) 之ニ對スル解答ハ獨逸政府ガ租稅ニ依ラズ紙幣増發ニ依ツ  
テ外國為替商ハシタルコトニテ培ヒ支拂ニモ拘ラズ。國民  
ノ外國為替需要ハ減退セズマルク下落ニ制止點ナカリシ  
コトニ在リ。

## (1) グラハムノ見解

(1) 賠償負擔ハ財政秩序復舊ノ成否ノ差ツ決定セリ。賠償支拂ハ爲替相場ヲ低下セシメルヲ得ズ、之ニ因ル歲出増加額ハ合理的ナル豫想困難ナルヲ以テ國立銀行ヨリノ借入ニ仰ガゼルヲ得ドリヤ。

(2) 聯合國ガ一九二一年五月迄賠償額ヲ決定セドリシコト及決定セラレタル總額千三百二十億金馬克ノ巨大サハ獨逸政府ノ信用ヲ破壊セリ。

(3) 賠償總額ヨリ重要ナルハ巨額ノ即時支拂要求ナリ。

輸出超過ナクシテ外國爲替入手ヲ可能ナシムベキ外國信用ヲ有セル爲多額ノ取金支拂ハ爲替匯落ヲ招カゼルヲ得ズ。

(4) 財政支出ガ政府ノ支配シ得ルトフロナラバ通貨ノ安定ヲ維持スルコト可能ナレドモ、賠償ハ國外ヨリアル强硬ナル現金支拂要求ニシテ獨逸政府ノ及ブトコロニ非ズ、賠償要求ガ飽クコトヲ知カゼル限り安定ハ自己ノ力ノ及ブトコロニ

非ズト主張シ得ルハ獨逸ノミナリ。

ルル侵入ハ頑固ナル債權者ヲシテ暴力威銃ノ船金ヲ覺シヌ。又獨逸ニ於ケル賠償完全履行政府ノ頑強ナル反對者ヲシテ頑固ナル非公權的態度ヲ續タルヨリモ鬼ニ角緩和セラレタル負擔ヲ委諾スル吉ガ得策ナルヲ悟テシタルモ、此ノ如キ妥協ヘノ道ハ獨逸ノ消極的抵抗ヲ媒介トスルマク貲ノ暴落ヲ見タル後ニ始メテ生ジタルモノナリ。

賠償ハ財政ヲ甚大ナル影響ヲ與ヘタルモ、財政的困難ハ此ノ原因ノミニ茲クモノニ非ズ。

(b) インフレーションハ現金支拂ガ行ハルル以前ニ既ニ進行シ、現会支拂暂停止セラレタル後モ加速度的ニ進行セリ。

(c) 其ノ根源ハインフレーションニ對スル財政金融當局ノ交易ナル態度ニ在リ。

(a) ヘルフエリツヒツ藏相トスル戰時内閣ハインフレーション政策ヲ敵視セズ、此ノ態度ハ長ク國立銀行ヲ支配セリ。

(2) 通貨價值低落ハ抵越ノ最弱點ニ沿フ國債整理トナレリ。  
(3) インフレー・シヨン政策ハ民間實業家ノ歓迎スルトコロナ  
リ。  
(4) 從テ<sup>レ</sup>ン<sup>レ</sup>・シヨン抑壓策ハ常ニ前途半端ニ止マレリ。  
有力實業家ハ納稅サ水タ・ジユヲ行ヒ、政府ノヅエルサ  
イニ條約義務履行ニ不協力態度ヲ持セリ。  
實業家ガインフレー・シヨンカラ確實ナル利益ヲ收ムル代リ  
ニ不安定ノ極ニ陷リ、事業活動ガ昂揚カラ恐慌ニ移レルト  
キ、又一般大衆ガ此ノ上ノ損失ヲ蒙ルヲ拒絶セントスル氣  
勢ガ一般化シタルトキ、始メテ安定セル標榜ノ復活ヲ必要  
ドスル確信ヲ生ゼリ。

## 四ボツダム對日宣言

(一) 我等一合衆國大統領、支那共和國々民政府主席及び大英帝國首相ハ我等ノ數億ノ國民ヲ代表シテ協議シタル結果、日本ガ今次ノ戰爭ヲ終結スル一チノ機會ヲ與フルコトニ意見ノ一致ヲ見タリ。

(二) 合衆國、英帝國及ビ支那ノ老大ナル陸、海、空軍ハ西方ヨリ自國ノ陸軍及び空中勢力ニヨリ屢次ニ亘ル補給ヲ受ケ日本ニ對スル最後的打撃ヲ與フベシ待機中ナリ。

(三) 起キ上ラントスル世界ノ自由ナル民族ソ力ニ對シテ行ハレタル禍逸ノ無益ニシテ意義ナキ抵抗ノ結果ハ日本國民ニ極メテ明白ナルトコロナリ。

現在日本ニ對スル情勢ノ結論レ居ル兵力ハチ千スガ抵抗ノ武ミ全弱過、土地、商業、國民生活等ノ凡ニル方途ノ潰滅ニ與セル力ニ比シテモ格段ノ相違ナリ。我等ノ決意ヲ背景トセル此等軍隊ノ力ヲ最高度ニ發揮セバ、日本ノ武装兵力ノ完全ナル壊滅ハ必至ニシテ、且日本本土ノ完全ナル破壊モ亦免ガルルコトヲ得ズ。

- (四) 無知識ナ見透チ以テ日本ヲ滅亡ノ門口ニ迄誘導セル軍國主義ノ標  
キ方、日本自ラガ定ムベキ時ハ到來セリ。  
(五) 我等ハ左ノ條件ヲ提出シ、他ニ選擇ノ余地ヲ與ヘズ、且猶豫ヲ許  
サヌモノナリ。
- (六) 世界征服ノ企圖ヲ誘致セル權威ト勢力トヲ永久ニ除去シ、軍國主  
義ヲ驅逐ス。
- (七) 菲律賓ノ實地ヲ確保スル爲聯合國ガ指定スル日本領土ノ諸地  
占領ス。
- (八) カイロ宣言ノ諸條項ヲ實施シ日本ノ主權ヲ本州、北海道、九州、  
四國及吾ラノ決定スル諸島嶼ニ限定スル。
- (九) 日本ノ武裝兵力ヲ完全ニ武裝解除ス。
- (十) 戰爭犯罪人ヲ嚴重ニ處罰ス、日本政府ハ國內ニ於ケル民主主義的  
傾向復活ニ對スル障礙ヲ除去シ、且基本的人權ヲ尊重シ言論、信  
教並ニ思想ノ自由ヲ確立スペシ。日本ニ對シテハ其ノ經濟ヲ支持シ且ツ正當ナル現物賠償ニ應ジ得

ル爲ノ産業維持ヲ許可スルモノ、再軍備ヲ可能ナラシメル如キ産業ヲ許サズ。

(国) 以上ノ目的ノ爲ニ原料資源ノ入手ヲ許可シ、且ツ將來國際貿易關係ヘノ參割ヲ許可ス。

(國) 聯合國ノ占領兵力ハ以上ノ目的ガ實現シ且ツ自由ニ表明セラレタル日本國民ノ意思ニ基ク平和的責任政權ノ樹立ト共ニ直ニニ撤收ス。

(国) 日本政府ガ即時全武装兵力ノ無條件降伏ヲ宣言スルコトヲ要望ス、然ラザレバ日本ヘ速力ニ且ツ全的ニ破壊セラレン。

U.S. POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

The purpose of this document. This document is a statement of the general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender. It has been approved by the President and distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers and to appropriate United States departments and agencies for their guidance. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately.

Part 1 - Ultimate Objectives.

The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

- A. to insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States and to the peace and security of the world.

To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will

-3-

~~support the rights of other states and will support~~  
the objectives of the United States and reflected in  
the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United  
Nations. The United States desires that this govern-  
ment should conform as closely as may be to the  
principles of democratic self-government, but it is  
not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to im-  
pose upon Japan any form of government not supported  
the freely-expressed will of the peoples.

These objectives will be achieved by  
the following principle means:

A. Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the  
islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such  
minor outlying islands as may be determined, in  
accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agree-  
ments to which the United States is or may be a party.

B. Japan will be completely disarmed and  
demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and  
the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated  
from her political, economic, and social life.

3

Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

C. The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedom of religion, assembly, speech and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.

D. The Japanese people shall be afforded the opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met.

Part 2 - Allied Authority.

1. Military Occupation. There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the principal Allied powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan.

-4-

~~For the soon participation of the forces of other nations that have taken a leading part in the war against Japan will be welcomed and expected. The occupation forces will be under the command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States.~~

Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied Powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern.

2. Relationship to the Japanese Government.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States

to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States' objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States' objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the

-6-

direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation.

3. Publicity as to policies.

The Japanese people, and the world at large, shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policies of the occupation, and of the progress made in their fulfillment.

Part 3. - Political.

1. Disarmament and Demilitarization.

Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people the part played with the military and naval leaders, and those who collaborated with them, in bringing about the existing and future distress of the people.

-7-

Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff, and all Secret Police Organisation shall be dissolved. Military and naval material, military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and military, naval and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander.

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese government, leaders of other nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial

-8-

~~Societies and institutions~~ will be dissolved and prohibited.

Militarism and ultra-nationalism, in doctrine and practice, including military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned and all other exponents of militarism and ultra-nationalism shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.

## 2. WAR CRIMINALS.

Persons charged by the Supreme Commander or appropriate United Nations' Agencies with being war criminals, including those charged with having visited cruelties upon United Nations' prisoners or other nationals, shall be arrested, tried and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its nationals shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nations.

-9-

~~ENCOURAGE LIBERTY~~  
~~ENCOURAGE EQUALITY FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES~~  
~~ENCOURAGE~~  
~~DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES.~~

Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation.

At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and the other democracies. Association of personnel of the occupation forces with the Japanese population should be controlled, only to the extent necessary, to further the policies and objectives of the occupation.

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion, shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.

Laws, decrees and regulations which establish discriminations on grounds of race, nationality,

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creed, or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended or amended as required; and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released.

The judicial, legal and police grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the Policies set forth in Articles 1 and 3 of this Part 3 and thereafter shall be progressively influenced to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

Part 4 - Economic

1. ECONOMIC DEMILITARIZATION

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others; the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all

-11-

~~roads designed for the equipment maintenance, or~~  
use of any military force or establishment; the  
imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities  
for the production or repair of implements of war,  
including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft;  
the institution of a system of inspection and control  
over selected elements in Japanese economic activity  
to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation;  
the elimination in Japan of those selected industries  
or branches of production whose chief value to Japan  
is in preparing for war; the prohibition of specialized  
research and instruction directed to the development  
of war-making power; and the limitation of the size  
and character of Japan's heavy industries to its  
future peaceful requirements, and restriction of  
Japanese merchant shipping to the extent required to  
accomplish the objectives of demilitarization.

The eventual disposition of those existing  
production facilities within Japan which are to be  
eliminated in accord with this program, as between  
conversion to other uses, transfer abroad, and  
scrapping will be determined after inventory.

12

Pending decision, facilities readily convertible for civilian production should not be destroyed, except in emergency situations.

2. PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command of direct economic activity in support of military ends.

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

A. To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends.

-13-

B. To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.

3. RESUMPTION OF PEACEFUL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering.

The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply activities and institutions, and to find useful employment for their people along lines adapted to and devoted to peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

-14-

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress.

The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs that serve the following purposes:

- A. To avoid acute economic distress;
- B. To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies;
- C. To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries agreed upon by the Allied Governments;
- D. To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied.

In this connection, the Japanese authorities on their own responsibility shall be permitted to establish and administer controls over economic activities, including essential national public services.

finance, banking, and production and distribution of essential commodities, in order to assure their conformity with the objectives of the occupation.

#### 4. REPARATIONS AND RESTITUTION

Reparations for Japanese aggression shall be made:

A. Through the transfer -- as may be determined by the appropriate Allied authorities -- of Japanese property located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan.

B. Through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supply of occupying forces.

Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization.

RESTITUTION

Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable looted property.

5. FISCAL, MONETARY AND BANKING POLICIES

The Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander.

6. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS

Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world during occupation and under suitable controls, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports.

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods, and foreign exchange and financial transactions. Both the policies followed in the exercise of these controls and their actual administration shall be subject to the approval and supervision of the Supreme Commander in order to make

-17-

sure that they are not contrary to the policies of the occupying authorities, and in particular that all foreign purchasing power that Japan may acquire is ultimately only for essential needs.

7. JAPANESE PROPERTY LOCATED ABROAD.

Existing Japanese external assets and existing Japanese assets located in territories detached from Japan under the terms of surrender, including assets owned in whole or part by the Imperial Household and Government, shall be revealed to the occupying authorities and held for disposition according to the decision of the Allied authorities.

8. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR FOREIGN ENTERPRISE WITH JAPAN.

The Japanese authorities shall not give, or permit any Japanese business organization to give, exclusive or preferential opportunity or terms to the enterprise of any foreign country, or cede to such enterprise control of any important branch of economic activity.

18  
9. IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY.

Imperial Household property shall not be exempted from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation. (USG)

六ボツダム對獨宣言

(1) 經濟關係

(1) 武器、彈藥、軍需機材、各種航空機及ビ海 洋 航 路 船ノ生産ヲ禁止シ阻止スル、金屬、化學藥品、機械及ビ其ノ他戰爭經濟ニ直接必要ナモノノ生産ハ嚴重ニ統制シ、戰後承認サレタトイツノ平時需要ノ範圍内ニ制限スル、許可サレタ生産ニ必要デナイ生産力ヘ賠償計畫ニ從ヒ移動セシメ移動不可能ナ場合ヘ破壊スル。

(2) カルテル、シンジケート、トラストソノ他獨占協定ニヨルドイツ經濟力ノ過度ノ集中ヲ一掃スルタメ、可及的速力ニドイツ經濟ヲ分散セシメル。

(3) ドイツ經濟ヲ組織スルニ當リ農業及ビ國內平和產業ノ發展ニ主トシテ重點ヲ置ク。

(4) 占領期間下ドイツ領土ハ單一ナ經濟單位トシテトリ扱ハレ、鐵業、農業、漁業ノ各產業部門、貨金物價、配給制度、輸出入計畫、通貨、金融、中央稅制、賠償ソノ他ニツイテ聯合國ハ共同ノ政策ヲ確立スル。

(B) ドイツ國民ニ對シ歐洲各國民生活水準ノ平均ヲ超エナイ程度ノ生活水準ヲ認メル。

(C) 管理理事會ノ確立シタ經濟管理ヲ實施スルタメドイツ人ニヨル行政機構ヲ設置シ、管理ニシイテヘ、ドイツ人ニ責任ヲ負ヘセル。

(7) 輸送ノ修復、石炭ノ増産、食糧ノ最大限生産住宅及ビ必須公共事業ノ應急修理ニ關スル措置ヲ至急實施スル。

(8) 未ダ聯合國ノ統制下ニ置カレザルドイツ所有在外資產ノ統制處分ニシキ管理理事會ハ適切ナ指量ヲ講ズル。

(E) 賠償關係

(1) 賠償支拂ニ際シテヘドイツ人ガ外國ヨリノ援助ナシニ生活シ得ル資源テ殘シテ置クコトトスル、管理理事會ノ承認セルドイツノ輸入ヲ決済スルニ必要ナ支拂手續ヲ供給スル年々ノ生産及ビ在荷ノ輸出ニヨル賣上代金ハマサ第一ニコノ補輸入ノ決済ニ使用セシムル。

(2) ドイツノ平和經濟ニ必要ナル資力從ツテ賠償額ハフランス代表參加ノ下ニ賠償委員會ニテ決定スル。

- (3) ソ聯ニ對スル賠償ヘソ聯占領地ヨリノ物資移動及ビ適當ナドイツ在外資産ノ使用ニヨリ實行スル、ソ聯ハ自國ノ賠償受取分中ボーランドヘノ財貨ヲ済済スル。
- (4) 米英兩國及ビソノ他諸國ノ賠償要求ハ夫々占領地帶ヨリノ資產ノ撤去並ニドイツ在外資産中ヨリ充足スル。
- (5) ソ聯ハ自國占領地ヨリ引揚グルベキ賠償ノホカ西部ドイツリ別ニ次ノ給付ヲ得ル。
- (6) 西部ドイツ冶金、化學、機械工業等工業設備ニシテドイツノ平和經濟ニ不必要カツ移動可能ナモノノ一五%、但ソノ他賠償協定ヨリ記メラレバ食糧、石炭、加里、亞鉛、木材、陶器ナドノ同額ヲ放棄スル。
- (7) 西部ドイツニアル工業設備ニシテドイツノ平和經濟ニ不必要カツ移動シ得ルモノノ一〇%ヲ賠償トシテ何ラノ反對給付ナクソ聯ニ引渡ス。
- (8) 西部ドイツヨリ移動セシムベキ設備ノ額ハ爾後六ヶ月以内ニ決定スペキモノトス。
- (9) 工業設備ノ移動ハ直チニ開始シ移動額決定ノ日ヨリ二ヶ年以内スル、ドイツノ平和經濟ニ不必要ナ設備ノ選定ハ聯合國ニ

賠償委員會ノ方針ニ基キ管理理事會ガ行ス。

(7) ソ聯ハドイツ所在ドイツ會社株式ニ對スル賠償請求權ヲ放棄ス  
ル

(8) 米英兩國ハ東部ドイツ所在ドイツ株式會社オヨビアルガリア、  
フィン蘭ド、ハンガリ亞、ルーマニア及ビ東部オーストリア  
所在ドイツ資產ニ對スル賠償請求權ヲ放棄ス。  
(9) ソ聯ハ聯合軍ニヨリドイツ國內テ押收サレタ金塊ニ對シテ請求  
權ヲ有セズ。