RUCIDATTA MIŚRA ON THE VYĀPTI-PAÑCAKA SECTION OF GAṄGEŚA'S *TATTVACINTĀMAṆI*

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1. Introduction

The Vyāptipañcaka (Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance) Section of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi (TC)* is often used in contemporary India to teach the definition of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*).[1] In the course of my research I became interested in the question of when and why this Sanskrit text had such a usage; To investigate this issue, I formed a project[2] to analyze Gaṅgeśa's "Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Section"[3] and four commentaries thereon by Yajñapati Upādhyāya (c. 1460), Vāsudeva Sārvabhama (c. 1480), Rucidatta Miśra (c. 1505), and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (c. 1510).[4] Yajñapati's *Tattvacintāmaṇiprabhā* and Vāsudeva's *Tattvacintāmaṇisāravalī (TCS)* are translated with analysis by Wada [2003] and

[1] G. Bhattacharya [1967: 70] states: "... Raghunātha thought that these five definitions form a series in which the latter is a positive improvement on the former since the defects of the former could well be avoided by the latter. Thus Raghunātha came to be regarded as a founder of the tradition that vyāptipañcaka in later period gained so much popularity so that it is still looked upon as an introduction to the study of Navyanyāya". According to Suzuki [2006: 24], William Adam reported that the *Vyāptipañcaka* was taught in Bengal in the nineteenth century.

[2] To carry out my project, I joined in October 2003, the COE (Center of Excellence) project entitled "Integrated Text Science", supported financially by the Japan Society of Promotion of Science, and conducted by the Graduate School of Letters, Nagoya University; this project ended in March 2007. My project's result written in English is Wada [2003] [2005] [2006a] [2006b], which I shall refer to later on.

[3] I have translated *vyāptipañcaka* as "Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Chapter" in Wada [2003] [2005] and as "Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Section" in Wada [2010]. Hereafter I will use the latter wording.

[4] Regarding the dates of these four commentators, I have followed Potter and Bhattacharyya [1993: 12-13].

Wada [2005] [2006a] respectively.[5] In these papers I concluded that it is Vāsudeva and not Raghunātha who first elaborated the connection between the definitions in Gaṅgeśa's "Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Section".[6]

This paper, which represents the forth part of my serial study, consists of translating with analysis Rucidatta's commentary, i.e., the *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa (TCP)*. It presupposes an understanding of both Gaṅgeśa's main text and Vāsudeva's commentary on it to understand Rucidatta's discussion on the five definitions. A translation of Gaṅgeśa's "Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Section" appears in Wada [2003: 73] [2006a: 285-286],[7] so I do not repeat the translation here. As I have avoided the repetition of Vāsudeva's discussion on the definitions here, I refer the reader to Wada [2005] [2006a] for that. However, I have reproduced in the following section of the present paper the description of the system of the diagrams used for representing the formal or logical structure of the definitions of invariable concomitance. The diagrams will facilitate the reader's understanding of the connection among the entities discussed.

2. Diagrams[8]

These formal structures have in the past been expressed mostly in terms of symbolic logic. The symbolization of the definitions started with S. Sen, and was inherited by D.H.H. Ingalls, Bocheński, F. Staal, C. Goekoop, and M. Ishitobi. Instead of using the notations borrowed from symbolic logic, I have made use of diagrams, which are also 'symbols' in a broad sense, in order to show the formal structures of the definitions. The two advantages of using symbols stated by

5   Wada [2006b: 61-71] discusses the relation between Vāsudeva's *TCS* and Rucidatta's *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa (TCP)* from the viewpoint of text science.

6   Bhattacharya's statement cited in fn. 1 does not necessarily imply that Raghunātha first interpreted a latter definition in this Section as being superior to the former one in spite of Bhattacharya's appearing to want to say so. I do not mean to deny his statement; instead, my serial papers point out that before Raghunātha, Vāsudeva attempted to interpret the connection between the definitions with more elaboration than his predecessors such as Yajñapati.

7   Wada [2006a: 285-286] corrected printing mistakes in the translation provided in Wada [2003: 73]. On the logical structure of the five definitions, see Wada [2003: 74-76]. Among these definitions, the third and fifth ones appear to have the same structure. On this issue, see Wada [2003: 76 Figures 8 and 10]. Wada [2010] discusses the issue.

8   This section is a reproduction of Wada [2007: 38-42] without footnotes with slight change. I refer the reader to the footnotes provided therein. The system of the diagrams is also explained by Wada [1990: 47-51, 70, 82, 161-162] [2001: 522-526] [2003: 70-73], and the history of the diagrams, by Wada [1994: 150-158] [2007: 42-46].

Goekoop [1967: 30] also apply to my use of diagrams: "(1) It enables us to prove the logical equivalence or divergence of the definition of pervasion," and (2) "We can easily distinguish, among the definitions of pervasion, the logical variants from the verbal variants". I would like to add a third advantage, which is that the diagram enables us to easily confirm whether the definitions to be tested are properly applied to valid or invalid probantia. Moreover, the diagrams serve as a visual aid and help readers to more easily understand the complicated structure compressed in the definitions.

Since I regard the *dharma-dharmin* (property and property-possessor), or *ādhāra-ādheya* (substratum and superstratum), relation as the most basic relation in Navya-nyāya analysis, I will first draw a diagram for representing this relation. A property (*dharma*) which exists in some entity is a superstratum (*ādheya*) or an occurrent (*vṛttin*). The entity wherein that property resides is a property-possessor (*dharmin*), a substratum (*ādhāra*), or a locus (*adhikaraṇa*). We can illustrate the connection between a property and its possessor in Figure 1.


Figure 1

Rectangle X represents a property, and rectangle Y represents its possessor. The line between X and Y indicates the relation (*sambandha*) between the entity denoted by X and the entity denoted by Y.

The relation indicated by the line can be a contact (*saṃyoga*), inherence (*samavāya*), or a self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandha*). In Navya-nyāya, a self-linking relation is designated as a particular qualifierness relation (*viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣasambandha*) or simply as a qualifierness relation (*viśeṣaṇatā*). Among these kinds of relation, the

relation of contact is the physical connection between two substances (*dravya*) which can exist separately. For instance, when there is a pot on the ground, the pot exists on the ground through contact. The relation of inherence is the relation between two entities which cannot exist separately. For instance, when there is a blue pot, blue color exists in the pot through inherence. A self-linking relation is that which is regarded as identical with one of its two relata. To give an example, when there is a pot, this pot is considered to exist in time because the pot exists for a certain period only. Navya-nyāya regards the relation between the pot and time as time itself.

These three kinds of relation are classified as occurrence-exacting (*vṛttiniyāmaka*) relations, one of two traditional types of relation in Navya-nyāya. An occurrence-exacting relation is that through which an entity can exist in or on another entity. The other category of relation is non-occurrence-exacting (*vṛttyaniyāmaka*) relation. This is a relation through which an entity cannot exist in or on another entity. All relations other than occurrence-exacting ones belong to this category.

It is an underlying assumption that 'relation' in the above explanation means a direct relation (*sākṣātsambandha*). The relation of identity (*tādātmya*) also belongs to this type. The other type of relation is indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*), which connects two entities through more than one direct relation.


Figure 2

In Figure 2, the dotted line indicates the relation through which the entity denoted by X does not exist in or on the entity denoted by Y. In

other words, the dotted line implies the relation whose existence is negated between these two entities.

In order to demonstrate a diagram applied to a specific case, suppose we look at a blue pot and recognize that the pot does not possess red color. The connection among blue color, the pot, and red color can be illustrated in Figure 3.


Figure 3

Color exists in a substance through inherence and does not exist there through contact. Hence, the dotted line can indicate contact whose existence is negated between red color and the pot. Moreover, since red color does not exist in the blue pot even through inherence, the line can indicate inherence whose existence is negated between red color and the pot. To be precise, the dotted line can imply any relation whose existence is negated between red color and the pot, because red color does not reside in the blue pot through any relation.

Here I have dealt only with direct relation (*sākṣātsambhandha*). If one can negate, for example, the existence of A in B due to some indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*), a dotted line drawn between the two rectangles denoting A and B respectively can also indicate this indirect relation. Hence, we conclude that the dotted line can indicate any relation: direct or indirect. This conclusion is implied by Wada [1990: 50]. I have refrained from discussing here further the issues regarding indirect relation in order to not deviate from the main subject.

Navya-nyāya employs several basic concepts for analyzing relation, among which *avacchedaka* (delimitor) and *nirūpaka*

(describer) are the most important.[9] I will introduce Figure 4 to illustrate the relation involving these two concepts.


Figure 4

This figure represents the connection among the entities referred to by the expression 'causeness delimited by pot-maker-ness which is described by effectness delimited by potness' (*ghaṭatvāvacchinna-kāryatānirūpitakumbhakāratvāvacchinnakāraṇatā*).[10] In the figure, the arrow of a single line is drawn from the rectangle denoting the delimitor to the rectangle denoting the delimited entity; the arrow of the double line is drawn from the rectangle denoting the describer to the rectangle denoting the described entity.

3. Rucidatta's "Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Section"

I have reproduced the edited text and variant readings of the *TCP* presented by Tatacharya [1982: 43-44] along with his numbers. Where I need to make my own comments with regard to the text, I have provided them with an asterisk in the editorial notes.

TEXT 1: (*) *nirūpaṇaprayojakatvenāha anumitihetv iti. saṃyoga*[1])-*sādhyakasaddhetāv avyāpter lakṣaṇāntaram āha sādhyavad iti.*

EDITORIAL NOTES: (*) Tatacharya [1982: 43] places at the beginning of the "Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Section" of the *TC* the sentence '*vyāptigrahopāyaś ca vakṣyate*', which I included in the previous chapter,[11] so the *TCP* on this sentence, '*nanu yogyopādhiśaṅkayā vyabhicārasaṃśayāt vyāptigrahābhāvād eva nānumānam ity ata āha vyāptīti*', is not included here; (1) Tatacharya [1982: 43] gives *saṃyogādi* as a variant.

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[9] On both concepts, see Wada [1990: 66-98]. For a brief explanation of them, see Wada [2001: 521-527] [2007: 27-35].

[10] On the meaning of this expression, see Wada [2001: 523-527] [2007: 30-35].

[11] This chapter is designated as the "The Explanation of Inferential Cognition Chapter" (Anumitinirūpaṇa), and the "Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Section" (Vyāpti-pañcaka) is the first of the next chapter: the "Invariable Concomitance Chapter" (Vyāptivāda).

TRANSLATION: [Gaṅgeśa,] who explains [the cause of an inferential cognition], says, "[What is invariable concomitance in that cognition of invariable concomitance which is] the cause of an inferential cognition?" Since [the first definition of invariable concomitance suffers from the defect of] narrow-application to a valid probans whose probandum is contact, [Gaṅgeśa] states another definition, [which includes the expression] "the possessor of the probandum".

NOTES: After the opening sentence, Rucidatta points out that the first definition of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) given by Gaṅgeśa does not apply to a probans whose probandum is an incomplete occurrent (*avyāpyavṛttin*)[12] such as contact (*saṃyoga*). To avoid this defect, according to him, Gaṅgeśa presents the second or third definition, or both definitions. Wada [2006a: notes to Text 2 and Figure 6] has illustrated why the first definition suffers from the defect in the case of the valid inference "[This] is the possessor of contact, because [it possesses] substanceness" (*saṃyogī dravyatvāt*). The second definition is free from this defect, as explained by Wada [2006a: notes to Text 2 and Figures 7 and 8], and the third definition is also free from the same defect. Since Wada [2006a] does not confirm this, we will see below how the third definition applies to the valid probans of that inference.

The third definition runs as follows: 'the state [possessed by a probans] of having no common locus with a mutual absence whose counterpositive is the possessor of the probandum' (*sādhyavatprati-yogikānyonyābhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyam*).[13] Let us try to apply this definition to the above invalid probans. (1) The probandum is contact. (2) The possessor of the probandum is, for example, a substance such as a pot. (3) A mutual absence of this possessor is the mutual absence of a pot. This absence exists, for example, in a quality (*guṇa*). (4) The probans, i.e., substanceness, does not exist in a quality, so the probans has no common locus with the mutual absence. All the conditions stated in the definition are met, and thus it applies to the present valid probans. We can illustrate the connection among the entities referred to in the above application in Figure 5.

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12   An incomplete occurrent is that which does not exist throughout its locus. On the other hand, a complete occurrent (*vyāpyavṛttin*) is that which exists throughout its locus, for example, generic properties (*sāmānya, jāti*). Cf., Wada [2005: 51] and Ingalls [1951: 73-74].

13   For the structure of this definition, see Figure 8 in Wada [2003: 76] or Figure 9 in Wada [2006a: 293]. I have shown a slightly improved version of the diagram for this definition in Wada [2010] and the reason for this change.

Figure 5

It is not clear whether Rucidatta's expressions 'another definition' (*lakṣaṇāntaram*) and 'the possessor of the probandum' (*sādhyavat*) in text 1 refer to the second or the third definition, or both. If these two expressions represent solely the second, Rucidatta is keeping silent about the applicability of the third one, which appears a little strange.

TEXT 2a: *nanu yatkiṃcitsādhyavatpratiyogikānyonyābhāvasāmānā-dhikaraṇyaṃ dhūmādav apy astīty arucer āha sakaleti.*

TRANSLATION: An undesirable consequence [will arise which is that someone may object that] even in smoke there exists the state of having a common locus with that of a mutual absence whose counterpositive is the possessor of some probandum. Therefore [Gaṅgeśa states] 'all possessors' [which is part of the fourth definition].

NOTES: Rucidatta anticipates the objection that the third definition suffers from the defect of narrow-application, because even a valid probans, such as smoke in the inference "the mountain possesses fire, because it possesses smoke" (*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*), does not possess the state prescribed in the third definition. Wada [2005: 44-45] has illustrated why smoke lacks this state, so we can omit explaining it here.

TEXT 2b: *sakalapadam aśeṣaparam, na tv anekāśeṣaparam. ato yatraikam[1] eva sādhyaṃ tatra na sākalyāprasiddhir iti dhyeyam.*

EDITORIAL NOTE: (1) Tatacharya [1982: 44] gives *yatraika eva sādhyābhāvavān* as a variant.

TRANSLATION: The word 'all' [employed in the fourth definition] means 'without exception', and not 'either plural or without exception'. Therefore, [we] should consider that the state of being all is not unobtained when only one probandum is [available].

NOTES: Rucidatta seems to avoid, by specifying the meaning of 'all' used in the fourth definition, the defect of narrow-application which the definition suffers from in the case of the valid inference "this is different from inherence, because [it possesses] potness" (*ayaṃ samavāyabhinno ghaṭatvāt*), which (inference) is dealt with in text 4d of Vāsudeva's *TCS* (Wada [2005: 47-49]). There Vāsudeva provides a revised version of the definition to remove the defect, while Rucidatta claims here that it is enough to interpret that the word 'all' means 'without exception' (*aśeṣa*). Furthermore, Rucidatta implies that the defect of narrow-application pointed out by Vāsudeva in his text 4e, which causes the necessity for the fifth definition, would be avoided by the above interpretation of 'all'. We will see this implication later on.

    If Rucidatta's interpretation is incorporated into the fourth definition, it will run as follows: 'the state [possessed by a probans] of being the counterpositive of an absence which exists in possessors, without exception, of the absence of the probandum' (*sakalasādhyā-bhāvavanniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitvam*).[14] The application of this definition will start as follows. (1) The probandum is a difference from inherence. (2) The absence of the probandum is the absence of a difference from inherence. (3) The definition prescribes that we should seek 'possessors, without exception, of this absence', and the second sentence of text 2a indicates that the definition does not exclude the case in which only one possessor is available. Hence, we can take only inherence as the possessor of the absence of a difference from inherence, which is a single entity. In other words, if the present interpretation of 'all' is adopted, we can find the property of 'being all' (*sākalya*) in inherence. (4) In inherence potness, i.e., the probans, does not reside, so an absence of potness exists there. Potness is the counterpositive of this absence. All the conditions stated in the

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14   On the structure of this definition, see Figure 9 in Wada [2003: 76].

definition have been fulfilled, and thus it applies to the valid probans. We can illustrate the connection among the entities referred to above in Figure 6.


Figure 6

We will next see how Rucidatta's interpretation of 'all' saves the fourth definition from the defect of narrow-application, which, Vāsudeva claims in text 4e of his *TCS* (Wada [2005: 50]), cannot be avoided by the fourth definition but can be avoided by the fifth one. The valid inference to be used for the test is "[This] is the possessor of contact, because [it possesses] substanceness" (*saṃyogī dravyatvāt*), which is dealt with in the notes to text 4e of the *TCS* (Wada [2005: 50-51]).

(1) The probandum is contact. (2) The absence of the probandum is an absence of contact. (3) Possessors, without exception, of this absence are qualities, actions (*karman*), generic properties (*sāmānya*, *jāti*), inherence, particulars (*viśeṣa*), and absences, because they all do not possess any quality including contact. Moreover, even substances which possess contact by one part do not possess the same contact by their other parts, so we can assume that substances also possess the absence of the probandum. To put it another way, the possessors of this absence without exception are all entities. (4) In all entities substanceness, which is the probans, does not reside even if it resides in substances, i.e., part of 'all entities'. In other words, the absence of substanceness exists in all entities. (5) Substanceness, i.e., the probans, is the counterpostive of this absence. All the conditions stated in the

fourth definition have been fulfilled, and thus it applies to the valid probans. We can illustrate the connection of the entities referred to above in Figure 7.


Figure 7

TEXT 3: *nanu saṃyogādisādhyakasaddhetāv avyāptir ity anuśayenāha sādhyavad iti.*

TRANSLATION: Since [someone objects that the fourth definition suffers from the defect of] narrow-application to valid probantia whose probanda are contact etc., [Gaṅgeśa] states with regret 'the possessor of the probandum' [which is part of the fifth definition].

NOTES: We have seen in Wada [2005: 50-51] that the fourth definition does not apply to a valid probans whose probandum is an incomplete occurrent such as contact. We will examine in the notes to the following text whether the fifth definition applies to such a probans or not.

TEXT 4a: *sādhyavattvāvacchinnapratiyogitākānyonyābhāvavad-[(2]avr-ttitvam[2)] ity arthaḥ.*

EDITORIAL NOTE: (2) Tatacharya [1982: 44] gives -*apratipattitvam* as a variant.

TRANSLATION: [The fifth definition] means 'the non-occurrence [of a

probans] in the possessor of a mutual absence whose counterpositiveness is delimited by the state of being the possessor of the probandum'.

NOTES: We can illustrate the structure of the definition improved upon here by Rucidatta in Figure 8. Let us call this definition R5.


Figure 8

Definition R5 does not differ much from the definition improved upon by Vāsudeva, for they use expressions differing only slightly.[15] Vāsudeva expresses the difference involved in the fifth definition as a difference whose counterpositive is qualified by the delimitor (avacchedaka)[16] of the state of being the possessor of the probandum (sādhyavattvāvacchedakāvacchinnapratiyogikabheda). In other words, this difference is that whose counterpositive is any possessor of the probandum. The difference referred to by Rucidatta, on the other hand, is a mutual absence whose counterpositiveness is delimited by the state of being the possessor of the probandum' (sādhyavattvā-vacchinnapratiyogitākānyonyābhāva), which also amounts to being the difference whose counterpositive is any possessor of the probandum. These two differences dealt with by both Navya-naiyāyikas cause us to understand their common content, and thus we may say that the expressions of these differences have the 'same

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[15] On the definition improved upon by Vāsudeva and its structure, see Wada [2005: Text 5a and 51].
[16] On the concept of delimitor, see Wada [1990: 81-98] [2001: 521-524] [2007: 30-31].

meaning'. However, the former difference includes the locus or property-possessor (*dharmin*) of the 'state of being the possessor of the probandum', which (locus/property-possessor) is not included in the latter difference. It is a Navya-nyāya feature to express the relation among property-possessors in terms of the relation among their properties (*dharma*).[17] From this point of view the difference expressed by Rucidatta is more technical in its use of Navya-nyāya terminology.

Let us test this improved definition (R5) by applying it to the valid probans of the inference "[This] is the possessor of contact, because [it possesses] substanceness" (*saṃgogī dravyatvāt*), as well. (1) The probandum is contact. (2) The possessor of the probandum is a substance. (3) In a substance there exists the state of being the possessor of the probandum. (4) Since this possessor is regarded as the counterpositive of the mutual absence stated in the definition, there exists counterpositiveness in the possessor. And since Navya-nyāya takes the view that this counterpositiveness is confined by the above-mentioned state to the possessor, that state is the delimitor of counterpositiveness. (5) The possessor of such an absence is, for example, a quality (*guṇa*), for a quality does not possess another quality such as contact. (6) In a quality the probans, i.e., substance-ness, does not exist. All the conditions stated in definition R5 have been met, and thus it applies to the valid probans. We can illustrate the connection among the entities referred to in the above application in Figure 9.


Figure 9

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17   On this feature, see Wada [2001: 527] [2007: 35].

TEXT 4b: *anyonyābhāvaś ca vyāpyavṛttir iti noktadoṣaḥ.*

TRANSLATION: A mutual absence is a complete occurrent, so [the fifth definition does] not [suffer from] the above-mentioned defect.

NOTES: If definition R5 contains the expression 'constant absence' (*atyantābhāva*) instead of 'mutual absence' (*anyonyābhāva*), the definition will suffer from the defect of narrow-application as in the case of the fourth definition in text 3. A constant absence[18] can be an incomplete occurrent,[19] while a mutual absence is a complete occurrent in any case. The definition including 'constant absence' will run as follows: 'the non-occurrence [of a probans] in the possessor of a <u>constant absence</u> whose counterpositiveness is delimited by the state of being the possessor of the probandum' (*sādhyavattvāvacchinna-pratiyogitāk<u>ātyantābhāva</u>vadavṛttitvam*). Let us call this R(5.1) and test it. The valid inference to be used for the test is "[This] is the possessor of contact, because [it possesses] substanceness" as well.

(1) The probandum is contact. (2) The possessor of the probandum is a substance (*A*). (3) In this substance there exists the state of being the possessor of the probandum. (4) Since this possessor is regarded as the counterpositive of the constant absence stated in definition R(5.1), there exists counterpositiveness in the possessor. And Navya-nyāya takes the view that this counterpositiveness is confined by the 'state of being the possessor of the probandum' to the possessor, so this state is the delimitor of counterpositiveness. (5) The possessor of the constant absence is, for example, another substance (*B*), for it is possible to take into account a pair of substances either of which is not produced in/on the other at any time. When the constant absence is an incomplete occurrent, this absence can share a locus with its counter-positive. As a result, the constant absence whose counterpositiveness is delimited by that state cannot exclude all substances from the

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[18] Constant absence is defined as that whose counterpositive is not produced at any time. *Tarka-saṃgraha* (*TS*), p. 62,13-14: *traikālikasaṃsargāvacchinnapratiyogitāko 'tyantābhāvaḥ* (Tran.: Constant absence is that whose counterpositiveness is delimited by a perpetual temporal relation).

[19] We can illustrate the following case in which constant absence is an incomplete occurrent. The constant absence of a pot, for example, exists any place in which a pot is not produced. This implies that even if a pot is produced in the center of the lathe, its constant absence exists on the edge of the lathe. In other words, a pot and its constant absence simultaneously exist on one and the same locus, i.e., the lathe, and the absence is an incomplete occurrent with reference to the lathe. A case, on the other hand, in which constant absence is a complete occurrent (*vyāpyavṛttin*) can be explained in the following manner. Using the same example, if we present a place in which a pot has never been produced, is not produced, and will not be produced, we can assume the constant absence of a pot on the whole of this place.

possessors/loci of the constant absence. Thus, we can take substance B as the possessor of the absence. (6) In substance B the probans, i.e., substanceness, resides. The condition stated in definition R(5.1) that the probans should not occur in the possessor of the constant absence has not been met, and thus it does not apply to the valid probans. This is the defect of narrow-application. We can illustrate the connection among the entities referred to in the above application in Figure 10.


Figure 10

If the definition restores the expression 'mutual absence', definition R5 will apply to the same valid probans. In step (5) of the above application we assumed the constant absence of the possessor of the probandum, so we could take substance B as the possessor of the absence. However, definition R5 prescribes that we should assume a mutual absence. This indicates that when we take something as the possessor of the mutual absence, the possessor should be different from all possessors of the probandum, i.e., all substances. Accordingly, we cannot take a substance as the possessor of the absence, and instead can take a quality as such a possessor. (6) In a quality the probans, i.e., substanceness, does not exist. All the conditions stated in definition R5 have been met, and thus it applies to the valid probans, as presented in the notes to text 4a.

TEXT 4c: *atra vṛttimattve satīti viśeṣaṇam, ato nākāśādāv ativyāptiḥ*[3]. *kevalānvayinīti. kevalānvayidharmasādhyaka ity arthaḥ.*

EDITORIAL NOTE: (3) Tatacharya [1982: 44] gives *avyāptiḥ* as a variant.

TRANSLATION: Here [in all the five definitions presented by Gaṅgeśa][20] 'when [the probans] is an occurrent' is the qualifier [of each definition]. That is why [R(5.1) does] not [suffer from the defect of] over-application to space and so forth. The expression 'in an unnegetable' [in the *TC*] means 'in [the probans] whose probandum is an unnegatable property'.

NOTES: If we assume an invalid inference whose probans is space, a non-occurrent entity, any of the five definitions will apply to the probans of such an inference. The inference is "the mountain possesses fire, because it possesses space",[21] which has been referred to in Wada [2005: 55-56]. To understand how the fifth definition, for example, applies to space, see Wada [2003: 56]. Vāsudeva does not save the fifth definition by improving upon it but invalidates the objection referring to space, while Rucidatta inserts a new expression: 'when [the probans] is an occurrent' (*vṛttimatve sati*). The definition incorporating this insertion will run as follows: 'the non-occurrence [of a probans] in the possessor of a mutual absence whose counter-positiveness is delimited by the state of being the possessor of the probandum, when [the probans is] an occurrent' (*vṛttimattve sati sādhyavattvāvacchinnapratiyogitākānyonyābhāvavadavṛttitvam*). The invalid probans of the above inference is space, which never occurs in any entity. The insertion to definition R(5.1) prohibits its application to this probans, and thus we can remove the defect of over-application.

On the meaning of the second and third sentences of text 4c, Rucidatta adds nothing new. This indicates that he follows Gaṅgeśa on this matter. I have reproduced below, with minimum alteration, my explanation of Gaṅgeśa's expression referred to in text 4c, which (explanation) is provided in Wada [2003: 76-78].

Gaṅgeśa[22] further argues that since none of the five definitions applies to an 'unnegatable probans' (*kevalānvayin*), they all are

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[20] In interpreting the meaning of 'here' (*atra*), I have followed *Tarkacūḍāmaṇi*, p. 44,15: *atra sarvatra lakṣaṇe ity arthaḥ*.

[21] This inference is basically invalid insofar as we consider that the probans, space, exists in the mountain with the probandum, fire. This is because space can never occur in any entity and cannot function as the probans. However, we can regard the inference in question as valid if we interpret 'possess' in the inference another way. On this interpretation, see Wada [2005: 56 fn. 13].

[22] The reproduction starts here.

incorrect. 'Unnegatable probans' in the present case is used in a technical sense.[23] To understand this concept, we should first make clear what is an unnegatable entity (*kevalānvayin*). Unnegatable entities are omnipresent in the universe and are those whose existence cannot be negated.[24] They are, for example, expressedness (*abhidheyatva*), the state of being an object of true cognition (*prameyatva*), and so on. In Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, every entity can be expressed by words, and that which is not expressed by words does not exist in the universe at all. The state of being an object of true cognition is also omnipresent, for every entity can be correctly recognized according to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

An 'unnegatable probans' is that whose probandum is unnegatable; it does not matter whether the probans itself is unnegatable or not. A probans is classified as an 'unnegatable probans' when we can demonstrate a positive agreement (*anvaya*) — where a probandum exists its probans also exists, and cannot demonstrate a negative agreement (*vyatireka*) — where a probandum does not exist its probans does not exist either.[25] An inference including such an unnegatable entity as a probandum is as follows: "a pot is expressed, because [it possesses] the state of being an object of true cognition" (*ghaṭo 'bhideyaḥ prameyatvāt*).[26] Here the probandum (expressedness) and the probans (the state of being an object of true cognition) are unnegatable, and it is true that where the probandum exists the probans also exists. Hence this is a valid inference. On the other hand, it is false to say that where the probandum does not exist the probans does not exist either, because we cannot demonstrate the absence of

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[23] An unnegatable probans, or purely positive probans (*kevalānvayi liṅgam*), is one of the three kinds of valid probantia. The other two are positive and negative probans (*anvayavyatireki liṅgam*) and purely negative probans (*kevalavyatireki liṅgam*). On these three, see *TS*, p. 40,8-18. This classification of valid probantia has its origin in Uddyotakara's classification of inferences. A purely positive probans will be explained in the main text later. A positive and negative probans is that whose positive agreement (*anvaya*) and negative agreement (*vyatireka*) both can be demonstrated. A purely negative probans is that whose negative agreement only can be demonstrated. Positive and negative agreements will also be explained in the main text later.

[24] The *Tarkadīpikā* (*TD*) defines an unnegatable entity as a non-counterpositive of constant absence (*TD*, p. 41,1: *atyantābhāvāpratiyogitvaṃ kevalānvayitvam*).

[25] Positive and negative agreements are devices for establishing causality (Cardona [1967/ 1968]). The former relation is expressed as "where x exists y also exists"; the latter is expressed as "where x does not exist y does not exist either". When both these two relations are found, x is regarded as the cause of y. In the discussion of inference, negative relations change their form into "where y does not exist x does not exist either". A. Uno [1988] [1996: 310-334] points out that scholars of Indian philosophy have been confused about negative relations used in the discussion of causality and inference.

[26] This inference is found in the *TS* (p. 40,13); it is not clear whether Gaṅgeśa has this inference in mind. He uses the following inference that includes an unnegatable probans: "this is expressed, [it possesses] knownness" (*TC*, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 53,2: *idaṃ vācyaṃ jñeyatvāt.*).

the probandum anywhere. Thus, the probans of the above inference is an 'unnegatable probans'.

As mentioned above, the probandum of an 'unnegatable probans' is unnegatable, so we cannot assume the 'absence of such a probandum' anywhere. Nor we can assume the existence of 'what is different from the possessor of such a probandum' anywhere, since the possessor of the probandum is every entity in the universe and since no entity except such possessors remains. All five definitions include either the expression "the absence of a probandum" or "what is different from the possessor of the probandum".[27] When a probans is an unnegatable entity, we can obtain neither "the absence of the probandum" nor "what is different from the possessor of the probandum". Therefore, none of the five definitions, including either expression, applies to an 'unnegatable probans'. This is the defect of narrow-application (*avyāpti*).[28]

Like Gaṅgeśa and Vāsudeva (Wada [2005: 55]), Rucidatta does not explain what is an unnegatable probans and why the five definitions do not apply to this probans. Here ends Rucidatta's "Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Section" with text 4c.

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TC: Tattvacintāmaṇi.
TCP: Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa.
TCS: Tattvacintāmaṇisāravalī.
TS: Tarkasaṃgraha.

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[27] The third definition appears not to include either expression. It runs as: the state [possessed by a probans] of having a different locus from that of a mutual absence whose counterpositive is the possessor of the probandum (*sādhyavatpratiyogikānyonyābhāvāsāmānādhikaraṇyam*), and it can be rewritten as the non-occurrence [possessed by a probans] in what is different from the possessor of the probandum (*sādhyavadbhinnāvṛttitvam*).

[28] The reproduction from Wada [2003: 76-78] ends here.

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