

Space, Territory and Sovereignty: Critical Analysis of Concepts

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Abstract

Recognising the exceptionally complex context of the high post-modernity of current global situation, this study deals with the genealogy, critical examination and importance of the concepts of space/spatiality, territory/territoriality and sovereignty for the theory of international relations. At the first analytic level, primary effect of the “spatial turn” in social sciences will be detected, in the sense that politics is hardly conceivable without space, since there is no interrelation with the heterogeneous Other. Space is continuously articulated and rearticulated, it is discontinued/topological and under constant construction, through multi-faceted and multi-dimensional relations and identities made of intersecting, networked political, social, economic and cultural circulations and connections. Hence, in line with the afore-said, remodeled regions are now treated as the connecting nexus of numerous fluxes and harmonised, juxtaposed and converging diversities. At the second and third analytic levels, the focus is on the processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as the central characteristics of contemporary international politics and the associated reformulation/reconfiguration of the idea of sovereignty. The centrepiece of the new territorial ontology and epistemology is the change of perspective in the conception of the territorial state as an omnipresent nucleus of modern political thought. The study emphasizes the idea of the social production of space and territory, the importance of the contingent, historical-cultural-social articulation of territoriality as a

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genuinely political project, foregrounding territory as a “networked social/spatial quantum”, as an underlying expression and agent of pluriversal spaces/territories, as apparently parallel and autarchic, but actually intersecting and tangent spatial units.

Keywords: space, territory, sovereignty, state, “territorial trap”, deterritorialization, reterritorialization, globalization, international relations.

Introduction

Fifteen years ago, Zygmunt Bauman (2002: 81, 83) proclaimed: “a symbolic end to the era of space” and transformation of the global space into extraterritorial frontierlands, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001: xii) heralded a new model of global sovereignty through the concept of Empire: “a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers”, while for Étienne Balibar borders were no longer “shores of politics but [...] the space of the political itself” (Balibar 2002: 92). Whether it results from common-sense or scientific reasoning, space, together with time, is a fundamental dimension of our perception and living of reality. But, contrary to this contention, its status within the theoretical, hermeneutical, epistemological and ontological social science agendas was disproportionate to its analytic primacy: the prevalent interest concerned the meta-narrative of time. Space was usually regarded as finalised, fixed and “reactionarily/regressively” formatted, since change was addressed more as a historical than a spatial social trajectory, and the qualities of spatially profiled multiplicity, the existence of Otherness and of the articulation of the *modus operandi* of our coexistence with the singular and/or plural Other were marginalised. The partitiveness of space had no bearing on its inflexible essence, and it was held as pre-given, pre-defined, isomorphic and static container for arranging objects/events/processes of different ranks. However, today, space is more or less accepted as transformable/heteromorphic, generated by human contemplation and agency and as such, a reflection of specific practices: space is a processual political entity undergoing the perpetual process of social production

and reproduction (Lefebvre 1976b, 1991 [1974], 2003).

If we add to the aforesaid: the phenomenon of time-space compression (Harvey 1990a, 1990b); the notion of distinguishing between “representations of space” and “spaces of representation”, or the trialectics of space seen through the analytical prism of the perceived, conceived and lived spaces (Soja 1989, 1996); the concept of heterotopia, or the possibility of several juxtaposed parallel, divergent spaces within the single real space (Foucault 2008 [1967], 2000b); post-colonial notions of hybridity and “thirdspace” which reconstructs its own history by new power structures and political initiatives (Bhabha 1994); or the distinction between “space of flows” and “space of place” (Castells 2010 [1996]), and put them together into the context of neo-liberal globalization and the culminating crisis of capitalism, we can then gain proper insight into the extent and scope of the post-modern reconceptualization/reconfiguration of this significant concept.

The “nature”/imaginarium of space has been changed as it has become a relational construct manifested in heterogeneous practices, deconcentrated activities, new relationally reformulated identities, openness and myriad interactions scaled from local to global level (Massey 1992, 1993, 2005, 2009). At the same time, the relationship between politics and space is mutually constituting, as is the relationship between state and territory (Lefebvre 2003: 87), or, none of the elements of these two pairs is antithetical to the other one. In fact, space cannot be contemplated in a politically neutral/sterile manner, as every imaginarium of space implies a cluster of political implications, explications, repercussions and effects: space and power are two inevitably related or dialectically inseparable notions. This implies not only antagonisms and confrontations over the control, annexation or acquisition of a space/territory, but also the fact that space itself articulates, configures, produces and represents power as such. Therefore, space forms part of the „genetic code“ of politics, and its contemplation is of extraordinary importance for the theoretical discourse of politics and international relations, disciplines, that were completely resistant to issues of spatiality. In other words, space, history and politics are mutually imbuing and empowering discursive platforms.

The theoretical fate of space/spatiality is shared by the directly associated

notions of territory/territoriality. For an inadequately long time, the academia was not sensitised to territory-related matters, which were an isolated blind spot of political theory. (Elden 2010: 799; Kolers 2009: 1). This constellation is partly due to the perception of the meaning of territory as self-evident, not requiring any additional explanation, argumentation or interpretation, as a taken-for-granted consequence of some specific narrative position of territoriality which is transparent as such. On the other hand, the historical perspective of territory was often overlooked and territory was elaborated as an ahistorical and universal category identified with the state by default, or more precisely: with the state-covered physical terrain. The “fatal” nexus between territory and state finds its most patent expression in the concept of the “territorial trap” and similar concepts, such as “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Schiller 2002). Regarding the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994, 1998, 2005, 2015) its idea is that a sovereign modern state can realise its political existence only through a particular, boundary-specified, territory, that there is an essential antithesis between the external and internal state domain and that the territorial state represents a spatial container of modern society. So conceived, territorialization qualified as a precondition of the political and social being, obscuring the possibility of its treatment as a historically/temporally profiled discourse/narrative of partialization and centralization.

The evolution of the globalization process led to the configuration of the new planetary reality which, both by its scope and intensity of influence, has reached a critical junction in terms of global exchange and global fluxes, suggesting that the territorial state can no longer make an omnipresent nucleus of political science and practice. This gap has been manifested in approaches ranging from those which, acknowledging the creation of networked territorial entities or supranational institutions, or the analogous dislocation of sources of power, pleaded for the “redundancy” and/or “dismantling” of the state, to the relatively milder concepts which, while acknowledging the fact that state power is narrowing or being shared with other sources of power, pleaded for the significant change of its role and functions. This prompted a full spectrum of issues concerning the redefinition of sovereignty, exploring possibilities for recomposing

its meaning and reach through a hybrid formula that would reflect its performance at the level of state territory/central authority and the potential external openness/control, or the examination of its inherent characteristics/attributes, such as indivisibility and the position of the sovereign within and outside the legal system. Of course the state has not disappeared, the deterritorialization of political imaginari-um ran in parallel with the process of intensive reterritorialization, but the insistence on an exclusive, particularistic position of state as an indispensable mode in understanding political power has definitely become academically inadequately poignant and obsolete (Shah 2012: 58).

With regard to the above, this study will address both the conceptual genealogy and critical examination of the ideas of space, territory and sovereignty. The aim is to identify, through the critical analysis of various discursive projects, employment of specific conceptual triangulation, the depth and scope or the research implications and explications of the changes crucial to the understanding of theory, practice and imaginary of the current international system, observed through the prism of globalization and marked by the ostensibly contradictory processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The central locus of this new territorial ontology and epistemology is the change of perspective in the comprehension of territorial state as an ideal of the modern political thought. At the same time, notwithstanding that territory is definitely not the only mode of political and state space, as will be shown in the study, it has not lost its outstanding significance. The study highlights the idea of the social production of state and territory, the importance of the contingent, historical-cultural-social articulation of territoriality as a genuinely political project, as opposed to any technological understanding of territory, by foregrounding the concept of territory as a “networked social/spatial quantum”, as an underlying reflection and agent of *pluriversal*, seemingly parallel and autarchic, but actually intersecting and tangent spatial units. It is essentially a digression from the naturalised/physicalized perception of territory as an attempt to examine and identify, consistent with a broader view of globalization as opposed to the neoliberal metaphor for market, the new normative principles of the territorial legitimation that more adequately express a radically globalised matrix or reality of the international order.

1. Discursive “Reanimation” of Space in Social Sciences: The Post-modern Situation

1.1. Axiomatic Inextricability of Spatial and Socio-Political: The Case of Lefebvre

Although the broadest division into the physical space of natural sciences and social space of social sciences is still a subject of academic debates, we will leave this division aside since the latter, if not drawing inspiration from the former, as is often the case, definitely relies upon them interpretatively. There are three ways of understanding space: (1) as the absolute (substantial), (2) relative or (3) relational modality (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]; Shields 1991; Massey 1992, 1999, 2005; Harvey 2009a [1973], 2009b; Suisky 2009; Santiáñez 2013; Slowik 2016). The isotropic absolute space is a “preexisting, immovable, continuous, and unchanging framework” (Harvey 2009b: 134), it is a tri-dimensional, “mathematically calculable and measurable”, external space of Euclid’s geometry, Isaac Newton’s mechanic or René Descartes’/Cartesius’ *res extensa*, an inactive and passive arena/platform where people, objects and processes define their identity, uniqueness and meaning depending on the invariable location they inhabit in its coordinate grid and that appears to them, at least partially, as their undisputed spatial truth, despite being separated from the world they observe and are determined by. Time and space are independent and disparate aspects of the objective reality. While time is linear and extends from the infinity of the past to infinity of the future, a separate and value-indifferent spatial arrangement of things, grids or other bounded entities (such as states, regions or cities, in a nutshell: power containers) that exist before their interactions, is based on restrictions, monopolization, threats, blackmail and on potential, but also actual, physical violence, manifested in the capitalist society through relations of private ownership (cf. Harvey 2009a [1973]: 168, 2009b: 134).

Contrary to absolute space, mutable relative space is a function of preeminence of process, behaviour and motion, associated with the non-Euclidean, hyperbolic geometry and Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity: it is understood as a format of existence of objects through mutually-constituting relations (Stannard 2008: 24-

32). It involves denial of the separate existence of tri-dimensional space and one-dimensional time, with reality understood as their abstract and actual amalgamation into a quadridimensional space-time, so it is essentially subject to the beholder's frame of reference. Here, it is important to note two issues (Massey 1992: 76-77): (1) this is not an amputation of the distinction between the spatial and temporal dimension, but the emphasis is rather on their interlacing; and (2), consequently, neither space nor time can be negatively defined by the absence of the other. Places can merge in myriad different ways and for a multiplicity of purposes and reasons, making it multidimensional, multifunctional, multi-perspective, multioperative and multilateral. The creator of these differentiated positions/points is in the role of someone who redistributes, reconfigures and maps spatial relations and temporal intervals/distances. We would also add that, unlike the Euclidean plane, Descartes' or Newton's coordinate grids, it refers to the genuine relational imaginarium of the topographic space which is primarily expressed through description based on "measurable" observations, characterization and qualification, topological space implies the fusion/intertwining/links between the non-linear time and the trans-scalar space with heterogeneous, complex and "unmeasurable relational grids of separate/differentiated actors, such as multiplied regional/fluid/grid spaces, without any territorial certainty and "petrification", opening the possibility for the relational collocation of linearly uncollocated places or relational uncollocation of collocated places. (cf. Johannesson and Baerenholdt 2009; Amin and Cohendet 2004b: 87-93). The political implications of this concept are far-reaching.

When in the notional hierarchy of space as the interpretative instrumentarium for its comprehension, Newton's concept of place, attributes of size, shape and distance, is dethroned and instead, the concept of situation or process is brought to the forefront, it means that we have Leibniz's relational approach to space (Harvey 2009b: 136-140; Suisky 2009: 48; Santiañez 2013: 22-23; Slowik 2016: 61-68). Absolute space, as shown before, implies a stance that regards space as an independently existing entity in relation to material objects that are either in a state of rest or in uniform motion. Inclining towards relationalism, Leibniz dismisses such a stance, as well as Descartes' idea that space is identical to

substance, and assumes both multiple forms of objects and space as a diffusion of place, thereby formulating the inherent dynamic principle of permanent transformations- non-fixity of the world. The relational space is linked to the idea of performativity, that we can understand as a post-modernist ontological view that the essence/identity of some being arises or is constituted from or by what someone does or how he acts, and not from some immanent, natural properties/dispositions of that entity. *Ergo*, social processes (occurrences and objects) generate their own space and time, while not being like the relative space within space-time. They are encrusted/engraved in the very processes and occurrences by being emulgated, fused and non-separable, which, in fact is the fundamental characteristic of the spacetime concept. What does it actually mean? If we assume that the parliament is the undisputable point of absolute space, then debate on some political issue not only implies the participation of people with different knowledge and experience, but also different memories, hopes and dreams and therefore, time and space are amalgamated. In relational spacetime, processes and occurrences are extracted from a field of flows, influences come and go in all directions, individuation and identities are destabilized, fluid, elusive and unreduceable and place, due to unterritorial openness and inclusion, is perceived quite differently than is the case with its absolute equivalent (Harvey 2009b: 137).

Anyhow, Émile Durkheim (1995 [1912]: 10-11), opposite to Kant's *imaginarium*, in which space and time are positioned as inadequately profiled, vague and difficult to determine media, argued that space, as well as time, have their social "genotype". Or, translated to a more modern vocabulary, both space and time are social constructs: space is constituted/founded through social relations and material social practices (Massey 1992). Our cognition of space nearly always oscillates around some abstract/metaphysical position, around the idea of some storage/container/repository where we cache or where our lives unfold, rather than something that we principally structure ourselves. In this context, Soja distinguishes between the contextual and created space, (Soja 1980: 209-210), while Lefebvre refers to (primary, first) nature and secondary nature, rural and urban (Lefebvre 1976a: 14-16). By contextual space, or nature, he means the primordial physical being of space: it is a materialist perspective that, whether

mechanistic or dialectic, defines time and space as objective forms of existence. Nature is appropriated and, thanks to this appropriation, transformed in line with human needs and wishes, the contextual space featuring as the inevitable “cage” in which human lives are drawn up, consistent with the rigid geometry of neutral objects. By contrast, and regardless of its potential primordiality/preexistence/precedence, the created/designed space, or secondary nature, is based on the (infra)structure, benefit and purpose as the results of social propulsion, social transposition, social intervention, social transformation and filtered social experience.

In order to overcome/deconstruct the “invasive” reductionist binom of the modern perception of space: the idealistic-subjectivistic *versus* materialistic-objectivistic, Lefebvre introduced the term “double illusion”, where each pole not only refers to the other, but they are also mutually dynamizing and camouflaging (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]: 27-30), so the truth is “magically” hard to discern both as a material and imaginary formula. Namely, on the one hand there is an “illusion of transparency” or space of unrestrained reflexivity, in which nothing is spatially latent/dissimulated or features as a masked spatial trap, everything is open and dependent on the spontaneous play of thought of human agency, where the mental/intelligible space coincides with the social one and the manifest and reality are in a state of systemic amalgamation, a linguistic/figural/stylistic representation of space substitutes its real equivalent, the contemplative “calculus” of space awaiting to be discovered/realised by some agency.

The illusion of transparency in the twentieth century can be more clearly designated as the “political illusion of transparency”- the result of an enhanced role of state in the production, manipulation and fabrication of capitalist spatiality in the routine, everyday activities of statecraft (Brenner and Elden 2009: 372). On the other hand, there is a “realistic illusion”, the naturalist/mechanist/empiricist version of space as a self-evident and clearly real/material context or situation, where its hapticity and measurability are treated as a significant advantage compared to the obscureness, haziness and arbitrariness of the imaginary/conceptual. *In summa*, Lefebvre’s solution is neither “phenomenal”, nor “noumenal”, since space is not only real, as it is not only imaginary, it is not a

simple, syncretic total of the material and the conceptual, but more than that: the eclectic combination/mix of both that supersedes them in scope, substance and meaning. This contemplative constellation, spatiality-historicity-sociality, can be defined as the ontological trialectic, applicable in the spheres of epistemology, theory-making, empirical analyses and societal practices (Soja 1996: 70-71).

In this respect, Lefebvre introduced the concept of social space, both mental and material construct or a symbolic “alloy” of their “higher” synergic action. His “tripartite unification” includes: (1) material spatial practice/perceived space/physical space; (2) representations of space/conceived space/mental space; and spaces of representation (representational spaces)/lived space/social space (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]: 33; Harvey 1990a: 218-222; Soja 1996: 60-70; Elden 2007: 110-112). Perceived space brings together spaces of everyday life and of its inherent spatial/material/“naturalised” experiential practices, it is oriented towards the production and social reproduction, and thereby towards the implied sense of social continuum, uniformity and homogeneity. Spatial practices are directly involved in the production of “materiality” of social spatiality, so they are both the medium and the outcome of human engagement and experience (e.g. business and other routines of everyday life, of networks, privacy or leisure time). Conceived space, the imagined representation of space, is the most superior form of space semiologically encompassing the “more minutiously” articulated signs, schemes, algorithms, formulas, texts and knowledge by which previous spatial practices are decoded, discussed and understood. Aside from space as a common theme of colloquial discussions, this space is “constituted” mainly at the level of stabilized, complementary and orchestrated hegemonic patterns by experts from various disciplines and by policymakers, in regulatory/ideological forms of disciplining knowledge or institutional control and prescription.

Lived space is the space of representation, intellectual invention, manifested both in various symbols, codes, discourses, scripts, utopian spatial mythologies and iconographies, as well as in images, museums, monuments, ceremonies, art performances or even, music (it can, but does not have to be, expressed in or by language, but is primarily a matter of nonverbal sublimation of symbols and signs). It is a poetically produced space that changes, adjusts and opts by

imagination. Such theoretical conjunction is also relevant for the comprehension of borders, since borders can and should be understood as lived borders. As a mixture of objects and ideas, naturalization and meditation, objectification and speculation, physical and mental space, it eludes the “tricks” of double illusion, is difficult to detect and is not just a mere spatial representation of power, but also the power of space representation: it holds capacities to politically transform or determine social practice, as well as to be a politically-rooted space of resistance, oriented towards the marginalized and the different. Anyhow, for Lefebvre, space manifests a specific kind of knowledge that is expressed in the materialization of the ruling system of domination, space serves the establishment, is used as a means of hegemony; the control of our grasp of space is a systemic “orthocentre” of capitalism, since without it, there would be nothing to control (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]: 11). Hence, his bifurcation of space implies two classes of the same: an abstract one, based on the general contemplation of space and inseparable from power relations, and societal, arising from the fragmented action of “ordinary” people. The qualities of space production, at all three levels, depend on the cognisance/analysis of the historical specificum in which it unfolds: space can not be amputated from ideology or politics, as the combining of historical and natural elements that comprise it is without any doubt a political process/act. Even when treated as apolitical, neutral, as an “orthodox” scientific object, this is only because spatial interventions of some former political strategy or ideological programme are not automatically detectable.

Lefebvre (cf. 2003: 85; 2009: 224, 228) insists that the national territory is a “child” of space, that the interaction between state and territory is mutually constituting, namely, that there is no state without territory and no territory without state and that the national territory is shaped and modified by myriad networks and flows established within it, in such a manner that human generations, classes or political forces create consistent/persistent objects and realities. Contrary to ideas that both space and territory are constructs, in the unstoppable/perpetual emergence and reshaping, social and historical fabrications, as one of the possible interpretations of Lefebvre’s positioning/formulation of national territory, the case of Claude Raffestin, is also the understanding of it as a

reified pre-existent, power-mediated space, through a full spectrum of political mechanisms, strategies, interventions, projections, apparatuses, instruments and representations, through which it acquires its “everyday”, and yet, relational recognisability and concretization (cf. Brenner and Elden 2009: 362-363; Klauser 2012). Implying the existence of market and political power/force that controls and exploits its resources, production of a nation is, on the one hand, underpinned by the political action geared towards the mobilizing capacities of nationalism as an ideology, while, on the other, there are numerous state projects, programs and tactics for the formulation/reformulation of territorial spaces as exclusive national territorial units (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]: 111-112).

Building on Lefebvre’s typology of space, and for ease of understanding, David Harvey (1990a: 219-222) adds four perspectives that enable a more complete insight (each of Lefebvre’s dimensions of space can be filtered through their view): (1) accessibility/distance represent the level of overcoming friction of space in adjusting to the qualities of social interaction; (2) appropriation/colonization of space explores ways in which space is occupied/populated by objects (apartment blocks, shops, street networks etc.), activities (land use), individuals, classes and social groups; (3) dominance of space denotes legal and non-legal methods by which individuals and power groups realise their supremacy at the level of organization and production of space; and (4) production of space examines the creation of new, real or potential spatial systems (land use, transport and communications, territorial organization, etc.), as well the emergence of new modalities/technologies of space representation (e.g. computerised mapping and plan design). These perspectives are not autonomous, but intertwined, just as they can not be considered as some universal language formula/algorithm/grammar, independent from societal practices which unfold because of a particular structure of relations (e.g. capitalism).

The present is marked by the fact that power can be exercised/transmitted at the speed of an electronic signal or at “astronomic speed” and by not being limited or decelerated by space, power has become exterritorialised (Bauman 2000: 11). This, of course, in no way implies its diminished significance. Referring to Karl Marx (1993 [1857-1858/1939]: 539), Harvey notes that the capitalist need for the

fixity of space, for the stabilization of the production system for the sake of increased accumulation/profit/surplus value, historically becomes a barrier for continuous development, for the insatiable capitalist propensity for finding new fixed spaces with the equal or greater accumulation/profit/surplus value. Capitalism is hence pressed by the contradiction between fixity and motion and so, its immanent expansiveness leads to the phenomenon of time-space compression, which revolutionises or radically alters both our objective perception of time and space as well as our imaginariums of the world we are witnessing and making (Harvey 1990a: 240-284, 1990b; Warf 2008, 2009). The capitalist system of production and social relations ultra-accelerates the pace of life as the time-space compression imposed through imperial expansion and neocolonialism encompasses a cluster of processes leading to the “shrinking” of space, contraction/concentration/convulsion of distance between places caused by constant, consecutive series of technological and communication innovations.

This is a radically revisionist/pro-revolutionary turn that not only devastates certain types of societal practices and lifestyles, but requires a devastating reconfiguration/reinvention of physical scenery/areas/landscapes and, accordingly, new, specific modes of social action. With respect to the above, it is worth noting that place is an existing location that has not yet been allocated/designated/occupied, while space manifests a compact and universal entity created by capitalist expansion, a state of permanent becoming, of arranging/rearranging places that are subalternate to space. The world of today is made of what Paul Virilio defines as speed-space or as dromosphere, where a man’s presence in it is no longer physical, but “electronic” in nature, captured in intensive time- a combination of extremely/monumentally long and extremely/infinitesimally short, the dual phenomenon of immediacy and instantaneity is one of the greatest problems/ “shocks” facing post-modern political strategists (Virilio 1995, 2006 [1977]; Dercon 2001: 70-71). The flow of capital and information, whose intensity far surpasses that of the workforce, coupled with the emergence of trans-national governance arrangements, persistently erode the Westphalian order of inter-state relations and result in new, still unclear, process of geographies of power, or geography of politics, if power is understood as an exclusive and inalienable

domain of politics (cf. Warf 2008: 213-218).

1.2. Foucault's "Geometric" Shift: The Heterotopia Issue

Generally speaking, for Michel Foucault (2000: 356, 361), spatial categories are an essential quality of any form of common life and of any rule/power, they are not the result of any other activity nor a static frame in which these activities unfold, but a mechanism installed in various discourses and practices, of particular importance for the organizing of some specific political, social and economic arrangement: control and division of space (together with the control and division of time) are key instruments for the disciplining and surveillance of individuals (cf. Driver 1985: 425-426; Shah 2012: 60). In this regard, Foucault's idea of panopticism is indicative (1995 [1975]: 195-231; Haggerty 2006; Lyon 2006: 23-46). Building on the notion that society without power relations is a mere abstraction (Foucault 2000a: 343), he analyses Jeremy Bentham's eighteenth century utopian project (1991 [1787, 1791]), panoptic penitentiaries for the profilaxis and cure of social ills, transferring the logic of disciplining power from the internal institutional setting, monitoring unnoticed by the monitored, to the whole of society and examining it as an internalization of surveillance that results in the hybrid auto-surveillant subjects.

We should point out that, when we refer to discipline, we imply three types of mechanisms: (1) norms and discourses; (2) disciplinary techniques and technologies; and (3) rituals and ceremonies (Leatherman 2008: 11). Foucault's understanding of power is not a deterritorialized one. The panoptical matrix, or "synoptic machinery", becomes the key instrument of population management through dissemination of power, involving not only segmentation and differentiation, but also identification and understanding (we know exactly how to behave in a theatre or university), defining what is appropriate and what isn't and thereby, space is one of the platforms that legitimise some specific political system of domination; by understanding some genuine spatial logic of a society, we also understand its way or reasoning and acting. *Ergo*, border panopticum can serve both for the understanding of border discourse in general and some authentic,

particular border cultural narrative. One of the possible criticisms of this approach concerns its emphasis on the post-panoptic deterritorialization (Bogard 2006) and the inversion of the rigid totality of control of the panopticum by mechanisms of seduction, or imperatives/commands of enjoyment (Baudrillard 1983, (1990) [1979]; Boyne 2000).

The legal conception of power is grounded in the institutions of positive and negative sanctions, on legal mechanisms of approval or prohibition of specific types of behaviour, with state sovereignty being treated as unquestionable and pre-given, whereas for Foucault (1978: 92-96), power represents a spectrum of forces, with their attendant platforms, calculations and strategies, based on particular aims and tasks, which make even possible the legal dimension. These forces, clusters of techniques and tactics of domination stand in a constant interplay of challenge, support, empowerment and transformation and are characterised by the concrete dynamic form of historical action. Framed in this way, power is nobody's property, it is ultimately impossible to possess, but is perpetually produced and reproduced as intentional and non-subjective, in opposition to some final state and without recognising of the distinction between those subordinated (or ruled) and those who are subordinating (those who rule). By denying validity to the argumentative reduction of state to an idea of a unitary centre of power, by dislocating its cognition, by exploring the perspectives of governmentality and bio-power to the paradoxical assemblage of multifarious processes and practices, Foucault strategically dethroned the state as the prime target of political antagonisms and confrontations. Therefore, by rejecting the state as the locus where power flows in and out, his accent was on the permutation of absolute sovereignty of the eighteenth century state, with the discourses and practices of monitoring/surveillance, control, disciplining and ordering of the population. We should add that Foucault (1980: 194) grounded his micro-analysis of power in the study of dispositives/apparatuses implying: "[...] a thoroughly heterogeneous assemblage consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid". Thus, by simultaneously defining an apparatus as a system of relations among the

previously identified elements, Foucault understands the concept of governmentality as a set of apparatuses that acquire various forms of domination within the society, while bio-power consists of: “[...] the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power [...] (Foucault 2009: 1)”.

In so doing, by arguing that space should be “dismissed as belonging to nature” and should not be regarded “as the residential site or field of expansion of peoples, of a culture, a language or a State”, or by speculating that the history of plural powers is indeed the history of plural spaces (Foucault 1980a: 149), along with a hyper-sensibility for the issue of space featuring in his entire opus, he may be said to be the initiator/spearhead of the geometric shift in the plural histories of social otherness (Philo 1992: 149). Relevant for this study is also Foucault’s distinction of general from total history. Namely, analogously with the post-modernist way of reasoning, the conception of total history as a society’s solid core, the coherence, consistency and certainty of systems ruling social objects and relations is challenged by arguing that it is the absence of the fundamental that makes the cognition and research of society interesting (Foucault 2000b: 356). Foucault is actually reserved towards the universal and eternal and, by introducing the concept of general history, he is exclusively oriented at the particular and the specific. He clearly demonstrates an analytic aversion for great temporal chunks – rigid historical periodizations, but also towards large spatial scales, such as continents and states, where homogeneity and determination of occurrences and phenomena is favoured, while the realities of smaller spatial units are neglected (Philo 1992: 140-144). While total history is preoccupied with “an overall shape”, general history addresses the “space of a dispersion” (Foucault 2002a: 11). Related to this is the “dispersion system” concept, a spatial ontology arising from an imaginary hypothetic space of dissemination, an area in which relational occurrences and phenomena are diffusely arranged, as opposed to the *a priori* configurations in total history analytics (Philo 1992: 148-149). It is an order of material and non-material, natural and human, individual and collective, continual and temporally limited juxtaposed occurrences and phenomena, a system that is of

“endogenous” and not “exogenous” nature, concerned with the objects themselves and not with some extrinsic, imposed criterion rooted in transcendental logic.

When Derek Gregory (1994: 63), building on Lefebvre’s trialectic critical antagonism for dualities of any kind, promotes the same trialectic principle in the work of Michel Foucault, he does so by concluding that contemporary society was not a society of spectacle but, as suggested in the previous paragraph, society of surveillance. It remains unclear why surveillance can not be a spectacle and *vice versa*, but we will leave that aside for the time being. Gregory formulates his understanding of Foucault’s heterogeneous spaces through the “discursive triangle”: space/knowledge/power (*loc. cit.*), embodied in the authentic concept of heterotopias, or heterotopology (Foucault 2008 [1967]; Foucault 2002b [1966]: xix). Thus, there are two categories of places/locations that are connected with, but also antithetical to, any other places/locations. These are utopias, and we also add dystopias and heterotopias. Utopias/dystopias are essentially unreal places directly or inversely analogous to real social spaces of a society, as its perfect or “upside-down” form. Contrary to utopias, embedded in the very foundations of societies *per se*, heterotopias, characteristic for all cultures and civilisations, are places that by their distinctiveness, disputation, neutralization, suspension and inversion, represent all other real places. Despite being on the margins of social order, or occupying a liminal position, they enable its sharper, alienative perception and representation- heterotopias are, in fact, realised utopias, with the alienated reality of the era that is most like a distorted reflection in the mirror (West-Pavlov: 2009: 137-139).

Heterotopias (army barracks, prisons, parks, shopping-malls, theatres, cinemas, homes for the elderly, cemeteries, memorial compounds, airports, railway stations, refugee camps, border zones, border crossings etc.) are underpinned by six pro-social principles/properties: (1) heterotopias are constants of every society and culture, but, albeit universal, they do not have a universal form; (2) although each heterotopia has a precisely determined social function, that function can be modified according to current requirements of society; (3) heterotopias can operate as a spatial tangent which links several totally incompatible spaces; (4) heterotopias are also heterochronies; it is only in discontinuity to their own

traditional time that their full potentials is initiated; (5) heterotopias imply “inclusiveness-openness” and “exclusiveness-isolation”, on the one hand access to some is completely open, while access to others it constrained by rituals, procedures or permits, but no matter how accessible they seem, every act of access automatically results in isolation; and (6) in relation to the remaining space, heterotopias articulate illusory spaces that make real space an even more “intense” illusion, but can also be heterotopias of compensation, the perfected “second” space or substitute for the unfinished or poorly structured one (Foucault 2008 [1967]: 18-21). Heterotopias are frequently associated with transitional stages featuring as socially unacceptable behavior, or what a society stigmatizes as “abnormal”, it can be any place that disrupts the routine order, or even undisputed “civilizational principles”. Borders are not only the portal between two “national heterotopias” from the perspective of different national identities/orders, but are themselves elusive heterotopian “wholes”.

Thus, at the beginning of the 19th century, numerous reports emphasized demands that the entire geographic area of the Balkans should be relocated outside European borders, in order to save the European civilization/culture from an actual plague epidemic and later, from its imaginary/fabricated equivalent. Heterotopian Balkans, like a cemetery, thus became a liminal European area, situated on the periphery, present as a constitutive part of the European cultural habitus, but distant from the core of the European civilization/culture: part of it only insofar as the centre wants it to be. It is, as presented, confused, belligerent and vague, too close to the geo-symbolic East, at the time called Middle East, a suburb/ “favela”/ “bantustan” of the European civilization, to be avoided in a “broad circle” or traversed “head down”, with aversion and fear. More or less, the Balkans remain a space that, by minstrelization and self-egotizing, “devotedly” keeps, furcates and perpetuates such a heterotopian position (cf. Zivkovic 2011; Lazarevic Radak 2014).

1.3. Re-Imagining of Space and Place: Political Implications and Explication

Pursuing Lefebvre's discourse/paradigm of the tripartite segmentation of space, as well as his idea of double illusion, Soja (1996, 1999) points to three epistemological ranks/types in the post-modern elaboration of space (see Figure 1): (1) Firstspace; (2) Secondspace; and (3) Thirdspace. The epistemological "vivisection" of Firstspace represents the deconstruction/analysis, the establishment of formal science on perceived space, or concrete, material, objective and materialised physical spatiality, of realistic illusion, primarily through readable texts and contexts (Soja 1996: 74-75). This positivistic, empirical optics of space, cartography and topography based on the quantitative and mathematical reading, mapping of space, integrates both our affective-behavioural, intimate space as well as complex, action-organising spatial forms, action spaces, from neighbourhood and city to the nation-state and global geopolitical strategies. *Ergo*, the epistemological perspective of Firstspace is preoccupied with the tangibility of objects in space, while human spatiality was predominantly treated as an outcome or product. However, Firstspace did not remain focused solely on the positivistic explanatory scientism of material configurations, as it was necessary to explain its social production, too. In order to achieve that, exogenous/external theoretical concepts were engaged, such as historical development, class consciousness, cultural preferences or rational choice (*ibidem*: 77). Space is, in fact, treated as the historical arena/stage for the unfolding of human events/dramas and thus, political implications were inevitable. A one-way, "unilateral" causality tended towards determinism: from subjectivity, consciousness, rationality, historicity and sociality to spatial practices and configurations, the causal feedback was not registered at all, and the "trilateral" causality of spatiality-historicity-sociality not only remained unexplored, but consistently suppressed, too.




Figure 1. The “Trialectic” of space according to Henri Lefebvre and Edward Soja
(Source: Lefebvre 1991 [1974] and Soja 1996)

The epistemology of Secondspace focuses at addressing problems of the naturalization of Firstspace, examining the functions of different modalities of thinking about what we perceive as the material universe/world (*ibidem*: 78-80). In so doing, the trend is that borders between Firstspace and Secondspace are becoming more vague and less accurate: the interpretations characteristic for Secondspace are relocated/appropriated for the needs and aims of Firstspace, while Secondspace knowledge extends into resolving the issues of actualised material forms of spatiality. The argumentative structure of Secondspace is focused on considering the epistemological primacy of subjectivity over objectivity, idealism over materialism or agency over structure. Equally, in attempts to transform the world according to the dimensions/standards of its own idealised constructs projected to the physical/objective world, Secondspace, as symbolic space, also includes great debates about the essence of space, covering a broad spectrum of discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of an absolute, concrete, relative or relational standpoint. Consistent with that, the imagined space

becomes real and its material version a paralysed/anesthetised denominator.

Accordingly, Thirdspace is a simultaneous deconstruction and a heuristic reconstruction of the Firstspace-Secondspace binom, its radical ontological rearticulation/ reinvention is aimed at generating new social opportunities, particularly for the marginalised and peripheral spatialities of resistance (*ibidem*: 81). Thirdspace is usually in the background, “out there”, far from sight, far from participation in the mainstream world capital flows. From the postcolonial vantage point, Thirdspace is a subaltern and “mute”, but also a point of fusion, encounter, revelation and transcendence, it is a radically inclusive concept which, let’s reiterate, includes epistemology, ontology and historiography of Otherness. It is, after all, a transgressive, meta-linguistic space of geographic imagination, grounded in total openness, dynamism, elusiveness and mobility, which, not only does not fear, but demands the incorporation/acceptance of broadest and most differently positioned perspectives. *Ergo*, the „sharpest“ version of understanding Thirdspace can be said to be an omniperspective, “meta-discursive“ space of resistance towards meta-discursiveness, which is actually a space in geographic terms, but in philosophical, psychological, sociological, anthropological or culturological terms, Thirdspace is neither space nor place.

From all of the above-said, it is clear that the way in which we understand space is not irrelevant, as its conceptualizations constitute our perception of politics and society and generate significant consequences for our political and social practices. It is no longer a matter of space being political (although the acceptance of the idea took a long time, and is still taken with certain reservation), but that it can contribute to/obstruct some current political argumentation/configuration and be the nucleus of imaginative structure that opens/initiates/constitutes the very sphere of the political (Massey 2005: 9). Without space, there can be no politics, not in the “vulgarly materialistic “sense of obviousness of territory and states, but in the sense that without space there is no interrelation with the heterogeneous Others and sociability formulated by it.

Doreen Massey (1992), one of the most impressive (post)modern thinkers (of politicality/politics) of space, builds her approach on the critique of Fredric Jameson and Ernesto Laclau. Commenting on the previously explained Lefebvre’s

idea of the simultaneously homogeneous and fragmented, abstract space as analytically highly interesting, Fredric Jameson (1991) suggests as the greatest perplexity of the post-modern era: “the disorientation of saturated space”. Namely, a primary distinction of post-modernity its spatial “depthlessness”, a multitude of “shallow, flat and superficial” spaces. In so doing, he links transcendence, or the surpassing of that which is accepted as a boundary, with time, while associating immanence, as something that remains inside accepted boundaries, with spatiality. The real world can be defined as a world without transcendence and without perspective, with all chaotic choices being level and equidistant. The sense of time, profound historical space, is overpowered by the domain of unrepresentable space of networks, as something that no longer is my “situation” and is in an inconceivable synchronicity with other people.

Like Fredric Jameson, Ernesto Laclau (1990) believed that space and time are antithetical notions. Namely, he argued that in a closed spatial system there are no “real” transformations, specifically that: it can change “internally”, within the system itself („static“ change without transformation, cyclical time), but “externally“ there is no real, authentic dynamism of change (that he identifies as dislocation, Great Historical Time, essential openness that makes politics possible), the system remains the same (Laclau 1990: 42, 69). Any attempt at spatial representation of the world, even of physical space, is the negligence of dislocation, society is unrepresentable: any attempt of its representation, and thereby also the representation of space, is an attempt to create it and not to assert what it really is (*ibidem*: 82). Such conceptual constellation is based on the perception of time and space as opposite categories/concepts/texts, where mobile time which creates History holds supremacy, while space is characterised by a stasis where nothing happens.

With this in mind, Massey (cf. 2005: 9-12; 2009: 16-17) points to three relevant qualities/propositions for the adequate comprehension of space: (1) space is a product of multi-layered relations (complex set of networks, exchanges and links from the privacy zone to global dimensions), that does not exist before the relationally understood identities/entities (it is, therefore, conceived anti-essentialistically), as a mutually-constituting effect contemporaneous to the

creation/production by acceptance or refusal of a relationship; (2) space is a dimension of multiplicity, plurality and heterogeneity, without which, in the context of political thinking, there could be no simultaneous coexistence of authentic Others, or more than one thing or relation; (3) space is always open to the political, always under construction, processual without ever being finalised, not possible to perceive as an occluded system as it is covered by relations that need to be made/remade/unmade, space is the product of the world in permanent making and its production is a social and political task of prime importance. This suggests that space is not something opposite to time, that space is not devoid of or “emancipated” from time. Therefore, space is not something static/akinetic/immobile, it is not a dead: “necro-space”, “decreed” and „pre-set“. The revitalization/reanimation of space, its extraction from the “theoretically induced coma”, is important for the political position because, if the time dimension means succession and change, then the space dimension means multiplicity, existence of Other and finding the *modus operandi* of our coexistence with the singular and/or plural Other/s (Massey 2009: 17-18).

Futhermore, we can not only refer to the imbueement/saturation/impregnation of space with power, where geography as such holds a certain amount of power, but it should be realised and accepted that power per se has its own geography or cartography. Massey (1992, 1993, 2005, 2009) defines this constellation as “power-geometry”. First of all, we should say that Massey (cf. 1993: 61-62) criticises Harvey’s time-space compression at two levels: (1) the experience of space for her is “polichromatically” determined, far more complex and multifaceted than the “monochromatic” shades of capital (money) as proposed by Harvey, not necessarily implying an anti-materialist position, but rather a much-needed annulment of the reduction of materialism to economism; and (2) time-space compression cannot be considered without social differentiation, social fragmentation (or even stratification), time-space compression has its own power-geometry. Different groups and individuals have different statuses towards fluctuation, interconnectivity and correlation (some use satellites, planes, ships, trains, trucks and cars, while some their own two feet, somewhere it is the financial capital, trade, exchange of information, while elsewhere it is migration

or emigration). However, although it is an important component/"variable", the issue is not who is moving or not, but who initiates, socially "emits", defines, orients and consumes the mobility process, and who only receives it, or moves without any influence on the direction and type of his mobility, or creates and understands it but remains capsulated in the time-space compression.

For Doreen Massey, regions represent ranges of open, discontinued spaces, always on the theoretical "conveyor" of defining and redefining, composed of overlapping, network-like political, social economic and cultural relations, flows and connections, difusely spread in various forms and temporarily fixed/"hibernated" (cf. Allen *et al.* 1998: 5; Massey 2005: 55; Allen and Cochrane 2007: 1162). Similarly, when it comes to the characterization of places, Massey (1993: 66-67) notes several points that contribute to their alternative reading: (1) like people, places also have multiple identities, their nature is not unison and monolithic, it does not evoke a single impression/emotion identical for everyone, which could be an ambivalent source of both their richness and conflicts; (2) it is not possible to contemplate/imagine any place without engaging a full array of historical ties that elevate a national "point" to the level of global reading; and (3) it would be wrong to define a place by means of outlining/defining its borders. The specificum of a place, therefore, is not history internalised over a long period of time, but a corpus of cohabitant/symbiotic social relations and processes, experiences and perceptions associated with some specific grid/relational location/flux/trajectory at a given moment, which, again, encompasses the global dimension, too. Borders, in that sense, are not an indispensable factor in the dynamic conceptualization of place, although this does not mean that they are redundant at all levels of its research, obstructing and unfunctional. We will revert to the issue of borders a little later.

Given the fact that the construction/organization of nation-state is increasingly examined from the supra-national and trans-national perspective, renewed interest in and the insistence on issues of places and regions, as crucial concepts in the contemporary geostrategic imaginariums, it is somewhat absurd and surprising, despite its compatibility with the process of regionalization/globalization and the implied incongruousness of regionality and locality as expressions of socio-spatial

structuring and regional and local as partitive politico-institutional units (Gualini 2006). Anyhow, Doreen Massey's perspective is more than a minor challenge for the Cartesian understanding of space as a value-void "container" and scales as "nested" hierarchies of compartmentalised and bounded space. There seems to have been a reinvention, remodelling or revisualization of places and regions that are now treated as the linking nexus of multiple fluxes and harmonised, juxtaposed and converging diversities, as accidental spatial points or sets, porous spatial formats, overlapping and intersecting relational networks, that do not have to be initiated locally or in the present, but have to be open to recomposition, recharacterization and rediaponing, or without prescribed or proscribed boundaries (cf. Amin 2004a: 34-35). In line with this, Ash Amin (*ibidem*: 35-41) contrasts topologically-based policies of propinquity and connectivity in the sense of negotiating the unrestrained institutional organization of the immanent connectivity of the physical environment, overlapping collectivities and contradictory cultural practices, or keen respect for different forms of spatial connectivity and transitivity that make up the locally profiled public life and political reality to the policies of territorial management and identities of new regionalism, based on the decentralization and deconcentration of power, or on public culture underpinning regional political projects.

Place, viewed encyclopaedically, can be understood in five ways (Staeheli 2003: 159-163): (1) as a physical location or site- where its materiality is emphasized, it is something that we can identify on the map or visit, suggesting something that is limited, particular, unique and grounded; (2) place as a cultural or social location- the where place, opposite to the previous approach, has metaphoric connotations of location for people and social groups, within the networks of political, cultural, social and economic relations/meanings, important for the reformulation of their identities; (3) place as context- where place is about the set of specific qualities of occurrences, objects and actions characteristic for some geographic area; (4) place as something constructed over time- the understanding of place as a dynamic and changeable category created from the combination of physical/geographic characteristics of place, modalities of the position of place within the broader network of relations and the status of

individuals vis-à-vis the broader relational networks, but also related to the place as such; and (5) place as a process (Agnew 1987: 27-28; 2009: 36)- where, unlike previous definitions which focus on place as a product or outcome, emphasizes the understanding of place as a process constituted through the mutuality of three factors (which, in a way, bring together all previous definitions), (5.1) location, geographic detection of place, or the relations between different places, (5.2) locality, place as an informal or institutional site of everyday social interaction, and (5.3) sense of place, relation between an individual and place, subjective qualification of place produced by living in a place, place as an genuine moral and political community or landscape (each of the variations in meanings ranges from the nomotetical, generalized space to the idiographic, particularistic place).

Although John Agnew's (1987: 1) conclusion that: "territorial states are made out of places" is still relatively correct, the meaning of the term of place he refers to has metamorphosed. The idea is that it is not only the locally definable scene for social interaction, but also a geographic location, where social action depends on proximity or distance, is replaced by social action based on, to mention a few, "identity" links": religious beliefs, ethical principles, language, political preferences and ethnic heritage. We should add that some terms from spatial grammar are semantically easy to convert to the sphere of social/political differences or social/political relations (Smith and Katz 1993). Thus, geographic terms: (1) locations, strictly determined points in some coordinate system; (2) positions, perspectively defined in relation to at least one location and hence, at least one-dimensional; or (3) localities, suggesting a two- or multi-dimensional place, including multiple and divergent social and natural occurrences and processes, are readily transposed into their counterpart social terms: (1) social locations- social subjects have a defined social point/place where they are at least identified as different; (2) subject positions- relativize social location, as a place of social activism, by the fact that various social actors, due to distant identity arrangements, have a particular place in comparison to other actors, which results in a distinguished perspective and, consequently, in differentiated design of social meanings; and (3) social locality- implying the idea that social location is some form of collective/multidimensional experience of mutually constituting identities.

Having the above in mind, and proposing to grant the analytically marginalized concept of place adequate treatment in political science, both at the level of political conflicts and of political behavior *in genere*, Lynn Staeheli (2003: 164-168) identifies four ways of the manifesting of political relevance and influence of perception on the sphere of political competitiveness, strife and collisions, or four ways/strategies/agendas that politics can mobilize/utilize place for some particular (micro) set of interests and preferences. These are: (1) politics about place- besides the fact that the fight for control of a place is inherent to macro nationalist and territorial political confrontations, it can also be registered on the smaller political scale related to the need, often futile and unattainable, for the defence of wider and more intense political forces and movements (neighbourhood, urban district etc.); (2) politics in place- an attempt to exploit the resources of a place in the everyday organization of life on the level of constituting of various networks with political connotations and agendas, and concerning those who are associated with the place in one way or another, where the identity of place should not be equated to the social identity or status; (3) politics as the construction of place- nationalism and economic development imply construction of place that is not essentially political, but different competitively based political projects also over time compete for the dominance of some type of meaning related to place, as is the case with the construction of spatial accessibility or inaccessibility, policy, public and private places; and (4) politics that deploys place- represents a conscious inclination towards the transgression of place, towards the disruption of its moral characteristics/landscapes as a modality for the creation of certain political argument.

1.4. Designing an Unity Impression: Social Spatialization/ Spatial Socialization and Border's Group Identities

In any case, the concepts/syntagms of the “social spatialization”, or the “spatial socialization” are of exceptional importance for the understanding of socio-politically generated/dimensioned space. According to Rob Shields (cf. 1991: 31), the social spatialization is an infinite/omnipresent process of social construction and, we would also add, of social deconstruction, spatial both in the domain of

societal imaginarium as well as in the domain of “concrete” operations/actions in a “concrete” landscape. It also covers the cultural coding of space (symbols, myths, ceremonies, rituals, memories, values and national “axioms”), and language formulations, figures and settings, as well as practical interventions and institutional arrangements. The Social spatialization is the foundation for the composition/harmonization of perception and cognition that enables the sociality of everyday interactions and the creation of persistent societal structures, forms and institutions. At the level of “colloquial” conversation, spatialization, too, subsumes a full range of complex spatial categories and metaphors, or perceptions referring to some place or region. Thus, a set of perceptions about some real place, that is perhaps simplification, stereotyping or labelling, affords it the cultural-symbolic value, resulting in a particular spatial practice and can, though not necessarily, lead to the material transformation of that place (*ibidem*: 47). Insofar as our perceptions are initiated by the “factography” of place, place also acquires the outline of our symbolically coded “ideography” over time.

According to Anssi Paasi (cf. 1996: 8), the spatial socialization manifests the process/procedure through which individual and collective actors socialise/qualify for the member/subscriber of some territorially specified and rounded entity and through which they internalize both their collective territorial identity and their, not only spatially but also temporally positioned, common tradition. We underline that in this definition, the author’s emphasis on the temporal dimension in the spatial validity of some traditionalist narrative/discourse is not its privileging, but indicates that the acceptance of some spatially “sanctioned” tradition means the acceptance of a certain cultural formula of time. It is not some neutral “Kantian” time, but time that is spatially coded or “lived” by space. Rather than being some universal territorial logic of the cultural-traditional, implied interference of time and space or some “symbolic juxtaposition”, this is the territorial marking by the “time-in-space”. It is achieved by the acceptance of the fact that tradition, group or national identity, equally applies to every point and projection within the arbitrarily designated, unscaled space. Like Lefebvre, who worked on two intertwined intellectual fronts: spatial history and historization of space, we think that Paasi also attempts and succeeds in achieving the equilibrium between the

spatialization of the temporal dimensions of identity and the demoralization of the spatial dimensions of identity. Contrary to the current completely unjustified but common reasoning, as mentioned above, this approach does not view space as something that is diametrically opposed to time. Also, contrary to the usual academic stereotype that spatial identity is solely an intellectual act or that it is inseparably linked with the construction of discourse, territorial identification can and does unfold also in the domain of material practices (Paasi 2011: 15).

Paasi (1996: 76) understands genealogy in the Foucauldian manner, as a diachronic process which, unlike the orientation of the Foucauldian archaeology on isolated synchronic points/issues, by conceiving the truth as a system of orderly procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operability of utterances, enables critique of the present and which, by exposing the contingency of “human things”, is comprised of multiple and dynamic phenomena in the making, relocation, realization and flux, as genealogy makes it possible to understand the discursive practice at the moment of its creation, and regards the truth as circularly related to the power systems that produce and sustain it and with the effects of power it stimulates and expands (Bevir 2008: 273-274; Elden 2001: 95-111, 2010: 799-801; Foucault 2015: 82-99). In other words, genealogy implies the historical examination of conditions that make it possible for things to be the way they are, but in a way that different research techniques are always combined with an analysis of practices, operationalization and functioning of power. Given its orientation towards the historical dimensioning of the present, it is always overtly political. In his attempt to explain the construct of the state of Finland, Paasi does not elaborate the past as a “petrified” object of study, but as “massive” material whose interpretation makes the historical construction/modeling of space first visible and then also intelligible, by acknowledging the interpretative accidentality, situationality or contextuality, which in sum enable the registration of distant forms of representation that symbolize people, nation or national culture, creating the impression (sometimes also a “delusion”) of unity. His analytical focus is on state production/generation, its social and historical construction as a particular, denaturalized and fluctuating social reality. In so doing, one of the important identity narrative “levers” is the internalization of

belonging/loyalty to some spatially/territorially determined entity.

Paasi (1996) also suggests four types of discourse that, from the explanatory point of view, profile the “analytical-methodological” modes of constructing group identities by engaging territorial borders (see Table 1): (1) We or Us/Here- implying the homogeneity/ /coherence within the border of some territorial unit (region, nation-state etc.), integration within a territory consistent with the ethnic nucleus of the community; (2) We or Us/There- expressing the tendency of the “external” integration/association of minority ethnic groups with a specific territorial unit-center; (3) We or Us/They or Them- identifying the Otherness/ Others within a territorial unit/borders (cohabitation with national minorities, migrants, refugees etc.); and (4) Other or Them/There- positioning the “absolute” Otherness/Others located outside a territorial unit/borders. It is evident the functioning of “We or Us/Here” is different from the functioning of “Other or Them/There” and that the latter in a way and almost as a rule involves: the affective, configured expectations rather than some “dry” and thoroughly elaborated factography. The state exerts considerable influence on this perceptive-emotional pattern, so it would be logical to assume that the strengthening of the national element, ethnic centripetalism, involves a greater degree of transparency and firmness of borders as social institutions.

Table 1. Socio-spatial integration and distinction according to Anssi Paasi

	Here	There
We/Us	Integration within a territory	Integration over borders
They/Them	Distinction within a territory	Distinction between Us and the Other across borders

(Source: Paasi 1996)

Social identities are extracted from a series of social relations in which we are installed/engraved and which constitute us as much as we constitute them: they are social processes of constant defining and redefining, formulation and reformulation of us and of the collective entity we belong to, with the implied “recognition” by others of our (re)avowed identity position, framework or coordinates. Apropos of spatial identity, one of the possible identity valences (such

as class, sex, race or gender), discursively institutionalized or marked as the “sense of place”, we should note that it is a multi-layered and gradual notion encompassing spatial units: from personal space, defined by body and motions, room and house, through neighborhood, city and region, to state and continent, ending with planet (Leimgruber 1991). There are several relevant principles used by people for the, we would say psychologised, emphasis on/use of place in the building of self-identity (cf. Gustafson 2001): (1) disjunctive emphasis on place in the sense of basic distinction between Us and Others; (2) the existence of continuity, history of self in one place or in places of the same type; (3) the feeling of self-respect/pride in relation to the place of residence; and (4) the dependence of self-efficacy on the quality/characteristics of a place (a place makes us more effective, thus influencing the (re) articulation of identity, and our efficacy in turn extends the spatial identity platform/specificity of that same place).

In analyzing the significance of identity for the institutional genesis or institutionalization or region, Paasi (cf. 2001: 140) regards it as both the “cause” and “consequence” of the regional identity discourse, presenting four important functional instances in its conceptualization: (1) territorial shape/formatting, with the implied (not necessarily exclusive and closed) borders which “accumulate” various social practices and make it unique, authentic and separate with respect to other regions and their identity discourses (in our view, parts of regions can in some cases overlap without using their compactness); (2) symbolic shape/coding, expressed by practices such as economic, cultural/educational/media or governance, used for generating/constructing of the identity narrative (any symbolic permutation/combination of this rank is original, there are no forged regions, but there are fabricated regional symbolic patterns); (3) the existence of a multitude of institutions, within and outside the region itself, for underpinning/maintaining both the discursive distraction of its territorial and symbolic format, and the distinctiveness of social group through the formula: us-them; (4) assimilation/absorption of identity expressed in particular inward and outward social practices, arising from moderate antagonisms related to the scarcity of resources, gaining of power or extreme Us-Them confrontations.

In order to better understand regions and regional borders, we would add that

distinction should be made between the identity of a region and regional identity/regional consciousness, as well as between the factual and ideal identity (Paasi 1986: 132-133; 2001:140-141; 2003a: 478-479). On the one hand, identity of a region consists of natural, cultural or inhabitation traits used in various discourses, from science and politics to cultural activism and economy, in order to promote the distinctiveness/"genuinity" by comparison to other regions. Their use is of selective nature, some components are put forward while others are neglected and so, they are an expression of power in delimiting, naming and symbolising a specific space and the referent group of people. On the other hand, regional identity refers to the identification with a region by people who can be within or outside it, grounded in the stereotypical classifications by regional activists, institutions or organizations as its constituents, which is part of a broader spatial consciousness resulting from an individual history and biography. The dichotomy of the ideal and factual identity is a useful analytical instrument for the understanding of existence of the collective and the individual in identity discourse. While ideal identity refers to the selectively profiled collective/normative narrative of the spatial identity that amalgamates the diachronic/historical and synchronic/current regional texts, factual identity refers to regional social activities reified in diverse associations and organizations that are not necessarily related with its promotion but can serve for the remodeling/reformulation of the meaning and content of some specific region. We should note that for Paasi (1997: 42), territory creation is foremost the (ephemeral/variable) institutionalization of regions as historically and socially generated creations marked by frequent processes of regional transformations.

2. Theorizing Territory/Territoriality and Sovereignty: The Post-modern Rearticulation of Discourses

2.1. Territory/Territoriality as a Topological Socio-Political "Quantum"

The pre-modern arrangement of space rested on the feudal system of rule, characterized by a host of intersecting borders and governed by different autonomous instances of authority within one area so that the so-called political

entities of the time, as religiously-dynastic communities, functioned through the mechanism of personal loyalty and obligations, and not through some abstract, integrating principle of individuality and citizenship in a geographically clear-cut/ fixed territory (Neocleous 2003: 410; Agnew and Corbridge 1995: 85). The whole structure of deified/socialized space is related to hierarchical subordination, at whose center was God, monarch, the church, intransigent repetitive tradition and a set of teleological requirements defining and justifying rule. The inversion of sovereignty embodied in the monarch and a cluster of hierarchical bonds, inherent in the feudal system, with the profane institution of state led to the secular concepts and symbolic codes of power directly linked to the spatial attributes. The new formula of identity represented the exclusive affiliation to a common territorially/legally defined and singularly centralized space with precisely specified borders, established through sovereign power and recognized by what then was an “embryonic” international state system. All of this indicates that issues concerning space/territory are inextricably linked to the conceptualization/ perception of state. The hierarchical architecture of the medieval Western culture of space was replaced with a new imaginarium during the Renaissance, when from an individual that existed in space, man became an individual who controlled space and thus able to rationally explain it, systematically arrange it and adjust it to his wishes (Larkin 2010: 196). In the political sphere, it meant a discreditation and delegitimation of any claim for sovereignty that was above state authority.

Historically viewed, the modern state assumed its early contours under the Capetian dynasty, in the period from the tenth (Hugh Capet, coronated in 987) to the fourteenth century (Charles IV, deceased in 1328), and by the papal bull *Inter caetera* passed by Pope Alexander VI in 1492, introducing “global linear thinking” as a form of spatial awareness (Schmitt 2006 [1950]: 87)- perceiving the planet as spatially divided and specifying to which European sovereign power the demarcated parts belong (Buck-Morss 2000: 32), to be consolidated after the Westphalian peace in 1648, when the idea of sovereignty as we know it was defined. Namely, the Thirty Years’ War began on 18 May 1618. In its early phase, it was designated as the religious war between protestant and catholic states by the Defenestration of Prague, but subsequently grew into a general European conflict.

It ended in October 1648 by the signing of peace treaties in the Westphalian towns of Osnabrück and Münster. Aside from its direct results: the promotion of religious tolerance, the devastation of the imperial and clerical universalism, and the demotion of Popehood to an international factor of the second order, in the long run, the Peace of Westphalia initiated the creation of a modern international system grounded in territorial and sovereign entities, or states, with firmly set borders, by eliminating the interference of external actors in the domain of autonomous internal arrangements of some state authority and the abolishment of overlapping political and religious loyalties (Bring 2000: 58-62; Kurtulus 2005: 130-133).

From the viewpoint of political theorizing, without discussing whether it is mediated/realised with the power from some potentially pre-existing state, as previously explained in more detail, or of a purely relational, processual, situational, relativist, topological, or namely constructivist nature, space does not automatically imply demarcation and borders, it is apparently compact, homogeneous and non-compartmentalised. Whether we look at the non-standard, relativistic-relational destabilization of space as the “equilibrium of spatial uncertainty” contingent upon different (re)scaling criteria, or at the hard and monolithic, positivistically stabilised and certain absolute space, every spatial intervention, or, to be precise- intervention in space, results in the partitive territory and territoriality discourse/narrative. Even more precisely, if we abstract the absolute space where this is obvious, even when relationally configured in explanatory aversion for borders and confinement (by an unconventional favouring of networks, fluxes and full openness), even when it is a “floating” thing, concept, narrative or discourse which is permanently mutable/fluctuating, apparently situated in the very relations/language/myths/culture and, of course, politically elaborated: territory/place is the starting “quantum” point/unit of social space, the smallest possible score of post-foundationalist variable codes through which it is both understood and manifested. Space is thus uncovered through territory/territoriality. That said, territory is not only an epistemic quality, or manner of space cognition. It also creates it, but in such a way that it does not precede it. Time and again, we measure and define space by territory/territoriality.

Space without territory is not an easily conceivable abstraction/imaginarium in any of its valences, even as network-relational modality, but also even when, in its “hardest” version, defined as independent from containing something or not: when understood as empty/hollowed out Newton’s absolute space (1974 [1686]: 6-13). The previous contention indirectly implies the idea of closeness, quantifiability and consonance of the networked spatiality and territory, the logic of overlapping rather than contiguity, which, in the authors’ opinion, results in off-setting the competitiveness of the two concepts along the line of “dehermetization” of territory and the territorial conversion of networks (cf. Painter 2010: 1093-1094). This, however, does not mean their automatic inversivity, but certainly indicates an increased level of overall mutuality and provisional intertwining (a kind of “light”, pro-dialectical connectivity).²⁾ In addition, this type of interpretation does not leave the possibility of equating place, as a political entity, with the fluid, topological, porous or contingent definition of territory and *vice versa*, or to eliminate the rigid territorial fetishization of the cruciality of borders *in genere* (which by no means implies the suspension of all its varieties and aspects). In other words, the problem is partly relocated to the level of political reading, to territoriality, justifying territorial rhetoric, imagination and representation, by profiling it as conducive to the fusion of different forms of social practices and actions- as bounded openness (cf. Malpas 2012). The interpretation of territory as a social “quantum”, which is not the trans-historical or trans-cultural form of the initial and ultimate cause of spatial practices and constellations, means that it is not a segment of some pre-given spatial universe or itself a spatial universe, but rather an expression and creator of pluriversal spaces, seemingly parallel and autarchic, but actually overlapping and tangent spatial units.

Thus, territory is not only a constructed scalar/ontological/semiotised “quantum” of socially perceived space, where dispersive “vacillating/vibrant” borders exist only to be replaced by other, equally elusive “vacillating/vibrant”

2) According to Joe Painter (2010: 1093, 1096), a territory is enacted by broadly defined networks of human and non-human actors, it is just one kind of socio-technical practices and should be a subject rather than an instrument of explanation (more an *explanandum* than an *explanans*), while a spatial network structure is inevitably a territory, as a bounded and continuous aggregate of space.

borders, where they are narratively (re)established by reformulated historic and symbolic grammars, conceptually equidistant from the “exteriority” (from space), but also from the “interiority” (from place): the relationship being forged here is not of absorptive/assimilative, but of generic nature. Insofar as the scholarly, public or colloquial language of territory is an expression of some power relation (state power being only one instance), it is also its political substratum and political technology. Hence, territory can be conceptualised as space and as place. Its synecdoche equalization with space is undisputed as territory and place are both spaces and its fragments, while the synecdochal relation with place (a manifestation of the Francophone approach to the issue) is reached through the view that both concepts/discourses are both semiotized, socially qualified/produced as well as quintessential elements of the world of life. At the same time, I would leave aside the fission of the sense of space to location/space and occupancy of that location, to physical place and phenomenal space, to impersonal feeling that something has longitude and latitude or an address (in a world obsessed with sameness, uniformity, unauthenticity or “placelessness” as, for example, shopping malls and Internet) and the emotional aspects associated with living at an address, a place filled with a potentially regressive nostalgia and reminiscences (cf. Agnew 2011).

Compatible with Bernard Debarbieux’s concept (Del Biaggio 2015: 40), territory is a social construct joining the physical/material/geographic space with a specific order/value system by attributing multiple or combined meanings to each of its elements (place) or discontinuity. In other words, each component of territory is identical to its symbolic-value code, while every aberration is equally coded in terms of symbols and values. It is a manifestation of clusters of relations of an individual/social groups to the world: a compound/assemblage of mediated, unfinished relations (by employing codes, ideas, knowledge, language or instruments and apparatuses) to the exteriority/outside and diversity/otherness, through a host of social, spatial and temporal scales, aimed at promoting and sustaining the individual’s/group autonomy (Raffestin 1984, 2012; Klauser 2012; Pedrozo 2017). The key difference between the Anglo-Saxon and Francophone approach to territory privileged in this study is that the Anglo-Saxon approach

argumentatively equates territory with state, while the Francophone one does not do so. At the same time, territory is not an exclusive, but a fundamental format/hypostasis of state space, and an even less exclusive format/hypostasis of political space.

Not supporting views that the size of the semantic platform of some notion directly attests to the confusion and unscientific nature of its understanding, namely, dismissing the distinction to the colloquial, esthetic and academic-scholarly jargon as a patent lever of manipulation, we argue that, on the contrary, size suggests the depth of nuance, subtlety and sophistication of a notion, without discarding the possibility that it also may also be a source of banalization/trivialization or cover-up for ignorance, absence of inventiveness or creativity. With that in mind, we will enumerate eight “classes” of meaning and usage of the notion of territory as mapped by Jacques Lévy: (1) from the modernist viewpoint, the notion of territory has, for a while, been underplayed in favor of the notion of space, due to the mathematical-geometrical abstractness/denotativity of space, or its unparalleled cultural-historical authenticity/connotativity of territory; (2) consistent with the previous, territory was equated and used interchangeably with the abstract notion of space due to its cultural-historical specificum; (3) in political and economic sciences, territory was used as a synonym for place, attesting the rootedness and identity that could be used as potentials for development and as opposite to the term global; (4) in the epistemological domain, territory is a real, socialized and actualized space, while space is a concept that enables territory to be contemplated; (5) in political science and international relations, territory manifests a border-determined and regulated space; (6) as an etiological-biological allegory, territory is a space controlled by violence; (7) territory is also defined as an appropriated space and as such, refers to the identity quality of every space; and (8) territory, in the sense of historical periodization and emphasis on social and individual identity, can be defined as an alternative to the geometric Cartesian spatialism (Painter 2010: 1099). Aware of the flaws and overlappings in the above definitions, Lévy suggests a division to topographic and topological metrics, where metrics is a manner of measuring and capturing distance. While topological spaces encompass discontinued objects of networks and rhizomes, territory

manifests a topographic space of continual objects. On the other hand, Michel Lussault, uses a tripartite classification of the social space to places (indivisible socio-spatial entities), areas (divisible and continual topographic socio-spatial entities) and networks (discontinued topological spaces of social connectivity). According to him, territories are ideal-typed areas (*ibidem*: 1100).

Let's consider the possibility that human territoriality is an ethological phenomenon. There are animals at a lower stage of development, for whom territorial behaviour, together with the need to set borders is innate and instinctive, while for higher primates, the territorial component of behaviour is seldom registered (Ewer 1968: 94). Although Soja underlined that the rule of social defining of territory applies to most societies, (1971: 13), at the very beginning of his career, as indicated in the introduction of this study, he made analogies between human and animal territorialism in his discussions on territoriality as a multi-scalar behavioural phenomenon of organising space on the principles of influence or domination, with implications reaching to identity-shaping and grasp of place. That said, it would be utterly wrong to insist on their homology, to take for granted some still scientifically unproved, pseudo-biologicistic "territorial imperative" (Ardrey 1966) caused by a set of evolutionary phylogenetic characteristics of humans which define and direct human behaviour towards conquest, control and defence of territory. It should be noted, however, that Soja (1989: 150, fn. 9) later registered as the principal flaw in this conceptual approach its distancing from any socio-political argumentation. Jean Gottmann (1973) relinquishes any behavioural connotativity in explaining territory and puts forward a historical periodization as an important interpretative element, but territory remains an ahistorical, universally neutral phenomenon. According to him (*ibidem*: 1-15), it is not possible to discuss state as a political institution without the spatial determination through territory as a compartmentalising space model based on partitiveness, diversification and organization, with two fundamental functions: that of providing security and the realization of social opportunities. Robert Sack (1983, 1986) identifies as a *differentia specifica* between human and animal territoriality the fact that the former is culturally/symbolically/value-coded process aimed at the realization of some authentic political or social aims, while

the latter is solely instinctive, or “signaling”, reflexive, vitalistic nature.

Arguably, territory represents a fairly homogenised (macro-meso-micro) fragment of space linked to the individual, group or institution that appropriates or acquires it, with its inherent (operationally soft or hard) borders, while territoriality is a compound of narratively orchestrated scripts/symbols/icons/codes varying over time and by respective culture/society, through which we establish our relationship with a territory, the process of articulation and rearticulation of a usually historically configured “claim-staking” to a specific territory. Territoriality is a political “meta-instance” of influencing and controlling people, phenomena and relations, by controlling, organising or ruling/governing a particular territory – a mode of power over space (cf. Sack 1986: 1, 5, 19-21). In sum, for Robert Sack, territoriality is more of a construct than a social product. It’s a floating discursive/narrative algorithm through which territory pseudo-accumulates its symbolic/semantic potential. In broadest terms, it “begins and ends” with the symbolic/semantic code of territorial borders (evinced in patriotic literature, epic and lyrical poetry and popular patriotic songs, specific ritual national holidays, history and geography books, pictures of border crossings or military check points or passport design). Contemplation of territoriality inevitably puts the ontology of power and its everyday manifestation at the forefront as important analytical lens for the perception of social and political fabrication of territories. It is not a strategy/project/agenda employed for the sake of some singular territorial, political, and social teleology, the achievement of particular ends and purposes; territoriality is above all a process initiated and generated by a full spectrum of relations assembling in a single place both individuals and groups as well as the material-discursive situation/setting.

The etymology of the word territory, as a spatial and political unit of the scope of specific authority/power, is associated with the Latin word *terra*, or earth, land, and *territorium*, meaning arable, agricultural lands surrounding or appended to a place, usually town or a religious (e.g. monastery) compound, intended for their supply with provisions (Elden 2011: 262, 2013: 11, 63; Dahlman 2009: 77). It should be noted, though, that while both terms express the politico-economic dimension of territory, its value as a potential commodity implying the possession

of natural resources, *territorium*, due to its link with the verb *terrere* (to frighten), contains some strategic-tactical political implications manifested through power relations incorporated in the term *terrain*, but neither of them adequately conveys the modern meaning of territory based on the politico-legal and politico-technical dimension. According to Stuart Elden (2009: xxv-xxviii; 2010: 801), while the first aspect represents a set of issues related to the subject of sovereignty, jurisdiction and authority, the second covers cartographic techniques of scaling and the convergent issues/subjects of control. From the political viewpoint, it seems as if to measure space is automatically to control it, perhaps not by the person measuring, but certainly by some other political actor. Accordingly, the evolution of the mathematical-geometric knowledge may feature as the source modality of territory control. Also, the term territory is sometimes used to capture the status of a political entity that has not yet achieved statehood, so territory can be described as a relationship between sovereignty, land and people, as a precedent or precondition of statehood, as an agent and catalyst. Dismissing the sufficiency of biological and social optics for the grasp of territory, Elden's philologico-linguistic point is that the historical possibility of territory is premised on a quantifiable and calculable geographic space, that draws its conceptual origins from the analytic geometry of Descartes.

The repercussion of this approach is that borders are not a bearing, defining element of territory, but accidental second-order problem, directly premised on the particular understanding of calculable equations and the consequent specificum in the capture of space. The principal shortcomings of this approach are the explanatory insensitivity for the cultural and affective perspectives in grasping territory and, by introducing the term "the territorial", disregard of the possibility that the cosmogony of territory may be related to unlinear pre-modern practices/formats of land appropriation, division and regulation, notwithstanding the existence and development of geometry as a science, with the corollary evasion of the translation of non-Western meanings of border-determined political space (Antonsich 2010). This implies respect for the post-colonial approach (Bhabha 1994; Appadurai 1996; Sakai 1997; Chakrabarty 2000) which, besides post-structuralism and post-modernism, quite directly advocates for resistance to the

manipulative cultural invasion of the self-proclaimed European and American knowledge as enlighteningly exclusive and universal, and everything else as contaminated in value and falsified knowledge, as parochial and provincial.

2.2. The “Territorial Trap” Problem

Let’s move now on to the meaning of John Agnew’s concept of the “territorial trap” (1994, 1998, 2005, 2015; Agnew and Corbridge 1995), as an arguable expression of alteration of the classical geopolitical triad - the formula of cross-fertilizing, supportive and empowering elements of space, authority and territory, or the nationally tinted version of the state, sovereignty and territory. For Agnew (2005: 441, 445), the key characteristic of the modern national sovereignty is its non-territorial ontology, while territory is perceived as blocks of space, and territoriality as an employment of territory for the pursuance of political, social or economic ends. Still, by covering the theoretical/paradigmatic spectrum from realism to liberalism, or, regardless of the state being conceived as a place or increased utility (i.e. conceptual limitations derived from negotiations, agreements and international institutions) or status (i.e. structural limitations derived from position in a hierarchically grounded state system), the territorial trap implies very frequent, almost regular, identification of the spatial expression of power with some kind of state. Such view is a specific state “fatalism”/ “ominosity”, an “ontologically” necessary territorial state with no alternative.

In other words, to make a slight digression, the only logic/substratum/rationality of state territoriality is the historically variable *raison d'état*. It is in fact the manifestation of the linguistically constructed and mythologically underpinned one-way simulacral inextricability of the generation and regeneration of an absolved narrative-grammatical fabricate: sovereignty over some, first and foremost, state territory. It does not mean that sovereignty is stripped of all its value, symbolic and systemic qualities, but only scepticism for its fixed “state monosemy”. In other words, in the modern world comprised of separate territories tending towards their particular national integration, the statehood discourse directly rests upon proclaiming sovereignty in the particular territory, upon the

orthodox sovereignty conventionally/traditionally construed as a manipulative ideal of the indivisible centralised and supreme/indisputable power “issuing” from a single place/site and exercised in some border specified/stabilised territory, thus enabling inbound prosperity and outbound international system or order of states. Sovereignty and its heterodox grasp will be further addressed at the end of this chapter.

Thus, whether we refer to a “realistic” state in an anarchical international environment which is in a permanent process of accumulation and reaccumulation of power, or whether state conduct is defined by rules, norms, principles and modes of decision-making, or by the effects of the idealistically-liberally profiled international cooperation, state is perceived as some absolute singular “meta-object”, some unavoidable spatial “meta-instance”- territory of all territories. Such monocausal, dehistoricized and decontextualized understanding overlooks the fact that the coercive power or capacity of state should not be treated as pre-given, and incontestable in a particular territory, but taken as a result of manifold, fragile historical contingencies underpinning state legitimacy. Finally, state asserts itself an “epistemological” container/cage/capsule making society recognisable and recognised, whose absence renders social order impossible although it is possible make a well-argued contrast between the society-in-state and an equally powerful idea of state-in-society (Migdal 2001). Although society cannot do without the space/territory discourse, it is far from inconceivable without the state discourse. In a nutshell, spatialised society is not by rule a statist society.

The existence of anomalous quasi-states, entities devoid of any institutional-legal traits of the classic state, or in their case, juridical rather than empirical sovereignty, bifurcation to positive and negative sovereignty and the implied close contingency on some territorial boundedness, does not mean the denial or transcendence of the state mosaic as an important milieu for contemporary global-scale political narratives. In fact, this is opting for a pluricausal observation of the new spatio-territorial modalities. The problem is that these blocks of space still identify their ontological “fulcrum” by reference to the nation-state scale. The relinquishment/ breakaway with the “territorial trap” tends to get caught up in the auto “trap” of territoriality (Shah 2012). Whenever we employ some “supra-” or

“sub-” territorial globalization term, we tend to mean the scaled transfiguration of the nation-state, its normative-value appendix, but as we know, it is rather difficult to “run away from an enemy we carry on our shoulders”. Despite the evident existence of territories outside the territorial state matrix, both schools of Realism and Constructivism in international relations theory equally register this “casual” attitude of the nation-state to the entropy of globalization, its compliance with the newly-emerged modality of the world anarchy. More specifically, the territoriality logic instilled in nation-states has been more or less converted into the logic of *raison d'état* recurrent in all territorial imaginariums and spatial transformations, raising the question how the problem detected can simultaneously its solution. The potential answer lies in a thorough deconstruction of the discursive nexus it forms part of. In other words, it is necessary to interpret the meta-narrative of globalization not only as a result of specific processes leading to the decadence of the border concept, but also as their constitutive component: it is necessary to reactivate the spatial history of different platforms in the politics of understanding global, to find global imaginariums unburdened by the manipulative dimensions of territorial imperatives and their corollary modes of perception of power and authority.

In his incisive, intriguing and highly poignant analysis of the “territorial trap”, Nisha Shah (2012: 61-65) identified four aspects crucial for understanding the emergence of territory as a political concept (cf. Ruggie 1993; Biggs 1999, Brenner 1999; Agnew 2009; Kolars 2009; Elden 2010; Sassen 2013): (1) abstraction of authority- rearticulation in the understanding of power or substitution of its being derived from the personal qualities of some status-holder with impersonal state authority, irreducible to the ruler and the ruled; (2) international sovereignty- as a particular kind of spatial dualism, the positioning of a state's interior, a space of order and security, as different from the bellicose international system of states, the simultaneous existence of state as territory and of the natural order displaced to international relations led to the formulation of territorial limits due to hostility and fear, the prospect of political life was subject to the defence of territory; (3) the practice of extraterritoriality- the previous aspect, due to the possibility of arbitrary interference and the need to open

communication channels, led to the formulation of the diplomatic system of embassies, places that were not only isolated from, but did not diminish the sovereignty of the host-states, which defined territory as a form of materialised power, but also as a normative category that intensified the recognition of territorial state as a substratum of legitimate authority, the concept of territory was adjusted and attuned to the needs for building legitimate sovereignty; and (4) precise administrative demarcation- manifests the result of a dialectical relationship between the eurhythmic cartographic representational power through the visual clichéing of the territorial state and the transformation of territoriality as a normative basis of political system in the sense of the perceptual novum of the political space. With respect to that, the discursive demise of the territorial trap, according to Nisha Shah (2012: 67), does not only requires the uncovering and insistence on the historical contingency of the modern state, but also “unpackaging” the territorial trap of the territorial trap, deconstructing the hypertrophied normative naturalization of the border-defined territory, its rigid and strict physicalization, as a reified and dogmatised area/constant of politics.

Territory, then, is not identical/synonymous with territoriality, but territoriality as a legal construct serving to mark state authority has become the prevalent formula for the apprehension of territory. As such, territoriality is a classically understood attribute of the international system where the legal exercise of state authority is postulated as inalienable, superior and omnipresent with regard to territory. Saskia Sassen (2013: 24-30) notes four elements of discordance/asymmetry of territoriality and territory as having particular currency: (1) the imbalance of classically perceived sovereignty partly due to globalization processes; (2) the distinction between legal instruments employed by countries in order to specify or construct territoriality; (3) territory-related cases and issues not covered by norms and rules; and (4) the dilution of the formal state power over territory, with the redistribution of power in different state sectors caused by such regulatory decline. Consequently, she defines her theoretical stance on the relations of state and globalization as neither glorification nor alteration of the state, but as its transformation. This transformation is marked by the process of “initial denationalization”, opening of space to foreign actors (specialised, semi-

autonomous agencies and international regimes for addressing national territory which, at least to some extent, differs from the traditional framing of sovereignty, resulting in changes both in the internal constellation of democratic responsibility and in the organizational structure of the international system and international law (Sassen 2008: 270; 2009: 580-582).

Rejecting the classical/standard/colloquial perception of state borders as mere geographically/spatially defined demarcation lines, Sassen (2009: 580-581; 2013: 30-31) calls for their perception based on a combination of different border regimes with different contents, as well as spatial and institutional coordinates dictated by different types of flows (e.g. of goods, money, information or migrants). While borderlines may be the crucial link, they are still no more than a link in the long chain of control institutions. In so doing, her analytic focus is not on the general increase in the volume of cross-border flows controlled by nation-states, even when they arise as a suspension of border restrictions (e.g. international finances and services, or cultural exchange), but on the new spatial format in the comprehension and operation of bordering capabilities which result in border spaces that are transversal to traditionally conceived and arranged borders. These are borders of “embryonic” territorial units, at times hermetically closed “spatial capsules”, located inside pre-given frameworks of state territoriality, akin to “nesting dolls”, which have highly formalised relations with the nation-state despite its involvement in their constitution and its capacity to derogate the founding act (law or informal arrangement). This constellation has not led to the disappearance or overpowering of sovereignty and territory as key characteristics of the contemporary international/interstate system, but has resulted in the formation of new institutional arenas, resulting in a partial devolution of sovereignty and denationalization of territory (Sassen 1996: 29-30). It is evident that, for Saskia Sassen, neoliberalism has not brought about an “emancipated”, boundless world, but has ushered in the transversal spatial forms with potentials to reduce as well as totally annul the classical, nationally specified territoriality. In that sense, even if national territory is not an obsolete category, its understanding has been rendered extremely complex by the possibility of the above-explained auto-debordering politico-economic process.

Modern political theory and theory of international relations define territoriality more narrowly than some of the previously elaborated concepts: as a spatially determined (contingent) political governance that, today more than historically, is shaped as a nation-state, or national and state territory. Hence, territory is one of the fundamental, existential components of state, the nucleus of its identity. We should add that even a narrow definition of the nation-state can be varied in three ways (cf. Kahler 2006: 4-5): (1) individuals and groups differ by their territorial attachment, both as their identification with some specific territory and by the intensity of that identification, (2) territory can be more or less important in some potential conflict negotiation and in the material control of people and resource, but particularly at the symbolic/iconic level; and (3) by the territorial regime, or norms/values, institutions/structure and practices/organization of territorial governance.

Concomitant with the intensifying multidimensional globalization process have been growing debates about the new position of the nation-state, ranging from arguments which, while acknowledging the networks of supranational institutions and the consequent displacement of power hubs, pleaded for its “meaninglessness” and/or “disintegration”, to relatively milder concepts which, acknowledging the fact that state power has been narrowed or shared with other sources of power, argue for the significant change of its role and functions. Of course, even in the era of globalization, the state is not “defeated”: it has succeeded in maintaining a remarkably high position. So, if we agree that globalization means the continuous expansion and acceleration of the flows of goods, money, finances, capital, information and people in the domain of physical space, as well as a relatively static and consolidated socio-territorial infrastructure supporting these flows, we can employ two ambivalent/conflicting processes unfolding in continual dialectic interplay: (1) the process of deterritorialization as an expression of the spatio-temporal compression; and (2) multiscalar reterritorialization as an expression of balanced territorial organization (Brenner 1999: 43). One of the key features inherent to the privileged position of the modern state is associated with the amalgamation of its historical tendency towards rationalization, standardization and compactness of social relations inside the national territory with the full

realization/achievement of this tendency.

Territorialization thus became the premise of the political and social being and not a result of the historically profiled projects of partitioning and centralization. According to Neil Brenner (1999: 45-46), the epistemological primacy of state (centrality of the territorial sovereignty) is premised on two concepts: (1) the idea of space as an inert social programme that is not socially constructed, organized or modified, resulting in the spatial fetishism of the neutral, timeless and self-renewing space, unsusceptible to historical transformations; and (2) the idea of state territory as a pre-given and inevitable analytic instance, which ultimately leads to methodological territorialism that treats all spatial forms and scales as self-sufficient and territorially profiled geographic units. Building on this logic, Brenner perceives globalization either as global territorialism or as supra-territorialism prone to historical metamorphoses, as a dialectical process of the historically constructed (spatial) deterritorialization and reterritorialization “responsible” for the composing, recomposing and decomposing of state policy and institutions. Territory is both generated by state activities/dynamism and is their generator.

The idea of national territorial state, as a specific combination of mythological and pragmatic components- sacralised land, power centre and functional space, fuses several core dimensions that influence its force (cf. Hassner 1997: 57): (1) the symbolic dimension of identity; (2) totalising/operative dimension of authority; and (3) organizational dimension of effectiveness. According to Max Weber (1946) [1919]: 78, 82), the modern liberal state is a bureaucratic-modern polity, “[...] a compulsory association which organizes domination”, or “[...] a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. This definition of the modern liberal state will later be reflected in the rigid interpretation by Anthony Giddens (1985: 172) who believes that: “Unlike traditional states, the nation-state is a power-container whose administrative purview corresponds exactly to its territorial delimitation”. Pro-Weberian definition of the modern (territorial) state, thus, always comprises/consolidates four classes of elements (cf. Mann 1984: 188): (1) a differentiated set of institutions and related personnel embodying them; (2)

centrality/concentricity of political decision-making; (3) borders determining their territorial scope; and (4) monopoly over law-making and coercive power. At any rate, the problem with the Weberian perspective and conceptualization of state is manifested in the fact that monopoly camouflages those situations when authority is disputable and fragmented, just as the notion of “legitimacy” blurs the possibility of different types of authority, or discontent and aversion to the prevailing forms of authority.

The interpretative focus shifts from the state as rule-creator and holder of exclusive use of force for adherence to its own decisions, to various forms of interaction by several separate systems characteristics of every human society. In that sense, state has limited, unfixed autonomy. Along this line, we should also mention the relevance of Mann’s (1986: 113, 114) dichotomy, as a distinction between the despotic and infrastructural power of the state. Despotic power is defined by the ability of a state’s elite (decision-makers) to undertake a certain number of activities as it deems fit: without negotiating (or consulting) with the civil society (non-governmental actors), even against the latter’s intentions, to out-power it. Infrastructural power manifests the state’s capacity to permeate civil society and to logistically implement political decisions, or observe, control and coordinate the implementation of its own decisions, power to exert influence on civil society and to centralize the coordination of its activities through its own (state) infrastructure. For him, the fundamental quality of state power is reflected in its territorial mode of existence. In that vein, pre-state societies were effectuated by social principle, the social defining of territory, while a shift into the state-making process in fact points to the territorial definition of the state-society. Rhys Jones (2007: 3-4, 34) argues that it is possible to criticise this conceptual stance since it discounts the influence of social connotations and practices by regarding state territoriality as a permanent state project, generated and transformed according to the competing programmes/narratives of civil servants/state administration, from the national to the local level, making state a dynamic, conceptually open, non-finalised and heteromorphic space.

2.3. Orthodox Sovereignty versus Heterodox Sovereignty

Within the classical political discourse,³⁾ sovereignty, more as a notoriety than a novelty but often analytically overlooked or underrated, implies, on the one hand, the internal, centralised or "domestic" perspective, the highest and ultimate authority within a state, responsible for the peace and prosperity based on the hierarchical relationship of the sovereign and his subjects, and, on the other, the external, decentralised or legal perspective, the relationship of formal equality, recognition by other, also recognised states, responsible for the potential collisions and aversions expressed as the anarchic element of the relations between states. Consistent with this approach, sovereignty is a plenipotent territorial arrangement of some political authority. With this in mind, the formula of sovereignty in fact includes both domestic hierarchy and international anarchy; in order for it to function "inside", it must be recognised "from the outside". Thus, for Hans Morgenthau (1948: 209-210, 243-267; 1948a), the coryphaeus of the classical Realism in the Theory of international relations, sovereignty has a classical/orthodox/ "sacrosanct" meaning of the territory-bounded and indivisible supreme authority in creating and enforcing the law: it's a state that is or is not sovereign, since "liminal", semi or partial state sovereignty is not possible. The foregoing conclusion implies that some political entity is a state only if it wields sovereign power, as the unquestionable "real" nature of state is manifested in its fundamental principle: axiomatic, or absolute, sovereignty.

Although neo-realism shifted the focus on the attributes of state onto the qualities of inter-state relations, by deriving state sovereignty from the absence of any higher authority in the international system, that is from the concept of anarchy, it maintained the orthodox concept, especially in its structural variant, by regarding any aberration from this formula as irrelevant or by ignoring it

3) Jean Bodin (2004 [1576]) was the first to define sovereignty in more prescriptive than descriptive terms, by deriving it from the word *maiestas* (majesty), as an fundamental attribute of state. Sovereign authority is: absolute, unique, inalienable, non-transferrable and, as one of its intrinsic and fundamental traits, its indivisibility has been particularly highlighted. It should be noted that Bodin's framing of sovereignty is deeply rooted in the historical context, emerging as a reaction to Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre and the Huguenot Monarchomach theories (Andrew 2011: 75).

(Biersteker and Weber 1996: 3-6; Lake 2003: 306). For neo-realists, once a system of sovereign states is in place, structured by anarchy, it is conformistically, through power balancing, regenerated by cloned systemic units, while the capacity for explaining radical/revolutionary changes is reduced to zero. The central realistic/neo-realistic hypothesis in the framing of society is thus related to the reproductive, rather than transformative logic (Ruggie 1983: 285). Although in the neo-realistic camp, Robert Gilpin (1981: 121) devotes more attention to state territoriality, emphasising that the modern nation-state differs from pre-modern one by: “strong central authority that is differentiated from other social organizations, and it exercises control over a well-defined and contiguous territory”. In his view, territoriality in the international sphere can be seen similarly to the functioning of property law: just as redistribution of ownership rights signals basic shifts in the sphere of domestic policy, redistribution of territories by wars indicates basic shifts in the sphere of international politics (*ibidem*: 37).

Constructivists believe that the external and internal versions of state sovereignty, as well as all their aspects, are already contained in the realistic definition: territory, power, population and recognition, socially constructed patterns. They are fluid, dynamic, but also persistent social facts, social construction of the text and context of sovereignty, formulated and reformulated through the interaction of myriad endogenous state practices and norms within the intersubjectively recognizable communities and that are never completely finished, contingent and culturally conditioned. Sovereignty thus arises as an outcome of different “teleological” state profiles, it is not their natural genotype, amalgamating a whole range of temporally and spatially variable practices and policies. However, despite the fact that the answer to the question: What is anarchy? is a continually varying mutual formulation of the states involved, because their dynamic behaviour is premised on the meanings attributed/regulated by the cultural network (Wendt 1992: 396-397), the constructivist sovereignty remains the immanent characteristic of all member-states comprising an effective international state system (Lake 2003: 308-309). By way of comparison, let’s say that bio-political sovereignty arises when bio-power meets its orthodox/classical

equivalent and that it refers less to the efficiency of the rule of law and more to the orientation, reorientation and disciplining of the population in some territory. (Swiffen 2011: 63, 93). At any rate, attempting to address four kinds of remarks/problems, those concerning irrelevance, vagueness, incoherence and normative deficiencies, Neil Walker (2003: 6) defines sovereignty: “as the discursive form in which a claim concerning the existence and character of a supreme ordering power for a particular polity is expressed, which supreme ordering power purports to establish and sustain the identity and status of the particular polity qua polity and to provide a continuing source and vehicle of ultimate authority for the juridical order of that polity”.

Stephen Krasner (1999: 9) distinguishes four types of sovereignty that do not need to be logically related or correlate in practice: (1) domestic sovereignty- concerned with organising of public authority within a state and capability of those who exercise it for the efficient, effective and full control; (2) interdependent sovereignty- pertaining to the public authority’s ability to oversee cross-border movement; (3) international sovereignty- mutual recognition of states and other entities; and (4) Westphalian sovereignty- non-interference of external actors, or their elimination from the configuration of power. External sovereignty reveals virtually nothing about internal sovereignty, as the degree of effectiveness of political authority within state borders, its organization and level of control do not necessarily have any bearing upon the international legal and Westphalian sovereignty (*ibidem*: 12), which, again, can be seen as examples of organised hypocrisy, as they never stood in a lasting equilibrium, or a situation in which there were no consistent attempts aiming at their disruption and imbalance (*ibidem*: 24). Thus, for Krasner, sovereignty is polysemic and represents different types/fluxes of power vertically, as profoundly embedded/rooted segregated practices, that that rely more on egotistic state interests than on normative principles. He does not elaborate them as diversified activation/operationalization of a single, ultimately ordering and systemic power oriented towards the harmonization, homogeneization and sustention of the entire political community (Walker 2003: 8). In addition, Krasner’s conceptualization of sovereignty is static and passivised, it isn’t helpful in the elaboration of various challenges confronted

by sovereignty and the plausibility of its transformation.

To recapitulate, Walker (2003: 9-10) identifies two stages in the development of linguistic algorithms/jargons of sovereignty: (1) the Westphalian phase/jargon- where sovereignty, besides being an international system underpinned by the legal instances of Constitutional law aimed at regulating the internal system of sovereign states and by International law, aimed at regulating the relations between sovereign states, is interpreted through the one-dimensional optics burdened by state supremacy and manifested in the meta-language of political and other sciences which, while purportedly providing factographic explanations and justifications, conceptualize the world in which it is operational; and (2) the post-Westphalian phase/jargon- where, due to globalization, multi-dimensionality and constitutional pluralism, there is a corrosion/erosion of the classical imaginarium of the sovereign state; the intensifying transnational cultural, media, trade and tourist interaction between citizens and the kinds and quantity of interstate treaties have led to a decline of military sovereignty (due to the existence military alliances), economic sovereignty (the functioning of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank or World Trade Organization) and political sovereignty (the case of European Unity), and have made it increasingly difficult for the state to control its borders in different respects and the post-Westphalian sovereignty jargon no longer aspires to omnipotent explanations and the “frozen” world image, with the sovereign state as the inevitable political postulate. Although globalization does to some extent challenge the absoluteness of the state authority and, consequently, its sovereignty, it has not been fully illuminated how the potential transformation towards post-sovereignty will be realized.

Quite a few current interpretations of sovereignty build upon, comment, criticize or are under the direct influence of the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005), shifting their analytical perspective from his exploration of sovereignty as an organizational principle of the international system to issues pertaining to the grounding of governance potentials and consequences of the exercise of unbounded, totalising state power over an unprotected and vulnerable population (Humphrey 2004; Agnew 2005; Gulli 2007; Jones 2012; Dunn and Cons 2014). Agamben's concept of the sovereign state power, his theory of sovereignty, is

based on the notion of “the paradox of sovereignty” and its consonant idea of “bare life”. The argumentative nucleus for the formulation of the “paradox of sovereignty” can be identified through the assimilation of the logic of violence underlying the much-quoted assertion by Carl Schmitt (Schmitt 2005 [1922]: 5): “The sovereign is he who decides on the exception”. In that sense, Agamben (1998: 15) analysed the fact that “the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order”, that he is able “to suspend the validity of the law”, or to exempt himself from the legal system despite being subject to it. In fact, sovereign power is based on the declaration of the state of exception, wherein: “The exception is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already included (*ibidem*: 25)”. The logic of sovereignty is, then, a non-logic, logic of paradox (the process of constituting rules is the process of their suspension/derogation), the sovereign’s prerogative to prohibit and derogate from prohibitions represents the fundamental characteristic of existence of the modern-day individual.

This constellation has caused the transformation of individuals into “homines sacri”,⁴⁾ a status implying the radical deprivation of political, social, cultural and civic opportunities, a totally destroyed subjectivity without any form of awareness, right or potential for political action. People, as some kind of social “mutants/zombies”, physiological holders and reflexive outcomes of the overall merging of politics into bio-politics. Reduced to their biological dimension, biological suffering or witnessing of it, they are no more even objects but abjects. (Papastergiadis 2006). The repressive language of Foucault’s disciplining panopticon has been replaced by the repressive language of border regimes and Agamben’s refugee camps, that are no longer an exception of politics but its warning and disturbing modern cliché, a prevalent, exemplary and essential political structure. Our “regular situation” has become a “state of emergency”. As Walter Benjamin (Benjamin 2007 [1955]: 257) already pointed out: “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the state of emergency in which we live is not the

4) Ancient Roman legal institute that defined a specific banned group of people for whose killing no prescribed responsibility/sanction applied, but who, absurdly, could not be sacrificed in religious ceremonies or rituals (Agamben 1998: 71-75).

exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight”.

Thus, although exempted from the application of the entire legal system, but subject to the application of extraordinary rules, the discursive position of borders and refugee camps does not constitute an aberration from or abandonment of the habitual functionality and operability of the state. Contrary to it, they are a predictable and expected enlargement and amplification of its power, “emergency spaces” within the “normal” state space, zones of organising life and death, where, in the name of territorial security, national integrity or humanitarian intervention it is possible to commit the most heinous crimes. A possible path of critique of Agamben’s theory of sovereignty could be that camps and borders cannot be treated as a conceptual result of some one-dimensional, invariable, unison and evenly spread sovereign power, but are the compression of sovereign power, the consequence of its accumulation and orientation on the specific zones of exclusion, created against a specific population. Accordingly, instead of the “hypertrophic” sovereign power of the space of “exemption”, we can refer to the “hypersensitive” zones marked by the plurality of forms of competitive and overlapping powers, that are not the *a priori* manifestation of sovereign power, but the *a posteriori* manifestation of its instability (Dunn and Cons 2014: 95). It is thus a relatively “chaotic” situation where, regardless of the bureaucratic apparatus which tends to equate reality and representation, the selection is made from different programmes, projects and power formulations whose intensity and duration cannot be guaranteed but which are more or less plausible.

Dismissing the possibility to reconstruct, at least theoretically, the historical and contextual components/elements/trajectories/premises/logics exerting influence on sovereign decisions in such complexly conceived zones, as in the case of contingent perception of sovereignty, Elizabeth Cullen Dunn and Jason Cons (*ibidem*: 101-105) suggest that sovereign activities in those spaces are consequences of Aleatory Sovereignty: sovereignty that rests on the stochastic method of reasoning and the stochastic calculus of power. But it should be noted that, although it is sometimes possible to gain insight/analyse a situation through the lens of history, decisions in sensitive zones often directly depend on the

disposition of individual actors, which imposes various restrictions such as the impossibility of capturing the full scope of potential factors relevant for some decision and the impossibility of predicting the full spectrum of their intended or unintended mutual interactions and/or intersections. The aforesaid finds its historical proof in Lauren Benton's (2010: 287) claim that sovereignty evolves through the uneven distribution across space and time and aberrations from it should be treated more as a pattern than an exception. Aleatory sovereignty thus implies an aberration of the classical sovereignty in the sense of several simultaneous, spatially isolated options/patterns of power, where a series of relatively minor transgressions of rules provided by a code of sovereignty results in its erosion, compromise or total collapse.

For Aihwa Ong (2006: 77-78), the destabilization of the conventionally grasped sovereignty, initiated by globalization, manifests itself in the concept of "gradual" sovereignty. Namely, within the situation of post-development, gradual sovereignty, through myriad technological zones, refers to the elastic organization of sovereignty, where flexible governments, while retaining the overall control of the territory, adjust some of its parts to the demands of global capital and global financial flows by creating spaces/zones determined by political conditions dictated by/adjusted to the requirements of corporations, provided/vested with the "decreed" indirect power for this kind of semi-sovereign activities by the respective states. As a result, governments are no longer solely oriented to the consolidation and preservation of their fully-fledged national entities, but are partly involved in administering the relations of differentiated spaces and populations with the global market. This constellation disrupts the immanence of the territorial coding of the spatial attributes of sovereignty by ushering in its divisibility, through the weblike patterns of the sovereign expression, just as efficient as their territorial equivalent.

For Jens Bartelson (1995: 4), the research of sovereignty does not primarily answer the question what sovereignty is, but examines and relates text and ways of capturing sovereignty with the salient difficulties in contemporary text and its grasp. Analysing the issue of the persistence of the thesis on the indivisibility of sovereignty, he (Bartelson 1995, 2008, 2011) initially starts from the argument

that sovereignty can be construed as a symbolic algorithm in experiencing the political world of our life, not necessarily in some determining relation to the perceived world. In his opinion (Bartelson 2011), there is also another reason why sovereignty is hard to redefine and why the presumption of its indivisibility is so reluctantly relinquished. Namely, the notion of indivisibility has made it possible to delegate and share sovereignty among different actors, by identifying what is to be delegated and shared, thus becoming, in its practical exercise, a condition of its own divisibility. Genealogically viewed, ever since Jean Bodin, from the sixteenth century onwards, the locus of sovereignty has been singular/One (whether an individual, part of the people, or people itself), and not plural/Many, and thus, its indivisibility has been deemed necessary for state unity and continuity, its ability to react to external and internal threats and the formulation of the international state system. In fact, it represented an emanation of the transcendental, unquestionable unity characteristic of the ancient and medieval universalism. Indivisibility of sovereignty has thus become the undisputed cornerstone of modern political systems and modern political interpretations, even with the emergence of nation, despite the fact that its relationship with political projects/arrangements has never been smooth or taken for granted. In that sense, the relocation of sovereignty from God to the monarch, from monarch to the people/nation, and thereon from to humanity as a whole has been possible due to the fact that the substratum of political power remained the same by the virtue of its immanent trait of indivisibility.

Despite the fact that the practice of political power often points to the contrary, dismissing the indivisibility of sovereignty would cause considerable conceptual chaos and incongruence of the modern political theory. Bartelson (2011: 93-94) suggests the examination of the historical ontology of the symbolic matrix of sovereignty to establish what has led us to believe that its indivisibility manifests its intelligibility, by reasoning that: "Undertaking this task would perhaps sensitize us to the possibility that the Many is prior to the One and that the only thing that has led us to believe otherwise is the violent imposition of that form upon the world." We should add that, for him (Bartelson 2001: 180), the contingency/possibility of the state, a site/element of relations between the authority and

community particularly and historically profiled by specific political discourse, is not validly justified only by the absence of its substratum or necessity, but also by its potential not to exist: accidentality of the state's compartmentalization of the political space as an expression of underlying issues of political order, can be justified by some new political technology. However, the problem is that, in the symbolic sphere, any critique of state leads to an even stronger instalment/empowerment of pro-state discursive positions, implying the total destruction of the state-centric political system. Namely, political theory and political system are rarely simultaneous, even if they are aiming at the same objective.

Drawing on the above-identified Michael Mann's bifurcation of state power to despotic and infrastructural one, John Agnew (2005, 2009) suggests that infrastructural power can be employed through networks which are not necessarily territorial in the external zones they generate, possibly resulting in the deterritorialization of the current state and reterritorialization around political entities such as regions or the European Union. Simultaneously, depending on the type of identity selected/created by elites (e.g. a criterion can be some other territorial level such as a region or a non-territorial entity such as international organizations) despotic power is not necessarily practiced through the orientation to the pre-given, singular, static or centralised territory/authority, it can be operational and with a dispersively positioned social power platform. Agnew demonstrates this destabilization/remodelling of the territorial fundamentals of sovereignty depending on despotic power, or relative power of the state's central authority in terms of the degree and permanence of an efficient and legitimate apparatus of law and depending on infrastructural power, or its consolidation in terms of the amount of state regulation in the delivery of public goods/services and the functioning of market in a specified/demarcated territory, through four ideal types of regimes/sovereignty efficiency systems.

They are (Agnew 2005: 443-446; 2009: 129-132): (1) the classical regime of sovereignty- closest to what is meant by meta-narrative of the Westphalian sovereignty, stamped by the high amount of effectiveness of central state authority and, virtually full employment of the despotic and infrastructural power within a bounded state territory, even if it is dependent on foreign investment and exports

of goods and services (China's case); (2) the imperialistic regime of sovereignty- manifested as diametrically opposed to the classical one and an expression of the hierarchic framing of world politics; central state authority is significantly dependent on, and controlled by, external factors (states or institutions such as the International Monetary Fund), the internal alignment of state and infrastructural cohesive forces are extremely frail, corruption is extreme and separatist tendencies exist (the case of Middle East and some parts of South America); (3) integrative regime of sovereignty- represented by the case of European Union and implying the simultaneous existence, from state down to sub-state levels, of different forms of governance and organization within the different functional, often non-territorial, arenas, resulting in highly complex sovereignty, but, although the central authority of the new entity and its member-states is lower than when they were independent, the territorial dimension of some forms of infrastructural power is detectable; (4) the globalist system of sovereignty- refers to globalist states grounded in hegemony, a combination of coercion and consent for the sake of securing the highest possible degree of convergence of other states to its own aspirations and objectives (the case of the United States of America), due to the emphasis on global financial centres as an important characteristic of these regimes, they, more than others, rest on the non-territorial mechanisms of power. John Agnew's (2005: 456) main intention was to join the critics of the conventionally viewed sovereignty by his critique of the perception of spatiality as an absolute territoriality through the idea of combining central state authority and the consolidated and open territoriality, all filtered through the symbolic and material efficiency of its functioning.

At the end of this part we will say that, analysing the post-structuralist, or post-positivistic approach, in addition to the conceptions of sovereignty by Michel Foucault and Jens Bartelson outlined above, Richard Ashley (1988, 1995) highlights the anarchy/sovereignty paradox, defining it as direct proportionality between attentiveness to the international system and the greater prominence of deconcentrated structure of the state system. The more attentive we are to international cooperation, the more we highlight the narcissism of sovereign states (Bickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch 2007: 28-31). In that sense, the situating of

the supreme authority within a state implies the denial of any authority above it, so the focus on the transformations of the international system, which needs to be fabricated over and over again and then harmonised in the global process, implies the discussion/debate/deconstruction of its fundamental concept which, in such discursive conjunction is not anarchy but sovereignty, a place where all things political are born and disappear into nothingness, analogous to its exclusive and tyrannical political nature. In any case, this resulted in the additional post-structural “paradox of the anarchy/sovereignty paradox”. The discarding of sovereignty as necessary and naturalised, understanding it as a fluid alternation of discursive and epistemic projects of various ranks, privileging of non-state actors and the attempt to sever anarchy from all polities and forever does not end with an emancipating perspective: no post-structuralist exegesis of the script of sovereignty has ever resulted in some new political paradigm, some new policy based on radically new intellectual postulates, nor has it identified the historical expression of political subjectivity as relevant (*ibidem*: 36).

Conclusion

Summa summarum, fundamental characteristics of the transformed conception of space, territory and sovereignty, with significant implications for international relations of the globalised post-modernity can be mapped as follows:

1. The idea that space is a heteromorphous, deconcentrated and relational social construct or format, a perspective of the multitude, plurality and heterogeneity equally importance as the perspective of time, that it is socially (re)produced and mediated by various social factors nad different from the physical/natural materiality and from historical elements, or from the perceived (“first”) and conceived (“second”) space, whose combination creates the lived (“third”) space, which, by exceeding the binary configuration by its own trialectics, yields the possibility of „objectivised“ or „estheticised“ employment in the sense of resistance to power/oppression as its immanent component (cf. Lefebvre 1976b, 1991 [1974], 2003; Massey 1992, 2005, 2009; Soja 1989,

1996, 2009). In addition to time, the perpetuated (re)articulated space is also co-constituting with politics, it is generated by power and generates “geometricised” power, without it there is no relationship with the distinct Others and no sociability formulated by this relationship. Although social spaces absorb or reflect the prevalent relations of production, they can not be reduced to them, just as they are not some isolated spatial entities, but intersect, blend and form hierarchies. The non-finalised, open and flexible spaces of post-modernity warrant a specific kind of relational identity and spatial socialization-construction, reconstruction and deconstruction of spatiality both at the level of imaginarium and everyday spatial practices which qualify someone as member of some territorially specified and encircled entity. The focus on the juridical-discursive power of sovereignty and the law, based on various forms of prohibitions and repression, is shifted to the delimitation of the productive disciplinary (“panoptic”) power of the scientific, political or military strategies of the same rank, from macro-spatial scales of total history to mezzo-micro ones of general history (cf. Foucault 1980a, 1980b, 1995 [1975], 2002a). This kind of space allows for the existence of several juxtaposed dissonant spaces within a singular real space and, as a topological, discontinued space implies the “osmosis” of non-linear time and trans-scalar space with such differentiated, highly complex and irreducible relational networks of autonomous actors as multiplied regional, networked, fluid or rhizomic spaces.

2. Territoriality is an instrument of mediation/intersection linking space and society, a cluster of historically-axiologically profiled unfixed accidentalities, social practises manifested by the aspirations of individuals, groups or institutions to control and influence people, objects, phenomena, processes and relations in a specific differently scaled geographic area (Sack 1986). Territoriality produces spatial classification and reflects a body of discursively/narratively harmonised texts, grammars, symbols, rituals, ceremonies, icons, patterns, matrices or codes that vary over time and depending on the particular culture/polity, establishing the relation to territory, the process of (re) configuration of the mostly historically defined “claim” to a specific territory. Accordingly, territory represents a somewhat compact segment of the defined

and controlled space linked to individual, group or institutional appropriation or acquisition, with (operationally soft or hard, physical or verbal) borders as inherent to it. Territory as a political concept unifies the personalization of power, distinction between the inner and outer spheres of state, extraterritoriality and a stable administrative delimitation (Shah 2012). Territoriality is a mode of power characteristic for different arenas of human interactivity, gaining its most effective and efficient form in the political sphere-as state, narrowly defined by modern political theory and theory of international relations as a spatially determined, contingent political governance which is, if not historically, today invariably assumes the form of the nation-state, or national and state territory. Territorial prerogatives in considering the logic of the modern state are related to the confluence of the historical gravitation towards streamlining, standardization and coherence in composing social relations, on the one hand, and the conception of space as a static, eternalised and sterile conceptual platform that is not socially constituted/organised or susceptible to the historical metamorphoses, on the other (Brenner 1999). To change this constellation, it is necessary not only to unmask/unveil the historical contingency of the modern state, but also to deconstruct the ultra-naturalization of border-defined territory as a reified, dogmatized and obsolete constant of politics, as well as to insist on the normative redefining of the legitimate authority. At the same time, it should be remembered that the neo-liberal attempt of eliminating borders under influence of the market-driven understanding of globalization, has not only led to the process of deterritorialization, but has also triggered the process of reterritorialization. All of this implies the need to decompose the meta-narrative of globalization, not only through the lens of processes leading to the relegation of the border concept, but also as their constitutive component: the identification of global imaginarium which are not loaded with the manipulating dimensions of territorial imperatives and the corollary modes of perception of power and authority. *Ergo*, this paper affirms the idea that: territory/territoriality is imagined and de-essentializes topological “quantum” point/unit of social/political space, the smallest possible score/entity of “post-foundationalist”

variable/relational horizontal and vertical power codes through which it is understood/manifested, expressed/functional and perpetually (re)articulated.

3. Consistent with the premises of classical realism, state power is directly proportional to the material resources/capacities at its disposal and is thus premised by the definite availability of some specific territory (Morgenthau 1948, 1948a; Aron 2003 [1966]). This implies that a political entity can be a state only if it has sovereign power, as the “orthodox” nature of the state is manifested in its underlying principle: postulated absolute sovereignty. Accordingly, the international system rests on contained or open conflicts and antagonisms over space. Neo-realism substitutes the favouring of state attributes with insistence on the characteristics of inter-state relations, while the international system is structured by the state of anarchy, the only relevant variable being the distribution of power (Waltz 1979). Constructivists disagree with the idea that states are egoistic actors predestined by the state of anarchy for political collisions, and with the neo-liberal thesis that anarchy has an “educational” dimension of cooperation towards the achievement of absolute gain. Anarchy is a floating mutual formulation/practice of states involved, since their dynamic behavior is premised on the meanings attributed/regulated by its cultural network, while the exercise of power over a territory is their *differentia specifica* with regard to other actors. Territory, in its constructivist framing, remains an immanent attribute of all member states comprising the international state system, although borders are indeterminate/fluid categories, while national identities, interests and imaginaries seldom coincide with current territorial borders. For post-modernists/post-structuralists, who have not succeeded in resolving the chronic deficiency of the emancipating political subjectivity in their concepts, the anarchy/sovereignty paradox is the way of reasoning that attention we place on international cooperation, the more we promote the narcissism of sovereign states. The distinction between the inner/us (sovereign, pacified individuals protected by borders of territorial state) and the outer/them (foreign, antagonistic and dangerous) is generated by state discourse and practice (as key topics of statehood and statesmanship). The crucial problem of the international system which, time and again needs to be fabricated implies

the de-construction of its central concept, which is not anarchy but sovereignty, as a sphere where all political issues materialise and dematerialise, arise and disappear in the vortex of its repressive matrix.

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