

主論文の要約

(Abstract of Dissertation)

論文題目 : The Determinants of CS Councilors' Accountability in the Context of Decentralization Reforms in Cambodia
(カンボジアの地方分権改革の文脈における地方議員のアカウンタビリティの決定要因)

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論文内容の要約 :

The Doctoral thesis is structured into eight chapters, and is summarized as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter focuses on the problem statement regarding the accountability of elected CS councilors in Cambodia and presents the research question “what are the factors affecting the accountability of the elected CS councilors in Cambodia? And how those factors are interrelated in influencing the CS councilors' accountability?” This research applies both case studies in Toul Sangker sangkat and Reab commune, and the governance survey 2016 to address this research question.

Chapter 2: Background Information of Decentralization Reforms in Cambodia

This chapter examines mainly the background information of decentralization reforms in Cambodia. It was officially started in 2001 at CS level which is the lowest tier of sub-national governments, then has been extended to higher tiers i.e. District/Municipality/Khan (DMK) and Capital/Province (CP) administrations.

So far, CS council elections have been held four times, while the CP and DMK council elections have been held two times. The majority of councilor's seats at all sub-national levels have been controlled by the CPP (ruling party). Furthermore, the CS Fund known as inter-governmental transfer has been established since 2002. The CS Fund has increased gradually from year to year from 1.5% in 2002 to 2.8% in 2016 of national current revenue. Another fund known as DM Fund was also established in 2012 to further strengthen fiscal decentralization and autonomy at DM administrations.

On the other hand, the functions from central ministries have not been transferred much to sub-national government.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

This chapter mainly reviews the literature on the accountability issues of local elected representatives in the decentralization reforms under the question “What influences elected representatives' accountability to be accountable to their constituents?”

Devas and Grant (2003:10) gave an argument that three kinds of accountability need to be taken into consideration when implementing decentralization reforms which include downward,

upward and horizontal accountability. However, it is observed that the ultimate goal of each type of accountability is to ensure downward accountability; that is, to be accountable to citizens at the grassroots.

The literature accepted that the accountability of the local elected representatives has been influenced by many factors. Based on the literature review, this study found that accountability of the local elected representatives is affected by election, political party, civil society, media/information, citizen's participation, clientelism, elite capture and corruption.

Chapter 4: Analytical Framework: Accountability and Its Determinants in the Context of Decentralization Reforms in Cambodia.

In the context of Cambodia, the accountability of elected CS councilors is the responsibility (reward/sanction) of elected CS councilors to be responsive to their electorates' needs in performing their roles in delivery public services, and they can be rewarded and sanctioned based on their working performance.

This research basically hypothesizes that elected CS councilors' accountability is influenced by elections, political parties, civil society, information-sharing, citizens' participation, clientelism, and corruption, but not by local elite capture. It is expected that those influencing factors above can be interrelated in ensuring accountability of elected CS councilors. To this end, the hypotheses of the research are elaborated as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Through the electoral system, political party increases the elected CS councilors' upward accountability in Cambodia both during and between elections. During election, political party can increase the upward accountability of elected CS councilors by imposing reward or sanction through candidate endorsement for the CS election. Between elections, the political party still has power to influence CS councilors' upward accountability by imposing sanction to the elected CS councilors when they underperform. However, the political party may improve downward accountability as well if the political party at national level mobilizes resources to promote the responsiveness of the elected CS councilors in responding to the citizens' needs.

Hypothesis 2: Political party can affect the downward accountability of elected CS councilors in the election, because, through having closed list proportional representation as election system, the political party does not allow citizens to impose reward/sanction on individual elected CS councilor. Moreover, the political party may affect the downward accountability (responsibilities) of elected CS councilors' negatively by its reputation; citizens will reward/sanction through election based on citizens' perception of political party performance at national level.

Hypothesis 3: Civil society can improve downward accountability of elected CS councilors by supporting the responsiveness of the elected CS councilors to citizens' needs and providing capacity with information on elected CS councilors' performance to citizens, when the civil society has project developments in the jurisdiction where the CS councilors hold office.

Hypothesis 4: Since there is election for CS councilors, clientelism can decrease the downward accountability of elected CS councilors against the responsiveness, because clientelism make the elected CS councilors use public budget or provide public services to be responsive only to their supporting group, despite they are supposed to be responsive to the whole constituents. Furthermore, the clientelism practice can work against downward accountability through the responsibilities of the elected CS councilors, because citizens do not reward/sanction elected CS

councilors based on their performance, but on how much favor the CS councilors give to their supporters.

Hypothesis 5: Village chiefs are supposed to congregate the demands of citizens by serving them as hubs of information flows, but this improves downward accountability (responsiveness) only when the village chiefs forward the demands to CS councilors and behave impartially.

Chapter 5. Case Studies on Accountability of Elected Representatives in Toul Sangker Sangkat and Reab Commune.

This chapter mainly focuses on the fieldwork in Toul Sangker sangkat and Reab commune to check the factors influencing accountability of elected CS councilors discussed in Chapter 4. The information was collected through in-depth interview with the relevant stakeholders.

The field interview shows that the shortage of CS Fund and budget availability of upper government, preference/performance of party at national level, religious beliefs and cultural norms, party working group, and capacity limitation are the determinants of accountability of those CS councilors.

Chapter 6: Factors Influencing on Accountability of Councilors in Cambodia through Governance Survey in 2016.

This chapter further tests the determinants of accountability on the local elected councilors at CS level in Cambodia discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter provides additional empirical findings to confirm the findings in the case studies in Chapter 5 by analyzing governance survey 2016 data quantitatively. The empirical analysis of data has provided some interesting findings, and it also confirms that most of the determinants on the elected CS councilors in Cambodia which are election, clientelism, corruption, political party, civil society, except information. The governance survey also reveals the significant roles of the village chief to be one of the main actors in promoting downward accountability of elected CS councilors.

Chapter 7: Discussion on Hypotheses of the Research

The Chapters 5 and 6 analyzed empirically the factors affecting the CS councilors' accountability. This chapter discusses whether the five hypotheses shall be confirmed or not by using the results from case studies and governance survey 2016 in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.

All the five hypotheses of the research are confirmed. Most of the factors found to be influencing on the elected CS councilors in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 influenced on downward accountability of elected CS councilors in interrelated ways.

Besides the hypotheses, the research further reflects the loophole of the current election system which needs to be addressed and PWG and political party performance at national level could affect downward accountability of elected CS councilors by make their accountability passive. On the other hand, the research also found that people perceived that the elected CS councilors in urban is more accountable (responsive) than those in the rural areas.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

It can be concluded that election, political party, civil society, informal citizen's participation, clientelism and corruption are the determinants of CS councilors' accountability in Cambodia.

Through the fieldwork in Toul Sangker sangkat and Reab commune and governance survey 2016, this study further found that village chief, CS Fund, Capacity of CS councilors and budget availability of DMK and religion belief, party performance at national level, Party Working Group

and limitation of CS' councilors capacity (both software and hardware) are also the factors affecting the CS councilors' accountability in the context of decentralization in Cambodia.

However, factors identified above cannot be effectively applied individually because they are interrelated to ensure accountability, mainly downward one of elected CS councilors. While the election is the main mechanism to reward or sanction candidates or incumbents for CS election, the political party and civil society (NGOs) are the complementary actors or mechanisms to the election to ensure the accountability of elected CS councilors. Furthermore, electoral system makes the political party become the main factor to increase upward accountability of elected CS councilors both during election and between elections, and political party can also affect downward accountability of elected CS councilors positively and negatively. In addition, clientelism practice is still the main challenge which undermines the downward accountability of the elected CS councilors. On the other hand, the village chief contributes to promote the downward accountability of elected CS councilors only if they perform impartially and without clientelism practice.

Last but not least, the current electoral system, closed-list proportional representation, has a loophole, especially for those incumbents who are accountable to their citizens, but they could not be rewarded to get reelected in the election. This will lead to discouragement of elected CS councilors in improving their accountability. Therefore, the electoral system of CS election could be altered to open-list proportional representation.