THE JAINA DOCTRINE OF *NAYĀBHĀSA*

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Logical fallacies are primarily understood as formal fallacies when they are the kinds of invalid arguments. But sometimes they are understood in a wider sense to cover informal (material) fallacies as well. In this sense they can be understood as the kinds of unsound arguments. But the word fallacy has a still wider sense which covers those expressions which are not explicit arguments but are reducible to unsound arguments or to parts thereof. The word fallacy thus applies also to an expression or a statement used by a speaker, where the speaker is not making any explicit argument, but simply formulating a definition or giving a description or an explanation. One of the ways in which such a definition, description or explanation could be claimed to be fallacious is to point out that it is based on a certain false presupposition. Sometimes the speaker is not clearly aware of the presupposition in which his definition or description or explanation is grounded, or even when he is aware, he may not present it as that. Such fallacies therefore stand apart from the formal or informal fallacies which are (invalid or unsound) explicit arguments. For the sake of convenience we may call these fallacies as fallacies of definition, fallacies of description and fallacise of explanation respectively.

With this background, I urge, we are in a better position to understand the Jaina concept of *nayābhāsa*. *Nayābhāsas* can be best understood as fallacies of description. Jaina doctrine of *nayābhāsa* is also intrinsically related to the Jaina philosophy of language. In the paper we will attempt to understand the Jaina doctrine of *nayābhāsa* in this light.

Hence the first part of the paper is devoted to elucidation of the Jaina concept of *nayābhāsa* as a fallacy of description and the relevance of that concept to the Jaina philosophy of language. In the second part we will consider the Jaina classification of *nayābhāsa* and see how our understanding of the classification substantiates our account of the concept of *nayābhāsa*.

I. The concept and its relevance

We come across many descriptive sentences in our ordinary language. These sentences are significant either in literal sense or in derivative sense. They could be true in one sense, but false in another. The sense of a sentence is relative to the frame of reference with which the sentence is associated. However due to some misconception about the working of ordinary language

we are likely to forget the relative character of the sense of a sentence and truth-value of a sentence and regard some sentences to be significant and true (or false) independently of any frame of reference. Hence if we are asserting (or denying) a descriptive sentence by attaching absolute significance and absolute truth (or falsehood) to it, then we are committing a fallacy of description. This is the cental idea of the Jaina doctrine of *nayābhāsa*.

Nayābhāsa means pseudo-*naya*, i.e. something which appears as naya but is not *naya*. In Jaina philosophical literature we sometimes find the words such as *mithyā-naya*[1] (false or pseudo *naya*) and *durnaya*[2] (bad or improper *naya*) used instead of *nayābhāsa*. *Naya* in Jainism means a view or an understanding of some reality which is expressed by an ordinary language desctiption. *Nayavākya*[3] means an ordinary language sentence expressive of such a view or understanding. Generally the viwe or understanding of some reality (*naya*) which is expressed by an ordinary language description (*nayavākya*) is a relative and partial view or understanding. It is relative because it is contextually true, subject to a certain contextual interpretation of the sentence which expresses it. It is partial because it concentrates on a single aspect of the given reality and ignores the other aspects. *Nayābhāsa* also is a view of some reality, but it does not express a partial truth or contextual truth, but a falsehood (or a non-sense). It too is expressed by a 'descriptive' sentence, but the sentence expressing a *nayābhāsa* fails to describe any reality truly, because it involves a false claim of absoluteness or completeness on the part of the view expressed by it.

This idea can be further clarified in a broader context of the Jaina approach to world and language. According to Jainas every object in this universe has infinite number of properties (*anantadharmātmaka*).[4] All of them, however, are not purely physical properties, but most of them essentially correspond to some linguistic ascriptions. Jainas go to the extent to claim that even the name of a thing belongs to the thing as its property.[5] Since naming or describing presupposes some contextual framework, Jainas seem to claim that generally properties belong to things depending upon some frame of reference. In relation to different frames of reference the same object can be described differently and hence even apparently contradictory properties can be ascribed to the same object in relation to two different frames of reference. A pot can be said to be existent in so far as it exists as itself. But the same pot can be said to be non-existent in so far as it does not exist as a cloth. Any two objects can be said to be identical relative to the properties they share in common. But the same two things can be said to be different relative to the properties they do not share in common. Words acquire their meanings relative to some frame of reference and sentences are true or false relative to the frames of reference they presuppose.

Jainas seem to hold that the whole of our ordinary language discourse is

made up of ambiguous (and hence systemaically misleading) sentences. The same sentence can be asserted in one sense and denied in another. But the Jaina view of language seems to imply that we have only to be clearly aware of this fact about language. We have only to see how the same sentence is true (i.e. can be asserted) in one sense and false (i.e. can be denied) in another. Jaina theory of *syāt* (= may be, somehow, in a sense, in a context) points to the same attitude.

In fact the Jainas' doctrine of *syāt* and their doctrine of *nayābhāsa* are the two aspects of Jaina approach to language. The doctrine of *syāt* implies that the same descriptive sentence can be asserted in some sense (in some context, somehow) and denied in some other sense (in some other context, somehow). The doctrine of *nayābhāsa* implies that it is wrong to forget this contextual and ambiguous character of all ordinary language descriptions and confer either absolute truth or absolute falsehood upon them. Both these doctrines virtually deny the possibility that we can envisage a language devoid of all ambiguities and contextuatilities. Jainas in this sense are ordinary language philosophers.

It is therefore not surprising that the examples *nayābhāsa* given by Jainas are the various philosophical positions held by the philosophers of the various schools (except Jainism itself). This reminds us of Gilbert Ryle who suggested that the expressions in ordinary language generally mislead the philosophers, while common man satisfactorily works with the contextual meaning expressed and the pragmatic purpose served by them.[6] On this view the descriptive sentences in ordinary language express contextual truths. On the other hand philosophical statements are claimed to express context-free truths and in this sense, absolute truths by way of abstracting the contextual truths from their contexts and overgeneralising them. In this sense many 'philosophical truths' are arrived at by way of misunderstanding the functioning of ordinary language.

Jainas through their doctrines of *syāt* and *nayābhāsa*, thus create an image that they are defenders of ordinary language as the vehicle of philosophising. The use of the term *syāt* in their philosophical idiom does not transform ordinary language into an ideal one by way of removing its ambiguities and vaguesses but it functions only as a pointer at them. One can compare this image of Jainas with that of *Navya-Nyāya* logicians. *Navya-Nyāya* logicians seem to be always dissatisfied with ordinary language because of its ambiguities and vaguenesses. As a result they try to evolve an ideal language with the help of which it will be possible to describe and define things with utmost precision.

But even if we characterise Jaina philosophers as ordianry language philosophers, the limits of such a characterisation should not be overlooked.

One, the Jainas' satisfaction with the relative, contextual and ambiguous

character of ordinary language does not free them from dogmatic metaphysics. Consider for instance their claims that *Jīva* is of the same extension as body, that *Jīva* is never anninilated though it may undergo change. These and such claims of the Jainas are in fact absolutistic metaphysical claims, though sometimes Jainas clothe them in the language of *syāt*. Thus it may be claimed that Jainas themselves commit *nayābhāsas* when they make certain metaphysical claims with fixed meaning and in absolute terms. The result is that Jainas' denial of metaphysical claims of other systems on the basis of the Jainas' view of language and the metaphysical claims of Jainas themselves do not go hand in hand.

Second, given that the opponents' metaphysical claims can be accepted in one sense and denied in another, and hence to assert them in absolute terms is to commit *nayābhāsa*; in which senses are these claims to be accepted and in which to be denied? Diplomatically enough, Jainas, while talking of acceptability or therwise of the other systems, attach those senses to the opponents' claims which are favourable to Jainas. As a result, Jainas while charging opponents of committing *nayābhāsa*, do not seriously try to remove the ambiguities in consultation with the opponent and then come to tackle the opponent's position substantively. On the contrary they seem to try to frustrate any efforts towards precision, by pointing out or if it is not possible, by imposing the ambiguity in the assertions of other systems. Supposing that Cārvāka argues that human self is mortal, an orthodox Jaina would say, for instance, that in a certain sense (the sense according to which self is identified with body; let us call this S_1) the human self is mortal, while in some other sense (the sense according to which self is separable from body; let us call this S_2) the human self is immortal. He will thus pretend to dissolve the problem by pointing out that Cārvāka's statement is true in some way but false in another; and hence Cārvāka would be committing *nayābhāsa* because for him it expresses an absolute truth. But has the orthodox Jaina really tackled the Cārvāka's position substantively? No. Because Cārvāka in fact holds that the human self does not exist in the sense S_2. The Jaina philosopher here has to show, if he can, that human self does exist in the sense S_2. But in that case, since the apparent ambiguity of Cārvāka position stands removed, the Jaina philosopher cannot continue with his charge of *nayābhāsa* against the Cārvāka, but he has rather to provide concrete arguments for proving his own position.

Although there are such limitations to Jainism as ordinary language philosophy, they are more relevant to the application of the doctrines of *syāt* and *nayābhāsa* made in Jainism rather than to the basic idea manifested in them. We may be in a position to appreciate the essence of the doctrines of *syāt* and *nayābhāsa* as inherent in Jainism, but may not approve of all the exemplifications and applications of the doctrines made in it. In the next part

of the paper we will survey the classification and exemplification of *naya* and *nayābhāsa* made by Jaina philosophers, which I hope, will reflect both the strength and limits of the Jaina doctrine of *nayābhāsa*.

In the west, the defence of ordinary language as the vehicle of philosophysing has been associated with the defence of common sense view of the world. Jainas in the context of Indian Philosophy, apart from being ordinary language philosophers (though in a restricted sense) are seen defending many common sense beliefs through their classification and exemplification of *nayābhāsas*. We will have an occasion to discuss this point briefly at the end of the second part.

II. The classification of *naya* and *nayābhāsa*

In this second part I will discuss the types and examples of *nayābhāsas* that Jaina philosophers give. Hopefully our discussion will substantiate my major thesis that Jaina doctrine of *nayābhāsa* is concerned with misleading character of ordinary language expressions. It may also become clear in the course of discussion that sometimes we can appreciate the basic characteristic of a particular type of *nayābhāsa*, but we may not accept its examples given by Jainas.

Though the Jaina concept of *naya* is as old as the canonical literature of Jainas, the Jaina doctrine of *nayābhāsa* seems to have appeared later. Umāsvāti explains the term *durnaya* in his *Pancāśaka*.[7] Samantabhadra also is seen to distinguish between factual (*vastu*) *naya* and pseudo (*mithyā*) *naya*.[8] However, an attempt in the classification of *nayābhāsas* corresponding to the classification of *naya* seems to be first made by Akalaṅka in his *Laghīyastraya*.[9] Akalaṅka's attempt was the primary step where he could give the account of only the first three. The account of all the seven *nayābhāsas* is clearly found first in Vādideva's aphorismic treatise *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra*.[10] In what follows, we shall condider one by one the seven *nayābhāsa* and their examples. Since each type of *nayābhāsa* results from over-generalising or giving absolute significance to the corresponding type of *naya*, while discussing each type of *nayābhāsa* we will also consider briefly the corresponding *naya*.

1. *Naigamābhāsa*

Sometimes we find that the two objects which are not separable from each other, though distinguishable, are explained by a philosopher in such a manner that they would appear as separate enities.[11] For instance thing and its qualities, thing and its movement are sometimes described as if they are separate ontological reals. But ontologically thing and its qualities cannot be separated from each other. The confusion occurs because in ordinary language

we have separate words for things and qualities. Thus the philosophers who are victims of the systematically misleading structure of our language may tend to think that the two distinguishabilities, namely the distinguishability (which is inbuilt in separability) between one thing and the other and the distinguishability between thing and its qualities, are on par. Jainas would say that if a thing and its qualities are regarded as entirely distinct by a philosopher, then the philosopher is committing *naigamābhāsa*, a variety of *nayābhāsa*. Jainas would say that though in a sense a thing is distinct from its qualities, in some other sense a thing and its qualities are one and the same thing.

Jaina logicians claim that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers commit this fallacy. Though there is some sense in Jainas' claim that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers commit *naigamābhāsa* because the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers regard substance and its qualities as entirely distinct reals, which can never be 'one and the same thing', still Jainas also neglect that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers also accept that substance and its qualities cannot be separated from each other.

'*Naigama*' is sometimes derived from *nigama* which means purpose or plan (*saṅkalpa*). Sometimes in our ordinary language the planned or proposed actions are described as if they are presently being done. This is a kind of temporal imposition. A person carrying fuel, water and rice, when asked 'what are you doing ?' says 'I am cooking' when cooking is his proposed action and not the present action. This is a case of *naigamanaya*. However, a thinker may be misled by such events and may conclude that the future action is implicitly there when it is proposed. Such a theory would be then a case of *nayābhāsa*. Accordingly the doctrine of *satkārya* (according to which the effect is implicitly present in the cause) is blamed by Jainas as a case of *naigamābhāsa*.

2. *Saṅgrahābhāsa*

Jaina logicians distinguish between *parasaṅgraha* and *aparasaṅgraha* as the two types of *saṅgraha*. By *parasaṅgraha* they mean the view by which all the things in the world are regarded as one. By *aparasaṅgraha* they mean the view by which some universal (but not 'the' universal) aspect of the things is emphasised and the peculiarities are neglected. In both the types of *saṅgraha* the peculiarities are neglected though not denied.

In our language we can describe all the things in the world as real. However, while describing the things in this manner we may not deny that the things, in spite of having the common feature called realness, are still distinguishable from one another. But a Vedāntin may get perturbed by such an obviously true description and start arguing that the common feature, namely realness of all the things, is the reality and everything else is just an

appearance. Thus the common-sense statement 'Everything in the world is real' is the expression of the *naya* called *parasaṅgraha*. But a philosopher's statement, 'Everything in the world is nothing but real, and it is this Real which is called Brahman' is an expression of *parasaṅgrahābhāsa*.[12]

Similarly we may occasionally make a statement such as 'What I need is some table. It does not matter if it is made of wood or iron or anything else'. In such a statement we emphasise the common property namely tableness, but we do not deny the peculiarities of each table, though we neglect them. But a platonist may be moved by such a common-sense statement and may be misled to think that tableness is real but the peculiarities of the tables are illusory. In that case the platonist is committing a *nayābhāsa* called *aparasaṅgrahābhāsa*.

3. *Vyavahārābhāsa*

When we do *saṅgrahanaya*, we conceive of the compilation (*saṅgraha*) of various objects to form one or more groups according to the common properties amongst the objects concerned, and treat the members of any group as non-distinct from each other. Though we may otherwise accept the peculiarities of the things, we neglect them while doing *saṅgrahanaya*. On the contrary, while doing *vyavahāranaya* we concentrate only upon the peculiarities of the objects and neglect the common properties amongst them. A philosopher who is moved by such statements which emphasise the peculiarities, may therefrom conclude that only peculiarities are real whereas the commonness is apparent and unreal. Shch a view would be called as *vyavahārābhāsa* by the Jaina logicians. Thus the view that only *sāmānyas* are real and *viśeṣas* are unreal would be a fallacious view due to *saṅgrahābhāsa*, and the view that only *viśeṣas* are real and *sāmānyas* are unreal would be fallacious due to *vyavahārābhāsa* according to Jainas.

It may be seen that some Buddhist philosophers believed that there are bare particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), there is nothing common between any two particulars and the similarity amongst them is imposed by mind. This view is similar to the 'fallacious view' termed as *vyavagārābhāsa*. However, this Buddhist view does not seem to be the result of the misleading nature of language; though Jainas seem to claim so.

Akalaṅka understands by *vyavahāranaya*, the commonsense view in which the existence of the external objects is accepted. According to him, the philosophers like Śūnyavādin and Vijñānavādin Buddhists who deny the existence of all objects or external objects commit *vyavahārābhāsa*.[13] It should be noted here again that this type of *vyavahārābhāsa* does not seem to be caused by the misleading nature of our day-to-day language. It is possible, however that a philosopher may be misled by the ordinary language expressions like 'When I was talking of the lecturer in philosophy, I had you in my

mind'. Such sentences may mislead a thinker to think that if anything can be there in one's mind, why not all the possible things? But generally such a thesis of the denial of external world arises from (a correct or incorrect) analysis of human knowledge, and not from a correct or incorrect analysis of human language.

Sometimes *vyavahāranaya* is regarded as the view by which the figurative use of language is taken to be derivatively meaningful.[14] Thus to regard such expressions literally meaningful would amount to committing *vyavahārābhāsa*. Therefore any serious attitude to hypostatise the concepts, personify the unconscious objects and so on, will be called as committing *vyavahārābhāsa*.

Curiously enough Vādideva suggests that the view of Cārvāka is fallacious due to *vyavahārābhāsa*.[15] While explaining *vyavahārābhāsa* he suggests that holding the separability between soul (*jīva*) and body, distinguishing between different grades of sould etc. is the task which is involved in doing *vyavahārābhāsa*. Cārvāka distinguishes between different elements of matter (namely the four gross elements) and also holds that they are separable from each other. But he does not accept the separability between soul and body; he does not approve of different grades of souls. Thus, according to Vādideva, Cārvāka commits the fallacy of *Vyavahārābhāsa*. It is not clear how Cārvāka position is a case of *nayābhāsa*. Cārvākas can reply with equal strength that Jaina position is a case of *naigamābhāsa* because Jainas hold that body and mind (self) are separable because we know from ordinary usage of the terms that they are distinguishable.

4. *Rjusūtrābhāsa*

When we do *rjusūtranaya*, we are concerned only with the object which is given to us in immediate present and we neglect the past and the future objects and even the present ones of which we are not directly aware. We do not consider, though we do not deny that the same object had some modes in the past and would have some modes in future. We may describe such an object by using the expressions as 'this red' or 'here now yellow' or 'here is now the feeling of pleasure'.[16] A philosopher may get inspired by such an attitude and comment that the descriptions like 'this red', 'here now yellow', etc. are the only genuine descriptions of reality. Only the present momentary object of one's knowledge is real and anything else is merely a mental construct. Jaina logicians regard such a view as fallacious due to *rjusūtrābhāsa*. Jainas also claim that Buddhists commit this fallacy when they hold that all the objects are the momentary sense-data and continuity of the so-called substance is illusory.

5. *Śabdanayābhāsa*

Tense of the esntence, the case-endings of the words, the genders of the nouns, singularity or plurality and suffixes of the word-forms are the factors which are responsible for the difference in meaning of a sentence. One who is doing *śabdanaya* emphasises these factors. However, a thinker may over-emphasise these factors to be responsible for the changes in the word-meanings. Take for instance the following cases.

(i) Take the two statements,

  1. There was a mountain called Meru.

  2. There is a mountain called Meru.

The statements certainly differ in meaning. But a thinker may further argue that because the meaning of the statement changes, accordingly the meaning of the word Meru also should change. This fallacy would be called *Śabdanayābhāsa.*

(ii) Consider the two statements.

  1. The teacher taught the subject.

  2. The subject was taught by the teacher.

In these sentences the positions of 'teacher' and 'subject' are changed. But the meanings are not changed. However, to argue that the meanings have also changed because the positions have changed would be to commit *Śabdanayābhāsa.*

(iii) In Sanskrit the change in gender does not necessarily mean the change in meaning. The words *taṭa* (masculine), *taṭī* (faminine), and *taṭa* (neutral) mean the same thing namely bank (of a river, pool, etc.). Similarly the words *dāra* (masculine plural), *kalatra* (neutral) and *patnī* (feminine) are synonymous and mean 'wife'. But a thinder may speculate that because the genders are different, the meanings must be different. Such a speculation would be fallacious due to *śabdanayābhāsa.*

(iv) In Sanskrit the word (j*ana* (=people) is used either in singular form or in plural form. But the meaning of the word does not differ due to singularity or plurality. But a thinker who argues that the meaning must differ because the number differs, is committing *śabdanayābhāsa.*

(v) The Sanskrit verbs change their meanings according to the prefixes attached to them. (*'Upasargeṇa dhātvartho balādanyatra nīyate*). Though this is generally true, sometimes the prefixes remain neutral and do not change the meaning of the verb. For instance we find that the terms *jñāna, vijñāna, prajñāna* are used in Upaniṣads synonymously. However, one who argues that the meaning must change according to the prefix, is committing *śabdanayābhāsa.*

In all the above cases the person who commits *śabdanayābhāsa* makes over-generalisations of the rules of language. Though the game of language needs rules, the rules of language need not be hard and fast, and there can always be some exceptions to most of the rules. The philosopher who commits

śabdanayābhāsa denies this possibility. He conceives of language as a perfect mechanical system.

Sometimes *śabdanaya* is taken to mean the view by which the role of words in making the things known is emphasised. Accordingly *śabdanayābhāsa* is supposed to mean over-emphasis on the role of words. Thus one who claims that knowledge without the mediation of words is impossible, commits *śabdanayābhāsa*. Thus the philosophers of Vyākaraṇa-school who hold this view are supposed to commit this fallacy.[17]

6. *Samabhirūḍhābhāsa*

The person who is doing *samabhirūḍhanaya* emphasises that the meaning or shade of the meaning of a word differs according to the etymology of the word. It is true that in our language we may use a particular word avoiding the other purposely, to express the shade of meaning that is expressed by its etymology. But this cannot always be the case. The two words which differ from each other etymologically may be used as the exact synonyms of each other. For instance, the three Sanskrit synonyms *Indra*, *Śakra* and *Purandara* are supposed to denote the same object namely the King of Gods. But the etymological meaning differs. For instance 'Indra' is derived from the root $\sqrt{ind}$ (= to be prosperous) and therefore etymologically means 'prosperous'. 'Śakra' is derived from the root $\sqrt{śak}$ (= to be powerful) and therefore etymologically means 'powerful'. And '*Purandara*' is derived from '*pur*' (= city) and $\sqrt{dṛ}$ (= destroy) and therefore etymologically means one who destroys the cities. Thus the different synonyms have different connotations. But a thinker may wrongly argue that because the etymologies are different, denotations also must be different. Such a view is an example of *samabhirūḍhābhāsa*. (The synonymous terms 'morning-star' and 'evening-star' also can be treated in the similar manner.) This *nayābhāsa* means the over-emphasis on etymological meaning (and the connotation suggested by it) and the confusion between connotation and denotation.

7. *Evambhūtābhāsa*

We name the things and create conventions. While giving a particular name to a thing we may take into consideration the function served by the thing. But after the thing is so named, the name becomes a conventinues symbol to connote that thing, wherher or not the thing continues to serve the particular if he delivers lectures. But we call that person a lecturer even when, fot instance, he is asleep. We may say, 'The lecturer is sleeping'.

But a philosopher may think that the 'functional' name should be used only when the named object serves the function. Aperson should be called as lecturer only when he is lecturing and not otherwise. The fallacy in this view according to Jainas is *evambhūtābhāsa*.

This fallacy can be treated as a species of *sambhirūḍhābhāsa*. Because the thinker who expects that a person should be called a lecturer only when he is lecturing, confuses between the etymological meaning of 'lecturer' (which is the connotation) and the conventional reference of 'lecturer' (which is the denotation). But the difference between the two is that, (1) in *evambhūtābhāsa* the function of the denoted object is considered, and the structure of it is neglected, while in *samabhirūḍhābhāsa*, both structure and function are considered; and (2) in *evambhūtābhāsa* time-element (that is, time of serving the function and the time of calling the thing by the name concerned should be one) is important, while in *samabhirūḍhābhāsa* it is not so.

Though the above classification of *naya* and *nayābhāsa* does not appear to be precise and exhaustive, it can still help us in understanding different forms of misleading expressions. As we have noted earlier, Jainas here are also defending the common-sense view of the world against the so-called philosophical views presented by various philosophers (of the schools other than Jainism). We may make here a list of some such common-sense views, as follows:

1. Thing and its qualities cannot be separated.
2. Time is not one. Past, present and future are distinct.
3. There are particulars and the plurality of things is true.
4. There are universals (common preperties, classes).
5. External objects exist.
6. There are substances which continue to exist in the passage of time.
7. The language is not a mechanical system.
8. The meanings of the words are not fixed merely by etymology; the convention plays a very significant role in deciding the meanings of words.

Out of these *naigamābhāsa* is against (1), (2). *Saṅgrahābhāsa* is against (3). *Vyavahārābhāsa* is against (4), (5). *Rjusūtrābhāsa* is against (6). *Śabdanayābhāsa* is against (7). *Samabhirūḍhābhāsa* and *evambhūtābhāsa* are against (8).

Here it would be interesting to juxtapose Jaina tendency to defend common sense with G.E. Moore's position manifest in his 'A defence of common sense'.[18] Moore, with all his efforts would justify the common-sense beliefs and try to analyse them in the way they could be clearly understood. But Jainas would not always justify the common sense beliefs. They would suggest that though in a sense (or in a way, from a certain point of view) these beliefs are true, in some other sense they are false. These beliefs are partial (inexhaustive) views of the things and in this sense defective visions of reality. To claim that they are utterly false is to commit nayābhāsa. But to claim that they are not at all false is also to commit *nayābhāsa*. Thus although

Jainas defend many common sense beliefs, they cannot be called common sense philosophers in the sense in which G.E. Moore is one.

NOTES

1) '*Nirapeksā nayā mithyā sāpekṣā vastu te'rthakṛt*' *Āptamīmāṁsa* (Bhāratīya Jaina Siddhānta Prakāśinī Saṁsthā,Benares (1914), verse 108. Here *mithyā naya* is said to be an absolutistic (*nirapeksa)* and therefore fallacious view.

2) '*Cedekāṁśakalaṅkapaṅkakaluṣāste syustadā durnayāḥ*' *Pancāśaka* by Umāsvāti (Referred to by Devendramuni Shastri, in *Jainadarsana Svarūpa Aura Viśleṣaṇa*, Shri Tarka Guru Jaina Granthalaya, Udaypur (1975), p. 320. fn. 2 (kha). Here *durnaya* is said to be fallacious because it is partial.

3) Yaśovijaya uses the word *nayavākya* (see *Jaina tarka bhāṣā*, translated with notes by Dayanad Bhargava, Motilal Banarsedas, Delhi (1973), Nayapariccheda, para 10). Sometimes the word *nayavāda* (Prakrit, *nayavāya*) is also used in this sense. For instance, '*Jāvaiyā vayaṇavahā tāvaiyā ceva honti nayavāyā*', *Sammatitattvasopānam* by Siddhasena Divākara, Shri Labdhisūrīśvara Jaina Granthamālā, Chhani, Baroda (1946), p. 284. (Meaning: There are as many *nayavādas* as there are ways of speaking).

4) For instance, '*pramāṇapratipannānantadharmātmakavastunaḥ*.' *Jainatarkabhāṣā*, *op. cit.*, Pramaṇapariccheda, para 64.

5) Yaśovijaya argues: 'If the name of the pitcher were not the characteristic of the pitcher, then it would not be an indicator of it.' *Jainatarkabhāṣa, op. cit.*, p. 80.

6) 'Systematically Misleading Expressions' by Gilbert Ryle, published in Proceedings of Aristotalian Society, Vol. XXXII (1931-32), pp. 139-70.

7) See note 2 above.

8) See note 1 above.

9) See *Laghīyastrayādisaṅgraha*, Manikchand Digambar Jain Granthamala Samiti, Bombay (1916), pp. 57-61.

10) See *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra* by Vādidevasūri, Rendered into English with a comm. by Dr. Bhattacharya Hari Satya; Jaina Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay (1967), Chapter VII.

11) The distinction between distinguishability and separability is made here following 'Distinguishables and Separables' by S.S.Barlingay, published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 2, Jan. 1975.

12) Akalaṅka states this when he says '*brahmavādaḥ tadābhāsaḥ*' *Laghīyastrayādisaṅgraha*, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

13) *Laghīyastrayādisaṅgraha, op. cit.*, p. 61.

14) *Jaina Darśana Manana aura Mīmāṁsā*, by Nathmal Muni, Adarsha Sahitya Sangha, Churu (1973), p. 359. But Sukhalalji Sanghavi brings this type under *Naigama*. See *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāmi, Commented by Sanghavi, Sukhalalji, Jain Sanskriti Samshodhana Mandal, Benares, Second Ed. (1952), p. 58.

15) See *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra, op. cit.*, pp. 524-525.

16) *Sukhavivartaḥ sampratyasti, Ibid*, 7.29.

17) *Jaina Darśana Manana Aura Mīmāṁsā, op. cit.*, pp. 371-72.

18) See Moore's article entitled 'A defence of common sense' published in *Philosophical Papers* by G.E. Moore; George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London (1959).

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