

The Game of Intertextuality : With Special Reference to *The Rape of the Lock*

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A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a beneficent God to explain geological movements. In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification. (Deleuze and Guattari 3)

Now, let me ask what the quotation tells us or what the quotation is. If it reads the descriptive statement about book, then let us interpret the phrase “beneficent God” as the word “genre.” The quotation shows us the typical idea of genre. As soon as a genre appears, the quotation becomes readable: “Without it [the floodgate of genre], neither genre nor literature come to light, but as soon as there is this blinking of an eye, this clause or this floodgate of genre, at the very moment that a genre or a literature is broached, at that very moment, degenerescence has begun, the end begins” (Derrida 65–66).

The quotation literally tells us the beneficence of genre, because we may interpret the quotation as the performative declaration that the writers make, or as the imperative sentences admonishing that we should not attribute a book to a subject. The reducibility, whether it is reduced to the

performative or the imperative, proves, simultaneously, the necessity and impossibility of genre, on the basis of which, Jacques Derrida formulates his idea of genre : “a text cannot belong to no genre, it cannot be without or less a genre. Every text participates in one or several genres, there is no genreless text ; there is always a genre and genres, yet such participation never amounts to belonging” (65). A genre is a simple result of classification, merely one of possible results, but an indispensable result for interpretation.

What kind of participation in genres ? Conventional, canonical, formalistic ? At any rate, at the moment of reading, one makes the participation available for the purpose of interpretation. As for *The Rape of the Lock* (hereafter *Rape*), I would like to invent a more effective participation than the typical frame of mock-epic to fabricate a consistent story suitable for the interrogations such as “what the rape is,” “why the lock is raped,” and “how the plunder of the lock is identified with a rape.” To supply such an urgent demand for an effective participation, I assume “lady *à la mode*” as a generic discourse, which consists of the intertextuality concerning the rape, ladies, and morality. In this paper, I aim at the compensation of lady *à la mode* for the *Rape* rather than the interpretation of genre in the *Rape*. I will make a detour to interpret the *Rape*, therefore to interrogate what the rape is.

First, it is necessary to explain what I mean by the term “lady *à la mode*,” although the term may be too simple to explain. Lady *à la mode* is nothing more than the generic designation for ladies described using contemporary fashions. It is not reduced to the designation of the individual character Belinda or to the actual person Arabella Fermor, but it is only the problem of how ladies were described. The probability of the assumption of lady *à la mode* is proved by the consistency of manner in which contemporary ladies were described. Indeed, in such a consistent manner, ladies

are usually expressed as beautiful, goddess-like, and well adorned with dress, makeup, and fan. Besides, they are more or less immersed in many pleasures such as a card game, chat, and ball. Whenever a described lady can be regarded as a lady of fashion, lady *à la mode* appears to function as a genre, “destined to be by virtue of its *telos*” (Derrida 57), by the genre *ipso facto*, the *de jure* genre.

In lady *à la mode*, what kind of intertextual discourse is plausible? The answer to this question must make it possible to interrogate why the lock is raped, because lady *à la mode* should be responsible for the text. As for the concatenation between the lady of fashion and the rape, then, the juncture is the strict morality for the lady of fashion. We will be able to make up an effective discourse by delving into the relation of the rape with morality.

As far as mock-epic, although not called mock-epic in those days, is concerned, morality seems to be an important factor to define what mock-epic is. Morality also seemed to have an influence on Pope’s revision and enlargement of the *Rape*. Pope received letters from John Dennis, critic and dramatist, in 1714 just after the publication of the revised and enlarged five-canto version of the *Rape*. In these letters, Dennis criticized Pope for the lack of morality in the five-canto version of the *Rape* published in 1714 :

The *Rape of the Lock* is a very *empty Trifle*, without any *Solidity* or *sensible Meaning* ; whereas the *Lutrin* is only a *Trifle* in *Appearance*, but under that *Appearance* carries a very grave and very important *Instruction* : For if that *Poem* were only what it appears to be, *Boileau* would run counter to the *fam’d Rule* which he has prescrib’d to others. (*The Critical Heritage* 99)

Dennis’s castigation of the *Rape* is based on its disobedience to the epic

convention, the lack of instructive meanings, by comparison with Boileau's *Lutrin*. It may be said that morality, as well as pleasure, was the most important trait for mock-epic. Let us remember the statement about mock-epic in the preface to *Joseph Andrews*, in which Henry Fielding estimates his work to be a "comic Epic-Poem in Prose" (4). In this case, we cannot necessarily say that mock-epic belongs to either comic or epic. In the contemporary comprehension that mock-epic has to give readers both pleasure and instruction, it was regarded as quite eclectic and syncretic.

The scene Pope added to the *Rape* in 1717 with the intention of giving instruction is the one called Clarissa's speech, which many critics refer to as an important scene including the contemporary sense of morality. The scene of Clarissa's speech implies a "view of life as it must be when the playing has to stop" (Martin Price 8), or "poignant realizations" (Robin Grove 62), or an "exercise in worldly realism" by turning "Belinda's eyes away from surfaces to the moral qualities within" (David Fairer 113). At any rate, although they explain distinctly, they agree on the point that Clarissa's speech functions to inculcate readers with the importance of morality in the realistic world against Belinda's fantastic world. Thus Clarissa's speech is often regarded as a moral center of the *Rape*. Let us go into detail. Clarissa vainly attempts to persuade sorrowful Belinda to be wise and realistic with "good Humour" (5.31) and to wipe the reverie about her scissored lock away: "frail Beauty must decay, / Curl'd or uncurl'd, since Locks will turn to grey, / Since painted, or not painted, all shall fade, / And she who scorns a Man, must die a Maid" (5.25-28). Her rhetoric does not have an instructive effect until it is exercised on Belinda's playing world. In other words, Clarissa's rhetoric says that Belinda should have hair that is uncurled, unpainted, and should not be strongly attached to the evanescent beauty of the lock, or absorbed in dressing herself, or beat men scornfully at the game of ombre.

If she remains so vain, she will die a maid. As Clarissa's speech shows, the quality of morality in the *Rape* is not chastity in the sense that the term simply signifies the virtue of virginity. Another kind of chastity may be suggested. Pope seems to imply the frailty of chastity throughout the *Rape*: "the purity of melting Maids" (1.71), "*Diana's Law*" (2.105), and "some frail *China Jar*" (2.106). The couplet in which Pope juxtaposes the breaking of Diana's Law and the cracking of the frail China Jar implies, as Cleanth Brooks points out, that "chastity is, like the fine porcelain, something brittle, precious, useless, and easily broken" (95). As far as chastity is restricted only to the virtue of virginity, I can agree with Brooks. In the *Rape*, however, if chastity is only such a thing as Brooks says, Clarissa's speech will be regarded as a kind of consolation to Belinda. What it all comes down to is that Clarissa plays a part in making Belinda realize the vulnerability of beauty as well as chastity. In the sense that chastity does not signify only the virtue of virginity, however, Clarissa's speech can be considered not merely as a consolation but rather as an admonition, which imperatively coerces Belinda into being modest. Clarissa implicitly becomes an accuser of our understanding of chastity as the virtue of modesty.

Focusing on the relation between beauty and modesty, I would like to develop a theory of effective discourse to give an account of the rape. The definite relation between them is not written into the *Rape*, but it should be made up with the intertextual discourse of lady *à la mode*, or beauty is closely related to modesty at least in the contemporary mode of writing. The *Rape*, according to Timothy Erwin, "brings the pleasures of the beautiful to bear on moral usefulness" (53), and the rhetorical design and diction embody the "morality of firm contour against the slippery appeal of color" (58). In Erwin's analysis from the viewpoint of pictorialism, what we should pay attention to are the distinctive features in the rhetorical means

of description in which writers extol the beauty of a lady.

When poets expressed the beauty of a lady, the virtue of modesty was often an important added value to emphasize the beauty. The more a lady is modest, the more she is beautiful. This need not apply only in what I call “lady *à la mode*.” Beautiful ladies with the virtue of modesty can be found in all kinds of writings. As a remarkable example for them, I would like to refer to Dryden’s “The Lady’s Song,” which was written in 1691 and published in 1704. “The Lady’s Song” is neither a mock-epic poem nor what I call lady *à la mode*, but the attention to the poem is effective enough to elucidate the function of discourse coercing ladies into the virtue of modesty. The poem consists of only three stanzas, with six lines in each stanza, and describes the pastoral scene, in which a lady called Phillis was chosen for the Queen of the May, but she refused it because of the absence of Pan : “While *Pan*, and fair *Syrinx*, are fled from our Shore, / The Graces are banish’d, and Love is no more” (7-8). And she continues to say that beauty should not be admired without Pan :

Forbear your Addresses, and Court us no more,
For we will perform what the Deity swore:
But if you dare think of deserving our Charms,
Away with your Sheephooks, and take to your Arms;
Then Lawrels and Myrtles your Brows shall adorn,
When *Pan*, and his Son, and fair *Syrinx*, return. (13-18)

This poem has been often interpreted in historical and political terms by means of the conventional connection between pastoral and political : that is, the flight of Pan and *Syrinx* may allude to the banishment of James II and his wife. I have no particular objection to this reading, but do not refer especially to it. Rather my focus is on the rhetorical technique by which

Phyllis is admired. The poet praises Phyllis for her beauty by showing that she was chosen for the Queen. However, why Phyllis deserves to be praised as a beautiful lady is not only that she was chosen for the Queen but also that she refused to come to the Queen. Without the “soft God of Pleasure that warm’d our Desire” (9), she cannot give or receive love during his absence. Thus her virtue lies in the fact that she distinguishes the timely love from the untimely love. Without Pan and the “soft God of Pleasure,” the timely love will take a turn for the worse and become the untimely love. Phyllis’s refusal is the proof of her modesty, and the poet’s rhetorical strategy is to suggest that his admiration of Phyllis is not specious, and that she is worthy of being the Queen.

Beauty and modesty were inseparable from each other at least when a poet praised a lady for her beauty. Although beauty and modesty are heterogeneous in substance, both of them generate in the common purpose of admiration of a lady a *topos*, which functions as the discourse saying that an admirable lady should be endowed with both fine looks and virtuous qualities. The discursive connection between them also penetrates the lady *à la mode* and often functions as a pedagogical innuendo to instruct female readers. While the discourse concerning the sexuality of lady is working on the performative level to praise the beauty of Phyllis in Dryden’s “The Lady’s Song,” it is working on the pedagogical level to inculcate female readers with moral goodness in the discourse of lady *à la mode*. That is not achieved by the performative narration of saying that ladies should be modest, but rather usually implied behind the veil of oleaginous admiration of beauty.

As is often the case with the poems of lady *à la mode*, the poets exaggerate the made-up beauty of a lady’s looks with excessive emphasis. In Pope’s description, it is remarkable in the toilet scene (1.123-39). In his “The Lady’s Dressing Room,” Jonathan Swift exaggeratedly describes the

toilet scene :

Five Hours, (and who can do it less in ?)
 By haughty *Celia* spent in Dressing;
 The Goddess from her Chamber issues,
 Array'd in Lace, Brocade and Tissues: (1-4)

In his description of toilet scene, John Gay also exaggerates the made-up beauty of a lady in a similar manner :

A different Toil another Forge employs;
 Here the loud Hammer fashions Female Toys,
 Hence is the Fair with Ornament supply'd,
 . . . There stands the *Toilette*, Nursery of Charms,
 Compleatly furnish'd with bright Beauty's Arms;
 The Patch, the Powder-Box, Pulville, Perfumes,
 Pins, Paint, a flatt'ring Glass, and Black-lead Combs.

(*The Fan* 1.111-13, 127-30)

It is in the hyperbole of made-up beauty that we can intercalate the pedagogical discourse.

As for the legitimacy of putting lady *à la mode* into the pedagogical discourse, the reference to Gay's "A Letter to a Lady" is indispensable for me, because the poem can be read as a kind of manifesto in which the poet clearly expresses his ideal about the connection between beauty and morality. The poem is a panegyric on a lady, Carolina, "Occasion'd by the Arrival of Her Royal Highness THE PRINCESS of WALES." The poet praises her beauty otherwise than with the oleaginous admiration endemic in lady *à la mode*. Carolina possesses both beautiful looks and a keen sense of morals :

BEAUTY and Wit were sure by Nature join'd,
 And Charms are Emanations of the Mind;
 The Soul transpiercing through the shining Frame,
 Forms all the Graces of the Princely Dame:
 Benevolence her Conversation guides,
 Smiles on her Cheek, and in her Eye resides. (51-56)

By the virtue of *physis*, beauty and morality are necessarily connected to with each other. In short, the lack of either beauty or morality may bring about the depravity of the other ; therefore, the connection of beauty and morality generates the virtue concerned with the “admirable” lady.

Besides, it is also important that what makes this connection possible is nature. In the logic that beauty connects in nature with morality, the made-up beauty is denied as something artificial, against nature : “*Nor catch your Lovers Eyes with artful Airs; / Restrain your Looks, kneel more, and whisper less, / Nor most devoutly criticize on Dress*” (“A Letter to a Lady” 64-66). Owing to her consistency between beauty and morality, Carolina can be a “tender Mother” and a “faithful Wife” (68) with the guarantee of success in her life and her posterity : “*The Son shall add new Honours to the [family] Line, / And early with Paternal Vertues shine*” (73-74). In this way, the individual problem of Carolina’s beauty accompanied by morality even expands to the family problem of her descendants’ success. The hyperbole causes an illogical leap in the succession that Carolina’s beauty is an incipient cause of guiding her descendants to success, but what I should notice here is not whether it depends on a logical legitimacy but that it is a panegyric in the performative method to praise the beauty of a lady.

I have referred to the connection between beauty and morality, especially the virtue of modesty, as an intertextual discourse in order to elucidate the sense of chastity in the *Rape*, and therefore can easily adumbrate

the problem concerning the generic feature of mock-epic as *satira*, that is, why the trifling plunder of the lock is depicted as a serious rape, and what the rape implies really. Since the term “beauty” not only denotes beautiful looks but also connotes moral goodness, the rape of the lock, which is the avatar of beauty in Belinda’s looks, is a moral sanction in the sense that Belinda only recognizes “beauty” in the denotative meaning. Let us remember Belinda’s addiction to ornamentation in the toilet scene, which C. E. Nicholson explains as the “dehumanising process that characterizes the poem as a whole” (72). By the “dehumanising process,” Nicholson means that Belinda “is in fact idolizing herself through the medium of the objects [toilet articles] which will transform her appearance, which will ‘create’ her public image” (72). Unlike Phillis and Carolina, Belinda is apathetic to the good sense of morality incidental to beauty. By putting the discourse concerning beauty and morality into the *Rape*, we can interpret on the pedagogical level the rape of the lock as a discipline against beauty without morality, regardless of the apotheosis of the lock in the final scene.

Now that we have seen the connection between beauty and morality in lady *à la mode*, let us continue with the virtue of modesty. The virtue of modesty functions, as I said, as an effective discourse in the *Rape*. In understanding how the virtue of modesty appears in the poems of lady *à la mode*, we will understand what Belinda is reprehensible for : for instance, the modesty of Phillis in “The Lady’s Song” depends on her discretion by which she can be equal and appropriate to the occasion. Belinda’s sin against modesty has nothing to do with her impertinence of beating men scornfully and proudly at the card game, or her infidelity when she even abuses, as an accessory, a “sparkling *Cross* . . . / Which *Jews* might kiss, and Infidels adore” (2.7-8), or her fickleness of “the moving Toyshop of their Heart” (1.100). Rather, to draw a conclusion, it has much to do with her artificial beauty, *techne* against *physis*, or *ars* against *natura*. The binary

opposition between art and nature becomes problematic.

Why the binary opposition between art and nature is problematic depends upon the idea that love occupies the *topos* of game, play, or *techne*. The idea of love as *techne* derives from Ovid. He makes a definite statement on the matter: “arte regendus Amor” (*Ars Amatoria* 4). In the *topos* of love, the idea of *techne* causes the ramification of controller and controlled. In the *Rape*, the scene of the card game is the best allusion to the struggle for leadership between Belinda and the Baron. The game can be interpreted as an “allegory of the game of sexual brinksmanship that Belinda plays” (Nelson 236), or a “microcosm of the whole poem, a brilliant epitome of the combat between the sexes that is the theme of the whole” (Wimsatt 32). Each of them wants to be a controller in the *topos* of love as *techne*.

The problem of love as *techne* converges on the power relation in the game of ombre, the ubiquitousness of game, and the iterability of game. First, the game makes its own territory, the ritual of ombre, the only one in which players can play their roles: for instance, Belinda plays the role of queen. Then, the reason they can play their roles is that the territory of game incarnates the prerogative as a substantial power. Everyone who shares this territory must obey the rule of game, or else the territory will be on the verge of a crisis of extinction. One who defies the rule of game discloses the secular element in the game, the hallucination of game; therefore he tends to put the territory of game in jeopardy. Who is a spoiler in the *Rape*? Maybe Belinda and the Baron. They are players and analysts of the game at the same time. Let us remember Belinda’s addiction to the lock and the Baron’s wish for the lock. Belinda’s fetishism of the lock spoils her “sacred Rites of Pride” (1.128). The Baron’s gratuitous wish for the lock spoils the ritual of ombre. Player and analyst are inseparable, so they are, as it were, two sides of the same coin. Derrida aptly explains this

relationship : “Between the actor and the analyst, whatever the distance or differences may be, the boundary therefore appears uncertain. Always permeable” (*On the Name* 3).

Second, the ubiquitousness and the iterability of game are synonymous. As far as a game has its own rules, the territory of game must be available wherever players require it, and it must be repeatable for players according to the rules. A game has neither specific space, nor specific time : ritual “does not define a field. There is ritual everywhere” (*On the Name* 3). The territory of game is unfolded wherever and whenever players wish. Owing to this nature of game, the *Rape* may endlessly unfold unspecified “sacred Rites of Pride,” an unspecified rape, and unspecified “mighty Contests.” That is why the game of ombre can be read as a ritual of “sexual brinksmanship” and a “microcosm of the whole poem.”

Again go back to the binary opposition between art and nature. The reason that artificial beauty is against nature and is often reprehensible is derived not from the unnaturalness, immorality and voraciousness in the act of dressing up like a goddess, but rather from the question of degree, whether the effect of dressing up is temperate or not. In his poem “The Progress of Beauty,” Swift describes the wastefulness of sumptuous ornamentation. The poem draws a parallel between “earthly Femals and the Moon” (9). The goddess of moon, Diana, whose face and looks are ugly at her awakening, gradually adorns herself with artificial powers and, at last, “Her artificiall Face appears / Down from her Window in the Sky, / Her Spots are gone, her Visage clears” (6-8) at the zenith. In the same way as Diana, Celia, an earthly lady, appears with her “frightfull hideous Face” (20), with such features as “Crackt Lips, foul Teeth, and gummy Eyes” (15), but “can with ease reduce / By help of Pencil, Paint and Brush / Each Colour to it’s Place and Use, /And teach her Cheeks again to brush” (33-36). Celia’s ability with make-up is so proficient that “She knows her Early

self no more” (37), she admires herself “As Other Painters oft adore / The Workmanship of their own Hands” (39-40), and it seems to be doubtful “which among the Heav’nly Pow’rs / Could cause such marvellous Effects” (43-44).

Although it seems to praise her improved beauty, the poem turns from the culmination of lionizing her skillfulness to the bathos of her making vain efforts in the end. Saying that “White lead was sent us to repair / Two brightest, brittlest earthly Things / A Lady’s Face, and China ware” (50-52), the poet recognizes that the proficiency in make-up is indebted to the materials for make-up, and then has misgivings about the waste of materials when make-up has no effect :

But, Art no longer can prevayl
When the Materialls all are gone,
The best Mechanick Hand must fayl
Where Nothing’s left to work upon.
Matter, as wise Logicians say,
Cannot without a Form subsist,
And Form, say I, as well as They,
Must fayl if Matter brings no Grist. (61-68)

When an immoderate waste of materials by ladies putting on heavy make-up causes an upset of equilibrium between matter and form, “Each Night a Bit drops off her [Diana’s] Face” (71) and “mortal Beautyes drop so soon” (98). Against the dissipation for something evanescent such as make-up, the poet concludes :

Poor Celia, but of mortall Race
In vain expects a longer Date
To the Materialls of Her Face.

When Mercury her Tresses mows
 To think of Black-head Combs is vain,
 No Painting can restore a Nose,
 Nor will her Teeth return again. (90-96)

The relation between beauty and morality is ingrained. Woman's dissipation has been a popular theme for criticism. Let me trace it back to Juvenal. He impugns a woman for her lavishness in adorning herself :

Nil non permittit mulier sibi, turpe putat nil,
 cum virides gemmas collo circumdedit et cum
 auribus extentis magnos commisit elenchos;
 intolerabilius nihil est quam femina dives. (Satira 6.457-60)

Here, Juvenal clearly focuses his target on a rich woman, "femina dives" *par excellence*. Impeachable is not *divitia*, wealthiness, but *turpe nihil*, shamelessness. It can be proved by the following line : "tanta est quaerendi cura decoris" (Satira 6.501). Fascinated by decorating herself, the woman pays little attention to the sense of shame. The satire on the rich woman becomes possible on the basis of the virtue of modesty.

It seems to be important that the virtue of modesty does not ask ladies to forbid the particular type of acts such as adorning themselves, playing a card game, going on and on about nothing, but asks them to forbear speaking and acting in an extreme deviation from nature. The question to ask concerning the virtue of modesty is not "what" but "how much." In the same sense, as Michel Foucault points out,¹ the virtue of modesty is not a question of quality but a question of quantity : "immorality in the pleasures of sex is always connected with exaggeration, surplus, and excess" (*The Use of Pleasure* 45). That is why the description of materials in the toilet

scene is important. Indeed the display of cosmetics was depicted in a stereotypical manner in the poems of lady *à la mode*. In such a manner, Pope displays “Puffs, Powders, Patches, Bibles, Billet-doux” (1.138); Gay displays “The Patch, the Powder-Box, Pulville, Perfumes, / Pins, Paint, a flatt’ring Glass, and Black-lead Combs”; and Swift displays “Her [Celia’s] Ointments, Daubs and Paints and Creams, / Her Washes, Slops, and every Clout” (“The Lady’s Dressing Room” 136-37). Moreover, the toilet scene in the *Rape* even lavishes unnatural materials on Belinda: “This Casket *India’s* glowing Gems unlocks, / And all *Arabia* breathes from yonder Box. / The Tortoise here and Elephant unite, / Transform’d to *Combs*, the speckled and the white” (1.133-36). The enumeration is based on the virtue of modesty.

The relation between both ladies’ excessive use of materials for something trivial and the virtue of modesty concerning quantity is also found in the *Rape*. The keyword is “material.” Belinda’s world is extremely saturated with materials, but she has no awareness of supernatural beings such as sylphs and gnomes. Indeed, the materialism in Belinda’s world has been the focus of much critical discussion.² Focusing on Belinda’s passivity, on the idea that her “self” is created by the power of exterior objects, Nicholson considers the *Rape* as the “automatic drama of object-life” (76), in which “human life is ‘lived’ by means of an extension into the objects that gradually form the subject of the poem” (70). K. M. Quinsey finds the “image of people transformed to objects” (87), and points out that abstract concepts such as morality, emotion, and mentality “are reduced to the status of decorative objects” (88). A. C. Buchmann regards the *Rape* as a “satire of materialism and snobbery,” and finds the “human-object reversals,” in which “the objects which now behave more or less like people were half-animated before, and the people have been objectified and borderline grotesque all along” (119). Richard Terry takes account of the background

of contemporary consumerism, which “took the form of purchasing luxuries rather than necessities,” and puts the *Rape* into a series of criticisms of “Women’s giddy consumerism,” which “took up economic slack and made them targets of male social criticism” (66). In any case, all of them point out the predominance of the material over the spiritual in Belinda’s world.

We cannot ignore the influence of consumerism in the emporium. The enumeration of materials in the poems of lady *à la mode* is reasonably provocative for austere people amenable to the virtue of modesty, and it is exactly the excessive use of materials beyond nature that Swift rebukes these ladies for. However, an “economic” friction between modest and immodest, or temperate and intemperate, is not the only *topos* to give discursive themes to the poems of lady *à la mode*. In the *Rape*, the urgency of the virtue of modesty is aggrandized at least through two discourses. One such discourse is the apprehension that immodesty and intemperance may corrupt the economic structure. In terms of such an economic discourse, the orderly enumeration of “Puffs, Powders, Patches, Bibles, Billet-doux” may turn out to be violated: “Sooner let Earth, Air, Sea, to Chaos fall, / Men, Monkeys, Lap-dogs, Parrots, perish all!” (4.119-20). Another is contingent upon the deviation from nature by means of excessive ornamentation.

Questions remain. In spite of the surpassing beauty of Belinda — “Fair Nymphs, and well-drest Youths around her [Belinda] shone, / But ev’ry Eye was fix’d on her alone” (2.5-6) — why does excessive ornamentation cause, not an admirable charm of beauty, but the deviation from nature? Why does the deviation from nature lay Belinda open to censure? There must be a process of reversal in which an admirable beauty turns into a target of censure. As a rhetorical strategy, the term “beauty” has often been abused to reverse the power relation between a censurer and a censured, a plaintiff and a defendant, or a victim and an assailant. I mean, beauty

is, as it were, the *topos* where the persons concerned play a game of putting themselves on a trial. In such a specious process of the trial game, a plaintiff, namely a victim who sustained a loss, often loses the case, while a defendant, an assailant who caused damage to the victim, wins it. In the case of the *Rape*, for example, Belinda is a loser and the Baron is a winner, or Belinda's claim that "*Restore the Lock !*" (5.103) becomes invalid: "The Lock, obtain'd with Guilt, and kept with Pain. / In ev'ry place is sought, but sought in vain" (5.109-10).

Along with the poems of lady *à la mode*, as a poem playing the trial game, I would like to refer especially to Gay's "The Lady and the Wasp" from *Fables* published in 1727. *Fables*, as the word usually signifies, consists of a number of "didactic" poems written with the intention to instruct readers in the moral sense. The first four lines epitomize the whole story of the poem.

What whispers must the Beauty bear!
 What hourly nonsense haunts her ear!
 Where-e'er her eyes dispense their charms
 Impertinence around her swarms. (1-4)

In the same manner as we have seen in the poems of lady *à la mode*, a lady, called Doris, adorns herself with make-up, simply idling away her time. Thus she has nothing to do, but "A giddy wasp around her flies, / He now advances, now retires, / Now to her neck and cheek aspires" (20-22). So she attempts to fan the wasp away. The more she fans the wasp away, however, the more the wasp dizzily flies around her. In the end the wasp grew so bold that it "Perch'd on her lip and sipt the dew" (26). The wasp enjoys lingering on her lips, so he "Braggs how her sweetest tea he sips, / And shows the sugar on his lips" (45-46). Satisfied with her sweetness, the wasp

calls a group of his fellows, who share her sweetness and fly “Round her with airy musick” (50). “And now they flutter, now they rest, / Now soar again, and skim her breast, / Nor were they banish’d, ’till she found / That wasps have stings, and felt the wound” (51-54).

By means of the metaphor of lady and wasp, the poem teaches us the antinomy that “Bees that have honey in their mouths have stings in their tails” (Tilley B211). Doris is stung by the wasp out of her ignorance. For Doris, who considers the wasp as something impertinent, she herself is just a victim; therefore she thinks that the wasp is at fault for attacking her. For the wasp, on the other hand, the one who is at fault is Doris herself. As far as the poem is concerned with the antinomy, her ignorance of the sting of the wasp appears to cause the reversal of power relations between the lady and the wasp in the trial game. The wasp complains, “Am I then slighted, scorn’d, disdain’d? / Can such offence your anger wake?” (32-33). In this reversal, we should pay attention to the rhetoric by which the wasp adroitly evades the fault and attributes the fault to her. In that rhetoric, we cannot help finding the discourse concerning beauty and morality, art and nature, immodesty and modesty.

Against the enmity of Doris who complains that “Of all the plagues that heav’n hath sent / A wasp is most impertinent” (29-30), the wasp refutes her intrusive rhetoric by claiming the fault on the side of Doris :

’Twas beauty caus’d the bold mistake.
 Those cherry lips that breathe perfume,
 That cheek so ripe with youthful bloom
 Made me with strong desire pursue
 The fairest peach that ever grew. (34-38)

According to the wasp, the main culprit that causes his flying around her,

lingering on her, and enjoying her sweetness, is just her beauty, the made-up beauty. Here, it is overt that the wasp's rhetoric abuses her made-up beauty in the trial game. The upshot of all this is that, in lady *à la mode*, the instruction of antinomy is given in terms of the discursive connection between artificial beauty and morality. The idea of "artificial beauty as an impelling force" lubricates our comprehension of why the lock is raped in the *Rape*.

Also in the *Rape*, it seems to be the lock itself that impels the Baron to the rape. The *Rape* does not clearly present any reason why the Baron comes to wish for the lock, but the beauty of the lock is the most impetuous driving force for the Baron : "Th' Adventrous *Baron* the bright Locks admir'd, / He saw, he wish'd, and to the Prize aspir'd" (2.29-30). The Baron's addiction to the lock is due to the artificiality of the lock, which is closely related to the virtue of modesty opposed to a deviation from nature. The lock is so excessively elaborate that it ensnares everyone, bringing about their ruin and destruction :

This Nymph [Belinda], to the Destruction of Mankind,
Nourish'd two Locks, which graceful hung behind
In equal Curls, and well conspir'd to deck
With shining Ringlets the smooth Iv'ry Neck.
Love in these Labyrinths his Slaves detains,
And mighty Hearts are held in slender Chains.
With hairy Sprindges we the Birds betray,
Slight Lines of Hair surprize the Finny Prey,
Fair Tresses Man's Imperial Race insnare,
And Beauty draws us with a single Hair. (2.19-28)

The excessively elaborate lock is so deceitful that it enslaves "the Birds," "the Finny Prey," and "Man's Imperial Race." When the deceitful beauty

of the lock impels them to the enslavement, it can be said, Belinda commits a sin of “deceit.”

The juxtaposition of “The Lady and the Wasp” and the *Rape* comes to expose a sin of deceit behind the make-believe beauty. In this process of the trial game between the ravisher (the wasp and the Baron) and the ravished (Doris and Belinda), therefore, the discursive testimony exposing a sin of deceit ironically makes the ravished subject to moral punishment, and at the same time the ravisher innocent. In the pedagogical sense as opposed to the performative sense of words, where the Baron should be seen as being reprehensible for committing the rape, the rape functions as a legitimate sanction on Belinda. Thus we can find both economic and moral discourses in the *Rape*. The economic discourse, as some critics point out, describes the quantitative problem of consumerism in ladies’ excessive ornamentation. Furthermore, the moral discourse describes a sin of deceit dependent on exaggeration, surplus, and excess. Above all, the latter is significant in the *Rape* when we persist in why the “lock” is raped. In the former case, the complaint about Belinda’s extravagance would be sufficiently annulled even by the attack on other ornaments than the lock. The rape may be an attack on the vice of deceit, whose embodiment is the lock. Anyway in such a double sense of modesty, no one must go overboard in anything.

That Belinda commits a sin of “deceit” seems to contrast with the manner in which the Baron rapes the lock. In the scene of the rape when “The Peer now spreads the glitt’ring Forfex wide, / T’inclose the Lock; now joints it, to divide” (3.147-48), Pope does not give a detailed explanation of the manner of the rape, nevertheless he makes an attentive implication. The Baron resolves to deprive Belinda of her lock, pondering how he can get her lock, and vacillating between two possible ways, that is, “By Force to ravish, or by Fraud betray” (2.32). If anything, his way of getting the lock corresponds to the former. In this point, the force by means of

which the Baron ravished the lock is compared with the fraud by means of which Belinda ensnares "Man's Imperial Race." Insofar as the comparison between force and fraud epitomizes the trial game between the Baron and Belinda, the Baron should not defraud her of the lock, because he cannot commit deceit himself if he is to apply a sanction on Belinda who commits the sin of deceit. Such a moral sanction should be carried out not by the law, but by the dictates of conscience.

Both force and fraud are regarded as criminal acts, but they are not always homogeneous. Considering ethical qualities of both force and fraud, we can distinctly find a hierarchy between force and fraud. A criminal act using force is vicious, because it inflicts injury on a person. In a similar way, a criminal act using fraud is vicious, and what is even worse, it also involves the vice of deceiving a person. From such an ethical viewpoint, as Taylor Corse points out, fraud has been seen as more unjust than force. Corse also points out that the ethical opposition between force and fraud "flourished as a literary *topos* in classical antiquity, in medieval Christendom, and throughout the Renaissance ; it saw, however, its final flowering in the eighteenth century" (356). In this ethical hierarchy, a man "would be punished less severely if he committed rape, overcome by the voracity of his desire, than if he deliberately and artfully seduced a woman" (*The Use of Pleasure* 146). Our reduction of the ethical discourse of force and fraud to the Baron and Belinda in the *Rape* corroborates the ethical legitimacy of the Baron's sanction on Belinda based on the hierarchy between "minor" force and "felonious" fraud. Owing to such an ethical discourse, therefore, the Baron's rape comes to function as a kind of sanction.

Moreover, the categorical position which Belinda occupies in the universal world containing both materials and spirits corroborates the rape as a moral sanction. Pope establishes a genre into which Belinda is relegated: Belinda is generically identified with "*Ill-nature*" whose "Hand is fill'd"

with “store of Pray’rs,” and “Bosom with Lampoons” (4.27-30), with “*Affectation*” who “On the rich Quilt sinks with becoming Woe, / Wrapt in a Gown, for Sickness, and for Show” (4.31-36), “wayward Queen” (4.57), and with “*Thalestris*” (4.89). Pope’s reference to Thalestris, the queen of Amazons, suggests that Belinda is a hazardous lady who plunges “Man’s Imperial Race” into destruction (Weinbrot 33-40). Charged with the sin of deceit and the deviation from nature, Belinda cannot help submitting to the repugnant categorization as an abnormality. By putting Belinda into such a category, a class, a genre, Pope makes a clear distinction between Belinda’s world and the moral world, whose usefulness Clarissa advocates. The ethical discourse of modesty wards off the refractory object of excess and resigns it to a peculiar frame of “*Ill-nature*.”

The ethical discourse is repressively at work on ladies, whom we have seen in the poems of lady *à la mode*. As long as they live in the moral world, they are not allowed to extricate their sex from the virtue of modesty. Sex must be controlled under meticulous surveillance ; therefore the use of sex is only approved of in a timely, legitimate, and generative locus, namely marriage. Clarissa’s rhetoric, that “she who scorns a Man, must die a Maid,” suggests the tolerance of sex in marriage. If they commit the sin of immodesty beyond the permissible level according to *physis*, then they must forfeit their honor and accept the confinement to the frame of ill nature. “If it was truly necessary to make room for illegitimate sexualities, it was reasoned, let them take their infernal mischief elsewhere : to a place where they could be reintegrated, if not in the circuits of production, at least in those of profit. The brothel and the mental hospital would be those places of tolerance” (*The History of Sexuality* 4). Foucault’s hypothesis seems to be compatible with the sickly and hysteric condition of Belinda. I mean, lest her immodesty should undermine the order based on the virtue of modesty, Belinda is transferred to the peculiar frame of “abnormality.” In

this way, the consumption of sex without productivity implicitly undergoes such a repressive transference.

As we have traced the consistent manner in which the beauty of ladies is described throughout the poems of lady *à la mode*, the *Rape* consists of two discourses, performative and pedagogical. In the former sense, dependent on the epic convention, the rape causing Belinda's fall into the underworld, the Cave of Spleen, is an important opportunity for the apotheosis of the lock in the final scene. The Baron's declaration that "the glorious Prize is mine! . . . So long my Honour, Name, and Praise shall live!" (3.162-70) literally shows that he wishes to get the lock for his honor. In this interpretation, the *Rape* is the epic poem in which Belinda triumphs finally. On the other hand, the latter sense subverts the former one. Belinda is no more an epic heroine, rather the Baron appears to be a hero who challenges vice, Clarrisa is equivalent to the epic God, the final apotheosis of the lock is not an antidote to her, and therefore the rape is the moral sanction which the hero, the Baron, imposes on the enemy, Belinda.

The way of writing that Pope utilizes the actual event between Arabella Fermor and Lord Petre is strictly dependent on the two discourses, from which Pope does not deviate. Indeed the *Rape* generates an incessant process of becoming between the two discourses, but it can be said that both of them function in a similar way as repressive devices for representing the poem. *Lady à la mode* is, as it were, the effectual device to reveal the power of discourse regulating the *Rape*. By considering genre, however, what is revealed is that the *Rape* is composed of the repressive power of discourse. We cannot relegate the *Rape* into a genre, although we can allow its participation in genres, but the participation itself is repressed by the power of discourse.

Notes

¹ By his analysis of sexuality especially in the ancient Greece and Rome, Foucault annotates on Aristotle's idea that "for the natural desires that are common to everyone, the only offenses that one can commit are quantitative in nature" (45). At first glance, his analysis seems to be incompatible with the virtue of modesty in the eighteenth-century England, but not without relationship. Foucault says that "one can have the impression that these three different forms of reflection [Greeks' arts of living, of conducting themselves, and of using pleasures] bear a close resemblance to the forms of austerity that will be found later, in the Western, Christian societies" (249).

² Focusing on Marx's idea of commodity fetishism, Helen Deutsch points out the relationship between the *Rape* and the "cultural context of the emergence of capitalism" in contemporary England: "To personify the commodity, to make it human and to give it a home, is to *own* it as the material fabric, the mechanical movement, from which meaning and beauty are made and which exceeds individual control" (75).

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Synopsis

The Game of Intertextuality :

With Special Reference to *The Rape of the Lock*

By Kenji Fujita

I do not need a genre as a panopticon, but as a useful device for interpreting texts. The power of genre is indispensable for the interpretation of text. As far as a genre is one of possible classifications, it is important to read a text in genres, not in a genre. Genres as intertextual discourses are ubiquitous in a text ; therefore the question of genre depends not on whether we can attribute a text to a genre but on whether we can utilize genre for interpretation.

The Rape of the Lock undergoes the participation of lady *à la mode*. Belinda is a queen, an epic heroine, in the performative sense, and is also a butt of satire or a reprehensible sinner in the pedagogical sense of lady *à la mode*. However, the antinomy is not the privilege given to the mock-epic poetry, but is dependent on the *de jure* genre.

Using the theory of genre, I attempt to interpret *The Rape of the Lock*. The point at issue is, as the title shows us, the term of "rape." In order to interrogate "why the Baron rapes the lock," "why the plunder of the rock is depicted as a rape," and "what the rape is," I fabricate a kind of genre, the intertextual discourse of lady *à la mode*. Lady *à la mode* proves that the rape is a kind of moral sanction. Belinda commits the sin of deceit because of her excessive adornment which is against the virtue of *physis*. In the poems of lady *à la mode*, the quantitative problem of excess is related not only to the waste of materials but also to the moral virtue of female sexuality. Then, the Baron's attack fulfills a function of moral sanction against the lack of modesty in Belinda.

Consequently, *The Rape of the Lock* is composed of the repressive power of discourse about female sexuality. Indeed, the actual models of Arabella Fermor and Lord Petre are replaced with the moral story about Belinda and the Baron. Through such a replacement, Arabella Fermor repressively becomes the sinner

Belinda, and Lord Petre paradoxically becomes the heroic Baron. In this way, both the epic convention and the discourse about female sexuality function in *The Rape of the Lock*.