

Mourning and the Literary Device of Pastoral Elegy:

Through Hamlet, Apollo, and the Poet of Gray's *Elegy*

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I

What mechanisms work through mourning? That is the sole question I present on the hypothesis that I may describe a topos in which mourning occurs and works mechanically or half-automatically by focusing especially on the literary devices of the pastoral and elegiac. The work of mourning is likely to operate on, more or less, a kind of pseudo-economic(al) place where the living and the dead exchange, give and take. I would like to investigate such an economy on mourning, in terms of the pastoral and elegiac, by crossing various kinds of texts, especially *Hamlet*, the story of Apollo and Daphne, and Gray's *Elegy*, because the discourse of mourning runs through those texts. We will find the irreducible experience of mourning in Hamlet's testimony to his mourning. Apollo's mourning structures the fictitious relation between the experience of mourning and the literary devices of the pastoral and elegiac. Gray's *Elegy* shows us a case of struggle for the posthumous controllable economy of mourning. At any rate, I will pursue the incessant relation between the economy and the experience of mourning, which cannot and should not be reduced to one story or literary genre.

I have to make a detour to ascertain the economy on mourning, insofar as the experience of mourning in itself has no history. It has something to do with the question of testifying, telling the truth for the sake of truth in truth. Possibly one can give a false testimony under an oath to tell the truth. In a situation that one testifies in favor of oneself, the truth and integrity of the testimony must be judged in terms of other verifications to ratify whether it is true or false. Indeed, a testimony alone does not amount directly to truth. It must admit of other testimonies, even though they result in refutation. When one tries to give a testimony, it ought to be derived from his own experience that nobody else has. He must be the only person who responds to his experience, taking responsibility in favor of truth. This matter should be considered under the question of medium in the name of *by way of* and *via*. On the instant that a single experience peculiar to one person is brought to light or to demands for its divulgence, insofar as it is a testimony, it must meet the demands of truth beyond the question of whether it is true or false. Beyond whether the content of testimony is true or false, it continues to assert its reliability and sincerity. Before the element of truth, "what I say is true," another element of truth, "I testify in the name of truth," operates in the midst of testification. The double element of truth permeates every act of giving testimony, swearing, and language whose necessary condition is reliability. Without reliability to the medium "I," neither true testimony nor false testimony can be considered. It is a kind of law that one should acquiesce in.

In front of the irreplaceability that nobody can vicariously testify to "my" experience, instead of "me," one can no longer consider any replaceable testimonies that everybody can give as common truth. Thinking logically, a nontransferable secret, with which a testimony begins, must remain in the testimony. That may indeed be a great paradox.¹ Secrets, which the "I" is the only one who possesses, make a testimony possible. In

a testimony, structurally, “I” appeal to “you” for reliability, a trustful relation between “us.” The act of giving testimony is, before the judgment of whether it is true or false, just a transfer of reliability on experience, a peculiar one remaining secret to the other, through the medium of “I” whose language is fictional to receivers. The idiom, which “I” can speak alone, puts on fictionality. In a sense, “I” always already give a testimony as if “I” were a foreign speaker whom nobody can comprehend. Then we will address the other as a foreigner with secrets. I want to abstract an appropriate address from *Hamlet*. The address is memorable: “Stay, speak, speak, I charge thee speak” (*Hamlet* 1. 1. 49). Horatio’s address to the ghost sounds extremely simple and brief. It is not only a “hello,” but also the address that demands a reply, probably a testimony. It is not an incident that Horatio addresses the ghost as if it were a foreigner. The scholar Horatio who speaks Latin is the only person who can play a role as an exorcist: “Thou art a scholar — speak to it, Horatio” (1. 1. 40). Horatio’s address is already conditionally articulated in potential sounds like English, Latin, and the idiom of exorcism at once, and besides in a tense utterance in such an imminent situation as to confront the monolingual for the first time. His address to the ghost is a doubled one containing a response to the monolingual that keeps secrets. In this way, “speak, speak” is repeated not only literally but also immanently.

The reference to *Hamlet* may occupy a marginal but permeating space in what I want to argue. It is a preface, a detour. From the very beginning we have considered a detour in the name of medium, *by way of*, and *via*: the detour that we are forced to take unavoidably insofar as we participate in the problematic concerning testimony. The opening in *Hamlet* constructs a very strained scene as a foreboding of the following dislocation: “The time is out of joint” (1. 5. 189). The ghost keeps silent to Horatio, Bernardo, and Marcellus. The strain principally consists of all kinds of testimonies to the

silent ghost. Characters respectively fall into the difficult and recalcitrant situation in which they are compelled to testify to their own experiences beyond reason and human knowledge. Keeping secrets because of the monolingualism that a witness falls into, Marcellus and Bernardo strive to exchange reliability with Horatio: “Horatio says ’tis but our fantasy, / And will not let belief take hold of him / Touching this dreaded sight twice seen of us” (1. 1. 21-23). Belief takes place before testimony. The appeal to reliability is a condition of the possibility of giving testimony. While testifying that they got the sight of the ghost twice, they keep telling him “believe in us, we talk the truth in truth” without voices. It is a voiceless utterance of reliability in testimony. After getting the sight of the ghost, Horatio testifies that the appearance of the ghost “bodes some strange eruption to our state” (1. 1. 68). His voiceless appeal to reliability is successfully received by Bernardo’s agreement: “I think it be no other but e’en so” (1. 1. 106. 1). A series of testimonies results from the duration of the asymmetrical relation between the witnesses, and the one between the witness and the ghost. The ghost in silence coerces them into standing in the position of witnesses patiently and enduringly. If keeping silent were to be reticent, taciturn, and even dumb, it is not synonymous with non-response, non-interest, and indifference, but rather suggests that it has an irreducible and outrageous secret, which, we know retroactively, is about the parricide; therefore the ghost is going to give a testimony. It seems at least to Horatio that the silence tells eloquently, “I have a testimony to give Hamlet”: “This spirit, dumb to us, will speak to him [Hamlet]” (1. 1. 152).

Reliability, credibility, and verisimilitude, which are the conditions for making testimony possible, may be more frequently swayed by the performative power of *giving* testimony than by the constative accuracy of testimony itself. Since reliability has more or less something to do with the performative, it is not enough to give just a pledge like “I promise” as a

mortgage. The “I promise” should be diglossiac in essence. To be precise, it should be uttered as the concatenation of “I” and “Promise” and, at the same time, as an oath opening the phenomenological horizon of promise on which “I engage myself to keep my word.” The promise is already repeated at the moment of utterance: I will be under the promise of “I promise.” Consequently the language of promise often conspires with the high-performance performative even until it reaches a ceremony or ritual. A ceremonious and ritualistic act may help to reveal the horizon of promise, and vice versa. When one endeavors to keep a promise as much as possible, whether it is conscious or instinctive, for the sake of oneself, it must be due to a kind of *conatus*, persistent-power-to-effort.² Remaining serious seems to guarantee the duration, persistence, and constancy of endeavor to be honest and sincere without resigning the possibility of perjury to nothing. *Hamlet* again. After hearing the ghost’s testimony that it was assassinated, Hamlet as the sole receiver of the testimony becomes the only person who can take responsibility to respond to the testimony. Nobody else should take *his* place, *his* responsibility, and *his* right as a successor to the father ghost. There can be no surrogate for Hamlet. So he cannot help negatively responding to Horatio and Marcellus, who want to know what the ghost told him, although they swear not to divulge it:

Horatio. Good my lord, tell it.

Hamlet. No, you’ll reveal it.

Horatio. Not I, my lord, by heaven.

Marcellus. Nor I, my lord. (1. 5. 123-24)

While taking “by heaven” as the words of oath, Hamlet cannot divulge the secret because of his sanguino-lineal responsibility to be a revenger. All he can do is to express his respect for their *conatus* to be honest, and then to give them his words of *conatus* in return, in a different way from confiding the secret completely. Indeed, he speaks the language of testimony, “believe

in me,” by giving the minimum information that “[I]t is an honest ghost” (1. 5. 142) and asks them to swear by his sword that they will keep the matter to themselves: “Swear by my sword” (1. 5. 156). The ritualistic act of “by my sword” reinforces the reliability to the *conatus* in which they endeavor to be faithful to what they swore.

Hamlet is a play that begins with the end, *after*. We *ex post facto* know that every kind of *after* happens before the beginning: the play begins after the death of the king, after the first appearance of the ghost, after the royal marriage, after the sunset, after the time set in joint, and so on. In spite of this kind of *after*, however, there is a sign showing the ties that bind the former generation and the succeeding generation together. Among people who have already passed through the *after*, Hamlet is only a sojourner who carries in a remnant of the former generation. He cannot step beyond the *after* and is still in mourning for his father. It seems to him that everything, affiliated with the term “time,” is “out of joint.”³ He is an anachronistic mourner whose possibility is contingent on the dislocation. One shall find what is characteristic of Hamlet’s mourning as opposed to how other characters mourn, if the ascription of his mourning for his dead father is not a sufficient explanation of mourning in detail. What would happen to the discrepancies between Hamlet on one hand and Claudius and Gertrude on the other hand if mourning had nothing to do with the performative at all (which seems to be impossible)? He might not have a detestation of the manner in which Claudius and Gertrude mourn, thereby of the marriage. Nobody could declare that he was in real mourning while they were not, without the element of reliability, the reference to the language of testimony. Claudius and Gertrude declare their mourning as well as Hamlet: Claudius testifies to their condolences “with a defeated joy, / With one auspicious and one dropping eye, / With mirth in funeral and with dirge in marriage” (1. 2. 10-12). Now the difference takes place between the element

of the performative and the reliability that the language of testimony speaks. Mourning is not merely lamentation, sorrow, or grief, but the work of lamenting, sorrowing, and grieving. It is exactly a work of mourning in a conspiracy with the performativity of ritualistic speech and action, that is, “in a dense matrix of rites and ceremonies, in the light of which many elegiac conventions should be recognized as being not only aesthetically interesting forms but also the literary versions of specific social and psychological practices” (Sacks 2). A conspiracy of mourning and ritual makes Claudius regard mourning as duty or obligation: “mourning duties” (1. 2. 88) and “filial obligation for some term / To do obsequious sorrow” (1. 2. 91-92). Characters like Claudius and Gertrude are likely to believe that a ritualistic work can testify to condolence in truth. Beyond ritual, for them, no condolence is believable and estimable. The condolence beyond ritualistic, conventional, and social orders, if it is possible, is regarded even as a “fault to heaven, /A fault against the dead, a fault to nature” (1. 2. 101-02). Claudius and Gertrude who live only in the economy of conventional orders cannot count the language of testimony that Hamlet speaks beyond the economy, nor find any reliability there. Whether or not the testimony opens the horizon of promise, ritualistic orders often economize one’s *conatus* to be honest in mourning. We shall listen to Hamlet’s sarcasm about the economy, the economization turning the irreducible to the reducible: “Thrift, thrift, Horatio. The funeral baked meats / Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables” (1. 2. 179-80).

It would not be reasonable to assert that appearances always express substances in truth, as ritualistic actions of mourning express sorrow, reliably, though that would not necessarily mean the ritual was conducted in name only. The ritualistic work of mourning can be a method to express condolence, and mourning also demands ritualistic performances. What one should begin with to *appear* as a mourner is the dependence on the conspir-

acy of mourning and ritual: not whether one in black mourns really, but one in black can be a mourner beyond whether one mourns really. The figure of costumes brings *Hamlet* and the elegiac together to a common stage, a common discourse. By looking at Hamlet in black, Gertrude reads that he is in mourning: “cast thy nightly colour off” (1. 2. 68). She tries in vain to reason with her son: “Thou know’st ’tis common — all that lives must die, / Passing through nature to eternity” (1. 2. 72-73). Here comes a gap, the one between Gertrude who believes that the work of mourning always sufficiently expresses the language of testimony and Hamlet who suspects that the work of mourning conceals a truth from one’s sight. He testifies to his mourning:

’Tis not alone my inky cloak, good-mother,
 Nor customary suits of solemn black,
 Nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
 No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
 Nor the dejected haviour of the visage,
 Together with all forms, moods, shows of grief
 That can denote me truly. These indeed ‘seem’,
 For they are actions that a man might play;
 But I have that within which passeth show —
 These but the trappings and the suits of woe. (1. 2. 77-86)

His great words of testimony make utterance beyond eloquence and hyperbole. Gertrude’s way of thinking is based on the deduction by which the premise “wearing black means mourning” elicits the answer “Hamlet is in mourning” from the fact of his wearing black. However, every kind of “seem” does not amount to his real condolence. Hamlet is fully aware of the situation that wearing black is a sign of mourning; nevertheless, he declares clearly that his mourning differs from one which ritualistic actions express, everybody can perform and testify to, and economists, namely

frugal people can calculate. If I restate his testimony in a little complicated but accurate expression, it is like the following: "I promise you, I am in mourning beyond what you think about and estimate as my mourning." While expressing his sincerity, "believe in my mourning," he makes it clear to her that she cannot comprehend it. This testimony also works as the restraint that Hamlet in advance forbids her to dispose of and economize on *his* mourning according to *her* sense of economy: it sounds like "I confiscate your imperative 'cast thy nightly colour off' from your economy." However, Hamlet's *coup de main* that comes to break through the economy elicits a misdirected reply from Claudius as well as Gertrude: "you must know your father lost a father; / That father lost, lost his" (1. 2. 89-90). It is nothing but the economization that endeavors to reduce his mourning to the countable. Claudius and Gertrude are definitely and necessarily out of step with Hamlet's mourning.

II

By emphasizing Hamlet's mourning, I do not deny in the least the economic(al) management of mourning. In spite of Hamlet's testimony that wearing black is not equivalent to his mourning in truth, his appearance implies that he is in mourning in the place where he can experience it alone. Mourning appears through something represented. Gertrude's request "cast thy nightly colour off" is a prohibition not against mourning itself but against showing that he is in mourning, whether or not so in truth, and therefore just a kind of imperative for undressing himself, casting off the representation of his mourning as if he were taking off his clothes. The figure of clothes runs through the fields of mourning and elegy. In his *A Prefatory Essay on Elegy*, William Shenstone, an eighteenth-century elegist, makes an analysis of elegy from the viewpoint of representation:

I think we may conclude thus much however; that *elegy*, in its true and genuine acception, *includes* a tender and querulous idea: that it looks upon this as its peculiar characteristic, and so long as this is thoroughly sustained, admits of a variety of subjects; which by its manner of treating them, it renders its own. It throws its melancholy stole over pretty different objects; which, like the dresses at a funeral procession, gives them all a kind of solemn and uniform appearance. (16)

The figure of clothes is definitively effective not only in the point that elegy does not necessarily express eulogy and consolation, but also in the point that elegy is no more than an appearance. The word “elegy” denominates not what one testifies to but how one testifies to something, in Shenstone’s words, the “melancholy stole” hiding various subjects. If Shenstone’s formulation gives the explanation that *Hamlet* has something elegiac, one may regard the fact that Hamlet wears black, under which hides whoever he is, as evidence that it participates in an elegy as a literary device. When confronting elegy, insofar as it is a covering hiding something, one is urged to make a decision: what it testifies to, whether it is the language of testimony, and so on.

The figure of clothes, which runs through *Hamlet* and Shenstone’s theory of elegy, is not always irrelevant to the matter. The duality of truth and fiction, which the representation causes, has been a kind of snare to catch readers, because it possibly enables readers to conjecture that there may be something solemn, serious, and truthful under the “melancholy stole.”⁴ The way of mourning during the English Renaissance, according to G. W. Pigman, had a memorable change. In the sixteenth century “Englishmen are acutely anxious about grief, which they regard as subversive of the rule of reason and domestic and social order” (2). Grief as a representation of disorder causes excessive self-defense to mourning. Claudius’s and Gertrude’s unwillingness to allow Hamlet to continue wearing black may be

brought about by anxieties about disorder to come, the dislocation of the time, which is “out of joint.” The deceased is going to be a menace to come. Mourning functions with a ritualistic, social, religious tinge to “induce the bereaved to suppress grief” (2). Indeed, Horatio’s address to the ghost is already uttered in the possible condition of exorcism. Besides, Pigman remarks that by the early part of the seventeenth century “[s]ympathy for bereavement is more prominent than anxiety” (2). In consequence, “one occasionally finds simple and direct expressions of loss instead of wildly hyperbolic grief” (3). By saying that elegies reflect the shift of attitudes toward mourning, Pigman even draws the conclusion that “[e]legies are too varied to be confined to one pattern; there is no ‘essential element’” (40-41). If something were likely to happen in a different field from what Pigman concludes, it would be the question concerning truth and fiction. The conclusion that diversity or non-essence is a quintessence of elegy should be noticeable in the point that elegy is always already a mode, based on the controlled act of the elegiac to become an elegy. To be precise, it is a covering that seems to reveal that it keeps secrets, although secrets remain closed. The conclusion suggests that elegies can be made to testify to something; otherwise they would renounce even the possibility to give utterance. Before the question of what distribution channel mourning takes place in, there must be an *a priori* place in which its performance is accepted as a covering. Testimony still remains at issue. By wearing black, as Hamlet does for Claudius and Gertrude, one already draws a promissory note of having “real” condolence in the name of truth. For instance, the debtor Hamlet strives to fulfill his obligation of promise by testifying that his mourning is not the “melancholy stole.” However a recipient sometimes receives a dishonored bill and sets to an attack on a debtor: “[s]ome theologians condemn all mourning as evidence of lack of faith” (Pigman 2). Without reliability, expressing condolence becomes condemnable and dis-

honorable as the pretense of condolence. There must be reliability to an *a priori* condolence as a condition of promise.

Lambert's point is based on the idea of death as a singular experience wherefrom various responses to death are drawn: "In death we are all alone, but in our responses to death how various" (xi). The diversity is structured in the response to the singularity. Then we will find such an answer as one can easily forecast in advance: "Pastoral elegies do differ from one another" (xii). Kay also pays attention to the formalism in elegy from the close relationship between writing elegy and its conventions: "the elegy . . . had from ancient times been recognized as a form in which consciousness of tradition, repetition, translation, and imitation was inseparable from innovation and invention" (4). The construction of the plausible genealogy that elegy had been established as a form, the "melancholy stole," paradoxically seems to testify that the critic unavoidably falls into the snare. To put it simply, the duality of truth and fiction, which elegies are always already possessed with, is a device which makes it possible for the critic to point out the genealogy. This device operates automatically at every instant when the elegiac is recognized as an elegy, unexpectedly, without preliminaries, beyond or even against the elegists' will, and inevitably plunges elegists, critics, and readers into an aporia: one of making a decision, of interpreting, and of economizing. The genealogy of formalism in elegy results not from the historical repetition of an origin, but from a group of experiences about the anachronistic (out-of-joint) performativity of mourning. Kay himself points out the paradox that the formalism in elegy consists of formlessness: "the funeral elegy was essentially a form without a form, a performance in which a high value was attached to individuality (of speaker as much as subject), invention, and improvisation, a genre defined by its occasion" (5). It is on Hamlet's own act of wearing black that Claudius and Gertrude try to economize (reduce) his singular experience of

mourning, not on his imitation of precedent, of mourners wearing black.

Although Shenstone's theory has the implication that "the elegy is not necessarily a lament over a person who is dead or . . . a complaint over unhappy love, though it may include these subjects" (Reed 229), one should not neglect the possibility of taking notice of mourning in the name of truth. I am keeping an elegy, known as a pastoral elegy, in mind. It is Alexander Pope's *Winter* from *Pastorals*. The title goes on: "The Fourth Pastoral, or DAPHNE. To the Memory of Mrs. TEMPEST." What did Pope want to do by means of the title? Or did he take the effect that the title would bring about into account? It contains the name of the addressee. Certainly readers acquire preliminary knowledge that the following poem is going to be addressed to a woman called Mrs. Tempest, and besides realize that she is dead in terms of the dedicatory description: not "To Mrs. TEMPEST" but "To the Memory of Mrs. TEMPEST." The dedication ought to express the language of testimony; therefore he swears and promises that the following poem performs the work of mourning. Insofar as it is a dedication, it must admit at least of showing the *conatus* to be serious, honest, and sincere, or else it would be out of place, even till, if it were possible, the "in favor of" could turn to be the "at enmity with" and thereby might be contrary to accepted standards of morality and reliability to the other. Every dedication expresses the language of testimony, promise, and *conatus* not only for reasons of morality, but also for reasons of etymology. The word "dedicate" derives from the Latin *dedicare*, *de-dicare* with senses of "devote," "declare," and "proclaim." Dedication in itself incarnates the proclamation of devotion, in which it finds its *raison d'être*. The horizon of promise, "in favor of the dead woman," emerges into the dedication.

While the title makes a promise, it provides us with a chance to venture and speculate before the beginning. What the meaningful subtitle "DAPHNE" refers to is literally Daphne in Greek mythology. The premise

that the story is dedicated to the dead woman stimulates one's desire to venture, speculate, and economize. Readers responsive to the desire for economy are easily led to read the substitution of Daphne for Mrs. Tempest, to venture and speculate on such a reading, and therefore to economize their reading of Mrs. Tempest by means of their supplementary reading of Daphne. The business of the title is to drive readers to the desire of economization. Instantly, unexpectedly, vicariously, the representation "Daphne" starts epitomizing and distributing "the Memory of Mrs. TEMPEST" and *the* mourning or *the* eulogy for the dead through the title wherein Daphne comes into contact with Mrs. Tempest. Without the title, especially the dedicatory words, one would no longer read the poem as an elegy, but even present a question about what Pope would like to do by referring to the story of Daphne anachronistically, *over again, after* it was already narrated. When the poem itself makes no reference to Mrs. Tempest, but to Daphne, one can hardly guess what the name of Daphne refers to without the title, even if the name were an implication of supplement. We already know a great deal about the story of Daphne, but to reiterate the main points: Apollo's love and chase of Daphne, Daphne's death and transfiguration, and then Apollo's grief and idolatry, his fetishism so to speak. One may, reading the poem in the first time, find himself reading what he has already read. I will quote the prolix and sounding enumeration from the poem: "Fair *Daphne's* dead, and Love is now no more!" (28), "Fair *Daphne's* dead, and Beauty is no more!" (36), "Now *Daphne's* dead, and Pleasure is no more!" (44), "Fair *Daphne's* dead, and Sweetness is no more!" (52), "Fair *Daphne's* dead, and Musick is no more!" (60), "*Daphne*, our Grief! our Glory now no more!" (68). Readers loyal to the title do not think that the repetitious diction emphasizes Apollo's grief or Daphne's beauty. It tends to converge on Mrs. Tempest.

There are things I want to refer to through the substitution of Daphne

for Mrs. Tempest. I should pay attention to the story of Daphne in order to investigate elements of mourning. The story presents two elements by which it, as well as the story of Pan and Syrinx, is often regarded as the archetype of pastoral elegy: love and death (transfiguration to vegetation). The myth as an archetype of pastoral elegy takes the relation of love and death into a discursive structure of pastoral: "To the most pastoral poets Eros and Thanatos appear to be twins" (Poggioli 65). Indeed, both stories of Apollo-Daphne and Pan-Syrinx may be archetypes, but it does not give enough explanation for conditions in which each elegy generates, what each elegy respectively performs by taking them as a model, and what law, being anxious about economizing, one can abstract from the genealogy of elegy. Because Pope's "Daphne" should not appear to trace the myth, but to perform something according to what can be elegiac, the myth should not be neglected in the point that the elegy, the utterance of mourning "Love is now no more" *par excellence*, exerts some powers in the work of mourning. There must be laws that the work of mourning consists of in the myth. They are conditions by which one can read that the myth allegorizes the work of mourning. Apollo whose love drives Daphne into death (transfiguration to a laurel tree) must suffer a definitive duration of endurance and passion, because of his everlasting love after her death, beyond her death, toward her in death. Anyway Apollo's love shall be found in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*:

But even now in this new form Apollo loved her; and placing his hand upon the trunk, he felt the heart still fluttering beneath the bark. He embraced the branches as if human limbs, and pressed his lips upon the wood. But even the wood shrank from his kisses. And the god cried out to this: "Since thou canst not be my bride, thou shalt at least be my tree. My hair, my lyre, my quiver shall always be entwined with thee, O laurel. (41)

The death generates a chance of turning love to fetishism. The first business fetishism has to launch into is to retain a substitution, a supplement, which one can still continue to love, throwing off his original loved one. Apollo loves the laurel tree as a substitution for Daphne, as if it were Daphne. What establishes this fetishism is a work of fiction, by which Apollo fabricates and appropriates another Daphne: "My hair, my lyre, my quiver shall always be entwined with thee." That is why fetishism is the duration of endurance and passion always at work beyond death, even toward death. The story suggests that mourning is likely to contain a work of duration in order to detain and prolong love as long as possible, which is based on the thanato-fetishism. Apollo's fetishism attempts to detain and prolong "Daphne," and Pan's fetishism of "Syrinx" works in a similar way.

The work of mourning is inseparable from the *conatus* to detain and prolong something lost to be present in remembrance by fictitious effects. Pope's elegy can serve as the work of mourning by which the *conatus* to detain and prolong "Mrs. Tempest" takes place. The repetitions of "*Daphne's* dead . . . no more" themselves can appeal to this kind of *conatus*, not to non-presence of Mrs. Tempest, in the performance that the ritualistic work of mourning exerts. The representation "Daphne" is a supplementary device to detain and prolong "Mrs. Tempest" in the place that she occupied, by the fictitious prosthesis. The work of mourning allows nature to substitute for Daphne:

But see! where *Daphne* wondering mounts on high,
 Above the Clouds, above the Starry Sky.
 Eternal Beauties grace the shining Scene,
 Fields ever fresh, and Groves for ever green!
 There, while You rest in *Amaranthine* Bow'rs,
 Or from those Meads select unfading Flow'rs,
 Behold us kindly who your Name implore,

Daphne, our Goddess, and our Grief no more!

While Plants their Shade, or Flow'rs their Odours give,

Thy Name, thy Honour, and thy Praise shall live!

(*Winter* 69-76, 83-84)

Only in the economic(al) relation of mourner-fetish is nature for mourners equivalent to the laurel tree for Apollo or the reed pipes for Pan. In a similar sense, Hamlet's words of mourning seem to come from his thanatofetishistic love for father so strongly that he would like to attempt suicide: "O that this too too solid flesh would melt, / Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew, / Or that the Everlasting had not fixed / His canon 'gainst self-slaughter" (1. 2. 129-32). His mourning attains to the degree in which it has some powers against the *conatus* for self-preservation. The stronger the love appears to be in mourning, the more frequent mourning intervenes in the principal element of being, which surpasses subsidiary elements of lamentation, eulogy, and consolation. The words "Thy Name, thy Honour, and thy Praise shall live" should come from the language of being in love before it appears to be the language of eulogy, insofar as it performs the work of mourning: "In many a funeral elegy love appears as the very cause that led the lamented shepherd to his death" (Poggioli 66). The elegiac initially appears between the *conatus* for self-preservation and the anti-*conatus*. Then Love, even thanato-fetishistic love, appeals to the *conatus* to try keeping the lost in "being present in mind," in order to detain it as long as possible for the sake of itself. We find, so to speak, a law by which mourning is assimilated to the economy of love.

While the law on mourning⁵ possesses the attractive effect of detaining and prolonging, it also possesses the repellent effect of sending and tearing off. Apollo successfully takes the "being present" of Daphne in his embracing the laurel tree, but it does not mean that he responds to the death of

Daphne in a negative way, that is, pretending and trying to consign her death to oblivion. In Apollo's "thou shalt at least be my tree," the words "at least" are an utterance of regret showing that he suffers a loss such as he cannot help. The ultimate difference between Daphne and the laurel tree would remain in his mind even if it were overcome by the effect of thanatofetishism: "thou canst not be my bride." His awareness of Daphne's death appears to be a condition of the possibility to fabricate the Daphne-laurel connection by effects of fetishism. Only a helpless situation can make fetishism work. Original objects of fetishism are always already something deprived, something lost, and something far from the reach of one's hand. To get the laurel tree as "my Daphne," paradoxically, Apollo must pronounce that Daphne is dead. The pronouncement of her death makes the decision that she is, no doubt, dead and never to come, whereby he bids farewell to and sends off his original loved one. Thus in his work of mourning, whether or not he expects to, Apollo follows at once two procedures prearranged by the law on mourning: the attractive and repellent. While sending off Daphne, he tries to detain and prolong her. Pan also follows the two procedures: "Pan, when now he thought he had caught Syrinx, instead of her held naught but marsh reeds in his arms; and while he sighed in disappointment, the soft air stirring in the reeds gave forth a low and complaining sound" (Ovid 53). He pronounces her dead in his sigh of disappointment and takes the reeds to be a substitution for her. In that instant Pan successfully fabricates the everlasting, it seems to him, communion with Syrinx: "This converse, at least, shall I have with thee" (53). Again "at least." It is nothing but the utterance that the language of mourning gives through Pan in favor of Syrinx. We should note the last line from Pope's pastoral elegy: "Daphne farewell, and all the World adieu!" (*Winter* 92). The mourner pronounces Mrs. Tempest dead by bidding farewell to Daphne and immediately detains her in the name of Daphne.

Insofar as elegies perform the work of mourning, they consist in the subtle topological space where the two conflicting procedures, being hostile to each other, try to work together and settle the matter in equilibrium.

III

Theoretically, mourning is forced to undertake the business between the extremes of detaining and sending. We can remember Hamlet's condemnation of Gertrude. It is against the economy, the impatience, and the non-thanato-fetishistic love that Hamlet makes an attack: "Thrift, thrift, Horatio. The funeral baked meats / Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables." It is an attack against the economy even to make Claudius excuse his situation "with a defeated joy, / With one auspicious and one dropping eye, / With mirth in funeral and with dirge in marriage." It is against the impatience of Claudius and Gertrude getting married during a time of mourning: "within a month, / Ere yet the salt of most unrighteous tears / Had left the flushing of her galled eyes, / She married. O most wicked speed" (1. 2. 153-56). It is against the non-thanato-fetishistic love to make Gertrude answer, "all that lives must die, / Passing through nature to eternity." For Hamlet Gertrude's mourning only seems to send off without detaining. It can be said that sending without detaining is equivalent to consigning the dead to absolute oblivion. Hamlet's attack against Claudius and Gertrude is a persistent resistance not only to them but also to oblivion. In the language of promise exchanged between Hamlet and the ghost, the ghost leaves solicitous words: "Adieu, adieu, Hamlet. Remember me" (1. 5. 91). The words are exactly an appeal to his memory, his *conatus* to remember, and his thanato-fetishistic love to detain. Then Hamlet receives the farewell as the language of promise that reliability speaks: "Now to my word: / It is 'Adieu, adieu, remember me'. / I have sworn't" (1. 5. 111-13).

While the economists Claudius and Gertrude take a shortcut with the desire for economy, the sojourner Hamlet can make a detour to hear the ghost's voiceless voice say "do not economize me."

I have left the death-vegetation connection in suspense, and I shall bring it to another topos in order to draw a proper answer. To begin with, Hamlet comments on the world by using the pastoral discourse: "Fie on't, ah fie, fie! 'Tis an unweeded garden / That grows to seed" (1. 2. 135-36). The "unweeded garden" metaphorically means the decadent world. Why does he use the metaphor of garden, especially unweeded? It is not inconvenient to transport that context to another discourse in search of a clue. The death-vegetation connection is structured in both archetypal stories of Apollo-Daphne and Pan-Syrinx. What happens in the figure of death as the transfiguration to vegetation, probably, has something to do with the two conflicting effects of mourning. The reason why the "unweeded garden" is regarded as decadent lies in its lawlessness, unimproved and neglected situation, and non-artificiality. It should need the care and work of gardening, a mower who weeds the garden. In his work of weeding he often appears to be a gardener and a distributor of death at the same time. Hamlet seems to long for the purification accompanied by the desire for death, at least to make demands for a mower who gives death in order to improve the garden. It is in the pastoral discourse, the figure of vegetation *par excellence*, that death corresponds to effects of improvement and purification. The pastoral discourse defies the reproducibility and recyclability peculiar to vegetation, sometimes because it can be regarded as the symbol of regeneration and improvement, sometimes because it makes it easier to detain and prolong something lost. In Andrew Marvell's "The Mower's Song" the narrator mower sings of his unrequited love to a woman called Juliana in comparison with meadows that grow greener by being mowed:

But what you [meadows] in Compassion ought,
 Shall now by my Revenge be wrought:
 And Flow'rs, and Grass, and I and all,
 Will in one common Ruine fall.
 For *Juliana* comes, and She
 What I do to the Grass, does to my Thoughts and Me.

And thus, ye Meadows, which have been
 Companions of my thoughts more green,
 Shall now the Heraldry become
 With which I shall adorn my Tomb;
 For *Juliana* comes, and She

What I do to the Grass, does to my Thoughts and Me. (19-30)

While the mower is mowed by his love for the woman, probably dead, meadows mowed by him turn or, rather I should say, return to be greener. The pastoral discourse sets the death in circulation, where it appears to have a chance for rebirth and prosperity. Death corresponds to another life; even better. Hamlet wants the mower to bring about new birth by giving death. The figure of vegetation helps to establish the topos in which giving amounts to taking. Here comes the economy again. Apollo and Pan give mourning to and send off Daphne and Syrinx in order to detain the laurel tree and the reeds pipe. The reproducibility in vegetation helps to endure Apollo's and Pan's fetishistic appropriations of Daphne the laurel tree and Syrinx the reeds pipe.

The pastoral discourse already guarantees that Pope's "Daphne" is sent off in the expectation of her being-to-come in mind. So far we have confirmed that the trinary composition of love, death, and vegetation reinforces the discourse of the elegiac with the pastoral. When one attempts to consign the work of mourning to a discourse, one is forced to

remain in the face of economy, in front of the question of truth and fiction, like Hamlet who suspects Claudius's and Gertrude's mourning. Here I shall pay attention to how the desire for economy prevails in England and instills the economic(al) idea of mourning, in order to investigate attitudes toward mourning, death, and the corpse, which result in Shenstone's idea of elegy. Occasionally death or mourning is likely to be thinkable in the element of economy rather than in the element of the religious, awful, and solemn. In that sense, there seems to be nothing unusual about Claudius's and Gertrude's mourning, that is, the disproportional and economic(al) way of mourning in which they take much by giving less. When mourning is going to give a testimony in truth, as I have already remarked, it demands the two effects of giving and taking in equilibrium. There is neither reliability, nor the performative effect in the language of testimony, without the equilibrium. The equilibrium is often in jeopardy and then the reliability of mourning falls under suspicion. Anyway, one could, or be forced to, participate in economic(al) activities even after one's own death. A report in *Gentleman's Magazine* testifies that a corpse could often be an object of economic desire:

What signifies to a dead man, the cutting and slashing of his flesh, or the scraping of his bones? — His body suffers no pain, and his memory no disgrace by his contributing to our instructions in anatomy and surgery, frequent dissections being necessary for that purpose, and the gallows not affording us a sufficient number of subjects. (*GM* 17. 487)

The surgeons testify that corpses should be available for their dissections. Nothing can be found about solemnity and awfulness that corpses often accompany. The point is not that they are indifferent to corpses, but that they attach too much emphasis on *getting* anatomical knowledge from corpses before *giving* the appropriate decency of mourning. It is with their attachment for disproportional economy that the complaint charges them.

The complaint makes the charge in his respect to corpses, his attachment to solemn rites of mourning, and thereby his attention to giving: "I HAVE a great veneration for the ashes of the dead, more especially of such, who are interred by the solemn rites of christian burial" (*GM* 17. 487). No sooner has the complaint finished the testimony of piousness than the complaint undertakes to attack the conspiracy between gravediggers and surgeons:

When I walk through a churchyard, and view a gravedigger throwing up the bones, and even the flesh of his fellow creatures, to be handled, or trampled upon by rude boys, it gives my nature a shock it is scarce able to bear. . . . I never think on the relation of the young lady, of *Hatton Garden*, whose body was taken away by the sexton, the very night of its interment, and sold to a surgeon, without heartily wishing the vile thief might be rewarded with the gallows and afterwards anatomized. I am informed that it is a common practice with these fellows, and their comrades, to steal dead bodies and sell them, which I fear is too true, since, otherwise, the surgeons would never have such plenty of dissections. (*GM* 17. 487)

The charge of exploiting the corpse is based on the idea that corpses still have the right to give and take and thereby to participate in the exchange between life and death. The denial of posthumous ownership might be regarded as evidence of lacking in reliability and seriousness in the work of mourning.

Judging from what we have traced, mourning is likely to be economized. Already in the background of Shenstone's idea of the "melancholy stole," there might be a situation that the work of mourning had been possessed with the question of economy. One may ask how the dead can avoid the effect of economization posthumously (as much as possible) if it were controllable, or how the dead can be guaranteed hearty and truthful mourning. Can the dead come back to appear as a ghost like Hamlet's

father? Is it possible to be present at the out-of-joint moment? One would be forced to strive at being in full control of posthumous economization, insofar as the “melancholy stole” keeps the “truth” in secret; therefore the work of mourning generally fluctuates between truth and fiction. I would like to take notice of a case, one of the *conatus* for controllable economy, one in the extreme. *Gentleman’s Magazine* reports funeral services of a man called John Underwood:

At his Burial, when the Service was over, an Arch was turn’d over the Coffin, in which was placed a small piece of white Marble, with this Inscription, *Non Omnis Moriar*, 1733. Then the 6 Gentlemen who follow’d him to the Grave sung the last Stanza of the 20th Ode of the 2d Book of Horace. No Bell was toll’d, no one invited but the 6 Gentlemen, and no Relation follow’d his corpse. . . . After the Ceremony was over they went back to his House, where his Sister had provided a cold Supper; the Cloth being taken away the Gentlemen sung the 31st Ode of the 1st Book of Horace, drank a chearful Glass, and went Home about Eight. He left near 6000 l. to his Sister, on Condition of her observing this his Will, order’d her to give each of the Gentlemen ten Guineas, and desir’d they would not come in black Cloaths; The Will ends thus — Which done I would have them take a chearful Glass, and think no more of John Underwood. (*GM* 3. 269)

In accordance with his last will and testament, his sister as an executor holds the ceremony by paying money. He willingly accepts funeral services as a formalistic ceremony without mourning, although it sounds strange, and even is willing to be consigned to oblivion. Those who send off him are only six gentlemen working at the pay of ten guineas. This report should be read in the place of resistance, the resistance to the discourse of elegy like Shenstone’s theory, because he seems to want his right to be himself posthumously: “*Non Omnis Moriar.*” Death does not always prevail over

all. Here comes a great contradiction. While he demands his posthumous ownership, he asks them to “think no more of” him. All he wants to avoid is not the work of mourning itself but the effect of economization of mourning. We have to notice the fact that he wishes to have no relative attending at the services. He does so, because sanguino-lineal relations often make the effect of economization conspicuous: the reason why Hamlet makes a charge against Gertrude is that she is his mother. What would happen if Hamlet were not the prince? Anyway, the non-sanguino-lineal employees might successfully perform the services without having the thanato-fetishistic love to him. By refusing to receive mourning, especially from relatives, the man paradoxically attempts to avoid being economized by others’ mourning. By paying forward, giving in advance, and giving to the non-sanguino-lineal employees *par excellence*, he successfully gets off with giving less without being taken and detained. It may be a possible way of resistance, as far as one cannot escape the effect of economization completely. This is an extreme case in which the denial of taking mourning leads to non-giving, not giving or allowing the possibility for “economized” mourning. Actually relatives in black always already expose themselves to the duality of truth and fiction, whatever the state of their mind.

We have reached at an aporia contingent on the effect of economization of mourning. It is the one that Thomas Gray’s *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard* is possessed of. “What is most real and valuable to this elegist [Gray] is what is hidden (and perhaps must remain hidden) in the shadows” (Lambert 189). It would get to the point in terms of mourning. The importance of what is hidden appears to be tangible in struggles for the posthumous economy on mourning. *Elegy* is, as Sacks asserts, “a poem of mourning” (133). I would like to add emphasis: a poem *of mourning*, not only *about mourning*. The latter part of the poem has funeral services: “The next with dirges due in sad array / Slow through the church-way path

we saw him borne" (113-14). The funeral scene is described from the outside viewpoint; therefore *Elegy* seems to be a poem about the "funeral," "landscape," and "graveyards" (Starr 5-6). However, Gray's narrator is likely to invert the relationship between subject and object. Here are problematic lines:

For thee who, mindful of the unhonoured dead,
Dost in these lines their artless tale relate;
If chance, by lonely Contemplation led,
Some kindred spirit shall inquire thy fate. . . . (93-96)

The narrator is transported to occupy the place of "thee" whom "[s]ome kindred spirit," namely a poet-like person, is going to tell. The dead poet in the funeral scene (it seems to be speculative) may be identified with the poet of *Elegy*: "This individual death, albeit imaginary, is that of the poet himself" (Sacks 133). In a speculative way, the poet performs the work of mourning for himself in advance. It contains the self-thanatology, in which narrating *the* death objectively amounts to the performance of funeral work of mourning for "me." The self-thanatology generates an aporia. After all, situations inevitably converge on one question. The poet cannot help engaging himself in the same aporia that John Underwood does. How can one be in full control of posthumous economization?

What the poet strives to resist is "dumb Forgetfulness" (85), because he is afraid that his life may end with him being an unknown and worthless person, such as "[s]ome village Hampden" (57), "[s]ome mute inglorious Milton" (59), or "[s]ome Cromwell" (60), without receiving *appropriate* mourning. Then the poet does not hesitate about concealing his desire to give utterance and tell his autobiography posthumously, even though he knows it is entirely impossible:

Can storied urn or animated bust
Back to its mansion call the fleeting breath?

Can Honour's voice provoke the silent dust,
 Or Flattery soothe the dull cold ear of Death?

Ev'n from the tomb the voice of nature cries,
 Ev'n in our ashes live their wonted fires. (41-44, 91-92)

The posthumous voice, if it were possible, could tell his autobiography. In spite of the impossibility of having a posthumous voice, the poet sticks to voice, utterance, and sound as the figure of "being present." So the poet consigns a person to tell his autobiography vicariously: "[s]ome kindred spirit [other poet] shall inquire thy fate [my autobiography]." This is logically an impossible consignment to perform: "The paths of glory lead but to the grave" (36). Besides, his desire for truthful mourning seeks its sphere from *parole* to *écriture*. *Elegy* comes to an end with the epitaph. An epitaph must be farewell words; therefore it ought to be, as it were, a conclusion where one signs one's own autobiography. In that sense, an epitaph is somewhat of an autobiography, which "is an inscription which marks the 'no-longer' of a self always projected toward the 'not-yet' of a presence which never arrives" (Mills-Courts 178). The epitaph is the final place in which the poet can venture and speculate himself. However, *Elegy* ironically suggests that the poet's speculation is going to be in vain: "Approach and read (for thou can'st read) the lay, / Graved on the stone beneath yon aged thorn" (115-16). It was an illiterate swain whom the poet consigned to read his epitaph, namely autobiography: the swain confesses that he is illiterate by adding "thou can'st read." Thus the poet wishes to receive the appropriate work of mourning and give his autobiography in return posthumously. All the poet wants to keep is the pseudo equivalent relationship between giving and taking, the exchange with people who send off and detain him at once, although he cannot directly participate in such a relation, such an exchange. We have a glimpse of the *conatus* for

self-preservation through *Elegy*, as far as it testifies to the poet's speculative death in truth. The persistent resistance to the disproportional economy of mourning runs through it.

Notes

¹ I would like to refer to what Jacques Derrida says about testimony: "if the testimony always claims to testify in truth to the truth for the truth, it does not consist, for the most part, in sharing a knowledge, in making known, in informing, in speaking true. As a promise to *make truth* . . . where the witness must be irreplaceably alone, where the witness alone is capable of dying his own death, testimony always goes hand in hand with at least the *possibility* of fiction, perjury, and lie. Were this possibility to be eliminated, no testimony would be possible any longer; it could no longer have the meaning of testimony" (*Demeure* 27).

² It is in the economic sense that I refer to the word *conatus*. In spite of the closed structure upon which everything bases its persistence in its own being, economic activities of *conatus* keep the possibility that it works with the other, and that the appropriation indirectly becomes beneficent to the other: "the power or endeavour of anything by which it does, or endeavours to do, anything, either alone or with others, that is, the power or endeavour by which it endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else than the given or actual essence of that given thing" (Spinoza 91). Elsewhere than the possibility of cooperative *conatus*, one shall not acquiesce in the economy of *conatus* unconditionally when the economy is likely to appropriate the other to itself in an imperialistic way. It is in the sense of self-centered economy that Emmanuel Levinas ethically criticizes the *conatus*: "The natural *conatus essendi* of a sovereign ego is put into question by the death or the mortality of the Other, in the ethical vigilance through which the sovereignty of the 'ego' can recognize itself as 'hateful,' and its 'place in the sun' as the 'image and beginning of the usurpation of the whole world'" (112).

³ The polysemy of the "time" generates the diachronic availability of "out of

joint.” “In ‘The time is out of joint,’” Derrida points out, “time is either *le temps* itself, the temporality of time, or else what temporality makes possible (time as *histoire*, the way things are at a certain time, the time that we are living, nowadays, the period), or else, consequently, the *monde*, the world as it turns, our world today, our today, currentness itself, current affairs” (*Specters of Marx* 18)

⁴ *The Spectator* mentions the “Force of Fashion” (275) in the work of mourning. It points out the estrangement between the real sorrow and the fashion of sorrow:

The Custom of representing the Grief we have for the Loss of the Dead by our Habits, certainly had its Rise from the real Sorrow of such as were too much distressed to take the proper Care they ought of their Dress. By Degrees it prevailed, that such as had this inward Oppression upon their Minds, made an Apology for not joining with the rest of the World in their ordinary Diversions, by a Dress suited to their Condition. This therefore was at first assumed by such only as were under real Distress, to whom it was a Relief that they had nothing about them so light and gay, as to be irksome to the Gloom and Melancholy of their inward Reflections, or that might misrepresent them to others. In Process of Time this laudable Distinction of the Sorrowful was lost, and Mourning is now worn by Heirs and Widows. You see nothing but Magnificence and Solemnity in the Equipage of the Relict, and an Air of Release from Servitude in the Pomp of a Son who has lost a wealthy Father. This Fashion of Sorrow is now become a generous Part of the Ceremonial between Princes and Sovereigns. . . . (275)

⁵ The word “law” also gives significance to the literal meaning of the word in eighteenth century England. *Gentleman’s Magazine* reports some strict orders of mourning, among which there is one issued in 1738:

ORDER to all Peers, Peeresses, and Privy-Counsellors, for the Court’s going into Second Mourning on May 21.

That the Ladies wear Black Silk, fringed or plain Linnen or Muslin, white Gloves, black and white Shoes, Fans and Tippetts, white Necklaces and Earrings, no Diamonds; — Undress, white or grey Lutestrings, Dam-

asks, or Tabbies — The Man to wear Black, full-trimmed, plain or fringed Linnen, black Swords and Buckles, ; — Undress, Grey Frocks. (*GM* 8. 218)

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Synopsis

Mourning and the Literary Device of Pastoral Elegy:
Through Hamlet, Apollo, and the Poet of Gray's *Elegy*

Kenji Fujita

Mourning should work through some mechanisms, although the original experience of mourning has no story, history, or genre in itself. In that hypothesis, I attempt to describe the topos in which the work of mourning occurs and works mechanically by focusing on the literary devices of the elegiac and pastoral. The work of mourning is likely to develop on, more or less, a kind of pseudo-economic(al) place where the living and the dead exchange. I pursue the competing relation between the irreducible experience of mourning and the economy on mourning through *Hamlet*, then the one between the economy and the literary devices of the elegiac and pastoral through the myth of Apollo and Daphne. Finally I find the aspect of speculations in a case where the economy has something to do with one's own death by focusing on a document from *Gentleman's Magazine* and Gray's *Elegy*.

The opening scene in *Hamlet* presents us Hamlet's opposition to Claudius and Gertrude over the economization of mourning. The economists Claudius and Gertrude want to reduce mourning to their calculations under the plausible cover of conventions, whereas the mourner Hamlet does not want his experience of mourning to be counted among convenient estimations. His mourning even attains to despair of his own being. The experience of mourning essentially has something that will collapse every kind of economy from conventions to the *conatus* for self-preservation. One should keep irreducible secrets beyond the economy in the experience of mourning, even though one would be aware of the possibility that one might fall into subreption or catachresis by expressing his mourning.

Then I pay attention to how the irreducible experience of mourning appears to perform the work of mourning and participate in the economy. There are

some tendencies in the economization of mourning which relate the elegiac discourse to the pastoral discourse. As the archetype structuring the relationship of love-death-vegetation, the myth of Apollo and Daphne, or Pan and Syrinx, suggests the thanato-fetishistic love in mourning. Apollo and Pan manage to detain Daphne and Syrinx by the fictitious effect of fetishism while pronouncing that they are dead. By suffering for the sorrow of parting, the irreparable loss, and the helpless *passion*, they win the substitution of vegetation in return. The figure of vegetation makes it easy to detain the lost, because the death often appears to be a chance to new life and rebirth in the pastoral world. The two conflicting procedures of sending and detaining put the economy of mourning into plausible equilibrium.

In the end I focus on how one speculates on the posthumous economy, insofar as no one can avoid the economy on mourning completely. The cases of Underwood from *Gentleman's Magazine* and the poet from *Elegy* show vestiges of struggle for the posthumous controllable economy of mourning. Underwood attempts to avoid the economy itself by refusing mourning, especially from relatives who easily make the economy problematic, whereas the poet wants his successful control over the posthumous economy in which he cannot intervene directly. The speculative performance of mourning paradoxically manifests itself in the endorsement of the *conatus* for self-preservation. It should be a resistance to the disproportional economy of mourning.