


Dr. Morinosuke Kajima and Pan-Asianism

Hitoshi Hirakawa



Morinosuke Kajima (June, 1924 at the Japanese Embassy in Germany)

Abstract

In today's Japan, the name of Dr. Morinosuke Kajima, a former president of a big construction company, Kajima Corporation, is famous as an example of a Japanese businessman in the Showa Period, as well as for being a politician and diplomat-scientist. However, very few people know that Dr. Kajima had been a proponent of Pan-Asianism from the pre-World War II era, particularly since the second half of the 1920's. Many people would be surprised to learn that in 1973 he erected a monument in the park in his parents' home, on which he inscribed his aspiration: "My biggest desire is to realize Pan Asia someday."

He was determined to create or help create Pan-Asia, an East Asian community.

His active social and intellectual activities such as the establishment of a publishing company and two institutes for diplomacy and peace studies, and creating the Kajima Peace Award were deeply related to his philosophy of Pan-Asianism.

What actually was his concept of Pan-Asianism? How did his philosophy survive through the trial of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of the World War II? These questions come to mind in our effort to understand Kajima's Pan-Asianism.

In this paper, the author considers Dr. Kajima's Pan-Asianism over three historic periods of Japan, i.e., pre-war period, war period, and post-war period), explains the fundamental structure of his idea, and tries to answer the above questions.

Quite recently, the people of East Asia have been actively discussing the concept of an East Asian community, and Dr. Kajima's Pan-Asianism contains some relevant suggestions.

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Preface—Morinosuke Kajima and Asia-ism

Morinosuke Kajima¹⁾ is known as the former president of Kajima Construction Company, who was an exemplar businessman of the Showa era. He was also a politician and scholar. His professional career was long and varied. He was a business executive and a member of Parliament for 18 years before and after World War II. For most of his adult life, in addition to his responsibilities as a businessman, he wrote profusely with intellectual depth on his ideas of Japanese foreign diplomacy and economic cooperation. As a publisher, he published his own writings as well as those of his contemporaries.²⁾ His interest extended to establishing institutions for broadening Japanese understanding and knowledge of diplomacy and peaceful relations. As such, he played an important role in establishing the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) which has become the public institute on Japanese diplomacy. He also set up by himself the Kajima Institute of International Peace for research on international peace. With these efforts, he left his marks on Japanese diplomacy and researches for peace after World War II.

Few people know of Kajima's life-long and singular pursuit of the ideal of "Asian League" or "Asian Community" since the latter part of the 1920's.³⁾ Many people would be surprised to learn that in 1973 he erected a monument in the park in his parents'

1 Morinosuke Kajima was born on February 2, 1896 at Ibo-gun, Hyogo-Prefecture. as the fourth son of Tosio Nagatomi and Kwan Nagatomi. The Nagatomi Family has 600 years of history and was wealthy and actively involved in the cultural and economic well-being of the community where they reside. The historic house where the young Kajima was brought up was designated an important cultural asset by the prefecture in 1963 and by the country in 1997. In 1927, Kajima married Ume Kajima, the eldest daughter of Seiichi Kajima, the president of Kajima-Gumi. Subsequently, the son in law, changed his family name from Nagatomi to Kajima and assumed the presidency of the company. On December 3, 1975, he died from myocardium, a heart ailment.

2 These writings included his own works, viz: "History of Japanese Diplomacy" (38 volumes), "Selected Works in Theories of Diplomacy" (15 volumes); "The Complete Works of Coudenhove-Kalergy" (9 volumes); "Selected Works for the Development of Southeast Asia" (7 volumes); and "The Foreign Economical Cooperation System" (12 volumes).

3 Interestingly, Yoshimi Takeuchi, who explained the Asia-ism in Japan before World War II did not mention Pan-Asiaism by Morinosuke Kajima (Takeuchi 1963), nor did Kouji Okamoto (Okamoto 1998).

home, on which he inscribed his aspiration: “My biggest desire is to realize Pan Asia someday.”⁴⁾ However if we read his large volume of writings and his political activities relating to international politics and diplomacy, we realize his earnest desire for “Pan Asia.” His varied social and political activities after World War II attested to this.

Nowadays, in this 21st century, when many people have rapidly become interested in the concept of East Asia Community, I think we can find something relating to this concept by focusing on Kajima’s Pan-Asia theory. I would like to confirm the characteristics of his theory after seeing how it was born and how it evolved over time. I would like to try to answer some questions mentioned earlier.

He used the word “Sina” when referring to China in his writings during and after World War II, so I will also use the same word “Sina” in this paper.

I—An encounter with the Pan-Europe movement and Pan-Asiaism

An encounter with Coudenhove-Kalergy

Morinosuke Kajima (Nagatomi) was born in 1896 (Meiji 28) in Ibo County, Hyogo Prefecture, Japan. In the year previous to his birth, Japan became a world power following its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War. Kajima grew up at the time when Japan was preparing to invade the Chosun Peninsula and then the Chinese sub-continent. In 1920 (Taisho 9) he graduated from Tokyo University and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1922 he went to Berlin as a diplomat of the Japanese Embassy in Germany. At this time, he read the first editorial column about “Pan Europe” by Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergy, which appeared in the newspaper “Vossische Zeitung” of Berlin and “Neue Freie Presse” of Vienna. Following this first encounter with the thoughts of Coudenhove-Kalergy, he became an avid reader and a passionate sympathizer of the philosopher (Kajima Construction ed. 1978, page 369).

Kajima physically met with Coudenhove-Kalergy and his wife for the first time in Vienna through an introduction by Kumataro Honda, then the Japanese Ambassador to Germany and an acquaintance of Coudenhove-Kalergy. A few days after this first meeting Kajima was invited by Coudenhove-Kalergy to a lecture meeting on “Pan Europe.” This was the start of a life-time friendship, which flourished with time. Before long Coudenhove-Kalergy requested Kajima to translate to Japanese his main writing “Pan Europe” and advised Kajima “to organize ‘Pan Asia’ along the principles of his Pan Europe” (Kajima Construction ed. 1977, page 372-373). After Kajima left Berlin, he happened to meet Coudenhove Kalergy at Zel-Am-Zee in Austria, and they agreed in principle that Coudenhove-Kalergy would organize Pan Europe and Kajima would organize Pan Asia... Coudenhove-Kalergy told Kajima in jest “When you organize Pan Asia, I will present to you Holland-owned East India, which is not necessary to Pan Europe, as a token of our friendship” (Kajima Construction ed. 1977, page 373; Kajima

4 This expression is a paraphrase of Edouard Herriot, former Prime Minister of France, who addressed the Congress on January 25, 1925 in France that “My biggest desire is the materialization of the Europe Community.” (Nagatomi 1926, Page 3; Herriot 1962, Page 2).

translation ed. 1970, page 15). Seriously, this expression was dangerous considering the restrictions of the times, but Coudenhove-Kalergy expressed his trust in Kajima.

The main features of Coudenhove-Kalergy's "Pan Europe" by Coudenhove were as follows:

- (1) By the development of scientific technologies airplanes and poison gas were used in wars, and defeated as well as victorious nations suffer from the devastation as a result. However, despite the awareness of this fact, ideological and economic differences persisted in Europe and nations realize that wars are inevitable.
- (2) Many countries in Europe have to cope with the fear of Russia.
- (3) A divided Europe would be defeated by America in an economic war (Nagatomi 1926, page 74-75).

In 1927, Kajima published his Japanese translation of "Pan Europe" from the League of Nations Association of Japan. In August 1929, he attended the 10th General Meeting of the League of Nations, where he listened to an advocacy of Pan Europe by French Prime Minister Aristide Briand and an expression of assent to the Pan Europe movement by German Prime Minister Gustav Stresemann. From this experience, Kajima decided to resign from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to "be prepared for the Pan Asia Movement." In December 1929, he resigned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in February of the following year he stood, somewhat recklessly, as a candidate for the House of Commons in Hyogo where he was born (Kajima Construction 1977, page 389). As he confessed later, "I got the biggest political and ideological influence from Coudenhove-Kalergy. I cannot imagine my thinking and activity without his influence" ("International Review" No. 90, October 1972, page 6).⁵ The Coudenhove-Kalergy philosophy influenced his other activities as well in addition to his espousing of Pan Asia.

An advocate of Pan Asian Theory

Morinosuke Kajima published "Pan Asia Movement and Pan Europe Movement" in April 1926 (Taisho 15) and for the first time asked the public about their thoughts on Pan Asia. He explained the necessity of Pan Asia as follows:

"World War I and the subsequent Russian Revolution made a big change in international relations. A new political form based on the principle of alliance or Super-etat emerged. Under this principle an alliance of states founded on similar interests or common political, economic and cultural traditions and beliefs is preferable to an alliance and entente based on armaments. At present, I believe, we are at the starting point of such international development. "Pan America", the United Kingdom, and Russian "Soviet Union" are already sympathetic to this concept. European countries have exchanged ideas and opinions and have dis-

⁵ 'International Review' will be mentioned hereafter as just 'Int'l Review. 72.10.P.6'

cussed the future political structures. I do not think we, East Asian countries, can ignore such international developments in other parts of the world. The capitalistic exploitation policy towards East Asia by American, European and Russian policies through military invasion should arouse the “Asian common emotion.” Such a spiritual feeling in the light of their political and economical needs and interests should be the basis of the composition of Asian Unity” (Nagatomi 1926, page 2).

How, then, to realize Asian union or community? Kajima divided the “awakening movement” of East Asia into two phases. One is the movement of East Asia countries composed of Japan and China. The other phase is the Middle East or Near East covering India, Persia [Iran], Afghanistan, and Mesopotamia [Iraq]. He further explained:

“Through their own effort the people of the countries in the first phase “have already attained their independence and freedom.” In the other phase there is “the movement of the people who like to get their freedom” (Nagatomi 1926 page 4-5). Since Japan and China are already independent and free, our biggest problem is how to cope with America and England which have the power and Russia which would be recovering soon following the dislocations caused by their transition to democracy.

There are rights or titles in Sina (China), namely consular jurisdictions, autonomy of custom duties and a leased territory etc... But we can say that Japan and China can keep their independence only by cooperating with each other. The Pan-Asia movement by Japan and Sina (China) is the only protection against hostile intention of other independent and liberalized people, for example, the Pan-American and Pan Europe nations” (ditto, page 5).

Kajima also mentioned as follows:

“As there are ideological and cultural differences among Japan and India, Far East / Middle East and Near East, I oppose the idea that the destiny of the Far East is compatible with the destiny of the Near East and the Middle East. The Pan Asia Movement should be the united movement of countries already independent and free in much the sameway as the Pan American movement and the Pan Europe movement which are likely to arise. For example, the Pan Asia movement would not be tenable for India and the Islamic people: people in India are already free and independent as compared with the oppressed Islamic people⁶” (Nagatomi 1926, page 10-11).

Why did he separate the awakening movement into two phases?

He explained:

“A Pan Asia movement in Far East can be built within the limitation of the League of Nations. But a Pan Asia movement of Near East and Middle East is not compatible with the League of Nations” (Nagatomi 1926, page 11). If colo-

⁶ This quotation includes the later partly revised expression of Kajima, himself.

nies like India and, French- Indo-China, which are respectively owned by Holland and France are “included in the East Asia community and this community would be enlarged to Pan Asia or the allies of the colored people they have to make up their mind whether or not to fight with the allies of England, France and Holland. First of all, we have to avoid such wars which destroy the lives, economies and cultures and have to undertake actions which we can carry out quickly. We should be satisfied with a fulfilment of the imperfect rather than wish for the fulfilment of the perfect” (ditto, page 26-27). This is so because the “Pan Asia movement which assists the independence of India is too spiritual and too political” (ditto, page 12).

Then how to realize the Asian alliance between Japan and China? After the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan spread their influence and interests step by step over Chinese sub-continent. Kajima said “Japanese hegemony in Asia became only a past dream in the light of the expansion of the powers of America and England” (ditto, page 41). Japan’s alternative solutions to its excess population are: (1) immigration to North and South America or (2) occupation of the Chinese sub-continent. But, the first is not possible because of the shut-out policy of the North and South American countries and the second was dangerous and fatal. If China, supported by America and England, counterattacks against Japan, China as well as Japan shall be divided and controlled. So, Kajima insisted “Japan has no choice but to desist from invasion and adopt a peace and friendly policy” (ditto, page 52). The following is a paraphrase from Kajima’s book:

“Japanese policies in the past were to annex Chosun and operate Manchuria and Mongolia using the Manchuria railway, and to expel Germany from Shandong using the Shandong Railway for the purpose as well as to make inroads upon the Chinese sub-continent. Should these policies succeed Japan would try to get such rights and interests legally under the so-called Twenty-One Demands. Japan would also try to conquer Siberia and North-Sakhalin by sending troops there. When Sina (China) learned of the Japanese intention to invade, it tried to solicit aid and protection from any country willing and able to help China unconditionally. When hostilities broke out, Japan was fighting not only the Chinese who were largely unarmed, but it also had to fight America and England which were then the strongest powers in the world.../

The main purposes of the policy of Amity and Friendship were the institution of political, economical and cultural cooperation between two countries founded on peaceful ground, and the transfer of Japanese technology and capital on the part of Japan; and commitment of availability of Chinese natural resources. The friendship agreement also provided a mutual joint defence against other foreign countries thereby promoting further East Asia alliance... .

It maybe that England, America and Russia would profit from the collapse of Japanese-controlled China due either to Japanese military invasion or the vengeful war by China against Japan. The conflict would tend to divide East Asia as similar conflicts divided Africa, and would also make impossible the attainment of independence by Mongolia. thereby endangering the existence of their unique

culture. Since the policy of invasion and revenge was mutually disadvantageous, the alternative should be a policy of peace and friendship. Japan should desist from its policy of invasion and remove suspicion by other people that Japan may invade again (Nagatomi 1926, Page 50,51-56).

Two years before the publication of this book, Sun Yat-sen, in Kobe, criticized Japan for wanting hegemony over the Chinese sub-continent saying “whether Japan will be the watchdog of the hegemony of western countries, or the honorable tower of strength of the orient” while at the same time appealing for solidarity (Sun Yat-sen 1967, page 45). Japan was being asked for clarification of this contradictory positions. Kajima raised the alarm of the consequences of Japanese invasion and the possibility of dividing China under the control of Europe and America. This first book of Kajima is based on his experience in diplomacy as a staff at Japanese Embassy in Germany. We can say that his theory on Pan-Asia, influenced by Coudenhove-Kalergy, was based on his practical experience and knowledge of the practice of diplomacy by European and American powers which propagated imperialism for a quarter century since the latter part of 19th to the beginning of 20th century.

When this book was published, Fascism was acquiring power in Italy and Nazism was preparing for a power grab in Germany. In Japan, too, when the so-called Taisho democracy, also known as the people’s democracy came into power, the sense of being a big power spread among the Japanese people. Regarding the policy on China, Kijyuro Shidehara, as the foreign minister of Takaaki Kato’s cabinet and Reijiro Sidehara were promoting a nonintervention policy (June 1924 ~April 1927), despite of the hard line by the military against China. People asked that the writings by Kajima be publicized. Notwithstanding the public sentiment, the cabinet of Giichi Tanaka which succeeded of the Wakatuki cabinet in April 1927, decided to send military troops to Shandong first in May to protect “Japanese residents” when “the Chinese Peoples Revolutionary army occupied North China and Xuzhou” (Narita 2007, page 213). It might be lucky for Kajima that this period was just a ravine of China’s the foreign policy.

How, then, to formulate a relationship between the League of Nations (which was already established in 1920) and the other nations of the area? Kajima said “the League of Nations consists of Pan-America, Pan-Europe, Great Britain, Russia and the community of East Asia. At the same time it was the highest court of the world. Those five Allies, under the Leagu of Nations,” have to keep the peace of the world on a long term basis by the policy of balance of power” (Nagatomi 1926, page 18-19). However, he said, “the peace under the League of Nations was the same as the Holy Alliance of the 19th century and continued to oppress under the good name of peace. The League of Nations means freedom in Europe and the Far East and oppression in the Near East and Middle East.” Moreover, America and the Soviet Union did not participate in the League of Nations. However, the League of Nations “is said to have avoided the hasty outbreak of wars.” Because of this merit, the Asian people of the Near East and Middle East became enthusiastic pacifists and believers in the League of Nations, but on the condition that they first get their own freedom and peace” (ditto,page 7-8).

On China, the alliance between Japan and China was selected as the present realistic policy. In this period, for example, Shumei Okawa, who supported the indepen-

dence of India, said in “Many Problems in the Reconstructed Asia” (published in 1922) “Asian people have to get freedom first. . .The present Asia is subordinate to Europe.” But “destroying the spirit of the League of Nations which is based on “maintenance of status quo”, caused the rise and spread among all colored people of a challenging spirit against world hegemony by Europe. In many territories or lands where the League of Nation tried to establish itself, resistance by the natives against the hegemony of the white was evident (Okawa 1963, page 251). Okawa insisted the reconstruction of Asia against the control of the powers of Europe. Kajima did not admit, in principle, the control of colonies. But as a specialist of diplomacy, he seemed inclined to the opinion of Asian-ists, who were in the main current of thought at that time in Japan. This opinion was considered dangerous because it did not distinguish between ideal and reality. Asian-ists have been insisting that Japan, as a leader in Asia, should oppose the powers of imperialism.

The practical philosophy of Morinosuke Kajima

Although Kajima was deeply influenced by the Pan Europe movement and thinking of Coudenhove-Kalergy, it was his own search for an answer that shaped his own philosophy. He said in the preface of his translation of “The Practical Idealism” by Coudenhove-Kalergy as follows:

“When I was 19 years old, I contributed an article “The Sorrows of Self-breakup” to the magazine Gakusuikai which was the school paper of Kyoto No.3 High School. While writing this article I discovered the anarchy of my ideology. This lack of order in my thinking continued until I met Coudenhove-Kalergy whose thoughts and voluminous writings put order into my own thinking. Another paper “The Life of Self-criticism” which I also contributed to Gakusuikai I chose the subject self-criticism which accepted neither communism nor democracy.”

The following excerpt is suggestive for a discernment of his fundamental philosophy.

“Japan adopted the Western culture since the first year of the Meiji era., and unconditionally imitated and absorbed it , into our politics, law, philosophy and art. This development with our traditional culture in which case we had to make a painful transition because the imported culture did not match the Japanese national character” (Nagatomi 1915, page 24).

“When we examine the present Japanese society, I cannot be optimistic. I feel deeply the necessity for a life of self-criticism. In general, the most dominant principles at present are materialism and democracy. Because these two principles mean “common” it is philistine and it contains almost all of mankind. The past brilliant Japanese culture was destroyed and abolished by “the civilized philistines “which derived from the union of those two principles. The world gradually became indiscriminate and non-characteristic. The present Japan is in disarray pretending to have freedom and democracy under the name of equality” (Nagatomi 1915, page 27).

What did Kajima learn from Coudenhove-Kalergy?

“The Practical Idealism” with subtitle “The Noble-Technology-Pacifism” by Coudenhove-Kalergy and translated by Kajima, consisted of three essays on each of the subtitles which were published in 1920, 1922 and 1924... On the the essay on the Noble, Coudenhove-Kalergy said it is necessary to have cells of leaders and pioneers in order to raise the future of mankind. The nucleus of the cell is the “noble.” “The basic attribute of the noble is beauty in the physical, spirit and intellect. Beauty with complete harmony of these three aspects elevates the life force. In this point, the nobles are superior to other people of the time” (Coudenhove Kalergy 1963, page 60). Traditional nobles are not the noble in this essay. . The “noble” aims at a noble minded goal which rise above the time and lead to the goal.

Kajima explained that at a talk about the philosophy of the noble Coudenhove-Kalergy described three types of nobles in Europe, namely: (1) the English gentleman with virtues of fairplay inherited from the knights of the Middle Age; (2) the Bohemian type with the artistic nature of France; and (3) the German-Siegfried type with characteristics of the chivalry of politicians,, bureaucrats, commissioned officers, and landlords. Among those three types, the English gentleman is superior to the rest.

Moreover, since his mother was a Japanese, Coudenhove-Kalergy was interested in oriental Confusionism and highly admired the “virtue” of Confucius. Kajima, himself, also) translated “Ko-Koumei of Sina (China) as a man of virtue and a gentleman” (Kajima 1975, page 54-55). A gentleman in Asia is a man of virtue.

Coudenhove-Kalergy said:

“Today’s mankind anticipate the appearance of the golden age by reason of the advent of socialism. The golden age would surely come. However, this change would come about not by politics but by Technology. It would not be by revolutionary upheaval but by an inventor;, it would not be by Lenin but by an ordinary man who discovers the unexplored source of energy, which would succeed in saving mankind from hunger and from freezing to death, and forced labour” (Coudenhove-Kalergy 1963, pages 139).

The development of Technology surely enriches mankind. But, on the other hand, it also causes miserable wars. Because of this, “only pacifism is a realistic policy in the present Europe” (ditto. Page 204). The Pan-Europe movement is required, and only “the noble”, as a pacifist, can carry out this mission. New era, however, needs a new type of pacifism. Religious pacifism eventually evolves into idealism and is non-political and impractical. What we need is practical pacifism, political pacifism and practical idealism (Coudenhove 1963, page 203-217).

While in Germany, Kajima contributed an article, “New Theory of the Noble” to The Tokyo Nichi Nichi newspaper in January 1925. He developed his advocacy as follows:

“Democracy is politics controlled by the people while, aristocracy is politics controlled by the nobles. The premises of democracy mean that people are equal and almost all are honest and fairly intelligent. Aristocracy, on the contrary, means that people are different in desire, talent and ability and almost all are dishonest

and ignorant. Only a few people are honest and clever. Actual politics traverses between the two extremes of democracy and aristocracy. The best politics is a combination of the best democracy and aristocracy, the worst politics is a combination of the worst democracy and aristocracy“ (Nagatomi 1926, page 337-338).

“Domestic politics in the Meiji/Taisho era was a conflict between the traditional Japanese spirit and foreign ideology - the spirit of samurai (warriors) and townspeople, bureaucrats and members of Parliament, and aristocracy and democracy. But the leaders of such conflict were not the samurai, nor farmers, nor artisans, nor tradesmen but only a few talented nobles” (ditto, Page 340).

“These nobles were generally superior to ordinary people in physique, knowledge, personality, character and ability. The present time lacks such nobles, heroes, great men, saints, clever and virtuous men... The time needs nobles. If the world is to develop, it needs conductors, teachers and pioneers. Without the noble, no development will be possible. Democracy is politics of the common while developing politically must be is the domain of aristocracy” (Nagatomi 1926, page 351).

“Nowadays when men of noble birth are scarce a new type of nobles might arise from among the past ruling classes, such as warriors or local landed gentry“ (Nagatomi, 1926, page 353).

It is clear that Kajima’s new theory of the noble came from the advocacy of Coudenhove-Kalergy. This article ended referring to an appropriate type of politics.

Kajima’s article continues:

“The election of members of House of Commons should be by universal suffrage, including woman suffrage. The House of Peers, though not elected by universal suffrage, can serve as a foil with quality and therefore more valuable opinion against the less valuable opinion of the majority House of Commons. By such ploy the House of Commons and the House of Peers can lead the country to progress and improvement. Thus, the present combination of the worst democracy and aristocracy can be transformed into a combination of the best democracy and aristocracy” (ditto, page 357).

The practical and self-confident philosophy of Coudenhove-Kalergy who was an Austrian nobleman whose ancestry goes back to the creation of European history, greatly inspired the talented Morinosuke Kajima, who came from a distinguished landholding family of the Japan and was anguished in his search for the meaning of self existence. From his exposure to Coudenhove-Kalergy’s philosophy he made up his mind to plunge into the political movement of Pan-Asia.

II—Pan Asia-ism and the Theory of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere

Japanese diplomacy and the policy toward China

In 1931 (Showa 6), the Manchurian Incident took place through a plot by the Kwantung Army. This incident strained the relation between Japan and China. During the period 1930 to the first part of 1940's the relation between the two countries continued to deteriorate leading to the breakout of the Sino-Japan War and the Greater East Asia War (Asia Pacific War of World War II). At first, Morinosuke Kajima held an anti-war opinion, but later joined the pro-war advocates.

His anti-war position dated several years back before the war actually started. Earlier in 1934, he was granted a doctoral by the Tokyo Imperial University through his great literary work "A Study of the Causes of a World War" using World War I for his study. In April 1935, he appealed for the publication of his anti-war sentiment which he called "the new pacifism." He insisted that:

"Positive pacifism is the only practical policy at present in East Asia. The present war will not give any benefit but will destroy." "At present there are many dangerous countries in the world where contribution to peace is more dangerous than contribution to war, [in a sense a reflection of his own life and social position]. Apostles of peace show greater courage than apostles of war" (Kajima 1946, page 19/25).

Maybe he was referring to Japan as a dangerous country.

However, he reversed his anti-war stance in his works: "An Anti-comintern Pact and Nazi-Fascio Revolution" published in February 1938; "A Basic Policy of Diplomacy of the Empire" published in May 1938; and "The Diplomacy of the Empire and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" published in June, 1943. In "An Anti-comintern Pact and Nazi-Fascio Revolution", he commented on the effect of the Anti-comintern Pact between Japan/Germany in 1936 and among Japan/Germany/Italy in November 1937. He evaluated affirmatively Fascism in Germany and Italy. He wrote:

"The joining of Italy with the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany is a natural outcome from the point of view of Japan and Italy, as an axis between Berlin and Rome. Three nations, Japan, Germany and Italy are fighters on a common front against communism. These three nations are on a common ground on a quest for international justice vis-à-vis their perception of having been the victims of injustice from dominant world powers... When we examine the changes in the situation, of both Germany and Italy in Europe, through the League of Nations and through the Treaty of Versailles we can see the eventual hostile confrontation between Germany and Italy on one side and the rest of Europe on the other side. It is also noted that the Soviet Union, England and France are on divergent positions on Japan in the Far East in debates at the League of Nations and through the Treaty among Nine Countries. It is natu-

ral that the three nations would, thus, combine for mutual protection” (Kajima 1938a, page 13-14).

“The Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany and the Agreement between Japan and Italy resulted in the removal of the frontline between Japan and Manchuria (ditto, page 36). This Pact and Agreement were quite timely if properly implemented. I express my hearty approval to a new diplomatic position, of giving up isolationism after Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations” (ditto, page 39).

Kajima studied and affirmed, in the same writings, the process and significance of the acquisition of political power by the Fascist party led by Mussolini in Italy and by Hitler in Germany... But at the same time, he had doubts and anxiety in the politics of both countries where their democracies were smothered.

His thoughts on Italy under Mussolini are as follow:

“I was astonished at the fact that a few or more million people rely on only one person and expect everything from him. At the same time, I have to watch carefully with serious misgivings as to what would happen to the Fascist party or Italy itself if Mussolini retires or dies. However, without such trust by the Italian people Mussolini and the Fascist Party would lose their positions or could not get such positions. In Italy, from the period of Rome and the Renaissance to the present time Mussolini is the only individual who played a leading role” (Kajima 1938a, page 128-129).

“In foreign countries, some people criticize Fascism as ‘reactionary’ without studying the recent improvement of the standard of living of the Italians and the recent improvement of Italian society. In order to judge Fascism, it is important to see the overall total situation and not focus on isolated episodes” (ditto, page 131).

Kajima explained in detail how Hitler obtained full power in Germany after winning at the general election. After his victory, Hitler presented to Parliament the “Enabling Act of 1933” and got it approved. He was bewildered at the people’s positive evaluation of the “Enabling Act.” Regarding the arson case presented to the House of Parliament just before the general election, he referred to various news reports and did not deny the possibility of arson by the Nazis. Kajima wrote a critique on the rise to political power by the Nazis, excerpts of which are as follows.

“The policies of Hitler were not based on intellectual analysis but he utilized psychological persuasion bordering on hypnotism. The diplomatic policies of the Nazis were also based on the same strategy, for example the rearmament of Germany and the abrogation of the Locarno Treaties were successfully achieved with the use of violence. , On the other hand, the concerns of other European powers were always assuaged by soothing statements and proposals from Hitler and his cohorts, which curiously made these other powers feel at ease. How-

ever, in case of foreign diplomatic relations, as there is no power to compel other countries to trust Hitler success in getting his way was not as speedy and safe” (Kajima 1938a, page 222).

Regarding Germany’s Enabling Act of 1933, Kajima had these comments:

“I understand that the the passage of Germany’s Enabling Act on January 30, 1933 through the Parliament Empire Congress (1933) marked the end of the traditional legal period since Hitler came to the power. Since that time there was no longer any difference between the Nazi Party and the Government -,both took the reins of government. The Nazi Party was aware of their power and blatantly demolished the exisitng legal system. They gradually established a new national socialist mechanism” (Kajima 1938a, page 257).

Kajima liked Fascism but worried about total affirmation of Naziism, which was complicated and delicate. However, around 1940, the year preceding the outbreak of Greater East Asian War (World War II in the Pacific), his worry was completely swept away. In his booklet of only 22 pages titled “Adolf Hitler” published in July 1940, he concluded:

“It is a leader that the present world wants most. In Germany, during the past 15 years, the Germans have been looking for a leader like Moses and finally discovered Hitler” (Kajima 1940, page 18).

He explained his fascination with the persona of Hitler based on other people’s impression. “Bernard Shaw’s appraisal of Hitler: From my first meeting with Hitler there was a feature in his person that charmed me. It was his face which projects a strong power of control, and also expressed deep anger.”

Kajima also quoted “Stanley Hyland who narrated his own interesting personal experience as follows: There was a big art dealer in Unter den Linden who displayed a portrait of Hitler hung in the center of a collection surrounded by many pictures of Christ. My art dealer friend who was an anti-Nazism sympathizer pointed to his collection of portraits and pictures and said “both of them (Hitler and Christ) resembled each other.” Many Germans, for whatever reason, discovered the an uncanny resemblance of Hitler and Christ” (ditto, pages 19-20).

Kajima expressed his support for Hitler beyond reason. He was misled by his historical belief that the “nobles” and leaders are important. He must have been influenced also by the very enthusiastic applause of Hitler by both the intellectual and mass of people in Germany.

In the first volume of the selection of essays on management by Morinosuke Kajima (published in 1974), with the preface titled “The Road to Victory” dated October 1940 Kajima claimed that Hitler was correct in his explanation in his famous book “Mein Kampf”, that “it is unnecessary for each citizen to know the details of the policy of the leader as faith that the leader would do what is good for the people should be the basis of the relationship between the leader and the led... It is sufficient that the people understand and accept the broad policies of the leader” (Kajima 1974, page3).

Kajima's evaluation of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere also changed according to the situation. At a luncheon meeting of the Kansai Economics Club in June 1940 just after the outbreak of World War II in Europe, he said that "many people believe England and France will finally win and Germany eventually lose. What on earth is the basis that England and France will win?" (Kajima 1940 page 6)

Regarding Japan's War policies, he said:

"I think we cannot now change the non-intervention policy in the war in Europe. It has become the current news that Japan will implement the policy of advancing South [in the Chinese sub-continent]. I have been opposing this policy. The policy may be appropriate for the development of Japan, but the implementation should be orderly. It is better to defer implementation till the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. It is also better to take up this policy only after England and France are weakened as a result of the expected Japan victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

However, based on the diminished strength of England and France following their initial losses from the attacks by Germany, America has to shift its fleet to the Atlantic Ocean giving Japan a stronger control of the Pacific Ocean" (Kajima 1940, page 27).

And he realized the opportunity for the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere considering the situation in Europe.

Kajima's books "Basic Policy of Diplomacy of the Empire" and "The Diplomacy of Japan and the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere" were published in 1938 and 1943, respectively. The first book described Japan's basic policy in diplomacy during 30 years since the Triple Intervention by Russia, Germany and France from 1895 to the restoration in 1925 of diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan.

The Unequal Treaties

During this period Kajima was engaged in Japan's effort to revise the so-called Unequal Treaties which Japan signed since the first year of the Meiji era to the outbreak of World War II in Asia. On this revision Kajima said: "it is the first time since the First Sino-Japanese War that Japan was admitted into negotiation on equal status of large foreign countries even though the foreign countries did not yet recognize Japan as a large country" (Kajima 1943b page 5).

The details of the revision effort are described in the following paragraphs.

1. At the outset, Kajima noticed that England sympathized with the Unequal Treaties and disagreed with the revision because of their being a colonizer of India.
2. He noted also that the negotiation started just after Russia started preparations for its invasion of the Orient by constructing the Trans-Siberian Railway.
3. To protect against a Russian invasion in the Far East, England considered the alliance with China before the First Sino-Japanese War, but they changed to an alliance with Japan after Japan won that war. England then agreed with the Japanese request to revise the Unequal Treaties to strengthen Japan's international position (Kajima 1943b, page 4-6).

4. By the Treaty of Simonoseki, Japan controlled Chosun and got the cession of Liandong Peninsula, Formosa and Penghu Islands, plus two hundred million Ryo as reparation. But Japan returned the Liandong Peninsula in exchange for 30 million Ryo from the Triple Intervention.
5. Japanese diplomacy was swayed between the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Russo-Japanese Agreement, broke the Russo-Japanese Agreement and went to war against Russia in what is now known as the Russo-Japanese War.
6. Japan joined the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and firmed up its position in Chosun and Manchuria by the Treaty of Portsmouth.
7. When Japan participated in the First World War and presented the Twenty-One Demands to China, a secret clause which was included in the demand provided that Japanese advisers for political, economic and military affairs be hired by the Chinese government. When this secret clause became known, the international community at the initiative of America severely criticized Japan. As a result, Japan had to accept the Chinese Open Door Policy formulated at the Washington Naval Conference in the period November 1921 to February 1922. At the same time the Nine-Power Treaty for China was concluded.
8. On Japan's international isolationism as an aftermath of the Twenty-One Demands, Kajima said this was due to "Japanese unskillful diplomatic technique", for example, "Japan concealed the Fifth Clause of the Twenty One Demands at the first stage of the negotiation with the world powers, particularly England" and following the severe criticism (see above) "Japan sent an ultimatum" on the Twenty One Demands (Kajima 1938b, page 472).
9. The pressure from America and England, irritated Kajima who declared: "It can be said that England and America, worried about the expansion of Japanese power to China after the War, have concocted a plot to prevent Japan from any action against China. China became anti-Japan with the backing of England and America." He also said "The Manchurian Incident took place because China took selfish actions in Manchuria, believing it can do anything against Japanese interests under the Nine-Power Treaty and the protection of England and America (Kajima 1943b, page 54; ditto 1938b, page 483).
10. Japanese behavior was rationalized and after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident the invasion that brought about the Second Sino-Japanese War was justified.

To Kajima, Pan Asia and Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere were the same. He mentioned in "The Imperial Diplomacy and the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere" that:

The institution of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere was my cherished dream and my ideal. It was the Austrian Count, Coudenhove-Karelgly whose mother was a Japanese national that enthusiastically expounded for its realization... The great powers today accepted the coprosperity concept without exceptions. Asia should seek to harmonize freedom and organization, independence and synthesis, and the nation and coprosperity sphere. This harmony means extensive internal autonomy and establishment of a coprosperity sphere with

respect to the countries outside the sphere . Without synthesized independence, the concept leads to ruin. The present analytical movements of nationalism and synthesized independence such as the coprosperity sphere should include a comparison of these two movements to get a clear understanding. The pursuit of synthesized coprosperity policy is the mission of Imperial Japan which has already secured its independence and has become the only strong country in Greater East Asia” (Kajima 1943b, pages 2 and 5).

Relation with China

Then how was the relation with China?

Kajima mentioned in his writings that the principles of The Pan Asia Movement and Pan Europe Movement require that “Japan should absolutely stop the militaristic policy of invasion. There are two “fundamentally different points” compared with 20 years ago.

“The first point is that some 20 years ago the ideology of liberalism was very popular such that liberalized nations were equal one with the other and it was unnecessary to have one or two leading nations as leaders of the group... But today, the need for sound leading nations in any coalition of equals is being emphasized. The East Asia Coprosperity Sphere would not succeed without Japan’s leadership, Second point is that : the idea of the coprosperity sphere was mainly proposed by the idealists and it was very rare that realistic politicians would seriously favor its materialization, but now it is being emphasized for reason of absolute necessity considering present politics... .

“With the development of airplanes and tanks, small countries have found difficulty in maintaining their independence. In the present world situation, any nation, unless they are first class and strong enough, cannot maintain their self-defence by their own power. The hidden powers of industries are decisive factors for the defence of nations... In case of war, at the end, there might be only two or three coprosperity spheres or big countries, or only one country that would survive... Greater East Asia is now in such a situation that cannot escape from the theory of powers. We are faced with reality in which we have to select either the establishment of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere led by Japan or suffer destruction” (Kajima 1943b, preface page 6 and 139).

Kajima explained in this book that the proximate cause of the Greater East Asia War (World War II) was the provocative grouping and counter-grouping of the most powerful countries purportedly for mutual protection. In September 1940 Japan, Germany and Italy signed the Tripartite Pact; America responded by declaring support to Chiang Kai-shek against this Pact. In April 1941 the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact came into being and was countered by strengthening of the alliance among the ABCD countries (America, British, China and Dutch/Holland), etc. Based on his analysis of these alliances or spheres of influence he came to the conclusion that war was inevitable, and he believed “that all responsibility for Japan entering the war would be that of America and England” (Kajima 1943b, pages 60 to 66).

Departure from the Illusion of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere

For one year and four months (June 1942 to September 1943) when he assumed the office as chief of the investigation bureau of Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association), Morinosuke Kajima officially worked for the realization of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. At this time when he was in his late 30s he came to believe that Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere and Pan Asia are synonymous. ("The Imperial Diplomacy and The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere," was published in June 1943 and was a top seller).

In the booklet "International Situation in the Second Year of the Greater East Asia War" published in January 1943, he assessed the situation, thus:

"Japan established a firm strategic position in Greater East Asia in only one year and succeeded in keeping its vital war munitions. Economically, Japan secured the resources in the South after overcoming the initial blockade set up by America and England. After destroying the initial blockade by America and England and taking control over the delivery route, Japan retaliated by blocking the supply of war commodities to America and England. This development can be said to have as basis the strategy of Germany and Italy of the Axis powers having the resources, and the anti-Axis do not have the resources. This development was very significant logistically as it provided Japan and its allies control over the supply route from the South..." (Kajima 1943a, pages 5-7).

"However, he also warned against making light of American industrial power, saying America recovered from the panic of the first battle, and has risen as the main force of the anti-Axis side. America counterattacked in the Solomon Islands and went on the offensive against the Axis forces in north Africa" (Kajima 1943a, page 17). "It may be inevitable that America would intensify its submarine attacks, because the supply routes from the southern occupied areas and the continent were most important for Japan and there was no other means of transportation then by ships" (Kajima 1943a, page 20).

"The production of aircraft planes in America was reported at 50 to 60 thousand a year, so we give attention to our air defence" (Kajima 1943a, pages 20-21).

"The production capacity of our enemy, America, was surprising. In addition to the aircraft production mentioned earlier other numbers are: 45 thousand war tanks and 8 million tons shipbuilding capacity. We have to exert our best effort to increase our production capacities" (Kajima 1943a, page 58).

It is important that he also mentioned strengthening the domestic political system as an urgent matter. "There was no nation that collapsed by force of military power in the previous World War. Russia fell through the Bolshevik revolution" (Kajima 1943b, page 123). He also called attention to the risk of communism saying the war, regardless of its outcome causes uneasiness to the people and "tend to make the people turn to communize" (ditto, page 124).

In the supplement to his book “The Diplomacy of the Empire and the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere” titled “The Diplomatic Principles of America and England” he mentioned the measures taken by the Allied powers after the war against Fascism was won. After the explanation of the Atlantic Charter by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt in August 1941, he said “Now we have just started to correct the unreasonable way of land distribution. “If we return the occupied land to former possessors like plunderers or exploiters, it can be said as international unfairness and vice” (Kajima 1943b, page 193). He insisted on building a the new order of land ownership under the Greater East Asia. In other words, Kajima did not deny the possibility of defeat in the war, but despite such possibility he appealed for understanding of the rationalization and accomplishment of the Greater East Asian War. We can read that he shifted his interest to countermeasures and especially against the threat the communism after the War.

In his “My Memoirs” published in 1975, though his words should be discounted because they are ‘memoirs’, it is possible to know that he resigned to defeat in the War as early as in 1942 -1943 when he was the chief of the investigation bureau of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. He mentioned in his “Memoirs” as follows:

“In my work as a diplomat, I was in a position to know the real war situation, although there was a control of speech. I thought with the participation of Russia on the side of the Allies our loss was only a matter of time. When I looked into the Cairo Declaration or Tehran Declaration, I thought when we are defeated there would remain in Japan only four proper islands. So not only Chosun, Manchuria and northern China but also the southern area and Formosa would no longer belong to Japan.

I have been talking to my staff overseas, since two or three years before the end of the War telling them that if Japan is defeated they should return to Japan as soon as possible with any properties that they may have. They are to return to Japan, not like miserables returning with only one rucksack. Do not engage in the construction projects. There would be plenty of jobs for the veterans for the expansion of production in Japan. There would be enough works which can contribute to the country. I sent many telegrams urging them to come back, rather than go to foreign countries where they may have terrible experiences” (Kajima 1975, page 152).

Actually he also sent messages as president of Kajima-Gumi on the next day, 16th of August 1945, after the announcement of the Emperor’s Statement of Japan’s surrender. He gave an instruction to all the staff of the company about the measures to be taken. He said it was the responsibility of the management of the company to take steps for the welfare of the employees, but we think he was prepared for this eventuality and could take quick measures with calm judgement.

By the way, he had been keeping some distance from communism since his Third Year in high school. But he was strongly interested in socialism and “studied the subject very hard.” During his work at the Japanese Embassy in Germany, he collected

information about Socialism. He read books by Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin on the Russian Revolution. He also read the academic writings of Rosa Luxemburg, Hilharding and Kautsky (Kajima 1975, page 42). As mentioned earlier he also fell under the influence of Coudenhove-Kalergy during this period. He was not a strong anti-communist, but he decided to deny the Communist ideology.

In July 1938, when Kajima was inaugurated president of Kajima-Gumi, he stated strong intention to deny communism access to the “Kajima community” as follows:

“I worry often about the possible infiltration of communism into Kajima. I think the past miserable operating results of the company were due not only to economical failure but also to an ideological matter. Communism is absolutely inconsistent with the national policy of the Imperial Government. We think the opposition to the communist ideology is based on loyalty to the country and, at the same time, it is an essential factor for the profitability and the growth of Kajima. If communism infiltrates Kajima, it will result not only in the decline of Kajima -Gumi and the Kajima family, but will also destroy your stocks, deposits and savings and your reasonable situation in the community” (Kajima 1974, page 13).

“The Kajima family, even only the originator families, hold about a half of the shares of the company and has the legal powers starting from the appointment of the management of almost all the business units of the company. I will not neglect my duty, helping or being helped by all the staffs, for the improvement and stability of the economic life of all the staffs and their families and leading them to a happy life” (Kajima 1974, page 15).

His position as president of the company may appear as the decisive factor for his anti-communist stance. But this is not the only reason. There is his evaluation about Soviet Russia and communism itself. According to the record of his speech on “Sino-Japan War and the Diplomacy of the Contending Powers” in March 1938 (Showa 13), he said as follows:

“It is Soviet Russia first which does not have goodwill for Japan. Japanese polity and the Soviet Union communism are absolutely incompatible Today, Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang are under the Soviet Union, so the next mission of Japan for the time being, after the settlement of the military operations, , will be, first, to drive off the communists from whole China and then expel communism together with its newly established government.”

“Some people say the Soviet Union has no intention to invade Japan, so we should conclude the nonaggression treaty with them at the appropriate time. If we conclude the nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union, there may be troublesome problems for us domestically such as the control of communism etc... First of all, Russia is not such a country with which we can conclude a treaty.

I heard very often when I worked for the Japanese Embassy in Germany, that a treaty with Russia was unreliable. A treaty with England and America shall be honored by the parties, but the Soviet Union will conclude a treaty if it is conve-

nient for it, and will cancel any a treaty anytime that it becomes inconvenient... England and America will generally keep a contract. On the other hand, Russia and China are not reliable even if we conclude a treaty and we can say they are unworthy to conclude. The peaceful relation between Japan and Russia can be kept only during the period when Japanese military power exceeds that of the Russians” (Kajima 1938c, page 20-22).

He understood that the “the peak” of the Japanese security “was during the period from the Russo-Japanese War to the Manchuria Incident after World War I.” Japan succeeded in building up a network of multi-lateral treaties on the Axis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Kajima 1959, page 7).

Through his diplomatic studies, he came to the conclusion that with respect to treaties, Russia was unreliable and England and America were reliable. In the biography of Kajima, the above was explained as follows:

“Through his reading of diplomatic documents of many countries, he concluded that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance during Meiji and Taisho Era can be said as a rare example of a treaty that was negotiated and implemented gentlemanlike and smoothly. On the other hand the Triple Alliance among Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, or the Russo-French Alliance in those days always caused trouble and required a lot of diplomacy... . When he read the diplomatic documents about the relation between Japan and England, he could not find any evidence that England tried to cheat Japan and vice versa. Everything was done in the spirit of friendship between the gentlemen” (Kajima 1977, page 444).

He expressed his trust in England, thus:

“England took several centuries to produce and develop the English gentleman who has become the best export item from England to Japan” (Kajima 1965b, page 35).

As mentioned earlier China was classified in the same category as Russia in so far as their conduct of foreign relations. After the Sino-Japanese War Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, insisted on strong policies against China by reason of “their national character” or “their specific manner” (Miyata 1998, pages160-165). After 1930, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized China as an anti-Japan country which was difficult to deal with. It is easy to understand that Kajima, as an ex-diplomat, had his impression of China based on information he got from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It must be also the true impression of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The ideology of communism is different from the body of ideological systems of modern nations, and Kajima perceived the inconsistency of communism in the form of exported revolution beyond national boundaries. After the War, his evaluation of China became more severe by reason of its dubious accomplishment in socialism. Moreover, China, in the latter half of 1960s, was in the midst of the Cultural Revolution and extremely chaotic.

Anyway in the year following Japan's defeat in World War II, Kajima was expelled from public office and barred from making public speeches from January 1946 to August 1951, a period of five years and eight months for his responsibility in the promotion and implementation of the concept of Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.

III—The Theory of Asia-Pacific Community and Pan-Asianism

Proposal for Asia-Pacific Community

In August 1951 after the termination of his expulsion period and the lifting of the ban from public speeches and public office, Morinosuke Kajima ran as candidate of the Liberal Party in the third ordinal election of the House of Councilors (national constituency) in April 1953. He was elected and in 1957, he assumed office as Minister of the Ministry of the Hokkaido Development Board. This career move was partly due to the situation of the Liberal Party and partly due to his long-standing critical position against Communist Soviet Russia. In 1965, based on his strong interest in Japanese diplomatic issues, he started the magazine "International Review" (Kokusai Jihyo) learning from an American magazine "The Current History", and he analysed international issues and vigorously presented his opinion on diplomatic matters and international current questions in it.

We recall that Pan Asia was Kajima's biggest interest since the prewar period. Not surprisingly it can be said that Kajima was the first proponent of the Asian Community in Japan after the War. The philosophy was the same, but the proposed name for the new concept was "Asia-Pacific Community" not Pan-Asia. His article 'I Propose Asia-Pacific Community' appeared in "The Monthly Report of Japan Business Federation" (Keidanren Geppo) in January 1964. At the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives on March 6, 1964, he talked about 'Asia-Pacific Community', pointing out the regionalism of America and Europe with the establishment of European Economic Community (EEC) (Kajima 1964, pages 34-35; Ohba 2004:206). In March the following year, he referred to the Asia-Pacific Common Market when he talked about the Chinese issue and the issue of the normalization of relations between Japan and Korea. When ECAFE asked Japan for cooperation in the establishment of the Asian Development Bank based on the Asian Economic Cooperation Plan, Kajima said 'I hope such Plan would expedite the establishment of the Asia Pacific Common Market which was equivalent to the European EEC (Kajima 1965, Page 13).

In January, 1966, he proposed 'Asia-Pacific Community' in his opening article of the "International Review" elucidating 'the international function which Japan should perform: .

"I hope the organization of the economic community of Asia-Pacific which would consist of Japan, southeast Asian countries, Australia and New Zealand, and adding America and Canada shall be implemented as quickly as possible. I have been proposing this for a long time toward the ideal of Pan-Asia.

When Asia-Pacific Economic Community is organized as Asian EEC, the development plan for the southeast Asian countries which was proposed by US President Johnson, other development plans by ECAFE, Colombo Plan, and others of each country will be carried out more effectively. There will certainly be ideological difficulties between such communities and communist China... . Nowadays the Soviet Union has changed its international posture from confrontational to peaceful coexistence and has gradually shown their enthusiasm for peaceful settlement with Western countries. Let us wait patiently until the time Japan will create a friendly relationship again with America, main land China any time, and Asia and Pacific countries, and even with other countries in the world on the basis of friendship, cooperation and freedom” (Int’l Review 66.1, page 7).

In the monograph titled “As to the Pacific Community” in March 1966, he narrated “since I was much younger, I have been proposing the idea of Pan-Asia as the worthiest objective of Japanese diplomacy. But we were forced to shelve this idea during the period from the Manchurian Incident to the end of World War II because real diplomacy was set aside by the pressure of the autocratic military” (Int’l Review 66.3, page 2). Kajima mentioned also in the “Preface” of the record of the first award of the Peace Prize which was given to Coudenhove-Kalergy as follows:

“I have tried many times to propose and promote the idea of East Asian League or Pan-Asia, but the time before World War II was not ripe. After the war, I proposed Asia-Pacific Community. My proposal was to organise Japan with southeast Asian countries, Australia and New Zealand, and adding America and Canada into this community politically, economically and culturally community... . Recently under the foreign policies of Eisaku Sato and Takeo Miki, which carried the plan of Asia-Pacific in big way, Japan as the only advanced country in Asia tried to promote our function toward the realization of such a community. Such plan is just the same as my plan of Asia-Pacific Community” (Kajima Institute for Peace ed. 1966, page 7-9).

In a paper in 1973, he said:

“I have been chasing for the last half century a big dream - the establishment of Pan -Asia within the limit of the charters of the League of Nations or the United Nations. Toward this ideal, I appealed for an East Asian League before World War II, and worked out the plan of Asia-Pacific Community after the war” (Int’l Review 73.8, issue, page 7). Both plans are for the same ideal.

Why, however, will the Asia-Pacific (economical) community in his mind link with the ideal of Pan-Asia?

He explained in the “Int’l Review” March 1966,

“My ideal of Pan-Asia became difficult to achieve because the sub-continent of China was under control of Red China. But, before achieving such ideal, I have

endeavoured to materialize the Pacific common market or community or Asia-Pacific Community within the limits of the United Nations...” (Int’l Review 66.3, page 3). He said that after the war he was the first official to propose Asia-Pacific Community, “formerly Pan-Asia” due to the existence of Chinese socialism.”

Moreover, he clarified that “it is a misunderstanding to oppose the establishment of Asia-Pacific Community as an organization of anti-communism” and prepared for the Asian-EEC. (Int’l Review 66.1, page 7). Is it sophistry to say it is a misunderstanding to be an organization against communism despite he had proposed the Asia-Pacific community because of the existence of Chinese socialism? If it is not sophistry, what is his opinion? Let us study in the following paragraphs.

In his Asian-EEC paper, he mentioned “it is essential to strengthen the United Nations in order to achieve real peace,” “we cannot achieve at all our hope for world peace if we withdraw ourselves into the shell of our Constitution, Article 9. Hereafter, Japan has to search seriously for the way to contribute positively to strengthen the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations” (Int’l Review 66.1, page 4). He insisted for a positive participation in the peace-keeping endeavor of the United Nations. Where is the logic for the ideal of pacifism, which breaks the shell of Article 9 of the Constitution?

The theory of balancing power in international politics

Morinosuke Kajima pointed out repeatedly the principle of balance of power in international politics. “To begin with, the balance of power in international politics shall be the basic principle for controlling international tendencies. The peace among countries is maintained because of this principle ” and that is a “cold fact” (Int’l Review 75.10, page 3). Since ancient Greece to the present modern nations, peace is achieved if there is balance of power among nations. “The alliance before World War I of the Triple Entente among England, France and Russia on one side, and the Triple Alliance among Germany, Austria and Italy on the other side, and just before World War II, the axis alliance among Germany, Italy and Japan on one hand and the alliance among America, England, France and the Soviet Union on the other hand, and present alignment of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) vis-a vis the Warsaw Treaty Organization are stark examples of the application of the balance of power principle, which for a time maintain the peace, but war eventually broke out with one of the alliances overpowering the other (Int’l Review 66.11, page 6-7).

The Japan-United States Security Treaty in November 1951 was “a counter measure against the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance which was followed by the Korean War, was concluded in February 1951 with an eye on Japan as a potential enemy (Int’l Review 65.12, page 4; ditto 66.2, page 5).

He said “this was inevitable based on the principle of balance of power in international politics” (Int’l Review 66.5, page 2).

According to Kajima, however, the main cause of instability in Asia in the 1960s was “the government of Red China which raised the dogmatism of Marxism-Leninism in the vast sub-continent of China and rushed recklessly toward becoming a nuclear big

power.” China is the country which has an aggressive policy and expansionism primarily considering Japan as a potential enemy. “There is no other way than the alliance with America for the Free World in Asia to keep the balance of power and resist the pressure of communism (Int’l Review 67.8, page 4-5). He stated positively that “it is a ridiculous illusion for an unarmed Japan to abandon the alliance with America, and expect to exist independently as a neighbor of Red China and the Soviet Union” (Int’l Review 65.12, page 2).

For Kajima the question is why socialist China has invasion and expansionism designs? He said “China at that time stood against American Imperialism and Soviet Revisionism and the United Nations, too. And they behaved invasive and warlike, denying peaceful coexistence and not abandoning their evil design to make the world communism and set about arming itself with nuclear power” (Int’l Review 66.2, page 2).

He showed his distrust of China saying that “their friendship with Japan is aimed against American Imperialism and its followers who fight with Japanese reactionary and monopolistic capital”; and “battle of ideology and politics was camouflaged with a mask of friendship” (Int’l Review 66.2, page 7).

Furthermore, “a part of the left wing power in Japan including the socialist party (then) spread their fight against the Security Treaty and try to cancel it when it comes up for review in 1970. This group was eager to neutralize Japan. “At present, we are enjoying peace and prosperity by reason of the Japan-United States Security Treaty.” He criticized the left wing party severely saying “it is important to recognize that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stands on the international principle of balance of power” (Int’l Review 65.12, page 3,4).

In December, 1964, when France and other countries approved China’s restoration among the community of nations, Kajima proposed four conditions for Japan’s approval saying that “Japanese diplomatic policy should not lightly respond to an easy principle of international adaptability or to the doctrine of restoration of diplomatic relation with China from the standpoint of Red China.” These conditions were (1) approval by China of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, (2) respect and adherence to the Treaty of San Francisco, (3) abandonment of the right to claim war reparation from Japan, and (4) non-interference in domestic affairs (Kajima 1975, page 237-238).

Kajima advised, as below, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato who was to attend the Asia-Africa Conference⁷⁾ which was scheduled to be held in Algiers, Algeria in June, 1965. China intended to put anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism in the conference agenda. Japan should stand against such Chinese intention and take joint steps with the Philippines, Thailand and India to emphasize the meaning of the Bandung 10-point Declaration at the first Asian-African Conference in 1955, in order to avoid criticism for a biased political standpoint (Int’l Review 65.6, page 4). His grounds for the argument was that China, in a conference, insisted in a loud voice to overthrow imperialism and

7 In June 1965, a coup d’etat broke out in Algeria where the conference would be held five days before the foreign ministers’ conference and ten days before the plenary session. Because of this, the conference was postponed. In September 1965, in Indonesia, which was the promoter of the nonalignment movement, another coup d’etat broke out and the second AA conference was postponed indefinitely. In April 2005, the Asia- Africa Conference was held at Jakarta commemorating its 50th anniversary, gathering the leaders of more than 60 nations.

that such insistence can be said to violate the principal of non-interference in domestic affairs and was against the Bandung 10-point Declaration.

In short, it seems to Kajima that it is possible to keep the peace only under a condition of balance of power to thwart communism's export of revolution and that expansionism violates the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. It is also a brake of the system of modern nations where international relation is managed within the diplomatic frame of nations. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is an unavoidable measure for Japan which has no armament against the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

Peace of Japan is not defended by Article 9 of the Constitution which is negative pacifism, and we have to support positively the peace keeping activities of the United Nations. Furthermore, with the Treaty, we neutralize Communist China which denies peaceful coexistence. Then he elaborated the plan of Asia-Pacific Community for peace-keeping.

This is the positive pacifism of Morinosuke Kajima. But if the communist countries admit the sovereignty of nations and chose peaceful coexistence, then new possibilities for peace will come out.

From Asia-Pacific Community to Pan-Asia

Morinosuke Kajima was pro-America and argued enthusiastically about the necessity of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, he chose the title "The Way to Pan-Asia" in the last issue of the Selection of Diplomatic Theory which was published in July, 1972, and he defined clearly that his final diplomatic goal was Pan-Asia. In the 100th memorial issue of the "International Review" in Summer 1973, he expressed his expectation for Pan-Asia saying "it is my greatest pleasure that my prayer for the organization of Pan-Asia has a bright future" (Int'l Review 73.8, page 7).

In the same year, he declared that my greatest "hope" was "an organization of Pan-Asia any time soon" and erected a monument with that inscription at the corner of Shuukeien (秋恵園) in the Nagatomi house where he was born. This monument was declared a national cultural heritage in 1967 (Atsumi 2000, page 2). He proclaimed in "the message for the opening of Shunkeien" that Pan-Asia "is my spiritual fermentation." Needless to say, it means he changed his opinion from Asia-Pacific Community to Pan-Asia again.

What made him return to Pan-Asia from Asia-Pacific Community?

In the preface of the above selection, in May, 1972, he explained as below:

The fifth volume of the Selection of the Diplomatic Theory "The Way to Pan-Asia" is the summary of the part of the postwar selection and consisted of three parts. In the first part, I reconsidered the idea of "Pan-Asia" which I had championed in the past half century because of the recent development in the world situation and Asian international circumstances. I arranged my thoughts under the title "The Way to Pan-Asia" asking Eiji Wajima to write these. Mr. Wajima is the managing director of Kajima Institute of International Peace and was former Japanese ambassador to the United Arab Republic and Belgium (Kajima 1972, Page i).

The manuscript of the fifth volume was slightly revised by Shunichi Kase, Sadao Iguchi, Yasujiro Ichikawa and others – all directors of the Kajima Institute of International Peace. As such, ‘it represents the opinion of the Kajima Institute of International Peace’ and as the way to Pan-Asia:

“In this manuscript, we decided to propose the phrase ‘The Way to the Pan Asia’ (a) starting from the issue of sovereignty among the nations of the Free World, (b) we try to approach the matter using the formula of the international organization which developed step by step in the spatiotemporal process or in the relation of politics and economy and (c) we temporarily call ‘the Union of the Asian Countries’ which is the first transitional organization” (Kajima 1972, page iv).

We can see that he returned to ‘Pan-Asia’ from Asia-Pacific in the middle of 1972 and his return came from the change of ‘the recent world situation and the international circumstance of Asia.’

What are these changes?

One of the basic changes of the world situation is the reversion of the Nixon Shock which cancelled the direct convertibility of US Dollar to gold. In “The Way to Pan-Asia” which Wajima wrote for Kajima, he said that the issue of the Nixon Shock was one of the subjects of the US Presidential Election and said;

“We cannot conceal the subsidence of American ‘Relative Power Positions’ in the world. The attitude and disposition of countries friendly to the USA are somewhat degraded by certain American actions which will deeply affect future relations... It is certain that such distrustful feelings exist that America, though we had better say the Nixon regime, would do anything to defend American interests” (Kajima 1972, Page 4).

On the other hand, what are the changes in the international situation in Asia? Kajima described as follows.

“My thought or advocacy for the Pacific Common Market or the Asia-Pacific Communities which I have promoted for the last 18 years when I worked as a Diet member since 1953 after the War, heavily considered the economy. Looking at the recent Asian situation, however, ‘I feel keenly the necessity for the establishment of an organization of cooperative solidarity among the nations, which contain both politics and economics aimed at the establishment of a regime of peace.’ Hence, the proposal of ‘the Union of Asian Nations’ as the way to the Pan-Asia.”
There is a difference from the last ‘Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere.’

“We had to be in a leading position in the Asian situation of the time, and since the other parties were cooperative regimes or governments, we can say that the ‘Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere’ was one of the strategic means for the administration of the occupied territories.

“The Union of Asian Nations,’ which I like to propose this time, is the union of independent sovereign nations and in order to make it clear I call it ‘the Union of Nations.’ This organization would be controlled and managed by an international organization which would be formed upon the mutual consent of member nations. The object would be to establish peace and order in Asia by the people of Asia and for Asia. It is not for the benefit of one member nation only” (Kajima 1972, Page 24-25).

Actually, after the 1960s, the Asian situation changed a lot as Kajima saw - the dispute in 1962 between China and Russia on peaceful coexistence, followed by the success of China in testing atomic bombs in 1964, and the American interference in the Vietnam War in 1965. Asia was in a complicated international position in the structure of the Cold War and the confrontation between China and Russia. In such an atmosphere, non-socialist countries attempted to organize an international organization. Examples of this search are the minister-level conference of South East Asian countries in April 1966 initiated by Japan; the Asian Pacific Conference (ASPAC) initiated by Korea in June in the same year; and the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) which was established in August 1967. In the 1970s, China joined the United Nations in 1971, followed by American President Nixon’s visit to China and the normalization of relation between China and Japan in 1972; and the end of the Vietnam War by the Paris Peace Accords in 1973.

China, by their diplomatic change, established diplomatic relations with Malaysia in 1974, with Thailand and Philippines in 1975, and formed international relations with sovereign states in East Asia.

Morinosuke Kajima had consistently opined that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was concluded as a countermeasure against the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. In 1966, he thought of extending the term of the Treaty by ten years up to 1980 instead of 1970 for the reason that the term of the Sino-Soviet Treaty was also up to 1980. He also mentioned that “it may not be a dream as the socialist party said that “the breach of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty” depends on the world situation” (Int’l Review 65.12, page 5). Such eventuality became more possible in 1975.

If Japan concludes a collective Security Treaty in the Asia-Pacific region similar to the groups of America, the Soviet Union and China, and Sino-Soviet Treaty be cancelled, then we could reconsider the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Int’l Review 75.1, page 5).

He wrote in the “International Review” (75.10) two years before he died that “it would be an urgent matter at present that the balance of power with the communist countries be established which would result in easing strained relations in Asia.”

It must be correct that he dreamed ahead the materialization of Pan-Asia.

The way to Pan-Asia

How was the “Way to Pan-Asia” which Morinosuke Kajima asked Wajima to write for him for the purpose of materialization of his thought ?

He grasped the Asian situation as follows. The Asian order was still under the structure of the Cold War and was affected by external factors as before. "However, a big turning point arose in Asia. This turning point came about because America had failed in the Vietnam War and was forced to reconsider their strategic structure against the Soviet Union." In addition to his opinion there were other opinions that it was time for a multi-polarized world or the Asian future would be decided by the four nations, America, Soviet Union, China and Japan.

Kajima asked "is it really OK?" (Kajima 1972, Page 81-82)

He believed "Asian peace and security should be achieved within the principle and methodology prescribed in the Charter of the United Nations" as he had evaluated the League of Nations before the War. However, he also believed that we cannot fully rely upon the United Nations Security Council because of its limitations. He took the position that the Union of Asian Nations is one of the schemes for "the right of self-defence and regional security which the Charter of the United Nations admitted as an exceptional measure."

Then, is it realizable? His thoughts:

"The economy in the world is becoming, plainly speaking, 'the economy of scale.' One nation or one group of nations find it difficult to continue to exist and to keep developing as one Economic Entity in the world unless they attain a certain level of 'the scale of economy.' Luckily enough, there are natural resources, population and big land area in Asia. What Asia lacks are capital, technology and a system for efficient management. I firmly believe if Asian countries would cooperate, the way for the future would be widely opened" (Kajima 1972, Page 90-91).

"Progress and development of scientific technology are the trend of the times and because of this, spatiotemporal differences among countries or regions have rapidly become small... I am sure that a time would come – maybe a hundred years later when countries would have the same goal in mind for the future of Asia there would emerge a people called Asian citizens walking hand in hand toward the same goal. This is the reason that I have proposed Pan-Asia for a long time as I propose it now for a solid and cooperative organization to meet the challenges of the time" (ditto. Page 94).

Then, how to realize such a solid and cooperative organization among Asian countries or the union of the countries?

He named such an organization officially "The Union of Asian Countries for Peace and Development' from his experience of the regional economic blocs in America, EC and COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), especially in EC. For its realization, he adopted the 'Dynamic Planning' and 'Economic and Functional Approach'" (Kajima 1972, Page 125). As regards the member countries of the Union, he set up a standard that 26 countries of ECAFE within the Asian region or 21 member countries of the Asian Development Bank would be nominated as member countries. Their attainment of full membership status would be decided depending on their progressive development during a transition period. The development would be

measured at three 5-year intervals during a transition period of 15 years starting from 1975 (Kajima 1972, Page 153-155).

The progressive development would be as follows:

- (1) The first interval (from 1975-1980 – Establishment of ‘the Asian Development Bank’)
- (2) The second interval (from 1980-85) - The ‘the organization of economic power’
- (3) The third interval (from 1985- 90) - The step for the political approach.

The EC model aimed at the economic approach through the Customs Union or Common Market as the core objectives of their action plan, so “we should also learn from such wisdom in our Asia.” At the first stage of the Union of Asian Countries, we should, at least, promote on the basis of the Asian Development Bank, keeping in mind the principle of cooperative relations with the special organizations of the United Nations or the international organization in Asia. In the future, these organizations should be absorbed into the Union. “In Europe, ten countries formed the European Community with the Common Market at the core. It is my proposal that in Asia, more than ten countries in the Free World in Asia should organize the Union of Asian Countries with the Development Fund at the core” (Kajima 1972, Page 167).

The role of Japan is the important mission of establishing the Asian Development Bank and its management and operations. “The objective of this economic approach is to seek for peace of heart of the Asian people and foster an Asian spirit... . There is no reason that science (relations between human beings and nature) would not thrive in Asia. I am sure all depend on our goodwill and awareness of the world around us” (Kajima 1972, Page 168).

Kajima finally realized that it would be a new phase in Asia and a good chance for the Pan-Asia concept to flourish, given the positive developments including halting the Nixon Shock by stopping the direct conversion of the US Dollar to Gold, the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the return of China to the United Nations.

IV—Special Features of the Pan-Asia Theory of Morinosuke Kajima and several controversial points

The practical philosophy of the Pan-Asia theory of Kajima

We confirmed in this paper that the theory of Pan-Asia by Morinosuke Kajima has been developed over three periods, namely pre-war, war time, and post-war.

Let us discuss several points. The most significant feature of his theory of Pan-Asia came from the movement of the European community and supported by his philosophy that history is made by leaders who do not stand daydreaming but act on reality and undertake the necessary missionary work themselves. Such belief is influenced by the philosophy, theory and practice of Coudenhove-Kalergy. It is the hallmark of a practical idealism and a practical pacifism. His vigorous activities for social involvement cannot be considered without his philosophy that he was more a politician than a scholar, as evidenced by his establishment of two institutes relating to diplomacy,

his publishing activities through a publishing company, and his founding the Kajima Peace Prize. In this sense, “my (Kajima) ideas and activities cannot be considered without his (Coudenhove-Kalergy) influence” (Int’l Review 72.10, page 6).

Kajima accepted such practical philosophy based on his personal experiences. When he was growing up Japan was going through the early stage of democracy. His keeping of, and staying within, the freedom of speech limits of the times had weakened his position in confronting fascism of Italy, Germany and Japan, and inclined him to the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere with its elements of fascism. History is made by excellent leaders. He had a question at first about the fascist ideology of three nations (Japan, Germany and Italy) which expanded their powers in the new imperialist countries and challenged the order of the existing imperialism. He exaggerated the roles (as heroes) of Hitler and Mussolini and closed his eyes to their expansionist policy of domination.

The framework of his recognition for the theory of Pan-Asia

By the way, what was the framework of his Pan-Asia Theory?

His idea came from his understanding that the world from the end of 19th century to the beginning of 20th century when the confrontation between imperialism and communism and fascism made him believe that “we are in the stream of several regional integrations.” Regional integration which he studied at that time was a monopoly of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Though the Soviet Union had already been dissolved, we can say, looking from a historical standpoint, that he had a sharp insight. It was Pan-Asia that was proposed based on such insight. In this aspect, anti-colonialism was very limited and different from the view-point of Great Asia-ism of the same age⁸⁾.

Actually, at the end of the 19th Century Japan’s Asian-ism was born as a form of resistance against the Asian invasion by European and American powers. It transformed to the Greater Asian-ism which rationalized the invasion of Asia and embraced modernization to become the military power that is Japan today. Kajima made the same mistake with the Greater Asian-ism of Japan at certain period, but he believed his was the pragmatic response to the situation of the times. For this, we cannot suspect him of malice of Asia in his Pan Asian-ism.

His proposed structure for international peace was based on the League of Nations and the United Nation. After World War II he ranked the UN as top in his list of international organizations, with the League of Nations at the middle of his list. This was his concept of peace and avoiding a war among sovereign countries. In other words, the basis of Kajima’s concept was the sovereign nations. His was, a theory of phased pacifism which intended to liberate colonies from their colonizers. He believed their

8 According to a Japanese famous Critic, Ko Takeuchi, 李大剣 who was a famous Chinese Marxist and had studied in Japan criticized the Greater Asia-ism in Japan, in ‘the Great Asia-ism the New Asia-ism’ (‘National Magazin (國民雜誌’) No.2, Volume 1, 1919), as ‘a secret code to invade China.’ At the same time, he ‘advocated for the New Asia-ism against the Japanese Greater Asia-ism and worked to form the Great Asian Federation which aimed to liberate the Asian people from the unequal alliances. His effort further led to the formation of the World Federation which consisted of the Europe Federation and American Federation (Takeuchi 1963, Page 10). His theory for the Great Asian Federation seems to be similar to Kajima’s Pan-Asia concept.

liberation and eventual independence is historically unavoidable and inevitable. This belief is related to the fact that Japan at that time was on the verge of becoming a modernized nation, though still in a fragile stage. This, again, rationalized keeping pragmatic, though strained, relations with imperialist nations with colonies. Kajima chose building peace first with sovereign countries with the assumption that Japan and China would form an alliance.

Accordingly his Pan-Asia was to be advocated based on the theory of balance of power among sovereign nations. His idea was rooted on two factors: time and personal experience. Regarding time, when he was growing up, Japan joined the group of countries which had accepted and practised Imperialism. At that time imperialism had spread widely in the world, through the China-Japan and Russia-Japan wars. We can say he embodied the era itself from the latter of the Meiji era to the Taisho era. He formulated the theory of building peace on the basis of his experience and exceptional intellect. The other factor was his study of the diplomatic histories of the Japan/England and Japan/America foreign relations while he was working in the Department of Foreign Affairs. He returned home from Germany in 1925 for the purpose of editing the historical materials of the diplomacy between Japan and England. From his editing work he developed the “High Policy” method as the way of analysis.

“I came to think, when we consider the diplomatic history of Japan/England, that we have to get our ideas in shape at the center of High Policy or Die Grosse Politik. I gave Die Grosse Plotik first consideration as basic policy before concrete, small or miscellaneous incidents. . . .” (Kajima Construction 1977, page 379).

“This framework of analysis decided the way of his perception thereafter. His experience as a diplomat in Europe also strengthened the framework. However, this framework seems to be one reason that his advocacy was thought light in the stream of Asian-ism in Japan. When he advocated Pan-Asia, Tanzan Ishibashi, for example, through ‘The Toyo Keizai Simpo’, consistently called it “Small Japan-ism.” When the German leased territory of Qingdao fell to the Japanese army in 1941, Ishibashi immediately reacted ‘Qingdao should not be possessed absolutely’ and wrote ‘An Illusion of Greater Asia-ism’ in 1921 (Ishibashi 1995, Ishibashi 1996). Sakuzo Yoshino who represented Democracy (which led to the Taisho democracy) also showed sympathy, though somewhat shaky for the March 1st Movement in 1919 in Chosun and the May Fourth Movement in China” (Narita2007, page61/139-148).

Kajima’s analysis, however, is different from the above. He deduced Pan Asia, on the basis of his study of diplomacy or diplomatic history mainly of Europe, which, in turn, was based on the analysis of Japanese foreign policy of so-called “national interest” or at the level of national “High Policy.” Kajima’s analysis is different from the observation which considered each international policy of Japan, and also different from Asian-ism that is based on the resistance against the imperialistic control by the powers of Europe/America. He rather eliminated these considerations from his analysis. This contradiction seemed to be the main reason that isolated his advocacy from

the stream of thought at the time and positioned it inferior to Japanese Asia-ism.

The view of an order of international peace and politics of Morinosuke Kajima of anchored on the theory of the balance of power among sovereign nations made necessary the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty after the World War II and led to the proposal for the Asian-Pacific Community. However, it became an acceptable framework only when communist or socialist countries and other sovereign nations of similar ideologies banded together and adopted a policy of peaceful coexistence.

Kajima shifted his interest against the slogan “going communism”, expecting Japanese defeat, and became a supporter of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty. His shift of position was due to several factors, namely: (1) his assumption of management and inheritance of the Kajima business; (2) confrontation of opposing views of communism between a framework of international politics and a view of class struggle; and (3) his reliable view on England and America which he obtained from his diplomatic study overlapped with his new theory on nobles and the gentlemen.

If the framework of the sovereign nations can be established and if a ‘reliable’ relationship among the nations can be created, Pan-Asia would not remain a dream.

Pan-Asia and the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere

What was his role in the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere?

After World War II, Kajima did not touch on his role in the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere and explained that Pan Asia was interrupted by the military, but did explain his actuations after the War.

“Long before Japan entered into the Greater East Asian War (World War II) against America and England, Japan had accepted that the Organization of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere would be the objective of the War. But it committed the error of accepting an aggressive policy by the unopposed Military. My plan on East Asian community also ended without ripening with time” (Int’l Review 74.6 page 4).

Regarding his taking office as Chief of Investigation Bureau of Taisei Yokusan-kai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association), he explained: When Fumio Goto who was his relative became the Secretary General, Kajima said “I accepted because I could not decline.” The “strong request” stated “that rejection was not allowed because it was ‘compulsory” (Kajima Construction 1977, page 129/467).

He mentioned in the selected works on The Theory of Diplomacy as follows;

“I have to mention to our readers that after the War, I was included in the first list of persons for expulsion from public office in September 1946 and at the same time to be purged of speech. I was told I had worked for the War. The recommendation for me to become the pre-war Chief of Investigation Bureau has some history. At the general election of the Tojo cabinet in April, Showa 17th, I stood as a recommended candidate and won. I became the Chief of Investigation Bureau of the reorganized Taisei Yokusankai by strong request from high authorities.

In this position, I had been insisting that the movement to join Greater East Asian War should be stopped because I had been a pacifist from the beginning. However, once the war started, it was the duty of all Japanese to work for victory regardless of the reasons for the war” (Kajima 1971, page viii).

As to the purge of speech, he mentioned in a talk:

“I was accused to be purged by the title of the book... . When I asked the reason for the purge, I was told that a person of authority went to a library and marked the titles of some books deemed bad for the situation and decided the purge. If the man read carefully, it was clear that I was not a man who supported war” (Kajima 1975, page 142).

It was not wrong that the opening the war with England and America was not his intention. As mentioned above, he was deeply involved in carrying out the establishment of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, which he equated to Pan-Asia. His contribution in the field of Japanese diplomatic and international politics after the War, based on his practical pacifism, was enormous. However, it was difficult to escape from the responsibility that he was positively related to the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.

How was the theoretical framework of his Pan-Asia plan?

For Kajima, the peaceful framework which avoid the massive destruction of war given by the progress of science and technology equal the regional community or the Pan-Asia. After the War, an antiwar community emerged in Europe. At present, the European Union (EU) is being deepened and broadened. There is no change in the basic conditions of this plan. He explained that, though the direction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere was correct, an invasion by the military to implement it was wrong and Kajima’s plan did not get the time to take hold.

When Kajima’s purge for speech was lifted, he once again threw himself to political world. Fostering international peace under the systems of modern nation which relate to Kajima’s basic framework became the theoretical foundation of the Asia-Pacific community. The dream for Pan-Asia is revived with additional vigor when China seems to have accepted peaceful coexistence with other nations.

There was another reason for his continued advocacy of practical pacifism after the War. He thought the biggest export commodity of England was the idea of what a gentleman is. That is why he could not take a prejudicial position that discriminates against Asian people; actually, he stood very far from such position. Once again, he advocated the Asian Pacific Community and allowed himself internally to return to Pan Asia.

Asia-Pacific Community and Pan-Asia

Generally speaking, Japan involved itself again in Asia after the formal ending of World War II in August 1945. In particular, the war reparation issue and its implementation became the basis for mutually beneficial relations. It strengthened the nascent relationship that southeast Asia was the supply source of raw materials on one hand and

the market of Japanese manufactured products on the other. Under the such circumstances, Asia-Pacific Community which he advocated in 1964 was the first real scheme which was announced from Japan after the War.

There was a fundamental difference between the later Asia-Pacific Scheme by Takeo Miki and the Kajima plan. Kajima said that there was no difference. The difference became clearer when we compare with the scheme of the Pacific common market proposed by Kiyoshi Kojima who influenced the scheme of Miki. In his chronological record which Kojima wrote in 1984 when he retired from Hitotubashi University, his recollection of PAFTA (Pacific Free Trade Area) follows:

“In 1964, I joined the joint research by Professor B. Balassa for one and a half years . The results of the research were published later... . During the research, I felt that, we were being left behind by the remarkable development of the European Community. In November 1965, I attended a meeting initiated by Saburo Ohkita at the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) on the subject ‘Trade and Development of Developing Countries.’ My paper ‘The Pacific Common Market’ was discussed at first. Takeo Miki, the then Foreign Minister, took notice of my proposal of a Pacific Community, and in March-April, 1967 he asked me to sound out the possibility of organizing an international conference for a scholar groups to promote my proposal. For this purpose I visited America, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand and talked to key persons knowledgeable on the subject. In January 1968, PAFTAD (Pacific Trade and Development) Conference was held at JCER; I was the chairman of the conference” (Kojima 1984, Page 513-514).

As Kiyoshi Kojima recalled, the scheme for the Pacific Economic Block started just like Kajima’s Pan Asia, from a feeling of crisis of being left behind by the European Community. The member countries of his scheme were only the five advanced countries (America, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand); other countries of South East Asia were not members, but would be assisted economically. It was an organization of Asia Pacific composed of advanced countries. Whereas in Kajima’s scheme countries than the five countries mentioned above were official members. There was a fundamental difference, although Kajima claimed that the Pacific Economic Block by (Kojima)/Miki was the same, and his Pan-Asia.

Morinosuke Kajima focused on Asia in his Asia Pacific Community theory. He returned to Pan-Asia amid the changes of international and Asian situation in the 1970s. He took the Dynamic Planning and Economic and Functional Approach in the way to Pan-Asia, and made concrete proposals. In other words, his Action Plan was based on the Economic and Functional Approach, which and I think surpasses the present level of the theory of the East Asia Community. After his death, we can say that his Pan-Asia plan was almost forgotten. On the contrary, the Pacific Common Market plan by Kojima, supported by Miki, internationally known as PAFTAD (Pacific Trade and Development Conference) flourished up to the present, despite Kajima’s position(Kojima 1984, Page 514).

What is the difference?

We can assume that, when Kajima returned to the Pan-Asia concept, the structure of the development of East Asia had just started toward the establishment of a Pan Pacific Economic Block. In the 1970s, the development of the NIES (Newly Industrializing Economies), such as Korea, Taiwan, HongKong and Singapore drew world attention to East Asia; ASEAN followed. In the early 1990s, such attention changed to the development of China. The structure of this development aimed at the materialization of regional development, on the basis of the triangle structure, that is Japan—NIES—America, and joined by ASEAN and China. An interest in Pan-Pacific through economic development grew strong, but, on the other hand, the concern for self-reliance of Asia tended to grow weak. In 1989, APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) was born advocating regionalism under the initiative of Australia. And, in the APEC, the globalization was strongly driven forward under the leadership of America. In 1994, APEC Leaders adopted the Bogor Goals in Indonesia which agreed to the free and open trade and investment by 2010 for industrialized economies and by 2020 for developing economies. In 1995, Yoichi Funabashi, an editorial writer of the Asahi (newspaper), named such economic integrations as ‘Asia-Pacific Fusion’ (Funabashi 1995).

This trend towards regionalism and globalization changed after the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. In 2001, the leaders of the ASEAN + 3, which was organized after the Asian Financial Crisis, approved the economic integration and holding a regular East Asian Summit as the future target proposed by the East Asian Vision Group in its slogan ‘Toward An East Asian Community.’ In 2005, the East Asian Leaders Conference was held, though it differed a little from the original idea. The concept of the East Asian Community is becoming the future target although concrete ideas are still vague. We can say the circumstances are leading towards the realization of Kajima’s dream of Pan-Asia, though there will be a lot of difficulties to be overcome before the dream becomes a reality. At present, international initiatives are not limited to the diplomacy of each country but each citizen can perform their duties to make the dream of a Community come true, and the possibilities for this are increasing.

Kajima’s dream for a Pan-Asia is approaching the goal step by step.

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